In the south of Russia, meanwhile, a very complex and dangerous situation had long been developing. Here it is necessary to go back to the first years after the death of Peter I, to his legacy in the form of the results of the Persian Campaign. Economic development a huge state necessarily required access to the Black Sea in order to establish regular trade relations with Europe and the countries of the Middle East. The southeastern outskirts of Russia developed mainly along the lines of traditional trade relations with the East. The Sultan's Turkey, constantly threatening the southern outskirts of European Russia and waging a successful fight against Persia, threatened to cut off all trade routes to the East. Therefore, the question of the Caspian provinces arose. The campaign of Peter I gave Russia vast territories in the western and south coasts Caspian Sea. However, Turkey's expansion in the Transcaucasus and Persia threatened Russia with the loss of not only them, but also all of its southeastern possessions up to Astrakhan. This was fraught with enormous political and economic damage. Turkey's expansion was actively encouraged, on the one hand, by England, and on the other, by France. Sweden was not averse to aggravating relations between Russia and Turkey. In the Persian-Turkish conflict of 1724-1727. Russia took the side of Persia.

During this period, the Persian state experienced severe internal strife between the Afghan Ashraf, who seized the capital Isfahan and the throne, and the legitimate Shah Tahmasp. Meanwhile, Türkiye occupied one Persian province after another. In response to Russia’s warning that Turkey’s conquests were approaching Russian possessions, and Russia would not tolerate this, the Grand Vizier cynically replied: “You yourself are doing nothing and you advise the Porte to sit with folded hands.” And yet Russia waited, although the Armenians repeatedly asked for Russian help in the fight against the Turks.

In 1725, a turning point occurred in the Turkish-Persian war. The Sultan's troops were expelled from Armenia, suffered a series of defeats in Persia and were pushed back to the banks of the Tigris. As a result, peace was concluded, which was facilitated by France, England and even Sweden, trying to switch Turkey's forces to Russia. However, Türkiye, fearing for the Georgia it captured, has so far refrained from conflict with Russia. Meanwhile, the new Persian Shah Ashraf came to terms with the withdrawal to Russia of all the territories captured by Peter I. True, Russia voluntarily returned the provinces of Mazandaran and Astrabad to Persia. This act, rarely seen in history, was prompted by the following: 1) the expediency of returning them to Persia, and not seizing them by Turkey, 2) to strengthen these territories, Russia needed large funds, but they did not exist. In return for these losses, under the treaty of 1729, Russia received free trade through Persia with India and Bukhara. However, having barely reached an agreement with Ashraf, Russia had to conduct secondary negotiations with Tahmasp, who had returned to the Shah’s throne. As a result of these negotiations under the Treaty of Rasht in 1732, Russia transferred to Persia not only Mazandaran and Astrabad, but also Gilan. Moreover, the text of the agreement promised to return both Baku and Derbent in the future.

Finally, after the next overthrow of Tahmasp and the defeat of the Turks in the Iranian-Turkish War of 1730-1736. The new Shah Nadir of Russia had to negotiate for the third time on the same issues. Now it was necessary not to promise, but to give back to a stronger Persia, under the terms of the new Gyandzha Treaty of 1735, Baku, Derbent, and the fortress of the Holy Cross with the territory to the north of it up to the river. Terek. Russia retained its trading privileges, and yet, on the whole, this was a retreat of Russian diplomacy, which was too deeply bogged down in the struggle for the “Polish inheritance.” True, in the Russian-Persian treaties of 1732 and 1735, Persia, in the event of a war between Russia and Turkey, pledged to act against the Turks.

Türkiye and its strongest outpost, the Crimean Khanate, have long pursued a constant aggressive policy towards Russia. Long fallen Tatar yoke. Russian state became powerful and independent. But its southern borders in the wide expanses of steppes, completely devoid of any natural barriers, were the weakest and most easily vulnerable place. The paradox of development was that with the development of deserted steppe expanses by peaceful peasant colonization, with the development of agriculture in these areas, with an increase in population density, the damage caused by the predatory raids of the Tatar cavalry did not decrease. Each such raid carried away thousands of Russian prisoners into slavery. In 1725-1735 The territories around Poltava, Mirgorod, Bakhmut and other areas were repeatedly raided. The Don, Right Bank Ukraine, the steppe Ciscaucasia, etc. suffered from the raids. The fight against the strongest cavalry of the Crimean Khan, with the huge army of the Sultan's Turkey was long, difficult and grueling, killing hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers. At the same time, this struggle was a vital problem.

