Creation of the Russian regular army. History of the creation of the regular army in Russia

DISPOSITION OF THE ARMIES The Scottish spearmen were assembled in four large circles, "...these rings are called schiltrons," as Guisborough helpfully points out. He does not say anything about whether the Schiltron front was covered with a barrier of stakes, only writes that “... the fighters stood closely,

The need to create a regular army

The Russian army, created during the reform in the conditions of the grueling Northern War, won numerous victories over a strong enemy. The old armed forces, which Peter inherited from the Moscow state at the beginning of his reign, were unable to cope with such tasks, which was clearly demonstrated during the Crimean campaigns, and then by the failure near Narva at the beginning of the war.

The armed forces of the Russian state in the 17th century had a structure that was characteristic of earlier times: noble cavalry, urban (city army) and rural (staff) militia, as well as the Streltsy army, which appeared under Ivan the Terrible. The local and settlement system of maintaining troops, when after the end of hostilities the nobles returned to their estates, and the archers and staffs returned to crafts and agriculture, did not contribute to increasing the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

It was traditional to invite foreigners to Russian service, and since the end of the 16th century this process has been significantly intensified. This made it possible to become more familiar with Western military systems and gradually learn their positive experience. From the second half of the 17th century, following the model of Western formations, so-called foreign regiments were created from Russians - foot and horse, whose commanders and officers were foreigners invited to Russian service. The greatest preference in hiring was given to the British and Dutch, because Russia had long-standing trade relations with these countries. But still, the majority of the army was made up of local cavalry, armed variably and mostly unsatisfactorily.

Time increasingly urgently demanded the creation of a new type of professional armed forces. It was necessary to tear the warrior away from the land or craft, to make military service the only source of his existence.

Beginning of the formation of the regular army

The formation of a new type of regular army began with four regiments: Lefortov and Gordon, Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, which together numbered just over 20 thousand people. Created and trained in accordance with Western standards, they became the backbone and source of personnel for the new Russian army. After the defeat of the Streltsy uprising, these formations became almost the only fighting force on which the tsar could fully rely. Many people from them later became officers of other units of the regular Russian army.

In the fall of 1699, the Streltsy regiments in Moscow were reformed, and a number of Peter’s associates were instructed to form three divisions of nine regiments each, recruited from datochny people from all over the state, as well as from the “willing” people of Moscow. During the winter of 1699/1700, recruits were delivered to Preobrazhenskoye, where Peter personally, with a list in his hands, determined the suitability of each and himself distributed them into regiments, the command of which was assigned to foreigners who had previously commanded regiments of the “foreign system”. The officers were either mercenaries who were at the disposal of the Foreign Order, or Semyonovtsy and Preobrazhensky soldiers who had undergone good training in the amusing regiments. There was practically no time to train the newly recruited units (only about three months), which resulted in a crushing defeat near Narva. Peter drew the right conclusions from this defeat. It was decided to more actively begin to create a new regular army, especially since the situation was favorable since Charles XII, considering the Russian army completely defeated, turned his main forces against Augustus II.

Since 1699, the principle of recruitment has changed. A recruiting system is being gradually introduced. Militarily, it was progressive for its time, although it placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the common people. The living conditions of the recruits were unbearably harsh, which led to high mortality and mass escapes.

By the end of the first decade of the 18th century, the active field army consisted of 54 infantry regiments (in their including the Guards - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky) and 34 cavalry regiments. The borders and cities were guarded by the so-called garrison regiments - 2 dragoons and 40 infantry, which were formed partly from former regiments of the “foreign system”, and partly from archers.

As for the number and distribution of personnel within each branch of the military, the situation here has changed over time. The infantry was divided into two types - grenadiers and fusiliers. By 1710, in addition to the two guards regiments, 5 grenadier and 47 fusilier regiments were formed. After the victory at Poltava, it was decided to have only 42 field infantry regiments: 2 guards, 5 grenadiers and 35 fusiliers. The remaining field regiments were to be disbanded. The staff of the regiments changed. Until 1704, the regiment had 10 fusilier companies and only a few - 9 fusiliers and 1 grenadier. Since 1704, all regiments had 8 fusiliers and 1 grenadier company. Since 1708, after the unification of all grenadier companies into special regiments, 8 companies remained in the field regiments, reduced to 2 battalions. Only the Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky and Ingermanland regiments had a three-battalion composition (12 companies). According to the states of 1711, the strength of the infantry regiment was 1,487 people. According to the states of 1720, the number remained almost the same (1,488 people), but the ratio of combatant and non-combatant ranks in the regiment changed somewhat. This situation is typical for the main composition of the Russian infantry, if you do not take into account some special formations.

