2nd Shock Army of the Leningrad Front. About the second shock army

The inevitable death of the 2nd Shock Army

Leningrad was entrusted to the care of Meretskov, who was appointed commander of the Volkhov Front, which was created to unite the armies operating east of the Volkhov River. The front's tasks were to prevent the enemy's attack on Leningrad, and then, with the participation of the Leningrad Front, to defeat the enemy and break the blockade of the northern capital. The first attacks there began at the end of December, but then, according to Meretskov himself, the need became obvious “to pause the offensive of the 4th and 52nd armies, put them in order, replenish them with people, weapons and with the approach of the 59th and 2nd armies.” th shock armies attack the enemy again. However, trying to break through the blockade of Leningrad, whose situation was extremely difficult, as quickly as possible, the Headquarters believed that the offensive of the Volkhov Front troops should develop without an operational pause. We were repeatedly demanded to speed up preparations for the offensive with all our might and to cross the Volkhov River line as soon as possible.” Mehlis was sent to the Volkhov Front as a representative of Headquarters, “who urged us on hourly.” But, despite this, Meretskov was able to achieve that “the date for going on the offensive with all front forces was postponed to January 7, 1942. This made concentration easier, but a breakthrough on the move was now no longer possible, since the enemy had thoroughly entrenched himself behind the river and on the bridgeheads and had organized a fire system. It was possible to continue the operation only by breaking through the enemy defenses... However, at the appointed time, the front was not ready for the offensive. The reason was again the delay in the concentration of troops. In the 59th Army, only five divisions arrived on time and had time to deploy, while three divisions were on the way. In the 2nd Shock Army, slightly more than half of the formations occupied their original position. The remaining formations, army artillery, vehicles and some units followed the only railway. The aviation did not arrive either...”

The Volkhov Front had practically no rear services and units - they did not have time to collect and organize them. Supplies came, as they say, “on wheels,” despite the fact that there were no equipped routes for transporting everything necessary. The main transport force was horses, which, in turn, needed food.

“The lack of preparation for the operation also predetermined its outcome,” Meretskov recalled. “The enemy met the front forces that went on the offensive on January 7 with strong mortar and machine gun fire, and our units were forced to retreat to their original position. Other shortcomings also emerged here. The fighting showed unsatisfactory training of troops and headquarters. The commanders and staffs failed to manage the units and organize interaction between them. To eliminate the identified shortcomings, the Front Military Council asked Headquarters to postpone the operation for another three days. But these days were not enough. On January 10, a conversation took place between Headquarters and the Military Council of the front via direct wire. It began like this: “According to all data, you are not ready to attack by the 11th. If this is true, we must postpone another day or two in order to advance and break through the enemy’s defenses.” To prepare the offensive for real, it took at least another 15–20 days. But such terms were out of the question. Therefore, we gladly seized on the delay of the offensive for two days proposed by Headquarters. During the negotiations, they asked for one more day. The start of the offensive was thus postponed to January 13, 1942.”

Considering that the enemy expected the Red Army to attack in well-prepared positions, equipped with a system of resistance nodes and strongholds, with a large number of bunkers and machine-gun sites, there was not much chance of success. The front line of the German defense ran along the western bank of the Volkhov River, and the second defensive line ran along the embankment of the Kirishi-Novgorod railway line. And this entire line of defense was occupied by thirteen Wehrmacht divisions.

According to Meretskov, “the general ratio of forces and means by mid-January was, if we do not take into account tank forces, in favor of our troops: in people - 1.5 times, in guns and mortars - 1.6 times and in aircraft - 1 ,3 times. At first glance, this ratio was quite favorable for us. But if we take into account the poor provision of weapons, ammunition, all types of supplies, and finally, the training of the troops themselves and their technical equipment, then our “superiority” looked in a different light. The formal superiority over the enemy in artillery was negated by the lack of shells. What's the use of silent guns? The number of tanks was far from sufficient to provide escort and support for even the first echelons of infantry...” Under such circumstances, the infamous Lyuban operation began, which did not achieve any of the intended goals.

On January 13, 1942, Soviet troops went on the offensive. The vanguards of the 2nd Shock Army crossed the Volkhov River and liberated several settlements. A week later we reached the second German defensive line, located along the Chudovo-Novgorod railway and highway, but failed to capture it on the move. After three days of fighting, the army still managed to break through the enemy defense line and capture Myasny Bor. But then the offensive stalled.

On March 9, a delegation led by Voroshilov and Malenkov arrived at the Volkhov Front to assess the situation. However, time was lost: on March 2, at a meeting with Hitler, it was decided to go on the offensive on Volkhov before March 7.

At the beginning of April 1942, Meretskov sent his deputy, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, at the head of a special commission of the Volkhov Front, to the encircled 2nd Shock Army to assess the state of affairs in it. For three days the commission collected information, and then returned to the front headquarters, where on April 8 a report was read out on the shortcomings found in the units. A. A. Vlasov remained in the 2nd Army - its commander, General N. K. Klykov, became seriously ill and was sent by plane to the rear. And soon the Council of the Volkhov Front, led by Meretskov, supported the idea of ​​appointing Vlasov as commander, since he had experience in withdrawing troops from encirclement. On June 21, 1942, a narrow corridor, less than a kilometer wide, was broken through, which was held for two days, and then, after prolonged fighting, by the morning of June 24, it was opened again. But a day later the life-saving corridor was completely blocked. About sixteen thousand people managed to escape from the encirclement, after which the notorious disaster at Myasny Bor broke out. The 2nd Shock Army practically ceased to exist, and its commander Vlasov surrendered to the Germans.

According to the data given in the publication “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century,” the irretrievable losses of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front during the Lyuban operation from January 7 to April 30, 1942 amounted to 95,064 people, sanitary losses - 213,303 people, in total – 308,367 people. Only every twentieth of those participating in the operation survived, avoiding capture, death or injury.

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This document was preserved in an envelope glued to the album “The Battle of Volkhov,” which was published in a limited edition in December 1942 by the 621st Propaganda Company of the 18th German Army. It ended up in the possession of a German collector who approached me with a request for help in finding a Russian museum or colleague interested in bringing the find to Russia.


Fragments of the protocol published below have already been published in No. 4 of the Military Historical Journal for 1991 (translation from a copy stored in the Lubyanka archives), but I have read its full text for the first time. Here he is.

“Secret.

Report on the interrogation of the commander of the 2nd Soviet-Russian Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov.

Part I

Brief information regarding biography and military career.

Vlasov was born on September 1, 1901 in the Gorky region (as in the text - B.S.). Father: peasant, owner of 35-40 morgens of land (morgen - 0.25 hectares, therefore, the area of ​​the allotment is approximately 9-10 hectares, that is, Vlasov’s father was a middle peasant, and not a kulak, as Soviet propaganda claimed. - B.S. ), an old peasant family. Received secondary education. In 1919 he studied for 1 year at Nizhny Novgorod University. In 1920 he joined the Red Army.

“Vlasov did not hide anything from the Germans and told the enemy everything he knew or heard. However, nothing indicated the possibility of his transferring to the service of the enemy.”

V. was initially not accepted into the Communist Party, as a former seminarian.

1920 – attends the school for junior commanders. Then he commands a platoon on the Wrangel front. He continued his army service until the end of the war in 1920. Then, until 1925, he was a platoon commander and acting company commander. 1925 – attends the school for secondary commanders. 1928 - school for senior commanders (in his autobiography, dated April 16, 1940, brigade commander A. A. Vlasov reported: “In the period 1928–1929, he graduated from tactical rifle training courses for improving the command staff of the Red Army “Vystrel” in Moscow.” - B .WITH.). 1928 - battalion commander, 1930 - joins the Communist Party with the aim of promotion in the Red Army. 1930 - teaches tactics at the officer school in Leningrad. Since 1933 - assistant to the head of department 1a (operational department) at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District (in the autobiography of A. A. Vlasov, written on April 16, 1940, it is said: “Since February 1933, transferred to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where he held positions: assistant to the head of the 1st sector of the 2nd department - 2 years; assistant to the head of the combat training department - 1 year, after which he was the head of the training department of the military translator courses of the 2nd Military District. the department at that time was actually called the operational department - B.S.). 1930 – regiment commander. 1938 – for a short time, chief of staff of the Kyiv Military District, after participating in the Soviet-Russian military delegation to China. During this period he was promoted to the rank of colonel. At the end of his trip to China in 1939, he became commander of the 99th division in Przemysl. 13 months commander of this division. 1941 - commander of the motorized mechanized corps in Lemberg (Lvov - B.S.). In the battles between Lemberg and Kyiv, the motorized mechanized corps was destroyed. After this, he was appointed commander of the Kyiv fortified area. At the same time he was transferred to the newly formed 37th Army. He left the encirclement in the Kyiv area with a small group of people. After this, he was temporarily appointed to the disposal of General (actually Marshal - B.S.) Timoshenko in order to restore the material support units of the Southwestern Front. A month later he was already transferred to Moscow to take command of the newly formed 20th Army. Then - participation in defensive battles around Moscow. Until March 7 - commander of the 20th Army. March 10 – transfer to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front. Here he began his career as a tactical adviser to the 2nd Shock Army. After the removal of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General Klykov took command of this army on April 15th.

Data on the Volkhov Front and the 2nd Shock Army.

Composition of the Volkhov Front in mid-March: 52nd, 59th, 2nd shock and 4th armies.

Commander of the Volkhov Front: Army General Meretskov.

Commander of the 52nd Army: Lieutenant General Yakovlev.

Commander of the 59th Army: Major General Korovnikov.

Commander of the 4th Army: unknown.

Characteristics of Army General Meretskov.

Egoist. A calm, objective conversation between the army commander and the front commander took place with great difficulty. Personal antagonism between Meretskov and Vlasov. Meretskov tried to push Vlasov. Very unsatisfactory orientation and unsatisfactory orders from the front headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army.

Brief description of Yakovlev.

He achieved good success in the military field, but was not satisfied with his use. Personnel officers often passed him over for promotions. Known to be a drunkard...

Structure of the 2nd Shock Army.

Famous brigades and divisions. It is noteworthy that those units of the 52nd and 59th armies that were located in the Volkhov pocket were not subordinate to the 2nd Shock Army.

By mid-March, the units of the 2nd Shock Army looked very exhausted. They suffered heavy losses throughout the heavy winter fighting. There were sufficient weapons, but not enough ammunition. In mid-March, supplies were already poor and the situation was getting worse day by day.

Information about the enemy as of mid-March was of low quality.

Reasons: lack of intelligence sources, only a few prisoners were captured.

The headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army believed in mid-March that the army was confronted by approximately 6–8 German divisions. It was known that in mid-March these divisions received significant reinforcements.

In mid-March, the 2nd Shock Army was faced with the following tasks: capturing Lyuban and linking up with the 54th Army.

Due to the subordination of the 2nd Shock Army to the Volkhov Front, and the 54th Army to the Leningrad Front, it was not possible to agree on orders for a joint attack on Lyuban.

Information about the real situation of the 54th Army reached the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army very rarely and, for the most part, did not correspond to reality and exaggerated the successes of the army. Using such methods, Meretskov wanted to encourage the 2nd Shock Army to move faster towards Lyuban.

After the connection of the 2nd shock and 54th armies, the next task was the defeat of the German troops concentrated in the Chudovo-Lyuban area. The ultimate task of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in the winter of 1942, as Vlasov believes, is the liberation of Leningrad by military means.

In mid-March, the plan for connecting the 2nd Shock Army with the 54th Army boiled down to the following: concentrating the forces of the 2nd Shock Army to attack Lyuban through Krasnaya Gorka, strengthening the flank in the Dubovik - Eglino area with the help of the 13th Cavalry Corps, conducting auxiliary attacks on Krivino and Novaya Derevnya.

According to the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, this plan failed for the following reasons: insufficient striking power, too exhausted personnel, insufficient supplies.

They stuck to the plan of advancing towards Lyuban until the end of April.

