It became the first serious test for the Russian army in the Northern War. In that year 1700, no one expected that the campaign would last two decades. Therefore, the “Narva Confusion” seemed to many to be a fatal failure.
Background of the battle
The Northern War began because Peter was trying to get convenient harbors on the Baltic Sea. These lands once belonged to the Russian kingdom, but were lost during the Troubles of the 17th century. In what year did the Narva Confusion take place? In 1700. At this time, the young Russian Tsar was making many plans to transform Russia into a real world power.
In 1698, Peter I was able to achieve diplomatic success. The King of Poland and Elector of Saxony Augustus II entered into a secret alliance with him against Sweden. Later, the Danish monarch Frederick IV joined this agreement.
Having such allies behind him, Peter hoped to act freely against Sweden. The king of this country, Charles XII, ascended the throne at a very young age and seemed a weak opponent. Peter's initial goal was Ingria. This territory is the modern Leningrad region. The largest fortress in the region was Narva. That's where the Russian troops headed.
On February 22, 1700, Peter declared war on Sweden, immediately after learning of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, which freed him from conflict on two fronts. Nevertheless, he did not yet know that the Narva embarrassment awaited him.
The state of the Russian army
They prepared for war with their northern neighbor in advance. However, this did not at all guarantee success. The Russian army still lived in the 17th century and lagged behind the European ones in technical terms. In total, there were about 200 thousand soldiers in its ranks, which was a lot. However, they all lacked material support, training and reliable discipline.
Peter tried to organize the army according to the modern Western model. To do this, he invited various specialists from European countries - mainly Germans and Dutch. The vector was chosen correctly, but by 1700 only two regiments met all the norms and requirements. Modernization and retraining required a lot of time, and Peter was in a hurry to finish off his enemies, hoping that surprise would give him an advantage.
By the beginning of the Northern War, Russia still did not produce its own muskets. In addition, from the very beginning the army was faced with a problem such as an underdeveloped transport system. In bad weather, roads in the northern regions became a real test for soldiers who had to travel more than a thousand kilometers. These factors also contributed to the phenomenon that became known as the Narva Confusion.
State of the Swedish Army
Russia's northern neighbor, on the other hand, was known throughout Europe for its well-organized army. Its reformer was the famous king who terrified his enemies during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).
The Swedish cavalry consisted of contract soldiers who received large salaries. The infantry was recruited by compulsory conscription from a specific province, however, the infantry also earned good money. The army was divided into squadrons and battalions, which interacted effectively on the battlefield. Each soldier was accustomed to strict discipline, which helped him during the battle. Over the past century, the Swedish army has won only victories, and it was thanks to it that the country began its expansion in Northern Europe. This was a formidable enemy, underestimating whose power turned out to be a fatal mistake.
Events on the eve of the battle
On November 17, he informed the Tsar that the Swedes were advancing and were very close. No one carried out normal reconnaissance, and in the Russian camp near Narva they did not know the exact size of the enemy troops. Peter I, having learned about the approach of the enemy, left for Novgorod along with Alexander Menshikov and Fyodor Golovin. Field Marshal General Karl-Eugene Croix remained in command. The Duke (that was his title) tried to resist this decision of the Tsar, but was unable to convince Peter.
Later, the sovereign explained his action by saying that he needed to meet with the Polish king, as well as replenish his convoys and reserves. At the same time, the Swedes, after their victory, tried to interpret this episode as the cowardice of the king. The Narva embarrassment of the Russians served as a reason for the release of commemorative medals, which depicted a sobbing Peter.
Construction of the Russian army
The troops under the leadership of Croix did everything to strengthen themselves on the banks of the Narva River. For this purpose, fortifications were built on the western side. The entire army was divided into three parts. The right flank was occupied by units of Automon Golovin, numbering about 14 thousand people. In the middle stood Prince Trubetskoy with his squad. There were 6 thousand people under his command. On the left was the cavalry, which was subordinate to Sheremetev.
When it became clear that the Swedes were already very close, de Croix ordered the army to take up combat positions. Communications were stretched over seven kilometers. At the same time, the troops stood in a thin line. There was no reserve or spare regiment behind them.
Karl's strategy
On the morning of November 30, 1700, she approached the Russian positions. The Narva Confusion was approaching. The date of the battle is known from three sources. If you refer to the pre-reform calendar, the battle took place on November 19, in Swedish - November 20, in modern - November 30.
The appearance of the Swedes was unexpected, despite all previous preparations. At the military council, Sheremetev proposed dividing the army. Part of it was supposed to go to the blockade of Narva, and the other was to give a general battle to the Swedes in the field. The Duke did not agree with this proposal and decided to leave the initiative to the young Swedish monarch, who himself led his troops. De Croix believed that the Russian army would be more efficient if it remained in its old positions.
The Swedes were well aware of the enemy's state of affairs, so they were able to develop the most effective strategy. Charles XII decided to press the Russian flanks, since the center of the army was the most fortified and could defeat the king. This is how the Narva Confusion happened. The Great Northern War might have had different results if not for the best Swedish strategists - Karl Renschild and Arvid Horn. They gave wise advice to the young monarch, who was brave, but without the support of his military leaders he could make a mistake.
Swedish attack
The Narva embarrassment is not only the poor preparation of the Russians for battle, but also a lightning strike from the enemy. The Swedes wanted to pin their enemy to the fortress. Thus, the space for retaliatory maneuver practically disappeared. The only escape route led to the cold Narva River.
The infantry was covered by artillery fire, which the Swedes had installed on a nearby hill, which offered a good view of the area. Snowfall was another reason why the Narva Confusion occurred. This was the Swedes' luck. The wind blew in the faces of the Russian soldiers. Visibility did not exceed a dozen steps, which made it extremely difficult to return fire.
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, two deep Swedish wedges struck the flanks of the extended Russian army. Very soon, gaps appeared in three places at once, where Karl’s blows could not be repelled. The coordination of the Swedes was exemplary; the Narva embarrassment became inevitable. Its importance is difficult to overestimate, because within a couple of hours the enemy broke into the Russian camp.
Panic and desertion began. The fugitives had no choice but to try to ford Narva. About a thousand people drowned in the icy water. Before this, a small one was thrown across the river, which could not withstand the onslaught of the fugitives and collapsed, which only increased the number of victims. The Narva embarrassment, the date of which turned out to be a dark day for Russian military history, was obvious.
The foreign generals placed at the head of the army by Peter also began to retreat, which infuriated the Russian officers. Among them was de Croix himself, as well as Ludwig Allart. They surrendered to the Swedes, fleeing from their own soldiers.
The greatest resistance was provided on the right flank. Here Russian soldiers fenced themselves off from the enemy with slingshots and carts. However, this could no longer change the outcome of the battle. As night fell, the situation worsened. There is a well-known episode when two Swedish detachments in the dark mistook each other for Russians and opened fire on their own. The center was broken through, and because of this, the two defending flanks could not contact each other.
Surrender
This was the beginning of the Northern War. The Narva embarrassment was an unpleasant but inevitable fact. As morning approached, the Russian troops remaining in their positions decided to begin negotiations on surrender. The main parliamentarian was Prince Yakov Dolgorukov. He agreed with the Swedes about free passage to the opposite bank. At the same time, the Russian army lost its convoy and artillery, but it still had banners and weapons.
The Swedes received significant trophies: 32 thousand rubles from the royal treasury, 20 thousand muskets. The losses were disproportionate. If the Swedes lost 670 people killed, then the Russians lost 7 thousand. 700 soldiers remained in captivity, contrary to the terms of surrender.
Meaning
How did the Narva embarrassment turn out for the Russians? The historical significance of this event had long-term consequences. First of all, Russia's reputation suffered. Her army was no longer taken seriously throughout Europe. Peter was openly mocked, and Karl gained the glory of a brave commander.
Nevertheless, time has shown that this was a Pyrrhic victory for the Swedes. Karl decided that Russia was not dangerous and began to fight with Poland and Denmark. Peter took advantage of the respite provided. He took up military reforms in the state, transformed the army and invested a colossal amount of resources into it.
It bore fruit. Within a few years, the world learned about the Russian victories in the Baltic. The main battle took place near Poltava in 1709. The Swedes were defeated, and Karl fled. It became clear that, oddly enough, the Narva embarrassment turned out to be useful for all of Russia. finally deprived Sweden of its established status as the dominant power in the Baltic Sea. In 1721, a peace treaty was signed, under which Russia received many lands and ports in the region. St. Petersburg, the new capital of the country, was founded here. The Narva Confusion, the Battle of Grenham - all these events became a symbol of the bright and complex era of Peter the Great.
Plans of King Charles XII. Charles XII brought 8 thousand soldiers to Narva (5 thousand infantry and 3 thousand cavalry; according to other sources, 10 thousand soldiers came with the king). On November 19, the Swedes managed to secretly approach the defense line of the Russian army. They concentrated in the area of the Hermannsberg heights, on which they installed their artillery. With attacks on the center of the Russian position, Charles XII planned to divide the Russian army into parts and defeat them one by one.
The Swedes are advancing. During the battle, which began in the middle of the day, the Swedes managed to implement part of their plan. Thick snow allowed them to approach Russian positions unnoticed. The Swedes filled the ditches with bundles of brushwood and quickly captured the fortifications and the cannons located there. The thin line of defense was broken through, and the Russian troops were divided into two parts. In addition, the Russian army was left without overall leadership, because foreign military specialists, led by the Duke of Croix, surrendered already at the beginning of the battle. An eyewitness justified this transition by the fact that there were cases of reprisals by Russian soldiers against foreign officers. There were shouts of “The Germans betrayed us!” On the Russian right flank, a panicked flight began towards the bridge. There was a crush and the bridge collapsed.
The Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments repel the Swedes. At this critical moment, only the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments were able to repel the enemy. They surrounded themselves with carts and steadfastly held their defense. They were joined by other troops who did not have time to cross the river. Charles XII himself led his troops to attack the Russian guard regiments, but to no avail. On the left flank, A. Weide also managed to stop the flight of his soldiers. Sheremetev's local cavalry swam across to the right bank of the Narva, while more than a thousand people went to the bottom. Each of the remaining units of the Russian army was no smaller in number than the army of Charles XII.
Negotiations and withdrawal of Russian troops. Therefore, the king willingly agreed to the negotiations offered to him by the Russian side. An agreement was concluded according to which Russian troops with weapons and banners were to leave for the right bank of the river. The Swedes got all the Russian artillery.
On the morning of November 20, the bridge was repaired and the withdrawal of Russian troops began. After Golovin's division, Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments crossed, Charles XII violated the agreement and demanded that the troops of the left flank surrender their weapons. Weida's division had to comply with this requirement, after which it was allowed to cross the bridge. The Swedes plundered the convoy, and 79 Russian generals and officers were captured, including Ya.F. Dolgorukov, A.M. Golovin, A. Veide, Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky, I.Yu. Trubetskoy and other notable persons. Having entered Narva, liberated from the blockade, Karl ordered noble Russian prisoners to be escorted through the streets.
Causes of defeat and loss. The battle of Narva was lost by the Russian army. Losses amounted to 6-8 thousand people - killed and died from hunger and disease. 145 guns were lost. The reasons for the defeat were the poor preparation of the Russian army. Only a few of its regiments (Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky, Lefortovo and Gordonov) had little combat experience. Unlike the two guards, the old soldier regiments, whose leaders were no longer alive by this time, did not show themselves well. The leadership of the Russian army turned out to be inexperienced and disunited. Some historians consider the “disorganization of command” to be the main reason for the defeat, but the entire system of the Russian army was imperfect. The use of foreign military specialists also did not pay off.
Assessment of Peter I. Twenty years after the event, Peter I himself gave a completely objective assessment of the events near Narva: “And so the Swedes received victory over our army, which is indisputable; but it must be understood over which army it was committed, for only one old Lefortovo regiment was... two regiments of the guard were on two attacks near Azov, and they had never seen field battles, and especially with regular troops. The other regiments... both officers and privates, were recruits... Moreover, late in the day there was a great famine, because of the great mud it was impossible to bring food, and in a word, the whole thing was like an infant’s play, but art below the view."