A similar process was going on in the cavalry. In 1702, 10 dragoon regiments were formed, in 1705 - the Life Regiment (the first guards cavalry regiment). According to the states of 1711, it was determined to have 33 dragoon regiments, not counting the life regiment, whose staff consisted of 10 companies (a total of 1328 people in the regiment). According to the states of 1720, there were 33 dragoon regiments and a life regiment left in the cavalry. Among the 33 field regiments, 3 were grenadiers and 30 fuiliers. The strength of the regiment was 1253 people. In 1721, the life regiment was transformed into an ordinary dragoon regiment.

The first regular artillery unit was the bombardment company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1701, a special artillery regiment was formed, consisting of pushkar companies and four bombardment teams, which also had pontoon and engineer companies and assigned ranks. The regiment's stable staff was determined in 1712. Now it consisted of one bombardment and four gunner companies, pontoon and engineering teams and regimental ranks. According to the states of 1723, the structure remained the same, but the number of people increased. All artillery was divided into regimental, field and siege. The regimental was part of the field, but was attached directly to the regiments.

At the same time, the unification of weapons of all branches of the military was carried out, and a single military uniform was introduced. The transition to linear tactics, which in Russia had specific features, is being completed.

Thanks to such transformations, Peter managed to create a mobile, clearly organized and well-armed regular army in a short time. Such a system, despite minor changes, was extremely cumbersome and inconvenient, especially at the level of local territorial administration. All this required the most radical restructuring.

Peter I is without a doubt one of the brightest and most talented statesmen of Russia. The time of his reign fell on the 18th century and it was under him that Russia finally turned into one of the strongest states in Europe, primarily in military terms.

The topic of the reign of Peter I is very extensive, so we will not touch on all of his many achievements, but will only talk about Peter’s reform of the Russian army. The reform envisaged the creation of a new type of army, more efficient and combat-ready. The further course of events showed that Peter’s plan was a brilliant success.

1. What is a regular army and how did it differ from the “old type” Russian army?

First of all, let us note the difference between the personnel (regular) army that Russia acquired during the reign of Peter, and the army that Russia had before the military reforms.

The Russian army of the old type was actually a militia that gathered in case of military necessity. Such an army was completely heterogeneous in composition - it was recruited from among service people, most of whom in peacetime lived on lands allocated to them by the state for service and were engaged in activities far from military affairs (boyars, stolniks, Duma clerks, etc. ) This unit, which formed the basis of the Russian army before the reforms of Peter the Great, was distinguished by the lack of constant military training, uniform weapons and supplies - each soldier was equipped at his own expense.

Another small part of the old type army, somewhat reminiscent of the future regular army, was recruited for permanent service and received a salary from the state (gunners, archers, etc.) This part of the army was more combat-ready and trained, but still its training left much to be desired the best.

The numerous difficulties that such an army encountered when faced with well-trained, prepared and armed troops like the Swedish ones put Russia at an extremely disadvantageous position in the event of a war with such a serious enemy.

What is the fundamental difference between a regular army and an old-type army? First of all, a regular army is a standing army.

Such an army does not disband in the absence of military necessity, but exists and is in a state of combat readiness even in peacetime.

In the absence of military action, she is engaged in military service, training soldiers and officers, maneuvers and tries in every possible way to strengthen her combat potential.

Such an army has a uniform uniform and weapons, as well as a system of organization. The regular army is maintained and supplied by the state.

It is more mobile, better armed and trained, and, accordingly, much better suited for solving foreign policy problems than the militia. Peter I understood all this very well. It was simply impossible to create one of the strongest states in Europe without a regular army - and Peter enthusiastically took on this task.

2. Why was a regular army necessary for Russia?

The main foreign policy task of Peter I was to establish control over the Baltic and access to the Baltic Sea, which provided Russia with a favorable economic and political position.

The main enemy standing in Russia's way in this matter was Sweden, which had a strong, well-equipped and trained regular army. In order to defeat the Swedes, gain a foothold in the Baltic and finally resolve the issue of control over the Baltic Sea in its favor, Russia needed an army that was not inferior to the Swedish one.

