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The beginning of the Battle of Borodino - war and peace. The Battle of Borodino is the culmination of the novel by L.N. Tolstoy "War and Peace". Let's return to Pierre Bezukhov

On August 26, 1812, the fate of Russia and the Russian people was decided. The battle of Borodino by L.N. Tolstoy is the moment of highest tension, the moment of concentration of popular hatred towards the invaders and at the same time the moment of final rapprochement with the people of his favorite heroes - Andrei and Pierre.
The Battle of Borodino in the novel is described mainly as Pierre Bezukhov saw it. This awkward, kind and naive man, who has never seen war, according to the author, like a child, perceives the unfolding battle events; all this is new to him, and therefore one cannot even doubt his veracity. Previously, Pierre had heard a lot about the role of the military plan, about the importance of a correctly chosen position. And having arrived, he first of all tries to understand issues of military tactics. L.N. Tolstoy likes the naivety of the hero. When painting a picture of the battle, the writer uses his favorite technique: first he gives a “view from above”, and then “from the inside”. It is Pierre’s view that is the same view from the inside, war through the eyes of a newcomer. Twice Pierre's gaze covers the entire Borodin field: before the battle and during the battle. But both times his inexperienced eye notices not the position, but the “living terrain.” At the beginning of the battle, a view from above is given. Pierre is amazed by the sight of the battle itself. Before him opens an amazingly beautiful and animated picture of the battlefield, illuminated by the rays of the morning sun. And Pierre wants to be there, among the soldiers. At the moment when the hero joins the ranks of infantry soldiers, he acutely begins to feel the power of people's patriotism. The folk and soldier scenes here are also given from Pierre's point of view. It is the simplicity and sincerity of Pierre in this case that become evidence of the great truth: the people are the main strength of the Russian army in the Battle of Borodino. He hears the soldiers' conversations and understands their majestic meaning not so much with his mind as with his heart. Pierre carefully observes the militias and, like Tolstoy himself, sees the extreme tension of the moral force of resistance of the Russian army and people. Soon Pierre meets Andrei Bolkonsky, who no longer serves at headquarters, but is directly involved in the battle. He, too, no longer believes in military science, but he knows for sure that the power of the people is now greater than ever. In his opinion, the outcome of the battle depends on the feeling that lives in all participants in the battle. And this feeling is popular patriotism, the immense rise of which on Borodin’s day convinces Bolkonsky that the Russians will certainly win. “Tomorrow, no matter what,” he says, “we will definitely win the battle!” And Timokhin completely agrees with him, who knows that the soldiers even refused to drink vodka before the battle, because it was “not that kind of day.”
In a hot battle, on the Raevsky battery, the writer, through the eyes of Pierre, observes the unquenchable fire of people's courage and fortitude.” Ordinary people - soldiers and militias - do not even think of hiding their feeling of fear. And this is precisely what makes their courage seem even more amazing. The more menacing the danger becomes, the brighter the fire of patriotism flares up, the stronger the strength of popular resistance becomes.
M. I. Kutuzov proved himself to be a true commander of the people's war. He is an exponent of the national spirit. This is what Prince Andrei Bolkonsky thinks about him before the Battle of Borodino: “He will have nothing of his own. He won’t come up with anything, won’t do anything, but he will listen to everything, remember everything, put everything in its place, won’t interfere with anything useful and won’t allow anything harmful. He understands that there is something more significant than his will... And the main thing why you believe him is that he is Russian...”
Historians believe that Napoleon won the Battle of Borodino. But the “won battle” did not bring him the desired results. The people abandoned their property and left the enemy. Food supplies were destroyed so that they would not reach the enemy. There were hundreds of partisan detachments. They were big and small, peasant and landowner. One detachment, led by a sexton, captured several hundred prisoners in a month. There was the elder Vasilisa, who killed hundreds of French. There was the poet-hussar Denis Davydov, the commander of a large, active partisan detachment. Possessing the inertia of the offensive and significant numerical superiority, the French army was stopped at Borodino. The logical end of Napoleonic victories came, and this dealt a decisive moral blow to the offensive spirit of the conquerors. The entire course of the war in Russia steadily eroded Napoleon's glory. Instead of a brilliant duel of swords, he met the club of the people's war. L.N. Tolstoy historically correctly views the battle of Borodino as a turning point in the war, which determined the further rapid death of the French army.
Moreover, Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy clearly showed that in the battle of Borodino it was precisely the moral superiority of the Russian liberation army over the predatory French army that was reflected. The writer regards the Battle of Borodino as a victory of the moral strength of the Russian people over Napoleon and his army.

