The achievements of German scientists make an important contribution to modern world science (for the history of science in Germany, see the section “ Ethnic history"), a special area of natural, mathematical and technical knowledge. But the Bonn government seeks to subordinate science, and especially scientific, technical and engineering activities, to the purposes of preparing for war. Huge funds are allocated for scientific works by the military department, while peaceful scientific institutions receive very little financial support. Honest German scientists strongly oppose such a policy: for example, in April 1957, 18 outstanding scientists, specialists in atomic physics, made a bold statement against the military use of atomic energy. They were supported by thousands of professors, teachers and students.
As for the humanities, the vast majority of their representatives in Germany are dominated by bourgeois ideology, and many of them defend reactionary concepts. So, in recent years V historical science the so-called doctrine of eastern lands (Ostforschung ), in ethnography - the so-called Volkskunde der N eimatvertriebenen (ethnography of settlers from the former East Prussia and other eastern regions).
Numerous scientific institutions of Germany are grouped, in addition to universities, around several Academies: Göttingen, Heidelberg and Munich; in 1949, a new Academy of Sciences and Letters was opened in Mainda.
There are quite a lot of ethnographic institutions in Germany: firstly, the departments of ethnography (ethnology, ethnic studies, anthropology, etc.) at universities (Bonn, Frankfurt am Main, Göttingen, Hamburg, Kiel, Cologne, Mainz, Munich, Münster, Tübingen); secondly, ethnographic museums (in Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Bremen, Kiel, Cologne). Some of them have the richest ethnographic collections from all parts of the world. There is the German Society for Cultural Morphology (the ideological legacy of Frobenius), the German Society for Ethnic Studies. A number of ethnographic journals, works of museums and ethnographic institutes are published (“Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie”, “Mitteilungen des Hamburgischen Museums fur Volkerkunde”, “Paideuma”, “Ethnologica”, “Baessler-Archiv”, etc.) from prominent West German bourgeois ethnographers we can name Jensen, Trimborn, Nevermann, Plischke, Dittmer, Pessler (now deceased), Scheer, Peukert, etc.
In the GDR, science develops differently. Everything is here scientific activity placed at the service of the people, it contributes in every possible way to the construction of socialist forms of life.
The leading scientific institution is the German Academy of Sciences in Berlin. She combines work 26 scientific institutes(one of them is the Institute of German Ethnography), 4 laboratories, 20 others scientific institutions. In 1951, the independent German Academy of Agricultural Sciences, as well as the German Academy of Construction, emerged from the Academy of Sciences. The German Academy of Arts is located in Berlin. In Leipzig there is the Saxon Academy of Sciences, in Halle there is the German Academy of Natural Scientists.
In addition to the above-mentioned Institute of the German Academy of Sciences, ethnography is also carried out by the Institute of German and General Ethnography at the Humboldt University of Berlin, the Institute of Ethnography and Comparative Law at the University of Leipzig (founded by the late Professor Julius Lips), the Institute of Sorbian Folk Studies in Bautzen, as well as a number of ethnographic museums. Ethnographers of the GDR are successfully mastering the Marxist method of research and have already made a significant contribution to world ethnographic literature.
The GDR has a wide network of libraries, including many scientific libraries. The largest German scientific library is located in Leipzig - 2.2 million volumes. In Berlin (GDR), on the basis of the former Prussian State Library, the German State Library was created with a collection of 1.8 million volumes. During the war, part of the collections of the former Prussian Library and other libraries of the GDR were taken to Marburg and other cities of West Germany. There are large libraries at the universities of Leipzig and Jena (more than 1 million volumes each), in Dresden and other cities.
In Germany, the largest library (2.1 million volumes) is the Munich State Library. It is followed in terms of the wealth of collections by the university libraries of Munich, Göttingen, Darmstadt, Heidelberg, Stuttgart, Cologne, Bonn and Hamburg.
In West Berlin there is a large library at the so-called Free University.
Development of culture after 1945
After the defeat of Nazism, the German people faced a difficult and important task- restore healthy traditions cultural life. It was necessary to gather the surviving cultural forces and direct their activities along a democratic path. Subordinated his activities to this task Kulturbund (Union of Culture), created on the initiative of progressive democratic intellectuals immediately after the end of the war. In June 1945, the Kulturbund united the activities of its member cultural organizations: the Union of German Writers, the Union German composers and musicians, the Union of Artists. The first chairman of the Kulturbund was the famous German communist poet Johannes R. Becher. The organs of the Union are the newspaper "Sonntag" and the magazine "Aufbau".
“Kulturbund” conducts systematic propaganda work, helps the development of all progressive democratic movements in literature, music, theater, painting, etc. It tries in every possible way to strengthen the ties of the progressive intelligentsia with the working and peasant masses, fights against militarism and revanchism, against relapses of Nazi ideology. Kulturbund works hand in hand with the German-Soviet Friendship Society. It is not surprising that the authorities of West Germany and West Berlin banned the activities<<Культурбунда».
In the GDR, cultural achievements not only became the property of the people, but the workers and peasants themselves participated in the creation of socialist culture. Amateur artistic activity among working people developed widely in the GDR. The Central House of Folk Arts in Leipzig took over the general management of clubs and amateur art groups.
Since 1955, regional Houses of Folk Art have existed in all regions of the GDR. Courses were created to train leaders of circles for both cities and villages. The state annually allocates significant sums for the development of amateur performances. In addition, trade unions finance mass cultural work. Over a seven-year period, it is planned to build 12 more new Houses of Culture for 9 thousand places in industrial centers and 65 (for 30 thousand places) in small towns and villages. Some amateur artistic groups have grown into ensembles that are widely known outside the GDR (see section “Folk Dances”).
On May 18, 1955, the Council of Ministers of the GDR established prizes “For Folk Artistic Creativity”, which are awarded to the best amateur groups and performers. In Berlin and other cities, exhibitions of works by amateur artists (watercolors, graphics, oil paintings, wood engravings, etc.) are organized.
Representatives of amateur performances from Germany often take part in meetings of representatives of folk art of the GDR. Thus, in August 1955, 7 thousand West German choristers took part in the third Wartburg meeting of singers. An all-German festival of German folk dance was held in Rudolfstadt, days of German folk music were held in Eisenach, a festival of German amateur art was held in Schwerin, etc.
In 1959, at a conference in Bitterfeld, a new stage of cultural development in the GDR was laid - closer cooperation between professional artists and amateur workers.
In Germany and West Berlin, the work of cleansing culture from Nazi ideology is extremely difficult due to the fact that the ruling circles there actually encourage revanchism, militarism and neo-Nazism. But progressive cultural figures and democratic intellectuals in West Germany do not stop fighting for the development of the culture of a peace-loving, democratic Germany.
Music
The musical culture of the German people stands very high (as already mentioned in the section “Ethnic History”). Works of great German composers of the 17th-19th centuries. has folk roots, although at that time their works were little accessible to the oppressed masses. Along with the rise of the labor movement in the second half of the 19th century. attempts were made to bring music closer to the people. Workers' choral circles appeared (in Leipzig and other places). The leader of one of the workers' choral circles was August Bebel. In 1877, the General Workers' Singing Union was created. In 1878, a revolutionary songbook was published. Later, the workers' musical movement, whose leadership fell into the hands of opportunists, merged with the burgher singing verein.
Now in the GDR, musical culture is penetrating ever deeper into the mass of the population. The Leipzig Gewandhaus - a symphony orchestra that originated in the Middle Ages as a guild ensemble of tailors. He regularly performs classical music concerts in Kongresshalle (a concert hall built by the composer Mendelssohn), tours in other cities and abroad. In Leipzig, in the Church of St. Thomas, where the great Bach once worked and performed and where he is buried, his famous “Passion” and other works are still performed. The “Thomaner Choir” - the boys’ choir is far known outside the GDR, as well like the Dresden Kreutzchoir and the Staatskapelle, the Berlin Philharmonic and other musical ensembles. Some city orchestras (for example, the district orchestra of the city of Pirna, etc.) systematically perform in rural communities, even the smallest ones, introducing the population to music. In addition, it is customary to organize concerts at enterprises, agricultural cooperatives and MTS. Since 1955, “rural music days” have been held every year in all districts of the GDR.
The network of music schools and conservatories is growing, amateur musical activities are expanding ( Laienkunst ).
There are good opera houses, where operas by German, Russian and other classics are staged, as well as works by modern composers, in Berlin and Dresden. At 19.60 the opera house was opened in Leipzig.
In May 1962, a Music Council was created in the GDR, headed by President Hans Eisler (died September 6, 1962), a famous German composer, author of the national anthem of the GDR. Professor Nathan Notovich was elected Secretary General of the Council. The task of this Council is to guide the musical life of the GDR.
And in Germany the musical life is successfully developing. In big cities there are symphony orchestras, opera houses, and philharmonic societies. The church choirs in the cathedrals of Aachen, Cologne, and Regensburg are widely known. Progressive musical figures are trying to bring musical culture to the masses (Workers' Society for Musical Education and Musical Culture). Music festivals have been held annually in Düsseldorf since 1951 ( Musicmesse ). Many large cities in Germany have their own opera houses. Performances of Wagner's operas have resumed in Bayreuth. Classical operas generally occupy a predominant place in the repertoire of opera houses. However, along with this, music such as rock and rolls, twists, etc. is also spreading in Germany. Modernist “operas” are increasingly being staged, including such as “Abstract Opera No. 1” by Boris Blacher, about to which the West Berlin newspaper Tagesspiegel wrote: “this is an opera devoid of the brilliance of illusions, scenery and costumes, an opera without characteristic images and destinies, without any content and even without words.”
SCIENCE IN GERMANY UNDER THE NAZIS
Nazi rule led German science to a disaster of unprecedented proportions, from which the country was never able to recover.
Germany has long been a country of science. Already in the Middle Ages, German universities became widely known in Europe and were revered as exemplary educational institutions, where young men from many countries sought education. When Peter I created the Academy of Sciences in Russia and the first St. Petersburg University in the country, he attracted most of the personnel for them from Germany. This connection between Russian and German science survived until the beginning of the 20th century. Many subsequently outstanding Russian scientists were educated at German universities (encyclopedist M.V. Lomonosov, physicists P.N. Lebedev and A.F. Ioffe, etc.).
The onset of the 20th century was marked by the further development of German science, especially in the field of mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology and medicine, technology, as well as philosophy, sociology, psychology, etc. There were over 20 universities in the country, many research institutes and laboratories: university and at companies, as well as five Academies of Sciences: in Berlin, Heidelberg, Göttingen, Leipzig and Munich. The awarding of Nobel Prizes, which began in 1901, confirmed Germany's position as the world's leading scientific country. Already in the early 1930s, 32 Nobel laureates lived in Germany - more than in any other country in the world!
Hitler's rise to power in 1933 radically changed the situation in Germany and, accordingly, the situation in its science. Firstly, the new authorities began to systematically intervene in university life in order to encourage scientists to study applied topics necessary for the Nazis to prepare the country for a new war. Thus, the main commandment of the scientist was violated: “...science does not tolerate coercion...” (Charter of Moscow University as amended by M.V. Lomonosov, 1755). Secondly, the Nazi leadership, which had already divided the country’s population into “Aryans” and “non-Aryans”, naturally with restrictions on the rights of the latter, tried to carry out this division in the field of science.