Peter diligently, step by step, moved towards reforming the troops.

He drew conclusions from the severe defeat of the Russian army near Narva in 1700, after which he consistently strengthened the combat capability of the Russian army. Gradually, in terms of order, training and organization, the Russian military forces not only reached the level of the Swedish army, but also surpassed it.

The Battle of Poltava in 1709 marked the rebirth of the Russian army. Competent tactical actions of the new Russian regular army became one of the significant reasons for the victory over the Swedish troops.

3. How was the regular Russian army created?

First of all, Peter I changed the procedure for recruiting troops. Now the army was equipped with so-called recruitment kits. A census of all peasant households was carried out and the number of recruits - soldiers who were to be sent to the households to replenish the Russian army - was determined.

Depending on the army's needs for soldiers, different numbers of recruits could be taken from a certain number of households at different times. During active hostilities, more recruits could be recruited from the yards, and accordingly, in the absence of an urgent need for people, fewer recruits. Recruitments were held annually. Peasants who thus became soldiers received liberation from serfdom.

However, it was not enough to recruit soldiers and form an army - it had to be trained.

To do this, Peter I began to hire military specialists from Europe for a lot of money, as well as train his own officers. Military schools were opened - artillery, engineering, and navigation. Commanders were trained on the basis of the best regiments of the Russian land army - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky. in 1716, a military charter was created that determined the procedure for military service.

A well-trained and prepared army required good logistics and supplies.

This problem was also brilliantly solved by Peter. As a result of the transformation of the control system, Provisions, Artillery, Naval orders, etc. appeared. We are not talking about orders - these “orders” were institutions that supplied the army and were responsible for a certain area.

All these measures made it possible to radically transform the Russian army, which literally in 15 years transformed from a “conciliar” army into a modern, well-organized and armed army, with trained soldiers and officers.

Now Russian troops were in no way inferior to European armies. Peter did a truly grandiose job - without the creation of a regular army, the transformation of Russia into a great power with weight in Europe would have been impossible.

18th century, History and politics

Creation of a regular army under Peter I

Recruit kits

Peter did not see the defeat of his army - he was no longer in the camp under the walls of Narva: literally on the eve of the battle, he left for Novgorod, taking with him his favorite Aleksashka Menshikov and the commander-in-chief of the army, Field Marshal F.

A. Golovina.

Of course, the fact that the king abandoned the army on the eve of the decisive battle does not adorn the great commander. But this act was not evidence of cowardice or weakness. It showed Peter's inherent rigid rationalism, a sober recognition of the impending inevitable defeat, a desire to survive in order to continue the fight with renewed energy.

Subsequently, many years after the Battle of Narva, Peter, filling out his famous “Journal, or Daily Note,” came to the idea not only of the inevitability then, in 1700, of defeat, the pattern of this shame, but even of the undoubted benefit that The ill-fated Narva brought all the work that had begun.

Of course, the thought about the benefits of defeat at the initial stage of the war, far from the vital centers of the country, came later, and in the first days after the “Narva embarrassment” he thought about something else: how to preserve what was left and not succumb to panic and despair, for indeed the victory of the Swedes was then “sadly sensual” for Peter.

Internal affairs were more serious: after Narva, Peter clearly realized that the Russian army was not ready to fight its enemy - the Swedish army of Charles XII.

Naturally, the question arises: why was army reform necessary after Narva?

The fact is that the defeat at Narva was on a par with the defeats that plagued the Russian army in the second half of the 17th century. And Peter understood this clearly.

Peter understood the reason for the chronic defeats of the army; he saw that it was necessary to change the very basis on which the military organization was based.

At its core, the regiments of the “new manner” were a type of local army, a new shoot on an old tree. The officers and soldiers of the “new manner” regiments served “from the ground”, enjoyed estate rights, that is, they were landowners.

Peter had no doubt which way to go.

It was in the absence of “order” - a clear organization, “regularity” (a concept that embraces and expresses the meaning and purpose of army reform) - that Peter saw as the reason for the failures of the Russian army in the 17th century, as well as near Narva.

It should be noted that he took the path of “regularity” long before the war with the Swedes. As you know, in 1687, 15-year-old Peter created two “amusing” regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky (named after the palace villages where they were stationed), in which noble children and royal servants served.

