The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the largest in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. It began on July 17, 1942 and ended on February 2, 1943. According to the nature of the fighting, the Battle of Stalingrad is divided into two periods: defensive, which lasted from July 17 to November 18, 1942, the purpose of which was the defense of the city of Stalingrad (from 1961 - Volgograd), and offensive, which began on November 19, 1942 and ended on February 2, 1943 year with the defeat of the group of fascist German troops operating in the Stalingrad direction.

At different times, troops of the Stalingrad, South-Western, Don, left wing of the Voronezh fronts, the Volga military flotilla and the Stalingrad air defense corps region (an operational-tactical formation of Soviet air defense forces) took part in the Battle of Stalingrad.

The fascist German command planned in the summer of 1942 to defeat Soviet troops in the south of the country, seize the oil regions of the Caucasus, the rich agricultural regions of the Don and Kuban, disrupt communications connecting the center of the country with the Caucasus, and create conditions for ending the war in its favor. This task was entrusted to Army Groups A and B.

For the offensive in the Stalingrad direction from the composition German group Army "B" was allocated the 6th Army under the command of Colonel General Friedrich Paulus and the 4th Panzer Army. By July 17, the German 6th Army had about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, and about 500 tanks. They were supported by the 4th Air Fleet (up to 1,200 combat aircraft). The Nazi troops were opposed by the Stalingrad Front, which had 160 thousand people, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars, and about 400 tanks.

It was supported by 454 aircraft of the 8th Air Force and 150-200 long-range bombers. The main efforts of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated in the large bend of the Don, where the 62nd and 64th armies occupied the defense in order to prevent the enemy from crossing the river and breaking through the shortest route to Stalingrad.

The defensive operation began on the distant approaches to the city at the border of the Chir and Tsimla rivers. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Headquarters of the Supreme High Command) systematically strengthened the troops in the Stalingrad direction. By the beginning of August, the German command also introduced new forces into the battle (8th Italian Army, 3rd Romanian Army).

The enemy tried to encircle Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don, reach the area of ​​​​the city of Kalach and break through to Stalingrad from the west.

But he failed to accomplish this.

By August 10, Soviet troops retreated to the left bank of the Don and took up defense on the outer perimeter of Stalingrad, where on August 17 they temporarily stopped the enemy. However, on August 23, German troops broke through to the Volga north of Stalingrad.

From September 12, the enemy came close to the city, the defense of which was entrusted to the 62nd and 64th armies. Fierce street fighting broke out. On October 15, the enemy broke through to the area of ​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. On November 11, German troops made their last attempt to capture the city. They managed to get to the Volga south of the Barrikady plant, but they could not achieve more.

With continuous counterattacks and counterstrikes, the troops of the 62nd Army minimized the enemy's successes, destroying his manpower and equipment. On November 18, the main group of Nazi troops went on the defensive. The enemy's plan to capture Stalingrad failed.

Even during the defensive battle, the Soviet command began to concentrate forces to launch a counteroffensive, preparations for which were completed in mid-November. By the beginning of the offensive operation, Soviet troops had 1.11 million people, 15 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and over 1.3 thousand combat aircraft.

The enemy opposing them had 1.01 million people, 10.2 thousand guns and mortars, 675 tanks and assault guns, 1216 combat aircraft. As a result of the massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts, a significant superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy was created: on the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts in people - by 2-2.5 times, in artillery and tanks - by 4-5 times or more.

The offensive of the Southwestern Front and the 65th Army of the Don Front began on November 19, 1942 after an 80-minute artillery preparation. By the end of the day, the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army were broken through in two areas. The Stalingrad Front launched its offensive on November 20.

Having struck the flanks of the main enemy group, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed the encirclement ring on November 23, 1942. 22 divisions and more than 160 individual parts 6th Army and partly the 4th Tank Army of the enemy.

On December 12, the German command attempted to release the encircled troops with a strike from the area of ​​the village of Kotelnikovo (now the city of Kotelnikovo), but did not achieve the goal. On December 16, the Soviet offensive began in the Middle Don, which forced the German command to finally abandon the release of the encircled group. By the end of December 1942, the enemy was defeated in front of the outer front of the encirclement, its remnants were thrown back 150-200 kilometers. This created favorable conditions for the liquidation of the group surrounded at Stalingrad.

To defeat the encircled troops by the Don Front, under the command of Lieutenant General Konstantin Rokossovsky, an operation codenamed “Ring” was carried out. The plan provided for the sequential destruction of the enemy: first in the western, then in the southern part of the encirclement ring, and subsequently - the dismemberment of the remaining group into two parts by a blow from west to east and the liquidation of each of them. The operation began on January 10, 1943. On January 26, the 21st Army linked up with the 62nd Army in the Mamayev Kurgan area. The enemy group was cut into two parts. On January 31, the southern group of troops led by Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus stopped resistance, and on February 2, 1943, the northern group stopped resistance, which was the completion of the destruction of the encircled enemy. From January 10 to February 2, 1943, over 91 thousand people were captured, about 140 thousand were destroyed during the offensive.

During the Stalingrad offensive operation, the German 6th Army and 4th Tank Army, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, and the 8th Italian Army were defeated. Total losses The enemy numbered about 1.5 million people. In Germany, national mourning was declared for the first time during the war.

The Battle of Stalingrad made a decisive contribution to achieving a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet armed forces seized the strategic initiative and held it until the end of the war. The defeat of the fascist bloc at Stalingrad undermined confidence in Germany on the part of its allies and contributed to the intensification of the Resistance movement in European countries. Japan and Türkiye were forced to abandon plans for active action against the USSR.

