1939 Russian-Finnish. Soviet-Finnish war. Reasons

The Russo-Finnish War began in November 1939 and lasted 105 days until March 1940. The war did not end with the final defeat of any of the armies and was concluded on terms favorable to Russia (then Soviet Union). Since the war took place during the cold season, many Russian soldiers suffered from severe frosts, but did not retreat.

All this is known to any schoolchild; all this is studied in history lessons. But how the war began and what it was like for the Finns is less often discussed. This is not surprising - who needs to know the enemy’s point of view? And our guys did well, they beat their opponents.

It is precisely because of this worldview that the percentage of Russians who know the truth about this war and accept it is so insignificant.

The Russian-Finnish War of 1939 did not break out suddenly, like a bolt from the blue. The conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland had been brewing for almost two decades. Finland did not trust the great leader of that time - Stalin, who, in turn, was dissatisfied with Finland's alliance with England, Germany and France.

Russia, to ensure its own security, tried to conclude an agreement with Finland on terms beneficial to the Soviet Union. And after another refusal, Finland decided to try to force it, and on November 30, Russian troops opened fire on Finland.

Initially, the Russian-Finnish war was not successful for Russia - the winter was cold, soldiers received frostbite, some froze to death, and the Finns firmly held the defense on the Mannerheim Line. But the troops of the Soviet Union won, gathering together all the remaining forces and launching a general offensive. As a result, peace was concluded between the countries on terms favorable to Russia: a significant part of the Finnish territories (including the Karelian Isthmus, part of the northern and western coast of Lake Ladoga) became Russian possessions, and the Hanko Peninsula was leased to Russia for 30 years.

In history, the Russian-Finnish war was called “Unnecessary”, since it gave almost nothing to either Russia or Finland. Both sides were to blame for its beginning, and both sides suffered huge losses. Thus, during the war, 48,745 people were lost, 158,863 soldiers were wounded or frostbitten. The Finns also lost a huge number of people.

If not everyone, then at least many are familiar with the course of the war described above. But there is also information about Russian-Finnish war, about which it is not customary to speak out loud or they are simply unknown. Moreover, there is such unpleasant, in some ways even indecent information about both participants in the battle: both about Russia and about Finland.

Thus, it is not customary to say that the war with Finland was launched basely and unlawfully: the Soviet Union attacked it without warning, violating the peace treaty concluded in 1920 and the non-aggression treaty of 1934. Moreover, by starting this war, the Soviet Union violated its own convention, which stipulated that an attack on a participating state (which was Finland), as well as its blockade or threats against it, could not be justified by any considerations. By the way, according to the same convention, Finland had the right to attack, but did not use it.

If we talk about the Finnish army, then there were some unsightly moments. The government, taken by surprise by the unexpected attack of the Russians, herded not only all able-bodied men into military schools, and then into the troops, but also boys, even schoolchildren, students in grades 8-9.

Children somehow trained in shooting were sent to a real, adult war. Moreover, in many detachments there were no tents, not all soldiers had weapons - they were issued one rifle for four. They were not issued with draggers for machine guns, and the guys hardly knew how to handle the machine guns themselves. But what can we say about weapons - the Finnish government could not even provide its soldiers with warm clothes and shoes, and young boys, lying in the snow in the forty-degree frost, in light clothes and low shoes, froze their arms and legs and froze to death.

According to official data, during severe frosts the Finnish army lost more than 70% of its soldiers, while the company sergeant major warmed their feet in good felt boots. Thus, by sending hundreds of young people to certain death, Finland itself ensured its defeat in the Russian-Finnish war.

The Soviet-Finnish war remained a “closed” topic for a long time, a kind of “blank spot” (of course, not the only one) in Soviet historical science. For a long time, the course and causes of the Finnish War were kept silent. There was one official version: the policy of the Finnish government was hostile to the USSR. The documents of the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (TSGASA) remained unknown to the general public for a long time.

This was partly due to the fact that the Great Patriotic War ousted the Soviet-Finnish War from minds and research, but at the same time they tried not to deliberately resurrect it.

The Soviet-Finnish war is one of the many tragic and shameful pages of our history. Soldiers and officers “gnawed through” the Mannerheim line, freezing in summer uniforms, having neither proper weapons nor experience of war in the harsh winter conditions of the Karelian Isthmus and the Kola Peninsula. And all this was accompanied by the arrogance of the leadership, confident that the enemy would ask for peace in 10-12 days (that is, they hoped for Blitzkrieg *).

Random nature photos

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It did not add to the USSR either international prestige or military glory, but this war could teach the Soviet government a lot if it had the habit of learning from its own mistakes. The same mistakes that were made in the preparation and conduct of the Soviet-Finnish War, and which led to unjustified losses, then, with some exceptions, were repeated in the Great Patriotic War.

There are practically no complete and detailed monographs on the Soviet-Finnish War containing the most reliable and up-to-date information about it, with the exception of a few works by Finnish and other foreign historians. Although, in my opinion, they can hardly contain complete and up-to-date information, since they give a rather one-sided view, just like Soviet historians.

Most of the military operations took place on the Karelian Isthmus, in close proximity to St. Petersburg (then Leningrad).

When you are on the Karelian Isthmus, you constantly come across the foundations of Finnish houses, wells, small cemeteries, then the remains of the Mannerheim line, with barbed wire, dugouts, caponiers (how we loved to play “war games” with them!), or at the bottom of a half-overgrown crater by chance you will come across bones and a broken helmet (although these may have been the consequences of hostilities during the Great Patriotic War), and closer to the Finnish border there are entire houses and even farmsteads that were not taken away or burned.

The war between the USSR and Finland, which lasted from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940 (104 days), received several different names: in Soviet publications it was called the “Soviet-Finnish War”, in Western publications - “Winter War”, popularly - “ Finnish War", in publications of the last 5-7 years it also received the name "Unknown".

Reasons for the outbreak of war, preparation of the parties for hostilities

According to the “Non-Aggression Pact” between the USSR and Germany, Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR.

The Finnish nation is a national minority. By 1939, the population of Finland was 3.5 million people (that is, it was equal to the population of Leningrad at the same time). As you know, small nations are very concerned about their survival and preservation as a nation. "The small people can disappear, and they know it."

Probably, this can explain its withdrawal from Soviet Russia in 1918, its constant desire, even somewhat painful, from the point of view of the dominant nation, to protect its independence, the desire to be a neutral country during the Second World War.

In 1940, in one of his speeches V.M. Molotov said: “We must be realistic enough to understand that the time of small nations has passed.” These words became a death sentence for the Baltic states. Although they were said in 1940, they can fully be attributed to the factors that determined the policy of the Soviet government in the war with Finland.

Negotiations between the USSR and Finland in 1937 - 1939.