Danger for Russia. After the battle of Narva, the Russian army actually lost its combat effectiveness. It is hardly possible to agree with the existing opinion that even after the Battle of Narva, Karl was afraid of the Russians; he supposedly “not only hastened to release the entire Russian army, but also retreated to Dorpat himself, without looking for a new meeting.” If Charles XII at that moment wanted to implement plans of conquest towards Russia, he could well have developed his success, seized significant territories, etc. The consequences could be catastrophic for Russia. Peter feared such a course of events; on pain of death, he forbade the remaining troops to retreat from the line of Novgorod and Pskov and ordered the hasty strengthening of the northwestern borders of the state.
But the worst did not happen. Charles XII concentrated on the fight against Augustus II, whom he considered the most dangerous of his opponents. The easy victory at Narva deceived the vain Swedish king and turned his head. As modern Swedish historians note, the contemptuous attitude towards the Russians and the Russian army that arose among Charles near Narva turned out to be fatal in 1708 and 1709. He believed that Russia was already finished. The Swedish medal, stamped in honor of the victory at Narva, depicted Peter I running, losing his sword and hat; the inscription was a quotation from the Gospel: “He went out, weeping bitterly.” The European press and journalism picked up this idea. Russia's diplomatic prestige has fallen sharply. European diplomats openly laughed at their Russian colleagues. Rumors spread in Germany about new, more severe defeats of the Russian army and about the rise of Princess Sophia to power. The European press spread the idea of the Narva defeat as an irreparable catastrophe for the Russian state. For almost ten years, Europe will look at Russia through the unsuccessful experience of Narva.
Read also other topics Part III ""European Concert": the struggle for political balance" section “West, Russia, East in the battles of the 17th – early 18th centuries”:
- 9. "Swedish flood": from Breitenfeld to Lützen (September 7, 1631-November 16, 1632)
- Battle of Breitenfeld. Winter Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus
- 10. Marston Moor and Nasby (2 July 1644, 14 June 1645)
- Marston Moor. Victory of the parliamentary army. Cromwell's army reform
- 11. “Dynastic wars” in Europe: the struggle “for the Spanish inheritance” at the beginning of the 18th century.
- "Dynastic Wars". The fight for the Spanish inheritance
- 12. European conflicts are becoming global
- War of the Austrian Succession. Austro-Prussian conflict
- Frederick II: victories and defeats. Treaty of Hubertusburg
- 13. Russia and the “Swedish question”
Preparations for the first battle of Narva
Peter was looking forward to news from Ukraintsev. He hurried the Duma clerk to complete peace negotiations with the Turks.
Reading Peter's letters, you involuntarily get used to his manner of demanding that the addressee quickly fulfill the order. It is rare that a letter does not contain indications of the need to carry out the command “without delay”, “with haste”, “immediately”, etc. Sometimes it is difficult to establish to what extent the situation really required the immediate execution of the order and whether it was not universally encountered " “not to procrastinate” is just a seal of the king’s temperament. He himself knew how to instantly assess the situation, grasp the main thing, quickly make a decision, and if there was no executor at hand, then carry out this decision.
In this case, Peter rushed Ukraintsev not in vain - the tsar’s obligations to his allies required it.
Back in December 1699, Peter wrote to Ukraintsev: “don’t hesitate, go as soon as God gives you help.” In February 1700, the Tsar’s address to his diplomat resembles an incantation: “Just make peace, of course: it’s great, it’s really necessary.” In anticipation of the conclusion of a peace treaty, Peter even delayed his response to the letter of Augustus II. “There is truly a reason for this,” the tsar explained to the king in July 1700, “that having not received useful news from the other side, they did not want to write, which we are constantly expecting.” To the ambassador of Augustus II, who specially arrived in Moscow to hasten the Russians to begin military operations, Peter said: “If today I receive news of peace, then tomorrow I will move my troops against the Swedes.”
Peter kept his word. On August 8, the long-awaited report from Ukraintsev arrived that peace had been concluded for 30 years, and the next day he informed Augustus II that he had given the order to the troops to march. A convoy of 10 thousand carts loaded with equipment, artillery, and food stretched for tens of miles. The Tsar himself, with the rank of captain of the bombardment company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, was also part of the troops. In Tver, Peter received alarming news: the courier of Augustus II told him that the Swedish king with an 18,000-strong army was preparing to arrive in Livonia. Peter expresses doubt about the reliability of the news: “And I thought about this many times, is it true or a forgery? And if it is true, then of course Datskoy will be overpowered by united caravans.”
The information, unfortunately, turned out to be correct. On that very day, August 8, when a messenger from Ukraintsev arrived in Moscow, one of the participants in the Northern Alliance - Denmark - was removed from the game. The Swedish king Charles XII unexpectedly landed at the head of a 15,000-strong army near the walls of Copenhagen. The landing party was delivered by “connected caravans” - Swedish and English ships. Frederick IV capitulated.
On September 23, the first Russian regiments of 10 thousand people, overcoming the autumn impassability, reached Narva. The rest slowly moved towards the fortress, and their concentration was basically completed only by mid-October. The king ordered the placement of batteries and siege operations. The bombardment of the fortress began on October 20 and continued for two weeks without any effect - exactly as long as there was enough gunpowder, cannonballs and bombs.
Meanwhile, Charles XII approached Narva as unexpectedly as he approached Copenhagen. Having received news of the approach of the enemy, Peter immediately leaves from near Narva, transferring command of the army to Duke von Krui, who had just been hired into Russian service. This act of Peter is difficult to explain. Many years later, in the “History of the Northern War,” edited by Peter, it is written like this: “Against the 18th, the sovereign left the army for Novgorod in order to encourage the remaining regiments to come to Narva as soon as possible, and especially to have a meeting with the Polish king.” It is unlikely, however, that the king in these anxious days could have had a more important task than being present among the troops on the eve of their battle with the enemy army.
The first thing that comes to mind when you try to understand Peter’s behavior in these memorable days of November 1700 is the assumption that the tsar was faint-hearted. But as soon as you take a closer look at his actions during the Azov campaigns and in the years after Narva, this assumption disappears. Neither before Narva nor after did the tsar sit out on a convoy, he was always in the thick of battles and many times put his life on the line. Most likely, in this case, Peter underestimated the extent of the danger hanging over the Russian army, for he knew that its numbers were many times greater than the army of Charles XII.
Defeat of Russian troops near Narva
The Swedish army concentrated at Narva on November 18. The battle took place the next day. The location of the Russian camp was oriented towards the siege of Narva, so its fortifications stretched out in a thin line seven miles long. Before the start of the battle, heavy snow fell, which allowed the Swedes to approach the positions of the Russian troops unnoticed. The swift attack of the Swedes caused general panic. “The Germans betrayed us,” shouts were heard. Sheremetev, together with his cavalry, rushed to swim across the Narova, losing over a thousand people during the crossing. The bridge along which the infantrymen from Golovin's division were fleeing collapsed, and many of the fugitives immediately sank to the bottom. Von Krui and foreign officers in Russian service hastened to surrender. Only two guards regiments and the Lefortovo regiment showed resilience and retained their combat effectiveness in this general confusion. Repeated attempts by the Swedes to crush the guards were unsuccessful.
At night there was a lull and negotiations on surrender began. Russian troops were given the right to leave Narva with all weapons, with the exception of artillery. However, the king treacherously broke his word. As soon as the guards crossed the restored bridge to the other side of the Narova, the Swedes attacked the rest of the Russians, disarmed the soldiers, took away their property, and declared the officers prisoners.
So, the beginning of the war, the very first contact with the enemy ended in a crushing defeat for the Russian troops. Near Narva, the Russians lost six thousand people killed, drowned, or starved to death and all their artillery, 135 guns of various calibers. The army lost almost all of its senior officers. And this despite the fact that there were several times fewer Swedes near Narva than Russians: under the command of Charles XII there were 8 - 12 thousand people, while the Russian army numbered 35 - 40 thousand.
Historians have no sources at their disposal from which it would be possible to extract information about Peter’s state of mind after Narva: not a single letter from the tsar has survived from those dark days, and perhaps he did not write them; Memoirists are also silent on this matter. Almost a quarter of a century has passed. Turning to the reasons for the failures of the Russian troops near Narva in the “History of the Northern War,” the tsar wrote: “So the Swedes received victory over our army, which is indisputable; but one must understand over which army it was done, for only one old Lefortovo regiment was (which before that it was called Shepeleva); two regiments of the guard were only in two attacks at Azov, field battles, and especially with regular troops, they never saw the other regiments, except for some colonels, both officers and privates, most of them were recruits. It was mentioned above, besides, lately there was a great famine, because of the great mud it was impossible to bring food, and in one word, the whole thing was like an infant’s play, and the art was below the surface. What a surprise for such an old, trained and practiced army. to find victory over such inexperienced ones?.. But when this misfortune (or better to say great happiness) was achieved, then captivity drove away laziness and forced us to hard work and art day and night.” To Petru, Narva clearly showed the backwardness of the country and the low combat effectiveness of the army. Narva was a cruel school from which one had to learn lessons - learn and teach to win.
The news of the victory of the eighteen-year-old Swedish king became the property of Europe and had a huge resonance. In mockery of the Russian Tsar, the Swedes knocked out a medal: on one side it depicted Peter at the cannons shelling Narva, and the inscription: “Peter was standing and warming himself.” On the other, the Russians, led by Peter, are fleeing from Narva: the hat falls off the Tsar’s head, the sword is thrown, the Tsar cries and wipes his tears with a handkerchief. The inscription read: “I went out, weeping bitterly.”
The prestige of Russia in Western European courts has fallen. The Russian ambassador in The Hague, Andrei Matveev, reported to Peter: “The Swedish ambassador, with great curses, himself visiting the ministers, not only blasphemes your troops, but also slanderes your person, as if you, frightened by the arrival of his king, went to Moscow from the regiments in two days ..." A similar report was sent by the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Pyotr Golitsyn.
Charles XII had a choice. He could, building on the success achieved at Narva, continue military operations against Russia and dictate a peace that suited him, or send an army to Poland against Augustus II. The Swedish king considered it expedient to move to Poland. The choice of direction was influenced by the attitude of Charles XII towards Augustus II. If the Swedish king underestimated the Russian Tsar, he fiercely hated the Saxon Elector, because he considered him the initiator of the Northern Alliance. “His behavior is so shameful and vile,” the Swedish king spoke of Augustus, “that it deserves vengeance from God and the contempt of all right-thinking people.”
And yet, it was not the desire to deprive Augustus of the Polish crown that determined Charles XII’s decision to move the theater of military operations to the west. The Swedish king could not go on a long campaign to Moscow, having in the rear the Saxon army, whose combat effectiveness was then higher than the Russian one. Moreover, it was clear that Poland was ready to take advantage of any favorable opportunity to oppose Sweden, and besides, Denmark was able to quickly recover from its recent defeat and join the Northern Alliance.
While ridicule was heard in Charles's camp against the Russian Tsar, Peter did not waste any time. He knows neither weakness nor fatigue. The king was not one of those people who gives up and bows his head in the face of failure. The trials, on the contrary, strengthened Peter's will. As after the first Azov campaign, failure spurred him on, and he energetically and purposefully began to forge a future victory. The dry chronicle of his travels testifies to the enormous strain of his strength and the energy he mobilized to the limit. At the end of January 1701, he rushes to the Exchange, returning from there to Moscow, hurries to Voronezh, where he spends two and a half months, then goes to Novgorod and Pskov. In subsequent years, the tsar could be met in Arkhangelsk, near Noteburg, at the Olonets shipyard, near the walls of Narva and Dorpat, and in St. Petersburg.
Peter rushes like a courier - day and night, in any weather and at any time of the year. An ordinary cart or sleigh was for him both a place to sleep and a dining table. He stopped only to change horses. Each movement of the tsar is not only a milestone in his personal life, but also a certain stage in mobilizing the country's efforts to fight the enemy. This is the tsar’s daily work, his personal, so to speak, contribution to the common cause.
Peter went to the Exchange on a date with Augustus II. The Polish king, who was not distinguished by either courage, loyalty, or desire to mobilize all resources to fight the enemy, who valued nothing more than the Polish crown, and therefore was ready to take any step to preserve it, was nevertheless an invaluable ally for Russia. The longer Charles XII chases Augustus, the more time Russia will have to heal the consequences of Narva. That is why Peter spared no effort and time, nor material and human resources to support Augustus. The Union Treaty was confirmed at the Exchange, according to which Peter undertook to place at the disposal of the Polish king a corps of 15-20 thousand people and, in addition to it, an annual subsidy of 100 thousand rubles.