This violated another fundamental principle of science: “Science is international” or, in Einstein’s language, “science cannot be German or Jewish, it can only be right or wrong.” Thirdly, energetic attempts were made to involve scientists in solving the problems of ideological justification of National Socialism. Thus, the third fundamental principle of science was violated: “Science is engaged in the search for truth. Justification (justification) of what has already been accepted as truth a priori is not her business.”
The violation of the fundamental principles on which science is built by the Nazi leadership in Germany had catastrophic consequences for German science. Let's name some of them.
Mass emigration of German scientists
Since 1933, that is, since Hitler came to power, the mass emigration of German scientists began. It lasted until 1940 and led to the departure of a huge number of outstanding scientists from the country. Only 29 of the 32 Nobel laureates left, that is, 90%! Many outstanding scientists who were not laureates also left. Let us name the names of some scientists who left Germany forever during these years: physicists A. Einstein, G. Bethe, M. Born, L. Meitner, O. Stern, E. Teller, mathematicians J. von Neumann, R. Courant, mechanic T. von Karman, chemists F. Haber, O. Mayerhof, R. Willstetter, psychologist E. Fromm, psychiatrist Z. Freud. As a result, the largest, world-famous German scientific schools were destroyed, and Germany lost the ability to carry out large-scale scientific and technological projects.
When explaining the “brain flight” from Nazi Germany, most researchers cite the militant anti-Semitic policies of the country’s Nazi leadership as the main reason. This is not entirely true. Of course, this policy pushed Jews out of the country, first of all. , including prominent scientists, because for these people living in Germany after 1933 became unsafe. However, a significant number of prominent German scientists - “pure Aryans”, who were not physically threatened in the country, also preferred to emigrate because they could not accept Nazism. They condemned the authorities’ persecution of their Jewish colleagues and sympathized with them, did not agree with attempts to switch science to a military track, and protested against the authorities’ desire to ideologize science and use it to justify Nazism, but they did all this secretly, not publicly. In addition, they understood that given the prevailing situation in the country of lack of freedom and coercion, it was impossible for a conscientious person to engage in science. However, these people constituted a minority of German scientists.
Transition to implementation of current scientific and technical developments
During the 1930s, the largest industrial concerns in Germany lost most of their leading scientists and specialists as a result of “brain flight” from the country. Under these conditions, they were forced to curtail the major scientific research that they had carried out in previous years and move on to carrying out current scientific and technical developments on government orders related to the war.
The most indicative here is the fate of one of the world's largest German chemical concerns, I.G. Farbenindustry". Before the Nazis came to power, this concern had been developing and
production of a wide range of paint and varnish products and became famous in the world for the special quality of the paints and varnishes produced. The level of work of this concern is clearly characterized by this “detail”: several Nobel laureates worked there! (How many such concerns does the reader know?) After 1933, I.G. Farbenindustry, by order of the government, began producing artificial liquid fuel and artificial rubber for the needs of the German army for car tires. Subsequently, for this purpose, the concern built two factories in the Auschwitz extermination camp, where the labor of camp prisoners was used. But the concern became especially famous during this period for the development and production of military and other toxic substances. It was with the help of these toxic substances that 4 million people were exterminated in Auschwitz. For this, the concern “I.G. Farbenindustry was recognized as a criminal organization at the Nuremberg trials, and its leaders were subsequently convicted as war criminals.
Using the ideas of misanthropic pseudoscience
To justify the most important component of the ideology of Nazism - racial theory (anti-Semitism was one of the important points of this theory), the leaders of Hitler's Germany successfully took advantage of the developments of their predecessors - pseudoscientists of the 19th century: the Frenchman J. Gobineau and the Englishman (who worked in Germany) H.S. Chamberlain and attracted their volunteer assistants in contemporary Germany, such as the philosopher and historian O. Spengler.
All these people sought to use scientific methods to prove that certain races and peoples were inferior and should be treated accordingly, for which anthropological data were used, in particular the shape and size of the skull. However, the methods that were used by these pseudoscientists (for example, the killing of 150 specially selected prisoners of Auschwitz to create a collection of skeletons of the Anatomical Institute of the University of Strasbourg, headed by Professor (!) A. Hirt), and the practice supported by their conclusions (the destruction by industrial methods of millions of “racially "inferior" people), led to the fact that the misanthropic pseudoscience that flourished in Nazi Germany (racial anthropology, eugenics, etc.) was prohibited by law, first in democratic countries, and after the end of the Second World War in Germany itself. Germany.
At the same time, many pseudo-scientists who were engaged in, so to speak, “theory”, after the war, were unable to successfully go through the denazification procedure in force in the country and were removed from academic activities, becoming “unshakable,” and their colleagues who were involved in the “practical implementation of the theory” “lit up.” "at the Nuremberg trials, were recognized as war criminals and convicted.
The shameful collaboration of individual scientists with the Nazi regime
Many German scientists of various specialties in the period from 1933 to 1945 disgraced themselves by actively collaborating with the Nazi regime. This cooperation was varied and included: scientists occupying important academic positions (dean, rector, director of a scientific institute) under conditions dictated by the regime; carrying out an official state personnel policy, that is, a decisive cleansing of universities from scientists and professors of non-Aryan origin; propaganda of state, Nazi ideology; denunciations of colleagues of “the wrong origin” or “the wrong views”; participation in government research and development programs in the interests of the war waged by Nazi Germany (including programs prohibited by international laws).
We emphasize that people who were engaged in at least one of the listed types of activities were at the same time real, often major scientists. Let's name some of them: W. Heisenberg, Nobel laureate in physics, led the German atomic project; R. Kuhn, Nobel laureate in chemistry, was involved in the synthesis of new chemical warfare agents; M. Heidegger, a world-famous philosopher, joined the National Socialist Party, became rector of the university and fired all non-Aryan professors, including his famous teacher, the elderly Professor E. Husserl, who soon died. This series can be continued...
The failure of the personnel policy of the Nazi leadership of German science
The twelve-year rule of the Nazis in Germany, their policies towards science and the active collaboration of many German scientists with the Nazi regime caused irreparable damage to German science and its prestige in the world. The personnel policy of the Nazi leadership of German science suffered a complete failure: many outstanding scientists - heads of large scientific schools - emigrated from Germany in the period from 1933 to 1940, while the overwhelming majority of emigrants after the fall of Nazism in 1945 did not return to their homeland, since they could not forgive the Germans for their massive support of the Hitler regime. As a result of all the events described, German science lost its status as the leading science in the world, losing it to the United States. And just as at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, young people from all over the world came to Berlin, Göttingen, and Heidelberg to improve their scientific qualifications, now they began to come to New York, Massachusetts, and Harvard for this purpose. And this, apparently, is forever. As they say, you have to answer for everything you do!
The above does not mean that normal scientific research completely ceased in Germany during the Nazi period. Individual scientists carried out successful scientific work, especially in the fields of chemistry, biology and medicine, atomic physics, and technology. For example, the already mentioned famous chemist R. Kuhn conducted extensive research on enzymes, B vitamins, discovered gamma-carotene, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1938; biologist K. Frisch, one of the founders of ethology, studied the behavior of animals (bees) in natural conditions and discovered their “language,” for which he received the Nobel Prize in 1973; chemists O. Hahn and F. Strassmann and physicist L. Meitner (the latter was already in exile in Sweden at that time) in 1938 discovered the fission of uranium nuclei under the influence of neutrons, for which O. Hahn received the Nobel Prize in 1945.
However, these “peaceful” achievements of German scientists were rather an exception against the background of the plight of “traditional” pure science in the Third Reich, caused by the disrespectful attitude of the Nazi authorities towards it and the constant pressure on it. The most striking example of this attitude is the ban imposed by Hitler in 1936 on any contacts of Reich citizens with Nobel committees. Because of this ban, German scientists who received Nobel Prizes during Nazi times in Germany were forced, under pressure from the Gestapo, to renounce their awards and received
them only after the end of World War II and the collapse of the Nazi regime.
History of the German atomic project
The most striking example of the consequences of this attitude of the Nazi authorities towards science for German science and Germany itself is the history of the German atomic project. In 1939, shortly after the discovery by German scientists of the effect of fission of uranium nuclei, it turned out that this effect leads to the release of colossal amounts of energy and, thus, can be used for military purposes to create new weapons with unprecedented destructive power. Immediately, by Hitler’s personal order, work began on the implementation of the German atomic project, the goal of which was the creation of atomic weapons. The project was headed by theoretical physicist Nobel laureate Werner W. Heisenberg, at the invitation of the Nazi leadership of Germany. Most people do not know that the German atomic project was launched somewhat earlier than the American (Manhattan) project. At the same time, the Germans, given the previous development of their science, technology and technology, had a potentially higher chance of completing the project first than the Americans.
However, reality turned out completely differently. Soon after the start of the German project, its leaders and implementers began to experience certain scientific and technical difficulties in its implementation. However, it was impossible to attract new, more qualified scientists and engineers to work on the project to overcome these difficulties, since at that time most of these people were already in exile. In the fall of 1941, the project leader, W. Heisenberg, unexpectedly came to Copenhagen to visit his teacher, Nobel laureate N. Bohr. The purpose of the visit, apparently, was to consult with N. Bohr, and even better, to involve him in work on the German atomic project. At this time, Denmark was already occupied by Nazi Germany, and this allowed W. Heisenberg to speak bluntly - so to speak, “as a winner”: “The war will inevitably end in the victory of Germany. Denmark will have to accept the fact that it will become part of Germany.
But the war may drag on. In this case, its outcome will be decided with the help of atomic weapons.” At this moment, N. Bohr, who understood everything, interrupted W. Heisenberg, and their conversation ended. After the departure of W. Heisenberg, N. Bohr was able to quickly transport information about the work ongoing in Germany to create an atomic bomb to London, from where it was immediately delivered to the USA. There is no doubt that N. Bohr's information forced the Americans to speed up work on creating their own atomic weapons in order to get ahead of the Germans. And the Germans were really ahead of them, thanks to the efforts of German scientists who ran away from Hitler.
And work on the German nuclear project continued for another year. Finally, in 1942, the Minister of Armaments of Nazi Germany A. Speer summoned W. Heisenberg and asked him a direct question: “We are ready to give any money for your project. Can you complete the project on time?” To which W. Heisenberg responded categorically in the negative: “This is impossible, since in Germany there are almost no highly qualified physicists and engineers who are needed to carry out the work.” What W. Heisenberg said was the absolute truth, quite natural after ten years of total persecution in the country against “non-Aryans” and “enemies of the Reich.” After this conversation, by order of Hitler, funding for the German atomic project was stopped, and all work on it was stopped. Thus, Hitler’s ambitious idea to create a new German “superweapon” and with its help quickly win a war that was clearly becoming protracted ended ingloriously.
