In the process of developing concepts for the rational development of rocket and space technology, the institute did not have such serious battles as with missile weapons, but still there were a number of significant differences with the position of some design bureaus and superiors. Apparently, this was explained by the lower importance of the tasks facing space technology for the state. Still, astronautics is only a means of ensuring the operation of the armed forces (communications, reconnaissance, geodesy, navigation). However, there were conflict situations here too. I would like to recall the ideological activities of NII-88 (TsNIIMash) and some unusual moments in the history of RKT. I’ll start with the most important thing, with the lunar program, with how it developed and how it was connected with the institute.
With the creation of the head space department, which determined and substantiated the prospects for the rational development of the then nascent rocket and space technology for defense, national economic and scientific purposes, NII-88 responsibly and skillfully became involved in work on space topics. It was a time of rapid development of astronautics, when any proposal to create a new and especially priority space object was accepted with enthusiasm, “with a bang.” The flights of the first artificial Earth satellite and the first Soviet man on a spacecraft brought unprecedented technical and political authority to our state. This gave birth to many new, bold and wonderful projects for further human exploration of outer space. On the basis of the created R-7 launch vehicle and the Vostok spacecraft, new bold experiments with human flight were carried out, demonstrating every day the superiority of domestic space technology over American ones.
The dynamics of development of cosmic events looked impressive. Following the flight of the world's first cosmonaut Yu.A. Gagarin on April 12, 1961 and the daily flight of G.S. Titov on August 6-7 of the same year followed by: the first group flight of cosmonauts A.G. Nikolaev and P.R. Popovich on the Vostok-3 and Vostok-4 spacecraft, the first three-day space flight of a woman cosmonaut V.V. Tereshkova in June 1963 on the Vostok-6 spacecraft; the first spacewalk from the Voskhod-2 spacecraft in March 1965 by cosmonaut A.A. Leonov, finally, the creation of a fundamentally new Soyuz spacecraft and the first automatic docking of such ships in orbit, known in the open press as the docking of the Kosmos-186 - Kosmos-188 satellites in October 1967, then the first docking in January 1969 year in orbit of two manned Soyuz-4 spacecraft with cosmonaut V.A. Shatalov and Soyuz-5 with cosmonauts B.V. Volynov, A.S. Eliseev, E.V. Khrunov and the transition through open space of cosmonauts Eliseev and Khrunov from the Soyuz-5 spacecraft to Soyuz-4.
All these were thoughtful stages in the development of manned astronautics, leading to the creation and operation of long-term manned orbital stations in low-Earth orbits with a replaceable crew. The main purpose of manned flights of such stations was to conduct fundamental research by humans in outer space in the interests of science and the national economy.
The technical and political international authority of the Soviet Union increased immeasurably compared to the United States. The Americans, not having powerful launch vehicles at that time, were unable to respond to us with something significant and more effective, and therefore President John Kennedy, in order to restore America’s global prestige in the field of technology and space, did not catch up with us in earth orbits (demonstrating thereby putting him behind), but passed through the Senate a law on the implementation of the Apollo project with the goal of landing the first man on the Moon. It was a bold and extremely expensive program. The Americans, gritting their teeth, accompanied by the systematic ringing of timpani that accompanied the new achievements of Soviet manned space exploration, began to thoroughly and punctually prepare means for landing the lunar expedition.
In turn, our chief designers and the country's leadership, continuing to increasingly intensively exploit the newly opened direction of manned near-Earth space exploration and launch automatic space stations for planetary exploration solar system, which brought us unprecedented political and technical dividends, also did not ignore the creation of a project to land a Soviet man on the Moon. However, they did it too late and less decisively. To understand the conditions in which the domestic lunar expedition program (N1-L3 program) was born, the complexity of its implementation, I would say, doom, it is necessary to go back a little.
After those first stunning space successes that the heavy carrier created on the basis of the R-7 intercontinental rocket gave us, S.P. Korolev realized that for further and wider exploration of outer space by man and for the study of the planets of the solar system, it is necessary to create a more powerful launch vehicle. Therefore, at the suggestion of Korolev, the government in October 1962 issued a decision on the development of a project for a three-stage N1 launch vehicle, launching a payload of 50 tons into a low reference orbit, and an N11 carrier (with two upper stages N1) with a payload capacity of 15 tons with quite common tasks ensuring the development of manned human flights to the Moon, Mars and the creation of space laboratory stations in near-Earth orbits. The resolution did not provide for the implementation of any specific targeted space program. Sergei Pavlovich at that time, apparently, believed that in order to carry out our new impressive steps in outer space, we need to have a backlog of carriers of approximately an order of magnitude.
Work on these media was not identified as a priority in the resolution, nor were related projects named. The carriers were created as if for the future. Work progressed sluggishly, since OKB-1 S.P. The Queen was busy implementing interesting programs flights of manned spacecraft and launches of automatic stations to the Moon, Venus, Mars. When reports appeared in the press about the beginning of the deployment of work on the Apollo program in the United States and the proposed implementation of an expedition to the Moon at the end of 1968, our government and Sergei Pavlovich had already seriously turned their attention to solving such a problem and, most importantly, with desire overtake the Americans.
OKB-1 first worked out the option of implementing a lunar expedition using the well-proven Vostok launch vehicle. This required 6-7 dockings of space blocks in earth orbit. At that time, automatic docking was big problem. Everything looked very complicated and unreliable, and this option was rejected. We turned to the N1 project. It turned out better. With one docking in Earth orbit and a direct landing on the Moon, it was necessary to increase the mass of the N1 carrier and increase the mass of the payload launched into a low reference orbit to 75 tons. The N1 launch vehicle design was finalized. At its first stage it was necessary to use 24 engines with a thrust of 150 tf, located along the perimeter of the block of this stage.
Detailed subsequent study by V.P. Mishin of the lunar expeditionary complex, taking into account the improvement of the design of the ship and upper stages, showed that the landing flight scheme (landing a lunar ship on the Moon from its orbit while leaving the upper stage on it) will make it possible to get rid of the docking of two heavy blocks in Earth orbit, but this will require an increase the payload of the N1 carrier is up to 92.5 tons. It was modified again. On the bottom in the center of the first stage, 6 more engines were placed in addition to the existing 24. In the future, to cover various mass deficits, the payload had to be increased to 95 tons, which they decided to do by supercooling the fuel components. Constant improvements to the project, subject to maximum preservation of documentation and production equipment, could not but affect the timing of the creation of the H1 carrier.
In the context of the successful development of two space programs: near-Earth manned flights and launches of automatic stations to the planets of the Solar System, the interests of implementing the grandiose lunar expeditionary program were greatly infringed, the work could not proceed smoothly and, with limited production and financial resources, the developers faced great difficulties. In order not to miss deadlines and not to go beyond the existing production and financial capabilities, chief designers S.P. Korolev and V.P. Mishin had to (in my opinion, unjustifiably, to the detriment of the common cause and his aspirations) seriously reduce the volume of ground-based testing of the launch vehicle, abandon the creation of necessary but expensive stands, including a test stand for fire tests of its first stage. This later became one of the fatal circumstances for the entire lunar project.
The volume of production support recorded in the lunar program set by the government was not initially supported by the corresponding capacities, and chief designer Mishin was silent and did not sound the alarm. What was he hoping for? Did you think the main thing was to start work, and then management would help, being a patron and, in essence, an accomplice in the implementation of the program, or were other considerations dominant?
Since the beginning of work on the lunar program, all sorts of incidents have occurred in their production and financial support, well known both to our institute and, I think, to the leadership of the ministry. For example, according to a government decree, the Kuibyshev plant was ordered to produce four N1 carriers per year for flight development testing. The plant, according to its production capacity, could produce only one and a half a year. However, regularly at the boards of the ministry devoted to reports on the state of work on the launch vehicle, the management did not seem to notice this circumstance and spoke with a serious look about the weakness of control over the production schedule. Apparently, the leaders of the IOM and the military-industrial complex, unable to correct the situation, pretended that everything was in order and the backlog would somehow resolve on its own: either the Americans would be late, or we would have new happy circumstances, like a second wind, as in Great Patriotic War, and we will still be able to implement the lunar program before the Americans.
At the very beginning of the design of the N1-L3 lunar complex, another serious difficulty arose that delayed the development of the launch vehicle project. The main and permanent subcontractor S.P. Queen on propulsion systems V.P. Glushko suddenly refused to develop powerful, 600 tf, liquid oxygen and kerosene engines, which were asked by the lead developer S.P. Korolev. Valentin Petrovich, from a faithful follower of the use of liquid oxygen as an oxidizing agent, became a supporter of the use of nitrogen tetroxide.
The reason for this reorientation is not difficult to understand. Having faced serious difficulties in developing powerful liquid oxygen and kerosene engines for the R-7 and R-9 missiles and having gained good experience in creating powerful liquid-propellant rocket engines using nitric acid oxidizers for the R-12, R-14, R-16, R-36 (M) missiles . K. Yangel) and the carrier of the UR-500 (V.N. Chelomeya), whose engine had a thrust of 150 tf, and also having a large reserve for the engine with a thrust of 600 tf, which was his unfulfilled dream, V.P. Glushko proposed making the N1 carrier based on such a rocket engine, contrary to the opinion of S.P. Queen.
Not so long ago, he was an ardent supporter of the use of liquid oxygen and hydrocarbon fuel as rocket fuel, considering it energetically beneficial for intercontinental missiles and launch vehicles. This, apparently, was also influenced by the fact that the development of engines using nitric acid oxidizers, even of relatively low thrust, about 8 tf, encountered problems. They were tormented by high-frequency vibrations in the combustion chamber, which led to the destruction of the engine, which is why such an engine for the first anti-aircraft guided missiles had to be made in the form of a bunch of four, steadily operating, with a thrust of 2 tf.
I remember well that the difficulties with creating rocket engines operating on these oxidizers were discussed in the 50s at a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Council NII-88, when chief designers A.M. Isaev and D.D. Sevruk, who overcame the problem of instability of fuel combustion, offered their services to develop powerful engines using high-boiling fuel components with high specific thrust and good mass characteristics. However, V.P. Glushko, in his opposing conclusion, which he presented very expansively, expressed sharp doubts about the possibility of creating such engines and even named his former first Deputy Sevruk is a technical swindler, misleading listeners with unrealistic promises. But time passed, Glushko himself realized that this was not a fantasy, and agreed with the proposal of the Ministry of Defense to develop, using his OKB-456, advanced engines using stable fuel components: nitric acid with nitrogen oxides and kerosene - for strategic ballistic missiles, becoming the leading chief designer in the industry to create such engines.
Thus, former comrade S.P. Koroleva Valentin Petrovich Glushko converted to “another faith.” A big dispute broke out between the proud leaders. Valentin Petrovich strongly recommended to Korolev his 600 tf engine, which, in terms of development time and size, was a good match for the N1 carrier. Sergei Pavlovich, at meetings of the Council of Chief Designers, sharply objected to this, believing that in the event of an accident, more than a thousand tons of tetroxide, turning into gas, as a strong toxic substance, would pose a direct threat to the lives of the population of the areas adjacent to the test site and located along the flight path of the launch vehicle. At that time, the word “ecology” was not yet used in everyday life. The dispute between two venerable designers drew into its orbit major scientists and designers, led by the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences M.V. Keldysh, who headed the interdepartmental expert commission. The commission supported S.P. Korolev, considering his arguments regarding the environmental dangers of using nitrogen tetroxide in such quantities during the flight of the N1 carrier, are certainly justified. The same official point NII-88 also shared this view. Valentin Petrovich did not agree with the opinion of the commission.
As a result of a long and fruitless exchange of views with Glushko, Sergei Pavlovich recruited Nikolai Dmitrievich Kuznetsov, a prominent designer of aircraft turbojet engines, to work on the liquid-propellant rocket engine, asking him, a newcomer in the field of rocketry, to develop a propulsion system on liquid oxygen and kerosene with a thrust of 150 tons. Design Bureau Kuznetsov had to suffer from all the “childhood diseases” of rocketry before he acquired the necessary experience. This affected the development time of such an engine, its reliability, with which, due to the short lead time, the engine was released into flight. It turned out to be insufficient. This is another fatal factor that played its tragic role in the fate of the H1 carrier himself.
Despite the opinion of the head developer of the launch vehicle S.P. Queen and the position of the vast majority of those involved in the project, V.P. Glushko stubbornly continued to insist on his own, addressing more and more new arguments to the very “top” - in the military-industrial complex and the Central Committee. The Institute had to fight them off. There was also such an argument. If you fill the ball tanks of the H1 carrier with nitrogen tetroxide instead of liquid oxygen, and high-calorie hydrocarbon fuel into the fuel tanks using Glushko engines, then the payload of such a modified launch vehicle will increase by 15%. NII-88 gave an opinion on this proposal, explaining its fallacy. After all, the increase in payload occurs mainly due to an increase in the mass of fuel in the mentioned volumes. And, therefore, it is incorrect to consider the mass of the carrier structure as the same: it is necessary to take into account the increased mass of tanks, shells, attachment points, engine load frame and other elements related to the mass of fuel, thrust and the amount of pressurization of the tanks. It is necessary to recalculate the entire mass of the launch vehicle structure, then the expected effect will not occur. Such counter-arguments, of course, did not convince Valentin Petrovich.
Despite the fact that the 600 tf engine based on nitrogen tetroxide and asymmetrical dimethylhydrazine did not have its consumer, Glushko continued to develop it, and all rearguard battles against the chief designer fell to NII-88. When drawing up draft annual plans for research and development work in the industry, the institute regularly excluded from them the development of this engine and its production at the pilot plant, excluding budgetary allocations for this work. Thus, according to Glushko’s proposal, the annual volume of required budgetary funds for his OKB-456 and the pilot plant was requested in the amount of 75 million rubles, and the institute left only 15 million rubles in the draft annual plan, excluding the specified engine and leaving other planned work. Valentin Petrovich was very offended by me. Every time I had to meet with him, listen to his reproaches for interfering with work, and politely explain the reasons for this decision. The designer became very angry, blushed and, interrupting the conversation, went to the minister to complain about another “robbery” of the institute. At the same time, Glushko always sought to satisfy his requests according to the estimate. And the minister himself could not resist his persistence.
In order to somehow resolve the protracted dispute regarding the fate of the strongman engine, G.M. Tabakov, then the head of the 7th Main Directorate, convened a narrow meeting at the GKOT, which was attended by chief designer V.P. Glushko, Director of NIITP V.Ya. Likhushin and I. Gleb Mikhailovich himself left him, instructing him to resolve the issue finally on the basis of an agreement. In soft tones, I justified the expediency of stopping work on the engine, since there is no consumer for it, and the engine is not simple, but extremely expensive: “the king engine,” and you can’t make it in the meantime. Valentin Petrovich kept me under the gaze of his angry gaze all the time and made dissenting remarks during my speech. Likhushin simply and monosyllabically expressed his position: “Look how good the engine is, what great thrust it has, and its specific characteristics far exceed those of the best American ones.” Such an engine needs to be made, it will come in handy someday.