Tasks and tests on the topic "The Battle of Borodino - the culmination of L. N. Tolstoy's novel "War and Peace""

  • Spelling - Important topics for repeating the Unified State Exam in Russian

    Lessons: 5 Tasks: 7

  • Basics of past tense verbs. Spelling the letter before the suffix -l - Verb as part of speech grade 4

Leo Tolstoy's novel "War and Peace" shows the reader the life of the Russian state in a fifteen-year period of historical time from 1805 to 1820. This was a very difficult period in the history of our country, marked by the War of 1812.

The culminating and decisive moment of the entire novel is the Battle of Borodino between the Napoleonic and Russian armies under the command of Kutuzov, which took place in August 1812.

L. Tolstoy very accurately introduces us to all the details of the Battle of Borodino. He shows us first the camp of our soldiers, then the French one, then we find ourselves at Raevsky’s battery, and then in the regiment. Such a description allows you to most accurately see and understand many of the details of the Battle of Borodino.

We see the Battle of Borodino with our eyes. Bezukhov was a civilian and understood little about military affairs. Pierre perceives everything that happens with feelings and emotions. The Borodino field, which was covered with tens of thousands of soldiers, the billowing smoke from cannon shots, and the smell of gunpowder evoke a feeling of delight and admiration.

Tolstoy shows us Bezukhov in the center of the Borodino battle, near Raevsky’s battery. It was there that the main blow of Napoleonic troops fell, and it was there that thousands of soldiers died. It is difficult for Pierre to understand all the events that are happening. Even when he encountered the French officer, he did not understand who had captured whom.

The Battle of Borodino continued. For several hours now, volleys of guns had been thundering, the soldiers were going into hand-to-hand combat. L. Tolstoy shows us how Napoleon’s troops no longer listened to the orders of their generals; disorder and chaos reigned on the battlefield. At the same time, Kutuzov’s troops were united as never before. Everyone acted harmoniously, although they suffered huge losses. Immediately the writer shows us the regiment of Andrei Bolkonsky. Even while in reserve, he suffered heavy losses from incoming cannonballs. But none of the soldiers even thought about running. They fought for their native land.

At the end of the story about the Battle of Borodino, Tolstoy shows Napoleon's army in the form of a wild beast that dies from a wound received on the Borodino field.

The result of the Borodino battle was the defeat of Napoleonic troops, their miserable flight from Russia and the loss of the awareness of invincibility.

Pierre Bezukhov rethought the meaning of this war. Now he perceived it as something sacred and very necessary for our people in the struggle for their native lands.

If it weren't God's will,
They wouldn’t give up Moscow...
M.Yu.Lermontov

Having studied Leo Tolstoy’s epic novel “War and Peace,” many historians argue that Tolstoy allowed himself to distort some facts of the Patriotic War of 1812. This applies to the Battle of Austerlitz and the Battle of Borodino. Indeed, the Battle of Borodino in Tolstoy’s novel “War and Peace” is described in sufficient detail, which makes it possible to study historical events through the pages of the novel. However, the opinion of historians agrees that the main battle of the entire Patriotic War of 1812 was Borodino. It was this that was the reason for the Russian victory over the French army. It was this that became decisive.

Progress of the Battle of Borodino

Let’s open L.N. Tolstoy’s novel, volume three, part two, chapter nineteen, where we read: “Why was the Battle of Borodino given? It didn’t make the slightest sense for either the French or the Russians. The immediate result was and should be - for the Russians, that we were closer to the destruction of Moscow... and for the French, that they were closer to the destruction of the entire army... This result was then completely obvious, and yet Napoleon gave, and Kutuzov accepted This is a battle."