The victory at Stalingrad was the result of the unbending resilience, courage and mass heroism of the Soviet troops. For military distinction shown during the Battle of Stalingrad, 44 formations and units were given honorary titles, 55 were awarded orders, 183 were converted into guards units.

Tens of thousands of soldiers and officers were awarded government awards. 112 of the most distinguished soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

In honor of the heroic defense of the city, the Soviet government established on December 22, 1942 the medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad,” which was awarded to 754 thousand of its defenders.

On May 1, 1945, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Stalingrad was awarded the honorary title of Hero City. May 8, 1965 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the victory Soviet people During the Great Patriotic War, the hero city was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

The city has over 200 historical sites associated with its heroic past. Among them are the memorial ensemble "To the Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad" on Mamayev Kurgan, the House of Soldiers' Glory (Pavlov's House) and others. In 1982, the Panorama Museum "Battle of Stalingrad" was opened.

(Additional

TASS-DOSSIER /Alexey Isaev/. February 2 is celebrated in Russia as the Day of the defeat of Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad (1943). Established in accordance with the federal law "On days military glory and memorable dates of Russia", signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on March 13, 1995.

The result of Operation "Ring"

The final chord of the Battle of Stalingrad was the surrender on February 2, 1943 of the so-called “northern” group surrounded by the German 6th Army in the area of ​​the Barricades plant. After a powerful fire strike from Soviet artillery, she laid down her arms and stopped resisting. The commander, Lieutenant General Karl Strecker, surrendered. On February 2, units of the Soviet 21st Army took 18 thousand prisoners, units of the 62nd Army - 15 thousand people. The commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, surrendered along with his headquarters two days earlier, on January 31, 1943.

In total, during Operation Ring, which completed the defeat of Paulus’s army, over 91 thousand Wehrmacht military personnel were captured, including 2.5 thousand officers and 24 generals. Thus ended the Battle of Stalingrad, a turning point in both the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole.

Defeat of Nazi troops

The crushing blow from the Red Army came at a time when the Third Reich, as it seemed to its leaders, was at the pinnacle of power and controlled the largest territory of the entire war. At that moment, when to many the twilight of Nazism gathering over Europe seemed eternal, the Wehrmacht suffered a defeat on an unprecedented scale. An entire army, the largest on the Soviet-German front, 300 thousand people, was surrounded and completely destroyed.

Then came the gradual collapse of everything southern sector front, with the disorderly withdrawal of the German Army Group A with North Caucasus and Army Group B in the direction of Rostov and Kharkov. The defeat of the 6th Army in Stalingrad continued with the smaller “Stalingrads” on the Don, when during the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan and Voronezh-Kastornensk operations they managed to defeat the armies of Germany’s allies - Hungary and Italy. The losses suffered by the German army during this period (December 1942 - January 1943) were exceeded only in the summer of 1944.

Reserves and mechanized corps

Several factors made it possible for the Red Army to launch a counteroffensive that was unexpected for the enemy in November 1942.

Firstly, this is a thoughtful accumulation of reserves. The divisions that suffered losses in the summer campaign of 1942 were withdrawn to the rear, replenished, put together and trained.

Secondly, the Red Army switched to qualitative new level in the formation of independent mechanized formations. Now the Soviet troops had mobile, fully motorized tank and mechanized corps, capable of deep breakthroughs and independent actions separated from the main forces of armies 50-100 km away. It was the attack of the mechanized corps from the sparsely populated steppes south of Stalingrad with a weak road network that was completely unexpected for the German command.

For its time, the formation of mechanized corps was the same advanced solution as the creation of airmobile divisions today, in in full force transported by helicopters. It should be noted that the mechanized corps of November 1942 were equipped with domestically produced vehicles; Lend-Lease revenues could not yet meet the needs of the army.

The role of Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky

A significant role in the fact that the counter-offensive near Stalingrad - Operation Uranus - was able to begin at all, was played by major Soviet military leaders - Alexander Vasilevsky and Georgy Zhukov. It took a certain breadth of thinking and self-confidence to decide and plan an offensive on an unprecedented scale.

Determination and self-confidence were also required from the commanders of tank and mechanized corps, who led their units in the steppe, in directionless terrain in snowfall and fog to the designated target behind enemy lines. The tenacity and courage of the participants in Operation Uranus were rewarded. The 300,000-strong enemy group consisting of the 6th Army and part of the forces of the 4th Tank Army found itself surrounded, as they wrote then, in a “cauldron.” Moreover, the scope of the encirclement turned out to be even greater than that originally planned by Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

Results of the victory

The high economic level and technical equipment allowed the German command to prolong the agony of the encircled army, the final defeat of which took place during Operation Ring on January 10 - February 2, 1943. After February 2, in the ruins of Stalingrad there were still separate small groups of German soldiers who had not surrendered and officers. Getting these last sparks of resistance lasted another 2-3 days, but no longer affected the outcome of the battle.

In addition to military success, a psychological turning point occurred: the soldiers of the Red Army realized the opportunity to destroy the enemy, and the German formations became increasingly nervous about the threats of encirclement. The USSR's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition were convincingly demonstrated the Red Army's ability to destroy entire Wehrmacht formations.