Since 1937, at the initiative of the USSR, negotiations have been held between the Soviet Union and Finland on the issue of mutual security. This proposal was rejected by the Finnish government, then the USSR invited Finland to move the border several tens of kilometers north of Leningrad and lease the Hanko Peninsula for a long term. In exchange, Finland was offered a territory in the Karelian SSR, several times larger in size than the exchange, but such an exchange would not be profitable for Finland, since the Karelian Isthmus was a well-developed territory, with the warmest climate in Finland, and the proposed territory in Karelia was practically wild , with a much harsher climate.

The Finnish government understood well that if it was not possible to reach an agreement with the USSR, war was inevitable, but it hoped for the strength of its fortifications and for the support of Western countries.

On October 12, 1939, when the Second World War was already underway, Stalin invited Finland to conclude a Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance pact, modeled on the pacts concluded with the Baltic states. According to this pact, a limited contingent of Soviet troops was to be stationed in Finland, and Finland was also offered to exchange territories, as discussed earlier, but the Finnish delegation refused to conclude such a pact and left the negotiations. From that moment on, the parties began to prepare for military action.

Reasons and goals of the USSR’s participation in the Soviet-Finnish War:

For the USSR, the main danger was that Finland could be used by other states (most likely Germany) as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. The common border of Finland and the USSR is 1400 km, which at that time amounted to 1/3 of the entire northwestern border of the USSR. It is quite logical that in order to ensure the security of Leningrad it was necessary to move the border further away from it.

But, according to Yu.M. Kilin, author of an article in No. 3 of the magazine "International Affairs" for 1994, while moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus (according to negotiations in Moscow in 1939) would not have solved the problems, and the USSR would not have won anything, therefore war was inevitable.

I would still like to disagree with him, since any conflict, be it between people or countries, arises due to the reluctance or inability of the parties to agree peacefully. IN in this case this war was, of course, beneficial for the USSR, since it was an opportunity to demonstrate its power and assert itself, but in the end it turned out the other way around. In the eyes of the whole world, the USSR not only did not look stronger and more invulnerable, but on the contrary, everyone saw that it was a “colossus with feet of clay”, unable to cope even with such a small army as the Finnish one.

For the USSR, the Soviet-Finnish War was one of the stages of preparation for world war, and its expected outcome, in the opinion of the military-political leadership of the country, would significantly improve the strategic position of the USSR in Northern Europe, and would also increase the military-economic potential of the state, correcting imbalances national economy, which arose as a result of the implementation of largely chaotic and ill-conceived industrialization and collectivization.

From a military point of view, the acquisition of military bases in the South of Finland and 74 airfields and landing sites in Finland would make the USSR’s positions in the North-West practically invulnerable, it would be possible to save money and resources, and gain time in preparation for a big war, but in at the same time it would mean the destruction of Finnish independence.

But what does M.I. think about the reasons for the start of the Soviet-Finnish War? Semiryaga: “In the 20-30s, many incidents occurred on the Soviet-Finnish border of various nature, but usually they were resolved diplomatically. Clashes of group interests based on the division of spheres of influence in Europe and the Far East by the end of the 30s created a real threat of conflict on a global scale, and on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.

At this time, the main factor that predetermined the Soviet-Finnish conflict was the nature of the political situation in Northern Europe. For two decades after Finland, as a result October Revolution gained independence, its relations with the USSR developed in a complex and contradictory manner. Although the Tartu Peace Treaty was concluded between the RSFSR and Finland on October 14, 1920, and the “Non-Aggression Pact” in 1932, which was later extended to 10 years."

Reasons and goals of Finland’s participation in the Soviet-Finnish War:

“During the first 20 years of independence, it was believed that the USSR was the main, if not the only threat to Finland” (R. Heiskanen - Major General of Finland). "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland; the Finnish people... are forever a friend of Germany." (The first President of Finland - P. Svinhuvud)

In the Military Historical Journal No. 1-3 for 1990, an assumption appears about the following reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish War: “It is difficult to agree with the attempt to place all the blame for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War on the USSR. In Russia and Finland they understood that the main culprit of the tragedy It was not our peoples and not even our governments (with some reservations), but German fascism, as well as the political circles of the West, who benefited from Germany’s attack on the USSR. The territory of Finland was considered by Germany as a convenient springboard for an attack on the USSR from the North. historian L. Woodward, Western countries intended, with the help of the Soviet-Finnish military conflict, to push Nazi Germany to war against the USSR." (It seems to me that a clash between two totalitarian regimes would be very beneficial for Western countries, since it would undoubtedly weaken both the USSR and Germany, which were then considered sources of aggression in Europe. The Second World War was already underway and a military conflict between the USSR and Germany could lead to dispersal Reich forces on two fronts and the weakening of its military operations against France and Great Britain.)

Preparing the parties for war

In the USSR, supporters of the forceful approach to resolving the Finnish issue were: People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army Mehlis, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov and People's Commissar of the NKVD Beria. They opposed negotiations and any preparation for war. This confidence in their abilities was given to them by the quantitative superiority of the Red Army over the Finnish (mainly in the amount of equipment), as well as the ease of introducing troops into the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus in September 1939.

"The anti-criminal sentiments led to serious miscalculations being made in assessing Finland's combat readiness."

On November 10, 1939, Voroshilov was presented with the assessment data of the General Staff: “The material part of the armed forces of the Finnish Army is mainly pre-war models of the old Russian Army, partially modernized at military factories in Finland. The rise of patriotic sentiments is observed only among young people.”

The initial plan of military action was drawn up by Marshal of the USSR B. Shaposhnikov. According to this plan (highly professionally drawn up), the main military operations were to be carried out in the coastal direction of Southern Finland. But this plan was designed for a long time and required preparation for war for 2-3 years. The implementation of the “Agreement on Spheres of Influence” with Germany was required immediately.

Therefore in last moment Before the outbreak of hostilities, this plan was replaced by the hastily drawn up “Meretskov plan”, designed for a weak enemy. Military operations according to this plan were carried out head-on in heavy natural conditions Karelia and the Arctic. The main focus was on a powerful initial strike and the defeat of the Finnish Army in 2-3 weeks, but the operational concentration and deployment of equipment and troops was poorly supported by intelligence data. The commanders of the formations did not even have detailed maps areas of combat operations, while Finnish intelligence determined with high accuracy the main directions of the Red Army's attacks.

By the beginning of the war, the Leningrad Military District was very weak, as it was considered secondary. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of August 15, 1935 “On the development and strengthening of areas adjacent to the borders” did not improve the situation. The condition of the roads was especially deplorable.

In preparation for the war, a Military-Economic Description of the Leningrad Military District was compiled - a document unique in its information content, containing comprehensive information about the state of the economy of the North-Western region.

On December 17, 1938, when summing up the results at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, it turned out that in the proposed territory of military operations there were no roads with stone surfaces, military airfields, the level of agriculture was extremely low (the Leningrad region, and even more so Karelia, are areas of risky agriculture, and collectivization almost destroyed what was created by the labor of previous generations).

