Two sources of cult
To begin with, it should be said that the “cult of personality” is not at all a specific phenomenon inherent exclusively to the Stalinist USSR. It is equally incorrect to consider it a manifestation of the “slave Russian soul”, about which Western psychoanalysts love to talk thoughtfully (See for example: Rancourt-Laferriere D. Slave soul of Russia. Problems of moral masochism and the cult of suffering / Translated from English. M., 1996 ), as well as home-grown Russian liberals who grovel before the “civilized world”. From primitive times to the present day, people have tended to glorify and elevate their leaders. Post-revolutionary Russia was no exception. As soon as the Bolshevik Party took power, endless streams of praise poured into its leaders. Soviet leaders were glorified at rallies and congresses, cities and ships were named after them. In 1923, the city of Gatchina was renamed Trotsk, in 1924 Elisavetgrad - in Zinovievsk (now Kirovograd), in 1923 Miass - in Tukhachevsk. Tsaritsyn became Stalingrad only in 1925.
The peasantry and workers of the Yaroslavl district express their sincere devotion to the leaders of our liberation movement: the respected comrade Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (applause), the great people's leader of the Red Army, Comrade Trotsky (applause) and all other comrades of our great formidable army - Comrade. Zinoviev, Kamenev (applause) and all of you comrades together (applause).
Long live our world leader Comrade Lenin (applause) and our steel leaders Comrade Comrade Lenin. Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev! (applause).
(Ibid. pp.97–98).
Long live the XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party! Long live his beneficial work in clearing the paths of socialism! Long live the leaders of the t.t. Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev and Stalin! (Applause).
(Ibid. P.531).
As we see, in the toasts of that time, the name of Joseph Vissarionovich did not occupy a leading position.
Having received real power, Stalin, contrary to popular belief, was openly burdened by such praise:
I must tell you, comrades, in all honesty that I did not deserve a good half of the praise that was given to me here. It turns out that I am a hero of October, and the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the leader of the Comintern, a miracle hero and everything else. All this is nonsense, comrades, and an absolutely unnecessary exaggeration. They usually speak in this tone over the coffin of a deceased revolutionary. But I'm not going to die yet.
(Stalin I.V. Response to the greetings of the workers of the main railway workshops in Tiflis on June 8, 1926 // Stalin I.V. Works. T.8. M., 1948. P.173).
But if the leader Soviet people was so burdened by his cult, why didn’t he ban it? The answer to this “tricky question” can be found in Stalin’s conversation with the writer Lion Feuchtwanger on January 8, 1937 (Maksimenkov L. Essays on the history of nomenklatura Soviet literature. Western pilgrims at the Stalinist throne (Feuchtwanger and others) // Questions of literature. 2004. No. 2. P.257–260):
Feuchtwanger. I've only been here 4-5 weeks. One of my first impressions: some forms of expressing respect and love for you seem exaggerated and tasteless to me. You give the impression of a simple and modest person. Are these forms an unnecessary burden for you?Stalin. I completely agree with you. It’s unpleasant when things are exaggerated to hyperbolic proportions. People go into ecstasy over trifles. Out of hundreds of greetings, I answer only 1-2, do not allow most of them to be printed, and do not allow overly enthusiastic greetings to be printed at all as soon as I learn about them. Nine-tenths of these greetings are truly in complete bad taste. And they give me unpleasant experiences.
I would not like to justify - it is impossible to justify, but to explain in a human way - where such unbridled, almost cloying delight around my person comes from. Apparently, in our country we managed to solve a big problem for which generations of people fought for centuries - the Babouvistists, the Hebertists, all sorts of sects of French, English, German revolutionaries. Apparently, the solution to this problem (it was cherished by the working and peasant masses): liberation from exploitation causes enormous delight. People are too happy that they managed to free themselves from exploitation. They literally don’t know what to do with their joy.
Liberation from exploitation is a very big deal, and the masses celebrate it in their own way. All this is attributed to me - this, of course, is not true, what can one person do? They see in me a collective concept and build a bonfire of calf delights around me.
Feuchtwanger. As a person who sympathizes with the USSR, I see and feel that the feelings of love and respect for you are completely sincere and elementary. Precisely because you are so loved and respected, can you not, by your word, put an end to these forms of expression of delight which confuse some of your friends abroad?
Stalin. I tried to do this several times. But nothing works. You tell them it’s not good, it’s not good. People think I'm speaking out of false modesty.
They wanted to celebrate my 55th birthday. I pushed through the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to ban this. They began to receive complaints that I was preventing them from celebrating, expressing their feelings, that it was not about me. Others said I was breaking down. How to prohibit these manifestations of delight? You can't use force. There is freedom of expression. You can ask in a friendly way.
This is a manifestation of a certain lack of culture. Over time it will get boring. It's hard to stop yourself from expressing your joy. It is a pity to take strict measures against workers and peasants.
The victories are already very great. Previously, the landowner and capitalist were the demiurge; workers and peasants were not considered people. Now bondage from the working people has been removed. Huge victory! Landowners and capitalists have been expelled, workers and peasants are the masters of life. They come into a calf's delight.
Our people are still lagging behind in terms of general culture, so this is the expression of delight that comes out. Nothing can be done here by law or by ban. You can find yourself in a funny position. And the fact that some people abroad are upset by this, nothing can be done about it. Culture is not achieved immediately. We are doing a lot in this area: for example, we built over two thousand new schools in cities in 1935 and 1936 alone. We are trying by all means to improve culture, but the results will appear in 5–6 years. Cultural upsurge goes slowly. Delights grow rapidly and ugly.
Feuchtwanger. I am not talking about the feeling of love and respect on the part of the workers and peasant masses, but about other cases. Your busts displayed in different places are ugly and poorly made. At an exhibition of Moscow planning, where people still think about you first of all, why is there a bad bust there? In an exhibition of Rembrandt, presented with great taste, why is there a bad bust?
Stalin. The question is logical. I meant the general public, not bureaucrats from various institutions. As for bureaucrats, it cannot be said that they have no taste. They are afraid that if there is no bust of Stalin, then either the newspaper, or their boss will scold them, or a visitor will be surprised. This is an area of careerism, a peculiar form of “self-defense” of bureaucrats: in order not to be touched, a bust of Stalin must be displayed.
Every party that wins attracts alien elements, careerists (Here Stalin indirectly quotes Lenin: “We are afraid of excessive expansion of the party, because careerists and scoundrels who deserve only to be shot inevitably try to join the government party.”- Lenin V.I. Childhood disease of “leftism” in communism // Lenin V.I. Full collection Op. 5th ed. T.41. M., 1970. P.30). They try to protect themselves on the principle of mimicry - they display busts, write slogans that they themselves do not believe in. As for the poor quality of the busts, this is done not only intentionally (I know it happens), but also due to inability to choose. I saw, for example, at the May Day demonstration, portraits of me and my comrades: they looked like all the devils. People carry it with delight and do not understand that portraits are not suitable. You can't issue an order to show good busts - well, to hell with them! There is no time to deal with such things, we have other things to do and worries, you don’t even look at these busts.
Thus, the “cult” had two sources. Firstly, a sincere feeling of gratitude to the new government, personified in the personality of Stalin, on the part of the broad masses of the population. It is very difficult to deal with this. As a visual experiment, try stopping the flow of friendly praise addressed to you at your own birthday. If you ask softly and delicately, nothing will happen. If you demand persistently and harshly, you risk seriously quarreling with your friends.