As Tolstoy describes, on August 24, 1812, Napoleon did not see the troops of the Russian army from Utitsa to Borodino, but accidentally “stumbled upon” the Shevardinsky redoubt, where he had to start the battle. The positions of the left flank were weakened by the enemy, and the Russians lost the Shevardinsky redoubt, and Napoleon transferred his troops across the Kolocha River. On August 25, no action followed from either side. And on August 26 the Battle of Borodino took place. In the novel, the writer even shows readers a map - the location of the French and Russian sides - for a clearer picture of everything that is happening.

The Battle of Borodino in Tolstoy's assessment

Tolstoy does not hide his misunderstanding of the senselessness of the actions of the Russian army and gives his assessment of the Battle of Borodino in “War and Peace”: “The Battle of Borodino did not take place in a chosen and fortified position with somewhat weaker Russian forces at that time, but the Battle of Borodino, due to the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt, was adopted by the Russians in an open, almost unfortified area with forces twice as weak against the French, that is, in such conditions in which it was not only unthinkable to fight for ten hours and make the battle indecisive, but it was unthinkable to keep the army from complete defeat for three hours and escape."

Heroes in the Battle of Borodino

A description of the Battle of Borodino is given in chapters 19-39 of the second part of the third volume. At the same time, not only a description of military actions is given. Tolstoy pays great attention to the thoughts of our heroes. It shows Andrei Bolkonsky on the eve of the battle. His thoughts are agitated, and he himself is somewhat irritated, experiencing a strange excitement before the battle. He thinks about love, remembering all the important moments of his life. He confidently tells Pierre Bezukhov: “Tomorrow, no matter what, we will win the battle!

Captain Timokhin tells Bolkonsky: “Why feel sorry for yourself now! The soldiers in my battalion, believe me, didn’t drink vodka: it’s not that kind of day, they say.” Pierre Bezukhov came to the mound, where they were preparing for battle, and was horrified, discovering the war “first-hand.” He sees the militia men and looks at them in bewilderment, to which Boris Drubetskoy explains to him: “The militia - they just put on clean, white shirts to prepare for death. What heroism, Count!

Napoleon's behavior also makes us think. He is nervous and the last day before the battle “is not in a good mood.” Napoleon probably understands that this battle will be decisive for him. He seems unsure of his army and something is questioning him. During the very course of the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon sits on a mound near Shevardino and drinks punch. Why did the writer show it at such a moment? What did you want to show? Pettiness and indifference to his soldiers, or the special tactics of a great strategist and self-confidence? At least for us, the readers, everything becomes clear: Kutuzov would never have allowed himself to behave like that during a general battle. Napoleon showed his isolation from the people, where he was and where his army was. He showed all his superiority over both the Russians and the French. He did not condescend to take up his sword and engage in battle. He watched everything from the side. I watched how people kill each other, how Russians smash the French and vice versa, but I thought only about one thing - power.

Tolstoy says about Kutuzov’s words (order for battle): “...what Kutuzov said flowed...from the feeling that lay in the soul of the commander-in-chief, as well as in the soul of every Russian person.” For him, the significance of the Battle of Borodino was truly the outcome of the entire war. A man who felt everything that was happening to his soldiers probably could not think differently. Borodino was lost for him, but he knew, with some inner feeling, that the war was not over yet. Can this be called Kutuzov’s calculation when, by allowing Napoleon to enter Moscow, he signs the death warrant for the Emperor of France? He dooms the French army to complete devastation. He exhausts them with hunger and cold and leads them to flee Moscow. Kutuzov is helped in this by nature, and the Russian spirit, and in victory, and faith in the forces, albeit weakened, but still alive, and the large partisan movement that the people launched.