Without a doubt, for Peter and his associates, service in the “amusing” became that invaluable military school that gave the young tsar an initial military education and developed those natural abilities that made him an outstanding commander and reformer of military affairs.

In terms of methods and techniques of training, the “amusing” regiments, based on the “regular”, that is, not on the local 6az, became the prototype of the army that Peter began to create on the eve and especially in the initial period of the war with Sweden.

The signal for the creation of regular regiments as the main ones was the dissolution of the Streltsy regiments in 1699 after the suppression of their rebellion in 1698.

In Peter's decrees and other government decrees for 1699, a whole program for creating a new army on principles significantly different from those on which the army of the 17th century was built is clearly visible.

To form new regiments, two methods were chosen: the admission of those who wished - volunteers - as they said then, into the “freedom”, as well as the recruitment of “dachas”.

Everyone was accepted into the “freedom”, with the exception of peasants who were tax-paying, that is, paying state taxes. Among the free people could be, according to the tsar’s decrees, “children of boyars, and from the undergrowth, and Cossack, and Streltsy children, and brothers, and nephews, and backbenchers, and from all other ranks, and from hired working people who sail on ships , except for retired Moscow regiments of archers, and by no means to take tax-paying peasants from the arable land.”

“Datochnye” are basically those armed serfs who previously, together with their landowner masters, went out to a review or war in accordance with established proportions, for example, the landowner had to present at least one armed soldier from every twenty households of his estate.

Now the recruitment of freemen and “dachas” (this practice, which was generally common in the 17th century), acquired a different character, having been changed radically: volunteers were not assigned to soldier regiments of the old, local type, and the “dachas” no longer served, as before, in auxiliary troops - they all became “correct” soldiers of regular regiments.

They were trained according to new regulations and supported by state funds, and they became lifelong military personnel who were not sent home after the war.

Since 1705, the government has taken the next step - it stops accepting the “freemen” and moves on to recruiting so-called recruits directly from the peasant population, which was not the case before.

This was caused by an acute shortage of people in the army, the needs of which could no longer be met by volunteers and “dachas”.

The recruiting system was introduced in 1699. It was based on the system of recruiting soldier and dragoon regiments, established in the second half of the 17th century. The merit of Peter I was that, having rejected all other methods of recruitment, he used domestic experience, which was justified in practice.

With this method of recruitment, the class principle of army organization was firmly established. The soldiers were recruited from peasants and other tax-paying classes, and the officers from the nobles.

All those who signed up were given a salary of 11 rubles a year and food money on a par with the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. The registration of freemen was entrusted to a special commission. Having verified all the data with the census books, the commission decided to recruit data from among the landowner peasants and courtyard servants. It was proposed to recruit into the service only from boyar children, underage Cossacks and Streltsy and free people.

Later, it was allowed to recruit from the Danish people, except “from the arable lands of fugitive peasants.”

The end of recruitment was envisaged in Moscow by December 1, 1699, and in Nizhny Novgorod and the lower cities - by January 25, 1700.

All those who wished to enroll as soldiers were offered to be accepted at the gathering yards “without any delay or bribes.”

As a result of the activities of both commissions, 22,514 people were accepted into the new soldiers of Golovin’s commissions, of which 10,727 people were datochnye and 11,787 people were free, and in the Repnin commission 10,720 people. A total of 33,234 people. Of this number, 32,130 people were sent to the army, and 1,104 people to the navy.

From this contingent, 27 new regiments of soldiers were staffed.

Of these: 8 - in Moscow, 9 - in Novgorod and 10 - in lower cities. In addition to the infantry regiments, at this time two dragoon regiments were formed, staffed by boyar and noble children who reported for military service with their datochniki.

Thus, the beginning of the recruitment system was laid by the decree of 1699, but the decree did not resolve all the organizational issues that arose during the recruitment.

The decree outlined only the general features of the recruitment system. Subsequent decrees, supplementing the law of 1699, completed the formalization of the recruitment system, which finally took shape only in 1705, when unified principles for recruiting field troops were developed. The garrison troops continued to be recruited in the same way.

The collection of recruits was usually carried out by the Local Order through the so-called stations.