Secondly, deliberate flattery on the part of careerists and scoundrels persistently climbing to the top. As the unknown author of a poetic response to Yevgeny Yevtushenko rightly noted:
And the cult?.. In a sycophantic frenzy
It truly bloomed magnificently.
Creatures like you
They created a halo for him.
And indeed, the future zealous denouncer of Stalinism during Stalin’s lifetime diligently composed servile poems:
I know:
To the leader
infinitely close
thoughts
our people.
I believe:
flowers will bloom here,
gardens
will be filled with light.
After all, this is about
we dream
and I
and you,
Means
Stalin thinks
about this!
(Evtushenko E. There will be a canal here // Evtushenko E. Scouts of the future. Book of poems. M., 1952. P.48)
I know:
seeing the future around,
leans
this night
my very best friend in the world
in the Kremlin
above the work desk.
The whole world is in front of him -
vast expanse!
In the sleepless silence of the night
he thinks
about the country
about the world
he thinks
about me.
Goes to the window.
Admiring the capital,
he smiles warmly.
And I fall asleep
and I'll dream about it
Very
good
dream.
(Evtushenko E. Night walks through Moscow // Ibid. pp. 70–71)
Stalin against the cult of Stalin
Nevertheless, Stalin tried to the best of his ability to fight the cult of his personality.
In the 30s, in private letters of instruction, as a censor fiction, film scripts or editor of party journalism, he [Stalin. - I.P.] repeatedly and persistently advised replacing the word “Leader” (Stalin) with the “Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)” (that is, with the metaphor of a collective leader).
(Maksimenkov L. Cult. Notes on words-symbols in Soviet political culture // Free Thought. 1993. No. 10. P. 27).
For example, in the play “Lies” (1933) by the young but already famous playwright A.N. Afinogenov, one of her heroes, Deputy People's Commissar Ryadovoy, in a dispute with former oppositionist Nakatov, utters a pathetic tirade:
I'm talking about our Central Committee... I'm talking about the leader who leads us, tearing off the masks from many highly educated leaders who had unlimited opportunities and went bankrupt. I'm talking about a man whose strength was created by the granite trust of hundreds of millions. His name in all languages of the world sounds like a symbol of the strength of the Bolshevik cause. And this leader is invincible.
(Ibid. P.28).
Since, unlike the current Russian Federation, in the totalitarian USSR there was absolutely no freedom of creativity, the manuscript of the play came to Stalin, and he made changes to its text. In particular, the quoted fragment was edited by the “invincible leader” as follows:
I'm talking about our Central Committee, which leads us by ripping off the masks of many highly educated leaders who had unlimited opportunities and went bankrupt. I am talking about the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whose strength was created by the granite trust of hundreds of millions. Its banner in all languages of the world sounds like a symbol of the strength of the Bolshevik cause. And this collective leader is invincible.
(RGASPI. F.558. Op.1. D.5088. L.84–85. Quoted from: Maksimenkov L. Cult. Notes on words-symbols... P.28).
The editorial edit was accompanied by the following comment:
P.S. It’s in vain to talk about the “leader”. This is not good and, perhaps, not decent. It’s not about the “leader”, but about the collective leader - the Central Committee of the party. I. St[alin]
(RGASPI. F.558. Op.1. D.5088. L.118ob. Quoted from: Maksimenkov L. Cult. Notes on words-symbols... P.28).
Published in 1936 biographical sketch about the life of Sergo Ordzhonikidze, compiled by M.D. Orakhelashvili. Stalin read this book and left many notes on its pages:
During this difficult period for the proletarian revolution [summer 1917. - I.P.], when in the face of the impending danger many wavered, Comrade Stalin firmly remained in the post of leader of the Central Committee and the Petrograd party organization. Comrade Ordzhonikidze was continuously with him, under his leadership waging an energetic, selfless struggle for the Leninist slogans of the party.
The above quotation was underlined by Stalin, and in the margin he wrote in red pencil: “What about the Central Committee? What about the party?
Elsewhere there was talk about the VI Congress of the RSDLP (summer 1917), about how Lenin, hiding in Razliv, “gave guidance on issues on the agenda of the congress. To receive Lenin’s directives, Comrade Ordzhonikidze, on Stalin’s instructions, twice went to Lenin’s hut.”
And again Stalin’s note: “Where is the Central Committee?”(Maksimenkov L. Cult. Notes on words-symbols... P.28–29).
On January 27, 1937, after viewing the script for the film “The Great Citizen,” Stalin sent a letter to the head of Soviet cinematography B.Z. Shumyatsky, in which, among other critical remarks, there was the following:
Mention of Stalin should be excluded. Instead of Stalin, the Central Committee of the party should have been installed.
(Ibid. P.28)
In the conversation with Feuchtwanger quoted above, Stalin mentioned that he had banned the celebration of his 55th birthday. And so it was. On a letter from the All-Union Society of Old Bolsheviks, which proposed using this anniversary for a propaganda campaign, Stalin imposed a resolution: “I am against it, since such initiatives lead to the strengthening of the “cult of personalities,” which is harmful and incompatible with the spirit of our party.”(Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 3. P. 104.).
On December 19, 1934, at the request of Stalin, the Politburo made a decision: “Respect Comrade Stalin’s request that on December 21, the fifty-fifth anniversary of his birth, no celebrations or celebrations or speeches in the press or at meetings would be allowed.”(RGASPI. F.17. Op.163. Item 1048. L.26. Quoted from: Maksimenkov L. Essays on the nomenklatura history of Soviet literature... P.258). Extracts were sent to Tiflis, Kyiv, to the newspapers “Pravda” and “Izvestia”, to Tashkent, to the editors of the newspapers: “Zarya Vostoka” - Grigoryan, “Communist” - Popov, “Pravda Vostoka”, “Leningradskaya Pravda”, etc. d. (Maksimenkov L. Essays on the nomenklatura history of Soviet literature... P.258)
In 1937–1938, the idea was repeatedly voiced to rename Moscow Stalinodar. Such a proposal was expressed, for example, by individual delegates of the Extraordinary XVII All-Russian Congress of Soviets held on January 15–21, 1937 (Starkov B.A. How Moscow almost became Stalinodar // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 12. P. 126).
From a letter from a member of the CPSU (b), Muscovite D. Zaitsev to the USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N.I. Yezhov, December 28, 1937:
The present socialist Moscow, which is the cradle of the future communist society, should become a historical milestone of the great Stalinist era... The genius of Stalin is a historical gift to humanity, its guiding star on the paths of development and rise to a higher level. Therefore, I am deeply convinced that all humanity of the globe of our era and all humanity of many future centuries will accept with satisfaction and joy the renaming of Moscow to Stalinodar (Emphasis by the author of the letter. - I.P.). Stalinodar will proudly and solemnly resound for many millennia, for it will carry into the centuries the triumph and pride of the heroic victories of current generations, and millions of people selflessly devoted to the cause of communism will see in this triumph the fruits of their struggle, their labor. And every citizen of our homeland will be proud that the name of the great Stalin will be glorified on the tablets of the city, which is the cradle of world communism.
(Starkov B.A. How Moscow almost became Stalinodar // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1990. No. 12. P. 126).
Based on such requests, referents N.I. Yezhov prepared a draft submission to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on renaming Moscow to the city of Stalinodar. It was sent to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR.