Conclusions

After a short analysis of this episode, I conclude that Kutuzov recognized the Russian people as a great force, which led Russia to victory. Whether it was a calculation or pure chance does not matter, but the Battle of Borodino was the outcome of the entire war of 1812. Briefly enough, I wrote some important, in my opinion, quotes that confirm this idea.

In my essay on the topic “The Battle of Borodino in the novel “War and Peace”” I tried to reveal the significance of the Battle of Borodino in Leo Tolstoy’s assessment, in his understanding of the meaning of this military operation. And also the significance of the Battle of Borodino in the destinies of the main characters of the novel.

Work test

The exhibition is located in the building of the former hotel of the Spaso-Borodinsky Monastery, where in 1867 the author of the epic novel “War and Peace”, the most famous work of world fiction about the era of the Napoleonic wars, stayed. The historical interior of the hotel has not been preserved; it has been converted into a museum space, in which the story is told about the author of the novel and the heroes of Borodin’s twenty chapters.

In the first hall L.N. Tolstoy is presented both as an artillery officer, a participant in military operations in the Caucasus and Crimea, and as an aspiring writer who gave priority to military themes in his work, striving “with all the strength of his soul” for a truthful description of events and phenomena. The chapters of the novel “War and Peace”, dedicated to its climax - the Battle of Borodino, were rewritten several times by the writer. In order to achieve the most reliable description of the battle scenes and landscapes of the field, Tolstoy arrived in Borodino. For two days, September 26 and 27, he “walked and drove through the area where half a century earlier more than a hundred thousand people had died, took his notes and drew a battle plan...”. Returning to Moscow, Tolstoy told his wife: “I will write a Battle of Borodino that has never happened before.” Books, photographs, graphic sheets, reproductions of the writer’s manuscripts, finds from the battlefield tell about the preliminary work on the novel, including a trip to Borodino, details of which can be found in the multimedia program.

The “battle like never before” is described in the second room. It is filled with images of historical characters and fictional heroes of the novel who took part in the fighting on the Borodino field in August 1812. First of all, these are the commanders-in-chief of the armies M.I. Kutuzov and Napoleon. Most of the generals of both armies mentioned in Borodin's chapters are represented here. Portraits of historical characters and quotes from the novel reflect the artful interweaving of historical reality and fiction that underlies the panorama of the grandiose battle. The well-known images of Pierre Bezukhov and Andrei Bolkonsky are shown in the hall with illustrations and Borodin’s pages of the novel in the context of battle graphics and authentic items of weapons, equipment, and personal belongings of the battle participants. It also reflects the second life of the heroes of the novel “War and Peace”, which they received thanks to small books with individual chapters of the novel, published during the Great Patriotic War, the opera of the same name by S.S. Prokofiev and the film by S.F. Bondarchuk.

The conclusion of the writer Tolstoy about the moral victory of the Russian army at Borodino was and remains undeniable.
The exhibition “Heroes of the novel “War and Peace” on the Borodino Field” was opened in the year of the 140th anniversary of the completion of the complete book publication of the novel and is dedicated to the 200th anniversary of Russia’s victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.