After the death of Peter I, the army on the southern borders of Russia was stretched into a giant thread. This thin cordon was easily penetrated, and outposts were urgently needed to prevent sudden attacks by the Tatar cavalry. One of these most important outposts - Azov - was lost under the Prut Treaty of 1711. Of course, the cardinal solution to the issue would be the elimination of the Crimean aggression. But at that time this was an almost impossible task. Crimea was a natural impregnable fortress. Firstly, it was separated from the agricultural outskirts of Russia by a wide border of waterless, hot steppes, which in itself was extremely difficult to cross. Secondly, from the north, the territory of Crimea, as is known, is inaccessible to hostile troops - the narrow isthmus was turned into a solid fortress with a rampart 7 miles long and a deep ditch. Thirdly, beyond the Perekop Wall there was again a waterless steppe part of the Crimea, ending in mountainous terrain. Even if you penetrate inside the peninsula, the Tatar cavalry slipped away into the mountains. But in that era, the question of final victory was a question of a general battle.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Ganja in 1735, Türkiye immediately tried to North Caucasus penetrate the Caspian lands of Persia. But here the position of Russian diplomacy became irreconcilable. Russian envoy in Constantinople I.I. Neplyuev conveyed to the vizier: “I cannot vouch for the consequences if the Tatars do not change this road and touch the lands of Her Majesty.” The Tatars nevertheless made their transition, passing through Russian possessions and having battles with border troops. Soon it became known about the upcoming new, second, transition of the 70,000th army Crimean Tatars. Thus, the conflict was obvious, and from St. Petersburg an order was given to the troops to march on the Crimea.

In the fall of 1735, the corps of General M.I. Leontiev hastily rushed to the Crimea at the moment when the hordes of Kaplan-Girey were moving towards Derbent. However, the poorly prepared army could barely move, and, having lost thousands of men and horses from disease and hunger, the general returned before reaching the Perekop fortifications.

The following year, military operations were led by Field Marshal B.Kh. Minikh. The campaign was more prepared - strong points were equipped on the way to Perekop. Leaving a reserve in Kazykermen, Minikh, having built over 50 thousand troops in an awkward giant quadrangle with a convoy in the middle, barely moved towards Perekop, fighting off constant small raids of the Tatars. In the end, an avalanche of Russian soldiers crushed the Perekop fortifications. In May 1736, Minikh, leaving a small garrison at Perekop, went inside the peninsula. Soon the capital of the Tatars, Bakhchisarai, and the city of Sultan-Saray were taken. But Minich did not win a single serious victory, since the main forces of the Tatars slipped away. Exhausted by the heat and lack of food, the Russian troops, not risking being locked out from the north by the Crimean Khan returning from the Caucasus, left Crimea, having lost almost half of their strength only from disease, i.e. about 25 thousand people.

In 1736, in addition to the Crimean campaign, the siege of Azov unfolded. In March, two observation towers were taken on the banks of the Don upstream from the Azov fortress and Fort Buttercup. Then, over the course of two months, more than 20 thousand Russian troops erected siege fortifications. By mid-June, part of the fortress’s structures was already in the hands of the Russians, and commandant Mustafa Agha surrendered the fortress to the mercy of the winner.

In 1737, Russia made two main blows: the campaign to Crimea P.P. Lassi and the actions of B.H. Minich on the liberation of Bessarabia. In July, the 90,000-strong army of Minich, greatly weakened by a poorly prepared campaign across the steppe, immediately began to storm the Ochakov fortress. It was only through the courage of the soldiers that the fortress was eventually taken; the losses were enormous, and again not so much due to combat, but rather due to disease and hunger. The offensive stalled.

At the same time, P.P. Lassi with a 40,000-strong army again penetrated the Crimea, crossing the Rotten Sea (Sivash) by ford and on rafts. After a row major battles With Tatar Khan The Russian army took Karasu-Bazar. But the heat and waterless steppe forced Lassi to leave Crimea again.

With the goal of capturing Wallachia and Moldavia, Austria began military operations only in the summer of 1737. Another blow to Turkey was to be dealt in Bosnia, which Austria intended to annex. In Bosnia, the Austrians' successes were insignificant. In Wallachia they took a number of cities. From Belgrade, the third part of the army moved along the Danube and besieged the city of Vidin.