And again Joseph Vissarionovich did not follow the flatterers’ lead. M.I. Kalinin informed the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the RSFSR that Stalin was categorically against this proposal. Moscow remained Moscow (Ibid. p.127).
In the diary of the future leader of socialist Bulgaria, Georgiy Dimitrov, there is an entry about a gala dinner at the Kremlin apartment of K.E. Voroshilov in connection with the 20th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Taking the floor for a toast, Dimitrov began to develop the idea of Stalin as a successor to Lenin’s work:
D[imitrov]: ...You can’t talk about Lenin without connecting him with Stalin! (Everyone raises their glasses!)
Stalin: I have great respect for Comrade Dimitrov. We are friends and will remain friends. But I don't agree with him. He didn’t even express himself in Marxist terms. For a cause to succeed, appropriate conditions are necessary, but leaders will be found.
(Ferr G. Anti-Stalin meanness / Translated from English by V.L. Bobrova. M., 2007. P.272).
And here is Stalin’s letter to Detizdat under the Komsomol Central Committee dated February 16, 1938:
vol. Andreev (Children's publishing house of the Komsomol Central Committee)
I am strongly against the publication of “Stories about Stalin’s Childhood.”
The book is replete with a mass of factual inaccuracies, distortions, exaggerations, and undeserved praise. The author was misled by hunters of fairy tales, liars (maybe “conscientious” liars), sycophants. Sorry for the author, but the fact remains a fact.
But that's not the main thing. The main thing is that the book tends to instill in the consciousness of Soviet children (and people in general) a cult of individuals, leaders, infallible heroes. This is dangerous, harmful. The theory of “heroes” and “crowd” is not a Bolshevik, but a Socialist Revolutionary theory. Heroes make people, transform them from a crowd into a people - say the Socialist Revolutionaries. The people make heroes - the Bolsheviks respond to the Socialist Revolutionaries. The book is grist for the Socialist Revolutionary mill. Any such book will be grist to the Socialist Revolutionary mill and will harm our common Bolshevik cause.
I advise you to burn the book.
(Pospelov P.N. Fifty years of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union // Questions of history. 1953. No. 11. P. 21)
Another entry from Dimitrov’s diary, dated April 26, 1939. The May Day appeal of the Comintern is discussed. When asked by Stalin whether Dimitrov had seen the text of the appeal, he replied that in the latest edition - no, but that it was the fruit of collective creativity, and Manuilsky - editor-in-chief. Stalin drew attention to fragments of the appeal praising his personality (Long live our Stalin! Stalin is peace! Stalin is communism! Stalin is our victory!), and declared:
Manuilsky is a sycophant! He was a Trotskyist! We criticized him that when the Trotskyist bandits were being purged, he was silent, did not speak out, and he began to fawn. This is something suspicious! His article in Pravda, “Stalin and the World Communist Movement,” is a harmful, provocative article.
"Joseph Vissarionovich,- Dimitrov wrote further, - did not agree to leave in the appeal “under the banner of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin”, but only “Marx-Engels-Lenin””(Ferr G. Anti-Stalin meanness. P. 273).
Failed Order
The negative attitude of the leader of the Soviet people towards his own “cult” did not change in the 1940s. Thus, it was originally planned to place a Stalinist bas-relief on the famous soldier’s Order of Glory, established on November 8, 1943, but Joseph Vissarionovich rejected this option:
And they began to redo the sketch. Moskalev conjured over him for three days. As a result, the word “Glory” appeared on the order, which later gave the name to the new state award, and in the center the bas-relief of Bagration was replaced by Moskalev with Stalin’s.
Khrulev, as Reznichenko wrote in his memoirs, took Moskalev’s work to Stalin. He, looking carefully at his image, said:
- We have the Spasskaya Tower.
This is the heart of Moscow. This is where the Spasskaya Tower needs to be placed!”
(Pakhomov V. “Glory”, illuminated by “Victory” // Soviet Russia. 2003, October 23. No. 119 (12462). P. 3)
On the highest military order “Victory”, established simultaneously with the Order of Glory, it was originally planned to place bas-reliefs of Lenin and Stalin, but here, at the insistence of the leader, they were replaced with an image of the Kremlin’s Spasskaya Tower (V.A. Durov. Order of Lenin. Order of Stalin (project) . B.m., 2005. P.97).
Later, the bas-relief of Stalin was nevertheless placed on the medals “For Victory over Germany”, “For Victory over Japan” and “For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945”. Double bas-reliefs - Lenin and Stalin - are depicted on the medal “Partisan of the Great Patriotic War” (1943) and the anniversary medal “30 Years of the Soviet Army and Navy” (1948).
Shortly after the end of World War II, a group of senior leaders came up with the following initiative: 
IN THE POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
We submit the following proposals for consideration by the Politburo:
1. Reward comrade. Stalin with the Order of Victory;
2. Assign comrade. Stalin the title of Hero of the Soviet Union;
3. Establish the Order of Stalin;
4. Build a Stalinist Victory Arch at the entrance to Moscow on the Moscow-Minsk highway.
We propose to adopt the corresponding Decrees at the XII session of the Supreme Council.
V. Molotov, L. Beria, G. Malenkov, K. Voroshilov, A. Mikoyan.
In the upper left corner of the document there is a pencil note: “My archive. J. Stalin" (Ibid. P.98).
The first point did not cause rejection from Stalin, since his activities as Supreme Commander-in-Chief were fully consistent with the statute of the Order of Victory. Only fools and demagogues can claim that victory in the Great Patriotic War was won “not thanks to, but in spite of Stalin.”
As for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, Stalin did not consider himself worthy of this award and never wore the Gold Star medal. This is what Molotov said in one of his conversations with the writer Felix Chuev in the 1970s:
Stalin said that he did not qualify for the status of Hero of the Soviet Union. A hero is awarded for personally demonstrated courage.
“I did not show such courage,” said Stalin.
And he didn’t take the Star. He was only painted in portraits with this Star. When he died, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union was issued by the head of the Awards Department. It was pinned on a pillow and carried at the funeral.
Stalin wore only one star - Hero of Socialist Labor... - adds Molotov.
(Chuev F. One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. M., 1991. P.254).
Vladimir Alliluyev, recalling the events of 1945, notes:
The day after the parade, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR I.V. Stalin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Malenkov took the initiative in this, but Stalin refused this high honor, and even spoke coolly with Kalinin, who signed the Decree - I, they say, did not take part in hostilities, did not perform any feats, I am just a leader.
(Alliluyev V.F. Chronicle of one family: Alliluyevs - Stalin. M., 1995. P. 195).
The last two points - about the Order of Stalin and the Stalin Arch - were rejected.
By the way, four years later, in connection with the leader’s 70th birthday, the question of establishing the Order of Stalin arose again. Test copies of the order badges were made, a draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was prepared, and a Statute of the award was developed (V.A. Durov. Order of Lenin. Order of Stalin (draft). B.M., 2005. P.98). However, the “tyrant greedy for flattery” again refused to establish an order named after himself.
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Everyone knows the monument to the Soviet soldier-liberator in Treptow Park. It is much less known that it was originally planned to erect a statue of Stalin on this site.
I asked:
Evgeniy Viktorovich, is it true that there were also long disputes around the project of a monument to Soviet soldiers in Treptower Park in Berlin?