According to Yu.M. Kilina, blitzkrieg - lightning war - was the only possible one in those conditions, and at a strictly defined time - late autumn - early winter, when the roads were most passable.

By the forties, Karelia had become the “patrimony of the NKVD” (almost a quarter of the population of the KASSR by 1939 were prisoners; the White Sea Canal and Soroklag were located on the territory of Karelia, in which more than 150 thousand people were detained), which could not but affect its economic condition.

Material and technical preparations for war were at a very low level, since it was almost impossible to make up for lost time in 20 years in a year, especially since the command flattered itself with hopes of an easy victory.

Despite the fact that preparations for the Finnish war were carried out quite actively in 1939, the expected results were not achieved, and there are several reasons for this:

Preparations for war were carried out by different departments (Army, NKVD, People's Commissariats), and this caused disunity and inconsistency in actions. The decisive role in the failure of material and technical preparations for the war with Finland was played by the factor of poor controllability of the Soviet state. There was no single center involved in preparations for war.

The construction of roads was carried out by the NKVD, and by the beginning of hostilities the strategically important road Svir - Olonets - Kondushi had not been completed, and the second track was not built on the Murmansk - Leningrad railway, which noticeably reduced its capacity. (The construction of the second track has not yet been completed!)

The Finnish War, which lasted 104 days, was very fierce. Neither the People's Commissar of Defense nor the command of the Leningrad Military District initially imagined the peculiarities and difficulties associated with the war, since there was no well-organized intelligence. The military department did not approach the preparations for the Finnish War seriously enough:

Rifle troops, artillery, aviation and tanks were clearly not enough to break through the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus and defeat the Finnish Army. Due to the lack of knowledge about the theater of military operations, the command considered it possible to use heavy divisions and tank troops in all areas of combat operations. This war was fought in winter, but the troops were not sufficiently equipped, equipped, supplied and trained to conduct combat operations in winter conditions. The personnel were armed mainly with heavy weapons and there were almost no light pistols - machine guns and company 50 mm mortars, while the Finnish troops were equipped with them.

The construction of defensive structures in Finland began already in the early 30s. Many countries Western Europe helped in the construction of these fortifications: for example, Germany participated in the construction of a network of airfields capable of accommodating 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force; The Mannerheim line, the total depth of which reached 90 kilometers, was built with the participation of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium.

The Red Army troops were highly motorized, and the Finns had high level there was tactical and shooting training. They blocked the roads, which were the only way for the Red Army to advance (it’s not particularly convenient to advance in a tank through forests and swamps, but look at the boulders on the Karelian Isthmus, 4-5 meters in diameter!), and attacked our troops from the rear and flanks. To operate in off-road conditions, the Finnish Army had ski troops. They carried all their weapons with them on sleds and skis.

On November 1939, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border with Finland. The initial advance was quite successful, but the Finns launched highly organized sabotage and partisan activities in the immediate rear of the Red Army. The supply of the LVO troops was disrupted, tanks got stuck in the snow and in front of obstacles, and “traffic jams” of military equipment were a convenient target for shooting from the air.

The entire country (Finland) has been turned into a continuous military camp, but military measures continue to be taken: water mining is carried out off the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, the population is evacuated from Helsinki, armed groups march in the Finnish capital in the evenings, and a blackout is carried out. The warlike mood is constantly fueled. There is a clear sense of decline. This can be seen at least from the fact that evacuated residents are returning to the cities without waiting for the “aerial bombardment”.

Mobilization costs Finland colossal amounts of money (from 30 to 60 million Finnish marks per day), workers are not paid wages everywhere, discontent among the working people is growing, the decline of the export industry and increased demand for the products of defense industry enterprises are noticeable.

The Finnish government does not want to negotiate with the USSR; anti-Soviet articles are constantly published in the press, blaming the Soviet Union for everything. The government is afraid to announce the demands of the USSR at a meeting of the Sejm without special preparation. From some sources it became known that in the Sejm, most likely, there is opposition to the government..."

The beginning of hostilities: Incident near the village of Maynila, November 1939, Pravda newspaper

According to a message from the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, on November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops located a kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila were unexpectedly shot from Finnish territory by artillery fire. Seven gun shots were fired, which resulted in the death of three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander and the injury of seven Red Army soldiers and one junior commander.

To investigate the incident, the head of the 1st department of the district headquarters, Colonel Tikhomirov, was called to the scene. The provocation caused a wave of indignation in the units located in the area of ​​​​the Finnish artillery raid."

Exchange of notes between the Soviet and Finnish governments

Note from the Soviet government regarding the provocative shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish military units

On the evening of November 26, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov received the Finnish envoy A.S. Irie-Koskinen and handed him a note from the USSR government regarding the provocative shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish military units. Accepting the note, the Finnish envoy stated that he would immediately communicate with his government and give an answer.

"Mr. Envoy!

On November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops, located a kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired upon by artillery fire from Finnish territory. Seven gun shots were fired, which resulted in casualties among Soviet soldiers.

The Soviet government, informing you about this, considers it necessary to emphasize that during negotiations with Mr. Tanner and Paaskivi, it pointed to the danger created by the concentration of a large number of regular Finnish troops near the border in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad.

Now, in connection with the fact of provocative artillery shelling of Soviet troops from the territory of Finland, the Soviet government is forced to state that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad not only creates a threat to the city, but also represents a hostile act towards the USSR, which has already led to an attack on Soviet troops and victims.

The Soviet government does not intend to inflate this outrageous act of attack by units of the Finnish Army, perhaps poorly controlled by the Finnish command. But it would like to ensure that such outrageous acts do not take place in the future.

In view of this, the Soviet government expresses a strong protest against what happened and invites the Finnish government to immediately withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus to 20-25 kilometers and prevent the possibility of a repetition of the provocation."

People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov.

“In connection with the alleged violation of the Finnish border, the Finnish government conducted an investigation, which established that the shots were fired not from the Finnish side, but from the Soviet side, near the village of Mainila, located 800 meters from the Finnish border.

Based on the calculation of the speed of sound propagation from seven shots, it could be concluded that the guns from which the shots were fired are located at a distance of 1.5-2 kilometers to the Southeast from the place where they exploded... Under such circumstances, it seems possible that this is an unfortunate an incident that occurred during training exercises that took place on the Soviet side and resulted in human casualties. As a result, I consider it my duty to reject the protest set out in your letter and to state that the hostile act against the USSR that you are talking about was not carried out by the Finnish side.

Regarding the statements made to Tanner and Paaskivi during their stay in Moscow, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it was mainly border troops located in close proximity to the border on the Finnish side. There were no guns with such a range that their shells would land on the other side of the border in this zone.