At the beginning of May, Lieutenant General Vlasov was summoned to Malaya Vishera for a meeting with the front headquarters, which was temporarily headed by Lieutenant General Khozin from the Leningrad Front (M.S. Khozin, who commanded the Leningrad Front, which from April 23 to June 8 included The troops of the temporarily abolished Volkhov Front also made themselves a scapegoat for the death of the 2nd Shock Army. On June 8, he was removed from his post with the damning wording: “For failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the timely and rapid withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army, for paperwork and bureaucracy. methods of troop control, for separation from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and the latter was put in an exceptionally difficult situation.” But, strictly speaking, the enemy cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army even before Khozin began to command. troops of the Volkhov Front - B.S.). At this meeting, Vlasov received an order to evacuate the Volkhov cauldron. The 52nd and 54th armies were supposed to cover the retreat of the 2nd Shock Army. On May 9, a meeting took place between the commander of the 2nd Shock Army and division commanders, brigade commanders and commissars at army headquarters, to whom he first announced his intention to retreat.

Note. Testimony from defectors about the 87th Cavalry Division first arrived on May 10 at the headquarters of the 18th Army, with subsequent news arriving between May 10 and 15.

Between 15 and 20 May the troops were ordered to retreat. Between 20 and 25 May the retreat began.

For the evacuation of the Volkhov cauldron there was the following plan.

First, the withdrawal of rear services, heavy equipment and artillery under the protection of infantry with mortars. Then follows the retreat of the remaining infantry to three successive lines:

1st line: Dubovik – Chervinskaya Luka;

2nd line: Finev Lug - Olkhovka;

3rd sector: border of the Kerest River.

The retreat of the 2nd Shock Army was to be covered from the flanks by the forces of the 52nd and 59th armies. Units of the 52nd and 59th armies, located inside the Volkhov cauldron, were to leave it in the eastern direction last.

The reasons for the failure of the retreat: extremely poor condition of the roads (spill), very poor supplies, especially with ammunition and provisions, lack of unified leadership of the 2nd shock, 52nd and 59th armies from the Volkhov Front.

The fact that on May 30 the broken encirclement ring was again closed by German troops, the 2nd Shock Army became aware only two days later. In connection with this closure of the encirclement, Lieutenant General Vlasov demanded from the Volkhov Front: the 52nd and 59th armies to knock down the German barriers at any cost. In addition, he moved all the forces of the 2nd Shock Army at his disposal to the area east of Krechno in order to open a German barrier from the west. Lieutenant General Vlasov does not understand why the front headquarters did not follow a general order for all three armies to break through the German barrier. Each army fought more or less independently.

On June 23, the 2nd Shock Army made the last effort to break through to the east. At the same time, the forces of the 52nd and 59th armies, deployed to cover the flanks from the north and south, ceased to control the situation (literally: kamen... ins Rutschen - slipped, slid. In a fragment of the interrogation protocol published in the Military Historical Journal , a translation more gentle for the command of the 52nd and 59th armies, but not corresponding to the text of the German original, was given: “At the same time, to cover the flanks, units of the 52nd and 59th armies began to move from the north and south - B.S.” .). On May 24 (probably a typo, it should be: June 24. - B.S.) unified leadership of the 2nd Shock Army became impossible and the 2nd Shock Army broke up into separate groups.

Lieutenant General Vlasov especially emphasizes the destructive impact of German aviation and the very high losses caused by barrage artillery fire.

According to Lieutenant General Vlasov, about 3,500 wounded from the 2nd Shock Army emerged from the encirclement in the east, along with minor remnants of individual units.

Lieutenant General Vlasov believes that about 60,000 people from the 2nd Shock Army were either captured or destroyed. (in all likelihood, Vlasov means losses for March - June. For comparison: during this period, the 18th German Army lost 10,872 people killed and 1,487 people missing, as well as 46,473 people wounded, and a total of 58,832 people , which is less than the irretrievable losses of Vlasov’s army alone. The German irretrievable losses are five times less than the irretrievable losses of the 2nd Shock Army alone, but Lindemann’s army at that time fought against the 52nd and 59th armies, a significant part of the formations. which also ended up in the cauldron and suffered no less damage than Vlasov’s army. In addition, the 4th and 54th armies acted against the 18th German armies. It can be assumed that the irretrievable losses of these three armies were at least three times greater than the irretrievable losses. 2nd drum - B.S.). He could not provide any information about the number of units of the 52nd and 59th armies located in the Volkhov cauldron.

Intentions of the Volkhov Front.

The Volkhov Front wanted to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from the Volkhov pocket to the east and concentrate it in the Malaya Vishera area for restoration, while maintaining the Volkhov bridgehead.

After the restoration of the 2nd Shock Army, it was planned to deploy it in the northern part of the Volkhov bridgehead in order to advance to Chudovo with the 2nd Shock Army from the south and the 54th and 4th armies from the north. Due to the development of the situation, Lieutenant General Vlasov does not believe in the implementation of this plan.

According to Lieutenant General Vlasov, the plan for the military release of Leningrad will continue to be implemented.

The implementation of this plan will significantly depend on the restoration of the divisions of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and on the arrival of new forces.

Vlasov believes that with the forces currently available, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts are not able to launch a large-scale offensive in the Leningrad area. In his opinion, the available forces are barely enough to hold the Volkhov Front and the line between Kirishi and Lake Ladoga.

Lieutenant General Vlasov denies the need for commissars in the Red Army. In his opinion, in the period after the Finnish-Russian war, when there were no commissars, the command staff felt better.

Part II

interrogation of the commander of the 2nd Soviet-Russian shock army, Lieutenant General Vlasov

Acquisition.

Older age group of those called up, known to him - born in 1898, the youngest age group - born in 1923.

New formations.

In February, March and April, large-scale deployment of new regiments, divisions and brigades was carried out. The main area of ​​the new formations should be in the south, on the Volga. He, Vlasov, is poorly oriented in the new formations within Russia.

Military industry.

In the Kuznetsk industrial region, in the southeastern Urals, a significant military industry has been created, which is now reinforced by industry evacuated from the occupied territories. There are all the main types of raw materials: coal, ore, metal, but no oil. Siberia may only have small, underutilized oil fields. Product production is increased by reducing the duration of the production process. Vlasov’s opinion is that the industry in the Kuznetsk region will be sufficient to meet the minimum needs of the Red Army for heavy weapons, even with the loss of the Donetsk region.

Food situation.

The food situation can be said to be stable. It will be impossible to completely do without Ukrainian grain, but in Siberia there are significant areas of land that have recently been developed.

Foreign supplies.

The newspapers pay much attention to supplies from England and America. According to newspaper reports, weapons, ammunition, tanks, aircraft, and food products are allegedly arriving in large quantities. In his army, he only had American-made telephones. He did not see any foreigners in his army.

He heard the following about the creation of a second front in Europe: in Soviet Russia there is a general opinion, also reflected in the newspapers, that this year the British and Americans will create a second front in France. This was allegedly firmly promised to Molotov.

Operational plans.

According to Stalin's order No. 130 of May 1, the Germans were to be finally expelled from Russia during this summer. The beginning of the great Russian summer offensive was the offensive near Kharkov. For this purpose, a large number of divisions were transferred to the south in the spring. The northern front was neglected. This may explain the fact that the Volkhov Front was unable to obtain new reserves.

Tymoshenko's offensive failed. Vlasov, despite this, believes that perhaps Zhukov will launch a medium or large offensive from Moscow. He still has enough reserves.

If Tymoshenko’s new tactics, “elastic defense” (slipping away in time), had been used on Volkhov, then he, Vlasov, would probably have emerged with his army from encirclement unharmed. He is not competent enough to appreciate how widely these tactics can be applied, despite the current attitudes.

According to Vlasov, Tymoshenko is, in any case, the most capable leader of the Red Army.

When asked about the significance of our offensive on the Don, he explained that gasoline supplies from Transcaucasia could be critical for the Red Army, since a replacement for Transcaucasian oil could hardly be found in Siberia. Gasoline consumption within Russia is already strictly limited.

In general terms, he notes that it is quite remarkable that he, as Army Commander, was not informed of the wider operational situation; this is kept so secret that even army commanders have no knowledge of the plans of the command in their own areas of responsibility.

Armament.

He had not heard of the construction of super-heavy 100-ton tanks. In his opinion, the best tank is the T-34. The 60-ton KV, in his opinion, is too bulky, especially considering that its armor protection needs to be strengthened.

Relatives of defectors.

In principle, they stopped shooting them in Russia, with the exception of relatives of defecting commanders. (Here Vlasov intentionally or accidentally misinformed the Germans. Order No. 270 of the Supreme High Command Headquarters dated August 16, 1941 provided only for the arrest of the families of defectors, that is, those who voluntarily surrender to the enemy, and even then only if the defectors are commanders or commissars. True , G.K. Zhukov, when he was commander of the Leningrad Front, sent ciphergram No. 4976 dated September 28, 1941 to the Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet: “Explain to all personnel that all families of those who surrendered to the enemy will be shot and upon returning from captivity they will also all be shot "It is unlikely that this threat was not brought to the attention of the military personnel on the Leningrad Front. However, it had only a propaganda value. In practice, Zhukov was too short to execute the families of defectors. After all, the NKVD was responsible for executions, and it was guided by Order No. 270; provided. Vlasov could have heard something about Zhukov’s order, which was formally canceled as illegal only in February 1942. Perhaps he also knew about Stalin’s telephone message to the military council of the Leningrad Front on September 21, 1941, in which the leader demanded, without hesitation, to use weapons against women, old people and children, whom the Germans allegedly sent to the front lines of the Soviet troops to persuade them to surrender . However, there was nothing said there about the possible execution of the families of defectors. It is possible that the former commander of the 2nd Shock Army was already thinking about entering the service of the Germans and was selling himself: they say, then I would have to risk the lives of my family and friends. – B.S.).

Attitude towards Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

People don’t believe that Russian prisoners of war are shot in Germany. Rumors are spreading that, under the influence of the Fuhrer, the attitude towards Russian prisoners of war has recently improved.

Leningrad.

The evacuation of Leningrad continues day and night. The city will be held by military means under any circumstances for reasons of prestige.

Personal information.

For about three months now, Colonel General Vasilevsky has been holding the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

Marshal Shaposhnikov resigned from this post due to health reasons.

Marshal Kulik is no longer in command. He was stripped of his marshal rank.

Marshal Budyonny, according to unconfirmed information, received a new assignment - to form new formations in the army rear.

Voroshilov is a member of the Supreme Military Council in Moscow. He no longer has troops under his command."

Formation and units of the 2nd shock army of the 1st formation before the start of the Lyuban operation

Citizens are brave,

What did you do then?

When did our city not keep count of deaths?

B.C. Vysotsky. "Leningrad Siege"

Until December 1941, the 2nd Shock Army was called the 26th Reserve Army. It was formed in accordance with the Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 004097 “On the formation of the 26th Reserve Army.”

Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov, commander of the Volga and Oryol military districts, heads of the Main Political Directorate and the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Troops, Logistics of the Red Army.

1. Form the 26th Reserve Army with its direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

2. The 26th Reserve Army will include seven rifle divisions from the Defense and Military District and the Ordnance Military District with their deployment at the following points:

338th Infantry Division - in Sergach

354th Infantry Division - in Shumerla

344th Infantry Division - in Cheboksary

340th Infantry Division - in Kanash

331st Infantry Division - in Alatyr

327th Infantry Division - in Saransk

329th Infantry Division - in Ruzaevka.

3. Appoint Lieutenant General Sokolov as commander of the 26th Army.

4. Appoint Major General Vizzhilin as chief of staff of the 26th Army

5. The Chief of the General Staff and the Head of the Main Directorate of Formations will form the 26th Army by 10/30 and transfer army control and service units to it. The army headquarters will be deployed in the Alatyr area by 10/30.

6. Report receipt and execution of the directive.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin, A. Vasilevsky

Initially, the army was formed for the battles near Moscow. According to the Supreme Command Headquarters directive No. 494 of November 25, 1941, the army, consisting of seven rifle and two cavalry divisions, began transferring to the area - Noginsk, Voskresensk, Kolomna, Orekhovo-Zuevo to cover a possible enemy breakthrough in the Kolomna direction. Accordingly, by December 1, 1941, only two rifle and two cavalry divisions remained from the army, and there was a need for additional staffing. The army was replenished in the same military districts.

