G.V. Malinovsky, “Sapper armies and their role in the Great Patriotic War” // Military Historical Archive, No. 2(17). M.: Ceres, 2001.

ENGINEERING ARMIES AND THEIR ROLE IN THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

During the Great Patriotic War The engineering troops made a significant contribution to the defeat by the Soviet Armed Forces of the armies of Nazi Germany and its satellites. This is confirmed by the awarding of orders to about a thousand units and formations engineering troops, assigning them over 400 honorary titles. All of these awards, with the exception of two, were awarded in the second and third periods of the war. But the most difficult period for our troops was the first period, when the Red Army, after unsuccessful border battles, was forced to switch to strategic defense.
It was at this time that sapper armies played an important role - a rather unusual form of organization of engineering troops that had no analogues before. These armies, firstly, completed a huge amount of work on the construction of strategic and then front-line defensive lines. Secondly, they became the main base for training reserves and the formation of specialized units and formations of engineering troops for the active army. Thirdly, the sapper armies were one of the sources of staffing the rifle divisions and brigades created in the rear with private and junior command personnel.
Despite the abundance of monographs, memoirs and other publications devoted to the activities of the engineering troops during the Great Patriotic War, the history of the engineer armies in 1941-1942. did not receive adequate coverage. They are sometimes mentioned in passing when describing the events of those years, and only about their construction of defensive lines. Moreover, sometimes some sapper armies are credited with something that did not actually happen. For example, about the participation of the 1st and 3rd sapper armies in the construction of lines during the preparation for the defense of Moscow; on the formation in October 1941 of a special sapper army consisting of three brigades for the construction of the Mozhaisk defense line."
In fact, the formation of sapper armies began after German troops approached the Mozhaisk defense line; Until February 1942, the 3rd Engineer Army built defensive lines in the Yaroslavl, Gorky, Ivanovo and Vladimir regions, and the 1st Engineer Army was formed on the Western Front only at the end of December 1941. There are many similar examples. "
This article makes an attempt to show the versatile nature of the activities of sapper armies during the war. The material was prepared on the basis of the funds of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the Red Army, sapper armies and brigades of engineering troops of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, one of the main tasks of engineering support for the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the construction of military and rear defensive lines and the construction of various obstacles. At the same time, the rapid advance of strike groups of fascist German troops necessitated the creation of rear defensive lines of strategic importance in the main directions of a probable enemy offensive, which were built according to the plans of the General Staff. All these lines were created in order to somehow delay the fascist troops on them for as long as possible, to gain time to pull up forces from the depths of the country and create reserves that could be deployed in the most important directions.
Already on June 24, 1941, a decision was made to build such a line along the Luga River; June 25 - along the lines of the cities of Nevel, Vitebsk, Gomel, the Dnieper River and further to Dnepropetrovsk; and on June 28 - along the line of the cities of Ostashkov, Olenin, Dorogobuzh, Yelnya and along the Desna River to Zhukovka (50 km west of Bryansk). In mid-July, the construction of lines for the defense of Odessa, then Crimea and Sevastopol began. At the same time, the question arose about the construction of defensive lines to cover the approaches to Moscow in the Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavl directions. For this purpose, in accordance with the decision of the State Defense Committee of July 16, 1941 and the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters of July 18, 1941, the creation of the Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line begins along the lines of the cities of Rzhev, Vyazma, Kirov and the Mozhaisk defense line, the front edge of which passed along the line from the Moscow reservoir along the Lama River, the cities of Borodino, Kaluga, Tula2.
Solving the above-mentioned tasks of engineering support for the combat operations of our troops at that time was significantly complicated by the fact that the engineer battalions of many rifle divisions, engineering battalions of a number of military circles, military construction departments and units located in the construction of fortified areas on the western border3 came under the first blow The aggressor armies suffered heavy losses of personnel and equipment and were unable to withdraw in an orderly manner.
The construction of defensive lines was led by the Main Military Engineering Directorate (GVIU) of the NPO. In the front-line zone, they were erected by the army and front-line military field construction departments (transformed from the directorates of the Chief of Construction) by the forces of the military construction battalions that were part of them. The construction of rear lines of strategic importance was entrusted to the Main Directorate of Hydraulic Works (Glavgidrostroy) of the NKVD, which, by the decision of the State Defense Committee of August 11, 1941, was reorganized into the Main Directorate of Defense Works (GUOBR) of the NKVD with subordinate directorates of defensive works.
By a special decree of the State Defense Committee, construction organizations of a number of people's commissariats were also involved in the construction of rear lines (including the Moscow Construction Administration of the Palace of Soviets, Akademstroy, construction trusts "Stroitel" and the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry). The local population was also involved in the construction of these lines. However, due to the rapid advance of enemy strike groups, it was possible to equip only certain sections of the defensive lines.
At the end of September 1941, German troops of Army Group Center resumed the offensive according to the Typhoon plan in the Moscow direction, trying once again to capture Moscow. On October 10, they approached the Mozhaisk defense line, which by that time was only 30-40 percent prepared. The troops of Army Group North were rushing in the direction of Novgorod, Tikhvin, and the Svir River, trying to connect there with Finnish troops and thus expand the ring of the blockade of Leningrad. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the troops of Army Group South, having captured a significant part of Ukraine, began an offensive in the directions of Rostov and Voroshilovgrad, with the main goal of capturing the Donbass, Rostov, and then breaking through to the Caucasus and the Lower Volga. The Wehrmacht Supreme Command still hoped to realize the main goal of the Barbarossa plan - to reach the line Arkhangelsk, Kazan, Volga, Astrakhan.
The extremely difficult situation on the fronts required the prompt adoption of the necessary measures, including the construction of new strategic defensive lines. By decision of the State Defense Committee of October 12, 1941, the Moscow defense zone was created from several lines, the first of which ran along the line of Khlebnikov, Skhodnya, Zvenigorod, Kubinka, Naro-Fominsk, the Pakhra River before its confluence with the Moscow River. At the same time, the issue of constructing defensive lines in the deep strategic rear of the country to cover the most important strategic areas, economic and administrative centers is being resolved. On October 13, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted two resolutions on this issue:
GKO Resolution No. 782ss
1. Establish a Main Directorate for Defensive Construction under the NPO with the task of accelerating the construction of planned defensive lines such as field fortifications.
2. Place at the disposal of the GUOBRA4 the construction organizations of the NKVD working on defensive construction.
3. Allow the GUOBR to organize a sapper army of 300 thousand people.
4. Subordinate military field army and front-line construction organizations (“military field construction”) to the GUOBR.
5. The task of the GUOBR:
construction of the first line from Medvezhya Gora along the eastern shore of Lake Onega and the eastern shore of the Catherine Canal. Cherepovets UR, Rybinsk-Yaroslavsko-Ivanovozneseneky UR, Gorky UR, line Oka, Tsna, Don;
and at the same time, the construction of a second line along the northern and eastern banks of the Volga from the Gorky UR to Astrakhan, with the Kazan, Ulyanovsk, Kuibyshev URs (double line). Saratov, Stalingrad.
Completion of work on December 10, 1941
6. Special groups of builders under the leadership of the GUOBR will be entrusted with the construction of a defensive line in the foothills area North Caucasus from Temryuk, along the southern bank of the Kuban River, through the Batalpashinsky foothills and further along the southern bank of the Terek to the Caspian Sea, while having the simultaneous construction of the Krasnodar, Tikhoretsky, Stavropol, Grozny levels.
7. Appoint the head of the Main State Military Institution of the NPO, Comrade Kotlyar, as the head of the Main Directorate of Regional Development, Comrade Pavlov, as the first deputy head of the Main Directorate for the Prevention of Internal Affairs, Comrade Salashchenko, as the second deputy.
8. Have a headquarters under the head of the GUOBR.
9. To entrust the general management of defensive construction to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Beria"
Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. Stalin5
GKO Resolution No. 787ss
In order to ensure the construction of deep rear lines and the simultaneous training of combat engineer units, the State Defense Committee decides:
1. Form six sapper armies, each consisting of five sapper brigades. Brigade composition: nineteen engineer battalions, one motor-tractor battalion and one mechanization detachment.
2. The sapper armies will be staffed by calling up reserves under the age of 45, primarily contingents withdrawn from the front line and construction specialties, in the amount of 300,000 people. Those mobilized are required to arrive in warm clothes, have two pairs of underwear, a mug and a spoon.
3. The formation of engineer battalions, brigades, armies, and motor-tractor battalions should be completed by November 1st of this year. with the deployment of army headquarters:
1st Engineer Army - Vologda;
2nd Engineer Army - Gorky;
3rd Engineer Army - Ulyanovsk;
4th Engineer Army - Saratov;
5th Engineer Army - Stalingrad;
6th Engineer Army - Armavir,
and sapper brigades and battalions in the areas of work of approved defensive lines.
4. For combat training and internal security, arm 5% of the personnel of the sapper armies6.