Well, the chief designer Glushko himself spent a long time and punctually arguing for the need to create a liquid-propellant rocket engine and warned of a big mistake if it was not used on the N1 carrier. We parted without reaching an agreement, without saying goodbye and without talking. Work on this engine was stopped only when the need arose for mass production of its experimental samples for the purpose of final testing. It was necessary to involve the appropriate plant of the State Committee for Aviation Equipment, and the State Planning Committee did not make such a decision, not having a specific customer for the engine. In this case, the institute, although it turned out to be right, acquired another influential ill-wisher.
Despite these difficulties in the first stage of development of the H1 launch vehicle, work on the lunar program gained momentum. Every year their volume increased, new related companies and new production facilities were connected, but so far no one has compared the progress of work with the given deadlines, which were clearly defined - in the third quarter of 1968, i.e. one quarter earlier than in the US. At the same time, neither the chief designer nor the top management wanted to part with the old manned space program, which maintained the prestige of the country and brought major political benefits, and at the same time did not want to give the palm to the United States in landing the first man on the Moon. The deadline seemed far away, and everyone reassured themselves with our Russian “maybe.” Maybe we'll make it in time. We'll tighten it up at the end.
And in October 1966, D.F. Ustinov gathers at our institute the leadership of the Ministry of General Engineering, all the leading chief designers of rocket and space technology, invites the leadership of the military-industrial complex and the customer - the Ministry of Defense, as well as the representative of science - M.V. Keldysh to hear and discuss the report of NII-88 on the draft of the first five-year plan (1966-1970) developed by him for the creation of space systems and objects for defense, scientific and national economic purposes. I was assigned to report on the draft five-year plan. I began to outline the proposed space program in sections: systems and objects for defense, scientific, and national economic purposes. Formulated the goals and objectives facing astronautics; indicated by what means and within what time frame they should be resolved; named the priority of certain developments; told which proposals of the chief designers did not make it into the plan, and explained the reasons for this.
The draft plan outlined the costs of creating the system as a whole and proposed annual funding for each development. I highlighted the lunar complex as a separate line and decided to draw the attention of those gathered to the most difficult situation with the specified program. A heated conversation could have been avoided by limiting ourselves to a general phrase that the program needed to be completed in the third quarter of 1968. Worried and feeling a negative reaction from management, I uttered the fatal phrase:
Although the draft plan indicates the time frame set by the government for completing the lunar program, I responsibly report that based on the volume of production and costs remaining for these two years, the N1-L3 program cannot be implemented.
In support, I have provided a graph of past costs and funding required to complete the work as a function of time.
You see, I said, the volume material resources, required to complete the work in the remaining two years, exceeds the production capacity of IOM by 2.3 times. It seems to me that no connection of other ministries will save the situation, since the necessary capacities are too large, in addition, special new production facilities are needed, the creation of which will take a long time.
However, during the debate the issue I raised did not evoke the appropriate sharp reaction. The military said that it was necessary to reduce spending on scientific and economic research. Representatives of science, M.V. Keldysh, they were looking for reserves in reducing the range of defense satellites, citing multi-topics and duplication. In my remarks, I explained that even a complete reduction of these sections will not free up the funds necessary for the lunar program, not to mention the fact that what is needed is not impersonal capacity, but production of a certain profile. Deputy Chief Designer S.O. made an original speech. Okhapkin. V.P. Mishin was on vacation at that time (S.P. Korolev was no longer alive - ed.). On behalf of his organization, he rather optimistically described the state of affairs with the progress of work on the lunar program. In conclusion, he said that he did not understand the position of the parent institute NII-88, which doubts the capabilities of the developers, and ended his speech with an effective phrase:
Dmitry Fedorovich, we want to complete this large and important work within the given time frame. We can accomplish it. And we will fulfill it if you, Dmitry Fedorovich, help us a little.
Thus, all the speakers did not seem to notice the catastrophic situation with the implementation of the lunar program within the required time frame and believed that the situation could be corrected with a minor cosmetic change to the five-year R&D plan.
In conclusion, Ustinov spoke, generally approving the five-year plan and pointing out the need to adjust it, taking into account the comments of the speakers. Dmitry Fedorovich seriously and specifically criticized the state of affairs with the N1-L3 complex, and in this part especially sharply - our institute and me as its director. Ustinov noted that the parent institute NII-88 took the wrong position in developing the draft five-year plan. Instead of puzzling the industry's design bureau with new promising and interesting developments so that designers would now be forced to prove the impossibility of their implementation due to abundance, the institute, on the contrary, began to doubt the implementation of plans, contrary to the wishes of the developers, suppressing their good initiatives. A lot of unflattering and angry things were said about the institute and mine. Ustinov's critical speech gradually became more emotional and harsher. Finally, pointing his hand at me, he addressed those present:
Look, he just doesn’t respect us! See how he's lounging at the table!
Meanwhile, I sat dejectedly at the end of the table, resting my head right hand, in a depressed state, aware that our report on the draft plan did not take place. And the institute, in my person, instead of praise for its objectivity, received a serious reprimand from a great leader whom I respect.
The project of the space five-year plan for 1966-1970 was adopted as a basis with a formal instruction to search for resources by clarifying individual positions of the plan and adjusting the cost and timing of individual development work. Thus ended the first public presentation of NII-88 on the project of a five-year space program, into which the institute had invested so much effort and effort. Despite serious criticism of me and the institute for our open disbelief in the possibility of implementing the lunar program within the given time frame established by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, Dmitry Fedorovich did not change his good attitude towards us and did not lose confidence. Perhaps Ustinov’s strong irritation with our statement was precisely the result of the fact that he himself clearly saw the unsolvability of the problem, but did not want this to become the object of premature discussion.
The meeting greatly pushed the progress of work on the lunar program: an extensive resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on their acceleration was urgently prepared and approved in February 1967, which indicated a large number of activities, delivery schedules for components, instruments, auxiliary equipment, as well as Specific short deadlines have been established for the intermediate stages of work on the creation and testing of individual elements of the complex.
Attaching great importance to the creation of the N1-L3 lunar complex, D.F. Already in April 1967, Ustinov convened a meeting of leading designers and ministry leadership in his building of the CPSU Central Committee on Old Square to check the progress of the February government decree. I was also invited to it. Chief designer V.P. reported on the state of affairs. Mishin. During the report, it turned out that the backlog for some positions reaches six months. Ustinov was so outraged by this situation that he interrupted Vasily Pavlovich’s speech with a sharp remark:
How did you, Comrade Mishin, manage to fall behind by six months in two months after the resolution was issued? Did you deceive the Central Committee of the Party?!
Vasily Pavlovich tried to reassure Ustinov, saying that the deadlines did not change, the backlog would be eliminated in the near future. However, Ustinov did not listen to the continuation of Mishin’s report and closed the meeting, instructing the minister to sort everything out and take the necessary measures.
In the large reception room D.F. Ustinov, where we all went out, the chief designer of the N1 launch vehicle, D.I., came up to me. Kozlov said:
Yura, you were right then. Write a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU that the lunar expedition cannot be carried out within the given time frame. We, all designers, will support you.
To which I replied irritably:
Thank you, you're taking me for a fool. The train has already left. You convinced me that you want, can and will solve this problem. “There’s the author of this saying,” I pointed to S.O. Okhapkina. - Now, if they ask me why we didn’t fly to the moon, I will answer that this is the result of your sluggishness.
In the process of implementing the N1-L3 complex project in 1966, one particular issue arose, but it was important for maintaining the prestige of our country and, most importantly, for developing the lunar complex. Whose astronauts, the USA or the USSR, will be the first to fly around the Moon and return to Earth? The problem is much simpler, since it can be solved without the H1 carrier, but, nevertheless, very tempting. In addition to obtaining a prestigious result, it allows, in particular, to work out the return lunar ship, being an indispensable and decisive stage in the implementation of the lunar expedition.
OKB-1 came up with a proposal to carry out a human flyby of the Moon using a standard upper stage and a return lunar ship from the N1-L3 complex using the spent Proton launch vehicle developed by V.N. Chelomeya. The ship returns from the direction of the Earth's South Pole, where it enters the dense layers of the atmosphere, partially decelerates, and ricochets with a small exit into space. A new immersion of the spacecraft into the atmosphere takes place at the southern borders of the Soviet Union with landing in a developed area of Kazakhstan. Everything worked out very well. With a minimum of costs, the problem of working out the flight pattern and important elements of the lunar complex was solved, and there was hope of recording another important record in the annals of our space history. However, OKB-52 V.N. Chelomeya came up with her project for a human flyby of the Moon, also using the Proton launch vehicle, but with an upper stage and a return lunar ship of her own design. Again a dispute arose between two respected leading OKBs.
NII-88 prepared and sent to the ministry a conclusion in favor of Mishin’s option, since it important stage flight testing of the N1-L3 complex. Vasily Pavlovich’s option was closer to implementation; its use provided great cost savings and significantly advanced the main lunar program. At the same time, an interdepartmental expert commission was created under the chairmanship of M.V. Keldysh, which included my first deputy A.G. from NII-88. Mrykin, came to a different conclusion, preferring the option of V.N. Chelomeya. The commission apparently proceeded from the expediency of expanding the scope of work in accordance with the lunar program by involving OKB-52 Chelomey in this topic. On this occasion, Keldysh instructively reprimanded me in the building of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the presence of Mrykin:
How does this happen, Yuri Alexandrovich? Your first deputy Mrykin signs my conclusion, are you the opposite?
To which I calmly replied:
There is no contradiction. I sign the opinion of the institute, and Mrykin, a member of your expert commission, as a specialist, expressed his point of view. According to the existing situation at the institute, he has the right to have and express his opinion.
Keldysh did not continue the conversation on this topic, and Mrykin remained silent altogether. The top officials approved the project to fly around the Moon according to Mishin’s version.
In 1965, the Central Design Bureau of Experimental Mechanical Engineering developed a design for a system for our citizen to fly around the Moon (assuming that he would be the first to make such a flight), without stopping work on the N1-L3 lunar complex. The return vehicle of the lunar ship L3 was tested on the basis of the Proton carrier with the fourth stage-block D LC. The descent vehicle was similar in its aerodynamic shape to the Soyuz spacecraft. Upon returning to the earth's atmosphere at a speed of 11 km/s, the spacecraft made a controlled flight ensuring landing in a given area of the Soviet Union. The return vehicle, after extinguishing the second escape velocity due to air resistance and transitioning to the speed established in the atmosphere, was further slowed down due to the activation of the parachute system from an altitude of 7 km. The ballistic flight pattern of the return vehicle was as follows.
The lunar spacecraft with block D is launched by the Proton carrier into a low intermediate orbit with an altitude of approximately 200 km. From this orbit, the LC launches towards the Moon, picking up a speed slightly less than the second cosmic speed - 11 km/s. When approaching the Moon at a distance of approximately 250 thousand km, one correction is made to the trajectory of the ship in order to ensure that it circles the Earth's satellite at a given distance - approximately 1.2 - 2.4 thousand km. During the return to the Earth, one or two corrections are made to the flight path of the device to ensure its approach to the Earth from the northern or southern hemisphere and precise entry into a given corridor in the upper atmosphere. This ensures the ricocheting flight of the SA and its landing in the selected area.
During braking, the return vehicle makes a controlled flight in the atmosphere by changing the roll angle and rotating the lift relative to the trajectory (in a perpendicular plane) of movement, which ensures the desired landing area of the vehicle and reduces its overloads during braking. The full flight time of the ship is about 7 days. Along the way, when testing all spacecraft systems, scientific equipment and a photographic apparatus are installed on it to obtain photographs of the lunar relief with great clarity.
The first Zond-4 apparatus was launched on March 2, 1968 to test its systems without returning. The second - “Zond-5” - on September 15, 1968 and was landed in the Indian Ocean without a rebound, with an approach from the southern hemisphere. Zond 6 was launched on November 10, 1968 and landed on the territory of the Soviet Union while approaching from the south. “Zond-7” - September 8, 1969 and landed on the territory of the USSR during an approach from the south with a double immersion in the atmosphere. And finally, the last one, Zond-8, was launched on October 20, 1970. To study the possibility of a new landing option, the spacecraft was splashed down in the Indian Ocean when approaching the Earth from the northern hemisphere - a trajectory most convenient for observing the device from ground points of the Soviet Union. Practically during these flights, the option of a flyby of the Moon by a Soviet cosmonaut was tested, but the flyby was never completed, since the Americans had already completed it on the Apollo spacecraft. Priority was lost, and the replay had no scientific value other than the unjustified risk of losing the astronaut.
The second attempt to torpedo the program for creating the N1-L3 lunar complex under the guise of saving it was the proposal of OKB-52 V.N. Chelomey, submitted to the CPSU Central Committee, on the creation of a super-heavy carrier UR-700. Considering the delay in testing the N1 launch vehicle, the existing shortage of payload mass that it launches into the reference orbit, the need to produce carrier tanks at the test site due to their non-transportability, as well as the undeveloped and low thrust of the engines, Chelomey proposed his UR-700, assembled from transportable cylindrical blocks, using a Glushko engine of 600 tf. The carrier had a carrying capacity of about 120 tons.
The proposal was presented to the CPSU Central Committee in the form of a preliminary design and signed by outstanding academic designers: V.N. Chelomeem, V.P. Glushko, V.P. Barmin, V.I. Kuznetsov and other prominent scientists. During the flight of the UR-700 carrier, tetroxide was used as an oxidizer and hydrocarbon fuel. The launch vehicle's layout was multi-block, well thought out from the point of view of production, transportation and operation. The design of the UR-700 incorporated many original solutions and took into account all the shortcomings identified during the development of the N1 carrier. I knew that D.F. Ustinov got acquainted with the proposed UR-700 carrier and supported it.
NII-88 carefully examined the UR-700 project, noted all the good design solutions, but spoke negatively regarding its implementation. The main reasons: the use of environmentally hazardous fuel components and the lack of financial resources and production capacity to create two launch vehicles - N1 and UR-700, and in the case of developing only a new launch vehicle - the absence of compelling reasons to abandon the N1. The latter’s project, although behind in terms of deadlines, is still significantly ahead of the UR-700 in terms of the degree of development. The official conclusion of the institute on the UR-700 project had been prepared, but had not yet been sent to management when I received an invitation from Chelomey. At the same time, he invited First Deputy Minister G.A. Tyulina.
Vladimir Nikolaevich, in his large office in Fili, hung with colorful posters with the UR-700 launch vehicle, spoke interestingly and convincingly for two hours about the design features of the launch vehicle, its characteristics, technological solutions and capabilities. Smiling slightly and addressing us one by one, Chelomey clearly outlined all the advantages and features of the proposed carrier. I was anxiously awaiting Vladimir Nikolaevich’s question about the institute’s opinion regarding the reported project. After such a kind reception, it was somehow awkward and even impolite for me to criticize the project and disagree with the advisability of developing the medium. After all, the negative conclusion of the institute has already been discussed and signed. But there was no question or discussion of the UR-700 project, but an invitation to Chelomey’s small office for lunch followed. At the end of dinner, after the third glass of cognac, Vladimir Nikolaevich casually and casually asked me:
What do you think, Yuri Alexandrovich, will my proposal pass or not? After all, Dmitry Fedorovich supports him.