Upon receipt of the decree, people were collected at the stations using census books, and here they were formed into “parties” (teams) of 500-1000 people, sworn in and forced to give so-called “mandatory notes” so that the recruits would not run away.

After this, the recruiting teams were transferred to the Military Order, which sent them to the regiments.

In order to clarify the contingent of service people who were supposed to serve as privates, at the end of 1699 a check of their composition was carried out, as a result of which minors aged 15 years and above were enrolled in the service.

The ongoing war required continuous reinforcements.

In this regard, a number of decrees were issued in 1703. Thus, on July 31, 1703, it was proposed to submit personalized lists of all minors to Moscow, and on October 1, it was ordered to send them to military service.

After the registration, all the youngsters who had not previously appeared at the review were ordered to appear for assignment to the dragoon regiments.

The lack of soldiers forced Peter to issue a decree in 1704 to collect previously released Moscow streltsy and streltsy children to Smolensk and enroll them in field and garrison regiments.

The need to replenish the infantry, which suffered heavy losses during the war, forced the decision to collect one person from two households from the Moscow Yamsk town settlements.

To replenish the fleet personnel, a recruitment was carried out, which provided 1000 sailors.

The transition to a unified recruitment system could not be carried out without a firm record of the people who were subject to enlistment for military service. The government decided to first conduct such a census in the Moscow district. The decree of August 17, 1704 on the general census was intended primarily to solve this problem and, in addition, to streamline the flow of funds for the maintenance of the army. However, this could not be done.

The complexity of the task undertaken forced the census to be temporarily stopped. Despite the lack of accurate data on the number of peasants, the government continued to carry out conscription.

In this decree, which required one person at the age of 20 from every 20 households to be sent as soldiers, the word “recruit” was mentioned for the first time, which included a certain content. Attached to the decree were articles given to the officers regarding the collection of Danish soldiers or recruits.

18 articles outlined the basic principles of the recruitment system. Particularly important was the 12th article, which stated, “if of all the datkas, at stations or in his sovereign service, who dies or kills, or runs away, and instead of those, have as soldiers the same people from whom they will be taken, so that those soldiers will always be fully prepared for his sovereign service.”

It was intended to create permanent recruitment areas in this way. However, this system created uneven replenishment conditions. That is why this order of recruitment was maintained for a relatively short time, and then it was necessary to abandon the tempting system of “immortal recruits” altogether and move on to carrying out widespread recruitment according to special decrees. The recruitment of 1705 was somewhat delayed and was extended until September. Thus, from this set a unified acquisition system was established.

Subsequent recruitments were still carried out by the Local Order.

The unevenness of recruitment had a particularly hard impact on the new provinces, which had to be freed from recruitment. The government shifted the recruitment to the rest of the provinces and proposed to be guided by the census books of 1678, and not by the data of 1710.

Since 1711, recruitments were carried out according to orders of the Senate.

In 1711 several recruitments were carried out. Special recruitments were carried out among clerks, coachmen and monastery servants and courtyard people. The first intake included 4,200 people. And the two subsequent recruitments yielded 47,712 people. In the same year, the government tried to create a reserve of recruits. The decree of 1711 clearly expresses this idea: “for the current real military situation, collect again 25 thousand recruits from all provinces; and 7 thousand horses for the dragoon service.” The decree was confirmed in 1712, and it also determined the norms for reserves in the provinces: “recruits must be collected without any delay, so that in each province there will be a recruit in reserve against the regiments assigned to the province.”

The number of reserves was to be half the number of recruits for the field army.

It was proposed to keep recruits at stations in the Moscow, Siberian, Kyiv, Azov, Smolensk, Kazan and Arkhangelogorod provinces and “train them in military art, so that they are in every readiness for service.”

But in 1713, recruitment under this decree was suspended, and again it was decided to recruit regiments from all over the state.

Since 1724, the distribution of recruits was carried out not from house to house, but from person to person. The transition to such a system became possible after the first revision, completed in 1721.

The levies fell heavily on the serfs and state peasants.

The army absorbed the best elements of the village.

The main form of protest against lifelong military service was escape.

Escapes of recruits also occurred in subsequent years. The government resorted to the most severe measures. Military courts sentenced fugitive recruits to whipping, exile to hard labor and even death.