Although there are no specific reasons for withdrawing troops from the border line, my Government is nevertheless ready to begin negotiations on this issue(on mutual withdrawal of troops).

In order to ensure that there is no uncertainty about the alleged incident, my Government proposes to carry out a joint investigation in accordance with the "Convention on Border Commissioners" of September 24, 1928..."

A.S. Irie-Koskinen

“The response of the Finnish Government to the note of the Soviet Government dated November 26, 1939 is a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Finnish Government towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring to the extreme a crisis in the relations between both countries, namely:

Denial of the fact of shelling and an attempt to explain the incident as “training exercises” of the Soviet troops.

The refusal of the Finnish government to withdraw troops and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and Finnish troops, while this would mean the withdrawal of Soviet troops directly to the outskirts of Leningrad.

Thereby violating the terms of the “Non-Aggression Pact” concluded by the USSR and Finland in 1932.

In view of this, the Soviet government considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the “Non-Aggression Pact” concluded by the USSR and Finland and systematically violated by the Finnish government."

We will briefly talk about this war, already because Finland was the country with which the Nazi leadership then connected its plans for further advancement to the east. During Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 Germany, according to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, maintained neutrality. It all started with the fact that the Soviet leadership, taking into account the situation in Europe after the Nazis came to power in Germany, decided to increase the security of its northwestern borders. The border with Finland then passed only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, that is, within range of a long-range artillery gun.

The Finnish government pursued an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union (Ryti was then prime minister). The country's president in 1931-1937, P. Svinhufvud, stated: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.”

In the summer of 1939, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder, visited Finland. He showed particular interest in the Leningrad and Murmansk strategic directions. In Hitler's plans, the territory of Finland was given an important place in the future war. With the help of German specialists, airfields were built in the southern regions of Finland in 1939, designed to receive a number of aircraft that was many times greater than what the Finnish air force had at its disposal. In the border areas and mainly on the Karelian Isthmus, with the participation of German, English, French and Belgian specialists and financial assistance from Great Britain, France, Sweden, Germany and the USA, a powerful long-term fortification system, the “Mannerheim Line”, was built. It was a powerful system of three lines of fortifications up to 90 km deep. The width of the fortifications stretched from the Gulf of Finland to the western shore of Lake Ladoga. From total number 350 defensive structures were reinforced concrete, 2400 were made of wood and earth, well camouflaged. The sections of wire fences consisted of an average of thirty (!) rows of barbed wire. In the supposed areas of the breakthrough, giant “wolf pits” were dug with a depth of 7-10 meters and a diameter of 10-15 meters. 200 minutes were set for each kilometer.

Marshal Mannerheim was responsible for creating a system of defensive structures along the Soviet border in southern Finland, hence the unofficial name - “Mannerheim Line”. Carl Gustav Mannerheim (1867-1951) - Finnish statesman and military leader, President of Finland in 1944-1946. During Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, he served in the Russian army. During the Finnish Civil War (January - May 1918) he led the white movement against the Finnish Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks, Mannerheim became commander-in-chief and regent of Finland (December 1918 – July 1919). He was defeated in the presidential elections in 1919 and resigned. In 1931-1939. headed the State Defense Council. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commanded the actions of the Finnish army. In 1941, Finland entered the war on the side of Nazi Germany. Having become president, Mannerheim concluded a peace treaty with the USSR (1944) and opposed Nazi Germany.

The clearly defensive nature of the powerful fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” near the border with the Soviet Union indicated that the Finnish leadership then seriously believed that its powerful southern neighbor would certainly attack small Finland with a population of three million. In fact, this is what happened, but this might not have happened if the Finnish leadership had shown more statesmanship. The outstanding statesman of Finland, Urho-Kaleva Kekkonen, who was elected president of this country for four terms (1956-1981), subsequently wrote: “The shadow of Hitler in the late 30s spread over us, and Finnish society as a whole cannot renounce the fact that it treated it quite favorably.”

The situation that had developed by 1939 required that the Soviet northwestern border be moved away from Leningrad. The time for solving this problem was chosen by the Soviet leadership quite well: the Western powers were busy with the outbreak of war, and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. The Soviet government initially hoped to resolve the issue of the border with Finland peacefully, without leading to a military conflict. In October–November 1939, negotiations were held between the USSR and Finland on issues of mutual security. The Soviet leadership explained to the Finns that the need to move the border was not caused by the possibility of Finnish aggression, but by the fear that their territory could be used in that situation by other powers to attack the USSR. The Soviet Union invited Finland to enter into a bilateral defense alliance. The Finnish government, hoping for help promised by Germany, rejected the Soviet offer. German representatives even guaranteed Finland that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany would subsequently help Finland compensate for possible territorial losses. England, France and even America also promised their support to the Finns. The Soviet Union did not claim to include the entire territory of Finland into the USSR. The claims of the Soviet leadership mainly extended to the lands of the former Vyborg province of Russia. It must be said that these claims had serious historical justification. Even in the Livonian War, Ivan the Terrible sought to break through to the Baltic shores. Tsar Ivan the Terrible, not without reason, considered Livonia an ancient Russian fiefdom, illegally seized by the crusaders. The Livonian War lasted for 25 years (1558-1583), but Tsar Ivan the Terrible was unable to achieve Russia’s access to the Baltic. The work begun by Tsar Ivan the Terrible was continued and brilliantly completed by Tsar Peter I as a result of the Northern War (1700-1721). Russia gained access to the Baltic Sea from Riga to Vyborg. Peter I personally took part in the battle for the fortified city of Vyborg. A well-organized siege of the fortress, which included a blockade from the sea and a five-day artillery bombardment, forced the six thousand-strong Swedish garrison of Vyborg to capitulate on June 13, 1710. The capture of Vyborg allowed the Russians to control the entire Karelian Isthmus. As a result, according to Tsar Peter I, “a strong cushion was built for St. Petersburg.” Petersburg was now reliably protected from Swedish attacks from the north. The capture of Vyborg created the conditions for subsequent offensive actions by Russian troops in Finland.

In the fall of 1712, Peter decided to independently, without allies, take control of Finland, which was then one of the provinces of Sweden. This is the task Peter set for Admiral Apraksin, who was to lead the operation: “To go not for ruin, but to take possession, although we don’t need it (Finland) at all, to hold it, for two main reasons: first, there would be something to give up in peace, which the Swedes are clearly starting to talk about; another thing is that this province is the mother of Sweden, as you yourself know: not only meat and so on, but also firewood, and if God allows it to reach Abov in the summer, then the Swedish neck will bend more softly.” The operation to capture Finland was successfully carried out by Russian troops in 1713-1714. The final wonderful chord of the victorious Finnish campaign was the famous naval battle off Cape Gangut in July 1714. For the first time in its history, the young Russian fleet won a battle with one of the strongest fleets in the world, which was then the Swedish fleet. The Russian fleet in this major battle Peter I commanded under the name of Rear Admiral Peter Mikhailov. For this victory, the king received the rank of vice admiral. Peter equated the Battle of Gangut in importance to the Battle of Poltava.