Frankly? - I asked, warmed by cognac and losing the feeling of timidity.
Well, of course. This is why we have gathered,” he simply suggested.
It seems to me that nothing will work out. Not only the ministry, but also the state does not have enough strength for two super-heavy carriers, and no one at the top has enough argumentation or courage to close the development of the N1, on which 500 million rubles have already been spent, in favor of a new, even better, carrier. Moreover, the N1 carrier has not yet flown, and therefore it is good,” I answered, rejoicing in this way of posing the question, eliminating the need for technical criticism of the UR-700.
Vladimir Nikolaevich immediately “wiped” the smile from his face and, straightening up, stated seriously and touchily:
You, as a professor at an educational institute, explain basic truths to a careless student.
Not expecting such a reaction, I apologized for the simplified presentation of the current situation. At this point, serious conversations ended, and after lunch we parted.
Two days later, Dmitry Fedorovich calls me on the Kremlin telephone and asks if the institute is familiar with the UR-700 launch vehicle project and, in particular, have I seen this project myself? When I answered yes to both questions, Ustinov asked me to state the opinion of the institute. I began to list at length all the positive aspects of the project, carefully gilding the pill in order to soften the main negative conclusion. Ustinov listened patiently and finally interrupted my praise with a short question:
“We consider it inappropriate to make a carrier for the UR-700,” I blurted out.
Why? - he was displeasedly amazed.
The Ministry of General Mechanical Engineering does not have enough funds and production capacity to develop the H1 carrier, and in order to make another similar UR-700, you need to have an additional billion rubles, which you don’t have.
It is not the institute's business to count money. There are other authorities for this. The institute must correctly evaluate and support all new advanced, progressive ideas and developments, without delving into the possibility of their implementation,” Ustinov instructed me irritably, raising his voice.
Dmitry Fedorovich, the institute is also responsible for planning development work and the specific distribution of budget allocations for all work. How can we not count money? - I managed to answer before he hung up. I don’t know who, where and how discussed the issue of developing the UR-700 launch vehicle. However, I know that it was discussed, but its development was never continued.
Three years after this implicit intervention, V.N. Chelomeya against the carrier N1 TsKBEM V.P. Mishina introduces a similar disturbance into the process of testing the N1 launch vehicle, proposing the development of another modified launch vehicle - N1M, which should launch into the reference orbit a payload that is 15 tons larger than the N1. For this purpose, the volumes of spherical tanks were increased due to cylindrical inserts, and N.D. engines were boosted. Kuznetsov and strengthened, and consequently, the configuration of the power circuit of the carrier changed. Thus, in essence, another super-heavy launch vehicle was created, which did not have a specific target task, except that it was a little larger in caliber and in terms of carrying capacity was close to the American Saturn-5 carrier.
TsNIIMash reviewed the N1M project and, taking into account the fact that the carrier was not given a target task, it was not intended to change the scheme of the lunar expedition, but only its parallel development with N1 was planned, gave a negative conclusion. The conclusion was sent to Mishin and the ministry’s headquarters in the late fall of 1970. The conclusion did not cause any verbal or official reaction: it was simply not noticed. The decision to develop the N1M carrier was made quite unexpectedly in 1971 at the highest forum - a joint meeting of the interdepartmental state commission on the N1-L3 lunar complex and the IOM scientific and technical council.
From our institute, my deputy for space issues, A.D., was present at the meeting. Koval, since at that time I was on a business trip in Leningrad as an official opponent on N.V.’s doctoral dissertation. Talyzin. The State Commission and the Ministry's Scientific and Technical Council unanimously support the project and recommend its development. Upon arrival, I ask Koval if he announced the official conclusion of the institute. Alexander Denisovich frankly admitted that he was simply afraid, since the consideration of the project was going “with a bang,” and he, as a newcomer, was afraid to introduce dissonance into the general chorus of enthusiastic voices. I considered this not tragic, since the official conclusion of the institute was filed in the affairs of TsKBEM and the ministry, and life will force us to return to this issue. And there is no point in starting an unnecessary confrontation with the minister.
However, three months later, in February 1972, S.A. called me from the “Red Stones” sanatorium via HF. Afanasyev, where he rested with V.P. Mishin, and from the very first words he begins to scold me in an irritated voice:
Why does the institute prevent the ministry from working? Why is he always in opposition? Why did he give a negative opinion on the N1M carrier, the creation of which was approved by the ministry and the interdepartmental state commission for the flight tests of the N1-L3 complex?
Why was the conclusion sent only to the military-industrial complex and not sent to TsKBEM and the ministry (it was Sergei Aleksandrovich who was incorrectly presented with the facts to strengthen his reaction)? I'm tired of all this, I'll come back from vacation and take appropriate measures. I will put an end to such liberties.
I tried to argue our negative conclusions, but a phone is a phone. The conversation ended on a high note of authority. And this was the time of my “great confrontation” with the management and designers in the “dispute of the century,” and one could expect the worst.
The minister returned, a week passed, then another - quietly. Finally, Afanasyev’s phone rings:
And you were right. We don't need the H1M carrier. Stick to his previous position and don't be afraid of Mishin.
I sighed with relief, freed from the anticipation of another unpleasant conversation. And everything was explained simply. When Mishin, in pursuance of the decision made to develop the N1M carrier, considered the question of where to make this carrier, it turned out that it was impossible at the Kuibyshev plant - it was overloaded with work on the N1 carrier. Then Mishin proposed to the minister to organize the production of launch vehicles in high-rise buildings near Chelomey in Reutov and then float the manufactured structures along the Moscow River, Oka and Volga to Kuibyshev, as if thereby expanding Kuibyshev production. However, the Lord God himself could not have taken away from Chelomey the buildings where he located the production of the Almaz orbital complex and other important facilities, especially in the process of the “dispute of the century” with the unlimited support of the Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko. This changed S.A.’s attitude. Afanasyev to the N1M project. The production of launch vehicles should have been thought about earlier when making a decision. Experience has repeatedly shown that large and unique launch vehicles, engines and other objects cannot be created in isolation from specific tasks, with the expectation of later finding a use for them, citing the positive example of the development of a launch vehicle based on the R-7 rocket, which was not made as a carrier, but as such successfully fit into the space program. At that time, the scale was an order of magnitude smaller (you can always redo it), and the creation of this carrier was preceded by the R-7 intercontinental missile with a specific, extremely important task.
At the test site, during the next, fourth, launch of the N1, the issue regarding its modification of the N1M was again raised, but this time at the suggestion of the minister himself. Sergei Aleksandrovich convened a small meeting of Mishin’s deputies at the training ground and instructed me to once again discuss with them, fans of the new carrier, the feasibility of its creation. He sat down in the corner of the room, taking the position of an observer. I began the discussion by asking the audience three simple questions:
Can the H1 carrier currently being tested solve the planned lunar mission program? If yes, then why N1M in conditions of a severe shortage of production capacity engaged in work on the N1-L3 lunar complex? Are the designers thinking of conducting parallel production and operation of these two launch vehicles, which are almost identical in power, or will N1, after testing its reliability to the level of the Soyuz launch vehicle and solving the problems of the lunar expedition, be “retired”, and testing the reliability of the N1M launch vehicle will begin?
It was not possible to obtain a clear answer to these questions. And it is impossible to close or discredit the tested carrier H1: why then are the tests carried out? It is very difficult to argue for the parallel creation of two media in the absence of specific tasks for the second. The minister listened for a long time, laughed and, waving his hand, left. So they put an end to the N1M carrier project.
This time was not only the end of the H1M carrier, but also the beginning of the end of H1. Let us return again to the period of time preceding the flight tests of the N1 launch vehicle. Despite the lack of funds and production capacity, work on it and the lunar complex as a whole proceeded quickly and purposefully. TsKBEM and its associates devoted themselves to their work with great enthusiasm and dedication. Emerging design and technological problems were resolved promptly and skillfully. One thing darkened the mood: the short time before the implementation of the lunar expedition, which left no hope for its completion within the time frame set by the government. But I was warmed by the thought that “over the hill” could also have its difficulties and deadlines could creep up. Therefore, our possibility of being the first on the Moon was not completely ruled out.
I will not touch upon the process of working out individual elements of the N1-L3 complex. This is the subject of a special description of labor heroism, high professionalism of scientists, designers, technologists and workers. I will only touch on some interesting and fateful moments in the history of the implementation of the lunar program that affected our institute.
One of these issues is the problem of ensuring the reliability of the launch vehicle. The previously existing methodology for testing the reliability of objects, mainly during their flight tests, was created for small and cheap rockets, when a small plant could produce up to 20-30 experimental samples per year. Due to this, the time frame for their flight design tests was sharply reduced, since the creation of complex experimental stands and installations was not required. With the increasing complexity of rocket and space technology objects, this approach began to fail, although the illusion that the sooner we go to flight tests, the faster we will solve the assigned space problem, has not yet left the chief designers.
The shortcomings of the method of testing the reliability of a product during its space launches in solving the target problem are clearly confirmed by numerous launches of automatic spacecraft for a soft landing on the Moon and exploration of the planets Mars and Venus. A large number of launches were accidents due to elementary design and construction errors, which could easily have been detected during ground tests. Hence the delay of work for many years and the receipt of incomplete information. Despite frequent accidents, the designers continued to persistently push forward and storm space, as they say, “by direct force,” carrying out one targeted launch after another, eliminating the causes of the next failure in the hope that it would be the last. And there, around the corner, a beautiful picture of success will open. Even the upper stages (blocks L, D, etc.) were tested through targeted launches.
I somehow managed to convince B.E. Chertok - Deputy S.P. Korolev that it’s time to stop aimlessly throwing expensive target space stations “over the hill” without working out the upper stage L. Chertok at one of the meetings held by S.P. Korolev and dedicated to the next launch of an important space object, tried to very carefully express the idea of testing the launch vehicle and upper stages with a cargo mock-up. To which Sergei Pavlovich said complacently and in surprise:
Boris Evseevich, what’s wrong with you, are you already sick? How will I contact Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev after such a cargo launch? Allow me to report, I launched a “boob” into orbit.
Boris Evseevich did not continue his thought. I also didn’t have the courage to develop this proposal. Sergei Pavlovich’s criticism of me would have been even more sharp and offensive. Unfortunately, the “direct poke method” was invisibly preserved and dominated during the development of the most complex and multi-detailed lunar complex N1-L3. Although Vasily Pavlovich publicly anathematized this method, he did practically nothing:
We cannot afford to test the lunar complex “by direct jabbing”: it is too expensive, he said with conviction, but gradually reduced the volume of ground-based development of the complex in order to meet the deadlines. Mishin pronounced the last phrase like a spell in response to the institute’s reproaches that the development of the N1 carrier and the complex as a whole was essentially transferred to flight tests, since no new ideas to ensure high reliability of this complex were developed, and the volume of ground testing its elements and blocks and simpler objects of rocket and space technology were practically no different. In matters of reliability development, the chief designers continued to move forward along the well-trodden road, naively believing that the complexity and high cost of new space technology products necessitates a particularly responsible attitude towards them by each subcontractor and the parent organization, and this will ensure the necessary high reliability of the design by itself, and will not be required increasing the volume of its ground mining.
The method of testing the reliability of space objects during their targeted launches began to irritate senior management due to frequent accidents even when launching simpler spacecraft for exploring the Moon, Mars, and Venus. For the first time, it officially drew attention to the frequent accidents of the E-6 apparatus, designed for a soft landing on the Moon. After his eighth unsuccessful launch, D.F. Ustinov decided to host a special analysis of the reliability of this object. The institute was instructed to conduct a detailed analysis of the failures that occurred, reveal their causes and make proposals to ensure the reliability of the spacecraft.
We carefully prepared for the report, formulating and justifying main conclusion: everything lies in the insufficient level of ground development of the object. It was recommended to significantly change the procedure for preparing it for flight tests, shifting the center of gravity to ground experiments on special stands. A specific list of necessary additional tests was indicated. I had a presentiment that I would encounter resistance from Sergei Pavlovich, since our proposals led to a certain break in the incessant, systematic targeted launches of E-6 objects - gambling attempts to “break the bank” as quickly as possible. He knew that D.F. would also be against it. Ustinov, dissatisfied with the delay in the testing process.
Korolev expected from us some kind of magical insight that would instantly solve the problem of reliability and the entire target task without much effort. This was generated by a general negative attitude towards delays in the development of rocket and space technology products. However, I could not offer any new, revolutionary ideas, other than increasing the volume of ground testing of the product, and my heart was filled with melancholy and unpleasant expectation.
I still have in my memory the painful memory of my extremely unsuccessful debut in 1965 when speaking on a similar issue about reliability - at an extended board of the ministry in the presence of the heads of all enterprises and organizations in the industry. Then I was asked to make a report on the reasons for the significant delay in missile development, their lack of reliability, and not to forget about the specific criticism of the negligent. In my speech, I noted that the reasons for these shortcomings are due to improper planning of work. In government decrees, the first and main controlled stage is flight design tests, and unreasonably short periods are assigned in the hope that the lag behind government assignments will be the most effective incentive to intensify missile development. In reality, the opposite is true. Insufficient time does not make it possible to develop a detailed preliminary design of the rocket in several versions, select the best one, and create the necessary complex test benches for ground testing of the rocket and its components. As a result, while observing the deadline, insufficiently tested rockets are produced at LKI, without experimental confirmation of important design decisions. And although we start flight tests a little late, creating the appearance of working on schedule, during the tests we begin to solve design problems anew, rework the rocket, its assemblies and components. The LCT process is greatly delayed, sometimes up to 5-7 years, hence the delay in completing work on the rocket and its insufficient reliability. Therefore, based on real statistics, I proposed to increase the duration of the stage before the missiles enter the LCI in order to ultimately reduce total time their creation, increase reliability, and reduce total development costs. I fancied myself a pioneer and expected superior praise from D.F. Ustinov, who was always present and spoke at extended boards with a detailed analysis of the work of the ministry over the past year. Dmitry Fedorovich spoke well, without paper, substantively and convincingly. I looked forward to him confirming the correctness of my conclusions. But from the very first words, Ustinov attacked the institute and me, accusing me of misunderstanding the basic laws of missile development, calls for relaxation, rest, and the creation of a demobilizing work regime for organizations. I was stunned and terribly upset by this assessment of my sincere, and, as it seemed to me, absolutely correct analysis. Leaving the college and saying goodbye to each of its members, Dmitry Fedorovich did not even shake hands with me: he was so angry.