Paragraphs 5-21 of this GKO Resolution and two appendices to it indicate the transport allocated for the needs of the sapper armies (3,000 trucks and 90 passenger cars and 1,500 various tires for them, 1,350 tracked tractors, 2,350 tractor and trailers), construction materials (10,000 cars round timber and 2,000 wagons of lumber, plumbing and entrenching tools (420,000 axes, pick-hoes, crowbars, shovels, steel wedges and entrenching hammers weighing 2-4 kg, as well as means of blasting frozen soil. The USSR State Planning Committee is also named there). . , Gorky, Ryazan, Tambov, Saratov, Stalingrad and Rostov), ​​Krasnodar and Ordzhonikidze territories, respectively responsible for the supply of the above transport and materials within the specified time frame (mainly in October-November 1941), fuel and lubricants, transportation of contingents for staffing sapper armies. The People's Commissariat of Defense has been instructed to provide commissariat supplies to engineer armies and all military formations included in them.
Financing of work on the construction of defensive lines was entrusted to the Narkomfin on the basis of monthly requests from the State Military Institution of the NPO7.
In agreement with the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was decided to form 10 sapper armies within the limits of the number of personnel and the number of sapper brigades determined by the GKO resolution. By November 1, 1941, 9 sapper armies were formed. Initially, they were subordinate to the Main Directorate of Defensive Construction of the NKO, which was part of the GVIU NKO, and from November 28, 1941 - directly to the Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Red Army.
Each sapper army consisted of an army administration headed by a military council (staff No. 012/91, staffing: 40 military personnel and 35 civilians) and 2-4 separate sapper brigades. The sapper brigade included: brigade management (staff No. 012/92, 43 military personnel and 33 civilians); 19 separate sapper battalions from 3 companies of 4 platoons (staff No. 012/93,497 military personnel);
a mechanization detachment, which included a platoon of road and bridge works, a logging platoon, a platoon of positional work (staff No. 012/94,102 military personnel) and a separate auto-tractor battalion from an automobile and tractor company of 4 platoons each (staff No. 012/95,391 military personnel)*. The regular strength of the sapper brigade is 9979 military personnel. In reality, due to a number of reasons, the staffing of battalions and brigades of engineer armies extremely rarely reached the regular strength.
A number of front-line and army military field construction departments with the senior work producer departments that were part of them, all five defensive construction departments of the Main Directorate of Defense Works of the NKVD, the Southern Construction Trust of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry and a number of others were turned to the formation of the management level of sapper armies and brigades. construction organizations involved in the construction of defensive lines. Many heads of these departments were appointed commanders of sapper armies and commanders of sapper brigades. Among them, the head of the 5th Directorate of Defense Works, military engineer of the 1st rank A.N. Komarovsky, and the head of the Military Field Construction Directorate were promoted to the post of army commanders Western Front senior major of state security M.M. Maltsev9, head of the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry for the construction of defensive lines - deputy. People's Commissar Brigade Engineer D.G. Onika, Head of the Akademstroy Trust of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1st Rank Military Engineer A.S. Kornev, Heads of the NKVD Defense Works Departments, 3rd Rank State Security Commissioner S.N. Kruglov, Senior State Security Major L.E. .Vladzimirsky, state security major M.M. Tsarevsky.
The average command staff of engineer brigades and their battalions was largely composed of graduates of military engineering schools, as well as commanders called up from the reserves. Thus, at the end of October 1941, at the Leningrad, Borisov, Arkhangelsk and other military engineering schools, commanders were quickly graduated after a 3-month training course. Of these, 3,545 people were sent as platoon and company commanders to sapper armies. However, this only satisfied 50 percent of the staffing needs of the platoon and company level command staff of the engineer armies that existed at that time." °.
The recruitment of sapper battalions with privates and junior commanders occurred mainly through the conscription of reserve military personnel under the age of 45. Sometimes the sapper brigades included military construction, sapper and work battalions of military construction organizations, including those on the basis of which these brigades were formed. As a result, up to a dozen supernumerary battalions appeared in some sapper brigades (for example, the 13th and 14th sapper brigades had 28 battalions each), which were soon transferred to military field construction departments. To train their junior command staff, temporary non-staff training battalions, schools and companies were created in the engineer brigades. In some brigades, the process of forming battalions took up to two months. As the sapper battalions were completed staffing, they began work on the construction of defensive lines.
By decision of the State Defense Committee, the local population was mobilized for the construction of defensive lines. Mostly they were women
old people, schoolchildren and teenagers of pre-conscription age: From them, according to the orders of the military councils of the fronts and military districts, regional and regional party and administrative bodies, working battalions were formed, which came under the command of the sapper armies." Some sapper armies were temporarily assigned military field construction (and with March 1942 - and front-line defense construction departments).
Strategic rear defensive lines were a system of battalion defense areas and company strongholds prepared in terms of fortification, created in the main directions of probable enemy advance and on defensive contours around large cities. Initially in a number of areas, incl. in the Stalingrad, North Caucasus and Volga military districts, these lines were erected continuous. On December 27, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 1068ss “On reducing the construction of defensive lines.” In order to provide labor and transport for threshing and exporting grain, as well as in connection with the changed situation at the front, it was decided: to suspend the construction of some defensive lines, including the Trans-Volga line from Rybinsk to Astrakhan, the contours of the cities of Ivanovo and Penza; limit ourselves to the construction of a number of boundaries and planned city lines in the most important directions; continue the construction of the Vladimir line and the line of Vytegra, Cherepovets, Rybinsk, the contours of the cities of Rostov-on-Don and Astrakhan; upon completion of the construction of lines and bypasses (accordingly, the completion dates for work are indicated from January 1 to January 30), release the mobilized population and transport12. In accordance with this decree of the State Defense Committee, the General Staff gave instructions to partially move to the construction of individual defense support units in the main directions13.
A 12-hour working day was established for engineer battalions working on the lines, including 2 hours allocated for combat training. In fact, they worked 12-14 hours a day and there was no time left for combat training. Until February 1942, sapper armies were constructing designated lines - each on a section of this line assigned to it. At the same time, the location of the defensive lines changed somewhat: the line along the Oka and Tsna rivers was shifted to the east (See the diagram “Sapper armies in the construction of strategic rear defensive lines (November 1941)”).
The 2nd Engineer Army was formed in the Arkhangelsk Military District in the city of Vologda (hereinafter the location of the army command and control is indicated - G.M.) as part of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Engineer Brigades, the formation of which was directed to the 6th, 7th and 8th -th army departments of military field construction. She built defensive structures in the Vologda region for the 39th, 58th and 59th armies at the border of the cities of Vytegra, Cherepovets, Poshekhonovo and the Vologda defensive circuit. 10 sapper battalions of the 1st sapper brigade were sent to the Karelian Front to create barriers along the lines of the cities of Medvezhyegorsk, Pudozh, Vytegra. The army was commanded by State Security Major M.M. Tsarevsky (November 1941 - February 1942).
The 3rd Engineer Army was formed in the Moscow Military District in the city of Yaroslavl as part of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Engineer Brigades and built defensive structures in the Yaroslavl, Ivanovo and Gorky regions at the line of Poshekhonovo, Rybinsk, Gorky, Cheboksary and the Ivanovo defensive contour . At the end of December 1941, three sapper brigades were transferred to the construction of the Vladimir defensive line. The army was commanded by: Senior Major of State Security Ya.D. Rappoport (November 1941 - February 1942), Major General of the Engineering Troops IA. Petrov (February - April 1942), Colonel I.N. Brynzov (April - August 1942 .), Colonel S.P. Grechkin (August-September 1942)14.
The 4th Engineer Army was formed in the Volga Military District in the city of Kuibyshev as part of the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Engineer Brigades. She built defensive structures in the Chuvash and Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, the Kuibyshev region at the border of Cheboksary, Kazan, Ulyanovsk, Syzran, Khvalynsk, as well as the Kazan and Kuibyshev defensive contours. The 10th and 11th engineer brigades were involved in the construction of the Ball Bearing plant and an aircraft plant at Bezymyanna station in the city of Kuibyshev. The army was commanded by: State Security Commissioner 3rd rank S.N. Kruglov (November 1941 - January 1942), State Security Major G.D. Afanasyev (January - March 1942), Colonel M.A. Kovin (March-May 1942).
The 5th Engineer Army was formed in the North Caucasus Military District in the city of Stalingrad on the basis of the 5th Defense Works Directorate of the NKVD, the 16th and 18th Army Field Construction Directorates consisting of the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Engineer Brigades and then transferred to the Stalingrad Military District15. Initially it was located at the line of Khvalynsk, Saratov, Kamyshin, Stalingrad, and then built two external defensive contours of the city of Stalingrad, the Astrakhan defensive line in the area of ​​Zamostye, Chernyshevskaya, Boguchar and the defensive contour of the city of Astrakhan. It was assigned the 5th and 19th military field construction departments. In January 1941 the army was transferred
for the construction of the Rostov defensive circuit. The army was commanded by: brigade engineer A.N. Komarovsky (November 1941-January 1942), Colonel I.E. Pruss (January-March 1942).
The 6th Engineer Army was formed in the Volga Military District in the city of Penza as part of the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Engineer Brigades. She erected the Volga-Sursky defensive line in the Penza region and the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the area of ​​Vasilsursk, Saransk, Penza, Petrovskoye. The army was commanded by: 1st rank military engineer A.S. Kornev (October 1941 - March 1942), Colonel M.I. Chernykh (March - May 1942), 1st rank military engineer A. Gandreev (May - June 1942), Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops A.S. Gundorov (June - September 1942).
The 7th Engineer Army was formed in the Volga Military District in the city of Saratov on the basis of the 2nd, 15th, 17th and 19th Military Field Construction Directorates as part of the 20th, 21st and 22nd Engineer Brigades and then transferred to the Stalingrad Military District. She erected defensive structures in the Saratov and Stalingrad regions at the turn of Petrovskoye, Atkarsk, Frolov. The army was commanded by: Colonel V.V. Kosarev (November 1941 - March 1942), Colonel I.E. Pruss (March-June 1942), Major General of the Technical Troops V.S. Kosenko (June - September 1942 G.).
The 8th Engineer Army was formed in the North Caucasus Military District in the city of Salsk as part of the 23, 24, 25 and 26th Engineer Brigades. It was stationed at the line between Rostov and Stalingrad. Together with the 8th Directorate of Oboronstroy (the former special department of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry), she began the construction of defensive structures in the Stalingrad and Rostov regions, concentrating the main forces on the construction of the Don defensive line along the Aksai, Don and Seversky Donets rivers. Since December 1941, all brigades were transferred to the construction of the lines of the Rostov defensive contour. The army was commanded by: brigade engineer D.G. Onika (October 1941 - January 1942), Major General of the Engineering Troops K.S. Nazarov (January - March 1942), Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops A.S. Gundorov ( March - May 1942), Colonel D.I. Suslin (May - July 1942), Colonel I.E. Salashchenko (July - October 1942).