Yes, there were disputes. Moreover, at first I myself had several options for the sculptural ensemble-monument...
Vuchetich spoke about some of the details of the design and construction of the now well-known thirty-meter bronze warrior-liberator. The impetus for his creative search was his conversation with Marshal K.E. Voroshilov in August 1945. Kliment Efremovich suggested: “Recently, Comrade Stalin signed the Potsdam Declaration of Victors on behalf of the Soviet people. This means that in the center of the ensemble-monument there should be him - in full height, made of bronze with an image of Europe or a globe hemisphere in his hands.”
Vuchetich quickly completed the order given to him, but in his heart he was not entirely satisfied with himself. He made several blanks in clay: “Victorious Soldier with a Banner”, “Soldier with a Machine Gun!..” Several cases told to him about the rescue of German children inspired the artist to a new creative search, and he created the sculpture “Soldier with a Child on His Chest”. When I modified it and enriched the content, it turned out sculptural composition"Warrior-Liberator"
He carefully sculpted this heroic warrior and placed him next to the generalissimo. First in the workshop, and then in one of the halls of the Moscow Kremlin.
The members of the artistic council focused their attention on the one and a half meter sculptural figure of the generalissimo; they did not seem to notice the figure of a soldier with a girl on his chest. But then I.V. appeared. Stalin. Slowly, he walked around the table on which the sketches stood, turning to the sculptor, he asked:
Listen, Vuchetich, aren’t you tired of this... with the mustache? - he aimed the mouthpiece of the pipe at the face of the one and a half meter figure.
This is still a sketch,” someone tried to intercede for the sculptor.
This is also a sketch,” Vuchetich replied.
Also... it seems not the same,” Stalin noted. - Show me...
Vuchetich removed the cellophane from the soldier’s figure. Stalin smiled sparingly and said:
We will place this soldier in the center of Berlin on a high burial hill... So we decided... Let this giant in bronze, the winner, carry a girl on his chest - the bright hopes of the people who freed the world from the brown plague.
As we remember, Joseph Vissarionovich refused to celebrate his 55th birthday. Stalin's 60th anniversary coincided with the Soviet-Finnish War, and his 65th anniversary coincided with the Great Patriotic War; the organization of pompous celebrations in those years was inappropriate. However, even in 1949, Stalin was against the magnificent celebrations on the occasion of his 70th birthday, and with great reluctance succumbed to the persuasion of his comrades:
Stalin was informed that members of the Politburo were in favor of widely celebrating the seventieth anniversary of his birth. Joseph Vissarionovich categorically objected.
I think,” said Poskrebyshev, “that the Politburo will still make such a decision, and Comrade Stalin will have to obey. After all, his anniversary, according to the Politburo, has great political significance: firstly, to strengthen the influence of communist and workers’ parties on the masses, and, secondly, this is an excellent occasion for the leaders of all communist and workers’ parties to gather in Moscow, and there, you yourself know what topical issues they will discuss. Stalin cannot ignore these circumstances, he will have to agree...
Poskrebyshev tried to talk about the upcoming anniversary, but Stalin stopped him in a tone that did not tolerate objections:
Choose a different topic. They didn't talk about it anymore.
Despite Stalin's objections, the Politburo decided to celebrate his seventieth birthday. An anniversary committee was formed headed by N.M. Shvernik.
(Ferr G. Anti-Stalin meanness. M., 2007. P.273–274)
“Brief biography” and Khrushchev’s report
According to Khrushchev, one of the most egregious manifestations of the “cult of personality” was the publication of Stalin’s “Brief Biography” in the late 1940s:
One of the most characteristic manifestations of Stalin’s self-praise and lack of elementary modesty is the publication of his “Brief Biography”, published in 1948.
...
There is no need to quote the nauseatingly flattering characteristics heaped one upon another in this book. It should only be emphasized that all of them were approved and edited personally by Stalin, and some of them were included in the layout of the book with his own hand.
What did Stalin consider necessary to include in this book? Perhaps he sought to moderate the ardor of the flattery of the compilers of his “Brief Biography”? No. He strengthened precisely those places where the praise of his merits seemed insufficient to him.
Here are some characteristics of Stalin’s activities, written by Stalin himself:
“In this struggle with those of little faith and capitulators, Trotskyists and Zinovievites, Bukharins and Kamenevs, after Lenin’s retirement, the leading core of our party... which defended the great banner of Lenin, rallied the party around Lenin’s behests and led the Soviet people onto the broad road industrialization of the country and collectivization agriculture. The leader of this core and the leading force of the party and state was Comrade. Stalin."
“Masterfully fulfilling the tasks of the leader of the party and the people, having the full support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin, however, did not allow even a shadow of conceit, arrogance, or narcissism in his activities.”
Where and when could any figure glorify himself like that? Is this worthy of a figure of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. This is precisely what Marx and Engels opposed so resolutely. This is precisely what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin always sharply condemned.
(On the cult of personality and its consequences. Report of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade N.S. Khrushchev, to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. No. 3. P. 157)
Let’s interrupt the flow of Khrushchev’s eloquence and still look into this “sickeningly flattering book”:
In this struggle against those of little faith and capitulators, Trotskyists and Zinovievites, Bukharins and Kamenevs, the leadership core of our party, consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Frunze, Dzerzhinsky, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, Yaroslavsky, was finally formed after Lenin’s failure. , Mikoyan, Andreev, Shvernik, Zhdanov, Shkiryatov and others - who defended the great banner of Lenin, rallied the party around Lenin’s behests and led the Soviet people onto the broad road of industrialization of the country and collectivization of agriculture. The leader of this core and the leading force of the party and state was Comrade Stalin.
Masterfully fulfilling the tasks of the leader of the party and the people and having the full support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin, however, did not allow even a shadow of conceit, arrogance, or narcissism in his activities. In his interview with the German writer Ludwig, where he notes the great role of the brilliant Lenin in the transformation of our homeland, Stalin simply declares himself: “As for me, I am only a student of Lenin, and my goal is to be a worthy student of his” (I. Stalin . Conversation with German writer Emil Ludwig, 1938, p. 3).
(Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Brief biography. 2nd ed., corrected and supplemented. M., 1950. P. 104–105)
Parts of text carefully omitted by Khrushchev are highlighted in bold. It is easy to see that they change things significantly. In the first case, Stalin positions himself as “first among equals” in the collective party leadership (To the chagrin of Nikita Sergeevich, the surname “Khrushchev” is not in this list). In the second, he emphasizes that he does not consider himself equal to Lenin, but is merely his student.
Let's return to Khrushchev's report:
Let me give you one more insertion made by Stalin in relation to Stalin’s military genius:
“Comrade Stalin,” he writes, “further developed advanced Soviet military science. Comrade Stalin developed a position on constantly operating factors that decide the fate of war, on active defense and the laws of counter-offensive and offensive, on the interaction of military branches and military equipment in modern war conditions, on the role of large masses of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare, about artillery as the most powerful branch of the military. At different stages of the war, Stalin's genius found right decisions, fully taking into account the specifics of the situation.” (Movement in the hall.)
“Stalin's military art was manifested both in defense and in attack. With brilliant insight, Comrade Stalin guessed the enemy’s plans and repelled them. The battles in which Comrade Stalin led the Soviet troops embodied outstanding examples of military operational art.”