Afterword
Concluding this article, let’s note the main thing. Hitler's Nazi regime inflicted enormous economic, political and psychological damage on Germany, plunging the country into global carnage and causing untold suffering to its people. The German people drew the right conclusions from the disaster that befell them and, after World War II, decisively renounced their Nazi past, rejecting any possible manifestations of political radicalism. This made it possible to revive a democratic society in the country and build a powerful economy.
However, science in post-war Germany found itself at an incomparably lower level than in pre-Nazi times. And it's not hard to see why. Ninety years ago, assessing the results of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, according to which huge indemnities were imposed on Germany by the victorious countries, the outstanding German chemist Nobel laureate F. Haber - a Jew and a passionate patriot of Germany - said that “in Germany there was only capital left, which cannot be taken away by any reparations. This capital is the intellectual potential of German scientists.” The situation after World War II turned out to be fundamentally different, since the largest, most active part of the German scientific potential left Germany during Nazi times and did not return to it even after the war, when Nazism was defeated. So, Nazism and the Germans themselves who supported it (and they were the majority) are to blame for the transformation of Germany after 1945 into a second-rate scientific country.
This sad story is instructive for all countries and peoples. After all, even if Germany - the country of Goethe and Hegel, Gauss and Hilbert - was able to descend from civilization into barbarism within a few years, then no country and no people are immune from such a turn in history, when there is no time for science.
V.I. Levin,State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Penza State Technological Academy"
Since the last world wars destroyed the old form of "heroic battle" between warriors and replaced it with "war of engines", and the soldier began to "wait in the wings" under a barrage of hurricane fire, since it became enough just to press buttons that open the bomb hatches , so that the monuments of a culture that had been created over centuries would instantly disappear in fire and smoke, since the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved that hundreds of thousands of innocent people could be destroyed with one blow, since then, finally, when self-destruction humanity in modern atomic war has become a theoretical possibility, we can say with confidence that technology has radically changed both the forms and the entire nature of war. But the basis of all technology is science, moreover, technology is science itself. This means that the course of a modern war and, consequently, the fate of its leading peoples decisively depend on scientific achievements and on the potential capabilities of peoples in the field of technology.
The old saying “In war the muses are silent,” which, among other things, also means a weakening of the spiritual activity of the people, is completely inappropriate in our age. With feverish haste and maximum effort, work is being carried out in the laboratories and research institutes of the warring parties in order not only to neutralize the enemy’s technical progress through the creation of new types of weapons, but also to surpass it, which in turn is an impulse for the enemy to new research. Thus, modern warfare, from the point of view of the growth of technical capabilities, is a kind of pendulum, which rises to even greater heights with each swing. This phenomenon is observed not only in the field of technology. In an age of ideological struggle and the struggle of views and worldviews, what ideological weapons and what forces can cause an upsurge in all areas of science is also of decisive importance. Therefore, “Results of the Second World War” cannot be written without all the functions of science in this era remaining unexplained.
Germany's submarine war against England and America, which began so effectively, was actually nullified by the enemy's superiority in radar technology, which literally paralyzed the efforts of the dedicated and brave German submariners. In the air battle for England, the technical data of German fighters turned out to be insufficient to reliably protect their bombers. When subsequently on the enemy radar screens, despite the dark night, fog and clouds, the outlines of cities and the desired targets became visible, the air defense of the German living space lost all meaning, and German aviation, despite all the courage of its soldiers and officers, became more and more gave up her positions.
Based on the study of all these events, a fatal question arises: did German science justify itself in this war? At the end of the war, according to the most conservative estimates, the victors confiscated 346 thousand German patents. The results of research in industry and in all public and even private research institutions were confiscated from their owners and were calculated not in the number of pages, but in the number of tons, yes! Yes! - tons, as stated by the American central research station Wright Field (Ohio), which exported from Germany “by far the most significant collection of secret scientific documents” with a total weight of 1.5 thousand tons.
By analyzing all the captured materials and implementing many of the ideas contained in them, American specialists, by their own admission, “advanced American science and technology by years, and in some cases by a whole decade.”
Australian Prime Minister Chifley, speaking on the radio in September 1949, said that the benefits that 6 thousand patents received from the division and the transfer of 46 German specialists and scientists to Australia brought to Australia cannot be expressed in monetary terms at all. “Australian industrialists,” he declared, “are able, with the help of German secret materials, to place their country in the field of technology among the most advanced countries in the world.”
If, therefore, the assessment of the achievements of German science can be so contradictory, that is, on the one hand, descending to the cause of Germany’s defeat in the war, and on the other hand, rising to enormous heights, causing admiration even among the most highly developed opponents, it means that the activities of German scientists -researchers in the Second World War cannot be reduced to some common simple denominator, but must be considered as a diverse and comprehensive set of scientific connections. And indeed, in that era, German science was not in any specific stable state, but in constant and to some extent even dramatic, contradictory development. Since there are no documents left from those years, nor the scientists themselves, who are now scattered all over the world, it is not possible to create a complete picture of their activities.
Therefore, now we can only talk about some of the most characteristic features of German science of that time. The German scientist of that era lived in isolation, being interested only in his science and not getting involved in any politics, not thinking about the state or the public. The “apolitical German professor” became a symbolic figure who often appeared on the pages of the German and foreign press in the most caricatured form. In this regard, a counter question arises: what could have interested a German scientist in the political life of that time? Germany did not have centuries-old national traditions, such as France. Germany never followed the path of imperialist development like England. It was a heterogeneous conglomerate of small states, united neither by foreign nor domestic policies. When National Socialism came to power between the two world wars, the “apolitical German intellectual” preferred to hide in his hole rather than make any protest. The new regime, however, was uncomfortable with the fact that such a large and necessary professional category remained neutral in relation to the new state. Therefore, propaganda was launched against “intellectuals” and “arrogant academics.”
The National Socialist Party at that time sought to win the worker over to its side. She tried to free him from Marxist traditions and make him a nationalist. But this was not easy, because class consciousness was already firmly rooted among the workers. Then the party resorted to a simpler method. The class of “academics” and “intellectuals” began to be vilified at all crossroads. Numerous party speakers, right up to the very beginning of the war, did not miss a single opportunity so as not to scold scientists. For example, statesman Robert Ley, speaking at a large meeting of war industry workers, illustrated his idea with such a “striking example.” “For me,” he said, “any janitor is much higher than any academician. A janitor sweeps hundreds of thousands of bacteria into a ditch with one sweep of his broom, and some scientist is proud that in his entire life he discovered one single bacterium!”
If we compare the attitude towards a scientist and his work in our country and in other countries, we get the following picture. While other states attach great importance to the development of science and technology and link the fate and existence of their nations with it, Germany has done and is doing too little in this regard. We feel the consequences of this until today. The leaders of our state looked at science as something that did not concern them. This can be seen from the fact that the most insignificant of all German ministers, Rust, was the minister of science. It is characteristic that this “Minister of Science” for the entire war, which more than all others was a war of technology. I have never been to a report with the head of state. And Hitler himself spoke with leading scientists for the last time in 1934. when he received Max Planck, who asked to allow his Jewish colleagues to continue the major research projects they had begun.
After 1933, as a result of the “worldview check,” 1,268 associate professors were dismissed from higher educational institutions in Germany.
The current situation clearly shows that in the “Führer State,” which forcibly subjugated even the most private areas of life, no truly comprehensive, state-wide planning scientific organization was created that would lead all research work. In fact, there were only many private institutions, each working in its own area and, in essence, independent of each other. There was almost no coordination in their work. If such a situation can still be tolerated in peacetime, then in modern war it must lead to the most fatal consequences.
Lack of unity in science
In Germany there was a large scientific sector in the system of higher education institutions, which included universities and higher technical educational institutions. This also included 30 research institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. These institutions were organizationally subordinate to the Ministry of Science, Education and Education. This network, covering thousands of scientists, had its own research council, which consisted of representatives of various fields of science (physics, chemistry, mining and foundry, medicine, etc.). Each member of the council was the leader of a specific group of scientists of the same profile and was supposed to direct the planning and research activities of this group.
Along with this educational research organization there was a completely independent industrial research organization, or, as it was otherwise called, a sector, the enormous importance of which became generally clear only after the winners in 1945 appropriated the results of its research work. These included laboratories of large industrial enterprises, for example, the concerns of Farbenindustry, Zeiss, Siemens, the General Electricity Company, Osram, Telefunken, etc., which, having large own funds, highly qualified specialists and equipment that meets modern technical requirements, could work with greater productivity than institute laboratories, which often did not have the most necessary funds to carry out their research. The industrial research organization was independent and did not require the assistance of any ministry, government research council or other departments dealing with contingent issues. This organization worked for itself, and at the same time - behind closed doors. The consequence of this was that a research scientist at any higher educational institution not only knew nothing, but did not even suspect about the research, discoveries and improvements that were carried out in industrial laboratories. This happened because it was beneficial for any concern, for reasons of competition, to keep the inventions and discoveries of its scientists secret. As a result, knowledge did not flow into a common large cauldron and could bring only partial success for the common cause.
The third major scientific organization was the research apparatus of the armed forces. But this apparatus was not unified, but again split into parts, scattered among individual types of armed forces. People who understood the revolutionary role of science and technology in modern warfare and demanded unified leadership of research and improvement work insisted that the general leadership be exercised by the General Staff, but they did not receive an advantage. During the reorganization of the armed forces, it turned out that each branch of the armed forces - army, air force and navy (and later even SS units) - created its own weapons department. This is how the Army Weapons Directorate arose with its own research institutions and experimental testing grounds; This is how an independent department of research, improvements and patents appeared under the main command of the Navy; Thus, a technical department was created at the Air Force High Command with well-equipped research and testing stations in Göttingen, Adlershof, Braunschweig, Oberpfafenhofen (near Munich), Ainring and other cities.
Hitler's famous order on the non-disclosure of secrets and secrets, issued at the beginning of the war and allowing an individual to know only what directly concerned him, as well as, to put it carefully, the “noble” struggle for primacy between the branches of the armed forces contributed to the fact that individual fields of study were increasingly became more and more isolated from each other, thereby worsening the general state of affairs in science. It was almost impossible for scientists in the laboratories of higher educational institutions to obtain information about even the most insignificant part of the scientific and experimental work carried out in the apparatus of the armed forces. An individual researcher at a higher educational institution was entrusted with only a small piece of the entire mosaic, which by no means gave him an idea of the overall picture of development. From these researchers one could often hear the following phrase: “We are wandering in the dark, we know too little of what we need to know. We have no idea where our shortcomings are.”
But that's not all. Along with the research sectors of higher education institutions, industry and the armed forces, there were also a number of private, independent research institutions. Of these, only the exceptionally well-equipped institutes of the Imperial Post deserve mention, which were engaged not only in improvements in the field of Long Distance Communications Technology, but also paid much attention to issues of nuclear physics, problems of infrared rays, electron microscopy and many other militaryly important areas of science .
Reading these lines, everyone asks himself the question: was there at least one such authority that summarized the results of research from all scientific sectors, supervised them and directed the resulting data to those institutions where they brought the greatest benefit for both military and civilian purposes ? No. There was no such authority. All research work in Germany lacked a connecting central body that would summarize the experience of scientists and, on its basis, guide their research. German science and technology were devoid of a head, instead there were only individual connecting nerve fibers and primitive coordinating organs.