The 9th Engineer Army was formed in the North Caucasus Military District in the city of Krasnodar as part of the 27th and 28th Engineer Brigades. She built defensive structures in the Ordzhonikidze region at the border of Pyatigorsk, Krasnodar, and the Kerch Strait. The army was commanded by: senior state security major L.E. Vladzimirsky (November 1941 - January 1942), military engineer 1st rank M.I. Chernykh (January - March 1942).
The 10th Engineer Army was formed in the North Caucasus Military | district in the city of Grozny as part of the 29th and 30th sapper brigades. She built defensive structures in the Ordzhonikidze region and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic at the border of Pyatigorsk, Grozny, and the Caspian Sea. The army was commanded by State Security Major M.M. Maltsev (November 1941 - March 1942)16.
Thus, in nine engineer armies there were 30 engineer brigades, which included 570 regular engineer battalions (Nos. 1200-1465, 1467-1541, 1543-1771; two engineer battalions had the same number 1485, and three numbers were missing). Automotive battalions and mechanization detachments did not have their own numbers (sometimes they were named after the number of the sapper brigade). The total initial strength of military personnel in the nine engineer armies was 299,730. In several brigades, engineer battalions initially had a different numbering, which was changed accordingly in November 1941.
At the same time, it was planned to form the 1st Engineer Army with its command located in the city of Medvezhyegorsk. In the summary of the Main Military Institution of the NPO dated November 7, 1941, “Dislocation of the directorates of engineer armies and headquarters of engineer brigades,” it is indicated that the 1st engineer army on the Karelian Front is building line No. 1 Medvezhyegorsk, Vytegra within the Karelo-Finnish Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Vologda region and is allocated 10 sapper battalions. Head of the Army Department17 - State Security Major K.S. Sergeev.
In the report “The progress of the formation of sapper armies on December 10, 1941” Also on the Karelian Front, at the same line, the 1st Engineer Army 1K is listed. But this army was never formed. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 00110 dated November 19, 1941, the GVIU NKO formed three operational engineering groups intended to construct barriers. Operational Engineering Group No. 1 was sent to the Karelian Front and merged with ten sapper battalions of the 1st Sapper Brigade of the 2nd Sapper Army in Pudozhskaya task force, subordinate to the Karelian Front. This group carried out work on installing reinforced barriers on east coast Lake Onega in the area Medvezhyegorsk, Pudozh, Vytegra. In this regard, the 1st Engineer Army was not formed at that time.
At that time, on the Western Front, work on the construction of defensive lines was carried out by two front-line and twelve army field construction departments, which included 80 sapper battalions. The practice of the work of sapper units to support the actions of front troops showed that the control of sapper battalions through military field construction is not justified, since their apparatus was cumbersome. On December 21, 1941, the Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Western Front, Major General M.P. Vorobyov, addressed the Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Red Army, Major General L.Z. Kotlyar, with a proposal to switch to managing engineer battalions through the engineer army and engineer brigades, for which purpose to reorganize military field construction of the front into an engineer army consisting of 10 engineer brigades of 8 engineer battalions each, and the commander of the engineer army is to appoint a part-time chief of the front engineering troops. At the same time, the number of personnel in the engineer army departments and engineer brigades was reduced by 1,258 people compared to the number of front military field construction departments. This proposal was accepted.
In accordance with the directive of the deputy NCO No. org/5/3756 dated December 24, 1941, on the basis of the 5th front-line military field construction directorate and the front-line military field construction directorate of the Western Front, 11 army military field construction directorates (No. 2 ,4,6,11, 12,13,20,21,22,24 and 26) was formed according to the existing states, the 1st Engineer Army consisting of the 31st -40th Engineer Brigades of 8 engineer battalions (a total of 80 engineer battalions, No. 773-852), an automobile and tractor battalion and a mechanization detachment. The total number of military personnel in the army was 45,160 people. On December 31, 1941, the 1st Engineer Army became part of the Western Front. The army was commanded by Major General M.P. Vorobiev (December 1941 - March 1942). During the winter campaign of 1941/1942. its sapper brigades mainly served the rear routes of the front armies (they were engaged in demining and clearing roads from rubble, clearing them of snow, building bridges)19.
By order of NKO No. 050 of December 19, 1941, it was decided to organize the publication of newspapers of the sapper armies with a frequency of publication twice a week with a circulation of 10 thousand copies each. The newspapers were given the following names: in the 1st Sapper Army “Son of the Fatherland”, in the 2nd Sapper Army “Red Sapper”, in the 3rd Sapper Army “Soviet Patriot”, in the 4th Sapper Army “For the Fatherland”, in 5th sapper army "At the combat post", in the 6th sapper army "Combat tempo", in the 7th sapper army "Valor", in the 8th sapper army "For the defense of the Motherland", in the 9th sapper army “The word of a fighter”, in the 10th Engineer Army “Courage”20.
It should be noted that there are serious difficulties in providing sapper teams with the required equipment. Thus, the personnel of the 9th Engineer Brigade of the 4th Engineer Army in November-December 1941 went to the construction of defensive lines in bast shoes purchased by the brigade command, since the units had no shoes. Subsequently, the production of bast shoes was established in the battalions, which employed 10 percent of the personnel. There were not enough entrenching tools, and there were almost no means of mechanizing construction work. The situation with weapons was especially difficult. In November 1941, the 24th Engineer Brigade had only 1 light machine gun and 18 rifles (including 11 Czech and 3 Japanese). There weren’t enough of them even for guard duty, and the sentries handed over weapons to the next shift right at the posts. In December 1941, the 18th engineer brigade had 2 machine guns and 130 rifles, the 29th engineer brigade had 59 rifles and 13 revolvers, and the 30th engineer brigade had 89 rifles and 11 revolvers. The situation with weapons was similar in other brigades. In the following months, sapper brigades were provided with weapons in accordance with the State Defense Committee decree of October 13, 1941, only 5 percent of what was required according to the staff list. In October 1942, in connection with the involvement of a number of sapper brigades in the engineering support of combat operations of front units, the head of the engineering troops of the North-Western Front petitioned the Chief of the Red Army Engineering Troops to cancel this order and issue weapons according to the report card21.
Along with the construction of defensive lines, sapper brigades immediately became the main training base for engineering units for the active army. On the instructions of the head of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army, on November 20-25, 1941, two sapper battalions, called training battalions, were allocated in all sapper brigades, and they began to prepare them for sending to the army.
On November 28, 1941, Order No. 0450 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was issued, “On the underestimation of the engineering service and the improper use of engineering troops and means,” which provided for a number of measures to improve the organization of the engineering service in the Red Army and improve the use of engineering units. Among other things, the position of Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Red Army was introduced (instead of the Chief of the GVIU KA). The chief of the engineering troops of the Red Army was instructed to create 90 combat engineer battalions in the 1-30th engineer brigades as a reserve of the Supreme High Command within 20 days.
For this purpose, the number of training battalions in each sapper brigade was increased to 90. They were staffed with the most trained command and rank and file personnel in all respects. These battalions were freed from work on defensive lines, and combat training was organized according to a 200-hour training program (with a 10-hour training day). The main attention was paid to training soldiers in mining, demining, demolition work, as well as their engineering and tactical training. Some of the training battalions were trained according to the profile of pontoon-bridge and road-bridge units.
The allocation of engineer battalions as training battalions continued and? in the following months. Thus, in the 3rd Engineer Brigade by February 1942, 26 engineer battalions were allocated for this purpose. After completing a combat training course, these battalions were sent to the front as sapper battalions or reorganized into mine-sapper, mine-blasting, engineering, road-bridge and pontoon-bridge battalions of army and front-line subordination. And new battalions were assigned to training and the brigades were equipped with the same numbers as the engineer battalions of the 2nd formation. The following examples give some idea of ​​the progress of training in sapper brigades of engineering units for the front. Thus, in four brigades of the 4th Engineer Army, on November 20, 1941, 8 engineer battalions were trained, which were transferred to the front during January 8-10, 1942; from December 10, another 8 sapper battalions began combat training, and on February 24 - March 5, 1942 they were sent to the active army; On January 15, 8 more sapper battalions were assigned as training battalions. In the brigades of the 6th Engineer Army, by the end of March 1942, 9 pontoon-bridge and 8 engineering battalions were trained and sent to the front. By February 20, 1942, engineer brigades sent 29 battalions of various specializations to the active army23.
At the same time, sapper brigades were a constant source of personnel (and sometimes horses) for newly organized rifle formations. On November 26, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the disbandment and reduction of technical and engineering troops to support the newly formed rifle divisions and brigades. In accordance with the directives of the deputy NKO No. org/5/542594-542598 dated December 28, 1941, in the Volga, Stalingrad, North Caucasus, Arkhangelsk and Moscow military districts, by January 10, 1942, they were subject to disbandment in the 1st - 30th sapper brigades have 100 engineer battalions and 30 mechanization detachments (including due to the lack of means of mechanization of construction work). In the brigades of the 2,9, and 10th engineer armies, 2 engineer battalions were disbanded, in the brigades of the 3,4 and 6th engineer armies - 3 engineer battalions, in the brigades of the 5th and 8th engineer armies - 4 battalions and in brigades of the 7th Engineer Army - 6 engineer battalions. From these and all other sapper battalions (except for the training battalions located in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command), private and junior command personnel fit for combat service were withdrawn and sent to staff the formed rifle formations; For more than 4 years, the personnel of the disbanded battalions were used to cover the shortage in the remaining engineer battalions, and the working columns were recruited from the remnants of the supernumerary personnel24.
In accordance with the order of the NKO No. 036 of January 17, 1942, healthy and efficient riding and baggage horses were withdrawn from the 2nd - 10th sapper armies (according to the calculation attached to the order). By February 1, 1942, the sapper armies of the Moscow, Volga, Stalingrad and North Caucasus military districts transferred the horse corps to the reserve cavalry regiments, and the 2nd sapper army of the Arkhangelsk Military District transferred them to the 14th cavalry corps. From this army, 1,756 riding and baggage horses were to be transferred. In fact, less than the estimated number of horses was transferred, since representatives of the cavalry regiments refused most of the horses offered due to their deplorable condition. Thus, the 2nd Engineer Brigade presented 474 horses for inspection, but the commission accepted only 67 horses; of the 724 horses presented by the 3rd Engineer Brigade, only 85 were accepted (including 1 riding)25.
It should be emphasized that in connection with the sending of engineer battalions to the front, their disbandment to staff rifle divisions and the transfer of engineer battalions to other engineer brigades, the composition of the latter was constantly changing. From the new reinforcements arriving in the sapper brigades, sapper battalions of the 2nd or even 3rd formation were created under the same numbers. In this regard, it is very difficult to trace the entire dynamics of the reorganization of 570 engineer battalions of the 1-30th engineer brigades. The composition of the brigades of the 1st Engineer Army of the Western Front was more stable, from which engineer battalions were not withdrawn. Due to the movement of sapper brigades, the composition of sapper armies also changed. (See table 1. “Subordination and composition of sapper armies in 1941-1942”).