History of the Ukrainian SSR in ten volumes. Volume eight Team of authors

1. ADVANCE OF GERMAN-FASCIST TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. HEROIC DEFENSE OF STALINGRAD

1. ADVANCE OF GERMAN-FASCIST TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. HEROIC DEFENSE OF STALINGRAD

Fighting in Crimea. Heroic defense of Sevastopol. The spring-summer campaign of 1942 began with the offensive of fascist troops in Crimea with the goal of capturing the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol. Having secured a significant quantitative advantage in men and military equipment against the left-flank 44th Army of the Crimean Front, the enemy's 11th Army went on the offensive on May 8 and broke through the Soviet defenses a day later. The command of the Crimean Front was unable to eliminate the enemy breakthrough. Developing the offensive, fascist German troops created a threat to the rear of the 51st and 47th armies. From the very first days of the enemy offensive, the command of the Crimean Front lost control of its troops. On May 19, the enemy captured Kerch.

East of Kerch, covering the evacuation of troops to the Taman Peninsula, Soviet rearguard units fought until May 21. Enemy aircraft continuously bombed the crossings. In such conditions, it was not possible to conduct an organized evacuation of troops. In total, about 120 thousand people were transported to the Taman Peninsula. The losses of Soviet troops exceeded 176 thousand people.

The reason for the failures of the Soviet troops on the Crimean Front was, first of all, that its command did not take the necessary measures to create a reliable, defense in depth. The front forces were stretched out in one line and did not have the necessary reserve units. As noted in the order of the Headquarters, the failures on the Crimean Front were largely explained by the fact that his command (front commander General D. T. Kozlov and member of the Military Council F. A. Shamanin) was unable to organize the interaction of the armies with ground and air forces . Having lost control of the troops, the front command gave orders without knowing the situation at the front. Instead of concrete leadership of the troops, the Military Council wasted time on numerous and fruitless meetings. Significant blame for the defeat lay with the representative of the Headquarters, Army Commissar L.Z. Mehlis.

Several units of the Soviet troops covering the retreat of the main forces through the Kerch Strait were cut off from the shore. They continued the heroic struggle against the fascist invaders using partisan methods in the area of ​​the Adzhimushkaya quarries (now Partisans, the outskirts of Kerch). There were also wounded and service personnel hospitals, elderly residents, women and children who did not have time to evacuate.

The struggle of the defenders of Kerch in the quarries was led by Colonel P. M. Lgunov and battalion commissar I. P. Parakhin. People were in difficult conditions. There was no light or water. There was only enough food for a few days. Children and wounded died from hunger and thirst. Courageous Soviet patriots made frequent forays and attacked the enemy. The Nazis made tunnels in several places and collapsed part of the catacombs with explosions, but did not break the opposition. Then, contrary to existing international law, they used poisonous gases. Having closed all the exits, the Nazis began pumping chlorine into the catacombs with compressors and throwing smoke bombs there.

On May 24, 1942, the underground garrison sent a radiogram on the air: “Attention! Attention! Attention! Everyone! Everyone! Everyone! To all the peoples of the Soviet Union! We, the defenders of the city of Kerch, are suffocating from the gas, dying, but not surrendering. Liars."

The strength of the heroes of Adzhimushka was melting. Colonel P. M. Lgunov died. The defense of the catacombs was led by the commander of the tank regiment, Lieutenant Colonel G. M. Burmin. Despite great losses, difficulties and incredible suffering, the garrison continued to fight courageously. Separate groups of fighters and commanders held out for almost six months, until November 1942. In November, the heroic garrison under the leadership of G. M. Burmin and I. P. Parakhin made a desperate attempt to fight their way into the Old Crimean forests to the partisans. In the unequal struggle, many warriors died the death of heroes. Many were captured, where executions, torture, and the terrible torment of fascist captivity awaited them. Only a few soldiers and officers reached the location of the partisan detachments.

The Adzhimushkay catacombs, where in 1942 15 thousand Soviet soldiers and workers of Kerch offered courageous resistance to the fascist invaders for almost six months, became an unconquered fortress behind enemy lines. The participants in this struggle are on a par with heroic defenders Brest Fortress. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated September 14, 1973, Kerch was awarded the honorary title “Hero City” with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

After the defeat of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula, the position of the defenders of Sevastopol worsened. The enemy had the opportunity to concentrate all the forces of the 11th Army against them. The Nazis had a superiority here in people - by 3 times, in guns and mortars - by almost 4 times, in tanks - by 13 times, and in aviation - by 12 times. From May 20 to June 1, enemy artillery and aviation attacked the city and the rear of the Soviet troops, and from June 2 to 7 - directly on their positions. There were many fires in the city that there was nothing to put out: the water supply did not work. But the enemy failed to demoralize the population and disable military installations. Signalmen, electricians, firefighters, MPPO fighters, repair and restoration teams, medical workers did the impossible, eliminating the destruction. The heroic struggle continued.

On June 7, enemy infantry, after strong artillery preparation, began an assault on the front line of defense. The main blow was directed at Kamyshly and the Mekenzi Mountains. The defenders of Sevastopol bravely repelled the attacks. Only on June 9, the enemy managed to capture the Mekenzievy Gory station in the direction of the main attack. On the morning of June 11, the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region with a powerful counterattack knocked out the Nazis from the station and restored the situation. The soldiers of the 25th Chapaev Division under the command of General T.K. Kolomiets and the combined detachments of the 7th Marine Brigade under the command of Colonel E.I. Zhidilov fought heroically. The next day, sailors of the Black Sea Fleet delivered the 138th Rifle Brigade to Sevastopol. Hitler's command also brought up reinforcements near Sevastopol. Fierce fighting went on day and night. “In June, the massive heroism of the defenders of Sevastopol manifested itself with unprecedented force, and what is commonly called a feat was accomplished as usual, ordinary in any company, in any battery,” the former chief of staff of the Separate Primorsky Army N. I. Krylov later wrote.