The State Research Council had no authority or full knowledge of what was happening outside its sphere of influence. And yet, on the own initiative of his employees and on behalf of various weapons departments, he prepared and conducted more than 10 thousand research works, which received well-deserved recognition from the military.
Another governing body was the Office of Economic Development, created under Goering's four-year plan and serving the 25 institutions provided for by this plan. The large funds allocated to him for these purposes were zealously used “only for targeted research,” and the poor research institutes of higher educational institutions, which until now carried out the main scientific work, did not receive a penny from them. Therefore, in the circles of researchers at higher educational institutions, the Economic Development Department was mockingly called the “concern development department.”
During the war, another governing body acquired extremely great weight - the Speer Ministry. Since during this period the possibilities for institutes to obtain raw materials, personnel and laboratory equipment were significantly reduced, since what was necessary and feasible could no longer be found anywhere, and since the country’s industry could barely cope with orders from various arms departments, this ministry, in turn, sought to gain authority to resolve issues about which research activities should be stopped as unnecessary, which should be continued as having “important military significance” and which should be given preference as being “decisive for the war.” But science is never benefited by a situation where its interests are decided by an authority that aims only at improving and producing what best suits the interests of the day. Such an organization fails to understand what opportunities lie within the plans and objectives of research institutions. Only because science was deprived of leadership, scientists began to be commanded by authorities alien to science.
If, despite this general position, as a result of long scientific research, new types of weapons, new artificial materials were nevertheless created, new scientific methods and new profiles of science were discovered, then for this we should thank, of course, not the pathetic organization of “leaders”, but only individual people who worked in all areas of science with full dedication of their strength and abilities. To this day, there is still no information about what German scientists worked on, researched and improved. Only the winners received comprehensive data about this using their own “method”. But even before this, German science, in its not devoid of dramatic development, went through many different stages and phases.
Science in the period of “lightning wars”
In 1939, German political leaders, guided by the experience of the war with Poland, hoped mainly for a short-term war. They, and in particular Goering, strongly advocated this. that the war must be won with the weapons with which it was started. New improvements that were “ripe for the front” only in subsequent years. were considered of no interest. Scientists whose work was only in its earliest stages and who still needed years to achieve results useful for the war were of no practical value to the government. Therefore, scientists were classified in the category of human reserves from which reinforcements for the front were drawn. It goes without saying that, under such circumstances, "humanitarian" scientists were regarded from the very beginning as quantite negligeable. As a result, despite the objections of the weapons departments and various other authorities, several thousand highly qualified scientists from universities, higher technical educational institutions and various research institutes, including irreplaceable specialists in research in the field of high frequencies, nuclear physics, chemistry, motor engineering and etc., were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war and were used in lower positions and even as ordinary soldiers. If Goebbels achieved this. that artists, musicians, writers, singers, athletes, etc. were spared from military service, since he needed them to organize entertainment at home and at the front, then Minister Rust could not do anything for his researchers. And when scientists, and especially representatives of the younger generation of scientists and researchers, left their laboratories and institutes to go to the front as humble fighters, this even made everyone proud. The British (and not the Germans) calculated that every year every talented nation produces one researcher per million of its population. As you can see, the harvest is not particularly dense. And the fact that in an age when one scientific researcher can be as important for the conduct of war as entire armies, this expensive and sometimes irreplaceable human material was squandered with such ease, could not pass without a trace for us.
After the war with France, Hitler gave the order to stop all research work that could not be completed within one year. This order turned out to be almost fatal not only for aviation (in 1939 there was already a design project for a jet fighter), but research work in the field of high frequencies also suffered from it, that is, precisely in the very area in which the enemy soon gained fatal advantage.
Science distress signal
Some time passed, and sobering blows rained down on the German army. The air battle over England is lost. The war in Russia has radically changed its original character. In the submarine war, the enemy's aircraft, superior in quality and quantity, caused a deep crisis. There was no doubt that without new aircraft the war would be lost, that the weapons, equipment and vehicles used in Russia must meet the deadly conditions of climate and terrain, that high-frequency technology had now become the most important link in all military equipment.
Then the steering wheel was turned in the opposite direction. Goebbels had to issue a directive that henceforth there should be no more speeches against scientists and researchers, against teachers and clergy in the press, on the radio, in cinema, in theater and in literature, but, on the contrary, the great importance of their activities would be emphasized. Despite the fact that Goebbels had nothing to do with science, he invited professors and directors of higher educational institutions to Heidelberg to tell them that the state highly values the work of scientists.
Doenitz turned out to be the most energetic in this matter. He autocratically discarded the intricate system of scientific leadership, personally convened a conference of leading experts, informed them with all frankness about the technical crisis of submarine warfare, appointed one of the scientists as the chief of the naval research staff and eliminated all intermediate authorities by subordinating this new “chief of staff” personally to myself. The fact that the commander-in-chief directly subordinated the research scientist was a kind of revolution in the field of military technology.
An alarm sounded for all scientists. At the same time that “General Unruh”, as a special commissioner, traveled around the country, “mobilizing” the last men remaining in the rear to the front, a decisive countermeasure was taken in the interests of science and technology: 10 thousand scientists, technicians, specialists and engineers were removed from the front and installed in their places to solve urgent problems. In order to prevent the extinction of entire scientific disciplines and preserve irreplaceable personnel, it was even decided to recall 100 scientists in the humanities from the front. It was necessary to save what could still be saved.
But even these measures could not completely restore the previous state of German science. Using a kind of “fist law” and overruling those who had less powerful fists, individual authorities achieved powers for themselves, received scientists, support staff, equipment, chemicals, scarce materials and funds. But science and technology are incompatible with improvisation. A state that wants to receive the real fruits of science and technology must act not only with great insight and skill, but also be able to patiently wait for these fruits.
It is clear that of all that was conceived, learned, improved and tested in the laboratories of higher educational institutions, in research institutions of the armed forces and in the laboratories of industrial enterprises, only a part could go into production and be used at the front, for when the war was already in full swing, the fruits of the mental activity of German scientists were still ripening, hiding within the walls of their laboratories.
Subjects of research and achievements of German science
The work done by German scientists in the field of creating new research methods, in the field of discovering new things and improving the technology of old ones, given the current situation in Germany, cannot be generalized. During the war, research work related to weapons was carried out exclusively as “secret”, and some studies were even labeled “state secret”. The usual peacetime publication of research results in special scientific journals was not carried out. A researcher working on a special task had no right to talk about it even with his colleagues.
A book about the achievements of German science could be written today much more easily not in Germany itself, but outside its borders, because the main original documents are located there. One American report states: “The Office of Technical Services in Washington states that thousands of tons of documents are stored in its safes. According to experts, over 1 million individual inventions, virtually related to all sciences, all industrial and military secrets of Nazi Germany, need processing and analysis. One official in Washington called this collection of documents "a unique source of scientific thought, the first complete expression of the inventive mind of an entire people."
How could this happen? Why did Germany's opponents understand before her the importance of research work in the current age of technology, not only for warfare, but also for the peaceful economy and cultural development in all areas of life?
The fact is that they looked at the seizure of valuable German inventions as a military task. Even during the invasion of the West, commando squads immediately began their hunt for research materials and for the researchers themselves. Prepared by the Allies, Operation Paper Clips was carried out mainly by the Americans. However, British, French and Soviet troops took no less part in this, the only “trophy campaign” in the history of wars.
The statement that was spread at the end of the war by foreign propaganda under the influence of general war psychosis. that German science has achieved only insignificant results and that in a country where there is no freedom, science is not capable of much at all, was soon refuted by numerous speeches by foreign scientists themselves. In the report of the Society of German Scientists entitled "Research means work and bread" (September 1950). a number of such statements are presented. Due to lack of space, I will cite only a few of them.
For example, Mr. Lester Walker writes in Harpers Magazine (October 1946): “Materials about secret military inventions, of which there were only dozens recently, now represent an accumulation of acts totaling up to 750 thousand...” In order to To find corresponding English terms for new German concepts, it would be necessary to compile a new German-English dictionary of special words, which would include about 40 thousand new technical and scientific terms.
The American official report cites a number of individual inventions and research results of German scientists in the field of applied physics, in the field of research of infrared rays, the invention of new lubricants, synthetic mica, methods of cold rolling of steel, etc., which have received universal recognition among American scientists. Thus, the report states: “We have learned from these priceless secrets how to make the world's finest capacitor. Millions of capacitors are used in radio engineering and in the production of high-frequency equipment... but this capacitor can withstand almost twice the voltage than our American capacitors. This is a real miracle for our radio technicians.”
Regarding inventions in the textile industry, this report states that “there is so much new in this collection of secrets that most American textile specialists have become uneasy ....”
About the trophies from the laboratories of the concern I. G. Farbenindustry it is said: “... however, the most valuable secrets were received by us from the laboratories and factories of the large German chemical concern I. G. Farbenindustry. Nowhere has there ever been such a valuable treasure trove of industrial secrets. These secrets relate to the production of liquid and solid fuels, to the metallurgical industry, to the production of synthetic rubber, textiles, chemicals, artificial fabrics, medicines and paints. One American specialist in the production of dyes said that German patents contain methods and recipes for producing 50 thousand types of dyes, and most of them are better than ours. We ourselves would probably never be able to make some of them. The American paint industry has advanced at least ten years."
One can cite a number of other statements contained in various reports: “No less impressive was the production of the Allied special search groups in the field of food production, in the field of medicine and military art” ... “the “trophies” in the field of the latest achievements of aviation and production of aerial bombs." “German secrets in the production of rocket and jet projectiles are of the greatest importance for the future,” it is said elsewhere, “... as it became known, the Germans at the end of the war had 138 types of remotely controlled projectiles in various stages of production and development... all known ones were used Until now, distance control and targeting systems: radio, short waves, wire communications, directed electromagnetic waves, sound, infrared rays, beams of light, magnetic control, etc. The Germans developed all types of rocket motors that allowed their missiles and rockets reach supersonic speeds."
After Japan's surrender, President Truman ordered the publication of 364,000 confiscated patents and other captured documents. On July 27, 1946, 27 former Allied states signed an agreement in London, according to which all German patents located outside Germany and registered before August 1, 1946 were expropriated. The Library of Congress in Washington began publishing a bibliographic weekly, which listed declassified military and scientific documents, their summary, the number and cost of copies made from them, etc. These weekly bulletins were sent to 125 libraries in the United States, “to make them more accessible for the public."
American businessmen themselves recognize the enormous importance of German discoveries and inventions for practical use in industry and technology. “The public is literally devouring published military secrets,” says one of the aforementioned reports. “In just one month, we received 20 thousand requests for technical publications, and now about 1 thousand copies of these bulletins are ordered every day ... authorized companies stand all day in the corridors of the Technical Services Directorate to be the first to receive a new publication. Much of the information is so valuable that industrialists would willingly give many thousands for it. to get new information one day before your competitors. But the employees of the Technical Services Department are carefully monitoring this. so that no one receives the report before its official publication. One day, the head of a research institution sat for about 3 hours. in one of the bureaus of the Technical Services Administration, making notes and sketches from some documents being prepared for publication. As he left, he said, “Thank you very much, my notes will give my company at least half a million dollars in profit.”