During the winter campaign of 1941-1942. Soviet troops carried out a series of offensive operations and inflicted a serious defeat on the shock groupings of the armies “North” near Tikhvin and “Center” near Moscow. As a result, in the main directions of active operations of the Red Army, the enemy was thrown back 150-400 km. This success also had a certain merit to the builders of defensive lines. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 21, 1942, for the exemplary fulfillment of the Government’s tasks for the construction of fortified lines against the German invaders, 926 people were awarded orders and medals, including the Order of Lenin 9 people, the Order of the Red Banner - 10, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor - 76, Order of the Red Star - 63, Order of the Badge of Honor - 196, Medal "For Courage" - 7, medal -
I award “For Labor Valor” - 248, the medal “For Military Merit” - 19, the medal “For Labor Distinction” - 298 people. Among those awarded the Order of Lenin are the commanders of the sapper armies, state security major M.M. Maltsev, senior state security major Ya.D. Rapopport, and the Order of the Red Banner - brigade engineer A.N. Komarovsky, colonel I.E. Pruss, state security major M.M. Tsarevsky26.
At the same time, the situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front became more complicated. All this required the Supreme High Command to take appropriate organizational measures to consolidate success in the North-Western and Western directions and concentrate efforts on the South-Western and Southern fronts. The organizational events carried out also concerned the sapper armies.
On February 1, 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 1229ss “On the formation of new 50 rifle divisions and 100 cadet brigades.” To staff them with personnel, horses, carts and vehicles, among other planned measures, there was paragraph 9-a of this resolution, according to which eight sapper armies (2,3,4,5,6,7,9 and 10th) with a total strength of 164,150 people27.
Three days later, on February 4, 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted a new resolution No. 1239ss, in which paragraph 9-a of the previous resolution was given in a new edition, according to which the directorates of five engineer armies (2,4,5,9 and 10 and nine engineer brigades ( 5,7,8,9,10,11,13,16 and 22nd) were disbanded; three sapper brigades (1, 2 and 3rd) were transferred to the Karelian, Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, and six sapper brigades (14). , 15,27,28,29 and 30th) were part of the 7th and 8th sapper armies, which were subordinate to the Southwestern and Southern fronts, respectively. The 6th sapper army consisted of three brigades (17,18 and. 19th) was subordinate to the Bryansk Front, and the 3rd Sapper Army, consisting of the 4th and 6th Sapper Brigades, was assigned to the Moscow defense zone for work in the Mozhaisk direction. The Main Directorate for the formation and staffing of the Red Army troops was allowed to withdraw privates and juniors. command personnel fit for combat service from the sapper armies, reducing the number of sapper battalions in the sapper armies according to the number of people withdrawn28.
The reorganization of the sapper armies made it possible to significantly strengthen the Southwestern Front with sapper brigades (7th sapper army with five sapper brigades) and especially the Southern Front, to which the 8th sapper army with 10 sapper brigades was subordinated (it also included the 10th and 11th -I sapper brigades that were not disbanded). Due to the withdrawal of personnel for the newly formed rifle divisions, the number of battalions in the engineer brigades was reduced. Thus, in the 2nd, 3rd and 12th engineer brigades, six engineer battalions were disbanded, in the 21st brigade - three battalions, from the 23,24,25 and 26th engineer brigades of the 8th engineer army, 9652 were sent to reserve rifle regiments person. The private and junior command personnel of the seven disbanded brigades were completely assigned to staff rifle formations, and those unfit for combat service were sent to work columns29.
At the same time, training continued in the sapper brigades of specialized units of the engineering troops. Thus, in March 1942, three sapper battalions in the 3, 17, 18 and 19 sapper brigades were reorganized into pontoon-bridge battalions and transferred to the front. By May 21, 1942, already 67 battalions from the Reserve of the Supreme High Command were on the Karelian, Leningrad, Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin, Bryansk, South-Western and Crimean fronts.
In accordance with the order of NKO No. 0294 of April 19, 1942 “On the withdrawal of personnel from the disbanded and downsized military-technical and engineering units of the Red Army,” organizational measures are being carried out in the engineering troops by May 1. They also affected sapper brigades: all sapper battalions switched to new staffs of smaller numbers (staff No. 012/155, strength - 405 military personnel), motor-tractor battalions were reorganized into motor-tractor companies consisting of four automobile and one tractor platoons (staff No. 012/156, 260 military personnel). In all brigades, seven engineer battalions and a motor-tractor company remained (the brigade's full-time strength was 3,138 military personnel; mechanization units were retained in the engineer brigades of the 1st Engineer Army); the surplus 98 engineer battalions were disbanded. To characterize the situation in some sapper brigades in connection with the withdrawal of personnel from rifle divisions and the sending of trained sapper battalions to the front, the following example is very indicative: by this time, in the 2nd sapper brigade, which was located on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, there were no sapper battalions left at all (six battalions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, after training, were transferred to the active army, and the remaining battalions have already been disbanded to staff the newly formed rifle divisions). In connection with this above-mentioned order, the NKO 2nd Engineer Brigade was given six engineer battalions from the 1st Engineer Brigade and one engineer battalion from the 11th Engineer Brigade. Three sapper battalions from the 11th sapper brigade were introduced into the 3rd engineer brigade of the Volkhov Front, where only four engineer battalions remained.
The practice of managing the activities of sapper brigades has shown that in order to quickly solve the problems facing them, it is advisable to increase the control apparatus of the sapper armies: by July 5, 1942, the directorates of the sapper armies were transferred to larger staffs (Staff No. 012/2, 122 military personnel and 62 civilians; introduced by NKO order No. 0519 of June 25, 1942)31.
During the summer-autumn campaign, the main efforts of the engineering troops were aimed at supporting the defensive operations of the Red Army. Back on March 26, 1942. GKO Resolution No. 1501 was adopted “On the construction of new and restoration of defensive lines.” The military councils of the Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin, Western, Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts, the 7th Army and the head of the Main Directorate of OS NKO were instructed to begin the construction and restoration of defensive lines and contours of the cities of Tula, Voronezh, Voroshilovgrad, Rostov and Stalingrad. It is proposed to devote the main forces and resources primarily to the construction of lines within the borders of the Southern, Southwestern fronts and the Moscow defense zone. This work will be carried out by the sapper armies and the construction bodies of the Main Directorate of Defense Construction, for which purpose seven defense construction departments will be created within it (each of which had from three to seven military field construction departments). At the same time, the construction of rear defensive lines in the Vladimir and Ryazan regions, the city of Boguchar, Art. Tsymlyanskaya and the bypass of the city of Kuibyshev32. In May 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave instructions on the creation and development of defensive lines along the entire Soviet-German front. Since February 1942, the sapper armies have carried out the following work:
The 1st Engineer Army (without the 35th Engineer Brigade, which left for the North-Western Front in March 1942) on the Western Front restored and improved the Mozhaisk LINE of defense, built and repaired roads and bridges, equipped airstrips, and arranged barriers and mine clearance, and also carried out the task of manufacturing wooden bridge parks and sapper boats for front-line engineering units. A number of engineer battalions of the 32, 36, 38 and 40th engineer brigades supported the combat operations of the front's rifle formations.
The 3rd Engineer Army, consisting of the 4th and 6th Engineer Brigades, subordinate to the commander of the Moscow Defense Zone, since February 1942.
restored the lines of the Mozhaisk defense line and, together with the 36th and 37th sapper brigades of the 1st Sapper Army, participated in the construction of eight fortified areas on the distant approaches to Moscow.
The 6th Engineer Army, consisting of the 17th, 18th and 19th Engineer Brigades, arrived on the Bryansk Front in February 1942, where it built a defensive line along the Don River and crossings across it, then built the Voronezh defensive line, the Voronezh defensive line and rear defensive the lines of the 40th and 60th armies; sapper brigades supported the combat operations of front troops in the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad defensive operation of 1942.
Since February 1942, the 7th Engineer Army, consisting of the 12,14,15, 20 and 21st Engineer Brigades on the Southwestern Front, has been building a defensive line in the Voroshilovgrad region along the Oskol and Don rivers; from July 12, on the Stalingrad Front, she built a defensive line in the Rostov region along the left bank of the Don River, then the contours of the second stage of the city of Stalingrad. Sapper brigades supported the combat operations of front troops in the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad and Stalingrad defensive operations of 1942.
The 8th Engineer Army, consisting of the 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30th (from May - 10th and 11th) engineer brigades, has been operating on the Southern Front since February 1942. Together with the front defensive construction department, it participates in the creation of the Voroshilovgrad and Rostov defensive contours, a field defensive line in the Rivne and Voroshilovgrad directions. Since July 27, as part of the North Caucasus Front, and since September 1, 1942, as part of the Transcaucasian Front, the army has been building defensive lines in the foothills of the North Caucasus: Ordzhonikidze, Grozny, Mineralvodchesky and Aksai bypasses, Tersky, Sunzhensky, Urukh, Gudermes lines, constructing barriers in Daryal Gorge and Elkhotovsky defile, provides combat operations of front troops during the Donbass defensive operation and the defense of the Caucasus. Part of the sapper battalions carried out the construction of defensive structures on the front line of the 9th and 56th armies, built a floating bridge across the Don River in the Rostov region, and participated in camouflage and defense of field airfields.
At the same time, a number of sapper battalions of the 6th and 8th sapper armies were sent to build the lines of the Stalingrad defensive perimeter33.
Defensive lines created in advance with the participation of sapper armies made it possible for our troops, during the retreat, to occupy already prepared positions and more successfully restrain the enemy rushing to the Caucasus and the Volga. At the same time, our army was undergoing comprehensive preparations for the upcoming offensive operations. In this regard, the issue of replenishing front-line and reserve units with personnel was also resolved. On July 26, 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted the resolution “Issues of NGOs,” which defined measures to find human resources for the active army, military schools and new formations being formed. The heads of the main departments of NPOs were ordered, on personal responsibility, to reduce personnel by 400,000 people by August 20 according to the attached calculation. The engineering troops were reduced by 60,000 people. The released contingents of private and junior command personnel, fit for combat service, also conveyed the order of the head of the Head of the Praforma, Colonel General E.A. Shchadenko34. At the same time, the planned change in the methods and forms of combat operations of the Red Army in the winter campaign urgently required further improvement of the organizational forms of the engineering troops, their greater maneuverability and massive use in the most important areas. Under these conditions, engineer armies, organizationally too cumbersome and inactive, could not effectively carry out the tasks of engineering support for the combat operations of our troops, especially in offensive operations. Therefore, it was decided to abolish the sapper armies, which by that time included 27 sapper brigades (the 27th and 33rd sapper brigades had already been reorganized into special-purpose engineering brigades of the RVGK in April - May).