Marines are engaged in a firefight. Sevastopol. 1942

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 20, 1942, the seven defenders of Sevastopol - corporals I. I. Bogatyr, P. D. Linnik, senior sergeant M. K. Baida, junior lieutenant A. S. Umerkin, senior lieutenant N. I. Spirin, political instructors M.L. Gakhokidze and G.K. Glavatsky were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. They were the first of the defenders of Sevastopol to receive these highest awards.

Ivan Bogatyr, the son of a sailor from the legendary battleship Potemkin, was a brave Black Sea border guard. Even during the defense of Odessa, he went on reconnaissance and repeatedly captured fascist officers, obtained valuable Romanian staff documents, and once returned in a tankette captured behind enemy lines. In December 1941, in the battles on the Mekenziev Mountains, being the senior man in a machine gun pillbox, Bogatyr destroyed 120 fascist soldiers.

Abdulhak Umerkin worked as a teacher before the war. In the first battles for Sevastopol he was a sergeant, an artillery reconnaissance, and the third enemy assault on Sevastopol was repelled by a junior lieutenant, commander of the heroic battery of the 134th howitzer artillery regiment. His battery was dying. At a critical moment, Umerkin called fire from his battery at the observation post, where enemy tanks had broken through, and he crawled towards them with grenades and blew up one of them.

The legendary feat was accomplished by senior sergeant twenty-year-old Maria Baida. The award sheet says that in a battle with the enemy, in just one day she destroyed 19 enemy soldiers and officers with a machine gun and in hand-to-hand combat, recaptured the Soviet commander and eight soldiers captured by the Nazis from the Nazis, and captured the enemy’s machine gun and machine guns. During the days of the defense of Sevastopol, Soviet soldiers of every unit, every division showed miracles of courage and heroism.

From mid-June, the defenders of Sevastopol began to acutely feel the lack of ammunition. However, despite heavy losses, they continued to defend for four days. On June 18, the enemy managed to approach the Northern Bay. Only then, by order of the command, did the Soviet troops retreat to the southern shore of the bay.

Enemy attacks in the Komarov area were successfully repelled. On June 23, the Nazis simultaneously launched attacks from the southeast on New Shuli and from the northeast on Inkerman. Fierce battles for the Inkerman Heights and on the approaches to the river valley. Chernoy did not stop until the end of June 1942.

Residents of the city provided great assistance to the soldiers of the Red Army. By decision of the Military Council of the Fleet, the Crimean Regional Party Committee and the City Defense Committee, two large underground enterprises were created back in November 1941: special plant No. 1 in a former warehouse, on the shore of the Northern Bay, and special plant No. 2 in the basements of the Inkerman sparkling wine factory. They launched the production of mortars, mines and grenades, sewing shoes, linen and uniforms. These and other industrial enterprises of Sevastopol, under the most difficult conditions of the blockade, provided the front with 2,408 mortars and 113,720 mines for them, 305,699 hand grenades, 231,549 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, thousands of kilometers of wire, tens of thousands of sets of uniforms, thousands of pairs of shoes, repairs tanks, guns, cars, ships, transporters, airplanes.

The population of the city showed mass heroism in those difficult days. Elderly people, teenagers and women replaced regular workers at enterprises who had gone to the front, donated 1,200 liters of blood for wounded soldiers, carried water to the front lines, collected and donated over 20 thousand gifts to front-line soldiers.

In the second half of June the fighting reached its highest intensity. The city’s defenders had to repel 10–20 enemy attacks during the day. During June 22–26, the leader Tashkent and two destroyers delivered the 142nd Infantry Brigade, the last reinforcement, to Sevastopol. The field and coastal artillery were left without shells, and enemy planes bombed the troops and the city without interference. “Tashkent” also delivered to Sevastopol much-needed ammunition, food and medicine for its defenders. This was his last flight. Subsequently, supplies were carried out only by submarines and aircraft. From June 26 until the end of the defense, submarines made 38 trips to the besieged city and delivered 4 thousand tons of ammunition, food and gasoline and took out more than 1,300 wounded soldiers from Sevastopol. Submarine crews had to operate in extremely difficult conditions. During July 1–4 alone, the enemy dropped about 4 thousand depth charges on five submarines of the 1st Brigade.

The forces of the defenders of Sevastopol were melting. On June 30, an order was received from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to evacuate the city. July 3, 1942 became the most difficult day for the participants in the defense of Sevastopol. The shells have run out. The human losses were great. After 250 days of bloody fighting, Soviet troops left the city and retreated to Streletskaya, Kamysheva, Cossack bays and Cape Khersones. Part of the garrison was evacuated on the last two submarines, on boats and other small vessels and aircraft. The Soviet soldiers who remained on the shore fought the Nazis to the last possible opportunity.

The heroic defense of Sevastopol was of great military-strategic and political significance. It pinned down significant forces of German-Romanian troops for a long time. The enemy lost thousands of soldiers killed and wounded and a lot of military equipment. The 11th German Army was so drained of blood that for almost 3 months after the battles near Sevastopol it could not participate in hostilities.