So, in 1701, Peter ordered runaway recruits to be hanged by lot or sent to hard labor. In 1702, he wrote to boyar T. Streshnev: “When you receive this letter, please immediately find these damned fugitives..., having found everyone, beat them with a whip and cut their ears, and in addition, on the 5th of the lot, exile them to Taganrog...”

Decrees on severe punishments for fugitives were issued almost every year.

However, harsh measures did not lead to the desired results. The escapes continued. The concerned government decided to study the reasons for the mass escapes.

A special investigation conducted in 1710 showed that recruits were afraid of the prospect of lifelong service and the inhumane treatment they received during recruitment. According to the instructions of the government, attention was paid to better maintenance of recruits and the responsibilities of the population were somewhat eased.

At the end of 1712, the government announced that the conditions for recruiting would be improved, and took upon itself the supply of recruits along the route.

While improving recruitment conditions, the government at the same time gave instructions to strengthen monitoring of recruits.

In an effort to improve the situation of the recruits, the government for a number of years issued decrees on the forgiveness of fugitives and on their voluntary appearance.

Returning fugitives were not hanged, but were sent to Azov, Siberia or St. Petersburg to serve their service. All cases of fugitive recruits were in charge of a special court at the Military Collegium, which was called the Lower Military Court.

Summing up the manning of the Russian army in the first quarter of the 18th century, the following should be noted:

The recruiting system significantly changed the face of the Russian army.

In the class army, soldiers were recruited mainly from serfs and state peasants, and officers were recruited from nobles.

Recruits were taken on for lifelong service. After taking the oath, they themselves and their children ceased to be serfs. This, of course, was not universal conscription, as noble military historians tried to portray the recruitment system, for the entire burden of recruitment fell on the peasants. The clergy were exempted from military service, and the merchants were paid off and thereby introduced elements of bourgeois relations into the recruitment of troops.

Already at the beginning of the century, the government’s attitude to the issue of recruitment was determined.

It viewed conscription duties in relation to peasants not as personal, but as zemstvo or communal. The government considered the legal entity to be “yards”, and later “taxable souls”, united in a community. Having presented the requirement to supply a certain number of recruits, the government did not care about how the community would organize the selection and in what order the recruits would be distributed among families.

The communities developed a system of priority for families when supplying recruits.

These spontaneously formed rules of “Russian recruitment” were then used by the ruling circles to their advantage. The landowners turned the community (the world) into an instrument of influence on the peasants, allowing them to keep them in line. In the army, the communal principle was also used in the interests of the ruling classes. It made it possible to unite soldiers into artels and oblige them to mutual responsibility.

At the same time, such a selection system played a significant role in strengthening camaraderie among the soldiers, who looked at their unit as “the world,” which increased the morale of the troops.

During the first quarter of the century, the forms of troop mobilization were completely determined.

The collection of recruits took place in the provinces and provinces, and from the 20s, the regiments received their own districts and were replenished on a territorial basis. Beginning in 1716, each regiment assigned officers to a special command to deliver its recruits. The recruits then went directly to the regimental commanders, who distributed them at their discretion. Recruitment made it possible to significantly increase the size of the army and make it combat-ready.

The constant replenishment of the army with untrained recruits created many difficulties: it was necessary to annually train the field army in the basics of military service.

Recruit(from the French récruter - to recruit an army) - a person accepted into military service through conscription or hiring.

• 1 History
• 2 Recruit regiments
• 3 Recruit set
• 4 Recruit families
• 5 Schools
• 6 Famous Recruits
• 7 In other countries
• 8 See
• 9 Literature

Story

Main article: Recruitment duty

In the Russian army and navy (Armed Forces) from 1705 to 1874 - a person enrolled in the armed forces under conscription, to which all tax-paying classes (peasants, townspeople, etc.) were subject and for whom it was communal and lifelong and they supplied a certain number of recruits (military personnel) from their communities. The recruitment of serfs into the armed forces freed them from serfdom.

The nobility was exempted from conscription duties. Later, this exemption was extended to merchants, families of clergy, honorary citizens, residents of Bessarabia and some remote areas of Siberia.

Since 1793, indefinite service was limited to 25 years, from 1834 - to 20 years, followed by a period of 5 years on so-called indefinite leave. In 1855 - 1872, 12-, 10- and 7-year service periods were successively established and, accordingly, 3, 5 and 8 years of leave were established.

Recruitment sets were not produced regularly, but as needed and in varying quantities.