In accordance with the NKO order No. 00176 of August 17, 1942, the directorates of the engineer armies were reorganized into the directorates of defensive construction, thirteen engineer brigades were subordinated directly to the fronts as RVGK brigades, six engineer brigades were transferred to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, and eight engineer brigades were subject to disbandment. At the same time, from the sixteen sapper brigades of the 1st, 7th and 8th sapper armies, 30,000 people were allocated, fit for combat service to staff rifle divisions.
On September 1, 1942, the 1st Engineer Army Directorate was reorganized into the 33rd Defense Construction Directorate. The 36th and 37th engineer brigades were withdrawn to the Supreme High Command Reserve. From the 32,34,38,39 and 40th engineer brigades, 8,000 people fit for combat service were allocated to the Commander of the Moscow Military District, after which the 32nd and 34th engineer brigades were formed from the remnants of the personnel, which, together with The 31st sapper brigade remained subordinate to the Western Front, and the 38, 39 and 40th sapper brigades were disbanded. (During the process of reorganization, the 34th engineer brigade was disbanded and the 34th engineer brigade of the 2nd formation was created from three engineer battalions and the control of the 38th engineer brigade and four engineer battalions and a mechanization detachment of the 40th engineer brigade).
On September 12, 1942, the 3rd Engineer Army Directorate was reorganized into the 34th Defense Construction Directorate, and the 4th and 6th Engineer Brigades were transferred to the Supreme Command Reserve and disbanded.
On September 13, 1942, the Directorate of the 6th Sapper Army was reorganized into the 35th Directorate of Defensive Construction, the 17th and 18th Sapper Brigades were transferred to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, and the 10th and 18th Sapper Brigades were subordinated to Voronezh and Bryansk, respectively. fronts.
On September 15, 1942, the Directorate of the 7th Sapper Army was reorganized into the 36th Directorate of Defensive Construction; from the 12, 14, 15 and 20th Sapper Brigades, 6,000 privates and junior commanders fit for combat service were allocated to the commander of the Volga Military District. , and the remnants of the personnel of these brigades were brought together into the 12th and 20th sapper brigades, which were directly subordinated to the Stalingrad Front. The 14th and 15th sapper brigades were disbanded.
On October 15, 1942, the 8th Engineer Army Directorate was reorganized into the 24th Defense Construction Directorate. From the 11, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29 and 30th engineer brigades, 16 thousand people fit for combat service were allocated to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, after which the 11, 23, 25 and 26th were formed from the remnants of the personnel sapper brigades, which, together with the 24th sapper brigade, remained subordinate to the Transcaucasian Front, and the 28th, 29th and 30th sapper brigades were disbanded35.
Thus, the sapper armies, having fulfilled their purpose of constructing defensive lines, preparing a reserve of engineering troops and staffing the newly formed rifle divisions with private and junior command personnel, ceased to exist. The remaining sapper brigades (by this time the 7th, 9th and 17th sapper brigades of the 2nd formation, subordinate to the fronts, had already been formed), along with carrying out the current tasks of engineering support for the troops, continued to be the basis for the formation of specialized engineering units and formations for the active army .
Thus, on September 29-30, 1942, all seven engineer battalions of the 36th engineer brigade were reorganized into army engineering battalions and transferred to the armies of the Western Front in October; in the same month, seven sapper battalions of the 2nd formation were created from the metro builders who arrived to the brigade to replenish them. In October 1942, all sapper broths of the 1st 7th sapper brigade of the 2nd formation were reorganized into army engineer battalions and sent to the front armies, and instead of them, seven new army engineer battalions arrived in the brigade. To a lesser extent, this process also took place in the 1st Engineer Army: over the entire period of its existence, 1,600 people were allocated from the engineer brigades to form pontoon-bridge battalions, and 8,279 soldiers were sent to replenish the rifle units of the front36.
As already noted, a number of sapper brigades were involved in directly supporting the combat operations of the troops. However, they could not successfully solve such problems, since the main profile of these brigades was positional construction. To carry out the significantly increased volume and more complex tasks of engineering support for the combat activities of the troops, formations specially prepared for this were needed.
Back in March 1942, the Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Western Front again turned to the Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Red Army with a request to form a special-purpose engineering brigade on the basis of the 33rd Engineer Brigade and special units of the front. In accordance with the directive of the Deputy NCO No. org/5/1444 dated April 18, 1942. The 33rd Special Purpose Engineering Brigade of the RVGK was formed, which initially included six battalions of engineering barriers, two electrical battalions, an electrification detachment, a searchlight battalion, an energy train, an engineering company of special equipment, an auto-tractor company and four electrical engineering companies attached to the brigade (the total strength of the brigade was 4,757 military personnel )37.
Soon it was decided to create special-purpose engineering brigades on each active front. The following were asked to form such brigades in May - September 1942: on the Karelian Front - the 1st Engineer Brigade (1st Special Purpose Engineering Brigade of the RVGK); on the Leningrad Front - four sapper battalions and a motor-tractor company of the 2nd sapper brigade (2nd special-purpose engineering brigade of the RVGK) located on it; on the Volkhov Front - the four engineer battalions and the command and control of the 2nd engineer brigade located there, as well as the command and tractor company of the disbanded 39th engineer brigade that arrived from the Western Front (from April 1, 1943 - the 2nd Guards Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the RVGK ); on the Southern Front - the 27th Engineer Brigade (27th Special Purpose Engineering Brigade of the RVGK); in the Moscow Military District - the 17th sapper brigade (44th engineer special forces brigade of the RVGK, soon sent to the Southwestern Front). At the expense of individual front-line units (including eleven sapper battalions that had previously left the sapper brigades), seven more special-purpose engineering brigades of the RVGK were formed on the North-Western, Kalinin, Bryansk, Voronezh, South-Western, Stalingrad and North Caucasus fronts.
In total, in April-October 1942, thirteen special-purpose engineering brigades of the RVGK were formed. Each consisted of a brigade command and control unit, an auto-tractor company (since December 1942 - a control company), 5 - 8 battalions of engineering barriers (in October 1942, one battalion was reorganized into a special mining battalion), an electrical battalion and an electrification detachment. The strength of the brigade with five battalions of engineering barriers is 3097 military personnel. These brigades were capable of carrying out work on mining, demining, installing controlled minefields and land mines, electrified obstacles, constructing various barriers, as well as supplying military units with electricity and electrifying engineering work38. It should be noted that these and other specialized brigades of engineering troops in practice performed many other tasks of engineering support for the combat activities of troops. Thus, the 39th engineer special forces brigade of the RVGK received a baptism of fire during the breakthrough of the siege of Leningrad in January 1943, when its battalions of engineer barriers acted as assault troops.
On the basis of NKO order No. 0634 of August 17, 1943, on the basis of the command and control and two engineer battalions of the 37th engineer brigade and teams of soldiers selected at the fronts, the 1st Guards Miner Brigade of the RVGK is formed as part of the brigade command, control company and five guards battalions of miners (there are 2,281 servicemen in the brigade). Its battalions were used to carry out mining and demining missions40.
There were still twenty sapper brigades remaining in the Subordination of the Fronts, which were used as part of the reinforcement for engineering support of combat operations of the troops. On November 2, 1942, the Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Red Army, Major General M.P. Vorobyov, turned to the Head of the Head of the Red Army, Colonel General E.A. Shchadenko, for permission to reorganize the remaining sapper brigades into engineering mine brigades for greater efficiency in using were intended mainly to create operational barrier zones. On November 12, 1942, NKO Order No. 00232 “On the reorganization of sapper brigades into engineering mine brigades of the RVGK” was issued. In November-December 1942 15 engineer brigades (3,10,12,18,19,20,21,31,32,35,36th engineer brigades and 7,9,17 and 34th engineer brigades of the 2nd formation) were reorganized into 1 - 15th engineering mine brigade of the RVGK. The brigade included a brigade command, a command company and seven mine engineering battalions (a total of 2,903 military personnel in the brigade). Based on the directive of the deputy NKO No. org/5/3327 of November 26, 1942, five sapper brigades (11.23, 24, 25 and 26th) on the Transcaucasian Front in November-December 1942 were reorganized into the 1st - 5th mountain mine engineering brigades of the RVGK (same structure, but five mountain mine engineering battalions per brigade with a total strength of 2344 military personnel). In mountain mine engineering companies, instead of tractors, pack platoons with horses and donkeys were introduced41.
Thus, in the most difficult period of the war, the sapper armies did a lot of work on the construction of defensive lines in the interior of the country, and since February 1942, directly on a number of fronts. Pre-prepared defensive lines helped stop the advancing forces in the fall of 1942 Nazi troops in the Stalingrad area, and then inflict a decisive defeat on them. Many Soviet military leaders more than once noted in their memoirs the importance of pre-constructed defensive lines. “Our troops,” wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, “relying on fortified lines, heroically defended every inch of land, launched counterattacks, exhausted and bled the enemy troops rushing to Stalingrad”42. Marshal of the Soviet Union N.I. Krylov noted: “The troops of the 62nd and 64th armies, waging stubborn defensive battles with superior enemy forces, were forced to retreat to the outer city defensive perimeter, where they stopped the enemy’s advance”43.
At the same time, the sapper armies were the main base for accumulating reserves and training engineering units of army and front subordination, as well as formations of the RVGK, for the front. In total, according to incomplete data, from the sapper brigades of the 2-10th sapper armies, over 150 sapper battalions and specialized units of engineering troops reorganized from them were transferred to the fronts. Of the 44 sapper brigades available during this time, 26 brigades with 133 sapper battalions, having acquired certain skills in performing engineering support tasks for combat operations of troops, were reorganized into 27 specialized engineering brigades of the RVGK44. In 1943, four of them were disbanded, and 23 brigades, after re-formation, continued their combat path until the end of the Great Patriotic War. All of them were awarded honorary titles, and 20 of them were awarded 32 orders; two brigades became guards (See table 2. “Reorganization of sapper brigades of sapper armies”). The battle flags of the three brigades were presented as part of the combined regiments of the fronts at the Victory Parade on June 24, 1945 in Moscow (1st Guards Assault Engineer Mogilev Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Brigade, 2nd Guards Motorized Assault Engineer Novgorod Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov brigade, 1st engineer-sapper Novgorod Order of Kutuzov brigade).
Finally, the sapper armies were one of the sources of replenishment of private and junior command personnel of the front-line and rifle formations formed in the rear, sending more than 150,000 people to them45.
Today, in the armed forces of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, soldiers of five military units serve with dignity and honor - the heirs of the famous brigades, the combat history of which dates back to the brigades of the sapper armies. In the Russian Army, these are the heirs of the 1st Guards Assault Engineer Mogilev Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Brigade of the RVGK, 1st Engineer Engineer Novgorod Order of Kutuzov Brigade, 12th Engineer Engineer Riga Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Brigade; in the army of Belarus - the 2nd guards motorized assault engineer-sapper Novgorod Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov brigade RVGK and in the Ukrainian army - the heirs of the 15th assault engineer-sapper Vinnitsa Red Banner order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky brigade RVGK. All of them worthily continue the glorious military history of their predecessors during the war years.