“For a long time, Sevastopol rose like a sword, the tip of which was directed against the invaders,” wrote the British newspaper. "Times". “Everything has its limits, including human capabilities. The defenders of Sevastopol raised this limit to unprecedented heights. Belgium did not resist for five days, Holland - for four days. Huge France was defeated in 16 days, and a small group of Russian troops continued to resist for many months,” Turkish gas gave a well-deserved assessment of the heroism of the Soviet people. "Istiqlal".

The Motherland highly appreciated the feat of the Sevastopol residents. On the 20th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany on May 8, 1965, the hero city of Sevastopol was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal, and the Black Sea Fleet was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. This was national recognition of the legendary feat of the Black Sea sailors, soldiers of the Primorsky Army, militias, and all residents of the hero city.

Fighting near Kharkov and Donbass. In May 1942, active hostilities began in the Kharkov region.

The overall balance of forces and means in the South-Western direction was unfavorable for the Soviet side. The forces were equal in tanks, the enemy was superior in number of people by 1.1 times, in guns and mortars by 1.3 times, and in airplanes by 1.6 times. And in the zone of the 57th and 9th armies of the Southern Front, the enemy had an advantage in infantry by 1.3 times, tanks by 4.4, artillery by 1.7 times.

The goal of the operation was to encircle and defeat the Nazis by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the Kharkov region. The main blow was delivered by the 6th Army under the command of General A. M. Gorodnyansky from the Barvenkovsky ledge in the northern direction of Kharkov. Formations of the army group led by General L.V. Bobkin launched an attack on Krasnograd. Towards the 6th Army, the 28th Army under the command of General D.I. Ryabyshev and part of the forces of the neighboring 21st and 38th Armies, Generals V.N. Gordov and K.S. Moskalenko, attacked the enemy from the Volchansk region. , which were supposed to advance bypassing Kharkov from the north and north-west.

Troops of the Southwestern Front broke through the defenses of the 6th German Army north and south of Kharkov. In 3 days of intense fighting, Soviet troops advanced 18–25 km from the Volchansk area, and 20–50 km from the Barvenkovsky ledge. By the end of the day on May 14, conditions were created for the introduction of mobile formations into battle. This was a favorable moment for developing further success and completing the encirclement of the enemy group in the Kharkov area. But the front command missed it and brought the 21st and 23rd Tank Corps into action only on May 17th. By that time, the Soviet troops, having suffered significant losses, slowed down the pace of the offensive. The Nazis brought up reserves and managed to organize a defense.

The fascist command was also preparing for offensive operations in the area of ​​the Barvenkovsky ledge. Before the start of the main attack planned for the summer campaign of 1942, it considered one of the immediate tasks to be the defeat of Soviet troops in the specified area. The strike group of fascist German troops, which included the 1st Tank and 17th Field Armies, unexpectedly went on the offensive on May 17 in the 9th Army of the Southern Front from the area of ​​Slavyansk, Kramatorsk through Barvenkovo ​​to Izyum. It was attacked by the 6th German Army from the Balakleya area. There was a threat of encirclement of the strike force of the Southwestern Front.

Attack of Soviet soldiers in the Kharkov direction. 1942

Anti-aircraft gunners of an armored train repulse an enemy air attack. Voroshilovgrad region. 1912

The troops of the 9th Army, weakened by previous battles, were unable to repel the enemy attack and began to retreat. The situation in the Kharkov region has become more complicated. It was necessary to immediately stop the offensive in the Kharkov direction, and turn the main forces to repel the enemy’s advance from the Barvenkovsky ledge. But the command of the Southwestern Front did not do this in a timely manner, which further aggravated the situation.

Only in the afternoon of May 19, when there was already a threat of encirclement of the 6th and 57th armies and the group of General L.V. Bobkin, the command of the Southwestern direction decided to suspend the offensive on Kharkov, consolidate on the occupied lines, and withdraw from the battle the main group of troops and with a concentrated strike of the 6th and 9th armies to defeat the enemy who had broken through to their rear. However, it was no longer possible to implement this plan. On May 23, fascist tank units advancing from the Kramatorsk area united in the Balakleya area with units of the 6th German Army. The troops of the 6th and 57th armies and the group of General L.V. Bobkin were surrounded by the enemy. Repeated attempts to break through the shrinking ring were unsuccessful. Only individual groups managed to move to the left bank of the Seversky Donets. Many Soviet soldiers died in these battles, among them generals L.V. Bobkin, A.M. Gorodnyansky, F.Ya. Kostenko, K.P. Podlas.

Thus, the offensive operation of the Red Army in the Kharkov region in May 1942 ended in a serious defeat, significantly weakening the Soviet front in the south. The reasons for these failures were that the command staff had not yet acquired the necessary combat experience. The command of the South-Western direction did not assess the situation well enough, failed to organize clear interaction between the fronts and regulate the issue of operational support, and made a number of miscalculations in command and control of troops.

Considering that the Red Army was still inferior to the enemy in the number of troops and weapons and that there were no ready reserves, the Headquarters, planning the spring-summer campaign of 1942, adopted the right decision on strategic defense. At the same time, the plan included a number of separate offensive operations: near Leningrad, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea. But this did not correspond to the situation and the balance of forces. The headquarters did not by that time have a sufficient number of prepared reserves to ensure the necessary superiority of forces for all planned offensive operations. In addition, the General Staff and Headquarters believed that the main events in the summer of 1942 would unfold in the Western direction, and in accordance with this they concentrated their forces there. When developing the plan for the summer of 1942, the Supreme High Command also hoped that the United States and England would withdraw part of the Nazi forces from the Soviet-German front.