The American report goes on to talk about representatives of the Soviet Union. This passage was still written in the naive expressions of 1946, but now, in the setting of 1953, it forces the reader to pay more attention to it. With naive pride, the Americans report: “One of our most insatiable clients is Vneshtorg (the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union). One of their leaders once came to the publishing office with a bibliography in his hands and said: “I want to have copies of everything you have.” The Russians sent us an order in May for 2 thousand publications for a total amount of 5,594 dollars 40 cents. In general, they bought any publication that came out.”
The Russians made sure to get the fruits of the labor of German scientists and technicians in another way as well. So, at the end of the war, they brought several hundred first-class specialists from Germany, including: Professor Dr. Peter Thiessen - director of the Institute of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry (Kaiser Wilhelm Institute), who was also the head of the chemistry sector in the state research council; Baron Manfred von Ardenne - the greatest German scientist in the field of high-frequency technology, television, electron microscopy and isotope separation; Professor Max Vollmer - full professor of physical chemistry at the Higher Technical School (Berlin - Charlottenburg) and a leading expert in the field of semiconductors and battery production, who had enormous authority in matters of military equipment; Professor Gustav Hertz - who until 1938 held the post of director of the Heinrich Hertz Institute for the Study of Oscillatory Phenomena (Berlin), and subsequently - the head of Siemens-Werke Research Laboratory No. 2, who knew all the many secrets of this concern; Dr. Nikolaus Riehl - director of the scientific department of the Auer company, a famous specialist in the production of luminescent paints, which are of great importance for the military and civilian industries.
The Russians also managed to bring home Dr. L. Bevilogua, a student of the world-famous Professor Debie, who emigrated from Germany to the West and was awarded the Nobel Prize. Debie was director of the Institute of Refrigeration in Dahlem.
These are just a few names. But what enormous benefits they can bring to the Soviet Union! Professor Dr. Thyssen, for example, occupied a paramount position in the German research world. Thyssen was a student of the most prominent German specialist in colloid chemistry, Professor Zsigmondy from Göttingen. Institute. headed by Thyssen. was the largest of the thirty institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and had a staff of about 100 employees. It had the best equipment, and its funds were equal to the sum of the budgets of at least a dozen other, of course, also no less important institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. Of the 25 electron microscopes then available in Germany, three were located at the Thyssen Institute. Thiessen was also head of the chemistry sector at the government research council. This meant that he knew all the plans for research work in the field of chemistry, their progress and results. Thiessen was the person who could process these results not only administratively, but also personally review them and give them a critical assessment. People who worked closely with Thiessen say that he has a phenomenal memory. Finally, Thyssen was one of the main figures of the so-called “chemical headquarters,” which consisted of three members: the chairman of the supervisory board of the I. G. Farbenindustry concern, Professor Krauch, the head of the German Society of Chemists, State Councilor Schieber, and Thyssen himself. Thus, Thyssen was aware of the state of affairs in all German chemistry. The task of the chemical headquarters was to summarize the results of experiments carried out in laboratories and then transfer the accumulated experience for further use in production. It follows that Thyssen not only knew the direction of research in the field of chemistry, but was also privy to the secrets of the German chemical industry, its methods, planning, and was in contact with the largest chemical industrialists. He knew the most important secrets that are now used by the Soviet Union.
As for the German scientists now in America, the Pentagon reported in December 1947 that 523 German scientists had been taken there and that this figure would soon increase to 1 thousand people. More precise information is not yet available.
The British have so far been the most restrained in their reports about captured scientists and specialists. But professors who have returned from pre-trial detention camps report that there are many "famous and even celebrities from all fields of science" there. In total, the victorious countries exported more than 2 thousand German scientists and specialists.
The removal of German scientists from Germany is the most difficult consequence of the last war for our people. Researchers can be compared to the brain of a nation. At the end of the war, our nation underwent a serious operation: this brain was cut out from it along with everything that the nation had achieved, that is, along with all the results of research, patents, etc. All this went to the victors and was poured into their scientific and economic organism. This, of course, is a more modern form of economic influence on the vanquished than war indemnities and monetary reparations of old. This measure leads to a sharp reduction in the spiritual potential of the defeated people. It represents the artificial insemination of science, technology and the economy of the winner. The American Life magazine, in its issue of September 2, 1946, quite soberly confirms this, declaring that the true purpose of reparations was not to dismantle German industrial enterprises, but “to excise the brain of the German nation,” to seize everything that it had accumulated in fields of science and technology.
The fate of explorers at the end of the war
German science, which had developed strongly in the first half of our century, was reduced almost to nothing at the end of the last war by the following three circumstances: first, the loss of all the results of scientific research, including patents, and their dispersion throughout the world; secondly, the movement of leading German specialists to the countries of former enemies; thirdly, discrimination against the researchers who remained in Germany.
As a result of the political purge carried out under Hitler, 1,628 associate professors were expelled from departments and research institutes. According to data published at the beginning of 1950 in the weekly Christ und Welt, this constituted 9.5% of the entire teaching staff of higher educational institutions in Germany. This means that every tenth scientist was excluded from the scientific life of the country. Another 4,289 associate professors fell victim to the next political purge, in 1945, which already amounted to 32.1% of all scientists. Thus, in 1945, every third German university teacher lost both his department and the opportunity to continue research work.
What the Americans thought about the “political danger” of these scientists becomes clear from a number of official statements. So. for example, the head of Operation Paper Clips gave the following directive to the commando units engaged in “catching” German scientists. “If you come across simply anti-fascists who are of no value to science, don’t take them. If they can have “a certain scientific interest for us, then their political past does not play any role.” And when one American senator expressed his doubts about this “importation” of German scientists, basing them on the fact that most of them were members of the Nazi Party, a representative of the American War Department responded this way: “Scientists are usually interested only in their research and only occasionally - politics."
The damage suffered by German science is by no means limited to those scientists who were left without a job during the political purges of Hitler's reign. After the war, another 1,028 associate professors migrated from universities in the eastern zone of Germany to the western zone as unemployed refugees. This represented 7.7% of the entire teaching staff of German higher education institutions. If you put it all together, it works. that from 1933 to 1946. According to the Society of the Founders of German Science, 49.3% of all higher education teachers lost their jobs “for political reasons.” This represents approximately half of the total number of German scientists. No other professional class in Germany was so bled dry. How such an amputation will affect the German intelligentsia can only be shown by the future.
A look at the future
It would be wrong to say that the fate that befell German science in the Second World War no longer worries the leadership circles of our state today. In the most diverse segments of the population, right down to members of parliament when they discuss state budgets, one can hear the same argument: “An impoverished people like the Germans cannot raise their science to a high level again. He must first get out of his plight.”
To this we Germans have only one answer. Precisely because such enormous damage has been caused to German science, we are concerned more than all others by the simple truth that the natural sciences of today create the prerequisites for the technology of tomorrow, and the worker of today will not be able to feed his sons if science continues to develop will not create the prerequisites for their independent work tomorrow. If our generation does not now correct the monstrous consequences of the war that ruined our science, it will cause great harm to the economy and social structure of future generations. We Germans must do much more for our science than others.
However, the numbers convincingly suggest that not everything is being done. For example, America allocates amounts to finance its research institutes that, calculated per capita, amount to 71 German marks; England - 25.2 marks, and the Federal Republic - only 7.75 marks.
In this regard, another question arises. It would be an illusion to believe that any “damage” in science can be compensated for by money. Science cannot be bought with money, just as it cannot be borrowed or “organized.” Money can only be an auxiliary means, although necessary, but not decisive. No amount of money will help where there is no talent for research work. But genuine talent for science and research is extremely rare in any nation: it is a gift of nature. But the way this natural gift has been treated over the past few years and how it has literally been squandered depending on the extent to which people endowed with this gift met one or another political requirements of the time is by no means an act of wisdom, but an act of exceptional political myopia and blindness. The great process of healing which has become necessary to our science is again beginning to command the deep reverence and recognition of the people. Only when external prerequisites are created, that is, sufficient financial support, and internal preconditions, that is, complete respect for scientists and reverence for this professional class, can we hope that our younger generation will single out from among its people the talents and talents of will allow them to turn to the difficult profession of a scientist. After all, the failures of the past act as a deterrent for a very short time.
This article is based on conversations with numerous scientists and experts in various fields of science.
An article by Erich Schneider, published in the collection “Results of the Second World War” (Russian translation published in 1957) is of undoubted interest for an analyst. If only because it contains unique data about the little-known Paper Clips operation carried out by the Allied forces in 1946, during which the most powerful reserves of patent and scientific and technical documentation were confiscated from Germany and Japan, and the most valuable scientific documents were exported abroad. frames.
The article is devoted to the problems associated with the lack of proper state coordination of scientific activities, the low quality of information support for scientific work, as well as the problem of disunity of commercial scientific units. This is all that was initiated in Russia by the transition to a market economy.
The article is also of interest to those who are interested in history, in particular the history of scientific and technological progress. The article reveals the background of the powerful post-war technological leap that was made by the United States and further increased the technological lag of the USSR.
The article is also interesting because it was included in one of those publications that did not undergo ideological adaptation and smoothing - the entire ideological (however, very calm and constructive) component was given in the introduction to the collection. Therefore, the article also preserves the assessments that were given to the Soviet Union by its Cold War opponents.
Here is the article in its text:
Schneider E. The Rise and Decline of German Science during the Second World War // Results of the Second World War. Collection of articles / Transl. with him. - M.: Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1957.
Erich Schneider, retired lieutenant general, engineer
The Rise and Decline of German Science during the Second World War
(The original - German - text of the article was published in the book "Bilanz Des Zweiten Weltkrieges" in 1953)“Research is the foundation of technical superiority over the enemy.
Research is the basis for worldwide competition." Prof. P. Thyssen
Since the last world wars destroyed the old form of "heroic battle" between warriors and replaced it with "war of engines", and the soldier began to "wait in the wings" under a barrage of hurricane fire, since it became enough just to press buttons that open the bomb hatches , so that the monuments of a culture that had been created over centuries would instantly disappear in fire and smoke, since the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved that hundreds of thousands of innocent people could be destroyed with one blow, since then, finally, when self-destruction humanity in modern atomic war has become a theoretical possibility, we can say with confidence that technology has radically changed both the forms and the entire nature of war. But the basis of all technology is science, moreover, technology is science itself. This means that the course of a modern war and, consequently, the fate of its leading peoples decisively depend on scientific achievements and on the potential capabilities of peoples in the field of technology.
The old saying “In war the muses are silent,” which, among other things, also means a weakening of the spiritual activity of the people, is completely inappropriate in our age. With feverish haste and maximum effort, work is being carried out in the laboratories and research institutes of the warring parties in order not only to neutralize the enemy’s technical progress through the creation of new types of weapons, but also to surpass it, which in turn is an impulse for the enemy to new research. Thus, modern warfare, from the point of view of the growth of technical capabilities, is a kind of pendulum, which rises to even greater heights with each swing. This phenomenon is observed not only in the field of technology. In an age of ideological struggle and the struggle of views and worldviews, what ideological weapons and what forces can cause an upsurge in all areas of science is also of decisive importance. Therefore, “Results of the Second World War” cannot be written without all the functions of science in this era remaining unexplained.