Soviet military miracle 1941-1943 [Revival of the Red Army] Glanz David M

ENGINEERING (SEPER) TROOPS

ENGINEERING (SEPER) TROOPS

Engineer and sapper regiments and battalions

Throughout the war, the engineering troops of the Red Army included sapper troops as part of the active fronts and sappers under the control of the leadership of the RGK or RVGK, who were allocated by the Headquarters to the active fronts and armies as needed. Both of them were supposed to be involved in the construction and renovation of defensive structures and providing various kinds of engineering support to field troops during offensive and defensive operations.

Engineering troops as part of the active troops of the Red Army included separate sapper battalions (squadrons) in rifle and cavalry divisions, motorized engineer battalions in mechanized corps, sapper battalions (squadrons) in rifle and cavalry divisions, pontoon-bridge battalions in tank divisions, light engineering battalions in motorized rifle divisions, engineer companies or platoons in rifle and cavalry regiments and in tank and motorized rifle regiments and brigades, as well as engineer platoons in regiments of the RVGK and corps artillery.

Sapper battalions of corps and divisions consisted of three sapper companies of three platoons and a technical company in battalions of a corps or technical platoon in battalions of divisional subordination, a bridge-building platoon and a platoon of secret weapons and a small rear service. The total strength of the corps engineer battalion was 901 people, the divisional one - 521 people. Depending on the division to which they belonged, these battalions moved either on foot or on horseback. On June 22, 1941, the field forces of the Red Army included over 200 sapper battalions, all of them retained their pre-war structure until December 1941, when the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) reduced the strength of the battalion to two companies, mainly due to the creation within the RVGK larger and more efficient engineer troops.

The engineering troops of the RGK included 19 engineering and 15 pontoon-bridge regiments stationed in military districts, which the NKO formed in the first half of 1941 from 22 separate engineering battalions and 21 separate pontoon-bridge battalions. Of this number, ten engineer and eight pontoon-bridge regiments, seven engineer battalions and two sapper battalions were assigned to active fronts, two engineer and two sapper battalions were directly subordinate to the RGK, and the rest were located in military districts and inactive fronts.

The RGK engineering regiment consisted of a headquarters, two engineering battalions (one of them motorized), a technical battalion with electrical, electrical, defensive, hydraulic and camouflage companies, a light pontoon-bridge fleet (NPL), 35 engineering vehicles, 48 ​​trucks and 21 tractors. The pontoon-bridge regiment included a headquarters, three pontoon-bridge battalions (but only one personnel), a technical company with platoons for road laying, bridge construction, lumberjacks, electrical and field water supply, the N2P pontoon-bridge park and an officer school equipped with pontoon bridges and technical equipment.

On the eve of the war, the military plans of the General Staff required the NPO to have in each field army at least one separate motorized engineering battalion, one motorized pontoon-bridge battalion and separate field water supply companies, camouflage, electrical and hydraulic technical support, a sapper training unit and a separate reserve pontoon-bridge park equipped with the N2P kit. In addition, each field army should have a reserve engineering regiment and a separate reserve technical company to perform special engineering tasks.

However, in addition to the general shortage of engineering troops, the engineering regiments and battalions of the RGK existing on June 22, 1941 were missing from 35 to 60 percent of the full-time command personnel, from 20 to 70 percent of the full-time sergeant majors. They were short on average 35 percent of their manpower and approximately 50 percent of their equipment.

In addition to the engineering troops, the People's Commissariat of Defense on the eve of the war also had 25 military construction departments. 23 of them were engaged in the construction of fortified areas and field defensive structures in the western military districts, along with the majority of engineer troops belonging to future fronts. As a result, with the outbreak of the war, most combat formations were deprived of the necessary engineering support.

When Wehrmacht troops brutally defeated the Red Army during Operation Barbarossa, the already fragile Soviet engineering forces suffered great damage. The NKO responded to this by hastily and practically from scratch starting the formation of new engineer battalions for the RGK (later RVGK) with their subsequent allocation to the active fronts. For example, in July 1941, all engineer and pontoon-bridge regiments of the RGK were disbanded, and their remains were used to form 100 small sapper battalions, equipped only with rifles and other hand weapons, as well as entrenching tools, explosives and anti-tank mines. 25 such battalions were assigned to rifle corps, and another 75 to rifle divisions.

As a result total number engineering-sapper and pontoon-bridge battalions in the Red Army constantly grew - from 20 on July 1 to 178 on November 1, including 140 assigned to the active fronts. However, during the same period, engineering support for rifle divisions decreased markedly. For example, on July 29, the NKO disbanded the technical and pontoon platoons in the sapper battalions of the rifle divisions, and in July 1942, after the liquidation of the battalion's three sapper companies in December, he reduced the size of the battalion by 60 soldiers, also reducing the number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

Starting from the first months of 1942, the NKO began to compensate for the shortage of engineering troops, giving the active fronts and armies one or two new engineer or sapper battalions, and the fronts - new pontoon-bridge battalions. Individual engineer battalions could be either foot or motorized, they consisted of three engineer companies with three engineer or motorized platoons and one technical platoon each (the latter had electrical, lumber and transport sections). The total strength of the battalion was 405 people. Individual sapper battalions had two or three sapper companies with a total strength of approximately 320 people.

While the number of separate engineer and pontoon-bridge battalions in the Red Army increased during the period described from 82 and 46 on January 1, 1942 to, respectively, 184 and 68 on January 1, 1944, the number of separate engineer battalions decreased from 78 to three .