According to the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, the Vyborg province became part of Russia. In 1809, by agreement between the Emperor of France Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia Alexander I, the territory of Finland was annexed to Russia. It was a kind of “friendly gift” from Napoleon to Alexander. Readers with at least some knowledge of 19th-century European history will likely be aware of this event. Included Russian Empire Thus the Grand Duchy of Finland arose. In 1811, Emperor Alexander I annexed the Russian Vyborg province to the Grand Duchy of Finland. This made it easier to manage this territory. This state of affairs did not cause any problems for more than a hundred years. But in 1917, the government of V.I. Lenin granted Finland state independence and since then the Russian Vyborg province remained part of the neighboring state - the Republic of Finland. This is the background to the question.

The Soviet leadership tried to resolve the issue peacefully. On October 14, 1939, the Soviet side proposed to the Finnish side to transfer to the Soviet Union part of the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and also to lease the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula. All this area was 2761 sq. km. in exchange, Finland was offered a part of the territory of Eastern Karelia measuring 5528 sq. km. however, such an exchange would be unequal: the lands of the Karelian Isthmus were economically developed and strategically important - there were powerful fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line”, providing cover for the border. The lands offered to the Finns in return were poorly developed and had neither economic nor military value. The Finnish government refused such an exchange. Hoping for help from the Western powers, Finland hoped to work with them to seize Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula from the Soviet Union by military means. But these plans were not destined to come true. Stalin decided to start a war with Finland.

The military action plan was developed under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikova.

The General Staff's plan took into account the real difficulties of the upcoming breakthrough of the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and provided for the necessary forces and means for this. But Stalin criticized the plan and ordered it to be remade. The fact is that K.E. Voroshilov convinced Stalin that the Red Army would deal with the Finns in 2-3 weeks, and victory would be won with little blood, as they say, we’ll throw in our hats. The General Staff's plan was rejected. The development of a new, “correct” plan was entrusted to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. The plan, designed for an easy victory, which did not even provide for the concentration of even minimal reserves, was developed and approved by Stalin. The belief in the ease of the upcoming victory was so great that they did not even consider it necessary to inform the Chief of the General Staff B.M. about the start of the war with Finland. Shaposhnikov, who was on vacation at that time.

They do not always, but often find, or rather create, some reason to start a war. It is known, for example, that before the attack on Poland, the German fascists staged an attack by the Poles on a German border radio station, dressing German soldiers in the uniform of Polish soldiers, and so on. The reason for war with Finland, invented by Soviet artillerymen, was somewhat less imaginative. On November 26, 1939, they shelled Finnish territory for 20 minutes from the border village of Mainila and announced that they had come under artillery fire from the Finnish side. This was followed by an exchange of notes between the governments of the USSR and Finland. In the Soviet note, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov pointed out the great danger of provocation committed by the Finnish side and even reported on the victims it allegedly led to. The Finnish side was asked to withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus 20-25 kilometers and thereby prevent the possibility of repeated provocations.

In a response note received on November 29, the Finnish government invited the Soviet side to come to the site and, based on the location of the shell craters, make sure that it was the territory of Finland that was fired upon. The note further stated that the Finnish side agreed to the withdrawal of troops from the border, but only from both sides. This ended the diplomatic preparations, and on November 30, 1939, at 8 a.m., units of the Red Army went on the offensive. An “unfamous” war began, which the USSR did not want to not only talk about, but even mention. The war with Finland of 1939-1940 was a severe test of the Soviet armed forces. It showed the almost complete unpreparedness of the Red Army to conduct great war in general and wars in the harsh climatic conditions of the North in particular. It is not our task to give any complete account of this war. We will limit ourselves to only describing the most important events of the war and its lessons. This is necessary because 1 year and 3 months after the end of the Finnish war, the Soviet armed forces had to experience a powerful blow from the German Wehrmacht.

The balance of forces on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war is shown in the table:

The USSR sent four armies into battle against Finland. These troops were located along the entire length of its border. In the main direction, on the Karelian Isthmus, the 7th Army was advancing, consisting of nine rifle divisions, one tank corps, three tank brigades and with a large amount of artillery and aviation attached. The number of personnel of the 7th Army was at least 200 thousand people. The 7th Army was still supported by the Baltic Fleet. Instead of competently disposing of this strong group in operational and tactical terms, the Soviet command did not find anything more reasonable than to strike head-on at the most powerful defensive structures in the world at that time, which made up the “Mannerheim Line.” During the twelve days of the offensive, drowning in snow, freezing in 40-degree frost, suffering huge losses, the troops of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the supply line and stopped in front of the first of the three main fortification lines of the Mannerheim Line. The army was drained of blood and could not advance further. But the Soviet command planned to victoriously end the war with Finland within 12 days.

After being replenished with personnel and equipment, the 7th Army continued the fighting, which was fierce in nature and looked like a slow gnawing of fortified Finnish positions, with heavy losses in people and equipment. The 7th Army was first commanded by Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov. (After the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army on May 7, 1940, the rank of “commander of the 2nd rank” began to correspond to the rank of “lieutenant general”). At the beginning of the war with the Finns, there was no question of creating fronts. Despite powerful artillery and air strikes, the Finnish fortifications held out. On January 7, 1940, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northwestern Front, which was headed by Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 13th Army (corps commander V.D. Grendal) was added to the 7th Army. The number of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus exceeded 400 thousand people. The Mannerheim Line was defended by the Finnish Karelian Army led by General H.V. Esterman (135 thousand people).

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Finnish defense system was studied superficially by the Soviet command. The troops had little idea of ​​the peculiarities of fighting in conditions of deep snow, in forests, and in severe frost. Before the start of the battles, senior commanders had little understanding of how tank units would operate in deep snow, how soldiers without skis would go on an attack in waist-deep snow, how to organize the interaction of infantry, artillery and tanks, how to fight against reinforced concrete pillboxes with walls up to 2 meters and so on. Only with the formation of the North-Western Front, as they say, did they come to their senses: reconnaissance of the fortification system began, daily training began in techniques for storming defensive structures; uniforms unsuitable for winter frosts were replaced: instead of boots, soldiers and officers were given felt boots, instead of overcoats - short fur coats, and so on. There were many attempts to take at least one enemy line of defense on the move, many people died during the assaults, many were blown up by Finnish anti-personnel mines. The soldiers were afraid of mines and did not go on the attack; the “fear of mines” that arose quickly turned into “fear of forests.” By the way, at the beginning of the war with the Finns there were no mine detectors in the Soviet troops; the production of mine detectors began when the war was nearing the end.