It must be said that few people thought about the rather interesting national composition of the fallen soldiers who remained at Myasny Bor. Only Russians, Tatars and Bashkirs are found there en masse. Meanwhile, the directive explains everything perfectly - Oryol VO - Black Earth Region and Volga VO - Kazan and surrounding areas. For the same reason, search engines most often worked and are working in the “Valley of Death” from Kazan University, Volga region cities, from Voronezh, not counting, of course, Novgorodians, on whose land Myasnoy itself is located

Command staff Commanders

Lieutenant General Sokolov G.G. from 12/25/1941 to 01/10/1942

Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from 01/10/1942 to 04/16/1942

Lieutenant General Vlasov A.A. from 04/16/1942 to 07/01/1942

Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from 07/24/1942 to 12/02/1942

Chiefs of Staff

Major General Vizzhilin V.A. from 12/25/1941 to 03/07/1942

Colonel Rozhdestvensky S.E. from 12/25/1941 to 03/07/1942

Colonel Vinogradov P.S. from 04/04/1942 to 24/05/1942

Colonel Kozachek S.B. from 07/15/1942 to 08/11/1942

Members of the Military Council

Brigade Commissar Mikhailov A.I. from 12/25/1941 to 02/11/1942

Divisional Commissioner Zelenkov M.N. from 02/11/1942 to 03/05/1942

Divisional Commissioner I.V. Zuev from 03/05/1942 to 07/17/1942

Monthly combat strength of the army

As we see, at all stages of the unsuccessful Lyuban operation, the 327th Infantry Division took an active part. And in its fate, the fate of the fighters and commanders, as in a mirror, the fate of the entire 2nd Shock Army was reflected.

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In blessed memory of the soldiers and commanders

2nd Shock Army, who fell in battles with the Germans

Dedicated to the fascist invaders.

During the Great Patriotic War, seventy Soviet combined arms armies fought with the enemy. In addition, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed five more strike forces - intended for operations in offensive operations in the directions of the main attack. At the beginning of 1942 there were four of these. The fate of the 2nd strike turned out to be tragic...

The year two thousand was coming to an end. The clock impassively counted down the time remaining until the new millennium. TV channels and radio stations, newspapers and magazines pushed the theme of the millennium to the max. Forecasts were made by politicians, scientists, writers, palmists, and sometimes outright charlatans.

The results were summed up. Lists of the “most-most” outstanding people and events of the past century and millennium were widely circulated. All different. Yes, it could not be otherwise in a world where momentary conjunctures constantly prevail over historical objectivity.

Russia was deeply affected by the Kursk tragedy. Society wanted to receive full information about the tragedy. In the meantime, only versions were expressed, rumors multiplied...

And in this huge stream of messages about past and future disasters, accomplishments and anniversaries, information about the opening of a monument-memorial to the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front on November 17 in the village of Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod Region, was somehow lost, not being distinguished from other news. Have you opened it? Well, good. Thanks to the sponsors - they gave money for a holy cause.

Sounds cynical, doesn't it? But, nevertheless, life is life. The Second World War has long receded into history. And there are fewer and fewer veterans of the Great Patriotic War on the streets. And more of them are quite young people with medal bars for other wars - Afghan, Chechen. New time. New people. New veterans.

So the St. Petersburg authorities did not delegate anyone to the opening of the monument to the soldiers of the 2nd shock. And again, from the point of view of modern bureaucratic formalism, it is true: a foreign region. And the fact that the army, through its actions, forced the Germans to finally abandon their plans to capture Leningrad, played a crucial role in the operations to break through and completely lift the blockade, knocked out the last German units from the territory of the Leningrad region in the battles near Narva... Well, let them do it historians.

But historians did not study the combat path of the 2nd Shock Army separately. No, of course, in numerous monographs, memoirs, reference books, encyclopedias and other literature devoted to the Second World Army, the Army is mentioned repeatedly and its combat operations in specific operations are described. But there is no research available to a wide range of readers about the 2nd shock. Only graduate students preparing a dissertation on a specialized topic will rummage through the heap of literature in order to get a real idea of ​​​​her combat path.

It comes to something amazing. The whole world knows the name of the Tatar poet Musa Jalil. Both in literary and in any “general” thick Big and Small encyclopedic dictionaries you will read that in 1942, having been wounded, he was captured. In a fascist prison he wrote the famous “Moabit Notebook” - a hymn to the fearlessness and perseverance of man. But nowhere is it noted that Musa Jalil fought in the 2nd Shock Army.

However, writers still turned out to be more honest and persistent than historians. Former TASS special correspondent on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Pavel Luknitsky, published a three-volume book “Leningrad is Acting...” in the Moscow publishing house “Soviet Writer” in 1976. The author managed to overcome censorship obstacles, and from the pages of his most interesting book openly declared:

“The feats accomplished by the warriors of the 2nd Shock are countless!”

It would seem that in 1976 the ice broke. The writer spoke in as much detail as he could about the army soldiers and described their participation in operations. Now historians must pick up the baton! But... they remained silent.

And the reason here is an ideological taboo. For a short time, the 2nd Shock was commanded by Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who later became a traitor to the Motherland. And although the term “Vlasovites,” which usually characterizes the fighters of the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA), cannot in any way refer to the veterans of the 2nd shock, they are nevertheless (so that the name of the traitor does not come to mind once again) from the history of the Great Patriotic War , as far as possible, we tried to cross them out. And the collection “2nd Shock in the Battle of Leningrad”, published in 1983 in Lenizdat, could not fill this gap.

It’s a strange situation, you’ll agree. Books have been written about the traitor Vlasov, and historical and documentary films have been made. A number of authors are seriously trying to present him as a fighter against Stalinism, communism, and a bearer of some “lofty ideas.” The traitor was convicted and hanged long ago, and discussions around Vlasov’s personality do not subside. The last (!) veterans of the 2nd shock, thank God, are alive, and if they are remembered at all, it will be on Victory Day, along with other participants in the war.

There is obvious injustice, since the role of the 2nd shock and the role of Vlasov in the history of the Great Patriotic War are incomparable.

To see this, let's look at the facts.

... Army Group North was advancing towards Leningrad. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb led to the city that Hitler so wanted to destroy, the 16th and 18th armies of Colonel Generals Busch and von Küchler, and the 4th Panzer Group of Colonel General Hoepner. A total of forty-two divisions. From the air, the army group was supported by over a thousand aircraft of the Luftwaffe I Fleet.

Oh, how the commander of the 18th Army, Colonel General Karl-Friedrich-Wilhelm von Küchler, rushed forward! With his invincible fellows, he had already crossed Holland, Belgium in 1940, marched under triumphal arch in Paris. And here is Russia! Sixty-year-old Küchler dreamed of a field marshal's baton, which was waiting for him on the first street in Leningrad - all he had to do was bend down and pick it up. He will be the first of the foreign generals to enter this proud city with an army!

Let him dream. He will receive the field marshal's baton, but not for long. Küchler's military career would end ingloriously under the walls of Leningrad on January 31, 1944. Enraged by the victories of the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Hitler would throw Küchler, who by that time commanded the entire Army Group North, into retirement. After this, the field marshal will be revealed to the world only once - in Nuremberg. To be tried as a war criminal.

In the meantime, the 18th Army is advancing. It has already become famous not only for its military successes, but also for its brutal massacres of civilians. The soldiers of the “Great Fuhrer” did not spare either the inhabitants of the occupied territories or prisoners of war.

During the battles for Tallinn, not far from the city, the Germans discovered three reconnaissance sailors from a combined detachment of sailors and Estonian militias. During a short bloody battle, two scouts were killed, and a seriously wounded sailor from the destroyer "Minsk" Evgeniy Nikonov, unconscious, was captured.

Evgeniy refused to answer all questions about the location of the detachment, and torture did not break him. Then the Nazis, angry at the Red Navy man’s stubbornness, gouged out his eyes, tied Nikonov to a tree and burned him alive.

Having entered the territory of the Leningrad region after heavy fighting, von Küchler’s wards, whom Leeb called “a respected man with fearlessness and composure,” continued to commit atrocities. I'll give just one example.

As the documents of the Trial in the case of the Supreme High Command of Hitler's Wehrmacht irrefutably testify, “in the area occupied by the 18th Army ... there was a hospital in which 230 mentally ill and other women suffering from other illnesses were placed. After a discussion during which the opinion was expressed , that “according to German concepts” these unfortunates “were not worth living any longer”, a proposal was made to liquidate them, an entry in the combat log of the XXVIII Army Corps for December 25-26, 1941 shows that “the commander agreed with this decision” and ordered its implementation by the SD forces."

Prisoners in the army of the “respected” and “fearless” Küchler were sent to clear the mines in the area and were shot at the slightest suspicion of wanting to escape. Finally, they simply starved. I will quote only one entry from the combat log of the chief of the intelligence department of the 18th Army headquarters for November 4, 1941: “Every night 10 prisoners die from exhaustion.”

On September 8, 1941, Shlisselburg fell. Leningrad found itself cut off from southeastern communications. The blockade began. The main forces of the 18th Army came close to the city, but were unable to take it. Strength collided with the courage of the defenders. Even the enemy was forced to admit this.

Infantry General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who at the beginning of the war held the post of Oberquartiermeister IV (chief of the main intelligence department) of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, wrote irritably:

“German troops reached the southern outskirts of the city, but due to the stubborn resistance of the defending troops, reinforced by fanatical Leningrad workers, the expected success was not achieved. Due to a lack of forces, it was also not possible to oust the Russian troops from the mainland...”.

Continuing the offensive on other sectors of the front, units of the 18th Army came close to Volkhov in early December.

At this time, in the rear, on the territory of the Volga Military District, the 26th Army was formed anew - for the third time after the battles near Kiev and in the Oryol-Tula direction. At the end of December it will be transferred to the Volkhov Front. Here the 26th will receive a new name, with which it will pass from the banks of the Volkhov River to the Elbe, and will forever remain in the history of the Great Patriotic War - the 2nd shock!

I specifically described in such detail the methods of warfare by the Nazi 18th Army so that the reader would understand what kind of enemy our 2nd Shock Army would have to face. There was very little time left before the start of the most tragic operation in 1942 in the North-West of the country.

In the meantime, headquarters on both sides of the front were assessing the results of the 1941 campaign. Tippelskirch noted:

“During the heavy fighting, Army Group North, although it inflicted significant losses on the enemy and partially destroyed his forces... however, did not achieve operational success. The planned timely support by strong formations of Army Group Center was not provided.”

And in December 1941, Soviet troops launched a strong counterattack near Tikhvin, defeated and routed the Germans near Moscow. It was at this time that the defeat of the Nazis in the northwestern and Moscow directions was predetermined.

In military science there is such a concept - analytical strategy. It was developed by the Prussians - great specialists in all kinds of teachings on how to better, faster and more people kill. It is no coincidence that all the wars with their participation, starting with the Battle of Grunwald, went down in world history as the bloodiest. The essence of the analytical strategy, if we omit all the complicated and long explanations, comes down to the following: you prepare and you win.

The most important component of the analytical strategy is the doctrine of operations. Let us dwell on it in more detail, since without this the course of the described operations and battles, the reasons for successes and failures, will be difficult to understand.

Don’t be too lazy to take a sheet of paper and put on it the coordinate system you know from school. Now, just below the X axis, start drawing an elongated capital letter S so that its “neck” is sharp corner with axle. At the point of intersection, put the number 1, and at the top, at the point where the letter begins to bend to the right, put the number 2.

So here it is. There is a preparatory stage up to point 1 military operation. At the very point it “starts” and begins to develop rapidly, at point 2 it loses momentum and then fades away. The attacking side strives to go from the first to the second point as quickly as possible, attracting maximum forces and resources. The defender, on the contrary, tries to stretch it out in time - the resources of any army are not unlimited - and, when the enemy is exhausted, crushes him, taking advantage of the fact that at point 2 the phase of extreme saturation has begun. Looking ahead, I will say that this is what happened during the Lyuban operation of 1942.