  • State Borodino Military Historical Museum Reserve
    The author of the project is E.V. Semenishcheva
    Scientific supervisor – Honored Worker of Culture of the Russian Federation A.V. Gorbunov
    Researchers-exhibitors – E.A. Rogacheva, V.N. Fedorov, S.N. Khomchenko
  • LLC Studio "Museum Design"
    The author of the artistic concept and artistic director of the project is Honored Artist of the Russian Federation A.N. Konov
    Artist-designers – V.E. Voitsekhovsky, A.M. Gassel
    Exhibition graphics – D.S. Rudko
  • LLC "Intmedia"
    Video and technical support – E.V. Kamenskaya, A.A. Lazebny
On the 24th there was a battle at the Shevardinsky redoubt, on the 25th not a single shot was fired from either side, on the 26th the Battle of Borodino took place. Why and how were the battles of Shevardin and Borodino given and accepted? Why was the Battle of Borodino fought? It didn’t make the slightest sense for either the French or the Russians. The immediate result was and should have been - for the Russians, that we were closer to the destruction of Moscow (which we feared most of all in the world), and for the French, that they were closer to the destruction of the entire army (which they also feared most of all in the world) . This result was then completely obvious, and yet Napoleon gave, and Kutuzov accepted, this battle. If the commanders had been guided by reasonable reasons, it seemed, how clear it should have been for Napoleon that, having gone two thousand miles and accepting a battle with the probable chance of losing a quarter of the army, he was heading for certain death; and it should have seemed just as clear to Kutuzov that by accepting the battle and also risking losing a quarter of the army, he was probably losing Moscow. For Kutuzov, this was mathematically clear, just as it is clear that if I have less than one checker in checkers and I change, I will probably lose and therefore should not change. When the enemy has sixteen checkers, and I have fourteen, then I am only one-eighth weaker than him; and when I exchange thirteen checkers, he will be three times stronger than me. Before the Battle of Borodino, our forces were approximately related to the French as five to six, and after the battle as one to two, that is, before the battle one hundred thousand to one hundred and twenty, and after the battle fifty to one hundred. And at the same time, the smart and experienced Kutuzov accepted the battle. Napoleon, the brilliant commander, as he is called, gave battle, losing a quarter of the army and stretching his line even more. If they say that, having occupied Moscow, he thought how to end the campaign by occupying Vienna, then there is a lot of evidence against this. The historians of Napoleon themselves say that even from Smolensk he wanted to stop, he knew the danger of his extended position and knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he saw the situation in which Russian cities were left to him, and did not receive a single answer to their repeated statements about their desire to negotiate. In giving and accepting the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and senselessly. And historians, under the accomplished facts, only later brought up intricate evidence of the foresight and genius of the commanders, who, of all the involuntary instruments of world events, were the most slavish and involuntary figures. The ancients left us examples of heroic poems in which the heroes constitute the entire interest of history, and we still cannot get used to the fact that for our human time a story of this kind has no meaning. To another question: how the Battle of Borodino and the Battle of Shevardino that preceded it were given - there is also a very definite and well-known, completely false idea. All historians describe the matter as follows: The Russian army allegedly, in its retreat from Smolensk, was looking for the best position for a general battle, and such a position was allegedly found at Borodin. The Russians allegedly strengthened this position forward, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk), at almost a right angle to it, from Borodin to Utitsa, at the very place where the battle took place. Ahead of this position, a fortified forward post on the Shevardinsky Kurgan was supposedly set up to monitor the enemy. On the 24th Napoleon allegedly attacked the forward post and took it. On the 26th he attacked the entire Russian army stationed on the Borodino field. This is what the stories say, and all this is completely unfair, as anyone who wants to delve into the essence of the matter can easily see. The Russians could not find a better position; but, on the contrary, in their retreat they passed through many positions that were better than Borodino. They did not settle on any of these positions: both because Kutuzov did not want to accept a position that was not chosen by him, and because the demand for a people’s battle had not yet been expressed strongly enough, and because Miloradovich had not yet approached with the militia, and also because other reasons that are innumerable. The fact is that the previous positions were stronger and that the Borodino position (the one on which the battle was fought) is not only not strong, but for some reason is not at all a position any more than any other place in the Russian Empire, which, when guessing, one would point to pin on the map. The Russians not only did not strengthen the position of the Borodino field to the left at right angles to the road (that is, the place where the battle took place), but never before August 25, 1812, did they think that the battle could take place at this place. This is evidenced, firstly, by the fact that not only were there no fortifications at this place on the 25th, but that, having begun on the 25th, they were not finished even on