Construction of defensive structures in Novgorod and Pskov and Arkhangelsk
The tsar goes to Novgorod and Pskov to supervise the construction of defensive structures. By his decree, dragoons, soldiers, priests “and every ecclesiastical rank, male and female,” were involved in the work, so that they even had to stop serving in parish churches.
Arkhangelsk attracted the attention of Peter in connection with the news received about the attack on the city by Swedish ships. The Swedes' attempt to burn Arkhangelsk failed, but the tsar set off on a long journey to strengthen the only port city connecting Russia with the West.
At first glance, Peter’s frequent visits to Voronezh were strange and did not seem to be caused by extreme necessity. In fact, the advisability of the Tsar’s long-term stay in Voronezh before the start of the Northern War is beyond doubt - a fleet intended for combat operations in the Sea of Azov was created there. But why did the tsar go to Voronezh now, when the theater of military operations had moved to the north-west and Russia was fighting not with Turkey, but with Sweden? Was it necessary to replenish the Azov fleet with new ships and constantly renew recently launched galleys and frigates that were quickly rotting in the fresh water of the Don? Moreover, none of the ships took part in any battle, and their guns did not fire a single combat salvo. Weren't these efforts of the tsar a pointless waste of people's resources and a kind of tribute to his passion for the fleet and shipbuilding?
There cannot be two opinions on this matter - Peter’s incessant worries about the Azov Fleet paid off in that they cooled the warlike ardor of the Turks and for a long time kept them from declaring war on Russia. The Russian resident in Turkey, Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, reported to the tsar: “most of all they fear your naval fleet, sir.”
Peter did not take his eyes off Turkey, carefully following the changing moods of the Sultan's court. To the Azov governor Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin, who was sent to Azov to guard the acquisition on the southern sea, the tsar wrote on June 24, 1701: “Please be careful to exercise caution both in Azov and especially in Taganrog for the defense of that place.” Two weeks later he again reminds: “Please be wary of the Turkish side.” The fears turned out to be unfounded, and in September Apraksin received new news from the Tsar: “war with the Turks is not in the cards, because the Sultan willingly confirmed the peace.”
The inaccuracy of the information that the tsar supplied to his governor is quite understandable - Russia then did not have a permanent diplomatic mission in Turkey, and Moscow had to be content only with rumors that reached in a roundabout way.
Peter breaks tradition and sends his representative to Adrianople, the residence of the Sultan. The choice fell on Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, a man as gifted as he was cunning. “Eh, head, head, you wouldn’t be on your shoulders if you weren’t so smart,” the Tsar once said in a moment of frankness to Tolstoy, hinting at his involvement in the conspiracy of the Miloslavskys and Sophia back in 1682. Tolstoy diligently atone for his old sins. To please the king, he, as an adult, about 40 years old, with a wife and children, voluntarily goes with volunteers to Venice to study naval affairs. Now, in 1702, the “smart head” had to leave for Turkey and follow the instructions drawn up by the king himself. Peter wanted to know the state of the Turkish army and navy; whether they train cavalry and infantry according to their ancient custom or use the services of European officers, and also whether the Turks are going to fill up the Kerch Strait in order to forever cut off the Russians’ access to the Black Sea.
Tolstoy was received more than coolly in Adrianople. They reasoned: “Never since forever has it happened that a Moscow ambassador could live near the Porte.” Didn’t he come here to sow confusion among the Christians subject to the Sultan?
Life was not easy for Pyotr Andreevich in Turkey, but the Tsar was pleased with his service. When the Sultan’s court, sometimes attentive and affectionate, sometimes arrogantly rude, became such a burden to Tolstoy that he requested changes, the tsar replied: his desire will be fulfilled, but not now - “don’t get bored with being there for a while; there’s a great need for you to stay there.” ".
The “need” for Tolstoy’s services was truly “great,” for the tides of peace in the Porte were interspersed with the same tides of belligerence. This forced Peter to consider the care of the Voronezh shipyard one of his most important concerns. He visited there for several weeks, either alone or accompanied by his company. The laying down of the ships and their launching were accompanied by a cheerful feast.
In Moscow, more precisely in Preobrazhenskoe, the tsar spent the winter months, that is, that time of year when, as a rule, there was some calm in the theater of war: the enemy armies were located in habitable places and arranged a kind of respite in order to resume military operations after the spring flood.
Rebuilding the army after the defeat at Narva
Three worries overwhelmed Peter: where to get money, where to get people and, finally, weapons to make up for the losses at Narva.
Andrey Nartov wrote down a story about how the money was obtained. The king thought about this alone for a whole day. He says to the “Prince Caesar” Romodanovsky who entered: there is no money in the treasury, the army is not supplied with anything, and there is no artillery, but this is needed soon. There is only one way out: “to reduce the treasures in gold and silver in the monasteries and squeeze money out of it.” “This matter is ticklish, we must come up with something else,” Romodanovsky objected and took the tsar to the Kremlin, where the secret storage room was located. When they entered the chamber, “to unspeakable surprise, His Royal Majesty saw piles of silver and gilded dishes and zbruya, small silver money and Dutch efimkas.” Romodanovsky told Peter the secret of the treasures: “When your parent, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, went on campaigns at different times, he, by proxy, gave me extra money and treasures for safekeeping. At the end of his life, calling me to him, he bequeathed, So that I don’t give this to any of the heirs until then, unless there is an extreme need for money during the war.”
It is not possible to separate the reliable from the legendary in this legend, especially since, according to other sources, the tsar had this conversation not with Romodanovsky, but with Prozorovsky. However, it is known for certain that Peter overcame financial difficulties in a way that was as simple as it was not very reliable - he increased the productivity of the Mint: the machines worked day and night, flooding the market with depreciated money: until 1700 they were produced from 200 to 500 thousand rubles a year , in 1700 about 2 million rubles were thrown into circulation, and in 1702 - over 4.5 million rubles. From this operation, which was accompanied by a decrease in the share of silver in the coin, the royal treasury gained short-term income and the opportunity to fill gaps in the budget.
Peter supplemented this age-old technique for increasing income with two new ones.
On a January day in 1699, someone found a sealed package planted in the Yamsky Prikaz with the inscription: “to present to the pious sovereign, Tsar Peter Alekseevich, without opening it.”
The author of the letter, as it turned out later, was Boris Petrovich Sheremetev’s butler Alexey Kurbatov, who accompanied the master on a trip abroad. Kurbatov suggested that the tsar use a new source of income - the sale of stamped paper. Peter treated the first profit-maker kindly, appointed him clerk of the Armory Order, and awarded him villages. Thus began the brilliant career of Kurbatov, the future president of the Town Hall, and then the Arkhangelsk vice-governor. But no matter what position Kurbatov held, he did not leave the service of a profit-maker. “Tell me,” he addressed the tsar, “where it is possible to carry out what orders arrived in which or what inclinations of the judge in cases, to report in private without fear, in which I promise to show my zeal to you, the sovereign, like God himself.”
Many other tax inventors followed Kurbatov's example. They were ordered, as a contemporary testified, “to sit and make a profit for the sovereign.”
The efforts of profit-makers, however, did not provide significant cash income. The income from coining money was also soon exhausted, and then Peter resorted to introducing an endless number of taxes for special purposes: for the purchase of saddles and horses, for the purchase of ammunition and the construction of ships, for carts and provisions, etc., etc.
Without any particular difficulties, we managed to solve the second task - to make up for human losses. As needed, a certain number of households of the urban and rural population supplied one recruit to the army. This system of recruiting the army and navy, formalized in the early years of the 18th century, operated flawlessly throughout the Northern War.
Finally, the artillery park was restored in a short time. True, when casting copper cannons, due to a lack of copper, it was necessary to use bells from churches and monasteries. But there was no shortage of cast-iron cannons - the metallurgical factories, urgently built at the beginning of the century, provided the army with excellent artillery, and Peter would repeatedly have the opportunity to note its high fighting qualities.
Peter encountered the greatest difficulties in staffing the army with officers, and primarily because in Russia until the 18th century there were no special educational institutions that trained military specialists. In 1701, Peter established the first such educational institution - the Navigation School, where mathematics, geometry, trigonometry, navigation, and astronomy were studied. According to the tsar, “this school is needed not only for naval navigation, but also for artillery and engineering.”
Peter took advantage of the knowledge of graduates of the Navigation School and other educational institutions created after it only many years later. Meanwhile, time did not wait; military specialists were needed at the moment. And although the tsar knew that foreign officers had not performed well at Narva, need forced him to once again turn to hiring military specialists abroad. In 1702, Peter’s manifesto, translated into German, was distributed in Western European countries, inviting foreign officers to serve in Russia.
On December 5, 1700, that is, two weeks after the Narva defeat, the tsar, being in Novgorod, ordered Boris Petrovich Sheremetev to “go into the distance, for the better harm to the enemy. And there is no excuse, since there are enough people, and the rivers and swamps are frozen, the enemy It’s impossible to capture. What I’m writing about again: don’t make excuses.”
Sheremetyev's first victories over the Swedes
Sheremetev opened a series of victories over the Swedes. He acted cautiously for now, daring to enter into battles with only double or triple superiority in forces, but at first any victories were important, they raised the morale of the army and gradually freed it from the torpor after Narva.
The first significant victory was won at the very beginning of 1702. Sheremetev, at the head of a 17,000-strong corps, attacked the Swedish general Schlippenbach and completely defeated his 7,000-strong detachment near the village of Erestfer, not far from Dorpat. Half of the Swedish army died here. "We can finally beat the Swedes!" - Peter exclaimed upon receiving Sheremetev’s report. The tsar generously rewarded the winners, noting everyone from the soldier to the commander. Menshikov, on behalf of Peter, brought Sheremetev the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and a notification that he had been awarded the rank of field marshal.
From the autumn of 1702 to the spring of 1703, the main forces of the Russian troops were busy expelling the Swedes from the banks of the Neva. Peter also took part in this campaign. Military operations began with the siege of Noteburg, located on an island at the outlet of the Neva from Lake Ladoga. High walls about two fathoms thick, erected right next to the water, and numerous cannons dominating both banks turned Noteburg into an impregnable fortress. For its siege, Peter concentrated 14 regiments. After a three-day cannonade, the wife of the commandant of the fortress, on behalf of all the officers' wives, sent a drummer to the Russian camp. In the report, this episode is described in Peter’s characteristic humorous tone: the wives asked the field marshal “so that they could be released from the fortress, for the sake of great anxiety from the fire and smoke and the disastrous state in which they find themselves.” To which he, the bombardier captain Pyotr Mikhailov, gallantly answered the garrison ladies: he does not dare to convey their request to the field marshal, “before he truly knows that his lord field marshal will not deign to sadden them by this separation, and if they deign to leave, they would deign their kind spouses with bring it out with you."
The ladies, however, did not heed the kind advice of the bombardier captain, and the continuous shelling of the fortress continued for about two weeks. Then the buglers sounded the attack, and a 12-hour assault began, which, according to Peter, was cruel and extremely difficult. The feat of the Russian soldiers surprised a foreign observer: “it is truly amazing how the Russians could climb such a fortress and took it with the help of siege ladders alone.”
Russian troops captured the ancient Russian Oreshok. The Tsar made puns using the consonance of the words “nut” - “Nut”: “It is true that this nut was very cruel, however, thank God, it was happily chewed up. Our artillery very miraculously corrected its work.” Peter renamed Oreshek - Noteburg to Shlisselburg (key city), emphasizing with this name the key position of the city on the Neva, which opened the way to enemy lands.