This is how Stalin was glorified as a commander. But by whom? Stalin himself, but no longer acting as a commander, but as an author-editor, one of the main compilers of his laudatory biography.
(About the cult of personality and its consequences. Report of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade N.S. Khrushchev ... P. 158)
Firstly, Stalin was not “one of the main compilers” of his biography. Its second edition, in question, approximately 90% repeats the text of the first edition of 1939 (Maksimenkov L. Cult. Notes on words-symbols in Soviet political culture // Free Thought. 1993. No. 10. P. 31–32) . In the writing of which Stalin not only did not participate, but did not even edit.
On December 14, 1939, a model of the book was sent to the leader with an accompanying letter from Mitin and Pospelov: “Dear comrade Stalin. We are sending you a draft of your “Short Biography” prepared by IMEL together with the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. Please review this work and give your instructions on the possibility of its publication.”
Stalin underlined the entire text of the accompanying note and wrote across the page in pencil: “There’s no time to “look through.” Return to “IMEL”. I. Stalin"(RGASPI. F.558. Op.1. D.3226. L.1. Quoted from: Maksimenkov L. Cult. Notes on words-symbols... P.33).
Who are the authors of the text of Stalin's biography? In November 1946, addressed to A.N. Poskrebyshev was sent a certificate signed by V.S. Kruzhkova: “A short biography of I.V. Stalin (former text) was prepared by: 1) Pozner S.M. 2) Cheremnykh P.S. 3) Volin M.S. 4) Mochalov V.D. Edited by: 1) Mitin M.B. 2) Alexandrov G.F. 3) Pospelov P.N. 4) Mints I.I.
Additions to chapter 10, chapter 11 and inserts at the end of the biography were prepared by: 1) Sutotsky S. B. 2) Galaktionov M.R. 3) Obichkin G.D. Edited by: 1) Alexandrov G.F. 2) Fedoseev P.N. 3) Kruzhkov V.S.” (RGASPI. F.629. Op.1. D.55. L.52. Quoted from: Maksimenkov L. Cult. Notes on words-symbols... P.34).
The passages quoted by Khrushchev specifically refer to the 11th chapter, dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, and were written by a military journalist, Major General M.R. Galaktionov. Stalin actually edited this text, however, contrary to Khrushchev, Stalin's edits reduced the degree of praise. Thus, “Generalissimo Stalin” was replaced by “Comrade Stalin”, the “doctrine of constantly operating factors” developed by him was replaced by the “provision on constantly operating factors”, and “immortal examples of military operational art” became just “outstanding” (Maksimenkov L. Cult. Notes on words-symbols... P.33).
As we see, Stalin was not at all the ambitious person susceptible to flattery, as his accusers portray him.
They say that once, reprimanding his son Vasily for his latest prank, Joseph Vissarionovich said in his hearts:
Do you think you are Stalin? No! Do you think I'm Stalin? No! It's him - Stalin! - and pointed to his portrait.
I don’t know if this story really happened, but it well conveys Stalin’s attitude towards his “cult.”
" Traveling into the future is difficult and unsteady. Traveling into the past is no easier. It is always, as L. Feuerbach aptly noted, a “prick in the heart,” disturbing, exciting. Peering into the blurring images of the past, we see that Stalin is alone one of the bloodiest personalities in history. Such people, whether we like it or not, belong not only to the past, but also to the present and the future. Their fate is eternal ideological food for reflection on existence, time and conscience. research about Stalin, is that the life of this man, as if in focus, highlights the most complex dialectics of his time. History does not exist without zigzags. The appearance of a person like Stalin at the head of the party, and in fact the people, completed the process of the sliding of the victorious Russian. revolution onto the rails of bureaucratic totalitarianism. Here is a lengthy quote from the Greetings of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR in connection with the 70th anniversary of the birth of Stalin (1949): “Together with Lenin, you, Comrade Stalin, were the inspirer and leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution. revolution, founder of the world's first Soviet socialist state of workers and peasants. During the years of the civil war and foreign intervention, your organizational and military genius led the Soviet people and their heroic Red Army to victory over the enemies of the Motherland. Under your direct leadership, Comrade Stalin, a huge amount of work was carried out to create national Soviet republics, to unite them into one union state - the USSR... In every transformation, large or small, raising our Motherland higher and higher, you invested your indomitable wisdom energy, iron will. It is our happiness, the happiness of our people, that the Great Stalin, as the leader of the party and state, directs and inspires the creative work of the Soviet people for the prosperity of our glorious Motherland. Under your leadership, Comrade Stalin, the Soviet Union has become a great and invincible force. … All honest people on earth, all future generations will glorify the Soviet Union, your name, Comrade Stalin, as the savior of world civilization from fascist pogromists... The name of Stalin is the most dear to our people, to ordinary people all over the world.”
Here's another assessment. In the famous dramatic report by N.S. Khrushchev, made on the night of February 24-25, 1956, “On the cult of personality and its consequences” said: “Stalin created the concept of the “enemy of the people.” This term automatically excluded the need to prove ideological mistakes committed by an individual or a group of people. This concept made it possible to use the most severe repressions, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who disagreed with Stalin on any issue, against those who were merely suspected of intending to commit hostile acts, as well as against those who had a bad reputation The concept of an “enemy of the people”, in itself, practically excluded the possibility of any kind of occurrence. ideological struggle or the opportunity to express one’s own opinion on a particular issue, even if this issue was not of a theoretical, but of a practical nature. The main and, in practice, the only evidence of guilt, which contradicts all provisions of scientific jurisprudence, was the “confession” of the accused himself of committing the crimes of which he is accused. Subsequent verification showed that such “confessions” were extracted by using physical violence against the accused. This led to an unprecedented violation of revolutionary legality, as a result of which many absolutely innocent people who in the past defended the line pursued by the Party suffered."
1. Portrait of a leader
Sholokhov about Stalin: “He walks around smiling, but his eyes are like those of a tiger.”
Trotsky: "Stalin is the most outstanding mediocrity."
Bukharin called Stalin: “Genghis Khan, who read Marx.”
Krestinsky: “This man with tiger eyes will bring a lot of grief.”
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Formation of the cult of personality and the regime of personal power I.V. Stalin. Approval of the administrative-command management system
In the 30s, the administrative-command system of management of Soviet society, which is closely connected with the functioning of the state party, which has the powers of supreme power in the country, finally took shape. The process of transforming the Communist Party of Russia into a state party began during the years of the Civil War, when, along with the Soviets, called upon to exercise power in the center and locally after October 1917, party committees began to be created in every district, volost, province. The experience of the Bolshevik Party, designed for extreme situations, helped party committees successfully master the techniques of public administration and replace the Soviets. Proposals from the opposition on the need to differentiate the powers of the center and local ones. bodies, about subordination to the center, but autonomy in developing means of implementing the directives of the center, separation of party bodies from Soviet ones, prohibition of commanding the Soviets, turning the latter into permanent meetings (a kind of small parliaments), ending the practice of appointment (as soon as the peak of the civil war had passed), Unfortunately, they were not heard, because they were always refuted by Lenin’s argumentation.