The first breach in the Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus was made by February 14. Its length along the front was 4 km and in depth - 8-10 km. The Finnish command, in order to avoid the Red Army from entering the rear of the defending troops, took them to the second line of defense. Soviet troops failed to break through it immediately. The front here has temporarily stabilized. On February 26, Finnish troops tried to launch a counteroffensive, but suffered significant losses and stopped attacks. On February 28, Soviet troops resumed their offensive and broke through a significant part of the second line of Finnish defense. Several Soviet divisions crossed the ice of the Vyborg Bay and on March 5 surrounded Vyborg, the second most important political, economic and military center of Finland. Until March 13, there were battles for Vyborg, and on March 12, in Moscow, representatives of the USSR and Finland signed a peace treaty. The difficult and shameful war for the USSR is over.

The strategic goals of this war were, of course, not only to capture the Karelian Isthmus. In addition to the two armies operating in the main direction, that is, on the Karelian Isthmus (7th and 13th), four more armies took part in the war: 14th (divisional commander Frolov), 9th (corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, then V.I. Chuikov), 8th (divisional commander Khabarov, then G.M. Stern) and 15th (2nd rank commander M.P. Kovalev). These armies operated on almost the entire eastern border of Finland and in its north on a front from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea, more than a thousand kilometers long. According to the plan of the high command, these armies were supposed to pull back part of the Finnish forces from the Karelian Isthmus region. If successful, Soviet troops on the southern section of this front line could break through north of Lake Ladoga and go to the rear of the Finnish troops defending the Mannerheim Line. Soviet troops in the central sector (Ukhta area), also if successful, could reach the Gulf of Bothnia area and cut the territory of Finland in half.

However, in both sectors, Soviet troops were defeated. How was it possible, in harsh winter conditions, in dense coniferous forests covered with deep snow, without a developed network of roads, without reconnaissance of the terrain of the upcoming military operations, to attack and defeat Finnish troops, adapted to life and combat activity in these conditions, moving quickly on skis, well equipped and armed with automatic weapons? Marshal's wisdom and more are not required here combat experience to understand that it is impossible to defeat such an enemy under these conditions, and you can lose your people.

In the relatively short-lived Soviet-Finnish war, many tragedies occurred with Soviet troops and there were almost no victories. During the battles north of Ladoga in December-February 1939-1940. Mobile Finnish units, small in number, using the element of surprise, defeated several Soviet divisions, some of which disappeared forever in the snow-covered coniferous forests. Overloaded with heavy equipment, Soviet divisions stretched along the main roads, having open flanks, deprived of the ability to maneuver, and became victims of small units of the Finnish army, losing 50-70% of their personnel, and sometimes even more, if you count prisoners. Here's a concrete example. The 18th Division (56th Corps of the 15th Army) was surrounded by Finns along the road from Uom to Lemetti in the 1st half of February 1940. It was transferred from the Ukrainian steppes. There was no training for soldiers to operate in winter conditions in Finland. Units of this division were blocked in 13 garrisons, completely cut off from each other. Their supply was carried out by air, but it was organized unsatisfactorily. The soldiers suffered from cold and malnutrition. By the second half of February, the surrounded garrisons were partially destroyed, the rest suffered heavy losses. The surviving soldiers were exhausted and demoralized. On the night of February 28-29, 1940, the remnants of the 18th Division, with the permission of Headquarters, began to leave the encirclement. To break through the front line, they had to abandon equipment and seriously wounded people. With heavy losses, the fighters escaped from the encirclement. The soldiers carried out the seriously wounded division commander Kondrashev in their arms. The banner of the 18th division went to the Finns. As required by law, this division, which had lost its banner, was disbanded. The division commander, already in the hospital, was arrested and soon executed by court verdict; the commander of the 56th Corps, Cherepanov, shot himself on March 8. The losses of the 18th division amounted to 14 thousand people, that is, more than 90%. The total losses of the 15th Army amounted to about 50 thousand people, which is almost 43% of the initial strength of 117 thousand people. There are many similar examples from that “unfamous” war.

Under the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty, the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the area north of Lake Ladoga, the territory in the Kuolajärvi region, as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula went to the Soviet Union. In addition, the USSR acquired a 30-year lease on the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The distance from Leningrad to the new state border is now about 150 kilometers. But territorial acquisitions did not improve the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR. The loss of territories pushed the Finnish leadership into an alliance with Nazi Germany. As soon as Germany attacked the USSR, the Finns in 1941 pushed back Soviet troops to pre-war lines and captured part of Soviet Karelia.

before and after the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.

The Soviet-Finnish war became a bitter, difficult, but to some extent useful lesson for the Soviet armed forces. The troops, at the cost of great blood, gained some experience in conducting modern warfare, especially the skills of breaking through fortified areas, as well as conducting combat operations in winter conditions. The highest state and military leadership became convinced in practice that the combat training of the Red Army was very weak. Therefore, specific measures began to be taken to improve discipline in the troops and to supply the army with modern weapons and military equipment. After the Soviet-Finnish war, there was a slight decline in the pace of repressions against the command staff of the army and navy. Perhaps, analyzing the results of this war, Stalin saw the disastrous consequences of the repressions he unleashed against the army and navy.

One of the first useful organizational events immediately after the Soviet-Finnish war was the dismissal from the post of People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of a famous political figure, Stalin's closest ally, “the people's favorite” Klim Voroshilov. Stalin became convinced of Voroshilov's complete incompetence in military affairs. He was transferred to the prestigious position of deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, that is, the government. The position was invented specifically for Voroshilov, so he could well consider this a promotion. Stalin appointed S.K. to the post of People's Commissar of Defense. Timoshenko, who was the commander of the Northwestern Front in the war with the Finns. In this war, Tymoshenko did not show any special leadership talents; rather, on the contrary, he showed weakness as a leader. However, for the bloodiest operation for the Soviet troops to break through the Mannerheim Line, which was carried out illiterately in operational and tactical terms and cost incredibly large casualties, Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. We do not think that such a high assessment of Tymoshenko’s activities during the Soviet-Finnish war found understanding among Soviet military personnel, especially among the participants in this war.

Official data on the losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, subsequently published in the press, are as follows:

total losses amounted to 333,084 people, of which:
killed and died from wounds – 65384
missing - 19,690 (of which over 5.5 thousand were captured)
wounded, shell-shocked – 186584
frostbitten – 9614
sick – 51892

The losses of Soviet troops during the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line amounted to 190 thousand people killed, wounded, and prisoners, which is 60% of all losses in the war with the Finns. And for such shameful and tragic results, Stalin gave the front commander the Golden Star of a Hero...

The Finns lost about 70 thousand people, of which about 23 thousand were killed.