Serious losses of both the Crimean Tatars and Turks forced the latter to come up with a peace initiative. In the town of Nemirov in August 1737, a congress of the warring parties - Turkey, Russia and Austria - met, which ended without result. The war continued. In 1738, Russian troops entered Crimea for the third time and again, due to lack of food and lack of water, were forced to leave it. In the summer of 1738, Minich's 100,000-strong army tried to penetrate the Dniester, but the campaign was unsuccessful and Minich went to Kyiv. In September, due to a severe plague epidemic, Russian troops abandoned Ochakov and Kinburn, which had been held until then.

Negotiations began again, but now a new danger was approaching from the north. France and Türkiye were conducting diplomatic preparations for an attack on Russia by Sweden. Under these conditions, A.I. Osterman was ready to return Ochakov and Kinburn to Turkey, leaving only Azov for Russia. And Austria itself already needed Russian help.

In the spring of 1739, the last attempt by Russia and Austria to wrest a “decent peace” with weapons took place. Minich's army moved to Khotyn through Chernivtsi and on August 17, 1739 met the troops of Veli Pasha near Stavuchany. The battle was won thanks to the courage of the soldiers and the skillful actions of a number of generals (for example, A.I. Rumyantsev and others). Soon Khotin also surrendered, the Russians entered Moldova. This led to the voluntary transition of Moldova to Russian citizenship while maintaining internal independence. An agreement was concluded with the Moldavian delegation on September 5, 1739.

Azov campaign

At the end of February 1736, while in St. Petersburg they were still arguing about the campaign plan, Field Marshal Minikh left the city of Izyum and a week later arrived at the fortress of St. Anna. Here he learned from the Cossacks that the enemy garrison of the Azov fortress did not exceed two thousand people, and the Turks could not deliver reinforcements to the fortress, since there was “high weather”, i.e. the wind was blowing from the upper reaches of the Don, not allowing ships to enter the river. The Cossacks also reported that the ground had already thawed, which meant they could build earthen fortifications.

Therefore, Minikh made adjustments to the operation plan: he decides to urgently send forward the Don Cossacks and Kalmyks under the command of Sergeant Major Krasnoshchekov, so that they attack the Tatars roaming near Azov and prevent them from providing support to the garrison of the fortress. To help the Don people for this operation, it was decided to involve Kabardians and Terek Cossacks, who were sent the appropriate instructions. At the same time, the field marshal ordered the troops located in the St. Anna fortress to prepare for a campaign, despite the lack of provisions and personnel in the regiments. He decided to personally begin the siege with the forces that he had at hand: a total of 18.5 thousand people. Minich himself argued this decision as a convenient coincidence, but many contemporaries believed that the ambitious commander himself decided to take Azov, so as not to share the glory with Lassi, who was supposed to command the Don Army.

On March 13 (24), the advanced detachment of Russian troops crossed to the left bank of the Don. The next day, engineer-warrant officer Malygin reported to Minich that the two castles protecting the approaches to Azov on both sides of the Don (the Russians called these fortifications towers) were dilapidated, and their garrisons were small. To capture these fortifications, the field marshal allocated a special detachment under the command of Major General Ulrich von Sparreiter (200 grenadiers, 300 fusiliers, 100 miners and artillery), and 1200 Don Cossacks of the appointed ataman Ivan Frolov, and he himself, at the head of 2.5 thousand infantrymen, headed for Azov . On the way, he was joined by Krasnoshchekov's Cossacks and several other infantry detachments. As a result, when the field marshal set up camp near Azov on March 19 (30), he had only 5 thousand people at his disposal, that is, less than a third of the forces with which he planned to wage a siege of the enemy fortress.

A snowstorm twice thwarted the assault on the tower castles. Only on the night of March 20 (31), Sparreiter’s detachment attacked and captured the fortification on the left bank of the Don. After which he sent the garrison of the right bank tower a proposal to surrender on the condition of issuing weapons and leaving the garrison to Azov. The commandant of the right bank tower, Ada-Bash, accepted the conditions and surrendered the fortification. It should be noted that during these battles, war had not yet been declared, and the Turkish commandant of Azov was completely at a loss. Only after losing the forward fortifications did he order the outpost to be set on fire and open artillery fire on the besiegers.