the 26th; secondly, the proof is the position of the Shevardinsky redoubt: the Shevardinsky redoubt, ahead of the position at which the battle was decided, does not make any sense. Why was this redoubt fortified stronger than all other points? And why, defending it on the 24th until late at night, all efforts were exhausted and six thousand people were lost? To observe the enemy, a Cossack patrol was enough. Thirdly, proof that the position at which the battle took place was not foreseen and that the Shevardinsky redoubt was not the forward point of this position is that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration until the 25th were convinced that the Shevardinsky redoubt There is left flank of the position and that Kutuzov himself, in his report, written in the heat of the moment after the battle, calls the Shevardinsky redoubt left flank of the position. Much later, when reports about the Battle of Borodino were being written in the open, it was (probably to justify the mistakes of the commander-in-chief, who had to be infallible) that unfair and strange testimony was invented that the Shevardinsky redoubt served advanced post (whereas it was only a fortified point on the left flank) and as if the Battle of Borodino was accepted by us in a fortified and pre-chosen position, whereas it took place in a completely unexpected and almost unfortified place. The thing, obviously, was this: the position was chosen along the Kolocha River, which crosses the main road not at a right angle, but at an acute angle, so that the left flank was in Shevardin, the right near the village of Novy and the center in Borodino, at the confluence of the Kolocha and Voina rivers . This position, under the cover of the Kolocha River, for an army whose goal is to stop the enemy moving along the Smolensk road to Moscow, is obvious to anyone who looks at the Borodino field, forgetting how the battle took place. Napoleon, having gone to Valuev on the 24th, did not see (as they say in the stories) the position of the Russians from Utitsa to Borodin (he could not see this position, because it did not exist) and did not see the forward post of the Russian army, but came across in pursuit of the Russian rearguard to the left flank of the Russian position, to the Shevardinsky redoubt, and, unexpectedly for the Russians, transferred troops through Kolocha. And the Russians, not having time to engage in a general battle, retreated with their left wing from the position they intended to occupy, and took up a new position, which was not foreseen and not fortified. Having moved to the left side of Kolocha, to the left of the road, Napoleon moved the entire future battle from right to left (from the Russian side) and transferred it to the field between Utitsa, Semenovsky and Borodin (to this field, which has nothing more advantageous for the position than any another field in Russia), and on this field the entire battle took place on the 26th. In rough form, the plan for the proposed battle and the battle that took place will be as follows. If Napoleon had not left on the evening of the 24th for Kolocha and had not ordered an attack on the redoubt immediately in the evening, but had launched an attack the next day in the morning, then no one would have doubted that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of our position; and the battle would take place as we expected. In this case, we would probably defend the Shevardinsky redoubt, our left flank, even more stubbornly; Napoleon would have been attacked in the center or on the right, and on the 24th a general battle would have taken place in the position that had been fortified and foreseen. But since the attack on our left flank took place in the evening, following the retreat of our rearguard, that is, immediately after the battle of Gridneva, and since the Russian military leaders did not want or did not have time to start a general battle on the same evening of the 24th, the first and main action The Battle of Borodino was lost on the 24th and, obviously, led to the loss of the one that was fought on the 26th. After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt, by the morning of the 25th we found ourselves without a position on the left flank and were forced to bend back our left wing and hastily strengthen it anywhere. But not only did the Russian troops stand only under the protection of weak, unfinished fortifications on August 26, but the disadvantage of this situation was increased by the fact that the Russian military leaders did not fully recognize the accomplished fact (the loss of position on the left flank and the transfer of the entire future battlefield to the right to the left), remained in their extended position from the village of Novy to Utitsa and, as a result, had to move their troops during the battle from right to left. Thus, during the entire battle, the Russians had twice as weak forces against the entire French army directed at our left wing. (Poniatowski’s actions against Utitsa and Uvarov on the French right flank were actions separate from the course of the battle.) So, the Battle of Borodino did not happen at all as they describe it (trying to hide the mistakes of our military leaders and, as a result, diminishing the glory of the Russian army and people). The Battle of Borodino did not take place in a chosen and fortified position with forces that were somewhat weaker on the part of the Russians, but the Battle of Borodino, due to the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt, was accepted by the Russians in an open, almost unfortified area with forces twice as weak against the French, that is, in such conditions in which it was not only unthinkable to fight for ten hours and make the battle indecisive, but it was unthinkable to keep the army from complete defeat and flight for three hours.