I expected to receive something similar during my speech on the reliability of the E-6 object, but my fears were not justified. Sergei Pavlovich passed away. The country has lost a talented designer, a generator of amazing ideas and achievements in human space exploration. And a month and a half after his death, during the next, ninth, launch of the E-6 object, as if to refute the thesis about the need for detailed ground-based testing, a photograph of the lunar panorama was obtained for the first time in the world - the greatest scientific achievement. What happened with a simple and small automatic station, when we managed to break through to the solution of the problem on the ninth attempt using the “direct poke method”, played a significant role negative role when creating a complex and expensive complex. The top management did not have enough money, time or patience for the same roulette with the N1-L3 complex. However, in the case of object E-6 there was a tragicomic incident.
Our hero-researchers, having received an excellent image of the lunar surface at the Evpatoria long-distance space communication measuring station, which for the first time gave a detailed idea of its microstructure, made an unfortunate mistake, one might say in internationally. The chairman of the state commission reported by telephone to the CPSU Central Committee to Ustinov about the exceptional successes of photographing the lunar panorama and proposed to produce commemorative booklets with the lunar panorama for the highest authorities before publishing it in newspapers. Dmitry Fedorovich expressed dissatisfaction with the delay in publication, but agreed with the proposal. Imagine Ustinov’s indignation when the whole world learned about our space successes from foreign newspapers, in which the English astronomer Lovel published photographs of the lunar surface received by radio from the E-6 object, however, with reference to our authorship. There was a “big khural” about this in domestic scientific circles. They even suggested encrypting scientific information to prevent this from happening again, but prudence prevailed. We decided to simply increase the efficiency of publishing interesting scientific information.
However, let's return to N1-L3. Already during the preparation of the lunar complex for flight tests and during their process, it became obvious that in order to ensure high reliability of such a complex complex, from the very beginning of its development it is necessary to include in the design special requirements that meet the required reliability of the complex being created, even at the expense of its energy characteristics and mass perfection . It is necessary, if possible, to avoid intense operating conditions of engines and structural elements of the product, to avoid complex design and technological solutions, so that possible errors and unfavorable conditions in production do not have fatal consequences, or at least reduce the likelihood of their occurrence. Another necessary condition for achieving high reliability of large and uniquely complex products is the mandatory thorough ground testing of all units, systems, blocks, stages, and then the product as a whole with running engines and a functioning control system. And, ultimately, providing the opportunity, following the example of the Americans, to conduct pre-flight fire technological tests of the product, i.e. check the quality factor of a specific product being sent into flight, and not its production analogue.
Of course, in this case, the process of testing the design of the complex must be built taking into account the possibility of pre-flight fire tests, which requires the construction of complex stands, and, therefore, significant time and money. But as American experience has shown, this approach pays for the costs of stands and, as a result, saves material costs and reduces the time for solving the problem.
In our conditions of development of the N1-L3 lunar complex, many things turned out just the opposite. The eternal shortage of payloads put into orbit forced the use of forced operating modes of engines, overvoltage of power structures and increased demands on the accuracy of compliance with the manufacturing technology of the complex. The pursuit of high specific engine characteristics, which gave us a feeling of legitimate pride in the technical level of domestic space technology, also could not but influence the difficulty of ensuring high reliability of the lunar complex. The absence, due to limited funds and tight deadlines, of some extremely necessary stands played a negative role in testing its reliability.
For the first time, TsNIIMash was officially entrusted with issues of reliability of the N1-L3 lunar complex shortly before the start of its flight tests. The institute was charged with the numerical determination of this parameter of the complex before launch. As a member of the state commission for testing N1-L3, I was tasked with reporting the results of calculations to the commission. At that time, TsNIIMash had not yet been assigned the obligation, before each launch of a space complex or manned object, to give a responsible conclusion on the sufficiency of its ground testing, safety and accident-free flight.
To solve the problem of numerical calculation of reliability indicators of the lunar complex, the institute’s specialists conducted a statistical analysis of materials on the launches of all rockets, launch vehicles and upper stages, reviewed and analyzed the causes of accidents of each product and proposals for eliminating them. Based on the results of the launches of 30 created objects, we built ex post facto reliability curves, starting from the first. Processing of statistical data showed that most accidents are associated with simple design, technological and operational errors (polarity mismatch, errors in circuits, clogging of lines, incorrect connection of elements). The second part of the causes of accidents is ignorance of the operating conditions of the facility, the magnitude of the loads on it and the features of the interaction of systems and units during their operation. The statistical growth curves for the reliability of each stage of the rocket and launch vehicle, as well as the upper stage during the first launch, lie in a wide range from 0.2 to 0.8. These figures correlate very well with the novelty and complexity of the design, the availability of its prototypes and the level of their ground-based testing. By the 10th launch, reliability increases and already reaches values of 0.8-0.9, and by the 30th - 0.97-0.98.
Based on such formal, dead statistics, in order to assess the overall danger at the beginning of flight tests, we assumed that, despite the novelty and complexity of all stages of the complex, and there are eight of them working in sequence, the probability of normal functioning of each of the stages at the first launch is not exceeds 0.5. At the same time, we believed that the uniqueness and lack of a prototype is compensated by the special responsibility of the developer. In this case, the probability of completing the target task during the first launch of the N1-L3 complex was estimated at slightly more than 1%. Even if you choose the maximum probability of normal operation of each stage equal to 0.8, the probability of solving the target problem at the first start does not exceed 16%.
The resulting assessment shows that to test the reliability of such a complex lunar complex, a new approach is needed, but, alas, there is none. Although we were aware of the reality of the figures received, we nevertheless could not go to the state commission with them. We had to change the methodology for assessing reliability and, based on experimental data, take into account only complex errors of our ignorance, discarding gross errors in production and operation. We could and should have done this. The results, from our point of view, were satisfactory. Thus, the mathematical expectation of the lunar complex solving the target problem during the first launch (with the return of the spacecraft from the Moon to Earth) was equal to 67% with a confidence interval from 38 to 92% with a probability of 90%.
Before the first launch of the N1-L3 complex, which took place in 1969, at a meeting of the state flight test commission, at which the decision to launch the complex was made, I reported the results of a numerical assessment of its reliability using the second methodology, i.e. about 67%, unobtrusively warning that in this case the developers and persons servicing the launch should not make a single simple or gross mistake or blunder. I expected approval of the results presented. However, my message was met with deathly silence. Each member of the state commission was puzzled by the given figures, since an accident was possible, and pondered their position. The first to speak was N.A. Pilyugin. With his characteristic originality and wisdom, he stated:
We cannot plan our own accidents in advance, as they suggest to us here. With such reliability figures, we do not have the right to make a decision on the launch of the lunar complex. Considering that the initial data used to determine reliability are unreliable, I propose to completely exclude numerical calculations from our practice. When making a decision to launch the complex, we must proceed from the absolute reliability of each system, each unit, each device and the product as a whole, which their developers must guarantee when reporting on readiness for launch.
Without discussion, everyone unanimously agreed with this formulation of the question. Everyone hoped that it would not be his system, unit, product, and if it was his, then according to the situation it would be possible to find an objective justification for himself. I was also pleased with the decision made. It freed the institute and me from the need to constantly explain the discrepancy between the numbers real picture tests, which in terms of the reliability of the first launches was more than gloomy.
The first launch of the N1-L3 lunar complex was carried out on February 21, 1969, with a full absolute guarantee from the chief designers of the reliability of the products they developed and the complex as a whole. The H1 carrier took off normally, the beginning of the flight was normal and stable. But due to high-frequency oscillations that arose in engine No. 2 of the first stage of the launch vehicle, the hot gas extraction tube from the combustion chamber to the sensor collapsed. As a result, at the 54th second of the flight, a fire broke out in the tail compartment of the rocket, and at the 70th second, it exploded due to the fire that had developed. However, everyone recognized the start as very successful. The carrier starts and flies normally. V.P. was especially pleased. Mishin. He considered the fire an accidental, easily eliminated factor. As they told me, Vasily Pavlovich even said:
It’s good that we didn’t listen to Mozzhorin and didn’t build a stand for fire testing of the first stage of the carrier. On this we saved 179 million rubles.
There was a small note about this flight: at the moment of launch, a pair of 150-ton peripheral engines were turned off in accordance with the logic of the Kord protective system. This system, in the event of certain explosion-threatening disturbances in the operation of any main engine, turns off it and the “healthy” engine opposite in diameter in order to eliminate the disturbing moment in yaw and pitch. After all, the object is controlled through these channels by correspondingly changing the amount of thrust of the peripheral engines. More than a year was needed to investigate the causes of the fire and prepare the next set of the lunar complex. The second launch of the N1-L3 complex was carried out on July 3, 1970. In this case, a fire broke out in the tail section in the first seconds of the flight. Cause of the fire: destruction of engine No. 8 when entering mode, presumably due to the entry of a foreign object into the pump inlet. However, engine destruction could also occur due to insufficient performance of the engines or due to defects in their manufacture. The absence of protective mesh filters at the inlet to the engine pumps made the first reason preferable. At an altitude of approximately 100 m, the Kord system, due to a fire (its wires were burning), contrary to technical logic, turned off all the main engines except one. The complex fell on the starting structure, exploded and completely destroyed it. At the moment of launch, the Kord system had already turned off two pairs of peripheral engines.
After this incident, it was decided to completely exclude the Kord system from the configuration of the N1 carrier: as it was established, most emergency situations in the engine leading to explosion or destruction developed so rapidly that there was not enough time for the fuel cut-off valves to operate in order to prevent engine damage and prevent fire. Based on the results of the second launch, many measures were proposed and implemented to increase the fire safety of the launch vehicle.
A year later, on July 27, 1971, the third launch of the lunar complex was made. His start went well. At the beginning of the active part of the flight path, the H1 carrier began to slowly rotate along the roll. When the maximum angle of 12° was reached, the propulsion system of the first stage of the launch vehicle was completely turned off by the flight safety system. The complex fell and exploded. The cause of the accident was a powerful aerodynamic disturbing moment, which was not taken into account when assessing the required roll control margin of the complex. The fourth launch of the N1-L3 complex took place on November 23, 1972. The launch and flight of the complex over most of the active part of the trajectory of the first stage of the N1 carrier were normal. At the end of this section, before the propulsion system of the first stage of the launch vehicle was turned off, small longitudinal vibrations began to develop. At the 107th second of flight, engine No. 4 was destroyed due to the heat of the oxidizer pump, and the complex exploded.
Thus, of the four emergency launches of the N1-L3 complex, three of them are directly or indirectly related to the engine of the chief designer N.D. Kuznetsov, which is part of the 30-engine installation. The statistics, frankly speaking, are bleak and very close to the first assessment of the reliability of the complex. Detailed analysis The results of the first four emergency launches of the N1-L3 lunar complex and the American experience of ensuring the reliability of the Saturn-5 launch vehicle led the institute to the firm conviction that continuing to develop the reliability of the mentioned complex in the previously accepted manner will not solve the problem. It is necessary to change the method of ensuring reliability. The main condition for this, in addition to increasing the volume of ground testing of each system and each unit, we considered the introduction of pre-flight fire technological tests of all stages and units of the complex in order to gain firm confidence in their performance and the absence of production and technological errors. It was also necessary to modify all stages of the launch vehicle and engines of the lunar complex with the aim of using them in flight after the OTI without bulkheads and complex neutralization, so as not to be limited, as before, to fire burns of “witnesses.”
Of course, the implementation of these measures was not an easy task. Easy to say, but difficult to do. It was necessary to create a unique stand for fire technological tests of the first stage of the N1 launch vehicle. This entailed significant capital construction, which required significant additional time, which was not available. Therefore, chief designer V.P. Mishin's proposal to introduce such tests into the practice of creating the N1 carrier was met with hostility. An endless technical dispute began between TsNIIMash and TsKBEM about the “benefits and harms” of OTI with extensive calculations based on the use of all statistical data on rocket and launch vehicle accidents to confirm their diametrically opposed views on the causes of accidents prevented by fire tests. It seemed to us that the TsKBEM specialists were biased in this matter as well. However, the obvious benefit of OTI is difficult to deny, and it does not need to be confirmed by calculations.
Let's follow the further development of events related to N1-L3. Due to a serious delay in work, the chief designers of the lunar complex prepared in 1973 a draft of a new resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on the continuation of preparations for a domestic lunar expedition with the landing of a Soviet man on the Moon in 1975, i.e. in two years. The Ministry of General Engineering supported this initiative. However, as I secretly learned, M.V. Keldysh refused to endorse the draft resolution, fearing to be insolvent for the second time before the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and demanded from the chief designers a conclusion confirming the possibility of completing the lunar expedition within the specified time frame.
Such a document was quickly drawn up and signed by the chief designers of the N1-L3 complex. In custody they are in general outline gave an analysis of the modifications made to the N1 carrier and its engines and, without any justification, stated that the lunar expedition would take place on time in 1975. At the same time, it was argued that the volume of ground tests of the launch vehicle is sufficient to ensure its necessary reliability, which is no worse, and in some cases even higher, than that of the American Saturn-5 launch vehicle. Mstislav Vsevolodovich, having read the conclusion of the chief designers, was dissatisfied with its declarative nature and lack of justification and requested, as I was told in confidence, the conclusion of TsNIIMash on the possibility of carrying out a lunar expedition in 1975, since the institute is responsible for the reliability of the complex. The Institute, on its own initiative, prepared a reasoned conclusion, in which it showed that such a problem could not be solved in two years, and sent it to the ministry. However, the ministry did not resort to the services of TsNIIMash, but prepared a similar document on its own behalf.
I was summoned by Deputy Minister for Space Affairs V.Ya. Litvinov proposed to endorse the ministerial conclusion, repeating the review of the chief designers. It listed in a more concise form the work done to improve the reliability of the engines and the launch vehicle, and repeated the same statements that had so alarmed Keldysh.
All persons who signed the conclusion can always say that they were deceived by subordinate organizations and individuals. I cannot take advantage of such a privilege, since the institute must answer the questions posed in a substantive and qualified manner. The leadership of the ministry will then have serious complaints against TsNIIMash.
My monologue continued for quite a long time until Litvinov lost his temper and said:
You talk a lot. Show specifically what you don’t like about prison and how to fix it.
I immediately got wound up and made a tactlessness:
Briefly, the meaning of my remarks boils down to the following. In the phrase: “the reliability of the N1 launch vehicle is no worse, and in some cases even better than the reliability of the Saturn-5 launch vehicle,” remove the “not” particle by inserting it into the phrase: “the volume of ground testing is sufficient to ensure the necessary reliability.”
Of course, Viktor Yakovlevich immediately took offense at me and began to complain on the phone to the minister (S.A. Afanasyev) that I had again taken an unconstructive position and did not recognize any arguments. I had to listen to several angry remarks on the phone from “myself,” which he connected with my dissenting opinion on the so-called “dispute of the century.” I asked Sergei Alexandrovich to see me to explain the state of affairs in more detail, but he hung up. I didn’t get a visa at the ministry’s conclusion.
A week later, Afanasyev, as chairman of the interdepartmental state commission for flight testing of the lunar complex, gathers the state commission and a large circle of participants in this development to discuss and approve the conclusion of the Ministry of General Engineering at a higher level. The meeting was attended by more than 150 people, including the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences M.V. Keldysh and Minister of Aviation Industry P.D. Dementyev.