For the German divisions, the “neck” of the letter S on the way to Leningrad and Moscow turned out to be prohibitively long. The troops stopped at both capitals, unable to advance further and were beaten almost simultaneously - near Tikhvin and near Moscow

Germany did not have enough strength to conduct the 1942 campaign along the entire front. On December 11, 1941, German losses were estimated at 1 million 300 thousand people. As General Blumentritt recalled, in the fall “...in the troops of the Center armies, in most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people.”

However, the German command had the opportunity to transfer troops to the Eastern Front from the territories occupied by the Third Reich in the West (from June to December, outside the Soviet-German front, fascist losses amounted to about 9 thousand people). Thus, divisions from France and Denmark ended up at the disposal of the 18th Army of Army Group North.

Today it is difficult to say whether Stalin counted on the opening of a second front in 1942 at a time when the Headquarters was planning a number of upcoming operations, including the liberation of Leningrad. At least the correspondence between the Supreme Commander regarding the need to open a second front with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain was quite lively. And on January 1, 1942, in Washington, representatives of the USSR, USA, England, China and 22 other countries signed a United Nations declaration on an uncompromising struggle against the states of the fascist bloc. The governments of the USA and Great Britain officially announced the opening of a second front in Europe in 1942.

Unlike Stalin, the more cynical Hitler was convinced that there would be no second front. And he concentrated the best troops in the East.

"Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be driven back so far that they can never touch the cultural soil of Europe... I will see to it that Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed."

Our Headquarters did not intend to give Leningrad to the enemy. On December 17, 1941, the Volkhov Front was created. It included the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd and 59th armies. Two of them - the 4th and 52nd - have already distinguished themselves during the counterattack near Tikhvin. The 4th was especially successful, as a result of a decisive attack on December 9, which captured the city and inflicted serious damage on enemy personnel. Nine of its formations and units were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In total, 1,179 people were awarded in the 4th and 52nd armies: 47 with the Order of Lenin, 406 with the Order of the Red Banner, 372 with the Order of the Red Star, 155 with the medal “For Courage” and 188 with the medal “For Military Merit”. Eleven soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The 4th Army was commanded by Army General K.A. Meretskov, the 52nd Army by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov. Now one army commander led the front, the other was to command the 2nd shock. The headquarters set a strategic task for the front: to defeat the Nazi troops, with the help of units of the Leningrad Front, to carry out a breakthrough and complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad (this operation was called “Lyubanskaya”). Soviet troops failed to cope with the task.

Let us give the floor to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, who traveled to the Volkhov Front and is well acquainted with the situation. In the book “The Work of a Whole Life,” the famous marshal recalls:

“Almost the entire winter, and then the spring, we tried to break through the ring of the Leningrad blockade, striking at it from two sides: from the inside - by the troops of the Leningrad Front, from the outside - by the Volkhov Front, with the goal of uniting after the unsuccessful breakthrough of this ring in the Lyuban region. The main role in the Lyuban operation The 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhovites entered the breach of the German defense line on the right bank of the Volkhov River, but failed to reach Lyuban, and got stuck in the forests and swamps. The Leningraders, weakened by the blockade, were almost unable to solve their part of the overall task. moved. At the end of April, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were united into a single Leningrad front, consisting of two groups: a group of troops of the Volkhov direction and a group of troops of the Leningrad direction. The first included troops of the former Volkhov Front, as well as the 8th and 54th armies. , previously part of the Leningrad Front. The commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Khozin, was given the opportunity to unite actions to eliminate the blockade of Leningrad. However, it soon became clear that it was extremely difficult to lead nine armies, three corps, two groups of troops separated by an enemy-occupied zone. The decision of the Headquarters to liquidate the Volkhov Front turned out to be erroneous.

On June 8, the Volkhov Front was restored; it was again headed by K.A. Meretskov. L.A. Govorov was appointed to command the Leningrad Front. “For failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the timely and rapid withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army, for paper and bureaucratic methods of command and control of troops,” said the order of the Headquarters, for separation from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and the latter was placed in an exceptionally difficult position, remove Lieutenant General Khozin from the post of commander of the Leningrad Front" and appoint him commander of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. The situation here was complicated by the fact that the commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, turned out to be a vile traitor and went over to the enemy’s side.”

Marshal Vasilevsky does not disclose the very course of the Lyuban operation (little has been written about it at all), limiting himself to stating the negative result achieved. But, please note, neither he nor the Headquarters make any accusations against the 2nd Shock units at their disposal. But the following quote is extremely far from objectivity. Although, to be honest, it’s hard to accuse the authors of the major work “The Battle of Leningrad” of deliberate bias (and in our uncensored era, many people adhere to this point of view). I quote:

“In the first half of May 1942, fighting resumed on the western bank of the Volkhov River in the Lyuban direction. Our attempts to expand the breakthrough in the enemy’s defenses in order to develop a subsequent attack on Lyuban were unsuccessful. The fascist German command was able to pull up large forces to this area and, having applied strong blows on the flanks of the advancing Soviet troops, created a real threat of their destruction. In mid-May 1942, the Supreme Command headquarters ordered the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army to the eastern bank of the Volkhov River. However, as a result of the treacherous behavior of General Vlasov, who subsequently surrendered, the army found itself in a catastrophic situation, and it had to escape from encirclement with heavy fighting."

So, from the above text it logically follows that the failure of the army is the result of Vlasov’s betrayal. And in the book “On the Volkhov Front”, published in 1982 (and, by the way, published by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Military History), the following is generally categorically stated:

“Inaction and betrayal of the Motherland and the military duty of its former commander, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, is one of the most important reasons that the army was surrounded and suffered huge losses.”

But this is clearly too much! The army was surrounded by no fault of Vlasov, and the general had no intention of surrendering it to the enemy. Let's take a brief look at the progress of the operation.

The commander of the Volkhov Front, Army General K.A. Meretskov, made a well-founded decision to attack with two fresh armies - the 2nd shock and the 59th. The offensive of the strike group had the task of breaking through the German defense front in the Spasskaya Polist area, reaching the line of Lyuban, Dubrovnik, Cholovo and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, defeating the enemy’s Lyuban-Chudov group. Then, having built on the success, break the blockade of Leningrad. Of course, Meretskov, who held the post of Chief of the General Staff before the war, was aware that it would be extremely difficult to carry out the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, but he made every effort to do this - an order is an order.

The offensive began on January 7. For three days, our troops tried to break through the German defenses, but were unsuccessful. On January 10, the front commander temporarily stopped the attacking actions of the units. On the same day, the 2nd Shock received a new commander.

“Although a change of command is not an easy matter... we still took the risk of asking the Supreme High Command Headquarters to replace the commander of the 2nd Shock Army,” recalled K.A. Meretskov. Kirill Afanasyevich spoke about G.G. Sokolov not in the best possible way:

“He got down to business ardently, made any promises. In practice, nothing worked out for him. It was clear that his approach to solving problems in a combat situation was based on long-outdated concepts and dogmas.”

It was not easy for Meretskov to contact Headquarters with a request to remove the army commander. The former chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, repressed and only miraculously not sharing the fate of many senior military leaders, Kirill Afanasyevich proposed (before the start of the strategic operation!) to remove from office not just General Sokolov, but, in the very recent past, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Sokolov.

However, precisely because it was before the offensive, Meretskov asked to replace the army commander. And... a few days later G.G. Sokolov was recalled to Moscow. Open the latest edition of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary - there you will find articles about all the commanders of the 2nd shock. Besides Sokolov...

But let's go back to 1942. On the Volkhov Front, forces were regrouped and reserves were concentrated. On January 13, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the offensive resumed along the entire area of ​​​​the deployment of front troops from the village of Podberezye to the city of Chudovo in the north-west direction from the original lines. Unfortunately, only the 2nd Shock Army, commanded by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from January 10, had the main and only success in this operation.

This is what Pavel Luknitsky, an eyewitness, writes in the Leningrad Diary:

“In January, in February, the initial excellent success of this operation was achieved under the command of... G.G. Sokolov (under him, in 1941, the 2nd Shock was created from the 26th, which was in the reserve of the Army High Command and some units of the Volkhov ... front...) and N.K. Klykov, who led it on the offensive... The army had many brave soldiers, selflessly devoted to the Motherland - Russians, Bashkirs, Tatars, Chuvash (the 26th Army was formed in the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ), Kazakhs and other nationalities."

The war correspondent did not sin against the truth. The onslaught was truly terrible. Reinforced by reserves transferred from other sectors of the front, the troops of the second shock wedged themselves in a narrow strip into the location of the enemy's 18th Army.

Having broken through the deeply echeloned defense in the zone between the villages of Myasnoy Bor - Spasskaya Polist (about 50 kilometers northwest of Novgorod), by the end of January the advanced units of the army - the 13th Cavalry Corps, the 101st Separate Cavalry Regiment, as well as units of the 327th 1st Infantry Division reached the city of Lyuban and enveloped the enemy group from the south. The remaining armies of the front practically remained at their original lines and, supporting the development of the success of the 2nd Shock Army, fought heavy defensive battles. Thus, even then Klykov’s army was left to its own devices. But it was coming!

In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Franz Halder, there were entries one more alarming than the other:

January 27. ...On the front of Army Group North, the enemy achieved tactical success on Volkhov.

Feeling a serious threat from the connection of units of the 2nd shock with units of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front of General I.I. Fedyuninsky, located 30 kilometers northeast of Lyuban, the Germans are strengthening their 18th Army. In the period from January to June 1942, 15 (!) full-blooded divisions were transferred to the area of ​​operations of the Volkhov Front to eliminate the offensive of the 2nd Shock Army. As a result, the command of Army Group North was forced to abandon plans to capture Leningrad forever. But also tragic fate The 2nd strike turned out to be a foregone conclusion.

On February 27, the Germans attacked the exposed flanks of the Soviet troops. Our units that reached Ryabovo found themselves cut off from the main forces of the front and only after many days of fighting did they break out of the encirclement. Let's take another look at Halder's diary:

2nd of March. ...Conference with the Fuhrer in the presence of the commander of Army Group North, army commanders and corps commanders. Decision: go on the offensive on Volkhov on March 7 (until 13.03.). The Fuhrer demands that aviation preparations be carried out several days before the start of the offensive (the bombing of warehouses in forests with super-heavy caliber bombs). Having completed the breakthrough on Volkhov, one should not waste energy on destroying the enemy. If we throw him into the swamp, it will doom him to death."

And from March 1942 until the end of June, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army, surrounded and cut off from their communications, fought fierce battles, holding the Germans in the southeastern direction. Just look at the map of the Novgorod region to be convinced: the battles were fought in wooded and swampy areas. In addition, in the summer of '42, the level of groundwater and rivers sharply increased in the Leningrad region. All bridges, even on small rivers, were demolished, and the swamps became impassable. Ammunition and food were supplied by air in extremely limited quantities. The army was starving, but the soldiers and commanders honestly performed their duty.

Circumstances were such that in mid-April Army Commander N.K. became seriously ill. Klykov - he had to be urgently evacuated by plane across the front line. At this time, the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov (who, by the way, arrived at the front on March 9) was at the army’s disposal. And it was quite natural that he, who had proven himself well as an army commander in the battles near Moscow, was appointed to act as commander of the encircled army.

Veteran of the 2nd Shock I. Levin testifies to the conditions under which they had to fight in his notes “General Vlasov on both sides of the front”:

“The situation with ammunition was desperate. When vehicles and carts could not get through the neck to us, the soldiers carried the shells - two ropes over their shoulders - on themselves. Junkers, Heinkels, Messers literally hung over their heads and in during the daylight hours we hunted (I’m sure with passion) for every moving target - be it a soldier or a cart. There was nothing to cover the army from the air... Our native Volkhov forest saved us: it allowed us to play hide and seek with the Luftwaffe.”

In May the situation worsened. This is how the commander of the 327th Infantry Division, Colonel (later Major General) I.M., remembers it. Antyufeyev:

“The situation on the line occupied by the division was clearly not in our favor. The forest roads had already dried up, and the enemy brought tanks and self-propelled guns here. He also used massive mortar fire. And yet the division fought on this line for about two weeks... Finev Lug passed from hand to hand several times. Where did our soldiers get their physical strength and energy!... In the end, at this line, a critical moment came, to the left of us, between the lakes, a partisan detachment was defending itself, which was pushed back by the enemy. Being completely surrounded, we were forced to retreat. This time we had to part with almost all the heavy weapons... By that time, there were no more than 200-300 people in each rifle regiment. They were no longer capable of any maneuver. In one place they still fought, literally clinging their teeth to the ground, but the movement was unbearably difficult for them.”