In mid-March, Peter arrived in Shlisselburg to lead military operations in the 1703 campaign. In April, the Tsar informed Sheremetev about the readiness of the troops to begin the operation: “and I can’t write anymore, it’s just time, time, time, and so as not to let the enemy know what we’ll worry about later.” It was about an attack on Nyenschanz, a fortress that blocked the mouth of the Neva. After examining Nyenschanz, Peter shared his impressions with Menshikov: “The city is much larger, as they said; however, it will not be like Schlutelburch. They said about the new rampart that it is low, which is higher than the city itself, and was all conceived and developed with a fair amount of fortification, only devoid of turf not surrounded, but with a rim (i.e., circumference) larger than Rugodev" (Narva). The garrison of Nyenskans laid down their arms without waiting for the assault. On May 2, Peter wrote to “Prince Caesar” Romodanovsky in Moscow: “I know to your Majesty that yesterday the Nyenshanskaya fortress, after 10 hours of firing from martyrs (also only the 10th cannon was fired), surrendered.” And then there was the order: “Please send this celebration well and so that after the cathedral prayer service the cannons in the square are fired as usual.”
Peter's first naval victory over the Swedes
At Nyenskans, three days later, the first military engagement with the enemy fleet took place. Two Swedish ships from the Numers squadron, not knowing about the surrender of Nyenskans, entered the mouth of the Neva. Peter decided to attack them. Under his pen, the operation looked like this: on May 5, “an enemy squadron came to the mouth under the rule of Vice Admiral Mr. Numbers; having learned about this, our Mr. Felt Marshal sent us in thirty trays. And on the 7th day, having arrived at the mouth, we examined the enemy much, and in a deliberate battle they took 2 frigates, one Gedan with ten, the other Astril with eight guns, and fourteen windows. Unfortunately, the enemies screamed too late, it was difficult for the soldiers to calm them down, who, having burst in, almost killed all of them; only 13 were left alive; I dare to write that it was true that there were only eight boats."
Attacking ships with primitive boats, whose crews had only guns and grenades, was associated with great risk. One had to have great courage to decide on this undertaking. Peter did not like to take risks, he preferred to act for sure, and the successful operation, it seems, was the only one where the king deviated from his rule.
In subsequent years, people became so accustomed to winning battles of this scale that, although they celebrated them with fireworks, they considered them to be everyday events of military life. This victory brought Peter into genuine delight, for it was the first on the water. He called her “a never-before-seen Victoria.” It laid the foundation for the glorious combat traditions of the Russian Navy.
By order of Peter, special searches were even carried out in the archive to see if anything similar had happened in times long past. Peter hastened to notify his friends of the victory by sending letters. The content of these, as well as many others, letters and reports announcing the victory reveals an essential feature of Peter. The Tsar writes “we”, “us”, “our troops”, “attacked the enemy”, “received Victoria”, and does not use the plural in relation to his own person, as monarchs did before and after him. For him, “we” means “Russian troops.” The author of the letters himself remained in the shadows; there is not a line in the text about his actions and orders that determined the outcome of the victorious battle. But detailed information is provided about trophies, captured prisoners, enemy losses and damage suffered by Russian troops. With this dry list, Peter seemed to invite his correspondent to assess the degree of luck that accompanied the Russian troops and the extent of the catastrophe that befell the enemy.
The plan for the attack of the two ships of Numers was drawn up by the king. 30 boats were divided into two groups: one of them cut off the Swedes' access to the sea, and the other attacked from the upper reaches of the Neva. Peter directly participated in the attack, commanding one of the detachments; the actions of the second were led by Menshikov. However, from Peter’s letters one can only guess that he was not an outside observer of what was happening: “Although we are unworthy, nevertheless, from the gentlemen field marshal and admiral, the lieutenant (i.e. Menshikov) and I were made cavaliers of St. Andrew.”
In honor of this event, the Tsar ordered to knock out a medal with the following laconic inscription on it: “The unthinkable happens.”
Peter also did not say a single word about his personal participation in the siege of Noteburg. Only from Sheremetev’s campaign journal do we learn that the tsar, “taking with him several soldiers, came under the city to the bank of the Neva River,” was under severe enemy fire.
Peter's bookmark of St. Petersburg
After the capture of Nyenskans, the entire course of the Neva from its source, where Shlisselburg stood, to its mouth was in the hands of the Russians. The Tsar had no doubt at all that the Swedes considered their failures in this theater of war to be temporary and that in the coming months they would make desperate attempts to push the Russians back from the banks of the Neva. Therefore, measures were immediately taken to strengthen the river mouth. “After the capture of Kanets (i.e., Nyenskans), - it is recorded in the “History of the Northern War,” a military council was sent, whether to strengthen the trench or to look for another convenient place (since it is small, far from the sea and the place is not very strong by nature ), in which it was supposed to look for a new place, and after a few days a convenient place was found - an island called Lust Elant (that is, Cheerful Island), where on the 16th day of May (the week of Pentecost) a fortress was founded and named St. Petersburg." This is how the future capital of the empire arose - St. Petersburg. Its cradle was a fortress hastily built by soldiers with six bastions. At the same time, the first civil building was erected next to the fortress - Peter's house, which has survived to this day.
The builders of the wooden fortress had to experience the hardships of the harsh climate and the vagaries of the Neva. “The city business is being managed as it should be,” Menshikov, who was appointed governor of St. Petersburg, reported to Peter in July 1703. “Many working people from the cities have already come and are constantly increasing. It is by the grace of God that the foretold business will continue to progress. The only bad thing is that there is sun here.” walks very high."
“It’s great, sir,” wrote General Anikita Ivanovich Repnin a month later, “we have severe weather from the sea, and in our place where I stand with the regiments, water fills right up to my village, and while sleeping in the Preobrazhensky regiment at midnight and the taverns of many sleepy people and their junk were wet, and the local residents say that nowadays that place is always flooded.” And here is a picture depicted by the tsar himself from life on September 11, 1708: “In my mansion there was a 21-inch floor on top, and around the city and on the other side of the street they rode freely on trays; however, it did not last long, less than 3 hours.” It was very comforting to see that people were sitting on the roofs and in the trees as if during a flood, not just men, but also women.”
All these inconveniences did not bother Peter. In his eyes, the new city seemed like “Paradise,” that is, paradise. In the tsar’s letters the following phrases are found: “I can’t help but write to you from here in Paradise”; “It is true that we live here in paradise”; “You shouldn’t have any doubts about the behavior here, for there can be no evil in God’s paradise.” Even a letter describing the flood, when water flooded the royal house, and men and women saved themselves in the trees, is marked: “From Paradise.” According to Peter’s original plan, Petersburg was supposed to be just a port city: “His Royal Majesty ordered that a city and a fortress be built not far from Schlottburg by the sea, so that from now on all the goods that came to Riga, Narva and Shants would also have a refuge there. If only Persian and Chinese goods would come there." However, already in the fall of 1704, Peter had the idea of turning St. Petersburg into the capital of the country. On September 28, he wrote to Menshikov from the Olonets shipyard: “We are planning to leave here on the second or third day of the next month and, hopefully, God willing, be in the capital in three days or four.” So that the addressee would not doubt what was meant by “capital,” the Tsar explained in parentheses: “Petersburg.”
But it was still a long way from turning the small fortress into the capital and major economic center of the country. This would happen many years later, but now, in 1704, they had to defend the returned lands from a strong and treacherous enemy who had repeatedly tried to break through to the mouth of the Neva. The king takes two urgent measures. First of all, he creates the Kronstadt fortress on the island of Kotlin, 30 miles from St. Petersburg. The commandant of the fortress had to be guided by the instructions signed by Peter on May 3, 1704: “Maintain this stronghold, with God’s help, if it happens, even to the last man.” The king often visited the island to supervise the construction of fortifications. When the matter came to an end, he said: “Now Kronstadt has been brought to such a state that the enemy does not dare to appear near the sea. Otherwise, we will smash the ships into chips. We will sleep peacefully in St. Petersburg.”
Defense of the territory only by garrisons of constructed fortresses gave the initiative of offensive operations to the enemy. To deprive the enemy of this advantage, a fleet was needed. Peter has a figurative thought: “Every potentate (i.e., ruler), who has a land army, has one hand, and with which he has a fleet, he has both hands.” Having caught on the banks of the Neva, Peter immediately began creating a fleet. Already in 1703, the laying of 43 ships of various types took place at the Olonets shipyard, and the tsar himself, who supervised the construction, returned to St. Petersburg on a frigate with the symbolic name “Standart”. The name of the first ship of the Baltic Fleet was given "in that image, before the fourth sea was added." Previously, the royal flag depicted a double-headed eagle holding in its beaks and claws maps of the three seas that belonged to Russia. Now the image of the fourth sea appeared on the standard.
At the same time, the Tsar founded a shipyard in St. Petersburg itself. The famous Admiralty Shipyard, which ensured Russia's naval superiority in the Baltic by the end of the war, began building ships in 1705. The first warship was launched in April 1706.
No decree officially declaring St. Petersburg the capital was issued. It is generally accepted, however, that the date of transformation of the city on the Neva into the capital is 1713, when the court, the Senate and the diplomatic corps finally moved to St. Petersburg.
Reasons for Peter I's move from Moscow to St. Petersburg
What guided Peter when he moved the capital from Moscow, the geographical center of the country, which had long-existing economic ties with the periphery, to a new unsettled place on the outskirts of the state?
This decision was partly explained by personal motives - antipathy towards the old capital, manifested at least in the fact that from a young age he preferred Preobrazhenskoye to the Kremlin palace. Peter associated with Moscow forces that opposed him personally and the cause he served: the old capital turned out to be the arena of his struggle for power with Sophia and the stronghold of Old Testament traditions.
But, of course, there was more to it than that. The new capital was a window to Europe; it symbolized the transformation of Russia into a maritime power that had the shortest routes for economic and cultural ties with the countries of Western Europe. St. Petersburg acquired the significance not only of a political center, but also of the most important naval harbor.
Calling St. Petersburg Paradise, Peter meant not so much the present of the city, built up with unsightly wooden houses and mud huts, as its future - a well-appointed capital with luxurious palaces and parks, straight stone-lined streets. Peter knew how to look far ahead, knowing that future generations would reap the fruits of his efforts. Once Peter, while planting acorns, noticed that one of the nobles present smiled skeptically. The angry king said: “I understand! You think I won’t live to see the mature oaks. True! But you are a fool; I leave an example for others to do the same; over time, descendants will build ships from them. I’m not working for myself, it’s for the benefit of the state in the future.” ".
Looking around the small fortress and his modest one-story house with three chambers, made of pine logs and covered with shingles, but painted so that it seemed as if it was made of brick and with a tiled roof, the king dreamed of a lively city with a harbor no worse than Amsterdam. At the berths there are barns with overseas and Russian goods, the multilingual dialect of foreign merchants who came from afar for Russian hemp, flax, mast timber, resin, and linen. “If God prolongs life and health, St. Petersburg will be a different Amsterdam,” Peter used to say. In the meantime, we had to be content with little. In the autumn of 1703, the masts of a foreign merchant ship appeared on the horizon. To celebrate, the St. Petersburg governor generously rewarded the entire crew of the ship that delivered wine and salt to the new city. This is how the future capital of the empire, a window to Europe, began its life modestly.
Peter, as we see, began the construction of St. Petersburg immediately after taking possession of Nyenskans. When Charles XII was informed of this, he arrogantly declared: “Let the king work on founding new cities, we only want to reserve the honor of later taking them.” But the king had no intention of giving Charles a new city. On the contrary, he intended to increase his Baltic acquisitions in order to “stand with a firm foot by the sea.” The campaign of 1704 brought the Russian troops two significant victories, achieved with the most active participation of Peter - the Russians captured Dorpat and Narva.
Assault on Dorpat
The siege of Dorpat (ancient Russian Yuriev) was led by Field Marshal Sheremetev, and for a long time the besiegers acted in vain. Peter found out about this while near Narva, and immediately rushed to Dorpat. He rode there on July 3, examined the fortress and siege work with the experienced eye of an artilleryman and engineer, and was extremely dissatisfied with what he saw. Sheremetev, who was accompanying the Tsar, muttered something in defense, but fell silent as soon as he noticed that the incensed interlocutor threw back his head and his face was distorted by a convulsion - a sign that the Tsar’s irritability had reached its highest intensity.
Sheremetev fully deserved Peter’s dissatisfaction: instead of constructing aproshes against the dilapidated and weakly fortified wall, which, in the Tsar’s words, “only waits for a decree to find where to fall,” the field marshal ordered preparations for an assault on the most powerful wall.