When planning the Kharkov offensive operation, the command of the South-Western direction underestimated the enemy’s strength, did not discern his true intentions, and did not take the necessary measures to secure the flanks of his strike group. When the troops of the Southwestern Front found themselves in a critical situation, the directional command did not take timely measures to prevent the encirclement of the strike force advancing on Kharkov. Moreover, it persistently sought permission from Headquarters to continue the offensive and only with great delay decided to suspend it.

All this led to the defeat of our troops near Kharkov and (caused a sharp change in the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in favor of the enemy. The initiative in the conduct of hostilities passed into the hands of the enemy. By transferring the 1st Tank Army from the right flank of Army Group "South" on the Balakleya - Slavyansk section, the Nazis launched an offensive in the Volchansky and Kupyansky directions from June 10 to 26. The troops of the left wing of the Southwestern Front were forced to retreat beyond the Oskol River.

At the same time, battles broke out in other sectors of the front. In the North-Western direction, the 2nd Shock Army failed on the river. Volkhov, who tried to break the blockade of Leningrad. The attempts of the Soviet troops to eliminate the Demyansk ledge of the enemy front were also unsuccessful. By the end of June the situation had changed in favor of the Nazis, and Headquarters decided to switch to strategic defense along the entire front. Measures were taken to evacuate industrial enterprises from the southern regions, which were threatened by the fascist occupation, to the East.

For the offensive in the south, the Nazi command allocated about 900 thousand soldiers and officers, 1260 tanks, over 17 thousand guns and mortars, 1640 combat aircraft. The Soviet forces opposing these forces had the same number of personnel and tanks, but were significantly inferior in artillery and aviation.

Hitler's command divided Army Group South into two parts - Army Groups B and A. The first was preparing for the attack on Stalingrad. It united the 2nd and 6th field, 4th tank armies of the German army and the 2nd Hungarian army.

This group was commanded by Field Marshal F. Bock. Army Group A, commanded by Field Marshal W. List, included the 11th and 17th German field and 1st tank armies, as well as the 8th Italian armies. This group was supposed to strike the Caucasus through Rostov.

Army Group B launched its offensive on June 28. Having broken through the defenses of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts, it began to advance with its left flank in the Voronezh direction. But the persistent defense of Soviet troops in the Voronezh region, replenished with the strategic reserves of Headquarters, stopped the enemy. The Voronezh Front, created on July 7 under the command of General N.F. Vatutin, thwarted the enemy’s advance in the Voronezh direction and an attempt to encircle the Southwestern Front, against which the 6th German Army from the Volchansk area and the 1st Tank Army from the Slavyansk area launched attacks.

To avoid encirclement, the troops of the Southern Front, by order of Headquarters, began to retreat to the Don on July 15. The Soviet command took urgent measures to stop the enemy and prevent the Nazi troops from breaking through to the Volga and the Caucasus. However, in this case, the weakened formations of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts could not hold back the onslaught of superior enemy forces. A gap of up to 170 km opened in the front line. By mid-July, the breakthrough of the strategic front in the south reached 150–400 km in depth. The entire Donbass and rich agricultural areas on the right bank of the Don were lost. Under the threat of encirclement, the troops of the Southern Front left Rostov on July 24 and retreated to the left bank of the Don.

Defense of the Caucasus. Having captured the areas of the lower reaches of the Don, the Nazis began to implement their planned Operation Edelweiss (seizure of the Caucasus). The 4th Tank Army was transferred to this direction from Stalingrad. Army Group A had an advantage over the troops of the Southern Front in men by 1.5 times, artillery by 2.1 times, tanks by more than 9.3 times, and aircraft by almost 8 times. On July 25, its troops crossed the Don near Rostov and launched an attack on the Kuban and the oil regions of the North Caucasus. Soviet troops retreated to the south and southeast. In the same situation, the Southern and North Caucasian fronts were united into one North Caucasian Front under the command of S. M. Budyonny. The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla were operationally subordinate to him. The front created two task forces: Donskaya under the command of General R. Ya. Malinovsky to cover the Stavropol direction and Primorskaya, commanded by General Ya. T. Cherevichenko, for defense in the Krasnodar direction.

On August 9, Soviet troops were forced to leave Krasnodar, and on September 16, Maykop. However, the heroic defense of Soviet troops in the Stalingrad direction, where the advance of fascist troops was delayed, forced the Nazi command to transfer there part of the forces of Army Group A. The troops of the Transcaucasian Front, commanded by General I.V. Tyulenev, covered the Black Sea coast from Lazarevskaya to Batumi, as well as the Soviet-Turkish border, where 26 divisions of Turkish troops were concentrated. In August, significant forces were allocated from this front to protect the approaches to the Main Caucasus Ridge, especially the Grozny direction.

As a result of the measures taken by the Headquarters, resistance to the Red Army in the foothills of the Caucasus increased. The enemy's attempts to break through to Tuapse and Ordzhonikidze were in vain. The Nazis failed to reach Transcaucasia along the Black Sea coast. On their way were formations of the 47th Army, which had been commanded by General A. A. Grechko since September. Fierce fighting broke out in the Novorossiysk area, where Soviet soldiers, showing massive heroism, stopped the enemy. Great assistance to the Red Army was provided by workers, party and Soviet organizations of the North Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The enemy's plans for national enmity between the peoples of the Caucasus failed. In the republics of Transcaucasia, general military training was launched, people's militia and fighter battalions were created, and national units and formations were formed. Only from people's militia Three rifle divisions were created in Baku. In the republics of Transcaucasia, 211 fighter battalions were formed. In total, 19 national divisions were created in the Transcaucasian republics. The soldiers of the 392nd Georgian, 416th Azerbaijani, 89th Armenian divisions and other national formations and units showed valor.