In mid-May 1942, the command of the 2nd Shock received a directive to leave the army beyond the Volkhov River. This was more than difficult to achieve. When the enemy closed the only corridor in the Myasny Bor area, the very possibility of an organized breakthrough became unlikely. As of June 1, in 7 divisions and 6 brigades of the army there were 6,777 commanding officers, 6,369 junior command personnel and 22,190 privates. A total of 35,336 people - approximately three divisions. It should be taken into account that the command lost operational control over the troops, the units were scattered. Nevertheless, Soviet soldiers offered heroic resistance to the enemy. The fighting continued.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, as a result of the failed operation of the troops of the Volkhov Front and the remaining combat-ready units of the 2nd Shock Army to break through the encirclement ring from Myasnoy Bor and the withdrawal of the remaining groups of fighters and commanders, the army command decided to fight their way to their own, breaking into small groups (soldiers and army officers have already done this).

When leaving the encirclement, the chief of staff of the 2nd shock, Colonel Vinogradov, died under artillery fire. The head of the special department, State Security Major Shashkov, was seriously wounded and shot himself. Surrounded by fascists, member of the Military Council Zuev saved the last bullet for himself, and the head of the political department Garus also did the same. The head of army communications, Major General Afanasyev, went to the partisans, who transported him to the “mainland.” The Germans captured the commander of the 327th division, General Antyufeev (who refused to cooperate with the enemies of the division commander and was subsequently sent to a concentration camp). And General Vlasov... surrendered to a patrol of the 28th Infantry Corps in the village of Tukhovezhi (together with the chef of the army military council canteen, M.I. Voronova, who accompanied him).

But our own people were looking for him, trying to save the army commander! On the morning of June 25, officers who emerged from the encirclement reported: Vlasov and other senior officers were seen in the area of ​​the narrow-gauge railway. Meretskov sent there his adjutant, Captain Mikhail Grigorievich Boroda, a tank company with an infantry landing force. Of the five tanks in the German rear, four were blown up by mines or were knocked out. M.G. Boroda, on the last tank, reached the headquarters of the 2nd strike - there was no one there. By the evening of June 25, several reconnaissance groups were sent to find the Army Military Council and withdraw it. Vlasov was never found.

After some time, a message was received from the partisans of the Oredezh detachment F.I. Sazanov: Vlasov went over to the Nazis.

When, many days later, the surviving soldiers of the 2nd Shock found out about this, they were simply shocked. “But how they believed this heroic general, scolder, joker, eloquent speaker! The commander of the army turned out to be a despicable coward, betrayed everyone who, not sparing their lives, went into battle on his orders,” wrote Pavel Luknitsky.

“The question arises: how did it happen that Vlasov turned out to be a traitor?” Marshal Meretskov writes in his book “In the Service of the People.” “It seems to me that only one answer can be given. Vlasov was an unprincipled careerist. His behavior before that It may well be considered a disguise behind which his indifference to the Motherland was hidden. His membership in the Communist Party was nothing more than a path to high positions. His actions at the front, for example in 1941 near Kiev and Moscow, were an attempt to distinguish himself in order to demonstrate his professional abilities and quickly. move forward."

During the trial of the ROA command, when asked why he surrendered, Vlasov answered briefly and clearly: “I was faint-hearted.” And you can believe it. Surrendering on July 12, the general, who did not have the courage to shoot himself, was already a coward, but not yet a traitor. Vlasov betrayed his Motherland a day later, when he ended up at the headquarters of the commander of the 18th German Army, Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann. It was to him that he described in detail the state of affairs on the Volkhov front. A photograph has been preserved: Vlasov with a pointer bent over the map, Lindemann standing next to him carefully follows his explanations.

Here we will leave the traitor. TO future fate It has nothing to do with the 2nd shock.

Despite Vlasov’s betrayal, the entire army was not blamed for the failure of the Lyuban operation. And in those days, just the slightest suspicion of betrayal was enough for the very name “2nd Shock” to disappear forever from the lists of the Red Army. In addition, none of the army units lost their battle flags.

This means that Stavka correctly assessed its role: despite tragic outcome The army operation buried the enemy's hopes of capturing Leningrad. The losses of Hitler's troops were too heavy. Pavel Luknitsky also reports this in the three-volume book “Leningrad is Acting...”:

“...it (the 2nd strike motor vehicle) destroyed a lot of enemy forces: six German divisions, pulled from Leningrad to Volkhov, were exsanguinated by it, the fascist legions “Netherlands” and “Flanders” were completely defeated, many remained in the swamps enemy artillery, tanks, airplanes, tens of thousands of Nazis..."

And here is an excerpt from a leaflet issued by the political department of the Volkhov Front shortly after the 2nd shock fighters left the encirclement:

"Valiant warriors of the 2nd Shock Army!

In the fire and roar of guns, the clang of tanks, the roar of airplanes, and fierce battles with Hitler’s scoundrels, you won the glory of the valiant warriors of the Volkhov borders.

Courageously and fearlessly, during the harsh winter and spring, you fought against the fascist invaders.

The military glory of the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army is etched in golden letters in the history of the Great Patriotic War..."

However, Hitler, unlike his commanders, who did not abandon his obsession with taking and destroying Leningrad, demanded from the Wehrmacht representative at the Finnish headquarters, General Erfurt, to achieve an offensive by the Allied units from the north. But the Finnish command turned Hitler’s envoy away, declaring: since 1918, our country has been of the opinion that the existence of Finland should not pose a threat to Leningrad. Apparently, the Finns, who carefully assessed both the international and military situation, were then groping for a way out of the war into which Germany had dragged them.

But Hitler did not let up. He took an unprecedented step: he transferred the victorious 11th Army of Field Marshal von Manstein from the southern borders to Leningrad. Manstein took Sevastopol! Manstein “figured out” the Kerch operation of the Russians! Let Manstein take Leningrad!

Manstein has arrived. I didn’t take Leningrad. In his memoirs he wrote:

“On August 27, the headquarters of the 11th Army arrived on the Leningrad Front to find out the possibilities of striking here in the zone of the 18th Army and draw up a plan for an attack on Leningrad. It was agreed that then the headquarters of the 11th Army would occupy part of the front of the 18th Army , facing north, while the eastern part of the front along the Volkhov remained behind the 18th Army."

And the 11th Army entered into heavy fighting with Soviet troops, which lasted until the beginning of October. Actually. Manstein had to solve the problems of the 18th Army, which had been badly beaten during the Lyuban operation by units of the 2nd strike and was no longer capable of large-scale operations.

The field marshal managed to destroy a number of our formations, but did not have enough strength to take the city. Manstein would later remember these autumn battles in 1942:

“If the task of restoring the situation on the eastern sector of the 18th Army’s front was completed, the divisions of our army nevertheless suffered significant losses. At the same time, a significant part of the ammunition intended for the attack on Leningrad was used up. Therefore, there could be no talk of a quick offensive and speeches. Meanwhile, Hitler still did not want to give up his intention to capture Leningrad. True, he was ready to limit the tasks of the offensive, which, naturally, would not lead to the final liquidation of this front, and in the end everything came down to this liquidation (emphasis added). - author). On the contrary, the headquarters of the 11th Army believed that it was impossible to begin the operation against Leningrad without replenishing our forces and without having sufficient forces at all. October passed by discussing these issues and drawing up new plans."

In November, the situation was such that the presence of the 11th Army was required in other sectors of the Eastern Front: the decisive battle for Stalingrad was approaching. Manstein's headquarters was transferred to Army Group Center. Except unsuccessful attempt take Leningrad, fate dealt the German commander another terrible blow. On October 29, the 19-year-old son of the field marshal, infantry lieutenant Gero von Manstein, who fought in the 16th Army, died on the Leningrad Front.

Many years later, after the events described, while working on his book “Lost Victories,” the old field marshal, always stingy in his praise of the enemy, would pay tribute to the heroic warriors of the 2nd Shock (an army at that time was only in name; the eight-thousandth infantry fought against the enemy division and one rifle brigade). He will appreciate their courage in a military way, clearly and concisely:

"The enemy's casualties in killed were many times greater than the number captured."

And in 1942, another important event took place on the Volkhov Front, which at first glance had no direct relation to the development of hostilities. A song was born that soon became popularly known and loved. Because it sounded truthful and, most importantly, it was already victorious!

Songs that raise the morale of soldiers sometimes mean more than new weapons, plentiful food, and warm clothes. The time of their appearance rightly takes its rightful place in military chronology. In 1941, it became “Get up, huge country!”, in 1942 - “Volkhov Table” to the words of the front-line poet Pavel Shubin.

They didn't sing then:

Let's drink to the Motherland, let's drink to Stalin,

Let's drink and pour again!

They didn’t sing because such lines had never been written before. but, you see, it sounded great:

Let's drink to the meeting of the living!

These words fully applied to all soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army.

At the end of 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided at the beginning of the next year to carry out an operation to relieve the siege of Leningrad, better known in history as Operation Iskra.

From the Leningrad Front, the 67th Army was assigned to the strike group. The Volkhov Front again entrusted this task to the 2nd Shock. The almost completely renewed army (only about ten thousand people emerged from the encirclement) included: 11 rifle divisions, 1 rifle, 4 tank and 2 engineer brigades, 37 artillery and mortar regiments and other units.

The fully equipped 2nd Strike continued its combat path. And he was nice!

On January 18, 1943, the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, in cooperation with the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, broke the blockade of Leningrad. The course of this operation is described in detail both in fiction and in special military literature. Numerous documentaries and feature films have been made about her. Every year, January 18 was celebrated in Leningrad, is celebrated and will be celebrated in St. Petersburg as one of the main city holidays!

Then, in the cold January days of 1943, the main thing happened: conditions were created for land and transport communications with the entire country.

For the courage and bravery shown in breaking the blockade, about 22 thousand soldiers of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts received state awards. The 122nd Tank Brigade, which interacted with units of the 2nd Shock Brigade, became the Red Banner Brigade. And in the army itself, the 327th Rifle Division was transformed into the 64th Guards Rifle Division. The chest of the commander of the newly minted guardsmen, Colonel N.A. Polyakov, was decorated with the Order of Suvorov, II degree. The commander of the 2nd attack, Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky, was awarded one of the highest military leadership insignia - the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree.

Since April 1943, already operating as part of the Leningrad Front, the army participated in the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, and with its active participation from the Oranienbaum bridgehead in January 1944, it ensured the final liberation of Leningrad from the siege.

In February-March - liberated Lomonosovsky, Volosovsky, Kingiseppsky, Slantsevsky and Gdovsky districts of the Leningrad region, reached the Narva River and Lake Peipus. In April-August she fought with German troops on the Narva Isthmus and successfully carried out an operation to liberate Narva. In September forty-four, in the successful Tallinn operation, the territory of Estonia was liberated from the invaders.

How were things going for the long-no longer victorious German 18th Army? Tippelskirch writes:

"On January 18 (1944 - author), that is, a few days after the start of the Russian offensive on the northern sector of the 18th Army front, the troops of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive from a wide bridgehead north of Novgorod with the aim of striking the flank of the 18th Army It was impossible to prevent this breakthrough, and it led to the withdrawal of the entire army group. The very next day we had to leave Novgorod."

But, true to its tradition of smashing and destroying everything, the 18th Army continued the practice of “scorched earth”!: out of the almost fifty thousand population of Novgorod, only fifty people survived, out of 2,500 buildings - only forty. Colonel General Lindemann, already familiar to us, ordered the famous monument “Millennium of Russia”, which is still located on the territory of the Novgorod Kremlin, to be dismantled into parts and sent to Germany. They dismantled it, but they didn’t have time to take it out - they had to run away from the rapidly advancing Soviet army.