The assault on the fortress began on the evening of July 12. “This fiery feast continued from evening to day until 9 o’clock.” We find a description of this “fiery feast” in Peter. Infantry poured into the three gaps punched by the artillery. On the ravelin, the attackers captured five cannons and immediately turned them against the enemy. The position of the besieged became hopeless. One after another, four Swedish drummers died, trying to notify the besieged of the readiness to begin negotiations - the roll of the drums was drowned in the roar of the battle. Only the trumpeter managed to stop the assault.
Negotiations began. Peter, who remembered for a long time the behavior of the Swedish king near Narva, countered the treachery of Charles XII with generosity and a chivalrous attitude towards the vanquished. Under the conditions of surrender, the commandant of the fortress stipulated the right to unhindered exit from the city of the entire garrison with officers, banners, and weapons. He asked for soldiers, officers and their families to be provided with a month's supply of food. Peter, on behalf of Sheremetev, reasonably answered the commandant: “Mr. Field Marshal is extremely surprised that such requests are made from the commandant when His Majesty’s soldiers are already at their gates, and who are so embittered that they can hardly be appeased; but when you wanted to strike such a chord, then it would have to be repaired in advance,” that is, before the assault began. But as a sign of high appreciation of the courage of the besieged, Peter still allowed the officers to leave swords and the soldiers a third of their weapons. The soldiers and officers leaving for home with their families were supplied with the requested monthly supply of food, as well as carts for removing property.
Having hastily celebrated the return of the “ancestral city” by firing rifles and cannons three times, Peter boarded the yacht, took captured banners and standards and hurried across Lake Peipsi to Narva. How much the tsar was in a hurry to get there is evidenced by the fact that, contrary to his custom of sending his friends notifications of victory from the battlefield, he sent couriers to them only on July 20, that is, after a three-day stay near Narva.
Success inspired Peter and at the same time gave rise to sad reflections. The assault on Dorpat cost the Russians more than 700 killed and wounded, while Swedish losses were around 2,000. And how many Russians would have died during the implementation of Sheremetev’s plan if he, Peter, had not been at hand? There were still few Russian specialists who knew their business. It was necessary to resort to the services of foreigners, among whom there were conscientious officers, but they were just mercenaries. And the one who led the technical side of the siege work near Dorpat turned out to be “a kind man, but very quiet.” However, most of all the tsar was irritated by Sheremetev’s lack of management.
Siege of Narva by Russian troops in 1704
Following Dorpat, Narva fell. Its siege began in late May, but proceeded sluggishly: there was no siege artillery. The shelling of the fortress began only after cannons and mortars were delivered from Dorpat and St. Petersburg. The commandant of Narva was the same Horn who commanded the garrison of the fortress in 1700. Much has changed since then in the Russian army, but Horn, like his master Charles XII, had the same ideas about it. The Narva commandant believed that the same poorly trained and poorly armed Russian army stood at the walls of the fortress as four years ago. When Horn was offered honorable terms of surrender with the right to withdraw the garrison, he rejected them, mockingly reminding the besiegers of their past sad experience. Peter ordered Thorn’s proud and insulting refusal to be read before the army.
Gorn paid twice for his arrogance and arrogance. The first time the tsar taught the arrogant commandant a substantive lesson was back in June. Peter took Menshikov's advice and equipped several Russian regiments in Swedish uniforms. They moved towards Narva from the side where the besieged were expecting help from the Swedish general Schlippenbach. A staged battle unfolded near the walls of the fortress between the “Swedes”, commanded by Peter, and the Russian troops. Horn heard the sounds of artillery and rifle fire, and for a long time he looked at the “battlefield” through a telescope, but he did not notice the catch. The blue uniforms of soldiers and officers, yellow and white standards of the Swedish army were visible. Confident that the long-awaited “sikurs” had approached Narva, Horn ordered an attack on the Russian troops from the rear and thereby help “his own” make their way to the fortress. Together with the detachment, the civilian population left the garrison, hoping to profit from all sorts of goods from the Russian convoy.
The military ruse was a success. The Swedes, lured out of the fortress, were successfully attacked and suffered significant losses. Let us recall the laughter heard in the Swedish camp and in the capitals of European states after the first Narva. Now it's time for fun in the Russian camp. Peter threw out the catchphrase:
The venerable gentlemen of the Swedes have a very large nose.
It is also in vain this time to look in the tsar’s letters for information about his personal participation in this episode. In two surviving letters, Peter writes about what happened so mutely that if the historian did not have other sources, it would be impossible to decipher their contents: “What happened near Narva, what an amazing thing, you will truly be notified of this from Mr. Admiralty, who witnessed him,” wrote Peter Tikhon Streshnev. “I don’t know anything else to write,” the tsar shared the news with Kikin, “exactly what happened recently before this, how smart fools deceived the smart ones, and, reasoning about this, I can’t figure out more than two things: the first, that God enlightened, the second, that a mountain of pride stood before their eyes, through which they could not see this fraud.”
Commandant Horn learned another lesson after the successful completion of the 45-minute assault on Narva. The Swedish resistance was as desperate as it was senseless. The Russian soldiers, enraged by the arrogance of the Swedes and heavy losses, burst into the fortress and did not spare anyone, and Peter, in order to stop the excesses, was forced to draw his sword against his own soldiers. The tsar considered Horn to be the culprit of the bloodshed, who only at the last moment grabbed the drum and beat it with his fists, signaling surrender. But it was too late. Isn't it all your fault? - Peter asked Horn. Having no hope of help, no means of saving the city, could you not raise the white flag? Then, taking out a sword stained with blood, Peter said:
“Look, this blood is not Swedish, but Russian. I stabbed my own to stop the rage to which you drove my soldiers with your stubbornness.” The Tsar, in his heart, dealt the former commandant a heavy slap in the face.
Laconically, without boasting, Peter informed his friends about the victory. Using a play on the words “Narva” - “abscess,” he wrote to Kikin: “I can’t write Inova, just that Narva, which has been abscessing for 4 years, has now, thank God, burst, about which I will tell you at greater length.”
Russian victory at Narva
Having captured two “ancestral” cities within a month - Dorpat (Yuryev) and Narva (Rugodevo), Peter, it seemed, could afford a respite. But he couldn’t sit still. First, he went from Narva to Dorpat in mid-August, taking with him generals and ministers. This voyage was of an educational and instructive nature, where fortress walls, tunnels and aproshes were used as a visual aid. Acting as both a guide and a mentor, the king explained in detail to his listeners how the “fiery feast” took place near Dorpat. From Dorpat, Peter, through Pskov and Novgorod, headed north, where two urgent matters drew him: at the Olonets shipyard he had to look after the ships under construction, and in St. Petersburg they were waiting for his orders on the construction of the Paradise. From St. Petersburg, the Tsar rushes to Narva to give a farewell audience to the Turkish ambassador there. Peter deliberately chose Narva as the place for the ceremony: let the Turkish ambassador, having examined the powerful fortress, himself appreciate the power of Russian weapons. From Narva the Tsar leaves for Moscow. There he intended to spend the happy year 1704 for him and celebrate the victories he had won. In Vyshny Volochok, Peter stopped for several days to examine Tvertsa and Meta in order to determine the place of their junction. Here the tsar ordered to dig the Vyshnevolotsky Canal. On December 14, the ceremonial entry of the winners into the capital took place. The column of prisoners was led by Major General Gorn, followed by 159 officers. They carried 80 guns. “The people looked with amazement and curiosity at the captured Swedes, at their weapons, dragged with contempt, at their triumphant compatriots and began to put up with innovations.” These words belong to Pushkin.
Peter had many reasons to see off 1704 in an optimistic mood. Only four winters separated the first Narva from the second, but how strikingly different they were from each other! Then the Russian army was capable of engaging in “infant play”; now it has entered the period of adolescence. Then she was defeated, now she triumphed in victory. What Peter happened to observe was pleasing to the eye, and his letters of 1704 contain previously unheard assessments of what he saw. “Here we found people in good order,” he writes from near Dorpat. From Pskov: “Everything is good and cheerful here.” From the Olonets shipyard: “here, thank God, everything is pretty good.” From Voronezh: “Everything was found here in good order.”
Peter strove to make the news of “good order” available to the population. The most important means of promoting reforms and military successes was the first printed newspaper in Russia, Vedomosti, which he founded at the end of 1702.
In the 17th century, handwritten “chimes” were published in one copy at the royal court, reporting foreign news for the king and his entourage. Petrov's Vedomosti was designed for a wider range of readers, and the list of issues covered also became more diverse. The newspaper published materials about the construction of industrial enterprises, the search for minerals, military operations, and the most important events in international life.
The first issue of Vedomosti reported: “In the Verkhoturye district, many cannons were poured from Novosibirsk iron ore and a lot of Velma iron was made. And such soft and kind iron was not brought from the Swedish land because they do not have such a thing. But in Moscow it was brought pud of 12 altyn." And here is a note about the partisan actions of priest Ivan Okulov in the Olonets region, published on January 2, 1703: “The city of Olonets, priest Ivan Okulov, having gathered foot hunters with a thousand people, went abroad to the Svei border and defeated the Svei Rugozenskaya, Sumerskaya, and Kensurskaya outposts And at those outposts of the Swedes he beat a large number of Swedes, and took the Reitar banner, drums and swords, guns and horses, and he, the priest, took supplies and belongings, and with that he satisfied his soldiers, and the rest of his belongings and grain supplies, which he could not. take it away, burn it all." Readers learned from the newspaper about the Russian troops’ capture of Shlisselburg, Dorpat, Narva, that “Moscow schools are multiplying,” that at the Navigation School “more than 300 people study and accept good science,” etc.
The theater also played the role of a promoter of reforms. This was new. In previous times, only courtiers watched theatrical performances. Now the spectacles were designed for a wide audience. A public theater was created in 1702. Peter instructed him to glorify the victories over the Swedes. A contemporary of Peter, Ivan Afanasyevich Zhelyabuzhsky, wrote about this: “And in Moscow on Red Square, for such joy, the sovereign’s wooden mansions and vestibules for a banquet were made; and against those mansions, on the same Red Square, various fun things were made.”
“Good order” did not escape the observant foreign diplomat. The English ambassador Whitworth writes a report to London: the Russian Tsar “with the power of his own genius, almost without outside help, by 1705 achieved successes that exceeded all expectations, and soon, of course, will raise his state to a degree of power that is threatening to its neighbors.”
The goal for which the war was fought was achieved: access to the sea was won, the beginning of a fleet was laid. However, no one, including the Tsar, imagined that the salute with which Moscow greeted the victors who captured Dorpat and Narva on December 14, 1704, would be separated from the salute in honor of the victorious world for another seventeen years and that the next of them would be the most difficult years of trials and hopes.
Battle of Narva |
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November 19, 1700 (Julian calendar) November 20, 1700 (Swedish calendar) November 30, 1700 (Gregorian calendar) |
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At the walls of the Narva fortress |
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Decisive Swedish victory |
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Opponents |
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Commanders |
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Charles XII |
Karl-Eugene de Croix |
Strengths of the parties |
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Narva garrison: 1900 people. King's army: about 9 thousand people 37 guns |
according to various estimates from 34 to 40 thousand people 195 artillery pieces |
Military losses |
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677 killed (including 31 officers), 1247 wounded (including 66 officers) Total: 1924 people. (including 97 officers) |
From 6 to 7 thousand killed, mortally wounded, drowned, deserted and died of hunger and frost, 700 prisoners (including 10 generals, 56 officers); 195 guns (including 48 mortars, 4 howitzers), 210 banners (including 151 taken during surrender), 20 standards |
Battle of Narva- one of the first battles of the Great Northern War between the Russian army of Peter I and the Swedish army of Charles XII, which took place on November 19 (30), 1700 near the city of Narva and ended in a heavy defeat for the Russian troops.
Background
Beginning of the Northern War
In 1699, on the initiative of the Polish king Augustus II, the Russian kingdom joined the coalition of northern states (“Northern Alliance”), which had territorial claims to the Swedish Empire. The coalition participants hoped that the youth of the Swedish monarch Charles XII, who ascended the throne at the age of fifteen, would provide the allies with a relatively easy victory. As a result of the war, Russia hoped to seize the Baltic lands, which were once part of the Old Russian state, and secure access to the Baltic Sea. For more details, see the causes of the Northern War.