Germany's submarine war against England and America, which began so effectively, was actually nullified by the enemy's superiority in radar technology, which literally paralyzed the efforts of the dedicated and brave German submariners. In the air battle for England, the technical data of German fighters turned out to be insufficient to reliably protect their bombers. When subsequently on the enemy radar screens, despite the dark night, fog and clouds, the outlines of cities and the desired targets became visible, the air defense of the German living space lost all meaning, and German aviation, despite all the courage of its soldiers and officers, became more and more gave up her positions.
Based on the study of all these events, a fatal question arises: did German science justify itself in this war? (At the end of the war, according to the most conservative estimates, the victors confiscated 346 thousand German patents.) The results of research in industry and in all public and even private research institutions were confiscated from their owners and were calculated not in the number of pages, but in the number of tons, Yes! Yes! tons, as stated by the American central scientific research station Wright Field (Ohio), exported from Germany “by far the most significant collection of secret scientific documents” with a total weight of 1.5 thousand tons.
By analyzing all the captured materials and implementing many of the ideas contained in them, American specialists, by their own admission, “advanced American science and technology by years, and in some cases by a whole decade.”
Australian Prime Minister Chifley, speaking on the radio in September 1949, said that the benefits that 6 thousand patents received from the division and the transfer of 46 German specialists and scientists to Australia brought to Australia cannot be expressed in monetary terms at all. “Australian industrialists,” he declared, “are able, with the help of German secret materials, to place their country in the field of technology among the most advanced countries in the world.”
If, therefore, the assessment of the achievements of German science can be so contradictory, that is, on the one hand, descending to the cause of Germany’s defeat in the war, and on the other, rising to enormous heights, causing admiration even among the most highly developed opponents, it means that the activities of German research scientists in the Second World War cannot be reduced to some common simple denominator, but must be considered as a diverse and comprehensive set of scientific connections. And indeed, in that era, German science was not in any specific stable state, but in constant and to some extent even dramatic, contradictory development. Since there are no documents left from those years, nor the scientists themselves, who are now scattered all over the world, it is not possible to create a complete picture of their activities.
Therefore, now we can only talk about some of the most characteristic features of German science of that time. The German scientist of that era lived in isolation, being interested only in his science and not getting involved in any politics, not thinking about the state or the public. The “apolitical German professor” became a symbolic figure who often appeared on the pages of the German and foreign press in the most caricatured form. In this regard, a counter question arises: what could have interested a German scientist in the political life of that time? Germany did not have centuries-old national traditions, like, for example, France. Germany never followed the path of imperialist development like England. It was a heterogeneous conglomerate of small states, united neither by foreign nor domestic policies. When National Socialism came to power between the two world wars, the “apolitical German intellectual” preferred to hide in his hole rather than make any protest. The new regime, however, was uncomfortable with the fact that such a large and necessary professional category remained neutral in relation to the new state. Therefore, propaganda was launched against “intellectuals” and “arrogant academics.”
The National Socialist Party at that time sought to win the worker over to its side. She tried to free him from Marxist traditions and make him a nationalist. But this was not easy, because class consciousness was already firmly rooted among the workers. Then the party resorted to a simpler method. The class of “academics” and “intellectuals” began to be vilified at all crossroads. Numerous party speakers, right up to the very beginning of the war, did not miss a single opportunity so as not to scold scientists. For example, statesman Robert Ley, speaking at a large meeting of war industry workers, illustrated his idea with such a “striking example.” “For me,” he said, “any janitor is much higher than any academician. A janitor sweeps hundreds of thousands of bacteria into a ditch with one sweep of his broom, and some scientist is proud that in his entire life he discovered one single bacterium!”
If we compare the attitude towards a scientist and his work in our country and in other countries, we get the following picture. While other states attach great importance to the development of science and technology and link the fate and existence of their nations with it, Germany has done and is doing too little in this regard. We feel the consequences of this until today. The leaders of our state looked at science as something that did not concern them. This can be seen from the fact that the most insignificant of all German ministers, Rust, was the minister of science. It is characteristic that during the entire war, which more than all others was a war of technology, this “minister of science” never reported to the head of state. And Hitler himself spoke with leading scientists for the last time in 1934, when he received Max Planck, who asked to allow his Jewish colleagues to continue the major research projects they had begun.
After 1933, as a result of the “worldview check,” 1,268 associate professors were dismissed from higher educational institutions in Germany.
The current situation clearly shows that in the “Führer State,” which forcibly subjugated even the most private areas of life, no truly comprehensive, state-wide planning scientific organization was created that would lead all research work. In fact, there were only many private institutions, each working in its own field and, in essence, independent of each other. There was almost no coordination in their work. If such a situation can still be tolerated in peacetime, then in modern war it must lead to the most fatal consequences.
Lack of unity in science
In Germany there was a large scientific sector in the system of higher education institutions, which included universities and higher technical educational institutions. This also included 30 research institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. These institutions were organizationally subordinate to the Ministry of Science, Education and Education. This network, covering thousands of scientists, had its own research council, which consisted of. representatives of various fields of science: (physics, chemistry, mining and foundry, medicine, etc.). Each member of the council was the leader of a specific group of scientists of the same profile and was supposed to direct the planning and research activities of this group.
Along with this educational research organization there was a completely independent industrial research organization, or, as it was otherwise called, a sector, the enormous importance of which became generally clear only after the winners in 1945 appropriated the results of its research work. These included laboratories of large industrial enterprises, for example, the concerns of Farbenindustry, Zeiss, Siemens, the General Electricity Company, Osram, Telefunken, etc., which, having large own funds, highly qualified specialists and equipment that meets modern technical requirements, could work with greater productivity than institute laboratories, which often did not have the most necessary funds to carry out their research. The industrial research organization was independent and did not require the assistance of any ministry, government research council or other departments dealing with contingent issues. This organization worked for itself, and at the same time - behind closed doors. The consequence of this was that a research scientist at any higher educational institution not only knew nothing, but did not even suspect about the research, discoveries and improvements that were carried out in industrial laboratories. This happened because it was beneficial for any concern, for reasons of competition, to keep the inventions and discoveries of its scientists secret. As a result, knowledge did not flow into a common large cauldron and could bring only partial success for the common cause.
The third major scientific organization was the research apparatus of the armed forces. But this apparatus was not unified, but again split into parts, scattered across separate types of armed forces. People who understood the revolutionary role of science and technology in modern warfare and demanded unified leadership of research and improvement work insisted that the general leadership be exercised by the General Staff, but they did not receive an advantage. During the reorganization of the armed forces, it turned out that each branch of the armed forces - the army, aviation and navy (and later even the SS units) - created its own weapons department. This is how the Army Weapons Directorate arose with its own research institutions and experimental testing grounds; This is how an independent department of research, improvements and patents appeared under the main command of the Navy; Thus, a technical department was created at the Air Force High Command with well-equipped research and testing stations in Göttingen, Adlershof (a suburb of Berlin), Braunschweig, Oberpfafenhofen (near Munich), Einring and other cities.
Hitler's famous order on the non-disclosure of secrets and secrets, issued at the beginning of the war and allowing an individual to know only what directly concerned him, as well as, to put it carefully, the “noble” struggle for primacy between the branches of the armed forces contributed to the fact that individual fields of study were increasingly became more and more isolated from each other, thereby worsening the general state of affairs in science. It was almost impossible for scientists in the laboratories of higher educational institutions to obtain information about even the most insignificant part of the scientific and experimental work carried out in the apparatus of the armed forces. An individual researcher at a higher educational institution was entrusted with only a small piece of the entire mosaic, which by no means gave him an idea of the overall picture of development. From these researchers one could often hear the following phrase: “We are wandering in the dark, we know too little of what we need to know. We have no idea where our shortcomings are.”
But that's not all. Along with the research sectors of higher education institutions, industry and the armed forces, there were also a number of private, independent research institutions. Of these, only the exceptionally well-equipped institutes of the Imperial Post Office deserve mention, which were engaged not only in improvements in the field of long-distance communication technology, but also paid much attention to questions of nuclear physics, problems of infrared rays, electron microscopy and many other areas of military importance. .
Reading these lines, everyone asks himself the question: was there at least one such authority that summarized the results of research from all scientific sectors, supervised them and directed the resulting data to those institutions where they brought the greatest benefit for both military and civilian purposes ? No. There was no such authority. All research work in Germany lacked a connecting central body that would summarize the experience of scientists and, on its basis, guide their research. German science and technology were devoid of a head, instead there were only individual connecting nerve fibers and primitive coordinating organs.
The State Research Council had no authority or full knowledge of what was happening outside its sphere of influence. And yet, on the own initiative of his employees and on behalf of various weapons departments, he prepared and conducted more than 10 thousand research works, which received well-deserved recognition from the military.
Another governing body was the Office of Economic Development, created under Goering's four-year plan and serving the 25 institutions provided for by this plan. The large funds allocated to him for these purposes were zealously used “only for targeted research,” and the poor research institutes of higher educational institutions, which until now carried out the main scientific work, did not receive a penny from them. Therefore, in the circles of researchers at higher educational institutions, the Economic Development Department was mockingly called the “concern development department.”
During the war, another governing body acquired extremely great weight - the Speer Ministry. Since during this period the possibilities for institutes to obtain raw materials, personnel and laboratory equipment were significantly reduced, since what was necessary and feasible could no longer be found anywhere, and since the country’s industry could barely cope with orders from various arms departments, this ministry, in turn, sought to gain authority to resolve issues about which research activities should be stopped as unnecessary, which should be continued as having “important military significance” and which should be given preference as being “decisive for the war.” But science is never benefited by a situation where its interests are decided by an authority that aims only at improving and producing what best suits the interests of the day. Such an organization fails to understand what opportunities lie within the plans and objectives of research institutions. Only because science was deprived of leadership, scientists began to be commanded by authorities alien to science.
If, despite this general position, as a result of long scientific research, new types of weapons, new artificial materials were nevertheless created, new scientific methods and new profiles of science were discovered, then for this we should thank, of course, not the pathetic organization of “leaders”, but only individual people who worked in all areas of science with full dedication of their strength and abilities. To this day, there is still no information about what German scientists worked on, researched and improved. Only the winners received comprehensive data about this using their own “method”. But even before this, German science, in its not devoid of dramatic development, went through many different stages and phases.