Only in 1831 were annual recruitments introduced, which were divided into regular: 5-7 recruits per 1,000 souls, reinforced - 7-10 people and emergency - over 10. In 1874, after the start of the military reform of Alexander II, conscription was replaced by universal military service, and the word "recruit" is replaced by the word "recruit". In the USSR and modern Russia, the term “liable for military service” is applied to persons subject to service and called up for service.

Recruit regiments

After the introduction of the recruitment system for staffing the armed forces, all regiments were divided into field and garrison ones.

The garrison regiments were training regiments, and reserve ones to replenish field units.

Peter I developed a system in which each recruit had to go through field regiments, garrison regiments (from 1764 garrison battalions), service in civil departments (watchman, messenger, from 1764 in a disabled team), settlement, dismissal for his own support, or to a monastery or almshouse.

The goal of the recruitment system is the fullest use of human resources.

Recruitment set

A personal decree on the recruitment of recruits was issued in the 18th century in September-October (less often in July-August), in the 19th century - in the 30th century. 40s (July), 1844-1855 - different times (most often July-August-September), 1862-1873. - mostly October-November. The recruitment was supposed to take place within 2 months.

Recruits had to be at least two arshins and two vershoks (155 cm) tall, healthy and not disabled.

Each recruit had to have clothes, shoes and food with him. The delivery of recruits to the place of service was ensured by “teachers”: Cossacks allocated by the voivodeship office and soldier teams.

According to the norms of 1766, there were two old soldiers for every 10 recruits, one non-commissioned officer for every 20 recruits, and one chief officer for every 50 recruits.

It was supposed to travel to the place of duty by “direct routes”; in good weather it was supposed to cover 20-30 versts. In bad weather, crossings were reduced by half. Every third day was set aside for rest. Roll call was held twice a day. To prevent escapes, the Senate in 1738 introduced the practice of cutting foreheads at county recruiting stations.

Upon arrival at the scene, a medical examination was carried out. Up to 10% of recruits turned out to be unfit for service due to illness or young age (there are known cases of recruiting 14-year-olds).

Before being distributed among the regiments, the recruits were read military articles weekly and were taught daily drill and rifle techniques. In the barracks it was commanded “not to waste money and provisions or waste them on drink.”

Caricature of the recruitment institute.

Recruit families

Recruits were, as a rule, single, but the wives of recruits were allowed to follow their husbands to the place of duty.

During his service, a soldier could get married with the permission of his regimental superiors. In 1798, 29% of soldiers in the Irkutsk garrison regiment had families. Soldiers' children from 2 to 6 years old received government support.

Schools

At first, there were numeral schools attached to the regiments, and in 1732 there were regimental or garrison schools. Boys began education at the age of 7, and orphans began earlier, as they had no means of food.

After entering school, state support ceased, and a salary was paid instead. In 1731, in the first year - 1 ruble 35 kopecks; after training in writing, singing, arithmetic, music, plumbing and clerking, the salary increased to 1 ruble 59 kopecks per year. After studying geometry and fortification, the salary increased to 2 rubles 7 kopecks per year. In addition, every month a schoolchild was entitled to two quadrangles of flour (two pounds), 1/8 of a quadrangle of cereals, and 2 pounds of salt.

Once every three years, a uniform, a sheepskin coat, trousers, and a hat were issued. Every year, material was supplied for ties, two shirts, two ports, two pairs of shoes with buckles and stockings. Third grade students were given a red cloth to wear on the collar of their caftan.

By decree of September 3, 1736, the education of soldiers' children became compulsory. Those who evaded were subject to a fine of 100 rubles. Since 1721, each garrison regiment created 50 places for soldiers’ children in digital schools.

According to the decree of September 2, 1732, there were 8 student places per company and 64 places per regiment. Since July 1735, it was allowed to accept over-class students. In 1744, digital schools were combined with garrison schools, and everyone was allowed to study in them at their own expense.

Soldiers' children entered service at the age of 15. Those suitable in height and age were sent to the regiments, the rest were assigned to clerks, apprentices of mechanics and blacksmiths, to non-combatant ranks.

In 1805, all soldiers' children were given the name cantonists.

Famous Recruits

• Dostoevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich
• Shevchenko, Taras Grigorievich

In other countries

In the armed forces of some other states, recruits are those recruits who have the lowest military rank.