The heroism and steadfastness of the Soviet troops in the fight for Novorossiysk played an exceptional role in the defense of the Caucasus. Although the enemy, after fierce fighting, managed to force the troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region to leave the city on September 10, he did not become the master of the situation here. Soviet units entrenched in east coast Tsemes Bay, shelled it and the city with artillery fire. All enemy attempts to break through northeast of the city were repulsed by units of the 47th Army.

The defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus lasted 5 months. The enemy's plans were a complete failure. Grozny and Baku oil did not go to the Nazis. The Nazi invaders, having lost over 100 thousand soldiers, were forced to go on the defensive.

Heroic defense of Stalingrad. Simultaneously with the battle for the Caucasus, historical battle near Stalingrad, which became one of the most outstanding in the Great Patriotic War. Fierce fighting raged here for 6.5 months. At all stages, over 2 million people took part in this battle on both sides. According to the nature of the fighting, the Battle of Stalingrad is divided into two periods: defensive - on the approaches to Stalingrad and in the city, from July 17 to November 18, 1942, and offensive - from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943.

The enemy's capture of Stalingrad would create a serious danger, leading to the loss of the last communication linking the central regions of the country with the Caucasus. The enemy's entry to the Volga would have cut the artery through which Baku oil, necessary for military needs and the national economy, was transported, and would have cut the Soviet-German front into two parts.

The State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took urgent measures. In June - early July, the construction of defensive fortifications, which began in the fall of 1941, resumed between the Volga and Don, where about 200 thousand people worked daily. Through the heroic efforts of the workers of Stalingrad and military engineering units, fortifications with a total length of 2572 km were built. People manually moved 14 million m 3 of earth, more than during the construction of the Volga-Don Canal. These defensive lines played a significant role in the Battle of Stalingrad.

Given the importance of the Stalingrad direction, Headquarters transferred the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies here. On July 12, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, and from July 23 - General V.N. Gordov. In addition to the named armies, the front included the 21st, 28th, 38th and 57th combined arms armies and the 8th Air Army. The enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops in men by 1.7 times, in artillery and tanks by 1.3 times, and in aircraft by more than 2 times.

Defensive battles on the distant approaches to Stalingrad began at dawn on July 17. The advanced detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front repulsed the first attacks of the vanguard units of the 6th German Army on the Chir and Tsimla rivers. The persistent resistance of these detachments, which lasted 6 days, made it possible to significantly improve the defense on the main line.

Having encountered stubborn opposition, the fascist command strengthened its strike force. On July 17, 14 fascist divisions were operating in the Stalingrad direction, and 6 days later - 18. By mid-August, this figure increased to 39. These divisions also included four tank and three motorized. They were supported by 1,200 combat aircraft.

Hitler's troops, during fierce three-day battles, broke through the front of the 62nd Army and on July 26, with their tank and mechanized units, reached the right bank of the Don in the Kamensky area (20 km north of Kalach), deeply enveloping the flank of the Soviet troops. The Red Army command sent into battle units of the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, which were just being formed and were only 40% equipped with tanks. Their counterattacks delayed the advance of the enemy’s northern group. The enemy was engaged in battles on the western bank of the Don, 150 km from Stalingrad. However general position things were getting more and more difficult in the Stalingrad direction. The enemy managed to deeply envelop both flanks of the 62nd Army and reach the Don near the village of Nizhnechirskaya, where the 64th Army was defending. There was a threat of a breakthrough to Stalingrad from the southwest.

The order played an important role in strengthening the morale and resilience of the Soviet troops at this time people's commissar Defense of the USSR dated July 28, 1942 No. 227. He brought to the consciousness of every soldier the harsh truth about the mortal danger looming over the Motherland. The main requirement of the order: “Not a step back!” - had a huge moral impact. Party political work intensified in the army, and discipline was further strengthened.

Soviet troops on the approaches to Stalingrad showed unshakable steadfastness, dedication, courage and mass heroism. On the menacing July days in the area of ​​the village of Kletskaya, an unprecedented feat was accomplished by armor-piercing soldiers of the 33rd Guards Division - I. Aleinikov, A. Belikov, P. Boloto and G. Samoilov. Having two anti-tank rifles, they entered into battle with 30 fascist tanks, destroyed 15 tanks and held their line. Soviet soldiers also showed steadfastness and courage in other sectors of the Stalingrad Front.

Soviet pilots fought bravely in the skies of Stalingrad. Leading four fighters, pilot of the 268th division M.D. Baranov entered into battle with 25 enemy aircraft on August 6. Four fascist planes were shot down. For this feat, M.D. Baranov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The fascist German command was forced to turn the 4th Tank Army on August 31 from the Caucasus to the Stalingrad direction, the advanced units of which had already reached Kotelnikovo on August 2. There was a direct threat of an enemy breakthrough to Stalingrad from the southwest. To defend this direction, on August 7, a new South-Eastern Front was separated from the Stalingrad Front, which included the 64th, 57th, 51st, 1st Guards and 8th Air Armies. General A.I. Eremenko was appointed commander of the front. On August 8-10, the troops of this front launched a counterattack on the enemy and stopped him.