The main speaker was V.P. Mishin. He outlined in detail and optimistically the state of affairs with the lunar complex, spoke about the measures that had been implemented to ensure its reliability, and in general terms explained the possibility of carrying out a lunar expedition within the proposed two-year period. Vasily Pavlovich harshly criticized the position of TsNIIMash, its conclusion, which he characterized as not worth the paper on which it was written. He was followed by the chief related designers, who noted that all difficulties had been identified and overcome, assuring the minister of the possibility of meeting the deadlines proposed in the draft resolution. Keldysh and Dementyev, having read the draft decision of the state commission, immediately left the meeting, citing urgent matters, so as not to participate in the decision-making. In total, we talked for more than two hours. Finally, the floor was given to me as the director of the institute.
Just without demagoguery and to the point! - Chairman Afanasiev warned me angrily.
Trying to appear calm after such parting words, I declare:
I see that you are all tired, and in order not to abuse your patience, I will be extremely brief: I will simply read out the conclusions of the institute. If you have any questions, I will answer in detail.
For some reason there were no questions. Only Sergei Alexandrovich irritably remarked to me:
So, in conclusion, you demand additional tests of the engines. Do you know that Vasily Pavlovich and the ministry... - and fell silent. Then he looked into my eyes, apparently remembered something, realized that I would answer in his own words, and did not continue. And Afanasyev wanted to say:
- ... such a problem cannot be solved within the given time frame.
To which I would answer:
This is necessary to ensure reliability. And it’s up to TsKBEM and the ministry to solve the problem.
Sergei Alexandrovich probably remembered the next episode. Once in his office, a number of members of the board, at the dawn of the creation of the IOM, got acquainted with a draft government decree prepared by the chief designers on increasing the firing accuracy of ballistic intercontinental missiles. The minister asked us:
Any comments?
To which I replied:
One cannot agree with such high requirements for shooting accuracy. The chief designers are currently unable to fulfill them, and the ministry will have to answer for this.
Are these characteristics good? - asked the minister.
I replied that they were necessary and very good, but not feasible at the present time.
So what right does the parent institution have to object to good numbers? If this is necessary and good, it is up to the chief designers to achieve them, and the ministries to provide a solution to this problem.
I was disgraced by S. A. Afanasyev’s state approach to the duties of the ministry, and this episode taught me that the assigned work must always be approached taking into account the maximum benefit for the country, and not for personal reasons.
After a hesitation from the minister, which no one understood, I was allowed to sit down. I was extremely surprised by V.P.’s gestural support. Barmin, who, because of his neighbor, so that the minister could not see, shook hands, expressing solidarity. And Barmin and I were at that time on opposite sides of the barricades in the “dispute of the century.” The last speaker was the customer's representative, Deputy Head of GUKOS A. A. Maksimov. His speech was very diplomatic, and, in essence, he supported me. He said a lot of good things about TsKBEM and the developers, showed how they overcome difficulties, how much they have done to improve the reliability of the complex. However, he recommended removing from the draft conclusion the phrase that the reliability of the N1 launch vehicle is no worse, and in some cases better than the reliability of the Saturn-5 launch vehicle. Maksimov explained his proposal by saying that the Americans and I are in different time planes. They have already flown to the Moon many times, but we are still testing the carrier and we have not gone beyond its first stage. Therefore, such a comparison is incorrect and may be misunderstood. He also proposed to exclude the phrase that refers to the sufficiency of the volume of ground-based development of the lunar complex to ensure its necessary reliability.
After each launch we carried out wide circle measures to improve reliability, sometimes significant, the presence of such a phrase will limit us when taking additional measures to improve reliability,” he concluded.
The draft conclusion of the ministry was never adopted by the state commission. However, this issue was not closed, and I had to face it again and defend myself very seriously on the territory of our strictest opponent - TsKBEM. On one sunny Saturday in June, I was looking at mail at the institute and getting acquainted with the reports. Suddenly the minister called:
What are you doing?
“I’m working,” I answer.
Come to Mishin's office now.
I realized that there would be a continuation of the unfinished conversation, but under pressure from authoritative TsKBEM specialists. I took some documents, and they, like weapons, were always at the ready, got behind the wheel of my personal car and drove off. I enter the large office of chief designer Mishin. 30-40 leading workers of TsKBEM are sitting around a long table, Vasily Pavlovich himself is at the end, and the minister, Sergei Alexandrovich, is perched on the side. They are waiting for me. Mishin began an accusatory opening speech. He was never shy about using epithets, but here he simply rudely attacked the institute and its activities. Basically it came down to this:
The institute not only does not help TsKBEM, but hinders its work with its unqualified conclusions. Every year the institute sends bags of its reports, which we, at TsKBEM, do not read or use. This institute creates additional difficulties for us: the secret departments and archives are overloaded. It seems that TsNIIMash works for the Military-Industrial Commission, and not for the industry.
The minister could no longer stand this. He stood up, frowning angrily, interrupted Vasily Pavlovich, since he skillfully stepped on his callus, and sternly asked me:
Who do you receive your salary from, Comrade Mozzhorin?! Why are you behaving like this?! - calling me to the front of the stage.
I receive it from you, Sergei Alexandrovich. We write conclusions on your orders. The issue is resolved simply, cancel the order on the need for the institute to issue official conclusions on all new developments and proposals of the chief designers, and everyone will be happy. “The main thing is that there is no need to say sometimes unpleasant words, the main thing is that you won’t have to listen to them,” I defended myself.
What followed was a very difficult conversation. Many TsKBEM employees criticized the institute on all points, apparently in accordance with the prepared direction. Including regarding the conclusion of the institute, which indicated the impossibility of implementing the lunar program in two years. Most often they attacked our proposal to introduce pre-flight fire technological tests of individual stages of the lunar complex, without which the institute considered it impossible to solve the target problem. At the same time, cosmonaut K.P. Feoktistov stated that we mistakenly attribute to the Americans the use of pre-flight OTI stages of the Saturn-5 launch vehicle; he was in the USA, supposedly he saw everything and knows for certain. I was silent. S. A. Afanasyev was included in the general choir two more times. When all the emotions of our opponents were discharged, and angry speeches began to fade and repeat themselves, I asked for the floor:
There was a lot of talk here that pre-flight OTIs are harmful and the Americans did not use them in their practice during the implementation of the Apollo program. I must assure you that this is a terrible misconception. We used them and thanks to them we have already visited the Moon more than once. I will read out some documents on this issue.
I began to read out a table of the data I had: the serial number of the first stage of the Saturn-5 launch vehicle, when and at what time Greenwich Mean Time it was tested on the stand, how many seconds the engines worked, what defects were identified during testing of the said stage and what measures were taken to eliminating identified deficiencies. With some sarcasm, he said that I would not convert Greenwich time to Moscow time; the audience should not be interested in this. In complete silence, he read out the results of the OTI of the twenty first stages and asked:
Is there a need to read out the results of fire tests of the twenty second stages of the Saturn-5 launch vehicle in order to convince you that OTI is a reality, and the Americans so confidently landed on the Moon six times precisely because each of their carriers underwent fire testing on Earth, and The defects identified during this process were eliminated on all 20 media.
In the ensuing silence, Sergei Alexandrovich asked in surprise, but benevolently:
How do you know all this?
The Institute works to summarize information contained in various US journals. “They don’t make a secret of it,” I answer.
Why don't I know this? - the minister asks the question again.
I have no idea. The institute sends all reports to its ministry headquarters,” I answer briefly.
Why doesn’t Vasily Pavlovich know about this? - the minister is interested again.
Because reports with such materials are in those bags that Vasily Pavlovich does not read, I am happy to shoot an arrow at Mishin.
He even screamed:
Without any politeness, can you simply explain why you consider it impossible to carry out the expedition in two years?
The ease of handling relieved me of the tension and constraint that I experienced during the meeting, when I was rolled through the hard rollers by the TsKBEM craftsmen. And the purpose of the meeting was, apparently, to test the strength of TsNIIMash’s conclusion with the authority of the designers and destroy its technical position. I also started informally:
About three years ago I bought a Volga car. I trained for a long time, but even now, when driving around Moscow, I experience a lot of stress: my neck hurts, my back gets wet, but the task is simple. I'm driving on a flat road, the speed is low. If the situation is difficult, I can stop altogether and wait it out. Those who know how will go around me. An astronaut landing on the Moon moves in space, without roads, at a speed of 2.3 km/s. Before landing, he must reduce all speed, choose a good site and gently land on the moon. There is no possibility of hovering for a long time during landing due to excessive fuel consumption. Should an astronaut train and learn how to fly on a lunar spacecraft? Undoubtedly. To do this, it is necessary to create a dynamically similar simulator based on a helicopter, but the creation of such a simulator has not yet begun. Its development and commissioning will take at least three years. So what kind of landing of a Soviet man on the moon in two years can we talk about?! This time.
What, no trainer? - the minister intervened excitedly.
Sergei Aleksandrovich, for two years now we have been raising the issue with the military-industrial complex to allocate a helicopter and convert it into a flying simulator, but the issue has not been resolved, Deputy Chief Designer Ya.I. began to explain. Tregub. Here the minister switched to a conversation with representatives of TsKBEM and the chief designer in a completely different tone and forgot about me. Afanasyev began to find out the reasons for this omission and was indignant not only at the slowness, but also at the absence of alarming reports addressed to him. I remained silent, preparing a number of other “logs” for the fire if the flames began to die out. But I didn't have to perform. The minister changed the addressee of his claims and ended the meeting with another defendant instead of me. I got up and decided to quietly walk away from the scandal. Afanasiev stopped me at the very door:
Where are you going?
I answered in monosyllables:
Work at the institute.
Wait, I'll go with you. You show me the dynamic testing laboratory, and I'll ask you a few questions. My “Seagull” has moved away for a while,” the minister said.
And you are not afraid to go with me. I'm an inexperienced driver.
But they gave him another, official, car. The conversation in the dynamic testing laboratory was more than pleasant. Having seen a large number of real objects - rockets and engines placed in stocks on vibration stands or being prepared for testing - Sergei Aleksandrovich was pleasantly surprised by the working condition of the laboratory. And having noticed the Temp-2S solid-fuel rocket of our competitor, the Ministry of Defense Industry, in the body, Afanasyev was amazed that he trusted TsNIIMash with important secrets and instructed him to test his developments.
We, as doctors, keep the secrets of diseases,” I explained.
The Minister examined all the objects about which I gave explanations. He was satisfied with the cleanliness of the laboratory, with the fact that work was being carried out so actively there, inquired about their plan and expressed half-complaints that, given the volume of work, tests were not carried out on Saturday. I said that with the available staff, testing can be carried out only in one shift, and on weekdays. Of course, it would be possible to make a show of it and work on Saturday, but this is not rational: it would be necessary to raise all the services of the institute, in addition to the testers, and in addition, lose an essentially productive working day in order to legally provide time off. Sergei Alexandrovich promised to help with personnel, machines and equipment. I was inspired by this turn of events. Instead of execution, I received understanding and support.
When leaving the building of the dynamic testing laboratory, the minister asked again:
Where are you going?
And having received mine:
“Work,” he continued:
Enough, get into the Chaika, let's go to Moscow. I'll take you home.
But I have my own car.
Are you afraid to leave her overnight on the territory of your institute?
No, I answer.
Then we’ll go,” said Sergei Alexandrovich and motioned for him to take a seat in “Chaika”. We didn't talk about business on the road.
I have not encountered any further delays in the implementation of the lunar program. Now the question may arise why a conflict arose with the two-year deadline for its implementation and why the institute so persistently did not agree with this, without yielding to the opinion of the minister and the chief designer of the complex. After all, one could remain silent, including in the conclusion an inconspicuous condition that would exempt the institution from liability. The Ministry and Mishin wanted to complete this unprecedented program by any means necessary. Two years were specified in order to obtain government consent to continue the work. Longer, realistic deadlines could immediately initiate a decision to close the lunar program. After four accidents of the N1 carrier, the Institute, taking into account the adopted method of testing its reliability, did not believe in the possibility of solving the problem even with much longer periods. Therefore, we did not want to take responsibility for unprincipled compromise, leading to inevitable colossal and wasteful costs. In addition, a tight knot of contradictions was tied around the lunar program with the “tops”, who were only looking for a reason and “switchmen” to close the development that had become unnecessary. They needed to save face and find the “red guy.”
I had to deal with the lunar program again when it was closed. One morning, on a fine July day in 1974, the institute received a call from the defense department of the CPSU Central Committee and said that I was invited to a meeting with D.F. at 11.00. Ustinov with the message of the agenda, as they liked to put it before, in order to take him by surprise, “on the spot.” I asked who else was invited. They answered me, and I understood that the issue of closing the lunar program would be discussed. It began to come up frequently in conversations at various levels. I urgently convened a meeting of institute specialists related to this program. I asked everyone, without polemics, to express their opinion with a brief argument on the question: should we close or continue the lunar program based on the current circumstances?
Much has been said about this. The majority was inclined to believe that the lunar program should be closed, since its scientific value had already been exhausted by the large number of flights of American astronauts to the Moon, flights of domestic automatic spacecraft taking soil from the Moon and delivering it to Earth, exploration of the Moon using “lunar rovers” and its artificial satellites. And the development of the H1 carrier must be continued for its use in solving other promising problems. I did not open discussions, since this coincided with my opinion, thanked everyone and left for the Central Committee.
The meeting took place in a rather narrow but representative circle. It was attended by D.F. from the CPSU Central Committee. Ustinov, I.D. Serbin, I.V. Illarionov; from the USSR Academy of Sciences M.V. Keldysh; from MIC L.V. Smirnov, B.A. Komissarov, A.I. Tsarev; from industry P.D. Dementyev, S. A. Afanasyev, G. A. Tyulin and me. In his opening remarks, Dmitry Fedorovich noted that the lunar program was essentially a failure. Of the four test launches of the launch vehicle in the automatic version, all were emergency launches, and even at the stage of operation of the first stage. The reasons for the failures lie in the unreliability of the N.D. engine. Kuznetsova. When using a multi-engine installation, this leads to catastrophic consequences and makes the problem of ensuring the reliability of the carrier hopeless. Therefore, the time has come to honestly report to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the state of affairs and come up with a proposal to close the N1-L3 program.
And now we will listen to the point of view of the parent institute on this problem, - Ustinov completed his opening remarks.
Having started my speech, I felt great awkwardness, since the opinion of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee had already been stated, and it did not coincide with the opinion of the institute and my personal beliefs. So I started from afar. Described the scientific significance of domestic lunar research with the collection of lunar soil using automatic spacecraft (“Luna-16”, “Luna-20”, “Luna-24”) and “lunar rovers” (“Luna-17”, “Luna-21” ). He noted that the scientific value of the research is almost equal to that of the American ones, but we solved this problem in a much cheaper and safer way. A domestic manned expedition to the Moon will add little to the already conducted Soviet and American lunar exploration. Such an expedition would only emphasize our lag (at that time it was believed that the Americans did not know about its preparation). Therefore, the main scientific and political significance of our lunar expedition has disappeared, and it is time to cancel it.