Under the blows of the Soviet troops, the 18th Army rolled back further and further until, together with the 16th Army, it was blocked as part of the Courland group. Together with her, the failed conquerors of Leningrad laid down their arms on the night of May 9. And then a terrible panic began among the soldiers of the 16th and 18th armies. General Gilpert, who commanded the group, was seriously afraid. It turns out that the Nazis “miscalculated.” Pavel Luknitsky says in his narration:

“Before accepting the ultimatum, Gilpert did not know that Marshal Govorov was in command of the Leningrad Front, he believed that they would surrender to Marshal Govorov, the “commander of the 2nd Baltic Front,” - this seemed to the Germans who committed atrocities near Leningrad not so terrible: “Baltic people,” Having not experienced the horror of the blockade, they have no reason to take such “merciless revenge” as the Leningraders allegedly will.”

You should have thought earlier when they were executed at the walls of the Neva Stronghold, dying of hunger, but not surrendering!

On September 27, 1944, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, transferring the 2nd strike to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, addressed its troops with the words:

“The 2nd Shock Army as part of the front forces played a big role in lifting the blockade of Leningrad, winning the Great Victory near Leningrad and in all the battles for the liberation of Soviet Estonia from the Nazi invaders.

The victorious path of the 2nd Shock Army on the Leningrad Front was marked by brilliant successes, and the battle banners of its units were covered with unfading glory.

The working people of Leningrad and Soviet Estonia will always sacredly cherish in their memory the military merits of the 2nd Shock Army, its heroic warriors - the faithful sons of the Fatherland."

At the final stage of the war, the 2nd Shock Division, as part of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, fought in East Prussia and participated in the East Pomeranian operation. In his memoirs, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky more than once noted her skillful actions:

“The 2nd Shock Army fought through a strong defensive line on the outskirts of Marienburg, which in ancient times was a crusader fortress, and on January 25 reached the Vistula and Nogat rivers. With part of its forces, it crossed these rivers in several places and captured small bridgeheads. Capture Elbing the troops could not move on the move... I.I. Fedyuninsky (commander of the 2nd shock - author) had to organize an assault on the city according to all the rules of military art. The battles lasted for several days until the 2nd shock captured the city."

Together with the 65th Army and a separate tank brigade of the Polish Army, the 2nd Shock Brigade played a decisive role in the assault on Danzig - the Polish city of Gdansk.

“On March 26, the troops of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, having broken through the enemy defenses to their entire depth, approached Danzig,” wrote K.K. Rokossovsky. “In order to avoid senseless losses, the garrison was given an ultimatum: it is useless to continue resistance. In the event, If the ultimatum was not accepted, residents were advised to leave the city.

Hitler's command did not respond to our proposal. The command was given to begin the assault... The fight was for every house. The Nazis fought especially stubbornly in large buildings, factory buildings... On March 30, Gdansk was completely liberated. The remnants of the enemy troops fled to the swampy mouth of the Vistula, where they were soon captured. The Polish national flag soared over the ancient Polish city, which was hoisted by soldiers - representatives of the Polish Army."

From East Prussia the army's route lay in Pomerania. The Germans understood perfectly well that Soviet soldiers had every right to take revenge. The memories of how the Nazis treated prisoners of war and civilians were too fresh. And even in the May days of 1945, living examples almost constantly appeared before our eyes.

On May 7, units of the 46th Division of the 2nd Shock cleared the island of Rügen from the Germans. Our soldiers discovered a concentration camp in which our compatriots were languishing. In his book “From the Neva to the Elbe,” the division commander, General S.N. Borshchev, recalled the incident on the island:

"Our people were walking along the road soviet people liberated from concentration camps. Suddenly a girl ran out of the crowd, rushed to our famous intelligence officer Tupkalenko and, hugging him, screamed:

Vasil, my brother!

And our courageous, desperate intelligence officer, Vasily Yakovlevich Tupkalenko (full holder of the Order of Glory - author), on whose face, as they say, never moved a single muscle, cried..."

But the winners, to the surprise of the local population, did not take revenge. On the contrary, they helped as best they could. And when a column of young men in fascist soldier’s uniforms came across the 90th Rifle Division, division commander General N.G. Lyashchenko simply waved his hand to the teenagers:

Go to mom, to mom!

Naturally, they happily ran home.

And the Great Patriotic War ended for the 2nd Shock with participation in the famous Berlin operation. And our soldiers had their own “meeting on the Elbe” - with the 2nd British Army. Soviet and English soldiers celebrated it solemnly: with a football match!

Over the four years of war, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army were expressed gratitude to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief twenty-four times, and the sky over Moscow was colored with victorious volleys of fireworks. For heroism, courage and bravery, 99 formations and units were given honorary names of liberated and captured cities. 101 formations and units attached the Order of the Soviet Union to their banners, and 29 formations and units became guards. 103 soldiers of the 2nd shock were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

History has given everyone what they deserve. Soldiers, officers and generals of the 2nd Shock Army found themselves on the heroic pages of the chronicle of Victory. And General Vlasov - to the gallows. The execution took place on the night of August 1, 1946 in Tagansk prison according to the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. And with this we could have parted ways with the traitor, if not for certain circumstances.

Our country entered the new millennium without a textbook on the history of Russia. Well - nothing surprising: too many idols in the previous decade were overthrown from their pedestals, not all heroes were pulled out of oblivion. And the history of any state is made up of the actions of individuals.

But when scientists thoroughly shook the flask with the historical cocktail of the twentieth century, many strange and sometimes terrible personalities appeared on the surface, whom the “independently-minded” pseudo-chroniclers, quick to hand, immediately began to present to us as heroes misunderstood by the people. A sort of Don Quixote of modern history, not at all concerned with the fact that, unlike Mister La Mancha, the knights are not of a sad, but rather of a bloody image.

General Vlasov was also included in the category of such “Don Quixotes”. His defense is based mainly on two positions (everything else is verbal fluff): the general is not a traitor, but a fighter against the regime, which collapsed anyway, and Vlasov is the Soviet analogue of Stauffenberg.

Not noticing such statements is dangerous. Our country is rightly called the most reading country in the world. But we must add to this that for the most part the Russian people are accustomed to believing the printed word: once it is written, so it is. That is why expositions are so popular among us and refutations often go unnoticed.

Without intending to engage in refutations of the arguments of Vlasov’s supporters in this narrative, I invite readers to consider only the factual side of the matter.

So, Vlasov and Stauffenberg. The German colonel never fought against Prussian militarism - the main opponent of Stauffenberg and his like-minded people was the Nazi elite. A competent officer of the General Staff could not help but understand that preaching the idea of ​​​​the superiority of one nation cannot build a “thousand-year Reich.” It was planned to replace key figures with less odious ones, abandon the most unacceptable Nazi principles - and that’s all. The world is for a certain period of time. One could not expect anything more from a graduate of a German military school, initially accustomed to planning wars and offensive actions. Stauffenberg did not consider himself a traitor to Germany, since he ultimately acted in its interests.

Oath to the Fuhrer? But we should not forget: for the hereditary aristocrat Count Klaus Philipp Maria Schenck von Stauffenberg, the son of the Chief Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg and the queen's lady-in-waiting, a descendant of the great Gneisenau, Hitler was a plebeian and an upstart.

Stauffenberg led the military conspiracy while on the territory of his country, fully understanding the inevitability of death in case of failure. Vlasov simply chickened out when danger threatened him personally and surrendered. And the next day he laid out to Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann not plans to fight the communist regime, but military secrets that he owned as deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

At the beginning of the war, Stauffenberg actively pushed through the General Staff his ideas for creating national volunteer armies. Consequently, Vlasov, who eventually headed the ROA, was considered no more than the commander of one of these legions.

For the Germans, Vlasov was not a person; he was not assigned any serious role in military and political plans. Hitler repeated more than once: “Revolution is made only by those people who are inside the state, and not outside it.” And at a meeting in the summer of 1943 he said:

“...I don’t need this General Vlasov in our rear areas at all... I only need him on the front line.”

Leaders on whom they place a serious bet in the hope of a successful outcome of the war, as is known, are not sent there - it is dangerous. The order of Field Marshal Keitel dated April 17, 1943 stated:

“...in operations of a purely propaganda nature, Vlasov’s name may be required, but not his personality.”

Moreover, in the order, Keitel calls Vlasov a “Russian prisoner of war general” - and nothing more. But that’s what they called him on paper. IN colloquial speech they chose harsher expressions, for example: “This Russian pig is Vlasov” (Himmler, at a meeting with the Fuhrer).

Finally, Soviet historians, unwittingly, played a significant role in “perpetuating” the memory of A.A. Vlasov, calling all ROA fighters “Vlasovites.” In fact, they never were.

The "Russian Liberation Army" was formed from traitors and prisoners of war. But the soldiers surrendered and were captured by the enemy, and the traitors went to serve the Germans, and not Vlasov. Before the war, his name was not widely known in the USSR, and after the transition to the Germans, Vlasov was known only as a traitor. They didn’t go to him the way they went to Denikin or Kolchak, Petliura or Makhno - not the same figure.

And he didn’t behave like a leader. The same Denikin, at the end of the civil war, refused an English pension, rightly noting that only the Russian government could pay a Russian general. Vlasov willingly ate in German kitchens; when he was arrested in 1945, they found thirty thousand Reichsmarks in his possession, hidden “for a rainy day.” He lived comfortably - he even got a German wife - the widow of SS officer Adele Billingberg (after the war she will try to receive a pension for her hanged husband, like a general's widow).

One of the commanders of the White Guard corps, General Slashchev, did not wear shoulder straps during the civil war, believing that the volunteer army had disgraced them with robberies and violence. Vlasov also did not wear epaulettes among the Germans, but he gladly donned the comfortable overcoat of a Wehrmacht general. “Just in case” I kept the book of the commanding staff of the Red Army and... my party card.

Well, Vlasov was not a leader. But maybe then he is a fighter for the people’s happy lot? Many refer to his so-called “Smolensk appeal” to the people and other propaganda speeches. But Vlasov himself subsequently explained that the texts of the appeals were compiled by the Germans, and he only slightly edited them. The former general complained:

“Until 1944, the Germans did everything themselves, and they used us only as a sign that was profitable for them.”

And, by the way, they did the right thing, because an unedited Vlasov would hardly have been perceived by Russian people as a patriot.

As already mentioned, in the spring of 1943 he made a “tour” to parts of Army Group North. The kind of “love for the Motherland” that the speeches of the former army commander were imbued with can be judged by the occasion at the banquet in Gatchina.

Believing in his own importance, the distraught Vlasov assured the German command: if they now give him two shock divisions, he will quickly take Leningrad, since the residents are exhausted by the blockade. And then he, Vlasov the victor, will arrange a luxurious banquet in the city, to which the Wehrmacht generals invite him in advance. As you already know, Hitler, outraged by such impudence, recalled Vlasov from the front and even threatened him with the death penalty.

As a result, the Fuhrer still had to put the ROA into action - there was not enough “cannon fodder” at the front and in the Reich they formed units even from teenagers. But the ROA no longer had any “liberation” character. And the German command did not have much hope for it. The same Tippelskirch will write after the war that the “Vlasov army,” despite its large numbers, was a stillborn fetus.

And how the Soviet units perceived it is clearly demonstrated by the memories of 2nd Shock Veteran I. Levin:

“In the sector of our 2nd Shock Army, I remember only one battle with the Vlasovites. Somewhere in East Prussia, near Koenigsberg, our tank landing came across a large German unit, which included a battalion of Vlasovites.

After a fierce battle, the enemy was scattered. According to reports from the front line: they took many prisoners, Germans and Vlasovites. But only the Germans reached the army headquarters. Not a single person with the ROA badge was brought in. You can say a lot of words about this... But no matter what they say, no one has the right to condemn our paratroopers, who have not cooled down from the battle, who have just lost their friends at the hands of traitors...”

The Vlasov army, in principle, had nothing to count on. In the thirties and forties of the twentieth century in our country, the power of personal example was of great importance to people. Hence the Stakhanov movement, the Voroshilov riflemen. During the war, fighters deliberately repeated Matrosov's feat, pilots - Talalikhin, snipers - Smolyachkov's achievements. And an example of civil courage for people was the feat of Kosmodemyanskaya, and not the activities of Vlasov. He could not find a place in this row.