Recruit means literally “recruited”, “recruited” - that is, a person who has already been accepted into the service, but has not yet received even basic training).

See also

• Military rank
• Table of ranks
• Recruit army
• Military duty
• Person liable for military service
• Recruiting Sergeant (English Burletta)

Literature

• Beskrovny L.G. “The Russian Army and Navy in the 18th Century.”

  Moscow, 1958

• Bykonya G.F. “Cossacks and other service population of Eastern Siberia in the 18th - early 19th centuries. Demographic and class aspect." Publishing house Krasnoyarsk ped.

  University named after V. P. Astafieva. Krasnoyarsk, 2008. ISBN 978-5-85981-287-5

• Hiring a recruit in the half of the 19th century in the Arkhangelsk province. Arkhangelsk, 1912 (Electronic copy of the book)

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To the question: When did the Russian army appear? given by the author Good neighborliness the best answer is Contrary to popular belief, it was not Peter I who began to create the regular army in Russia, but Ivan the Terrible. After the Russian army failed to take Kazan in the summer of 1550, the tsar began reforms. On October 3, 1550, Ivan the Terrible signed a decree dividing the lands around Moscow among 1,000 landowners who occupied key command posts in the army. (It is this date that the Russian General Staff now proposes to consider as the day of the formation of the Russian army.) .
In the period from 1550 to 1571, Ivan IV managed to create the largest army in Europe - up to 300 thousand people, which amounted to about 3% of the population of Rus'. As a result of streamlining the system of recruitment and organization of military service, a local army was created. Its basis was the noble cavalry, formed on the principle of a militia: all owners of estates and estates fit for service were obliged to go on a campaign with their horses, supplies and weapons and fielded one armed warrior for every 50 acres of land they owned. In addition to the local one, Ivan IV organized the Streltsy army. It became the first regular army in Rus' and was recruited from the free urban and non-taxable (not taxed) rural population.
"Ivan Khazarin took part in the education of Svyatoslav the Great, played an important role in preparing Svyatoslav's army for a victorious campaign against the Khazar Khaganate."
"In order to carry out their last great territorial acquisition, the Byzantine emperors call upon the Russian pagan army led by Svyatoslav to fight the Orthodox Bulgarian kingdom."
And only the PROFESSIONAL RUSSIAN ARMY under the leadership of SVYATOSLAV could carry out ITS GREAT CAMPAIGNS and CONQUESTS, as well as resist the BYZANTINE EMPIRE!
Source: History of the RUSSIAN ARMY

Reply from 358392656 [guru]
..when the unification of the principalities began.

Reply from Neurologist[guru]
If we mean the regular army, then its first attempts to create it under Ivan the Terrible (oprichniki) turned out to be ineffective. Then, under Fyodor Mikhailovich, the Streltsy army became obsolete in 50 years, finding itself unable to meet the requirements of modern warfare (unsuccessful campaigns against the Crimean Khan)!
Thus, the first regular army - with conscription and full maintenance of soldiers - appeared under Peter 1 (along with regulations for ranks, etc.)

Reply from stroke[guru]
The army appears simultaneously with the creation of the state and disappears with its disappearance. As soon as you remember when Russia emerged as a state, you will immediately answer your question. But the Charter, composition and method of forming the army are not particularly important. The principle is always the same - the core personnel plus, in wartime, reservists-militia.

The regular Russian army was created under Peter I at the beginning of the 18th century. Its creation was facilitated by the defeat of Russian troops in 1700 near Narva in a battle with the Swedish army. Streltsy regiments and noble cavalry showed their complete helplessness. The Russian army lost more than 6 thousand people and all artillery near Narva.

Peter I introduced a new army recruitment system. It began to be carried out on the principle of recruitment, when 10-20 peasant households, by lot, supplied one person for lifelong military service. The introduction of conscription allowed Peter I to significantly increase the number of standing troops. The officer corps of the Russian army consisted of nobles; for them, public service was mandatory and lifelong. To receive an officer rank, a nobleman had to serve as a soldier in the Guards regiments - Preobrazhensky or Semenovsky.

A new organizational structure of the army was established, and unified states were introduced. The Russian armed forces at this time consisted of a field army and garrison troops. The field army included 2 guards regiments, 5 grenadier (selected infantry) regiments, 35 infantry, 33 cavalry and an artillery regiment.