Restrictions on democracy caused by wartime circumstances subsequently led to massive coercion and violence. The Bolsheviks oust almost all parties from the political arena of Russia and remained in the 20s. the only party. The transformation of the Bolshevik Party into government structure power was facilitated by profound changes within the party itself. First of all, by the end of the 20s, as a result of the Lenin and October calls, it became a mass party, numbering 1,200 thousand people by 1927. The overwhelming majority of those accepted into the party at that time were illiterate people, who were required, first of all, to submit to party discipline. The communists of mass appeals, who went through the struggle of the opposition, firmly grasped the foundations of repressive thinking: the need to politically cut off an ideological opponent and suppress all dissent. The layer of the old Bolshevik guard became thinner and thinner. In addition, its leadership was drawn into the struggle for power and was split, and then completely destroyed.
Next important step On the path to becoming a state party and establishing an administrative-command system of government in the country, the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) appeared. The resolutions of the congress allowed the Bolshevik Party to directly engage in state and economic management, gave unlimited freedom to the top party leadership, and legitimized the unconditional subordination of ordinary communists to the leadership centers of the party hierarchy.
First of all, the congress introduced a new structure of party committees. Instead of “functionalism,” as the hitherto existing principle of organizing party committees was disparagingly called. departments, now “integral production and industry departments” were created. Thus, parallel departments of parjos arose along with the departments for industry, agriculture, culture, science and science that already existed under the executive committees of the Soviets. educational institutions etc. However, the functions of these equally named departments had significant differences.
The political role of party committees in fact became decisive and led to the replacement of the power of Soviet and economic bodies with party ones. The growth of the party into the economy and the public sphere from that time became a distinctive feature of the entire Soviet period.
The next significant decision of the XVII Congress was the abolition of the previous system of party-Soviet control, proposed by Lenin. The Congress established a new decentralized, powerless control system.
By abolishing the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, the congress transformed the Central Control Commission, elected by the congress, into the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The head of the commission was appointed from among the secretaries of the Central Committee. At the same time, the execution commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was transformed into a commission of Soviet control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, planned by the party congress and approved by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The head of this commission was also appointed from among the deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Thus, the congress established “zones of non-criticism”, Historical experience showed that even the Central Control Commission-RCP could not rise above the Central Committee of the party and turned out to be a weapon in Stalin’s struggle for sole power... the activities of the inspection bodies were taken under the strict control of the Central Committee of the party and the General Secretary.
The pyramid of party and state administration built by the congress, at the top of which Stalin occupied a strong place as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was supplemented by another decision of the congress.
In the Charter adopted at the congress, the principle of democratic centralism was concretized by 4 points proposed by Stalin: election, accountability, subordination to the majority and binding decisions for all communists. If the first two points can be called declarative, then the last two were indeed strictly and strictly followed. All communists observed party discipline, which was primarily expressed in the subordination of any minority to any majority, and were also obliged to carry out the decisions of all higher party bodies.
The control system based on democratic, and in fact bureaucratic, centralism was elevated by the congress into law, which extended its effect not only to the party, but also to all other spheres of government in the conditions of Soviet reality. Such a system worked in a single, strictly defined direction, only from top to bottom and, therefore, could not by itself be viable without additional funds and artificially created incentives. The assertion of the power of the administrative-command system of party-government was accompanied by the rise and strengthening of the power structures of the state. its repressive organs.
Already in 1929, so-called “troikas” were created in each district, which included the first secretary of the district party committee, the chairman of the district executive committee and a representative of the Main Apolitical Directorate (GPU). They began to carry out out-of-court proceedings against the perpetrators, passing their own verdicts.
In December 1932, a special passport system was introduced in the country. The entire rural population of the country, with the exception of those who lived in the 10-kilometer border zone, was deprived of passports and was counted according to the lists of village councils. Strict control over compliance with the passport regime did not allow the vast majority of Soviet citizens to independently decide questions about their place of residence. In June 1934, the OPTU was transformed into the Main Directorate of State Security and became part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
Under him, a Special Conference (SCO) was established, which at the union level consolidated the practice of extrajudicial verdicts. The strengthening of repressive actions was largely facilitated by the events that took place at the 17th Party Congress, which officially went down in its history as the “Congress of the Executed.” Indeed, the facts indicate that out of 1961 delegates to the congress, 1108 were subjected to repression, and out of 139 members of the Central Committee elected at the congress, 98.
The main reason for these repressions, which were organized by Stalin, was disappointment in him as a Secretary General Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of a certain part of party workers and communists. They condemned him for organizing forced collectivization, the famine it caused, and the incredible pace of industrialization that caused numerous casualties.
This dissatisfaction found expression during the voting for the list of the Central Committee. 270 delegates expressed in their ballots a vote of no confidence in “the leader of all times and peoples.” Moreover, they suggested S.M. Kirov the post of General Secretary, who, realizing the futility and danger of their efforts, did not accept the proposal.
However, this did not help Kirov: December 1, 1934. he was killed. And then it was clear to many, especially in Leningrad, who the true killer of Kirov was.
On the day of Kirov’s murder, on Stalin’s telephone order, an urgent resolution was adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR “On amendments to the existing criminal procedural codes of the union republics.” The changes concerned the investigation of cases of terrorist organizations and similar acts against employees of the Soviet government.
Extraordinary forms of consideration and hearing were introduced: the investigation period was limited to 10 days, hearings of cases were allowed without the participation of the parties, cassation appeals were canceled, and the sentence to capital punishment was carried out immediately. In essence, this resolution cannot be qualified differently than a resolution on mass terror.
Stalin took cruel revenge for the fact that he was displeasing to someone. Having organized the murders of Kirov, he used it to instill fear in the country, the day of reprisals against the remnants of the previously defeated opposition” with its new manifestations. In March 1935, the Law on punishing family members of traitors to the Motherland was adopted, and a month later a Decree on bringing children under 12 years of age to trial. Millions of people, the vast majority of whom. were not guilty, found themselves behind the wire and walls of the Gulag. Archival materials, the publication of which has been going on since the early 90s, will ultimately help to name the exact figure of Stalin’s repressions.
However, individual figures and facts provide a sufficient idea of the past of the 30s. In 1939 alone, 2,103 thousand people passed through the Gulag system. Of these, 525 thousand died. Innocent victims called for resistance.
Resistance continued “at the top.” Everyone who uttered a word of protest knew that they were doomed, and yet people went along with it. In the highest echelon of political leadership at this time (1930), a group was formed headed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, candidate member of the Politburo S.I. Syrtsov and the secretary of the Transcaucasian regional party committee V.V. Lomnadze. A group of Soviet and party workers spoke out against the incompetence and bureaucracy of the party-Soviet apparatus.
The issue of Syrtsov and Lomniadze was considered at a special meeting of the Council of People's Commissars. Party and Soviet workers of the territories and regions of the RSFSR in the spring and summer of 1930 raised the issue of creating the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and moving the capital of Russia to Leningrad. The reprisal against the members of this group took place in gross violation of the Party Charter and Soviet legal norms. A special place in the anti-Stalin resistance was occupied by a group led by M.N. Ryutin. He acted as an ideologist and organizer of the “Union of Marxists-Leninists” (1932). He prepared the main program document of this organization “Stalin and the crisis of the proletarian dictatorship” and a manifesto-appeal “To all members of the CPSU (b)”. For the first time, authoritative leaders appealed to all party members against Stalin's actions. The slogan “liquidation of the kulaks as a class” is adventuristic, based on a false foundation. Entire regions of the country were in conditions of permanent war. As a result of programmatic changes, the Politburo turned into a gang of politicians. M. Ryutin warned that the struggle would be long, it would require many sacrifices, but there was no other way. He directly called for the overthrow of Stalin. Obviously, this is why the reprisal against the members of the “Union” was swift and carried out in an atmosphere of special secrecy.