At the same time, I continued, the abandonment of the lunar expedition should not be accompanied by the cessation of development of the super-heavy carrier N1. As for the issue of the 150 tf engine being unused, this question has practically been removed: a serious modification of the engine was carried out, its operating time was increased to three resources. In this case, after fire tests, the engine can be installed on the launch vehicle without overhaul. Consequently, it will no longer be the narrowest link. At least under current conditions, it cannot reasonably be seen as the reason for possible future failures.
I also noted that an analysis of the development of domestic and American space technology indicates its significant complication and integration of the tasks being solved, which leads to a sharp increase in the mass of space objects, and named specific examples of such an increase in the mass of domestic and American satellites. Therefore, the need for super-heavy carriers will not disappear with the closure of the lunar program: there will be tasks for them in the near future. By stopping work on N1, we are significantly devaluing the already created objects at the test site, completely losing equipment, technology and production capacity. The main plant in Kuibyshev will not wait two years for new “space” documentation and will be loaded with other, no less important, products. We will lose production that is very necessary for astronautics. This will set us back far when creating a super-heavy carrier in the future: we will have to start all over again.
These are the brief theses of my speech. I was asked many questions about the N1 launch vehicle, trends in the development of heavy launch vehicles abroad, and ensuring their reliability. Question from L.V. Smirnov remained in my memory. He asked why the modified N.D. Kuznetsov, the engine will no longer be a source of our worries about the reliability of the first stage of the launch vehicle:
Can you guarantee the accident-free flight of the fifth H1 carrier? After all, we will have to report to the Politburo of the Central Committee.
I answered like this:
Leonid Vasilyevich, even if I gave guarantees, how could I confirm them? The question is not easy. We are developing a unique carrier, an order of magnitude more powerful and complex than the famous Soyuz. We have not yet passed the stage of operation of the first stage of the launch vehicle. In principle, other difficulties may arise.
In total, my speech took one and a half hours. Finally, Ustinov summed up:
So, you are against the closure of work on the H1 launch vehicle?
Having received my quiet “yes,” he continued:
Now let's listen to the others.
All speakers (and the survey took place from the bottom up the chain) expressed support for the closure of the lunar program and work on the lunar complex together with the H1 carrier, with frequent reminders of the need to use the groundwork created for the H1 complex as fully and efficiently as possible in the field of creating new space technology -L3. Moreover, each briefly explained his position. B. A. Komissarov reduced the entire argument to criticism and sharp attacks on me, repeating like a spell:
Is this the director!? He doesn't have a constant point of view! convinced that if the opinions of others differ from his position, then they themselves are vicious. For which Ustinov interrupted him twice:
Talk about technology, don't get personal.
I was extremely surprised that P.D. spoke in favor of closing the lunar complex development program without any explanation or hesitation. Dementyev, although the main reason for the cessation of work was the unreliability of the engine developed by the chief designer of MAP N.D. Kuznetsov. The Minister of General Engineering S.A. took a similar position. Afanasiev. We can only assume that they were tired of the tension in which the lunar program “held” them, and they had no hope of fulfilling it. Having defended the program, they would subsequently assume the full weight of responsibility for its probable failure. And so the ministers dissociated themselves from the designers and joined the top management.
In conclusion, D.F. Ustinov said that the opinion on the closure of the lunar program is almost unanimous, and ordered the preparation of a draft report to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee with a brief justification of the reasons.
I was one of the first to leave with a heavy feeling that I was alone. But I was not particularly depressed by the current situation, since this was in my life, as the reader can see from my memoirs lying before him, not the first time when, due to disagreement with the technical point of view of the leadership, my position could have been shaken. But somehow everything worked out. This can only be explained by the consistent and technically reasoned position of the institute, which found understanding and support among a certain part of the chief designers and various managers. After all, they were not all offended and angry at once, but one by one. Probably, everything will be more clear if you familiarize yourself with all similar difficult situations, which the Institute has experienced over the past 30 years as the main opposing organization, stewing in the cauldron of technical and administrative contradictions that accompanied the rapid and successful development of rocket and space technology.
While I was sitting in my office at the institute, thinking about the current situation after the meeting that had just passed, the minister called. I thought that now he would express his claims to me with all directness and sharpness and connect them with the opposition of the institute to the ministry on the issue of justifying the prospects for the development of RCT. But suddenly I heard something completely different. Afanasyev asked in a comradely manner:
What are you doing?
Come on, you're great! You performed wonderfully, beautifully and convincingly.
How beautiful and convincing is it if none of you are convinced? Everyone only criticized me, but my friend B.A. Komissarov, he generally tried to kick the most sensitive place, I whined contentedly.
Sergei Alexandrovich burst out laughing:
So do you still consider the leadership of the military-industrial complex your friends? They will crush you to the bone when it is profitable and convenient for them. In general, well done. Never mind, keep working and don't worry! - and hung up.
I was very happy about the call, but somewhat confused by this turn of affairs. S.A. Afanasyev did not favor me with his attention all this time, when the fire of the “dispute of the century” was blazing. He punished me strictly for mistakes and was really angry because the institute was in technical opposition. I heard rumors that Sergei Aleksandrovich put D.F. in front of him three times. Ustinov asked about releasing me from the post of director of TsNIIMash with the motivation: “It interferes with my work.” Finally, I spoke at a meeting with Ustinov against the minister’s point of view about stopping work on the N1 carrier, and this was the result. Truly, the ways of the Lord are mysterious.
I can only explain Sergei Alexandrovich’s unexpected reaction to me in one way. He, of course, did not want to close the N1-L3 program. This is a large black indelible stain on the façade of his ministry. However, Afanasyev also saw that there was no way to defend his point of view in the current technical and political situation, and resisting such a decision was simply dangerous: you would end up in the camp of those responsible for implementing the program. Therefore, my brave speech, despite pressure from the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, against the cessation of work on the N1 carrier and the argumentation of this opinion could not but bring satisfaction to the minister. They were in tune with Afanasyev’s moods and thoughts and were expressed out loud on behalf of the industry’s leading institute, which he always considered the unconditional spokesman for Ustinov’s ideas. And here there is a disagreement, and even a face-to-face one, with Dmitry Fedorovich himself.
Two years later, walking with Komissarov in the park of the Central Clinical Hospital, where we were being treated, I heard from him:
And you were right, Yura, when you opposed the closure of topic H1. We made a mistake.
This was a great gift to me.
In 1974, a government decision was made to stop work on the N1-L3 lunar complex with a careful recommendation to maximize the use of all production, technological and testing equipment created under the specified program for the development of a new reusable space system. Later it received the name “Energy” - “Buran”.
As has always happened in our practice, when the technical course changes, the leaders - the leaders with whose name this direction is associated - also change. Vasily Pavlovich Mishin was relieved of his post as chief designer of TsKBEM, which was merged with the Power Engineering Design Bureau and called the Research and Production Association “Energia” (NPO “Energia”). The outstanding designer V.P. was appointed its leader. Glushko is the founder of domestic practical rocket engine building. This association was entrusted with the development of the Energia - Buran system as a means of countering the efforts of the Americans to gain superiority in outer space for military purposes, using the development of the Space Shuttle system.
This is how the events related to our grandiose unique lunar program N1-L3 took shape, proceeded and ended, which were visible to me as the director of TsNIIMash, who was a direct participant in this historical epic.
In the context of the emergence of unlimited publicity and the opportunity to express the most arbitrary judgments, without bearing any responsibility for intentional or unintentional distortion of facts and unfounded accusations of individuals and organizations of malicious acts, many publications were published on the topic: “Why didn’t we fly to the Moon?” Let's try and calmly figure out who is to blame for the fact that the Soviet man did not set foot on the surface of the Moon? Is the chief designer V.P. Mishin and the powerful creative team of TsKBEM and its associates entrusted to him were unable to solve this epoch-making technical problem? Or did the party and state leadership of the country not give the opportunity to the creators of space technology to implement their project?
Landing a man on the Moon initially did not have the main goal of solving purely scientific problems that would justify the colossal costs with their significance. It was, first of all, a competition between two social systems, two superpowers for technical (and military) leadership, although colored by scientific ideas, but stimulating a strategic arms race.
After the first impressive successes of our state in manned space flights, the American leadership suddenly felt with particular acuteness and surprise the prestige of the United States as the most powerful state in the world, which had been shaken in international opinion, and the sharply increased technical authority of the Soviet Union. The Americans realized that catching up with us in the field of near-Earth manned flights meant emphasizing their technical backwardness. Therefore, a particularly impressive space program on the verge of a miracle was needed to immediately restore US prestige. And a truly miraculous program was chosen: eight years after the first man’s flight in Earth orbit, to land an expedition on the surface of the Moon. No expense or effort was spared on this program, discarding all non-prestigious, although scientifically more significant, space research. The program cost Americans $25 billion.
It seems to me that the leadership of our state did not initially appreciate the full political urgency of the American challenge and did not attach due importance to it, continuing to replicate the success in the field of near-Earth manned space flights and collecting the abundant fruits of world admiration. In this space race, we, as if in a sieve, have lost much-needed time and resources. When the decision was made to create the N1-L3 lunar complex and to land a Soviet man on the Moon first, time was completely lost and no additional measures could solve the problem. Therefore, it was necessary to very carefully and soberly weigh our production and economic capabilities before taking up work and joining such a competition.
It was necessary to take some extraordinary measures on a national scale, or it was not worth starting the development of a lunar expeditionary complex at all, but to concentrate all our efforts on studying the Moon and taking its soil first with the help of automatic devices. We were pretty close to this. Solving this problem almost optionally, in parallel with the lunar expedition, and having begun to move in the indicated direction much later than we should have, we, nevertheless, if not for an accidental error in calculations, would have been the first in the history of mankind to deliver lunar soil to Earth using an automatic Luna-15, ahead of the Americans by several days. Of course, this priority achievement would naturally not have such a public resonance as the landing of an American astronaut on the Moon. However, in a purely scientific sense, domestic research would be close to American research, would remove the halo of scientific glory from them and would significantly devalue the feasibility of such an expensive lunar expedition as Apollo. Political passion and the experience of the war years, when people did the almost impossible, prevailed this time too, instilling hope in the promises of the designers. This, in my opinion, is the main mistake of the party and state leadership, who authorized work on solving an almost impossible task in the usual way.
Could chief designer V.P. Mishin and his illustrious team, together with their subcontractors, solve the technical problem of landing a man on the Moon, without being tied to strict deadlines? Of course they could. Mishin is undoubtedly an outstanding designer, and his contribution to the development of rocket and space technology is significant. A significant share of the successes in astronautics and rocket science is associated with the name of Vasily Pavlovich. He has proven himself well while working as the first deputy of S.P. Queen. Many, many original design and engineering solutions were introduced by Mishin into those developed by OKB-1 S.P. Queen of rockets and space systems. Vasily Pavlovich independently continued and completed the development of the Soyuz spacecraft and led the work on the creation of a long-term orbital station of the Salyut type - a unique space system that provided cosmonauts with the opportunity to work in Earth orbit for an unlimited time in the interests of science and the national economy. With this, Mishin practically opened a wide path for manned near-Earth cosmonautics. For a long time he was the chief designer of the N1-L3 lunar complex. The qualified staff of TsKBEM and its associates had the necessary work experience to implement the lunar expedition. But what doomed TsKBEM to failure?
There can be only one answer. Insufficient volume of ground testing of the complex and its engines, caused by in a certain sense the short duration of the expedition, insufficient material and production support for the work, as well as commitment to an irrational methodology for testing the reliability of products during their flight tests. This led to frequent and major accidents, a significant delay in the development of the complex and, as a consequence, to the loss of the intended purpose of the lunar expedition. Negative consequences were also caused by the developer’s desire to please his superiors by minimizing the requested funds for the expedition, which created the illusion of a simple solution to the problem among the management. Instead of showing from the very beginning the enormity of the task, the entire volume of required costs, without fear that the government might not agree to create a lunar expeditionary complex, the developers carefully and gradually revealed the map of their real needs, delaying a radical solution to the problem. This, in my opinion, was Mishin’s main mistake, complicated by external difficulties.
Now it is difficult to determine who is more to blame for the fact that we did not fly to the moon. The state leadership, who set (out of their ignorance) an unrealistic task, or the chief designer Mishin, who agreed to carry it out without the necessary support and in a fantastic time frame by reducing the required detailed ground testing. Most likely, both sides are equally to blame. But the result turned out natural. The hopelessly low reliability of our complex and the critical delay in the timing of its development, on the one hand. The landing of American astronauts on the Moon during this period of time, on the other hand. As a result, the political and scientific value of the domestic lunar expedition was completely lost.
Soviet Union on the Moon
On the day of the 45th anniversary of the landing of the first people on the Moon, “Russian Planet” recalls the Soviet lunar program
A month after Gagarin's space flight, US President John F. Kennedy gave NASA a clearly defined goal: "If we can get to the Moon before the Russians, then we should do it."
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Kennedy's speech was preceded by several years of Soviet space triumphs, including successful flights to the Moon and filming of its far side. It was a challenge. Just eight years later, on July 21, 1969, Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin became the first of 12 Americans to visit Earth's moon. Three years later, the members of the last Apollo 17 mission not only took a “small step”, but already fully rode on a lunar rover on the Sea of Clarity.
Those six expeditions into the unknown 300 thousand kilometers from their home planet inspired generations of astronauts, science fiction writers and dreamers. Humanity momentarily believed in space colonization. But the practical side of the lunar program was not so rosy: for billions of dollars, almost half a ton of dusty regolith with rather dubious scientific value was brought to Earth. In the 1970s, American authorities forever turned away from the idea of manned flights to the Moon. The political task of the space race had already been completed.
The glory of space pioneers passed to the Americans, but the Soviet Union tried to maintain leadership until the last, developing its own lunar program.
2. Automatic interplanetary station Luna-1 with the last stage of the launch vehicle
Konstantin Tsiolkovsky wrote about space flights in the 19th century. In the first half of the 20th century, engineer Mikhail Tikhonravov mathematically substantiated the possibility of flying a multi-stage rocket to the Moon. His developments served as the basis for the creation by the chief Soviet designer Sergei Korolev of the R-7 rocket, with which the space age began - the “seven” sent Sputnik, Laika and Gagarin into orbit. Already in the mid-1950s, Korolev said that flights to the Moon were “not such a distant prospect.” A design department for spacecraft is opened in his design bureau, of which Tikhonravov becomes the head.
In 1959, a modified R-7 (called the “First Space Rocket” in a TASS report) launched Luna 1 into space, two years after Sputnik’s triumphant flight. “That night when Sputnik first traced the sky, I looked up and thought about the predetermination of the future. After all, that little light, rapidly moving from one end to the other of the sky, was the future of all humanity. I knew that although the Russians were wonderful in their endeavors, we would soon follow them and take their rightful place in the sky,” recalled the American science fiction writer Ray Bradbury.