After detailed reconnaissance, it became clear to Minich that the garrison of the Turkish fortress was much larger than they thought and it could not be broken with the available forces. He decided to organize a proper siege of the fortress. Russian troops built a camp near the Don and the gardens of Azov, in a place where the soldiers found enough good water, firewood, straw and reeds. The field marshal, in order to strengthen the blockade of Azov, ordered von Sparreiter to take possession of the Buttercup fortress. The fortress was small; Dandelion's garrison numbered only a hundred Janissaries. However, the fortress was of strategic importance, since it was located north of Azov and dominated the mouth of the Dead Donets (one of the branches of the Don), covering the exit to the Sea of ​​Azov, and a lot of supplies were stored in it in case of expansion of the military contingent during the war.

On the evening of March 23 (April 3), von Sparreiter's detachment approached Buttercup from the east. At the same time, the Don Cossacks entered the mouth of the Dead Donets by boat from the sea and appeared at the western wall of the fortress. The Ottomans panicked and began to flee. However, they were captured by the Cossacks. The Russians captured 20 guns and supplies from the fortress. As a result, Azov was surrounded on all sides and Russian troops were able to reach the sea. For this purpose, 1000 Cossacks were allocated, who went to the sea in boats. They had to build redoubts and place 14 guns to prevent assistance to Azov from the sea.

Minikh strengthened his positions around Azov and began bombarding the fortress. Since the siege artillery had not yet arrived at Azov, the fortress had to be shelled from cannons taken from the walls of the St. Anna fortress. On March 24 (April 5), Major General Levashov arrived in the Russian camp, to whom Minikh handed over command. On March 26 (April 7), the field marshal left the camp near Azov to go to Tsarichanka and lead the campaign to the Crimea. It should be noted that, despite the haste of the Azov campaign and the small number of Russian forces, Minich did his job well. The advanced fortifications of the Azov fortress (two towers and Buttercup), which, if the Ottomans had time to prepare for defense, could have created serious problems for the Russian army, were taken quickly and almost without losses, the Don Cossacks drove the Tatars away from the city, depriving the Turkish garrison of support, and the proper beginning began. siege.

Leaving the camp, the Russian commander-in-chief drew up for Levashov detailed instructions about concentration near Azov required quantity troops, the delivery of siege weapons, the construction of batteries at the mouth of the Don, the protection of the camp itself with retrenchments and redoubts. At the same time, nothing was said about the assault. They planned to take Azov with a proper siege, since there were few troops for a decisive assault. Lacking sufficient forces for active operations against Azov, Levashov concentrated on ensuring the blockade (if possible, narrowing it), building additional fortifications for the camp and transporting supplies and materials necessary for the siege.

Beginning of the siege

At the beginning of April, Russian troops completed the construction of the Main Camp, which was located one and a half miles east of the fortress, on the banks of the Azovka River, the left tributary of the Don. Another camp was built southwest of Azov, in the valley of the Uzyak River. Both camps were protected by retracements, armed with fortress cannons and served as strongholds on the flanks of the siege line. Between the camps stretched lines of redoubts, redans and flashes. A particularly important role was assigned to four redoubts on the right flank of the besiegers, in which three mortars were placed for firing huge bombs weighing five pounds (80 kg), brought from the fortress of St. Anna. On March 26, these powerful guns opened fire.

The Ottomans, having recovered from their first fear and seeing that there were few Russians, began to make strong attacks. On April 3 (14), the Azov garrison decided for the first time to launch a major attack. More than 600 foot and horse soldiers came out of the fortress and attacked the Russian convoy, which was protected by only hundreds of guards. The soldiers, however, were not at a loss and, having built a Wagenburg from the carts, fought back for two hours until the Cossacks came to their aid. On April 5 (16), the Turks made a new sortie. This time even more troops took part in it - 500 foot janissaries and over 1 thousand horsemen. The main attack of the Turkish troops was directed against the most dangerous Russian position for the fortress - on the right flank of the Russian position, where redoubts with mortars were located, which caused great damage to Azov. The Turkish cavalry attacked the Don Cossacks standing between the redoubts, and the Janissaries struck the fortifications. But, despite all the efforts of the Janissaries, they failed to take the redoubts. On April 25 (May 6), a large detachment of Crimean Tatars went out on a sortie. Levashov learned in advance about the enemy attack and allocated 400 Cossacks for an ambush. Having let the Tatars through, the Cossacks attacked them from the flank and rear, overthrowing the enemy, who was forced to flee. After these three unsuccessful forays, the Turkish garrison abandoned active operations for some time.