While in prison, M. Ryutin did not stop his theoretical activities. The summer and autumn of 1932 became a critical point in the establishment of the regime; party reports indicated that anti-Stalinist sentiment had reached its peak. Groups similar to Ryutin’s also operated in Taganrog, Kharkov, Irkutsk, and Novosibirsk. In November 1932, a peasant uprising broke out in the Ural region. For the first time in the “Ryutin case” an attempt was made to combine spontaneous resistance with its theoretical justification. It is no coincidence, apparently, that G.E. was involved in this case. Zinoviev and L.B. Kamenev. On the direct orders of Stalin, they were expelled from the party and convicted out of court.
In the 1930s, several more groups were discovered whose members opposed Stalin’s autocracy. The most famous are; group A.L. Smirnova, N.V. Tolmacheva, N.V. Eismont - three people's commissars, Krylov's group - an active participant in the socialist revolution and civil war.
After the murder of S.M. Kirov's resistance weakened significantly, although it did not stop, despite the terror. In 1937 At the June plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, members of the Central Committee I.L. spoke. Pyatnitsky and People's Commissar of Health G.N. Kaminsky, who demanded an end to repression and the removal of Stalin. They were immediately arrested.
Defectors - V.G. - appealed to Stalin's actions to world public opinion. Krivitsky, I. Reise, diplomats F.F. Raskolnikov and A.G. Barmin. They were presented as renegades discrediting our country on the eve of the attack on the USSR by Nazi Germany.
Among those who openly and without fear opposed Stalin were academicians. L. Pavlov, in his letters to the Council of People's Commissars, he wrote that “we live in a regime of terror and pressure,” that “everything that is happening in the country is a gigantic experiment,” etc. And this was indeed the case: by this time, a regime of arbitrariness and repression had been established in the country, the totalitarian command system was gaining strength...
Why did the resistance fail? Stalin and his entourage managed to isolate all attempts at organized resistance, and this became possible thanks to the penetration of Stalin’s secret police-political police into all pores; a split occurred in the ranks of the old party guard, which could have provided genuine resistance.
Stalin's opponents did not receive widespread support among the party masses; for the most part, they came to leadership on the crest of military victories and had a weak idea of democracy. It seemed to them that there was no alternative to Stalin. Most of the participants in the anti-Stalin resistance rightfully called themselves revolutionaries, but could not rely on a broad social base.
The proletariat is young, grateful to Stalin, ready and believing in the real implementation of all the thoughts of the leader, the peasantry was considered a reactionary class, a. That’s why representatives of the creative intelligentsia did not try to contact him. They were wary, having learned from the “mining business.” After the political discreditation of Bukharin in the highest echelon, no. there were alternative leaders equal to Bukharin and capable of resisting Stalin.
The system of public repentance was used by Stalin to politically and morally discredit his opponents. Many of the participants in the anti-Stalin resistance took an active part in the creation of the regime of party and Soviet power, in all its abuses and did not find the strength and courage to admit their own responsibility for the fact that was done by them. 197 All this led to the defeat of the anti-Stalin resistance, the eradication of any possibility of resistance to Stalin and Stalinism.
The presence of opposition is a sign of a democratic society and any attempt to destroy it is the destruction of democracy.
This resistance, being unable to resist Stalinism, at the same time had a huge moral significance, prepared the subsequent denial and condemnation of this system.
Thus, a society that declared its goal to achieve the highest ideals of social justice essentially degenerated into a society of extreme social injustice, terror and lawlessness - the Stalinist model of socialism. According to Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. 1-1, it is based. Kudryavtsev, the following provisions lay:
- - replacement of the socialization of the main means of production with their nationalization, suppression of democratic forms public life despotism and arbitrariness of the “leader”, although based on the party and state apparatus, but actually standing above the party and apparatus; administrative-command methods of coercion.
- - (non-economic) labor organization, up to state terror;
- - inability to self-correction, especially internal reforms due to the lack of both economic and political (democratic) regulators of public life;
- - closedness of the country, tendencies towards autarky in all spheres of life;
- - ideological conformism and obedience of the masses, dogmatism in science and culture.
Stalinism essentially discredited the socialist idea in the eyes of workers all over the world.
REFERENCES
- 1. Beladi Laszlo, Kraaus Tamás. "Stalin". M., 1989.
- 2. Vert N. History of the Soviet state. Progress Academy, 1992.
- 3. History of Russia. Second half of the 19th-20th centuries.
- 4. Course of lectures, ed. V. Levapova. Bryansk, 1992.
- 5. Carr E.X. Russian revolution from Lenin to Stalin. 1917-. 1929. M.: “Piter-Vorsa”, 1990.
After the death of Stalin, the Central Committee of the Party began to strictly and consistently pursue a course to explain the inadmissibility of exalting one individual, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, turning him into some kind of superman possessing supernatural qualities, like a god. This man seems to know everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do everything; he is infallible in his actions.
The cult of personality acquired such monstrous proportions mainly because Stalin himself in every possible way encouraged and supported the exaltation of his person. This is evidenced by numerous facts.
Stalin decides what the architecture of the Palace of the Soviets should be - a monstrous building, which, with its heavy uselessness, its brutal grandeur, gives expression to a brutal regime without ideas, without prospects. Stalin watches films in order to give not only political, but also technical instructions to directors and artists. The purpose of films is to glorify the leader. This is how Soviet cinematography, which had such a promising beginning, was killed.
Stalin's autocracy led to particularly grave consequences during the Great Patriotic War.
If we take many of our novels, films and historical “research”, they portray the question of Stalin’s role in the Patriotic War in a completely implausible way. Usually such a diagram is drawn. Stalin foresaw everything and everyone. Soviet Army Almost according to the strategic plans drawn up in advance by Stalin, she carried out the tactics of the so-called “active defense”, that is, the tactics that, as we know, allowed the Germans to reach Moscow and Stalingrad.
Before the war, a boastful tone prevailed in the press and in all educational work: if the enemy attacks the sacred Soviet land, then we will respond to the enemy’s blow with a triple blow, we will wage the war on the enemy’s territory and win it with little bloodshed. However, these declarative statements were far from being fully supported by practical deeds to ensure the actual inaccessibility of Soviet borders.
The cult of personality in the 30-40s of the twentieth century. caused damage to our country, our people. But he did not and could not change the essence of the socialist social and political system precisely because decisive role It is not the individual who plays a role in determining the course of history, but the relationship between classes and the activity of the masses.
In raising the issue of combating the cult of personality, the CPSU proceeded from the fact that it contradicts Marxism-Leninism and the nature of the socialist system, that it hindered the development of Soviet democracy and the advancement of Soviet society towards communism. The restoration and further development of Leninist norms of party life and principles of leadership opened up space for the development of creative forces and initiative of the party and the people, accelerated the country's movement towards communism, and further strengthened the party's ties with the masses. “The law of party life is strict adherence to Leninist norms of party life and the principle of collectivity of leadership,” notes the CPSU program, “...The cult of personality and associated violations of the collectivity of leadership, internal party democracy and socialist legality are incompatible with the Leninist principles of party life.”