According to the agreement with Augustus II, the Russian kingdom first of all laid claim to Swedish Ingria (Ingria) - a territory approximately corresponding to the current Leningrad region. The largest Swedish fortress in the region was Narva, located on the western border of Ingria and Estland. Ingria in general and Narva in particular became the main target of the Russian offensive at the beginning of the Northern War.
According to the agreement with Augustus II, Peter I declared war on Sweden immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Constantinople with the Ottoman Empire - August 19 (30), 1700 and set out on a campaign to Ingria.
Russian army at the beginning of the 18th century
Commanders of the Russian army
Although the attack on Sweden was planned in advance, the Russian army at the beginning of the 18th century had limited training and demanded the continuation of the reforms begun by Peter I. The Russian army had a large number, the Russian Tsar could field up to 200,000 soldiers, however, both according to historians and According to Peter I himself, made after the battle, the Russian army during this period lacked discipline, training and material support. Continuing the practice of attracting military experts from Western Europe, begun by Ivan the Terrible, Peter I sought to use Western experience in combat and modernize the Russian army, however, by 1700, only two regiments formed on the basis of amusing troops - Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky, were completely organized according to Western models , and two more - Lefortovo and Butyrsky - are partially organized according to Western models. For material support, the Russian army depended on supplies of weapons and equipment from abroad. In 1700, the Russian kingdom produced almost no muskets, smelted very little metal, and had a poorly developed transport system. The Russian army was trained under the guidance of foreign officers according to the new military regulations of 1699, compiled by Adam Weide, modeled on the Swedish and Austrian military regulations. Despite all the shortcomings, before the battle of Narva, Peter I believed that the Russian army was quite ready for war with the Swedes.
Peter I planned to bring over 40,000 regular infantrymen to Narva, divided into three “generalships” (divisions): under the command of generals Anikita Repnin, Adam Weide and Avtonom Golovin, as well as 10,000 noblemen of the hundred service, including five thousand cavalry under the command of Boris Sheremetev, and 10,000 Little Russian Cossacks under the command of Ivan Obidovsky - in total over 60,000 soldiers. In addition, the Russian army included an artillery regiment consisting of 195 guns, under the command of Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky (Batonishvili). Initially, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army was Field Marshal General F.A. Golovin (received this title on August 19, 1700). Provisions General Semyon Yazykov was responsible for supplying the army. At the last moment, the Duke of Croix joined the headquarters of the Russian army on the recommendation of Augustus II.
Swedish army at the beginning of the 18th century
Commanders of the Swedish Army
The Swedish army at the turn of the 18th century was a well-organized semi-professional structure, formed at the beginning of the 17th century by the Swedish king Gustav Adolf. The principles of organization of the Swedish army remained with minor changes until the reign of Charles XII. In the Swedish army, cavalry was formed on a voluntary contract basis - the estate sending a mounted soldier to the army received monetary compensation in the form of tax breaks. There was a mandatory recruitment of soldiers into the Swedish infantry - each territorial entity had to field a certain number of soldiers, and in addition, any man who did not have a means of subsistence and had not stained himself with breaking the law was sent to military service. All soldiers and their families were provided with government housing and salaries.
The Swedish army was well disciplined, which flowed organically from the Lutheran ideology that dominated the Swedish Empire. The Lutheran Church supported the military activities and conquests of Sweden in the 17th century, proclaiming the successes of Swedish military campaigns as “the will of God.”
The Swedish infantry was divided into battalions of 600 soldiers, and the cavalry into squadrons of 150 to 250 cavalry; the Swedish monarch was traditionally the supreme commander of the army. Charles XII, who ascended the throne in 1697, despite his young age, proved himself to be a decisive commander who, according to his contemporaries, was “in love with war.” The headquarters of Charles XII during the Battle of Narva included Lieutenant General Karl Gustav Rehnschild, generals Arvid Horn, Otto Welling and Feldzeichmeister General Baron Johan Sjöblad.
Preparing for battle
The march of the Russian army to Narva
The concentration of Russian troops near Narva occurred slowly. Together with the infantrymen, a convoy of 10,000 carts was moving towards Narva, transporting gunpowder, lead, cannonballs, bombs, hand grenades and other military supplies. Rainy weather made it difficult for the convoy to move, and the carts got stuck in the mud and broke down. The supply of the army was poorly organized: both the soldiers and the horses were poorly fed, and by the end of the campaign, horses began to die from lack of food. During the march, the soldiers' uniforms became disheveled and unraveled at the seams.
The advance detachment led by Prince Ivan Trubetskoy arrived at the fortress three weeks after the declaration of war - September 9 (20). Another 2 weeks later, on September 23 (October 4), Ivan Buturlin’s detachment arrived along with Peter I. On October 14 (25), Avtonom Golovin’s detachment and Boris Sheremetev’s cavalry arrived. Thus, by the beginning of hostilities, Peter I managed to concentrate near Narva, according to various estimates, from 34 to 40 thousand people (21 soldier regiment, 7 streltsy, 2 dragoons, the Sovereign regiment, a regiment of the Smolensk gentry and part of the Novgorod Reiter regiment) and 195 artillery pieces: 64 siege guns, 79 regimental guns, 4 howitzers and 48 mortars. Two more large detachments did not have time for the start of hostilities near Narva: about 10,000 soldiers under the command of Anikita Repnin were in Novgorod, and 11,000 Little Russian Cossacks under the command of Ivan Obidovsky took positions in Pskov, Gdov and the Pechora Monastery.
Siege of Narva
The Narva fortress was defended by a Swedish garrison under the command of Colonel Horn, which consisted of 1,300 foot and 200 mounted soldiers, as well as 400 militia. The city and fortress of Narva were located on the western bank of the Narva River (then called Narova), and on the eastern bank there was a fortified Ivangorod. Both fortresses were connected by a fortified bridge, allowing passage between Narva and Ivangorod even under siege conditions, which led to the need to besiege both fortresses simultaneously.
To organize the siege, Augustus II recommended engineer Ludwig Allart to Peter I, but Peter was “dissatisfied with his slowness” and personally took charge of the siege work. The besiegers placed artillery pieces around Narva and Ivangorod, and also built fortifications in case additional Swedish forces approached from the west. Taking advantage of the fact that the Narova River makes a bend near Ivangorod and Narva, Russian troops built a defense line two miles (about 2 km) west of Narva, consisting of a double earthen rampart. Both ends of the rampart - both northern and southern - abutted the river, and the Russian army, occupying positions near Narva, was protected on the west by the rampart, and on the other sides by the river. The total length of the shaft was 7 versts (7.5 km).
On October 20 (31), the Russian army began regular shelling of the fortress. The charges lasted only two weeks, and the effectiveness of the fire was minimal. The Russian shelling caused almost no damage to the fortress. The main reason for the failure of the artillery bombardment was planning problems: most of the artillery delivered to Narva was small-caliber and did not damage the fortress walls. In addition, both the Russian gunpowder and the guns themselves turned out to be of low quality, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of the shelling.
The march of the main Swedish forces to Narva
Disembarkation in Pärnu
At the time of the attack of Russian troops on Ingria and Estland, Swedish troops in the region were few in number. In addition to the garrison defending Narva, a large Swedish detachment (up to 8,000 soldiers) under the command of Otto Welling was located southeast of Pernov (modern Pärnu) in Ryuevel (modern Ruijena) and small detachments were located in Revele (modern Tallinn) and in others cities, including Wesenberg (modern Rakvere).
The unsuccessful actions of Peter I's allies led to the quick capitulation of Denmark, as well as to the fact that Augustus II lifted the siege of Riga and retreated. This development of events allowed Charles XII to send additional forces (about 10,000 soldiers) to Estonia and Ingria, which landed in Reval and Pernov. Charles XII also arrived in Pernov along with his troops on October 5 (16), that is, a month before the main battle. He decided to give the newly arrived forces a long rest, since many soldiers suffered from seasickness, and on October 12 (23) he arrived in Ruevel and gave the order to Otto Welling with the main forces of his detachment to move north to Wesenberg, where, according to rumors, reconnaissance troops were already located detachments of Russian troops. On October 25 (November 5), Charles XII arrived in Revel, where he held a meeting with local residents. The Swedish monarch promised the Estonians additional privileges within the Swedish Empire and Revel allocated 5,000 militia for the Swedish army.
Clashes at Purz
Meanwhile, having received news of the landing of the troops of Charles XII in Pernov, Peter I on September 26 (October 7) sent a cavalry detachment of Boris Sheremetev along the Revel road running from Narva to the west. The distance from Narva to Revel (modern Tallinn) was about 200 versts, the road passed through marshy areas along the coast of the Gulf of Finland, and on the way were the village of Pyhayogi, the Purtz fortress and Wesenberg. Small detachments of Swedes retreated to Revel, and Sheremetev, without encountering resistance, by October 3 (14) covered 100 miles and took the position of Wesenberg. The number of Sheremetev's detachment, according to various estimates, ranged from 5,000 to 6,000 cavalrymen.
On October 25 (November 5), when Charles XII was in Revel, a detachment of General Welling approached Wesenberg from the south, which, by order of Charles XII, left Revel on October 12 (23). Having learned in advance about the approach of the Swedes, Sheremetev decided to retreat 36 miles back to the Purts fortress and disperse his detachment across several villages in the marshy area east of Purts to guard all roads leading to Narva (see map of the surroundings of Purts). Sheremetev stationed small detachments of several hundred people in the Estonian villages of Purts, Gakgof, Variel (Vergle), Kokhtel and Iove, and he himself stood with large forces in the village of Povanda (on the site of the modern Estonian city of Kohtla-Jarve).
On October 25 (November 5), the vanguard of Welling’s detachment attacked the Russian cover in Purts. Taking advantage of the carelessness of the Russian soldiers stationed in Purts, the Swedes won an easy victory. On the evening of October 26 (November 6), the vanguard of the Swedes attacked Russian soldiers stationed in the village of Variel. Russian soldiers settled in village houses without posting sentries, and found themselves easy prey for the small Swedish detachment. The Swedes suddenly entered the village, set it on fire and had the opportunity to kill the Russians taken by surprise one by one. Several Russian cavalrymen managed to escape to Povanda and inform Sheremetev about what had happened. Sheremetev, in turn, immediately sent a large detachment of 21 cavalry squadrons to help, which managed to encircle the Swedes at Variele. The Swedes emerged from the encirclement with battle and losses, but two Swedish officers were captured by the Russians. These two officers, following instructions from Charles XII, gave false information about the size of the Swedish army advancing on Narva, giving many times inflated figures of 30,000 and 50,000 Swedish soldiers.
Despite the success achieved, Sheremetev decided not to gain a foothold in Purts, but, on the contrary, to retreat another 33 miles back to the village of Pyukhayogi. Sheremetev was wary of decisive and unexpected attacks by the Swedes, saw the clumsiness of his cavalry in the swampy terrain, realized the danger posed by the Swedish tactics of setting fire to villages, and, most importantly, feared that the Swedes could bypass his detachment and cut it off from the main Russian forces at Narva. Justifying himself to Peter I in connection with his next retreat, Sheremetev wrote:
Peter ordered Sheremetev to hold his position at Pikhayoga.
Approach to Narva
Despite the fact that the number of Swedish troops in the region was significantly lower than the number of Russian troops, Charles XII did not concentrate all his forces for the battle of Narva, because he saw a possible danger in the south of Estland. In Novgorod there were about 10,000 Russian soldiers under the command of Anikita Repnin and 11,000 Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Ivan Obidovsky, and in addition there remained the possibility of new actions on the part of Augustus II, who, having lifted the siege of Riga, could join the Russians at Pskov and develop an offensive from there to Dorpat. Guided by these considerations, Charles XII left several thousand regular soldiers and militias in Reval, and sent a thousand-strong detachment under the command of General Volmar Schlippenbach to the south to Pskov, who on October 26 (November 6) inflicted a heavy defeat on the Pskov militias at Lake Ilmen. In this battle, more than 800 Russian soldiers out of an army of 1,500 died; Schlippenbach also captured a dozen Russian ships and the banner of the Pskov province.
Having learned about the results of the clashes at Purtz, on November 4 (15), Charles XII decides to advance with a relatively small detachment of 4000-5000 soldiers to Wesenberg, where he will join the detachment of General Welling. On November 12 (24), having barely arrived in Wesenberg, the Swedish king, contrary to the advice of some of his generals, decides on a joint march to Narva. Charles XII, who has always been inclined to underestimate the role of artillery, makes an unexpected decision to leave his baggage train in Wesenberg and go out light.