The writer was not mistaken, but so far the space pioneer was the Soviet Union. Luna-1 became the first human product to successfully develop a second escape velocity, rushing towards the Earth's satellite. Previous launches, including American Pioneers, ended in accidents. The device carried measuring instruments, four radio transmitters and power supplies. To prevent terrestrial microorganisms from reaching the Moon, the ship was subjected to thermal sterilization. The flight ended unsuccessfully: due to problems with the engine, Luna-1 missed six thousand kilometers, entering a heliocentric orbit. Nevertheless, for her almost successful attempt, she was nicknamed “The Dream.”
3. Luna-2 and Luna-3 (from left to right)
A year later, Luna 2 completed a historic mission, flying from Earth to another for the first time. celestial body. Unlike modern devices, the Soviet ship did not have any parachutes. Therefore, the landing turned out to be as simple and rough as possible - Luna 2 simply collapsed on September 14, 1959 at 00:02:24 Moscow time on the western shore of the Sea of Rains. On board there were three pennants with the inscription “USSR, September 1959.” The area where it fell was called Lunnik Bay.
Another month later, Luna 3 orbited the Moon and transmitted the first photographs of its far side in human history. The images were taken by two cameras with long- and short-focus lenses and sent to Earth by the Yenisei photo-television device developed by the Leningrad Research Institute of Television. In the same year, the American Pioneer 4 failed to complete a similar mission, becoming the fifth US ship that never reached the Moon. After this, the entire Pioneer program was considered a failure and was refocused on other tasks. The Americans will continue to try to take photographs for several more years, but in the USSR preparations for the soft landing of the lunar spacecraft were already in full swing.
4. Map of the far side of the Moon
In 1960, based on photographs of Luna 3, the USSR Academy of Sciences published the first atlas of the far side of the Moon with 500 landscape details. They also made the first lunar globe depicting two-thirds of the surface of the opposite hemisphere. The names of the photographed landscape elements were officially approved by the International Astronomical Union.
5. Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy during a meeting in Vienna, June 3, 1961
In his 1961 inaugural address, Kennedy invited the Soviet Union to “explore the stars together.” In a response letter, Khrushchev congratulated the United States on the first orbital flight of John Glenn and agreed to join forces. Many years later, the son of the first secretary, Sergei Khrushchev, recalled that his father was determined to cooperate with the Americans. Kennedy instructed the government to prepare a draft for a Soviet-American space program, which would include a joint landing on the Moon.
In September 1963, the American president again raised this topic at the UN General Assembly: “Why should the first flight of man to the moon be a matter of interstate competition? Why do the United States and the Soviet Union need to duplicate research, design efforts and expenses when preparing such expeditions? I am sure we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries, and indeed the whole world, could not work together in the conquest of space, sending not representatives of any one state, but representatives of all our countries to the Moon one day this decade.”
It would seem that everything was ready for that era to be remembered not as a space race, but as a great alliance of two powers to conquer the Universe. But a month later, Kennedy was killed, and with him the dreams of a joint space program were killed. There was no more talk about her. According to Khrushchev's son, "if Kennedy had survived, we would have lived in a completely different world."
6. Cover of the magazine Youth Technology for September 1964
In 1964, “Technology for Youth” published the article “Why does man need the Moon?”, which begins with a quote from Tsiolkovsky: “My worries will give mountains of bread and an abyss of power.” A manned flight to the earth’s satellite seems to be a done deal for the Soviet popular science publication: “Soon man will fly to the moon. Why? Not just out of sporting interest, is it? (...) Of course, the Moon is just a link in an endless chain of other scientific achievements. She will not give us the entire “abyss of power,” but we will demand something, and a considerable one, from her as soon as a human foot sets foot on its age-old dust.”
The Soviet man is not going to the Moon for fossils - “delivery would be too expensive.” For knowledge! To conduct an “isotopic analysis of the chemical elements of lunar rocks”, to obtain “information about the influence of cosmic rays on different types plants"; make meteorological forecasts by observing “the movement of clouds over half the globe at once”; find “inorganic oil” and build the first extraterrestrial observatory. And thanks to the inviolable lunar landscape, it will “take scientists billions of years ago and reveal the secrets of history and our Earth.”
The most futuristic plan is to sheathe the surface of the satellite with mirror glass. Then the Moon will reflect sunlight around the clock, and “Leningrad’s white nights will penetrate all corners of the Earth.” “This will provide enormous energy savings on lighting,” the article says.
7. Drawing of the landing of the Luna-9 space station
On February 3, 1966, the world's first soft landing on the Moon took place. The station confirmed that the lunar surface is solid, there is no multi-meter layer of dust on it, and transmitted television panoramas of the surrounding landscape. The landing area in the Ocean of Storms was called the Lunar Landing Plain.
Looking at the images transmitted by Luna 9 turned out to be more difficult than sending the station itself into space. The signal from it was intercepted by the Manchester University Observatory. English astronomers decided not to publish lunar photos and wait for the official Soviet presentation. But the next day no statements were made. The British sent a telegram to Moscow. Nobody answered them, and even then the astronomers sent the pictures to newspapermen. Subsequently, it turned out that in the USSR the photographs taken by Luna-9 took a long time to be passed from one instance to another, collecting the signatures necessary for publication.
8. Sergei Korolev, Vladimir Chelomei, Mikhail Yangel (from left to right)
The Soviet manned lunar program may have been doomed from the start; it was in turmoil from the start. In 1964, the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers “On work on the exploration of the Moon and outer space” determined the period of the Soviet expedition to the Moon - 1967-1968. However, there was no unified plan or schedule. In the 1960s, three design bureaus of famous Soviet engineers - Korolev, Chelomey and Yangel - worked secretly on launch vehicles and the lunar modules themselves.
9. Diagrams of the N-1, UR-700 and R-56 missiles (from left to right)
Korolev worked on the super-heavy N-1 rocket, Chelomey on the heavy UR-500 and super-heavy UR-700, Yangel on the super-heavy R-56. An independent assessment of the sketches, on behalf of the government, was carried out by Academician Mozzhorin. Yangel's project was eventually abandoned, ordering the construction of the N-1 and UR-500. Sergei Khrushchev worked for Chelomey in those years, including on the development of the UR-500.
10. Model of the N-1 launch vehicle on a scale of 1:10 (left) and
the last stage of the N-1 rocket on a scale of 1:5
Korolev proposed assembling a heavy interplanetary spacecraft in orbit. The super-heavy N-1 with 30 engines was intended for this purpose, the operation of which had to be carefully coordinated.
“Until the end of 1963, the structure of the lunar expedition had not yet been chosen. Initially, our designers proposed an option with a good weight margin. It provided for a three-launch scheme with the assembly of a space rocket in assembly orbit near the Earth with a total launch mass (including fuel) of 200 tons. At the same time, the payload mass for each of the three H1 launches did not exceed 75 tons. The mass of the system during the flight to the Moon in this version reached 62 tons, which was almost 20 tons higher than the corresponding mass of Apollo. The mass of the system landing on the surface of the Moon was 21 tons in our proposals, while for Apollo it was 15 tons. But there were not even three launches in our scheme, but four. It was planned to launch a crew of two or three people into space on the proven 11A511 rocket - that was the name of the R-7A rocket produced by the Progress plant for manned launches at the end of 1963, writes Boris Chertok, Korolev’s main ally, in “Rockets and People” .
11. Computer model of the Soyuz 7K-L1 spacecraft in space
Korolev's project was named N1-L3; he designed not only the rocket, but also the L3 lunar complex consisting of an orbital ship and a landing module, on which the astronauts were supposed to descend to the surface of the satellite. One of the contenders for the role of an orbital ship was Soyuz 7K-L. Five copies made successful automatic flights - one even circled the Moon and returned to Earth. There were two turtles on board.
The first manned launch of 7K-L1 was planned for December 8, 1968, ahead of Apollo 8, which launched on the 21st and brought people to orbit the Moon for the first time. But due to the lack of development of 7K-L1, the flight was postponed.
12. Computer model of the LOK ship in space
Another modification of the Soyuz is 7K-LOK (Lunar Orbital Ship). Upon reaching the lunar orbit, the Lunar Ship, the Lunar Ship, was to be detached from it, on which one cosmonaut would go down.
Due to the characteristics of the designed ships, they wanted to send only two astronauts to the Moon, of which only one could land on the satellite itself. NASA, in turn, formed a team of five people. Soviet designers also expected that the ship would land and take off using only one engine—the Americans developed two different ones for these purposes.
The chances of success were also reduced by the fact that the USSR did not organize preliminary photography of sections of the Moon from close range to select the landing site for the cosmonauts. In the USA, 13 successful flights were made for this purpose.
13. Computer model of the Lunar ship on the surface of the Moon
The lunar ship consisted of a pressurized cabin that could accommodate only one astronaut, a compartment with attitude control engines with a passive docking unit, an instrument compartment, a lunar landing unit and a rocket unit. There were no solar panels installed on it; the power supply was provided by chemical batteries.
The LC was launched three times empty into low-Earth orbit, where they simulated a flight to the Moon - the last time in 1971. Based on the test results, it was decided that the lunar module is completely ready to remain on the earth’s satellite. However, in the early seventies there was little sense in the belated success - the Americans had already visited the satellite several times.
14. Alexey Leonov (center) and Yuri Gagarin (right) look at photographs of the lunar surface, 1966
A group of astronauts for the flight to the Moon was established in 1963. Gagarin was initially appointed head of the team. The first Soviet cosmonaut to set foot on the moon was to be Alexey Leonov. When the 7K-L1 flight was canceled in 1968, the team wrote a statement to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee asking for permission to fly to the Moon. A year later, the group was disbanded - first they stopped training for the lunar flyby, and six months later they stopped training for the landing.
15. N1 rocket accident
The launches of N1, on which the greatest hopes were placed for delivering the LOK and LC to the Moon, did not work out. The death in 1966 of Academician Korolev, who led most of the work, called the project into question. The work was continued by his colleague Vasily Mishin.
The first launch in the spring of 1969 ended in a crash 50 kilometers from the cosmodrome: the automatic control system, overheating, turned off all engines. During the second, two weeks before the Apollo 11 flight, one of the engines caught fire, causing the automation to shut down the other 29. The rocket fell directly onto the Baikonur launch pad, destroying the entire infrastructure. Perhaps this was the first harbinger of loss in the space race: 11 days later, the Americans landed on the Moon, and our launch pad was just beginning to be rebuilt. The renovation will take two years.
In 1971, in order not to destroy the launch complex again, after launch the rocket was moved to the side, as a result of which it began to rotate around a vertical axis and fell apart. During the fourth launch, one of the engines caught fire again, after which the rocket was destroyed by a team from Earth. Along with it, 7K-LOK, which was supposed to go to the Moon without a crew, also crashed. All further planned launches were canceled - by this point the Soviet Union had already completely lost the lunar race.
16. Diagram of the UR-700 missile
A fundamentally different version of a manned flight was proposed by Academician Chelomey - to send a ship of his own production LK-700 on the super-heavy UR-700 directly to the Moon without assembly in low-Earth orbit. The rocket's payload in low Earth orbit was supposed to be about 150 tons - 60 tons more than the Royal N-1. Chelomey's descent module could accommodate two cosmonauts.
UR-700-LK-700 was intended not only for manned flights there and back, but also for the creation of stationary bases on the Moon. However, the expert commission only allowed preliminary design of the complex. The central argument against it was the extremely toxic fuel cocktail - 1,1-dimethylhydrazine, nitrogen tetroxide, fluorine and hydrogen. If such a rocket fell, there would be nothing left of Baikonur.
17. UR-500 rocket at the launch position
As a result, it was Chelomeyev’s medium-heavy UR-500 that became the main Soviet space rocket. In the early sixties, it was developed simultaneously both as an intercontinental ballistic missile with a warhead and as a launch vehicle for spacecraft weighing 12-13 tons. After Khrushchev was removed from office, the combat option was abandoned. Only the spacecraft launch vehicle remained in operation, and already in 1965 they carried out a series of successful launches.
Today we know the UR-500 as “Proton”.
18. Yakov Zeldovich
It was proposed to send not only astronauts to the Moon, but also a nuclear bomb. The idea was put forward by atomic physicist Yakov Zeldovich, who hoped that the pillar from the explosion would be seen anywhere on the planet and it would become clear to the whole world that the USSR had conquered the Earth’s satellite. He himself rejected his initiative after calculations showed that the trace of even a nuclear explosion would not be visible from Earth.
Republican Robert McNamara, who served as US Secretary of Defense in the 1960s, said that several senior Pentagon officials at the time feared that the Soviet Union would conduct nuclear tests on the far side of the Moon, thereby violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. McNamara himself called such ideas “absurd” and that these officials were “out of their minds” due to the Cold War. Ironically, it later turned out that the Pentagon had exactly the same plan to explode a nuclear bomb on the Moon - the so-called A119 project, however, like the Soviet one, it was not implemented.
19. Model of the interplanetary station Luna-16
In September 1970, a year after Armstrong's flight, the Soviet Union managed to deliver regolith beyond Earth. Luna 16, which landed in the Sea of Plenty, drilled a 30-centimeter hole and brought back as much as 100 grams of sand.
20. Drawing of the landing of the automatic station Luna-17 with Lunokhod-1
The Soviet Union was unable to send a single person to the Moon, but was making huge strides in robotic space exploration, which the United States would bet on after the last Apollo. Luna 17, sent by Proton, landed in the Mare Mons area. Two and a half hours after landing, Lunokhod-1, the world's first moving vehicle to operate on an alien surface, rolled down the ramp from the landing platform.
21. Landing stage of Luna-17, image transmitted by Lunokhod-1
The Lunokhod was built at the plant named after. S.A. Lavochkin under the leadership of chief designer Babakin. Its chassis - eight wheels with a separate engine for each - was designed at the Leningrad Institute of Transport Engineering VNIITransMash.
He worked for 10 months or 11 lunar days, drove 10 kilometers and performed soil surveys at 500 points. I traveled mainly along the plain south of Rainbow Bay in the Sea of Rains.
22. Route of Lunokhod-2
A year after the Americans last visited the Moon, Lunokhod-2 will land on it. He was landed in the Lemonnier crater on the eastern shore of the Sea of Clarity. Unlike his older brother, he moved much faster and traveled almost 40 kilometers in four months.
A few more years will pass and the USSR and the USA will finally curtail their lunar programs - this time robotic ones. The last one will be Luna 24 in 1976. Only in 1990 did Japan launch its first lunar probe, Hiten, becoming the third state to rush to the Earth's satellite.
23. Still from the movie “Funny Stories”
- Hey, buddy, you're Russian, of course?
- No, I'm Spanish! - Spaniard? Damn it, how did you get here?
- It’s very simple: we took a general, put a priest on him, then again alternately generals and priests, until we finally reached the Moon!
“Technology for Youth” No. 9, 1964
The program was compiled by the Space Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences on behalf of Roscosmos in 2014. IKI proposes to use the Moon as a scientific testing ground for large-scale astronomical and geophysical research. It is proposed to create an optical observatory and an automatic radio telescope-interferometer on the Moon, consisting of separate receivers distributed over the surface of the Moon. Despite the fact that the program was not officially published, its main provisions were undoubtedly taken into account when developing the Federal Space Program for 2016-2025.