During a month of fierce fighting in the big bend of the Don, the enemy troops suffered heavy losses and advanced only 60–80 km. From the second half of August until mid-September there were fierce battles on the near approaches to Stalingrad. The intensity of the struggle increased. On August 23, the enemy managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad, in the area of ​​​​the village of Rynok. Here he was pinned down in battle by units of the NKVD, air defense, and detachments of armed workers of Stalingrad enterprises.

At the same time, fascist aviation subjected Stalingrad to brutal bombardment. The fire engulfed city blocks and oil tanks. Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft gunners fought bravely against Nazi air pirates, shooting down 120 enemy aircraft in one day on August 23.

Anti-aircraft gunners also had to fight fascist tanks and infantry. Thus, the soldiers of the 1077th anti-aircraft artillery regiment in 2 days of fighting destroyed 83 enemy tanks, 15 vehicles with infantry, over three battalions of machine gunners and shot down 14 fascist aircraft. Soviet armor-piercing soldiers fought selflessly. On August 24, in the area of ​​Bolshaya Rossoshka, 33 soldiers of the 87th division fought an unequal battle for 2 days, surrounded by large enemy forces. In this battle they destroyed 150 Nazis and 27 enemy tanks.

During the fierce battle for the station. Kotluban, the soldiers of the 35th Guards Division showed courage and perseverance. The machine gun company of the guard of Captain Ruben Ibarruri, the son of the outstanding Spanish figure of the communist movement Dolores Ibarruri, especially distinguished himself. Inspired by the example of their commander, Soviet soldiers selflessly repelled attacks by fascist tanks and motorized infantry. Ruben was mortally wounded. For his unparalleled courage and bravery, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet command focused its main attention on directing the combat operations at Stalingrad. Representatives of the Headquarters, in particular General G.K. Zhukov and the Chief of the General Staff, General A.M. Vasilevsky, took a direct part in leading the defense of Stalingrad.

The city defense committee, headed by the first secretary of the regional party committee A.S. Chuyanov, provided great assistance to the troops. Militia units and destruction battalions were formed. Only on August 24–25, more than 2 thousand militias came to the front from the city, and in subsequent days - still 8 thousand. At the Stalingrad factories, which were constantly bombed by enemy aircraft and shelled by artillery, work did not stop until the last opportunity. Tanks were built here, guns and mortars were produced, and damaged military equipment was repaired.

Gun crew at a firing position. Battle of Stalingrad. November 1942

On August 19, fascist German troops resumed their offensive, trying to capture Stalingrad with attacks from the west and southwest. On August 23, as already mentioned, they managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad, and on September 12 the enemy came close to the city from the west and southwest. From that time on, the direct defense of the city was entrusted to the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikov and the 64th Army of General M.S. Shumilov. Fierce fighting broke out in the city, fighting for every house. Often the front line ran between two floors of one house. A striking example The defense of the house, later called the house of Ya. F. Pavlov, entered into the history of the Battle of Stalingrad with unshakable fortitude, high courage and heroism. On September 28, a group of scouts from the 13th Guards Division, led by Guard Sergeant Ya. F. Pavlov, knocked out the Nazis from a four-story building on Peschenskaya Street. The Nazis subjected the house to air strikes and artillery fire and continuously attacked it. But Soviet soldiers repulsed all attacks. The defense of this house, which became a monument to immortal military glory, lasted 57 days. The squad of defenders was truly international. It included: Russians, in particular A.P. Aleksandrov, I.F. Afanasyev, I.V. Voronov, Ya.F. Pavlov, N.Ya. Chernogolov; Ukrainians P. I. Dovzhenko, V. S. Glushchenko, G. I. Yakimenko; Georgian N. G. Mosiashvili; Tatar F.Z. Romazanov; Tajik A. Turdyev; Uzbek K. Turganov; Kazakh T. Murzaev; Abkhazian Sukba. Friendship, perseverance, and selfless mutual assistance won in this difficult struggle.

The soldiers of the 13th Guards Division of General A. I. Rodimtsev, formations and units of D. N. Bely, V. A. Gorishny, S. F. Gorokhov, L. N. Gurtiev, S. S. showed great courage in street battles. Guryev, I.E. Ermolkina, V.G. Zholudeva, I.I. Lyudnikova, F.N. Smekhotvorova, V.P. Sokolov, I.P. Sologuba and others. The Volga Flotilla fought bravely and provided great assistance to the ground forces under the command of Rear Admiral D. D. Rogachev.

The soul of the defense of Stalingrad, as elsewhere, were the communists. They devoted all their strength to defending the city and, by their example, inspired warriors to heroic deeds. The party organization of the city and region sent 33 thousand communists to the front. 60 thousand Komsomol members joined the active army. Thousands of brave and enterprising commanders, political workers and agitators showed themselves brilliantly in the battles for the city.

Hitler's troops suffered enormous losses. In the period from August 21 to October 16 alone, the enemy lost 1,068 officers and 38,943 soldiers. The commander of the army group, General M. Weichs, tried in vain to persuade Hitler to abandon a further offensive, which was “consuming forces.”

In November, the defensive stage of the Battle of Stalingrad ended. During 4 months of fighting between the Don and Volga, the enemy lost about 700 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, over a thousand tanks and assault guns, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars and more than 1,400 aircraft. The heroic defense of Stalingrad thwarted the strategic plans of the Hitlerite command for 1942 and enabled the Soviet command to create favorable conditions for the Red Army to launch a decisive counteroffensive.