Meanwhile, Sheremetev, who took a defensive position near the village of Pyuhayogi, made a serious tactical mistake. Not expecting such a quick arrival of the Swedes and facing serious difficulties with the supply of his detachment, Sheremetev sent most of his detachment to the surrounding villages for forage. Sheremetev left only 600 cavalrymen at the key defensive position at Pyhayogi, and the remaining soldiers, divided into small detachments, dispersed to search for food, most of these detachments being located west of the village of Pyhayogi on the route of the Swedish army. The problem was aggravated by the fact that Sheremetev did not have any intelligence data and did not know either the exact location of the Swedish detachment or its strength. On the other hand, Charles XII regularly sent scouts ahead and learned of the disadvantageous position of the Russian cavalry. The Swedish king divided his detachment into two parts, sending them to Pyhayogi along two parallel roads. In each case, the Swedes, due to surprise and organization, turned small Russian cavalry detachments into stampede and in large forces approached Sheremetev’s main defensive line at a time when he was unable to provide decent resistance to the large Swedish detachment. As a result, on November 16 (27), Sheremetev was forced to quickly and disorganizedly retreat to Narva, which “aroused the Tsar’s strong anger.”
Main battle
Peter's departure
On November 17 (28), Sheremetev’s detachment, fleeing from Pyhayogi, brought Peter I news of the Swedish offensive. Due to the fact that Sheremetev did not carry out reconnaissance, and also due to the fact that he never entered into an organized battle with the main Swedish detachment, the Russians did not have reliable data on the strength of the Swedish army, but there were false testimonies from Swedish prisoners about allegedly 50,000 Swedes approaching Narva. Having learned about the approach of the Swedes to Narva, Peter I, accompanied by Field Marshal General F.A. Golovin, left for Novgorod on November 18 (29), leaving command to Field Marshal Duke de Croix. Thus the main battle, which took place the next day, was fought in the absence of the king. According to the memoirs of Baron Allart, de Croix resisted this appointment, but failed to convince Peter.
After their decisive victory in the main battle, the Swedes spread the version that Peter I fled out of cowardice. Sweden also issued a medal with the image of a crying Peter running from Narva. This same version is repeated in the popular press by some Russian historians and publicists, including A. M. Burovsky and I. L. Solonevich. Nevertheless, in modern scientific literature on history this version is rejected. Historians point out that in previous battles, for example during the campaigns against Azov, and in subsequent battles of the Northern War, Peter I never showed cowardice, so the reasons for Peter’s departure should be sought elsewhere.
Peter I himself explained his departure by the need to replenish reserves, convoys and meet with King Augustus II:
In historical literature, assumptions are made as to why Peter I decided to leave the army. Firstly, the Russian command probably did not expect such decisive actions from Charles XII and hoped that the Swedish army, after arriving near Narva before the battle, would spend time resting and strengthening its positions. Therefore, Peter could believe that he had enough time before the main battle. Secondly, Peter I, on the one hand, could believe rumors about the large number of the Swedish army and insist that Augustus II immediately resume hostilities in order to weaken Charles’s onslaught on Russia. On the other hand, Peter I, on the contrary, could seriously underestimate the enemy, have no doubt about the outcome of the battle near Narva in his favor, and already plan the next steps to encircle the Swedish troops in the Narva region with the help of the detachments of Repnin, Obidovsky and the troops of Augustus II.
Troop disposition
Disposition of Russian troops
Russian troops had built fortifications in advance to protect their positions from the west. On the left bank of the Narova River, a double earthen rampart was erected, the ends of which rested on the river. The distance between the lines of the shaft was 600 fathoms on the right flank, 120 fathoms in the center, and 41-50 fathoms on the left flank. The narrowness of the space between the ramparts - only 80 m on the left flank, which was still built up with barracks for soldiers, deprived the army of maneuverability.
The troops were divided into three groups: on the right flank were Golovin’s troops, numbering about 14 thousand people; in the center on Mount Germansberg - a detachment of Prince Trubetskoy of 6 thousand people; on the left flank there is a division of General Adam Weide of 3 thousand people; to the left of Weide’s detachment, resting against the river bank, is Sheremetev’s cavalry of 5 thousand people. 22 cannons and 17 mortars were located along the ramparts, and all the rest of the artillery was located in positions near Ivangorod. The army headquarters was located on the extreme right flank, on the island of Kamperholm.
Having learned about the approach of the Swedes, the Duke of Croix ordered the troops to be put on combat readiness and placed in one line between the ramparts, stretching the troops in a thin line over 7 miles and leaving no reserve.
Disposition of Swedish troops
The Swedish army reached the positions of the Russian army at 10 a.m. on November 30, 1700. The army of King Charles XII, numbering about 9 thousand people, formed in two lines. On the right flank, in the 1st line, the troops of General Welling stood, and in the 2nd line, the Wachtmeister’s cavalry. In the center, in the 1st line are the detachments of Major General Posse, in the 2nd line of Major General Maydel. Baron Sjöblad's artillery was placed in front of the center. On the left flank were the detachments of Lieutenant General Renschild and Major General Horn in the first line; behind them, in the second line, are the troops of Major General Rebing. In the gap between the lines, the Guards Grenadiers were placed on the right flank, and the Delicarlians on the left. King Charles himself was in front of the center.
Swedish attack
On the night of November 30, 1700, the army of Charles XII, observing complete silence, advanced to the Russian positions. At 10 o'clock in the morning the Russians saw Swedish troops, who “at the sound of trumpets and kettledrums, battle was proposed with two cannon shots”. The Duke of Croix urgently convened a council of war. At the council, Sheremetev, pointing out the stretched positions of the army, proposed leaving part of the troops to blockade the city, and taking the rest of the army onto the field and giving battle. This proposal was rejected by the Duke, who declared that the army would not be able to resist the Swedes in the field. The council decided to stay put, which transferred the initiative into the hands of the Swedish king.
Unlike the Russian command, which believed that it was opposed by a 30,000-strong Swedish army, King Charles knew very well the number and location of the enemy troops. Knowing that the center of the Russian army was the most strongly fortified, the king decided to concentrate attacks on the flanks, press the Russians to the fortress and throw them into the river. The king personally commanded the army. In the center, on the Hermanensberg hill, the Swedish artillery was located under the command of Feldzeichmeister General Baron Johan Sjöblad. The right flank was commanded by Karl Gustav Rehnschild (three columns of 10 battalions each), the left by Otto Welling (11 infantry battalions and 24 cavalry squadrons). In front of the columns were 500 grenadiers with fascines.
The battle began at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Thanks to heavy snowfall (visibility no more than 20 steps) and wind in the face of the enemy, the Swedes managed to carry out a surprise attack, coming close to the Russian positions. The first blow was made by two deep wedges. Russian troops stood in one line stretching for almost 6 kilometers and despite the multiple advantage, the line of defense was very weak. Half an hour later there was a breakthrough in three places. The grenadiers filled the ditches with fascines and mounted the rampart. Thanks to speed, pressure and coordination, the Swedes broke into the Russian camp. Panic began in the Russian regiments. Sheremetev's cavalry fled and tried to ford the Narova River. Sheremetev himself escaped, but about 1,000 people drowned in the river. Panic was intensified by screams “The Germans are traitors!”, as a result of which the soldiers rushed to beat the foreign officers. The infantry tried to retreat along the pontoon bridge near the island of Kamperholm, but the bridge could not withstand the large crowd of people and collapsed, people began to drown.
The commander-in-chief Duke de Croix and a number of other foreign officers, fleeing from beating by their own soldiers, surrendered to the Swedes. At the same time, on the right flank, the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Lefortovo regiments with the soldiers from Golovin’s division who joined them, fenced in with carts and slingshots, put up fierce resistance to the Swedish troops. On the left flank, Weide's division also repulsed all attacks of the Swedes; the Swedish column of General Renschild was frustrated by the fire of the Russian guards. King Charles himself appeared on the battlefield, but even his presence, which strengthened the morale of the soldiers, could not help the Swedes. The battle stopped with the onset of darkness.
The night led to worsening disorder in both the Russian and Swedish troops. Part of the Swedish infantry, breaking into the Russian camp, plundered the convoy and got drunk. In the darkness, two Swedish battalions mistook each other for Russians and started a battle with each other. The Russian troops, despite the fact that some troops maintained order, suffered from a lack of leadership. There was no communication between the right and left flanks.
Surrender of the Russian army
On the morning of the next day, the remaining generals - Prince Yakov Dolgorukov, Avtonom Golovin, Ivan Buturlin and General-Fieldmaster Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky decided to begin negotiations on surrender. General Weide did the same. Prince Dolgorukov agreed on the free passage of troops to the right bank with weapons and banners, but without artillery and convoys. Weide's division capitulated only on the morning of December 2 after the second order of Prince Dolgorukov on the terms of free passage without weapons and banners. Throughout the night from December 1 to 2, Swedish sappers, together with the Russians, established crossings. On the morning of December 2, Russian troops left the Swedish bank of the Narova.
As booty, the Swedes received 20,000 muskets and the royal treasury of 32,000 rubles, as well as 210 banners. The Swedes lost 677 people killed and about 1250 were wounded. The losses of the Russian army amounted to about 7 thousand people killed, drowned and wounded, including deserters and those who died from hunger and cold.
In violation of the terms of surrender, the Swedes retained 700 people in captivity, including 10 generals, 10 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 7 majors, 14 captains, 7 lieutenants, 4 warrant officers, 4 sergeants, 9 fireworksmen and a bombardier, etc.
Results
The Russian army suffered a heavy defeat: a significant amount of artillery was lost, heavy casualties were suffered, and the command staff suffered greatly. In Europe, the Russian army was no longer perceived as a serious force for several years, and Charles XII received the fame of a great commander. On the other hand, this tactical victory sowed the seed of the future defeat of Sweden - Charles XII believed that he had defeated the Russians for a long time and greatly underestimated them right up to Poltava. Peter I, on the contrary, after the defeat at Narva, realized the need for military reforms and focused on training national command personnel.
Following the battle, Peter I, drawing conclusions, wrote:
So, the Swedes received victory over our army, which is indisputable. But we must understand over what army they received it. For there was only one old Lefortovo regiment, and only two guard regiments wereAzova, but they never saw field battles, especially with regular troops: the other regiments, except for some colonels, both officers and privates themselves wererecruits. Moreover, due to the late hour and great mud, they could not deliver provisions, and in a single word, it seemed that the whole thing was like an infant’s play, and art was beneath the surface. What surprise is it for such an old, trained and practiced army to find victory over such inexperienced ones? |
The defeat at Narva greatly worsened both the military and foreign policy position of Russia. Peter's repeated attempts, through the mediation of Austrian and French diplomats, to make peace with Charles remained unanswered. This led to the establishment of closer Russian-Saxon relations. The army of King Augustus, although it retreated beyond the Western Dvina, was still a significant force. On February 27, 1701, a meeting of the Russian and Saxon monarchs took place in Birzhi. The negotiations ended with the conclusion of the Biržai Treaty, which determined the conditions for joint actions of the parties against Sweden. On March 11, 1701, at a military council, the Russians and Saxons drew up a detailed plan of military action.
Memory of the battle
Monument to Russian soldiers on the Victoria Bastion
In 1900, on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the first battle of Narva, on the initiative of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky regiments and the 1st battery of the Life Guards of the 1st Artillery Brigade, a monument to the fallen Russian soldiers was built near the village of Vepsküll. The monument is a granite rock with a cross mounted on a truncated earthen pyramid. The inscription on the monument reads: “To the heroic ancestors who fell in battle 19 N0 1700. Life Guards. Preobrazhensky, Lieutenant-Guards. Semenovsky regiments, 1st battery of the Life Guards. 1st Artillery Brigade. November 19, 1900."
The first Swedish battle monument was unveiled in Narva in 1936 and disappeared without a trace after World War II. The new one was opened in October 2000 by Foreign Minister Lena Helm Wallen. The funds were collected by the Swedish Institute. Engraved on granite: MDCC (1700) and Svecia Memor (Sweden remembers).