Science in the period of “lightning wars”
In 1939, German political leaders, guided by the experience of the war with Poland, hoped mainly for a short-term war. They, and in particular Goering, strongly advocated that the war should be won with the weapons with which it was started. New improvements, which were “ripe for the front” only in subsequent years, were considered of no interest. Scientists whose work was only in its earliest stages and who still needed years to achieve results useful for the war were of no practical value to the government. Therefore, scientists were classified in the category of human reserves from which reinforcements for the front were drawn. It goes without saying that, under such circumstances, "humanitarian" scientists were considered from the very beginning as quantite negligeable (a quantity that can be neglected). As a result, despite the objections of the weapons departments and various other authorities, several thousand highly qualified scientists from universities, higher technical educational institutions and various research institutes, including irreplaceable specialists in research in the field of high frequencies, nuclear physics, chemistry, motor engineering and etc., were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war and were used in lower positions and even as ordinary soldiers. If Goebbels ensured that artists, musicians, writers, singers, athletes, etc. were spared from military service, since he needed them to organize entertainment at home and at the front, then Minister Rust could not do anything for his researchers. And when scientists, and especially representatives of the younger generation of scientists and researchers, left their laboratories and institutes to go to the front as humble fighters, this even made everyone proud. The British (and not the Germans) calculated that every year every talented nation produces one researcher per million of its population. As you can see, the harvest is not particularly dense. And the fact that in an age when one scientific researcher can be as important for the conduct of war as entire armies, this expensive and sometimes irreplaceable human material was squandered with such ease, could not pass without a trace for us.
After the war with France, Hitler gave the order to stop all research work that could not be completed within one year. This order turned out to be almost fatal not only for aviation (in 1939 there was already a design project for a jet fighter), but research work in the field of high frequencies also suffered from it, that is, precisely the very area in which the enemy soon gained fatal advantage.
Science distress signal
Some time passed, and sobering blows rained down on the German army. The air battle over England is lost. The war in Russia has radically changed its original character. In the submarine war, the enemy's aircraft, superior in quality and quantity, caused a deep crisis. There was no doubt that without new aircraft the war would be lost, that the weapons, equipment and vehicles used in Russia must meet the deadly conditions of climate and terrain, that high-frequency technology had now become the most important link in all military equipment.
Then the steering wheel was turned in the opposite direction. Goebbels had to issue a directive that henceforth there should be no more speeches against scientists and researchers, against teachers and clergy in the press, radio, cinema, theater and literature, but, on the contrary, the great importance of their activities would be emphasized. Despite the fact that Goebbels had nothing to do with science, he invited professors and directors of higher educational institutions to Heidelberg to tell them that the state highly values the work of scientists.
Doenitz turned out to be the most energetic in this matter. He autocratically discarded the intricate system of scientific leadership, personally convened a conference of leading experts, informed them with all frankness about the technical crisis of submarine warfare, appointed one of the scientists as the chief of the naval research staff and eliminated all intermediate authorities by subordinating this new “chief of staff” personally to myself. The fact that the commander-in-chief directly subordinated the research scientist was a kind of revolution in the field of military technology.
An alarm sounded for all scientists. At the same time that “General Unruh”, as a special commissioner, traveled around the country, “mobilizing” the last men remaining in the rear to the front, a decisive countermeasure was taken in the interests of science and technology: 10 thousand scientists, technicians, specialists and engineers were removed from the front and installed in their places to solve urgent problems. In order to prevent the extinction of entire scientific disciplines and preserve irreplaceable personnel, it was even decided to recall 100 scientists in the humanities from the front. It was necessary to save what could still be saved.
But even these measures could not completely restore the previous state of German science. Using a kind of “fist law” and overruling those who had less powerful fists, individual authorities achieved powers for themselves, received scientists, support staff, equipment, chemicals, scarce materials and funds. But science and technology are incompatible with improvisation. A state that wants to receive the real fruits of science and technology must act not only with great insight and skill, but also be able to patiently wait for these fruits.
It is clear that of all that was conceived, learned, improved and tested in the laboratories of higher educational institutions, in research institutions of the armed forces and in the laboratories of industrial enterprises, only a part could go into production and be used at the front, for when the war was already in full swing, the fruits of the mental activity of German scientists were still ripening, hiding within the walls of their laboratories.
Subjects of research and achievements of German science
The work done by German scientists in the field of creating new research methods, in the field of discovering new things and improving the technology of old ones, given the current situation in Germany, cannot be generalized. During the war, research work related to weapons was carried out exclusively as “secret”, and some studies were even labeled “state secret”. The usual peacetime publication of research results in special scientific journals was not carried out. A researcher who worked on a special task, but had the right to talk about it even with his colleagues.
A book about the achievements of German science could be written today much more easily not in Germany itself, but outside its borders, because the main original documents are located there. One American report states: “The Office of Technical Services in Washington states that thousands of tons of documents are stored in its safes. According to experts, over 1 million individual inventions, virtually related to all sciences, all industrial and military secrets of Nazi Germany, need processing and analysis. One official in Washington called this collection of documents "a unique source of scientific thought, the first complete expression of the inventive mind of an entire people."
How could this happen? Why did Germany's opponents understand before her the importance of research work in the current age of technology, not only for warfare, but also for the peaceful economy and cultural development in all areas of life?
The fact is that they looked at the seizure of valuable German inventions as a military task. Even during the invasion of the West, commando squads immediately began their hunt for research materials and for the researchers themselves. Prepared by the Allies, Operation Paper Clips was carried out mainly by the Americans. However, British, French and Soviet troops took no less part in this, the only “trophy campaign” in the history of wars.
The assertion, spread at the end of the war by foreign propaganda under the influence of the general war psychosis, that German science had achieved only insignificant results and that in a country where there is no freedom, science is not capable of much at all, was soon refuted by numerous speeches by foreign scientists themselves. The report of the Society of German Scientists, entitled "Research means work and bread" (September 1950), sets out a number of such statements. Due to lack of space, I will cite only a few of them.
For example, Mr. Lester Walker writes in Harpers Magazine (October 1946): “Materials about secret military inventions, of which there were only dozens recently, now represent an accumulation of acts totaling up to 750 thousand...” For In order for new German concepts to find corresponding English terms, it would be necessary to compile a new German-English dictionary of special words, which would include about 40 thousand new technical and scientific terms.
The American official report lists a number of individual inventions and research results of German scientists in the field of applied physics, in the field of research of infrared rays, the invention of new lubricants, synthetic mica, methods of cold rolling of steel, etc., which have received universal recognition among American scientists. Thus, the report states: “We have learned from these priceless secrets how to make the world's finest capacitor. Millions of capacitors are used in radio engineering and in the production of high-frequency equipment... but this capacitor can withstand almost twice the voltage than our American capacitors. This is a real miracle for our radio technicians.”
Regarding inventions in the textile industry, this report states that "there is so much new in this collection of secrets that most American textile specialists have become uneasy..."
About the trophies from the laboratories of the concern I. G. Farbenindustry it is said: “... however, the most valuable secrets were received by us from the laboratories and factories of the large German chemical concern I. G. Farbenindustry. Nowhere has there ever been such a valuable treasure trove of industrial secrets. These secrets relate to the production of liquid and solid fuels, to the metallurgical industry, to the production of synthetic rubber, textiles, chemicals, artificial fabrics, medicines and paints. One American specialist in the production of dyes said that German patents contain methods and recipes for producing 50 thousand types of dyes, and most of them are better than ours. We ourselves would probably never be able to make some of them. The American paint industry has advanced at least ten years."
One can cite a number of other statements contained in various reports: “The production of special search groups of the Allies was no less impressive in the field of food production, in the field of medicine and the art of war” ... “the “trophies” in the field of recent achievements are absolutely boundless aviation and the production of aerial bombs." “German secrets in the production of rockets and rockets are of the greatest importance for the future,” it is said elsewhere, “... as it became known, the Germans at the end of the war had 138 types of remotely controlled projectiles in various stages of production and development... All hitherto known systems for distance control and targeting were used: radio, short waves, wire communications, directed electromagnetic waves, sound, infrared rays, beams of light, magnetic control, etc. The Germans developed all kinds of rocket engines that allowed their missiles and rockets to reach supersonic speeds.”
After Japan's surrender, President Truman ordered the publication of 364,000 confiscated patents and other captured documents. On July 27, 1946, 27 former Allied states signed an agreement in London, according to which all German patents located outside Germany and registered before August 1, 1946 were expropriated. The Library of Congress in Washington began publishing a bibliographic weekly, which listed declassified military and scientific documents, their summary, the number and cost of copies made from them, etc. These weekly bulletins were sent to 125 libraries in the United States, “to make them more accessible for the public."
American businessmen themselves recognize the enormous importance of German discoveries and inventions for practical use in industry and technology. “The public is literally devouring published military secrets,” says one of the aforementioned reports. “In just one month, we received 20 thousand requests for technical publications, and now about 1 thousand copies of these bulletins are ordered daily... authorized companies stand all day long in the corridors of the Technical Services Directorate to be the first to receive a new publication. Much of the information is so valuable that industrialists would willingly give many thousands to obtain new information one day before their competitors. But the staff of the Office of Technical Services is careful to ensure that no one receives the report before its official publication. One day, the head of a research institution sat for about 3 hours in one of the bureaus of the Technical Services Administration, taking notes and sketches from some documents being prepared for publication. As he left, he said, “Thank you very much, my notes will give my company at least half a million dollars in profit.”
The American report goes on to talk about representatives of the Soviet Union. This passage was still written in the naive expressions of 1946, but now, in the setting of 1953, it forces the reader to pay more attention to it. With naive pride, the Americans report: “One of our most insatiable clients is Vneshtorg (the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union). One of their leaders once came to the publishing office with a bibliography in his hands and said: “I want to have copies of everything you have.” The Russians sent mothers an order for 2 thousand publications in May for a total amount of 5,594 dollars 40 cents. In general, they bought any publication that came out.”
The Russians made sure to get the fruits of the labor of German scientists and technicians in another way as well. So, at the end of the war, they brought several hundred first-class specialists from Germany, including: Professor Dr. Peter Thiessen - director of the Institute of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry (Kaiser Wilhelm Institute), who was also the head of the chemistry sector in the state research sonnet; Baron Manfred von Ardenne - the largest German scientist in the field of high-frequency technology, television, electron microscopy and isotope separation; Professor Max Vollmer - full professor of physical chemistry at the Higher Technical School (Berlin - Charlottenburg) and a leading expert in the field of semiconductors and battery production, who had enormous authority in matters of military equipment; Professor Gustav Hertz - who until 1938 held the post of director of the Heinrich Hertz Institute for the Study of Oscillatory Phenomena (Berlin), and subsequently - the head of Siemens-Werke Research Laboratory No. 2, who knew all the many secrets of this concern; Dr. Nikolaus Riehl - director of the scientific department of the Auer company, a famous specialist in the production of luminescent paints, which are of great importance for the military and civilian industries.
The Russians also managed to bring home Dr. L. Bevilogua, a student of the world-famous Professor Debie, who emigrated from Germany to the West and was awarded the Nobel Prize. Debie was director of the Institute of Refrigeration in Dahlem.