Now briefly about the situation around the Soviet-Finnish war. During the war, England and France provided assistance to Finland with weapons and materials, and also repeatedly offered to its neighbors - Norway and Sweden - to allow Anglo-French troops to pass through their territory to help Finland. However, Norway and Sweden firmly took a position of neutrality, fearing being drawn into a global conflict. Then England and France promised to send an expeditionary force of 150 thousand people to Finland by sea. Some people from the Finnish leadership proposed continuing the war with the USSR and waiting for the arrival of the expeditionary force in Finland. But the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, soberly assessing the situation, decided to end the war, which led his country to relatively large casualties and weakened the economy. Finland was forced to conclude the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940.

Relations between the USSR and England and France deteriorated sharply because of these countries' help to Finland and not only because of this. During the Soviet-Finnish War, England and France planned to bomb the oil fields of Soviet Transcaucasia. Several squadrons of the British and French Air Forces from airfields in Syria and Iraq were to bomb oil fields in Baku and Grozny, as well as oil piers in Batumi. They only managed to take aerial photographs of targets in Baku, after which they headed to the Batumi area to photograph oil piers, but were met by fire from Soviet anti-aircraft gunners. This happened at the end of March - beginning of April 1940. In the context of the expected invasion of France by German troops, plans for the bombing of the Soviet Union by Anglo-French aircraft were revised and ultimately were not implemented.

One of the unpleasant results of the Soviet-Finnish war was the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, which lowered the authority of the Soviet country in the eyes of the world community.

© A.I. Kalanov, V.A. Kalanov,
"Knowledge is power"

After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany went to war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to strain. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on delimiting spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.

Realizing that a major war was inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be shelled by artillery from Finnish territory. Therefore, the task was to move the border further north. To resolve the issue peacefully, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They didn't want to come to an agreement.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was an incident near the village of Mainila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Maynila was subjected to artillery shelling, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov summoned the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and presented a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and that the only thing that saved him from starting a war was that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main provisions of the answer were as follows:

• The shelling actually took place and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
• The shelling came from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Maynila.
• It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What really happened near the village of Maynila? This important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. The only thing that can be stated unequivocally is that there really was shelling of the village of Maynila, but who carried it out is impossible to establish through documentation. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and each needs to be evaluated. The first version is that Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version is that it was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians talk about two reasons:

1. The Finns were a political tool in the hands of the British, who needed war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we remember the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident a world war was already underway, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and this alliance would sooner or later hit England itself with all its might. Therefore, to assume this is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not the case.
2. They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is an absolutely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. It's nonsense. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long defense that would exhaust the enemy. With such situations, no one will disturb the den with the bear.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation of the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was subsequently presented to Soviet society as an example of the treachery of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

Balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is summary table, which describes how the opposing countries approached the Winter War.

In all aspects except infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But conducting an offensive, superior to the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. The Soviet army had problems with all three aspects. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

Progress of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7th 40th) and the second (January 7th 40th - March 12th 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and establishing order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to carry it out briefly. The USSR army actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was the following - to help the people of Finland in overthrowing the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. They even mentioned a figure of 3 weeks as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The Soviet command's plan was approximately as follows:

• Send in troops. We did this on November 30th.
• Creation of a working government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on this later).
• Lightning-fast attack on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
• Declining the real government of Finland towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. The blitzkrieg did not work out, and the army was stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in the initial days of the war, until approximately December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they stumbled upon the Mannerheim line. On December 4, the armies of the eastern front (near Lake Suvantojärvi), on December 6 - the central front (Summa direction), and on December 10 - the western front (Gulf of Finland) entered it. And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to encounter a well-fortified defense line. And this is a huge question for the Red Army intelligence.

In any case, December was a disastrous month that thwarted almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops advanced inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

1. Terrain. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. It is difficult to use equipment in such conditions.
2. Application of aviation. Aviation was practically not used in terms of bombing. There was no point in bombing villages adjacent to the front line, since the Finns were retreating, leaving behind scorched earth. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they were retreating with civilians.
3. Roads. As the Finns retreated, they destroyed roads, caused landslides, and mined everything they could.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on territory already captured by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish people's government included:

• Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs – Otto Kuusinen
• Minister of Finance – Mauri Rosenberg
• Minister of Defense - Axel Antila
• Minister of the Interior – Tuure Lehen
• Minister of Agriculture – Armas Eikia
• Minister of Education – Inkeri Lehtinen
• Minister for Karelia Affairs – Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly, it looks like a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of its formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finnish Democratic Republic). December 2 is signed new agreement- about mutual assistance. From this moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution took place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this fortification system that all the world generals recognized its impregnability. This was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.

The Mannerheim Line (as it received this name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was approximately the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, it should be noted the difficult terrain conditions of the Mannerheim Line. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore a defense line did not require large number fortifications

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim Line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to occupy the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success came to be called the “Miracle of Summa.” Subsequently, the line was broken on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who spoke of Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and the outbreak of war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role it had been assigned following the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany left it, refusing to comply with the demands of the League of Nations for disarmament and simply left the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14, the League of Nations de facto ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second stage of the war

On January 7, 1940, the Headquarters of the Northwestern Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a break, and no active operations were carried out until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful attacks began on the Mannerheim line. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksy-Karkhul sector. After this, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was a turning point in the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin advancing deeper into the country. We advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but the main thing was that we advanced. Early March soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.

This effectively ended the war, since it was obvious that Finland did not have large forces and means to contain the Red Army. From that time on, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its terms, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be harsh, because the Finns forced them to start a war, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.

Why did the war last so long

According to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to end in 2-3 weeks, and the decisive advantage was to be given by the troops of the Leningrad district alone. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

• Poor organization of troops. This concerns the poor performance of the command staff, but big problem- coherence between military branches. She was practically absent. If you study archival documents, then there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
• Poor security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was fought in winter and in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And at the same time, the army was not provided with winter clothing.
• Underestimating the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. The plan was to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without war, attributing everything to the border incident of November 24, 1939.
• Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (primarily) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, airplanes, and so on. The greatest efforts were made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded a solution to all problems, restoration of order in the army and a speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent this was achieved. And quite quickly. The Soviet offensive in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplinedly, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos about the situation at the front were accompanied by a postscript - “an explanation of the reasons for the failures.” I will give some quotes from Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5518/B dated December 14, 1939:

• During the landing on the island of Sayskari, a Soviet plane dropped 5 bombs, which landed on the destroyer "Lenin".
• On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired upon twice by its own aircraft.
• When occupying the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing forces, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several shots in bursts. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then next I want to give examples of how the equipment of the Soviet army took place. To do this, let us turn to Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5516/B dated December 14, 1939:

• In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass enemy fortifications. This was not possible, since the Headquarters received 3,000 pairs of skis with broken points.
• The new arrivals from the 363rd Signal Battalion include 30 vehicles in need of repair, and 500 people wearing summer uniforms.
• The 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived to replenish the 9th Army. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 are in good condition, out of 150 machines - 90. 80% of the personnel are not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the backdrop of such events there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, on December 14, 430 people deserted from the 64th Infantry Division.