The program for the study and development of the Moon is divided into stages, united by a common strategic goal and differing in methods of work on the Moon. In total, four stages of work on the Moon have been identified, although the experts themselves talk about three, since the latter is not considered in their program.
First stage: 2016-2028
Until 2028, it is planned to study the Moon with automatic stations and select a site for expanding human presence. It is already known that it will be at the south pole, but the exact location will be chosen only after automatic missions provide all the information about the resources necessary to supply the future base, including energy (sunlight), the presence of ice, etc.
More details about all the spacecraft that are planned to be sent to the Moon at the first stage can be read in the subsections of this page. In addition, before 2025 it is planned to begin preliminary design of a new generation of automatic research stations that will be able to begin studying the Moon in the second half of the next decade and after 2030.
Scientific tasks
- study of the composition of the substance and physical processes at the lunar poles- study of the processes of interaction of space plasma with the surface and the properties of the exosphere at the lunar poles
- study of the internal structure of the Moon using global seismometry methods
- research of ultra-high energy cosmic rays
Second stage: 2028-2030
The second stage is transitional. The program developers expect that by this time the country will have a super-heavy class launch vehicle with a payload capacity of about 90 tons (in low Earth orbit). During these years, it is planned to test operations for landing a manned expedition on the Moon. It is planned to fly astronauts into lunar orbit on the new PTK NP spacecraft, cislunar dockings of the spacecraft with fuel modules and a reusable one with a take-off and landing vehicle. The latter will have to several times pick up samples of ice-containing soil from the surface of the Moon, which the astronauts can deliver to Earth. The operations training program also includes refueling the take-off and landing module in lunar orbit.
Third stage: 2030-2040
During this period, a “lunar test site” with the first elements of infrastructure should not be created. Manned flights are envisaged only in the form of short-term visiting expeditions. The purpose of the astronauts will be to maintain equipment, machines and scientific equipment.
Stage four: beyond the planning horizon
After 2040, a permanently inhabited lunar base with elements of an astronomical observatory should be built on the basis of the lunar test site. Base workers will be engaged in Earth monitoring, experiments on the use of lunar resources, and development of new space technology necessary for expeditions into deep space.
A proposal for a joint program to land on the Moon (as well as launch more advanced meteorological satellites), but, suspecting an attempt to find out the secrets of Soviet rocket and space technology, he refused. To maintain primacy in space exploration, the Soviet government initially issued the design bureau Queen permission and resources to continue modification of the Vostok and Voskhod type spacecraft and only preliminary preparation of lunar manned projects, including a flyby of the Moon assembled in orbit by the 7K-9K-11K complex of the early Soyuz spacecraft project.
Only a few years later, with a great delay relatively USA , August 3 A government decree approved the lunar manned program USSR and real large-scale work began on two parallel manned programs: the flyby of the Moon (“ Proton » - « Probe/L1)" To 1967 and landing on it ( N-1 - L3) To 1968 with the beginning flight development tests V 1966.
The resolution contained full list all participants in the development of systems for L1 and L3 and prescribed multilateral work in which, it seemed, “no one is forgotten and nothing is forgotten.” Nevertheless, questions about the detailed distribution of work - who issues requirements to whom and for which systems - were debated and the answers to them were signed with private decisions and protocols for another three years.
Design of ships L1 and L3 and rocket units N-1, as well as the development of schemes for expeditions to and to the Moon began even before the adoption of the program - in 1963. Over the next two years, working drawings of the rocket were released N-1 and the first preliminary designs of lunar ships appeared.
Dozens of government officials needed to understand the production and technical scale of the entire lunar program, determine the full volume of capital construction and make preliminary calculations of the total necessary costs. The economy of those years did not allow particularly accurate calculations. However, experienced economists Gosplan with whom Korolev usually consulted, they warned that the real figures of the necessary costs through Ministry of Finance and the State Planning Committee will not pass. Not to mention the costs of a nuclear missile shield, it was necessary to find funds for new proposals for heavy missiles from Chelomey and Yangel.
Calculations submitted to Central Committee And Council of Ministers, were underestimated. Officials from the State Committee for Defense Equipment, the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee made it clear that the documents should not intimidate Politburo many billions. The project estimate should not contain any extra costs. Chelomey and Yangel began to prove that their projects were much cheaper. Highly knowledgeable in Gosplan policies Pashkov advised: “develop production with at least four carriers per year, involve everyone who is needed in the work, but according to a single schedule. And then we will issue more than one resolution. It is unlikely that anyone would dare to close down a work of such magnitude. There will be success - there will be money! Involve as many businesses as possible without delay.”
To understand the design contradictions of Korolev, Chelomey and Yangel, Ustinov instructed NDI-88 to carry out an objective comparative assessment of the possibilities of lunar exploration by carrier options N-1 (11A52), UR-500(8K82) and R-56(8K68). According to calculations Mozzhorina and its employees to unconditionally ensure priority over USA follows with three N-1 assemble a rocket system of 200 in orbit near the Earth tons. To do this you will need three missiles N-1 or twenty UR-500 missiles. In this case, landing on the Moon of a ship weighing 21 a ton and the return of a ship weighing 5 tons to Earth. All economic calculations were in favor N-1. Thus, N-1 became the main promising carrier for the implementation of the Soviet lunar program and, as it turned out later, main reason her failures.
- E-1 - collision with the moon. Four launches. 1 partial success ( Luna-1)
- E-1A - collision with the moon ( Luna-2)
- E-2 - photographing the far side of the Moon. Launch was scheduled for October-November 1958. Canceled
- E-2A - photographing the far side of the moon using the Yenisei-2 photosystem. Completed ( Luna-3)
- E-2F - canceled due to problems with the Yenisei-3 photosystem. The launch was scheduled for April 1960.
- E-3 - Photographing the far side of the Moon. Launched in 1960.
- E-4- Atomic explosion on the surface of the Moon. Canceled
- E-5 - Entry into lunar orbit. Was planned for 1960
- E-6 - Soft landing on the Moon. Was planned for 1960
- E-7 - Photographing the surface of the Moon from orbit. Was planned for 1960
Implementation of the program
The program was implemented according to the same principles as in USA. At first, attempts were made to reach the surface Moon by using AMC.
With their help, it was planned to perform a number of important applied tasks:
- better understand the physical properties of the lunar surface;
- study the radiation situation in near space;
- develop technologies for creating delivery vehicles;
- demonstrate the high level of domestic science and technology.
However, unlike the Americans, some of the work, especially those related to the manned aspect of the program, was classified. Before this year, only a few Soviet sources (“Yearbook of TSB” and the encyclopedia “Cosmonautics”) casually mentioned that the “Zond” apparatus was an unmanned prototype of a ship for circling the Moon, and general and non-specific phrases about future landings of Soviet cosmonauts on the Moon were mentioned in official sources stopped appearing even earlier - after year.
In addition, imperfect technology has necessitated the need for redundancy of individual systems. Since the manned flyby Moon and landing on its surface was a matter of prestige; it was necessary to take maximum measures to prevent casualties in case of emergency situations.
To study the lunar surface, as well as for detailed mapping of possible landing sites for Soviet lunar spacecraft, the Luna series of satellites (representing vehicles for various purposes) were created. Also, special options were designed to support landing expeditions lunar rovers.
Lunar Cosmonaut Squad
Lunar group of the Soviet detachment of civilian cosmonauts at TsKBEM V Cosmonaut Training Center was actually created in year. At the same time, before the strictest secrecy was imposed on the Soviet lunar program, this and the fact that initially the head of the group was Gagarin, spoke to foreign journalists Tereshkova during a visit to Cuba. Since then, the group has been documented (as a department for training cosmonaut commanders and researchers for the lunar program), in May it was approved by the Military-Industrial Commission, and in February it was finally formed.
According to published sources, key members of the group were present and inspected the ships during the launches of Zond 4 and subsequent L1 ships (including while on Baikonur, were waiting for permission to fly on Zond 7 December 8), as well as L1S on the second launch of the launch vehicle N-1. Popovich and Sevastyanov and others negotiated with the control center through the Zond ships during their flights.
Manned flyby of the Moon (UR500K/Proton-L1/Zond complex)
There were a number of flight projects in different design bureaus Moon, including several launches and assembly of the ship in low-Earth orbit (before the advent of the Proton rocket) and direct flight around Moon. For the implementation of the flight program, a project was selected and brought to the stage of the last unmanned development launches and flights from the newly created OKB-1 Korolev 7K-L1 spacecraft as part of the Soyuz family and the Chelomey OKB-52 Proton launch vehicle created somewhat earlier.
- submit a schedule for the production and testing of the UR-500 missile within a week;
- together with the heads of OKB-1 and OKB-52, S. P. Korolev and V. M. Chelomey, within two weeks, consider and resolve issues about the possibility of unifying the manned spacecraft being developed for flying around the moon and landing an expedition on its surface;
- within a month, submit the LCI program for the UR-500 rocket and manned spacecraft.
Nevertheless, both the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of General Machinery found it expedient to continue work based on the use of the Soyuz complex (7K, 9K, 11K) as another option for solving the problems of orbiting the Moon, and also instructed OKB-1 and OKB-52 to work out all the issues use of the UR-500K launch vehicle in the Soyuz complex program.
To fulfill the assignment of the Ministry and the issued instructions, during September-October, a comprehensive assessment of the state of work in OKB-52 and OKB-1 was carried out to implement the tasks of flying around the Moon with the involvement of employees of NII-88 (now TsNIIMASH), the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry, the heads of the Ministry, government representatives and Central Committee of the CPSU. During the review, it became clear that OKB-52 is not able to resolve in a timely manner all issues related to the creation and testing of the UR-500 missile, rocket booster unit and the spacecraft for lunar flight LK-1. In OKB-1, on the contrary, the state of development of a manned spacecraft of type 7K and upper stage D for the complex H1-L3 was more prosperous. This created the basis for the reorientation from OKB-52 to OKB-1 of work on the ship and upper stage D for the flyby Moon including the solution of a number of tasks related to the implementation of the lunar expedition program carried out by the N1-L3 complex.
Ship flight schedule 7K-L1(from start year):
| Flight | Task | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 2P | February -March | |
| 3P | unmanned flight in highly elliptical orbit | March |
| 4L | unmanned flight Moon | May |
| 5L | unmanned flight Moon | June |
| 6L | world's first manned flight Moon | June -July |
| 7L | Moon | August |
| 8L | unmanned or manned flight Moon | August |
| 9L | unmanned or manned flight Moon | September |
| 10L | unmanned or manned flight Moon | September |
| 11L | unmanned or manned flight Moon | October |
| 12L | manned flyby Moon | October |
| 13L | reserve |
There were turtles on the Zond-5 ship. They became the first living beings in history to return to Earth after the flyby Moon- three months before the flight " Apollo 8 » .
In the nervous conditions of the “moon race”, due to the fact that it was held in USSR two drone flights around Moon and concealment of failures in the L1 program, USA made a risky rearrangement in their lunar program and made a flyby flight before the previously planned complete testing in low-Earth orbit of the entire Apollo complex. The Apollo 8 lunar flyby was carried out without a lunar module (which was not yet ready) following the only near-Earth manned orbital flight. For a super-heavy carrier " Saturn-5“This was the first manned launch.
The last unmanned flight of the Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft, called Zond-8, was made in October, after which the L1 program was finally closed, since the non-stop flight of the Soviet cosmonauts on the Moon after the Americans landed on it twice was lost meaning.
Moon landing (complex N1-L3)
Lunar orbital ship-module LOK (computer graphics)
The main parts of the rocket and space system for landing on the Moon according to the project N-1-L3 were the Soyuz-7K-LOK lunar orbital ship, the LK lunar landing ship and the super-heavy launch vehicle H1.
The lunar orbital vehicle was very similar and significantly unified with the near-Earth orbital vehicle Soyuz-7K-LOK and also consisted of a descent module, a living compartment, on which a special compartment was located with orientation and mooring engines and a docking system unit, instrumentation and energy compartments, which housed the “I” rocket unit and units of the power supply system based on oxygen-hydrogen fuel cells. The living compartment also served as an airlock during the astronaut’s transition to the lunar spacecraft through outer space (after putting on the lunar spacesuit “ Merlin »).
The crew of the Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft consisted of two people. One of them was supposed to go through outer space into the lunar ship and land on Moon, and the second - to wait for the return of his comrade in lunar orbit.
The Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft was installed for unmanned flight tests on the carrier N-1 during its fourth (and last) launch in November, but due to an accident the carrier was never launched into space.
The lunar spacecraft LK consisted of a sealed cosmonaut cabin, a compartment with orientation engines with a passive docking unit, an instrument compartment, a lunar landing unit (LLA) and a rocket unit E. The LK was powered by chemical batteries installed externally on the LPA frame and in the instrument compartment. The control system was built on the basis of an on-board digital computer and had a manual control system that allowed the astronaut to independently select the landing site visually through a special window. The lunar landing module had four legs - supports with honeycomb absorbers of excessive vertical landing speed.
The lunar spacecraft LK T2K was successfully tested three times in low-Earth orbit in unmanned mode under the names " Cosmos-379", "Cosmos-398" and "Cosmos-434" respectively in November and February , August G.
Flight schedule of L3 ships (from the beginning year):
| Mission | Target | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 3L | mock-ups during testing H1 | September |
| 4L | reserve | |
| 5L | unmanned LOC and LC | December |
| 6L | unmanned LOC and LC | February |
| 7L | April | |
| 8L | Moon as a backup LK-R | June |
| 9L | manned LOC and unmanned LOC | August |
| 10L | manned LOK and LC with the world's first landing of an astronaut on Moon | September |
| 11L | manned LOC and unmanned LOC landing on Moon as a backup LK-R | |
| 12L | manned LOK and LC with landing of an astronaut on Moon | |
| 13L | reserve |
Even before the launch of the lunar flyby and lunar landing programs in USSR Technical proposals were developed for the creation and use of the heavy lunar rover L2 and the lunar orbital station L4 in lunar expeditions. Also, after success USA and curtailment of work on the program H1- L3, was compiled new project N1F - L3M to provide longer-term than American expeditions to Moon To year with the prospect of construction on its surface in the 's. Soviet lunar base "Star", a fairly detailed design of which has already been developed, including models of expeditionary vehicles and habitable modules. However, the academician V. P. Glushko, appointed in May 1974 general designer of the Soviet space program instead of V.P. Mishin, by his order (with the consent of the Politburo and the Ministry of General Engineering) stopped all work on the launch vehicle H1 and manned lunar programs in year(formally the program was closed in year). A later project for Soviet manned flights to the Moon, Vulcan-LEK, was considered, but was also not implemented.
The failure of the Soviet lunar program mainly affected his career V. P. Mishina, which May 22 was removed from the post of Chief Designer TsKBEM. On the same day, a government decree was signed on the transformation of TsKBEM into an NGO " Energy"and about the appointment