These are just a few names. But what enormous benefits they can bring to the Soviet Union! Professor Dr. Thyssen, for example, occupied a paramount position in the German research world. Thyssen was a student of the most prominent German specialist in colloid chemistry, Professor Zsigmondy from Göttingen. The institute, headed by Thyssen, was the largest of the thirty institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and had a staff of about 100 employees. It had the best equipment, and its funds were equal to the sum of the budgets of at least a dozen other, of course, also no less important institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. Of the 25 electron microscopes then available in Germany, three were located at the Thyssen Institute. Thiessen was also head of the chemistry sector at the government research council. This meant that he knew all the plans for research work in the field of chemistry, their progress and results. Thiessen was the person who could process these results not only administratively, but also personally review them and give them a critical assessment. People who worked closely with Thiessen say that he has a phenomenal memory. Finally, Thyssen was one of the main figures of the so-called “chemical headquarters”, which consisted of three members: the chairman of the supervisory board of the concern I. G. Farbenindustry, Professor Krauch, the head of the German Society of Chemists, the sovereign adviser Schieber, and Thyssen himself. Thus, Thyssen was aware of the state of affairs in all German chemistry. The task of the chemical headquarters was to summarize the results of experiments carried out in laboratories and then transfer the accumulated experience for further use in production. It follows that Thyssen not only knew the direction of research in the field of chemistry, but was also privy to the secrets of the German chemical industry, its methods, planning, and was in contact with the largest chemical industrialists. He knew the most important secrets that are now used by the Soviet Union.
As for the German scientists now in America, the Pentagon reported in December 1947 that 523 German scientists had been taken there and that this figure would soon increase to 1 thousand people. More precise information is not yet available.
The British have so far been the most restrained in their reports about captured scientists and specialists. But professors who have returned from pre-trial detention camps report that there are many "famous and even celebrities from all fields of science" there. In total, the victorious countries exported more than 2 thousand German scientists and specialists.
The removal of German scientists from Germany is the most difficult consequence of the last war for our people. Researchers can be compared to the brain of a nation. At the end of the war, our nation underwent a serious operation: this brain was cut out along with everything that the nation had achieved, that is, along with all the results of research, patents, etc. All this went to the victors and was poured into their scientific and economic organism. This, of course, is a more modern form of economic influence on the vanquished than war indemnities and monetary reparations of old. This measure leads to a sharp reduction in the spiritual potential of the defeated people. It represents the artificial insemination of science, technology and the economy of the winner. The American Life magazine, in its issue of September 2, 1946, quite soberly confirms this, stating that the true purpose of reparations was not to dismantle the industrial enterprises of Germany, but to excise the brain of the German nation, to seize everything that it had accumulated in the region. science and technology.
The fate of explorers at the end of the war
German science, which had developed strongly in the first half of our century, was reduced almost to nothing at the end of the last war by the following three circumstances: first, the loss of all the results of scientific research, including patents, and their dispersion throughout the world; secondly, the movement of leading German specialists to the countries of former enemies; thirdly, discrimination against the researchers who remained in Germany.
As a result of the political purge carried out under Hitler, 1,628 associate professors were expelled from departments and research institutes. According to data published at the beginning of 1950 in the weekly Christ und Welt, this constituted 9.5% of the entire teaching staff of higher educational institutions in Germany. This means that every tenth scientist was excluded from the scientific life of the country. Another 4,289 associate professors fell victim to the next political purge, in 1945, which already amounted to 32.1% of all scientists. Thus, in 1945, every third German university teacher lost both his department and the opportunity to continue research work.
What the Americans thought about the “political danger” of these scientists becomes clear from a number of official statements. For example, the head of Operation Paper Clips gave the following directive to the commando units engaged in “catching” German scientists. “If you come across simply anti-fascists who are of no value to science, don’t take them. If they may have a certain scientific interest for us, then their political past does not play any role.” And when one American senator expressed his doubts about this “import of German scientists, basing them on the fact that most of them were members of the Nazi Party, a representative of the American War Department responded this way: “Scientists are usually interested only in their own research and only occasionally - politics."
The damage suffered by German science is by no means limited to those scientists who were left without a job during the political purges of Hitler's reign. After the war, another 1,028 associate professors migrated from universities in the eastern zone of Germany to the western zone as unemployed refugees. This represented 7.7% of the entire teaching staff of German higher education institutions. If you put it all together, it turns out that from 1933 to 1946, according to the Society of the Founders of German Science, 49.3% of all higher education teachers lost their jobs “for political reasons.” This represents approximately half of the total number of German scientists. No other professional class in Germany was so bled dry. How such an amputation will affect the German intelligentsia can only be shown by the future.
A look at the future
It would be wrong to say that the fate that befell German science in the Second World War no longer worries the leadership circles of our state today. In the most diverse segments of the population, right down to members of parliament when they discuss state budgets, one can hear the same argument: “An impoverished people like the Germans cannot raise their science to a high level again. He must first get out of his plight.”
To this we Germans have only one answer. Precisely because such enormous damage has been caused to German science, we are concerned more than all others by the simple truth that the natural sciences of today create the prerequisites for the technology of tomorrow, and the worker of today will not be able to feed his sons if science continues to develop will not create the prerequisites for their independent work tomorrow. If our generation does not now correct the monstrous consequences of the war that ruined our science, it will cause great harm to the economy and social structure of future generations. We Germans must do much more for our science than others.
However, the numbers convincingly suggest that not everything is being done. For example, America allocates amounts to finance its research institutes that, calculated per capita, amount to 71 German marks; England - 25.2 marks, and the Federal Republic - only 7.75 marks.
In this regard, another question arises. It would be an illusion to believe that any “damage” in science can be compensated for by money. Science cannot be bought with money, just as it cannot be borrowed or “organized.” Money can only be an auxiliary means, although necessary, but not decisive. No amount of money will help where there is no talent for research work. But genuine talent for science and research is extremely rare in any nation: it is a gift of nature. But the way this natural gift has been treated over the past few years and how it has literally been squandered depending on the extent to which people endowed with this gift met one or another political requirements of the time is by no means an act of wisdom, but an act of exceptional political myopia and blindness. The great process of healing which has become necessary to our science is again beginning to command the deep reverence and recognition of the people. Only when external prerequisites are created, that is, sufficient financial support, and internal preconditions, that is, complete respect for scientists and reverence for this professional class, can we hope that our younger generation will single out from among its people the talents and talents of will allow them to turn to the difficult profession of a scientist. After all, the failures of the past act as a deterrent for a very short time.
This article is based on conversations with numerous scientists and experts in various fields of science.
Total R&D expenditures in Germany amounted to 49.8 billion euros in 2000 (11.6% more than in 1998). At the same time, funds from public sources increased by 2.3% to 15.9 billion euros, but the state’s share has been constantly declining since 1996. The share of private business increased from 60.8% in 1996 to 65.5% in 2000 (32.7 billion euros). R&D expenditures amount to 2.3-2.4% of GDP.
The main organizations in the field of scientific research are the German Research Community, the Society named after. Max Planck (21 institutes), Society named after. Fraunhofer (19 institutes and branches) and others - receive financial resources from both federal and state sources.
However, the main financial source for scientific research in Germany, as in other Western European countries, is private business. In 2000, firms accounted for 2/3 of all R&D expenditures in Germany. In recent years, firms are increasingly implementing research projects not independently, but with partners from both business and science: if 15 years ago, financing external orders for R&D accounted for approximately 9% of the corresponding expenses of firms, now it is more than 14%. Moreover, this trend is especially pronounced among large companies. At the same time, only 1/6 of all R&D expenses of firms goes directly to scientific institutions. This is even slightly less than foreign orders from German businesses. However, orders to universities are growing, and their volume has doubled over the past 10 years.
An important source of funding for scientific research is the activities of foundations, the resources of which are generated from private sources. The state creates favorable conditions for funds, in particular, stimulating them with tax breaks. The Association of Foundations for German Science alone includes 307 foundations financed by business. Moreover, this union does not include many large and independently operating foundations, such as the Volkswagen Foundation, the Robert Bosch Foundation, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Körber Foundation, etc. 11 funds are financed from the federal budget and are aimed at providing scholarships for students and doctoral students.
The role of R&D funding within the EU is steadily increasing, but remains small. The EU's 5th Framework Program for Research and Development (1999-2003) has a total budget of about 15 billion euros. annually receives about 670 million euros from these funds, which represents only 4% of public funding for R&D. However, for certain areas this share is significantly higher (biotechnology - 10%, information technology - 20%).
Germany has a multi-level school education system with different types of educational institutions. In the 2001/02 academic year, there were 41,441 general education schools (including 17,175 primary schools, 3,465 secondary schools and 3,168 gymnasiums). In addition, there are 9,755 vocational schools. To be able to enter a university or other higher education institution, you need a third degree certificate of education, which requires studying for 13 (sometimes 12) years and passing exams.
Germany is a country with deep university traditions. The oldest German university - - founded in 1386. The largest universities: Berlin, Cologne, etc. In the 2002/03 academic year, 359 universities operated in Germany, incl. 99 universities. Currently, reform of the higher education system is beginning.
Germany is a country of great culture with strong roots. The names of G. Schütz, J. S. Bach, R. Wagner, J. Brahms, F. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and others - in music, A. Dürer, L. Cranach, T. Riemenschneider, E. L. Kirchner and others - in the fine arts, I.V. Goethe, F. Schiller, G. Heine, E.T.A. Hoffmann, T. Mann, etc. - in literature are world famous and represent phenomena not only of German, but also world culture.
Modern Germany is characterized by diversity and widespread culture. There is no centralization of cultural life and cultural values in one or several cities - they are dispersed literally throughout the country: along with the famous ones, Munich, Weimar, or there are many small, not so widely known, but culturally significant places: Rothenburg oblast der Tauber, Naumburg, Bayreuth, Celle, Wittenberg, Schleswig, etc. In 1999 there were 4,570 museums, and their number is growing. They receive almost 100 million visits per year. The most famous museums are the Dresden Art Gallery, the Old and New Pinakothek in Munich, the German Museum in Munich, the Historical Museum in Berlin and many others. There are also many palace museums (the most famous is Sans Souci in Potsdam) and castle museums.
Theater is no less loved in Germany: in the 1999/2000 season there were 6.1 million visits to operas and ballets, 5.6 million to dramatic performances, 3 million to operettas and musicals, 1.2 million to concerts. There are more than 1000 scientific and more than 11.3 thousand public libraries in the country. From 50 to 75 films are produced annually (including co-productions). R.W. Fassbinder and F. Schlöndorff are world-class directors.
If there was almost no one to support the composer traditions (one can name only K. Orff and K. H. Stockhausen), and installations (J. Beuys and followers) and abstractionism dominated in the visual arts, then the development of literature in post-war Germany turned out to be more significant. Such major writers as G. Böll, G. Grass, Z. Lenz, K. Wolf are world famous. It is impossible not to mention German philosophical literature, which is traditionally strong in Germany and influences European and world cultural development (it is enough to name such philosophers of past centuries as I. Kant, I.G. Fichte, G.W.F. Hegel, F.W. Schelling, A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, etc.). These traditions in Germany were supported by M. Heidegger, K. Jaspers, T. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, J. Habermas, H.-G. Gadamer. The books of economists W. Eucken and W. Röpke had a great impact not only on professionals, but also on public life in the post-war period.
In 1999, 6.9 billion euros were spent on culture from the state and municipal budgets. Most of them (2.9 billion) were allocated to support theaters, professional orchestras and choirs, other musical groups and musical events.