Help for Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria’s report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455/B.

Finland is helped by:

• Sweden – 8 thousand people. Mainly reserve personnel. They are commanded by career officers who are on “vacation.”
• Italy - number unknown.
• Hungary – 150 people. Italy demands an increase in numbers.
• England - 20 fighter aircraft are known, although the actual number is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 took place with the support of the Western countries of Finland was the speech of Finnish Minister Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Havas. Below I quote the literal translation from English.

The Finnish people thank the English, French and other nations for the assistance they provide.

Greensberg, Minister of Finland

It is obvious that Western countries opposed the USSR aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I would also like to show a photo of Beria’s report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Conclusion of peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its terms for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The peace terms were as follows:

1. The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and islands.
2. The western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexgolm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
3. Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
4. Hanko Island with its maritime territory and base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR paid 8 million German marks for rent annually.
5. The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
6. On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.

USSR losses

The question of the number of USSR soldiers killed during the Soviet-Finnish War is still open. The official history does not answer the question, speaking in veiled terms about “minimal” losses and focusing on the fact that the objectives were achieved. There was no talk about the scale of the Red Army's losses in those days. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the success of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures for the losses of the 139th Infantry Division over 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). The losses are as follows:

• Commanders - 240.
• Privates - 3536.
• Rifles - 3575.
• Light machine guns – 160.
• Heavy machine guns – 150.
• Tanks – 5.
• Armored vehicles – 2.
• Tractors – 10.
• Trucks – 14.
• Horse train - 357.

Belyanov's memo No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, rank and file - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And during these 2 weeks, of which only the last was actually combative, the OFFICIAL figures are losses of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people suffered frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on USSR losses in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 people killed and 158,863 people wounded and frostbitten. These are official figures and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians give different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said that between 150 and 500 thousand people died. For example, the Book of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that in the war with the White Finns, 131,476 people died, went missing, or died from wounds. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are listed as follows: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, points to both absolutely negative and absolutely positive aspects. The negative is the nightmare of the first months of the war and the huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and early January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. That's how it really was. But there was also a positive aspect: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of its army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army was the Civil War. We will not analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites now (after all, we are now talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks do not lie in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to just quote one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble needs to be disbanded as soon as possible.

Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR had its head in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting in January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. This is very easy to prove. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim Line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, and trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, even then began to talk about the need for peace.

Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, there were 5,393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. Captured Red Army soldiers were divided into the following groups:

• Political leadership. It was political affiliation that was important, without singling out rank.
• Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
• Junior officers.
• Privates.
• National minorities
• Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards representatives of the Russian people. The privileges were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who was in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern camp. Within three months, ensure all necessary measures are taken to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, refer cases to court.

Stalin

The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoschenko, informing that 5277 people had arrived at the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to it, the Southern camp “receives” 5,157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish “cuckoos”

“Cuckoos” is what Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit in trees and shoot almost without missing. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disoriented the soldiers.

Stories about “cuckoos” are one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to large quantities. It’s hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at air temperatures below -30 degrees, was able to sit on a tree for days, while firing accurate shots.

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–40 (another name is Winter War) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

The formal cause of hostilities was the so-called Mainila incident - artillery shelling from Finnish territory of Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which, according to the Soviet side, occurred on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.

The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. As a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on the adoption of measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the original Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.

Despite the fact that a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Finland and the USSR in 1932, relations between the two countries were quite tense. In Finland they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), might give its territory to another unfriendly country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city of the USSR, Leningrad, was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.

During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland moves into the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.

In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to achieve the exchange of part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as the transfer of several islands and parts of the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories being given to it (not least because of its reluctance to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see. And ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to armament of the demilitarized Åland Islands.

The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). The last attempt was the USSR's proposal on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.

Negotiations dragged on and reached a dead end. The parties began to prepare for war.

On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to begin preparations for military operations. Newspaper article "Is it true" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intends to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.

Less than a month remained before the Maynila incident, which served as a formal reason for the war.

Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not happen at all, but there were only unsubstantiated statements by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. There are no documents confirming this or that version. Finland proposed a joint investigation of the incident, but the Soviet side harshly rejected the proposal.

Immediately after the start of the war, official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called "The People's Government of Finland", formed from communists and headed by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, the "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, it did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.

The Soviet Union planned to launch military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army was able to make maximum use of its advantage in manpower and its overwhelming advantage in technology. According to the time frame, the operation should have taken place within a period of two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on stabilizing the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold off the enemy for up to six months and then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated the strength of Finland, but Finland did too much big bet for the help of foreign powers and for the reliability of their fortifications.

As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland there was a general mobilization. The USSR decided to confine itself to parts of the Leningrad Military District, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.

As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies attacked Finland. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in Karelia, and the 14th Army in the Arctic.

The most favorable situation for the USSR developed on the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland’s access to Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defense to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to advance successfully, but was also stopped, with part of its forces being surrounded and forced to withdraw. The heaviest and bloodiest battles took place in the sector of the 7th Army, which was advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army had to storm the Mannerheim Line.

As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely meager information about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. Underestimating the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, the Red Army units with losses were able to overcome only the support zone of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were also unsuccessful. By the end of December it became obvious that attempts at an offensive in this style were pointless. There was relative calm at the front.

Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant reinforcement of troops, saturation of them with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods of combating defensive structures were developed, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches and to raise morale (see. ).

The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military District Military Council Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.

Finland at this moment also carried out measures to increase the combat effectiveness of its own troops. Both new equipment and weapons captured in battles and those supplied from abroad were put into service, and the units received the necessary reinforcements.

Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.

At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.

The most famous in the historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war during that period was the encirclement of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the 9th Army near Suomussalmi. Since mid-December, the 44th Division had been advancing to help the encircled 163rd Division. In the period from January 3 to January 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite the difficult situation, they continued to fight, having superiority in technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting and a rapidly changing situation, the division command incorrectly assessed the current situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving behind the heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division were still able to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the line.

It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns tried to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were unsuccessful and were repulsed.

On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of Finnish defense and brought tank formations into the breach. On February 17, Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.

On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.

In parallel with the fighting, there were battles on the diplomatic front. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and the entry of Soviet troops into the operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the struggle. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded.

As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus went to the USSR and major cities Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas. Lake Ladoga became an internal lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between Western countries and the USSR has reached a critical point.

Recommended reading:
1. Irincheev Bair. Stalin's Forgotten Front. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: Unknown wars of the 20th century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b.: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter War. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939–1940. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. “Winter War”: working on mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army to summarize the experience of the Finnish campaign / Responsible. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer Garden, 2003.

Tatiana Vorontsova