At that time, the word “SS man” was the worst curse word—nothing to do with sometimes kindly Russian swearing. And Vlasov conducted propaganda with the help of SS Obergruppenführer Goebbels, equipped and armed the ROA under the leadership of Reichsführer SS Himmler, and chose an SS widow as his life partner. And finally, the official ID of the commander of the “Russian (!) Liberation Army” for Vlasov was signed by SS General (!) Kroeger. Isn't the attraction to the security forces of the Nazi Party too strong for a “carrier of high ideas”, a fighter for a “free Russia”?

In the historical period described, a person who had any connection with the SS could count on best case scenario to a place in a prison cell. But not on the political Olympus. And this opinion was held not only in the USSR.

After the war, traitors were tried throughout Europe. Quisling was shot in Norway, and the Belgian king Leopold III, who signed the capitulation to Germany, was forced to abdicate. Marshal Petain was sentenced to death in France, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. By the verdict of the people's tribunal, Antonescu was executed as a war criminal in Romania. If such punishment befell traitors of the first magnitude, then what could smaller fry like Vlasov count on? Only for a bullet or loop.

And presenting an obvious traitor today in the role of a martyr and “sufferer for the people” means deliberately engaging in false patriotic propaganda. This is much worse than selling from the stalls of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Because it has long been the custom - sufferers in Rus' are loved and pitied. But Vlasov is not a holy cripple. And a scaffold instead of a platform was erected for him according to his merits.

Russia had other generals. During the Great Patriotic War, one of the leaders of the White Guard movement and an irreconcilable enemy of Soviet power, Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin, called on White emigrants to fight the Germans in order to support the Red Army. And Soviet Lieutenant General D.M. Karbyshev preferred martyrdom in a concentration camp to treason.

How did the fates of other commanders turn out? Lieutenant General Nikolai Kuzmich Klykov (1888-1968), after recovery, from December 1942, was assistant to the commander of the Volkhov Front, participated in breaking the siege of Leningrad. In June 1943, he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Moscow Military District. In 1944-1945 he commanded the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. Having led the 2nd Shock Army before the operation to break through the blockade ring, Valery Zakharovich Romanovsky (1896-1967) subsequently became deputy commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front and in 1945 received the rank of Colonel General. After the war, he commanded troops in a number of military districts, worked in military educational institutions.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky (1900-1977), who replaced him as army commander in December 1943, also commanded district troops in 1946-47 and 1954-65. He again had the opportunity to serve his Motherland on already peaceful German soil: in 1951-54, he was deputy and first deputy commander-in-chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany. Since 1965, Army General Fedyuninsky worked in the group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1969, as a participant in the battles in Mongolia, a veteran of the famous Khalkhin Gol, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann (1884-1963), who opposed the 2nd shock at the head of the 18th German Army - the same one who wanted to remove the Millennium of Russia monument from Novgorod - led Army Group North on March 1, 1944, but for military failures in early July of the same forty-fourth, he was removed from office. Commanding German troops in Denmark at the end of the war, he surrendered to the British on May 8, 1945.

Field Marshals Wilhelm von Leeb and Karl von Küchler were tried as war criminals by the Fifth American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. On October 28, 1948, the verdict was announced: von Leeb (1876-1956) received an unexpectedly lenient sentence - three years in prison. Von Küchler (1881-1969) was treated more strictly. No matter how much he lied, no matter how he dodged, no matter how he referred only to the exact execution of orders, the “respected” and “fearless” field marshal, the tribunal turned out to be inexorable: twenty years in prison!

True, in February 1955, Küchler was released. From the beginning of the fifties, many “Fuhrer soldiers” began to be released and amnestied - in 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO and “experienced specialists” were required to form units of the Bundeswehr.

They had a lot of “experience”! Suffice it to say that soon after the formation of the Bundeswehr, the fascist General Ferch, one of the leaders of the artillery shelling of Leningrad, was appointed its commander. In 1960, Wehrmacht Major General, former head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Adolf Heusinger became the chairman of the NATO Permanent Military Committee. The same Heusinger who calmly gave orders for punitive expeditions and reprisals against the civilian population of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.

However, these are different times now. But, you see, historical facts are stubborn things. And it is necessary to remember them - evidence of the bloodiest war of the twentieth century!

Every year on May 9, Moscow salutes the Winners. Alive and dead. Majestic monuments and modest obelisks with red stars remind us of their exploits.

And in Myasny Bor there is a memorial in memory of the feat of the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army, which cannot be erased from History!

2002-2003

P. S. HIS MEAT BOR

In memory of N.A. Shashkova

Businessmen are different. Some love to shine in front of television cameras, others love to support “high-profile” projects, sanctified by the patronage of statesmen. Still others engage in charity work, receiving in return laureate badges of various awards - from literary to fence-building (the main thing is to hang a beautiful diploma in the office).

My longtime acquaintance, the general director of the BUR mining company, Leonid Ivanovich Kulikov, did not belong to any of the above categories. But if there was a need to support an interesting and necessary initiative, he helped. True, having first made sure that the money will go to a good cause, and not into the pocket of the initiator.

Therefore, in Kulikov’s office one could often meet writers and poets, officials, generals, and scientists. And I was not at all surprised when several years ago, on one hot June day, I found a tall, gray-haired old man in the uniform of a vice admiral at Leonid Ivanovich’s. He was talking animatedly, walking around the table. The star of the Hero of the Soviet Union swayed above the order bars in time with the movements.

Shashkov. Nikolai Alexandrovich,” the admiral extended his hand. “It’s good that you came.” “We are just discussing one important topic,” explained Leonid Ivanovich. “You, of course, have heard about the Second Shock Army?”

Lyuban operation of 1942?

You see!” exclaimed Shashkov. “He knows.” And he didn’t tell me, like this idiot (the name of one official was mentioned): Vlasov’s army.

Well, Vlasov is Vlasov, and the army is an army. In the end, she later broke the blockade of Leningrad and took part in the East Prussian operation.

Because of Vlasov, little was written about her, but we heard a lot about the heroism of the fighters. After all, he worked as a city reporter for a long time. WITH different people met.

I know, for example, that the brother of the famous BDT artist Vladislav Strzhelchik fought in the Second Shock. The mother of the writer Boris Almazov, Evgenia Vissarionovna, was the senior operating sister of an army field hospital in 1942. In Yakutia - God grant him many years - lives unique person- Sergeant Mikhail Bondarev. He was drafted from Yakutia and spent the entire war as part of the Second Shock! In a rare case, she was born again three times. And the son of Eduard Bagritsky, war correspondent Vsevolod, died during the Lyuban operation.

Just like my father, Alexander Georgievich. “He was the head of a special department of the army,” Shashkov interrupted.

We talked for a long time that day. About heroes and traitors. Memory and unconsciousness. About the fact that the recently opened memorial to the fallen soldiers in Myasny Bor needs to be equipped, but there is no money. The surviving veterans are very old people. Businessmen are not interested in them, so they don’t try to help.

We’ll help, we’ll help,” Kulikov reassured Admiral every time.

We also talked about search engines who are absolutely disinterestedly engaged in a holy cause - searching for and burying the remains of fighters. About officials who give vague answers to all proposals to perpetuate the memory of the fallen.

It was firmly stuck in their heads: the Vlasov army,” Shashkov got excited. - When I was still an assistant to the USSR Minister of Defense, I spoke many times to the head of Glavpur (Main Political Directorate Soviet army and the Navy - author) - it is necessary to prepare and publish a normal history of the Second Shock. And this old wood grouse answered me: let’s see, let’s wait. We waited...

Listen. I have read some of your historical essays. Maybe you'll take up this. You see, it is necessary to briefly and clearly reflect the entire battle path. Young people will not read the Talmud. And she definitely needs to know this page of history.

What happens: they write and make films about Vlasov, this bastard, a traitor. And they forgot about the army that actually saved Leningrad!

Since then we began to meet quite often.

What was striking about Nikolai Alexandrovich was, first of all, his irrepressible energy and determination. He constantly shuttled between St. Petersburg and Moscow. And not in the "SV" carriage - at the wheel of his own "nine". He made his way into high offices - he persuaded, proved, signed the necessary papers. It seemed that he no longer needed anything in this life except to perpetuate the memory of the soldiers of the Second Shock. It was largely thanks to the efforts of Shashkov that the memorial appeared in Myasnoy Bor in the Novgorod region.

Many wondered: why does a respected and honored person need all this trouble? At such a respectable age, with such merits and, let us note in parentheses, connections, you can calmly rest on your laurels. And sometimes - decorate the presidium of some important forum with your ceremonial admiral's uniform.

But the fact of the matter is that Shashkov was not a “wedding general.” In the full sense of the word, a combat commander (it was his submarine that was ready to fire missiles at the Promised Land during the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1968), he felt personally responsible for returning from oblivion the names of his father’s comrades. With the help of the FSB, he installed a memorial plaque at the memorial. But how many more nameless heroes lie in the Novgorod land! And Shashkov continued to act.

In Kulikov’s office, which became our headquarters, Nikolai Alexandrovich prepared requests and letters, copied and sent out documents, and met with potential sponsors. Here we made clarifications to the manuscript of the story.

He came to this office on May 8, 2003, after a meeting with Valentina Ivanovna Matvienko, who then held the post of presidential plenipotentiary representative in the North-West, joyfully excited:

Valentina Ivanovna was more attentive to my proposals than she expected. Now things will move forward.

And indeed, it has moved. We were convinced of this a few months later, when we arrived on August 17 - the next anniversary of the opening of the memorial - in Myasnoy Bor.

Nikolai Alexandrovich told us what still needs to be done. And, knowing his ability to achieve his goal, I, Kulikov, and everyone involved in this work by the admiral had no doubt: so be it.

Throughout the fall, winter and spring, Shashkov was engaged in routine and, as he put it, bureaucratic work. On May 1, the phone rang in my apartment.

I just arrived from Moscow. Lots of interesting news about the memorial. As I said before, a film will be made about Second Impact. Vladimir Leonidovich Govorov (Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Chairman of the Pobeda Foundation - author) is actively promoting this idea. By the way, I brought you a letter from him thanking you for the story.

Yes. Remember when you scanned photos for me? So...

And we delved into a discussion of technical issues. In parting, Nikolai Alexandrovich reminded us: we will meet on May 9, in Myasnoy Bor. But fate decreed differently.

...On May 7, I stood in the large funeral hall of the crematorium and looked at the portrait of the admiral displayed in front of closed coffin. The artificial light reflected dimly in the orders resting on scarlet cushions.

The night after our conversation, a fire broke out in the Shashkovs’ apartment. Nikolai Alexandrovich and his wife Valentina Petrovna died in the fire. The apartment itself was completely burned out.

...The volleys of farewell fireworks died down. The sailors removed the Navy flag from the coffin. Vice Admiral Shashkov passed away into eternity.

A man who fought all his life to preserve the names of fallen heroes in our history has passed away, leaving only a memory of himself. Like a true Patriot of the Motherland, a man of Honor and Duty.

How much this is, and not everyone has it...

June 2004

___________________________

Musa Jalil (senior political instructor Musa Mustafievich Dzhalilov) was executed in the terrible Nazi prison Moabit on August 25, 1944. Shortly before his death, the poet wrote the following lines:

I'm leaving this life

The world may forget me

But I'll leave the song

Which will live.

The homeland did not forget Musa Jalil: in 1956 - posthumously - he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the next year he was awarded the Lenin Prize. And today his poems are widely known in Russia.

After the war, one of the streets in Tallinn was named after Hero of the Soviet Union Evgeniy Aleksandrovich Nikonov. Now you won’t find a street with this name on the city map. In recent years in Estonia, on whose territory the Nazis killed 125 thousand local residents, carefully rewriting history...

One of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (1897-1968) - later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the highest military order "Victory". After the war - Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since 1964, Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal K.A. Meretskov worked in the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

As an example of Sokolov’s “commander’s skill,” in his book “In the Service of the People,” Marshal Meretskov cites an excerpt from Army Commander Order N14 dated November 19, 1941:

“1. I abolish walking like the crawling of flies in the fall, and I order from now on in the army to walk like this: a military step is a yard, and that’s how you walk. Accelerated - one and a half, and keep pressing.

2. Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle they have lunch and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is in the dark, before dawn, and lunch is in the dark, in the evening. During the day you will be able to chew bread or crackers with tea - good, but not - and thank you for that, fortunately the day is not particularly long.

3. Remember to everyone - commanders, privates, old and young, that during the day you cannot march in columns larger than a company, and in general in war it is night to march, so then march.

4. Don’t be afraid of the cold, don’t dress up like Ryazan women, be brave and don’t succumb to the frost. Rub your ears and hands with snow."

“Why not Suvorov?” comments K.A. Meretskov. “But it is known that Suvorov, in addition to issuing catchy orders that penetrate the soldier’s soul, took care of the troops... Sokolov thought that it was all about a dashing piece of paper, and limited mainly to orders."

Of the 2,100 people of the “Netherlands” legion, 700 remained alive. As for the “Flanders” legion, its strength was reduced threefold in just a few days of fighting.

The war spares no one - neither the marshals nor their children. In January 1942, the son of the famous Soviet commander Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze - aviation lieutenant Timur Frunze. Posthumously, pilot T.M. Frunze was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Here full text“Volkhov Table”, written by Pavel Shubin in 1942:

Rarely, friends, do we meet,

But when it happened,

Let's remember what happened and drink, as usual,

How it happened in Rus'!

Let's drink to those who spent many weeks

Lying in frozen dugouts,

Fought on Ladoga, fought on Volkhov,

He didn't take a step back.

Let's drink to those who commanded the companies,

Who died in the snow

Who made their way to Leningrad through the swamps,

Breaking the enemy's throat.

They will be glorified forever in legends

Under a machine gun blizzard

Our bayonets are on the heights of Sinyavin,

Our regiments are near Mga.

Let the Leningrad family be with us

He sits next to the table.

Let us remember how Russian soldier strength

She drove the Germans for Tikhvin!

Let's stand up and clink glasses, standing we -

Brotherhood of fighting friends,

Let's drink to the courage of the fallen heroes,

Let's drink to the meeting of the living!

Around the same time, the traitor Vlasov, traveling around German headquarters, visited Riga, Pskov, and Gatchina. He spoke to the population with “patriotic” speeches. Hitler became enraged and ordered Vitia to be placed under house arrest: the 2nd Shock Strike was beating Wehrmacht units, and its former army commander was carrying all sorts of nonsense about victory in the rear of the suffering Army Group North. By the way, the Fuhrer ordered Vlasov to be executed if he allowed anything like that to happen again. It is clear how “highly” he valued the traitor.

By May 14, 1945, 231,611 Germans with all their weapons, including 436 tanks, 1,722 guns, and 136 aircraft, surrendered to the troops of the Leningrad Front in Courland.

All those who surrendered were guaranteed life, as well as the preservation of personal property.

On April 6 of this year, in the village of Tesovo-Netylsky, Novgorod district, Novgorod region, a military-historical reconstruction of several combat episodes of April-May 1942 took place. Soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army fought here with the Germans for a rather narrow supply corridor. The official name of the event is international festival "Forgotten feat - Second Shock Army". Several hundred reenactors took part in an unusual festival, which was filmed for the military-historical portal WarSpot.

The action turned out to be noteworthy for several details: exhibits from the Tesovsky Museum of Narrow-Gauge Railway Transport were used, and the reconstruction took place in the same places where heavy fighting took place. For the first time I saw that some elements of drama were included in the script of a military-historical reconstruction, I noticed a decent number of participants who thoughtfully worked on their appearance. Well " civilians"turned out to be extremely appropriate. Perhaps this was one of the most interesting reconstructions I have ever seen.

*****

Brief historical background: when the city on the Neva was already blocked and, without surrendering, was subjected to constant attacks by the Germans, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures to unblock Leningrad. In December 1941, attempts were made to counter-offensive in the area of ​​​​the city of Tikhvin, and the success of the attackers was to be supported by the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts. A joint simultaneous powerful strike by all forces did not work out, the operation stalled, from the Tikhvin strategic offensive it turned into the Lyuban offensive, first, and then defensive, which in turn transformed into an operation to withdraw troops from encirclement.

The Volkhov Front began the Lyuban operation in January 1942, in a fierce winter with forty-degree frosts. Several stages of the offensive led to the formation of a breakthrough zone, shaped like a bottle with a neck in the Myasnoy Bor area. Our troops managed to push back the Germans, but there was a threat of encirclement, the Red Army’s offensive stopped and the “bottle” began to rapidly turn into a “cauldron”.

In April 1942, the army moved from unsuccessful offensive actions to defensive ones. On April 20, 1942, General A. A. Vlasov was appointed commander of the 2nd Shock Army. Under his leadership, the already surrounded troops tried to break out of the “bag” to their own. Being almost completely isolated, the soldiers and commanders of the Second Shock fought fiercely with the enemy.

The encircled troops were supplied through the only “corridor” that remained just near Myasny Bor, between Polist and Glushitsa. It was he who later received the name “Valley of Death” due to the large number of those who were breaking through the encirclement who died under German fire. The "Valley" was known to the Germans as "Eric's Corridor". In June 1942, the Germans managed to eliminate this only corridor. The encirclement was completed, and the destruction of the Second Shock soldiers by the Germans continued.

During May-June, the Second Shock Army under the command of A. A. Vlasov made desperate attempts to break out of the bag. Having given his troops the order to leave the encirclement as best he could, Vlasov himself, with a small group of soldiers and staff workers, after several weeks of wandering, was captured by the Germans. While in the Vinnitsa military camp for captured senior officers, Vlasov agreed to cooperate with the Nazis and headed the “Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia” (KONR) and the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA), composed of captured Soviet military personnel. So, because of one person, an undeserved shadow of betrayal fell on the tragedy and death of an entire army.

I wrote more (but still quite briefly) about these places here. If the topic interests you, read the very detailed and difficult in every sense book by B.I. Gavrilov entitled “In Myasnoy Bor, in the Valley of Death. The feat and tragedy of the 2nd Shock Army."

“I saw this sleeper after the war. It is stored in Novgorod Museum. In the fall of 1966, Nikolai Ivanovich Orlov, a lineman at the Spasskaya Polist station, found her. We managed to find the address of one of the authors unusual poster- Sergei Ivanovich Veselov. He told me that there were six of them: Russians Anatoly Bogdanov, Alexander Kudryashov, Alexander Kostrov and he, Sergey Veselov, Tatar Zakir Uldenov and Moldavian Kostya (his friends did not remember his last name). All from the 3rd Saber Squadron, 87th Cavalry Division. For five days, hungry, they wandered around enemy lines. During the day they sat in shelter, at night they walked east, guided by the lightning of a distant cannonade. When the sounds of battle began to be heard clearly, the friends decided to make a last stop and gather their strength. A dugout was spotted in the railway embankment. We went into it. The floor of the dugout was littered with spent cartridges, apparently our machine gunners were fighting off the enemy here. Kostya picked up the shell casing and placed it on the blackened sleeper that lay right there in the dugout.

“Look how great it stands out. It will be visible from afar,” he said (as S.I. Veselov writes). - Let's write a letter.

Which letter? - we were surprised.

But let’s hammer the cartridges into the sleeper so that the words come out. Let everyone read it.

I liked the idea. But what to knock out on the sleeper?

You seem to be a party member, you know better,” Kostya told me.

I offered:

- “We will win anyway.”

It’s long,” Kostrov objected. - Let's just say: “We will win!”

Kostya found a stone and began to hammer the cartridge case. She entered tightly - she bent. Kostya corrected her and hit her with the stone again. He was replaced by Sasha Kostrov. He beat me until he hurt his hand. So we took turns. And someone was on duty outside. Having finished the “letter”, they laid the sleeper across the path: let everyone see who passes here.

They crossed the front line under fire. Sasha Kostrov was killed. Both my legs were broken. Kostya and Anatoly Bogdanov carried me out to their people.”

from the book by K. F. Kalashnikov “The Right to Lead”

Before, in fact, the reconstruction, those who wished could get acquainted closely with the narrow-gauge variety of railway transport.

A rally was supposed to take place at the village memorial in the middle of the day. So that festival guests do not have doubts “Where should we go first?”, a narrow gauge train ran between the site and the memorial. It might seem like a small thing, but it’s quite possible to take off your hat to the organizers for this alone. It was imperative to attend the rally, and at the same time we also took a ride on a rare narrow-gauge train. Personally, this is my first time.

Funeral salvo. The word “pleased” in this context is not very appropriate, but when the boys, after laying wreaths by the adults, rushed to collect spent cartridges, it somehow let go inside. They are normal guys, their values ​​are normal and their memory of the event will remain correct. What they all say is true: it’s not the dead who need it, the living need it.

Heavy German weapons. This is the first time I've seen this during a reconstruction. Schwere Wurfgerat 40 (Holz). Wooden frame with a 32-cm Wurfkorper Flamm inside. A 32 cm incendiary rocket filled with crude oil. The maximum flight range of the missile was about 2000 meters with a maximum speed of 150 m/s. It was launched directly from the packaging frames, flew to the target very reluctantly, there was no need to talk about any accuracy. However, when firing across a dry meadow or forest, a mine explosion caused a fire of up to 200 square meters with a flame height of up to two to three meters. The explosion of a mine charge (weighing 1 kg) created an additional fragmentation effect.

English-language sources report that this particular installation received the nickname “Land Stuka” (Yu87 dive bomber), because of the... roar (howl) that the missiles emitted at launch. The rocket engine operates in the first third of the flight path, and then it flies by inertia. That is, they jammed the missiles of their crew, and then fell silently on enemy positions. “Im Soldatenjargon wurde es als “Stuka zu Fu?” (auf Grund des ahnlich charakteristischen Pfeifgerauschs wie bei der Ju 87 "Stuka") oder "Heulende Kuh" bezeichnet."

Jokes aside: At the end of 1941, the command of the Leningrad Front, in preparation for breaking the blockade of Leningrad surrounded by German troops, instructed engineers of the Leningrad artillery range S.M. Serebryakov and M.N. Aleshkov to develop heavy high-explosive and incendiary rocket mines. The need for such mines arose due to the fact that, despite the presence of a significant number of guns for the destruction of enemy defensive structures, the Leningrad Front did not have a sufficient amount of ammunition for them. The task assigned to the engineers was significantly facilitated by the fact that in mid-March, Soviet troops operating in the Volkhov area captured a German ammunition depot in the village of Konduya, which also stored 28Wurkor-per Spr turbojet shells. (280 mm high explosive mine) and 32 Wurkurper M.F1.50 (320 mm incendiary mine). Their design was adopted as the basis for the creation of Soviet turbojet shells M-28 (MTV-280) and M-32 (MTV-320). On the Leningrad Front, the abbreviated name “MTV” (heavy rotating mine) was used.

By July 1942, military representatives accepted 460 M-28 mines and 31 M-32 mines from Leningrad enterprises. The first were equipped with the explosive "sinal", and the second - with a flammable liquid. Military tests were carried out on July 20, 1942 in combat conditions: 192 heavy M-28 mines (more than 12 tons of explosives and steel) immediately covered two enemy battalions - Spanish volunteers from the Blue Division and the Germans who were changing them at that hour in the fortified area of ​​​​Staro-Panovo . The shooting was carried out using “frame” type launchers, on which sealed boxes with mines were placed (four for each installation). These boxes were used both for storing and transporting mines, and for launching them. The same principle was used to create the Soviet M-30 and M-31 missiles.

Well, it's time to start. To make it even more believable, cold rain fell mercilessly, the wind grew stronger, and everything in nature became the way I like it.

Inscriptions on the pillar (from top to bottom):

Field Gendarmerie

Sapper battalion

Berlin - 1321km

250th Infantry Division

Inscriptions on the pillar (from top to bottom):

Finev Meadow. Under fire! Drive without stopping!

Field Gendarmerie

Sapper battalion

Berlin - 1321km

250th Infantry Division

The Germans reoccupied the station.