While resolutely opposing the cult of personality, the Communist Party at the same time considers it necessary to support and strengthen the authority of leaders in the communist and labor movement. It is unacceptable to confuse the well-deserved authority of leaders who fight for the fundamental interests of the working people with the cult of personality. V.I. Lenin wrote: “Marxists cannot stand on the usual point of view of the radical intellectual with its supposedly revolutionary abstraction: “no authorities.” No. The working class, which is waging a difficult and stubborn struggle throughout the world for complete liberation, needs authorities.” The authority of leaders is inseparable from the authority of the party, from the principles of collective leadership.
The cult of Stalin’s personality is an artificially created exaggeration and exaltation of the role of the personality of I.V., alien to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin.
During Stalin's rule, Soviet propaganda created a semi-divine aura of an infallible leader around him. The personality cult of Stalin began in the mid-20s and lasted until the early 50s of the 20th century.
Stalinism is characterized by the dominance of authoritarian-bureaucratic methods of governing the country and society, the practical identification of party and state bodies, the lack of control over political leadership, the suppression of free thought, the elimination of national equality, mass terror and repression, and, in theoretical terms, the dogmatization of Marxism.
The country during the formation of the cult of personality
In the 1930s The Soviet Union had a one-party system of government. A course towards an accelerated transition to socialism, strict centralization, merging of party and state power- all these factors determined the vector of political development of Soviet society for a long time. The concrete expression of all qualitative changes in the political regime was the establishment of Stalin's personality cult. He was at the top of the pyramid of power, all lower links of which had only executive functions.
Stalinism is characterized by the dominance of authoritarianism, the strengthening of state punitive functions, the merging of state bodies and the dominant Communist Party, and strict ideological control over all aspects of social life.
Some researchers consider Stalinism to be a form of totalitarianism. Stalinist repressions are massive political repressions carried out in the USSR during the period of Stalinism. The number of direct victims of Stalinist repressions (persons sentenced for political (counter-revolutionary) crimes to death penalty or imprisonment, evicted, exiled) amounts to millions.
Stalin and power
Stalin was barely able to raise his hand to call him to him. There was horror, fear and prayer in the eyes...
Stalin encouraged applause for his own glory and, sometimes, he shot those who did not applaud him enough. Stalin revels in his power. He showed such dark passions characteristic of his nature as personal vindictiveness, rancor, sadism and others, while not taking into account any class interests and even acted contrary to these interests - showing exceptional personal cruelty, personal deceit and personal thirst for power.
The culmination was 1937, when Stalin was able to eliminate all his imaginary and real opponents of the party. Stalin's irrationality consisted in the fact that yesterday's heroes of the revolution were imprisoned and shot, they shot their own, the most devoted members of the party, who sometimes died with an oath of allegiance to Stalin on their lips. This seems crazy. And there is a version that the leader of the people was simply a madman who arranged and organized all this, contrary to his own party interests.
In fact, Stalin acted absolutely logically from his point of view, and even in some ways adhered to Leninist policies. But if we still admit that I. Stalin was a madman who ruled the country for several decades without encountering any interference or resistance, then the state itself, created by Lenin, gave him such an opportunity.
The only actor-director, and the stage is the whole country
In Stalin's times, any statement that expressed mild criticism of the state and Stalin was considered bourgeois agitation and propaganda. Yes, in fact, there was no need to speak out. There was also a suspicion that the person was thinking somehow differently. An accidental slip or typo was enough.
The leader of all nations was very skillful in recruiting personnel. He destroyed people who were talented or independent in leadership and surrounded himself with performers who could not compete with him and were afraid of this more than fire.
Terror in Russia began long before October Revolution. More from…
In addition, having an amazing understanding of people, he could so skillfully arrange them and pit them against each other that as a result it benefited him alone. As a result, his victims were arranged as if in chains, sometimes first playing the role of executioners. Stalin knew how to charm people with his soft and courteous manners. He skillfully maintained a mask of impenetrability, behind which something unpredictable was hidden...
Power itself attracted him, among other things, as a game human lives. Knowing people well and deeply despising them, the head of state treated them as raw material from which he could mold anything, realizing in history some plan of his personality and destiny. In his own eyes, he was the only actor-director, and the stage was the whole state and, more broadly, the whole world. In this sense, he was an artist by nature. Hence, in particular, Stalin’s many deviations from Lenin towards the cult of his own personality. Hence his capricious despotism, as well as the preparation and deployment of trials as complex and fascinating detective stories and colorful performances.
“Under Stalin there was order!”
When these days you hear: “Under Stalin there was order!”, you want to ask the question - at what cost was this “order” achieved? And was this really “order”?
Over the decades of its functioning, the Stalinist bureaucracy proved that it could “restore order” in only one single way: first, society or a separate “section” of it was brought into a socially amorphous state, destroying all its connections, the entire complex structure, and then they brought into it "organization element", usually taking as a model military organization. At the same time, the military organization is again of a very special type, where, for example, “a Red Army soldier must fear the punitive structures of the new government more than the bullets of the enemy.”
However, this method of social organization can be called establishing order only in a very conditional sense. How is it with A. Tolstoy? “This one has put things in order - you can even roll a ball.” Where all the diversity of relationships between people is reduced to one single dependence of a barracks nature, the price of “order” becomes disorder, social disorganization is not overcome, but is only driven deeper.
To maintain this kind of “order,” it is necessary to artificially create in the state a situation of extreme tension, a state of emergency, an undeclared internal or even external war.
Now about the “accelerated modernization” of industry and agriculture, the implementation of which some people credit to this totalitarian bureaucracy, considering it the main hero of eliminating Russia’s centuries-old backwardness. The primary source of this concept can be found in the reports of I. Stalin, who, with his mesmerizing figures - millions of tons of coal, cast iron, steel, crowded out of people’s consciousness even the reason to think about other millions - about millions expelled from their homes, died of hunger, shot or rotting in camps.
As a result of the opening of Soviet archives, many documents signed by Stalin were found, which may indicate, as modern researchers believe, that it was he who sanctioned almost all mass political repressions.
But the most terrible thing was that among those crushed there were those who...
Party Leader
Stalin could skillfully use not only people's faith in socialism, but also the inviolable authority of Marx and Lenin, seeking to increase his authority as their comrade-in-arms. The formation of a cult of personality in a state where there were no democratic traditions was largely determined by the atmosphere of fear of repression. The textbook “History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)” played a major role in the ideological justification of Stalin’s personality cult. A Short Course,” which was published in 1938. It portrays Stalin as the leader of the party from the moment of its formation. Kult I.V. Stalin was indoctrinated by his inner circle, who made a quick political career out of it. Throughout the country, the cult of J.V. Stalin was introduced into the consciousness of the people by numerous party workers and government officials.
Exposing Stalin's personality cult
Stalin's cult of personality was exposed by N. Khrushchev during the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, on February 25. It lasted from February 14 to February 25, 1956. Nikita Sergeevich’s exposure of Stalin’s personality cult was outlined in a closed report “On the personality cult and its consequences.” In it, Khrushchev voiced his point of view on the recent past of the state, and also listed numerous facts of the history of the second half of the 1930s and early 1950s; he interpreted them as crimes, where Stalin was blamed for them. The problem of military and party leaders repressed under Stalin was also raised. The report, despite this conditional secrecy, was distributed to all party corners of the Soviet Union.