Introduction
The Battle of Narva is one of the first battles of the Great Northern War between the Russian army of Peter I and the Swedish army of Charles XII, which took place on November 19 (30), 1700 near the city of Narva, ending in the defeat of the Russian troops.
1. Background
Immediately after receiving news of the conclusion of the Treaty of Constantinople with the Ottoman Empire, Peter I declared war on Sweden. On August 4, 1700, Russian troops advanced towards Narva.
The summer and autumn of 1700 were very rainy, which caused great problems in supplying the army. The carts broke down and got stuck in the mud, the horses began to die from lack of food already on the march, and the columns were greatly stretched. When approaching Narva, the soldiers' uniforms became disheveled and were coming apart at the seams, there was a shortage of food, and the soldiers were fed little and poorly.
The concentration of troops occurred very slowly. The advance detachment led by Prince Ivan Trubetskoy arrived at the fortress on September 20. On October 4, Ivan Buturlin’s detachment led by Peter I arrived. On October 25, Automon Golovin’s division and Boris Sheremetev’s cavalry arrived. It was not until November 5, 1700 that the army fully assembled near the city. Near Narva, Peter I concentrated about 32-35 thousand people and 184 artillery pieces. The garrison of the fortress, under the command of Colonel Horn, consisted of 1,300 foot and 200 mounted soldiers and 400 militia.
Narva and Ivangorod were a single fortification, connected by a permanent bridge. In this regard, it was necessary to besiege both fortresses. Peter personally supervised the siege work. On the left bank of the Narova River, double lines of a continuous rampart were erected, with their flanks resting on the river. The distance between the lines of the shaft was 600 fathoms on the right flank, 120 fathoms in the center, and 41-50 fathoms on the left flank. The narrowness of the space between the ramparts, which was still built up with barracks for soldiers, deprived the army of maneuverability. The troops were divided into three groups: on the right flank were Golovin’s troops, numbering about 14 thousand people; in the center on Mount Germansberg - a detachment of Prince Trubetskoy of 6 thousand people; on the left flank there is a division of General Adam Weide of 3 thousand people; to the left of Weide’s detachment, resting against the river bank, is Sheremetev’s cavalry of 5 thousand people. 22 cannons and 17 mortars were located along the ramparts, and all other artillery was located in positions near Ivangorod.
On October 31, the Russian army began regular shelling of the fortress. The charges lasted only two weeks, and the effectiveness of the fire was minimal. The poor quality of gunpowder and the lack of large-caliber artillery had an impact.
Having received news of the landing of the troops of Charles XII in Pernau, Peter I sent a cavalry detachment of 5 thousand people under the command of Boris Sheremetev, who stopped in Wesenberg, for reconnaissance. On November 5, General Welling’s detachment approached Wesenberg. Sheremetev, fearing for his left flank, retreated 36 versts to the village of Purts. On November 6, the vanguard of the Swedish army attacked the Russian cover in the village of Vergle. Sheremetev sent a detachment of 21 squadron to help, which managed to surround the Swedes. Despite the success achieved, Sheremetev retreated to the village of Pikhayogi. Justifying himself to the tsar, Sheremetev wrote: “I didn’t stand there for that: unspeakable swamps and swamps and great forests. And one person would sneak up from the forest and set the village on fire and cause great troubles, and even more dangerous, so that they would bypass us around Rugodiv (Narva).”. Peter ordered Sheremetev to hold his position at Pikhayoga. From the prisoners captured in the battle at Purtz, it became known that the royal army had 30 thousand people, and that an advance detachment of 5 thousand people was in Rakvere. On November 23, the Swedish army advanced to Narva. Sheremetev, instead of holding his position, retreated to the city.
By this time, Russian troops had not sufficiently strengthened their positions in the western direction and the Swedes were moving towards the city without hindrance. On November 29, Peter I left the Russian army camp for Novgorod, leaving command to Field Marshal de Croix. Peter I explained his departure by the need to replenish reserves, convoys and meet with King Augustus II: “Against the 18th, the sovereign left the army for Novgorod in order to encourage the remaining regiments to come to Narva as soon as possible, and especially to have a meeting with the King of Poland.”. By this time, the besieging army had a difficult situation with provisions. Before the battle, soldiers of many regiments did not eat anything for a day.
2. Progress of the battle
Having learned about the approach of the Swedes, the Duke of Croix ordered the troops to be put on combat readiness and placed in one line between the ramparts, stretching the troops in a thin line over 7 miles and leaving no reserve.
On the night of November 30, 1700, the army of Charles XII, observing complete silence, advanced to the Russian positions. At 10 o'clock in the morning the Russians saw Swedish troops, who “at the sound of trumpets and kettledrums, battle was proposed with two cannon shots”. The Duke of Croix urgently convened a council of war. At the council, Sheremetev, pointing out the stretched positions of the army, proposed leaving part of the troops to blockade the city, and taking the rest of the army onto the field and giving battle. This proposal was rejected by the Duke, who declared that the army would not be able to resist the Swedes in the field. The council decided to remain in place, which transferred the initiative into the hands of the Swedish king.
Unlike the Russian command, which believed that it was opposed by a 30,000-strong Swedish army, King Charles knew very well the number and location of the enemy troops. Knowing that the center of the Russian army was the most strongly fortified, the king decided to concentrate attacks on the flanks, press the Russians to the fortress and throw them into the river. The king personally commanded the army. In the center, on the Hermanensberg hill, the Swedish artillery was located under the command of Feldzeichmeister General Baron Johan Sjöblad. The right flank was commanded by Karl Gustav Rehnschild (three columns of 10 battalions each), the left by Otto Welling (11 infantry battalions and 24 cavalry squadrons). In front of the columns were 500 grenadiers with fascines.
The battle began at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Thanks to heavy snowfall (visibility no more than 20 steps) and wind in the enemy's face, the Swedes managed to carry out a surprise attack, coming close to the enemy. The first blow was made by two deep wedges. Russian troops stood in one line stretching for almost 6 kilometers and despite the multiple advantage, the line of defense was very weak. Half an hour later there was a breakthrough in three places. The grenadiers filled the ditches with fascines and mounted the rampart. Thanks to speed, pressure and coordination, the Swedes broke into the Russian camp. Panic began in the Russian regiments. Sheremetev's cavalry fled and tried to ford the Narova River. Sheremetev himself escaped, but about 1,000 people drowned in the river. Panic was intensified by screams “The Germans are traitors!”, as a result of which the soldiers rushed to beat the foreign officers. The infantry tried to retreat along the pontoon bridge near the island of Kamperholm, but the bridge could not withstand the large crowd of people and collapsed, people began to drown.
The commander-in-chief, the Duke of Croix, and a number of other foreign officers, fleeing beatings by their own soldiers, surrendered to the Swedes. At the same time, on the right flank, the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Lefortovo regiments with the soldiers from Golovin’s division who joined them, fenced in with carts and slingshots, put up fierce resistance to the Swedish troops. On the left flank, Weide's division also repulsed all attacks of the Swedes; the Swedish column of General Renschild was frustrated by the fire of the Russian guards. King Charles himself appeared on the battlefield, but even his presence, which strengthened the morale of the soldiers, could not help the Swedes. The battle stopped with the onset of darkness.
The night led to worsening disorder in both the Russian and Swedish troops. Part of the Swedish infantry, breaking into the Russian camp, plundered the convoy and got drunk. Two Swedish battalions in the dark mistook each other for Russians and started a battle with each other. The Russian troops, despite the fact that some troops maintained order, suffered from a lack of leadership. There was no communication between the right and left flanks.
On the morning of the next day, the remaining generals - Prince Yakov Dolgorukov, Avtomon Golovin, Ivan Buturlin and General-Fieldmaster Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky decided to begin negotiations on surrender. General Weide did the same. Prince Dolgorukov agreed on the free passage of troops to the right bank with weapons and banners, but without artillery and convoys. Weide's division capitulated only on the morning of December 2 after the second order of Prince Dolgorukov on the terms of free passage without weapons and banners. Throughout the night from December 1 to 2, Swedish sappers, together with the Russians, established crossings. On the morning of December 2, Russian troops left the Swedish bank of the Narova.
As booty, the Swedes received 20,000 muskets and the royal treasury of 32,000 rubles. The Swedes lost 667 people killed and about 1,200 were wounded. The losses of the Russian army amounted to about 6-7 thousand people killed, wounded and drowned, including deserters and those who died from hunger and cold.
In violation of the terms of surrender, the Swedes retained 700 officers in captivity, including 10 generals, 10 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 7 majors, 14 captains, 7 lieutenants, 4 warrant officers, 4 sergeants, 9 fireworksmen and a bombardier, etc.
3. Results
The Russian army suffered a heavy defeat: a significant amount of artillery was lost, heavy casualties were suffered, and the command staff suffered greatly. In Europe, the Russian army was no longer perceived as a serious force for several years, and Charles XII received the fame of a great commander. On the other hand, this tactical victory sowed the seed of the future defeat of Sweden - Charles XII believed that he had defeated the Russians for a long time and greatly underestimated them right up to Poltava. Peter I, on the contrary, after the defeat at Narva, realized the need for military reforms and focused on training national command personnel.
Following the battle, Peter I, drawing conclusions, wrote:
“So, the Swedes received victory over our army, which is indisputable. But we must understand over what army they received it. For there was only one old Lefortovo regiment, and two regiments of the guard were only at Azov, and they had never seen field battles, especially with regular troops: the other regiments, except for some colonels, both officers and privates, were recruits themselves. Moreover, due to the late hour and great mud, they could not deliver provisions, and in a single word, it seemed that the whole thing was like an infant’s play, and art was beneath the surface. What is the surprise for such an old, trained and practiced army to find victory over such inexperienced ones?
The defeat at Narva greatly worsened both the military and foreign policy situation of Russia. Peter's repeated attempts, through the mediation of Austrian and French diplomats, to make peace with Charles remained unanswered. This led to the establishment of closer Russian-Saxon relations. The army of King Augustus, although it retreated beyond the Western Dvina, was still a significant force. On February 27, 1701, a meeting of the Russian and Saxon monarchs took place in Birzhi. The negotiations ended with the conclusion of the Biržai Treaty, which determined the conditions for joint actions of the parties against Sweden. On March 11, 1701, at a council of war, the Russians and Saxons drew up a detailed plan of military action.
4. Memory of the battle
4.1. Monument to Russian soldiers on the Victoria Bastion
In 1900, on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the first battle of Narva, on the initiative of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky regiments and the 1st battery of the Life Guards of the 1st Artillery Brigade, a monument to the fallen Russian soldiers was built near the village of Vepsküll. The monument is a granite rock with a cross mounted on a truncated earthen pyramid. The inscription on the monument reads: “To the heroic ancestors who fell in battle 19 N0 1700. Life Guards. Preobrazhensky, Lieutenant-Guards. Semenovsky regiments, 1st battery of the Life Guards. 1st Artillery Brigade. November 19, 1900" .
4.2. Swedish lion
The first Swedish battle monument was unveiled in Narva in 1938 and disappeared without a trace after World War II. The new one was opened in October 2000 by Foreign Minister Lena Helm Wallen. The funds were collected by the Swedish Institute. Engraved on granite: MDCC (1700) and Svecia Memor (Sweden remembers).
Bibliography:
Carlson F.F. Sveriges historia under konungaraa av dct pfalziska huset, 6-7. 1881-1885.
Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. The path from Copenhagen to Perevolochnaya. 1700-1709. - M: Reitar, 1998. P. 42
Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. P. 40
Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. P. 39
Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. P. 41
Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. pp. 40-41
Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. P. 42
Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. P. 43
Charles Duke of Croix, Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky, Prince Yakov Feodorovich Dolgorukov, Automon Mikhailovich Golovin, Adam Adamovich Weide, Prince Ivan Yurievich Trubetskoy, Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin, Ludwig von Gallart, Baron von Langen and General Schacher
Preobrazhensky Ernest von Blumberg, artillery Kazimir Krage, Karl Ivanitsky, Vilim von Deldin, Jacob Gordon, Alexander Gordon, Gulitz, Westhof, Peter Lefort and Schneberch
Bespalov A.V. Northern War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. P. 44
Petrov A.V. The city of Narva, its past and attractions. St. Petersburg, 1901. pp. 354-355
Svenska institutet - SI och Narva