Sapper brigades and armies

Although during the initial stages of the German Operation Barbarossa the number of Red Army engineering troops was greatly reduced, the State Defense Committee (GKO) ordered

Headquarters to build new strategic defensive lines and positions to slow down the Wehrmacht’s advance, using newly created engineering and sapper units for this purpose. For example, on June 24, the State Defense Committee ordered the construction of a strategic defensive line along the Luga River south of Leningrad, on June 25 - a second line from Nevel through Vitebsk and Gomel along the Dnieper to Dnepropetrovsk, and on June 28 - a third line from Ostashkov through Olenino, Dorogobych and Yelnya along the Desna to Zhukovka, 50 kilometers west of Bryansk.

As the Wehrmacht advance accelerated, the GKO in mid-July ordered Stavka to build two more major defensive lines, the first to defend Odessa, Crimean peninsula and Sevastopol, the second - to protect the approaches to Moscow. The Moscow line, which blocked the Wehrmacht's advance in the Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets directions, began from Rzhev, went through Vyazma, south from the Moscow reservoir along the Lama River, then through Borodino and Kaluga to Tula.

Responsibility for the construction of these defensive lines was assigned by the Headquarters to Main Military Engineering Directorate NPOs and the Main Directorate of Hydraulic Construction ( Glavgidrostroy) under the NKVD. The first was to use military construction battalions subordinate to the front and army military field construction departments in the areas allocated to them for the construction of lines; in turn, the latter had to use its construction troops to build defensive lines in the deeper rear. When this organization of work turned out to be ineffective, the GKO on August 22 transformed Glavgidrostroy into the Main Directorate of Defense Works (GUOBR) under the NKVD and gave it responsibility for coordinating the construction of rear defensive lines.

Despite all the efforts of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters, the rapid advance of the Wehrmacht inflicted heavy damage on the engineering troops of the Red Army, preventing most of them from taking part in the construction of defensive lines. The Germans forestalled many of Stavka's attempts to build defensive lines. In August and September, German troops overcame the Vitebsk-Gomel and Luga lines of the Red Army, and in early October they broke through the strategic defenses in the Vyazma and Bryansk sectors, encircling and destroying large forces of Soviet troops. Alarmed by the possibility of the Germans reaching Moscow, the Headquarters formed the Moscow Defense Zone on October 12, which was to consist of a series of defensive belts around the city. The most important of them passed through Khlebnikovo, Skhodnya, Zvenigorod, Kubinka and Naro-Fominsk, along Pakhra and the Moscow River.

Since the Red Army lacked the engineering and construction troops needed to build these and other defensive lines, the GKO on October 13 ordered the NKO to form six engineer armies consisting of engineer brigades by November 1, 1941, and transferred all engineering and construction troops of the Red Army consisting of active fronts and in the rear under the command of the GUOBR (NKVD). Numbered 1st to 6th, these armies were formed in Vologda, Gorky, Ulyanovsk, Saratov, Stalingrad and Armavir, their total strength was 300,000 people.

The GKO assigned responsibility to the GUOBR for the creation of all rear defensive lines and positions by December 10, especially west of Moscow, and ordered it to prepare all personnel assigned to the newly formed sapper armies and other engineering troops of the Red Army.

Each sapper army was supposed to have approximately 50,000 people, mostly reservists under the age of 45. It was supposed to attract personnel from engineering and construction units from the active front zones, as well as other specialists mobilized in the rear. The sapper brigades consisted of 19 sapper battalions, one motor-tractor battalion and one mechanized detachment. By order of the State Defense Committee, the sapper army was to have 3,000 trucks, 90 passenger cars, 1,350 tracked tractors and 2,350 tractor-trailers, 12,000 wagons of building materials and the full number of necessary construction tools. In addition, the departments of other commissariats and the civilian population were involved in the construction of defensive lines.

By order of the State Defense Committee, the local population was mobilized for construction. These were mostly women, old people, schoolchildren and teenagers of pre-conscription age. By order of the military councils of the fronts and military districts, as well as regional and district party and administrative bodies, working battalions [mobilized] were formed from them, which were then subordinated to the sapper armies.

Ultimately, nine sapper armies were formed, numbered 1st to 9th. These armies consisted of 30 engineer brigades and had a total of 570 engineer battalions, numbered 1200 to 1465 and 1543 to 1771. The total number of sapper armies as of November 1, 1941 was 299,730 people. However, an acute shortage of engineering and construction troops limited the size and capabilities of these armies and brigades.

Each of the first nine sapper armies consisted of a headquarters and two to four separate sapper brigades. The sapper brigade included a headquarters, 19 separate sapper battalions, divided into three companies with four platoons each and a total battalion strength of 497 people, a mechanized detachment with one road and one bridge platoon, a lumberjack platoon, a position construction platoon and an automobile and tractor platoon with four departments. Although each engineer brigade was supposed to have a strength of 9,979 soldiers, most brigades remained understrength. As a result, the personnel of the sapper battalions, who were supposed to spend 12 hours a day on construction work and another two hours on military training, were forced to work on the construction of defensive structures for 12-14 hours a day and did not undergo any military training at all. The tenth sapper army, number 1, which completed its deployment to the Western Front in January 1942, consisted of ten sapper brigades with eight sapper battalions each - a total of 80 sapper battalions and 45,160 soldiers.

Initially, the sapper armies were subordinate to the GUOBR under the NKVD, but worked under the direct leadership of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the NKO. However, this organization of command turned out to be not entirely effective, and on November 28, the Headquarters subordinated these armies to the chief of the engineering troops of the Red Army. In December 1942, the chief of engineering troops assigned nine sapper armies and 29 sapper brigades to military districts and active fronts (two to the Western Front and one to the Karelian Front). By mid-January 1942, the structure of the Red Army engineering troops had expanded, now there were ten sapper armies, 40 sapper brigades, three engineer regiments and 82 engineer-sapper, 78 sapper and 46 pontoon-bridge battalions.

These sapper armies and brigades were primarily responsible for the construction of strategic defensive lines deep in the rear of the Red Army. The first of these lines, located in the Moscow, Stalingrad, North Caucasus and Volga military districts, were permanent in nature and consisted of a complex system of fortified battalion defensive areas and company strong points located on the likely directions of the German offensive and around large cities. However, on December 27, 1941, after the Red Army's victory near Moscow, the GKO ordered the cessation of defensive work around Moscow so that more resources could be allocated to transport refugees, grain and bread for the needy population, and limited construction work on other defensive lines.

In addition to fulfilling their construction duties, the sapper armies also served as a training base for the engineering troops of the Red Army as a whole. For example, in November-December 1941, the NKO assigned two and then three battalions in each brigade the designation of training and ultimately transferred over 90 such battalions to the active fronts. Trained as ordinary engineering, pontoon-bridge or road-bridge battalions and staffed with the most experienced personnel, the units intended for transfer to the front immediately stopped all defensive work and engaged in intensive field training. After they left for the front, engineer brigades formed new battalions and companies to replace those who left. However, the chaos caused by the constant flow of personnel between the sapper armies and the active fronts negatively affected the effectiveness of the former's actions.

The ten sapper armies proved their worth during the Red Army's winter offensive of 1941-1942, helping to maintain security behind the lines while enhancing the engineering and sapper capabilities of the fronts. However, they turned out to be clumsy, ineffective and difficult to control, especially in a constantly changing combat situation. Therefore, in February 1942, the State Defense Committee ordered the NKO to disband half of the sapper armies and brigades, assign the rest to active fronts, and use the personnel of the disbanded troops to facilitate the formation of new rifle divisions and brigades.

In February-March, the NKO disbanded the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 9th and 10th sapper armies and six sapper brigades, increasing the number of the 7th and 8th sapper armies of the Southwestern Front, respectively, to five and ten brigades. In addition, he gave the active armies and the Moscow defense zone four sapper armies, three separate sapper brigades and many newly formed special engineering units.

At the same time, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Red Army Troops under the NPO removed the command staff from the engineer armies and brigades for transfer to the active forces, and also reduced the number and strength of engineer battalions in the engineer brigades. The NPO took the second step in April, reducing the number of engineer battalions from 497 to 405 people, replacing motor-tractor battalions with companies with four motor vehicles and one tractor platoon in each, and reducing the number of engineer brigades to seven battalions with one motor-tractor company for a total brigade strength of 3,138 people.

At the end of June, two months after the completion of this reorganization, the NKO was faced with the difficult task of stopping the Wehrmacht's new summer offensive, Operation Blau. In addition to providing support to the active fronts, the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 8th engineer armies of the NKO were supposed to strengthen the defensive lines west of Moscow, build new lines to defend the approaches to Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and allocate manpower from their ranks to compensate for losses in the Red Army.

Five sapper armies built these defenses at an accelerated pace, but on July 26, the State Defense Committee ordered the NKO to extract 400,000 people from non-combat units by August 20, including 60,000 sappers to assign them to combat formations. The remaining sapper armies and brigades were supposed to be reduced, since they “too large and organizationally immobile and cannot effectively carry out their tasks of engineering support for the combat operations of our troops, especially in offensive operations”.

The GKO intended to create more flexible and effective engineering troops, which the Headquarters could use in defensive and offensive operations in the most critical areas in the late summer and autumn of 1942. As a result, it was decided to disband the remaining sapper armies and part of the sapper brigades, and transform another part of the brigades into specialized engineering brigades designed to support active fronts.

By order of August 17, 1942, the NKO began transforming the remaining five sapper armies and 27 sapper brigades into defensive structures directorates (see the “Construction Troops” section below). Six sapper brigades were reorganized into engineering brigades of the RVGK, subordinate to the active fronts, and another 8 were disbanded. 30,000 people from the former 1st, 7th and 8th engineer armies were transferred to staff the newly formed rifle divisions. Later, already in September, the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 7th sapper armies were reorganized into the UOS (Defense Construction Administration), the 8th sapper army became the UOS in October. 12 sapper brigades became engineering brigades as part of the active fronts (see Table 9). The remaining 18 sapper brigades, assigned to the active fronts on October 15, now performed dual functions, providing the front troops with engineering support and serving as bases for the formation of new, more specialized engineering brigades and battalions.

Sapper armies and brigades made a significant contribution to the victories of the Red Army at Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, preparing defensive lines, providing engineering support to the active fronts, and serving as a base for the formation of other, more specialized engineering troops transferred to the active fronts. For example, in 1941, nine engineer armies organized, trained, and fielded more than 150 specialized engineer battalions; in 1942, engineer armies and brigades formed 27 specialized engineering brigades of the RVGK, 23 of which served until the end of the war, and five still exist today. Finally, the engineer armies contributed more than 150,000 men to man and form new rifle divisions.

Engineering teams

Disbanding its engineer armies in the spring of 1942, the NKO at the same time took into account the demands of the front commanders, who proposed the formation of specialized and flexible engineering brigades that would better meet their needs. Therefore, at the same time, the creation of a wide range of new engineering brigades and battalions began. For example, responding to the March demand of the chief of engineering troops of the Western Front, the NKO began forming special-purpose engineering brigades (IBON) from April 18. The first of these, the 33rd Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Western Front, formed in May from the 33rd Engineer Brigade of the 1st Engineer Army, consisted of six engineer barrage battalions, two electrical battalions, one searchlight battalion, an electrification detachment, an electric generator train, a special technical engineering company, a motor transport company and four electrical engineering companies (seconded), with a total brigade strength of 4,757 people. Ultimately, the NKO formed six special-purpose engineering brigades by July 1 and eight more by November 1, giving their field troops one brigade per active front.

Although the structure of these special purpose engineer brigades could vary, most consisted of a headquarters, a motor-tractor company, five to eight engineer barrage battalions, one of which was converted into a special mine battalion in October 1942, an electrical battalion and an electrification detachment, with a total number of 3097 people per 5-battalion brigade. The brigade's main mission was to perform specialized tasks, such as laying and removing minefields, placing controlled minefields, and creating electrified and other obstacles, but they often had to carry out more dangerous combat missions. For example, the 33rd Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Volkhov Front used its engineer barrage battalions as assault groups during the breakthrough of the siege of Leningrad in January 1943.

In addition to these special purpose engineering brigades, the NKO also formed separate mine engineering battalions in April 1942. One such battalion was assigned to each of the anti-tank brigades of the Red Army with the task of erecting anti-tank barriers and destroying enemy tanks together with artillery troops.

The NKO continued this process at the end of the summer of 1942, when the formation of guards mine battalions began - the most interesting and most secret of all specialized types of engineering troops. In August, two Guards mine battalions were deployed to the Voronezh and North Caucasus fronts. By October 1, the field troops already had ten such battalions, as a rule, one battalion per active front. Formed specifically to carry out sabotage operations behind enemy lines, the battalions usually operated in small sabotage groups.

In addition to the Guards mine battalions, the NKO formed a Guards mine brigade in the Moscow Military District on August 17, subordinating it to the direct leadership of Headquarters. Formed from two engineer battalions of the 37th Engineer Brigade of the 1st Engineer Army, the 1st Guards Mine Brigade consisted of a headquarters group, a control company and five Guards mine battalions with a total brigade strength of 2,281 people. Like individual battalions, this brigade not only laid and removed mines, but also formed and deployed small groups to carry out sabotage operations (often in conjunction with partisans) against German communications and important rear objectives.

During the summer of 1942, the NKO also created a wide range of smaller specialized units, including five high-explosive flamethrower companies, several field water supply companies, and an artesian well drilling group to provide drinking water to active troops.

In preparing the Red Army for major counteroffensives and the subsequent winter campaign, the Stavka ordered the NKO to form larger and more specialized engineer troops to support these offensives. As a result, many of the existing engineer battalions were consolidated into engineer engineer brigades (Isbr) in October, each of which consisted of four to five engineer battalions, a light pontoon-bridge fleet of the NLP and a motorized engineer reconnaissance company. Several of these brigades were formed as mountain engineering brigades, subdivided into four mountain engineering battalions, capable of operating effectively in mountainous terrain.

On November 12, responding to the demand of the chief of the engineering troops of the Red Army, Major General M.P. Vorobyov, the NKO transformed part of the sapper brigades into 15 engineering mine brigades (IMB), numbered from 1 to 15. These brigades, responsible for creating operational obstacle zones, consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company and seven mine engineering battalions with a total strength of 2,903 people.

In addition, on November 26, 1942, the NKO ordered the transformation of five sapper brigades of the Transcaucasian Front into mountain engineering and mine brigades of the RVGK (from 1st to 5th) in November-December. Each such brigade (gimbre) consisted of five mountain engineering mine battalions, the companies and platoons of which had horses and donkeys rather than tractors as vehicles; the total number of the brigade was 2,344 people.

In the fall of 1942, the NKO began to form larger and more efficient pontoon-bridge units - primarily because the Headquarters considered the consolidation of bridge-building units an important condition for achieving success in extended offensive operations. At the beginning of autumn, the NKO sent reinforcements to the active fronts and armies in the form of 11 separate pontoon-bridge parks of the RVGK, and in November 1942 formed two pontoon-bridge brigades and assigned them to the Stalingrad Front for use in the counter-offensive near Stalingrad. These brigades consisted of a headquarters company, three to seven (usually four) N2P motorized pontoon-bridge battalions, one DMP-42 pontoon-bridge battalion with a total bridge capacity of 50 tons, and several diving squads for underwater work. When the winter offensive unfolded, the NKO assigned the third pontoon-bridge brigade to the Leningrad Front in January 1943. In February, four new heavy pontoon-bridge regiments were added to these brigades, each consisting of two battalions equipped with the new 100-ton capacity TMP pontoon bridges.

During 1942, the NPO not only formed and transferred an impressive number of new engineering brigades to the active forces, but also strengthened the existing engineering forces, including new engineering units in existing structures. For example, engineer battalions were included in all the new guards rifle and mechanized corps, and mine engineering companies were included in the new tank corps.

Thus, by February 1, 1943, the structure of the Red Army engineering troops expanded and included 13 special-purpose engineering brigades, one sapper brigade, 17 engineer-sapper brigades (including five mountain), 15 engineer-mine brigades, 185 separate engineer battalions, ten separate Sapper battalions, one Guards mine brigade, 11 Guards mine battalions, three pontoon-bridge brigades, four pontoon-bridge regiments and 78 pontoon-bridge battalions.

All these special-purpose engineering brigades, engineer-sapper, engineer-mine, pontoon-bridge brigades and the Guards mine brigade, as well as pontoon-bridge regiments and mine-sapper and pontoon-bridge battalions, together with the guards mine battalions, were created by the NKO specifically to carry out specific combat missions during offensive operations, either as part of active fronts and armies, or under the direct control of Headquarters.

In 1943, the NKO continued to expand and improve the structure of its engineering troops. For example, in February, the formation of five rear barrage brigades began, consisting of five to seven engineer battalions each. The task of such brigades was to clear the liberated territory of mines and obstacles. After a long process of formation, the Headquarters in December 1943 transferred one of these brigades to the Moscow Military District, two to the newly formed Kharkov Military District, and one each to the North Caucasus and Ural Military Districts.

And more importantly, given the growing ferocity of ground battles and the increased strength of the Wehrmacht’s defenses, the NKO began on May 30 to create assault engineer brigades. Converted from existing engineer brigades, these new brigades consisted of a headquarters, five assault engineer battalions, one motorized engineer reconnaissance company, a light fleet for crossing rivers, a mine clearing company (including mine detection dogs), and a small logistics service. These new brigades were supposed to assist infantry and tank forces in overcoming well-prepared enemy defensive lines and fortified positions.

When the Red Army began new offensive operations in the late summer and early fall of 1943, clearing minefields became more important than laying mines. Therefore, the NPO began to replace the RVGK engineer-mine brigades with the RVGK engineer-sapper brigades, creating new and reorganizing existing engineer-sapper brigades to increase their efficiency. As a result, the number of mine engineering brigades in the structure of the RVGK decreased from 15 on February 1 to 12 on July 1, and by December 31 - to zero, but at the same time the number of engineering and sapper brigades increased from 12 on February 1 to 13 on July 1, and finally - until 22 on December 31, 1943. In addition, by July 1, 15 new assault engineering brigades were created, and by December 31 there were already 20 of them.

And finally, in June 1943, the NKO put into operation new tank regiments, equipped with 22 T-34 tanks and 18 PT-3 mine trawls. Formally, these regiments were not part of the structure of the engineering troops, but their main task was to clear passages through the numerous minefields installed by the Germans throughout their defenses.

Thanks to these NGO efforts, the size and diversity of the structure of the Red Army engineering troops increased sharply in two years - from 32 engineer brigades, three engineer regiments and 206 battalions of various types on January 1, 1942 to 68 brigades of various types, six pontoon-bridge regiments and 270 engineering and pontoon-bridge battalions on December 31, 1943. When the Red Army began the 1944 campaign, the structure of its engineering troops was already fully responsive to increased operational needs.

1. Ground Forces Before the Manchurian incident, the Japanese army consisted of 17 divisions according to peacetime plans, and 30 divisions according to wartime plans. With the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict in 1931 and especially in connection with the growing military power of the Soviet Union