On May 4 (15), P.P. Lassi arrived near Azov, who had just returned from a campaign on the Rhine and received the rank of field marshal. He had many adventures along the way. On March 17, Lassi left his army near Vienna and went to Tsarichanka on post horses, covering 80 km a day (the commander was in his 58th year). With incredible speed for that time, he reached the location of the Dnieper army. Lassi met with Minich in Tsaritsynka and discussed the siege plan. Hurrying to Azov, Lassi, on the way from Buzovaya to Izyum, was attacked by the Crimean Tatars. With the field marshal there were only 40 men of the mounted land militia. Having lost 20 people from the convoy, his crew and things worth 10 thousand rubles, the field marshal managed to escape on horseback. After that, he no longer dared to ride across the steppe in front of the Ukrainian line, but went behind the line to the fortress of St. Anna, and from there to Azov.

It must be said that Lassi was a very extraordinary person. Irish by nationality, he took part in the War of the Two Kings in Ireland at a young age, emigrated to France, joined the Irish detachment, and participated in a number of campaigns in Europe. Lassi entered Russian service in 1700 and participated in Northern War, Prut and Persian campaigns. In 1727, he carried out a very delicate order from Menshikov, expelling Moritz of Saxony, who was laying claim to the ducal throne, from Courland. In 1733 he was sent as commander of a corps sent to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to support Augustus III against Stanislaw Leszczynski. He completed his mission successfully. Troops under the command of Lassi began the siege of Danzig. In 1735, Lassi commanded an army sent by the Russian government to help the Austrians. The Rhine campaign ended successfully. The appearance of Russian troops in Germany forced the enemies of Austria to bow to peace. Many contemporaries compared Lassi with Minich and the conclusions were most often not in favor of the latter. In their opinion, Lassi was not inferior to Munnich in military skill, and won because he was indifferent to court intrigues.

44-gun prime. Large flat-bottomed artillery sailing and rowing vessel used as a floating battery

Continuing the operation

Having arrived at the army's location, Count Lassi on the same day inspected the location of his troops and carried out reconnaissance of the enemy's positions and the outskirts of Azov. By this time, the army entrusted to Count Lassi consisted of 8.4 thousand people in regular regiments and 3.3 thousand people in irregular troops (Cossacks and Kalmyks). The fleet was still on the way, and the army had at its disposal 30 galleys (half-galleys) and 6 half-frames. On the day of Lassi's arrival, Rear Admiral Bredal arrived at the watchtowers with several galleys. Having examined the troops, Lassi noted with disappointment that they were “in very bad condition.” In the regiments, especially those returning from Persia, there were many sick soldiers and very young recruits who were not yet accustomed to service. There was a shortage of food, uniforms, ammunition and even guns. The irregular troops mostly consisted of old men or very young men, who, in the words of the field marshal, “are not only up to business against the enemy, and are of little use for work.”

This state of the army is explained by the fact that Minikh, in order to ensure the effect of surprise, acted before the completion of preparations and the extreme slowness of the Russian bureaucracy. All orders for the delivery of necessary supplies to the army were carried out extremely slowly and were accompanied by eternal red tape. The Field Marshal, in his reports, constantly asked to put pressure on whoever should be and “to provide Your Imperial Majesty with strong Decrees.”

Having studied the state of the defense of Azov, Lassi came to the conclusion that “the city appears to be in a solid state...”. However, he did not abandon the siege. After a reconnaissance carried out on May 5 (16) by engineers, under the command of Quartermaster General Baron Peter de Brigny, they decided to carry out the assault from two sides. The main attack was to be made on western front Azov fortress, from the left flank of the besieging army, and a demonstrative one - against the eastern front, on the Alekseevsky Kronverk - from the right flank. Lieutenant General Artemy Zagryazhsky and Rear Admiral Bredal received orders to quickly move to Azov with their regiments and fleet. On May 8 (19), Lassi took active action. They began to dig aproshes towards the western and eastern faces of the Azov fortress. Seeing this, 800 Turkish soldiers immediately made a sortie, but were repelled. After this, Lassi ordered that not only the guards, but also the people carrying out engineering work should go out to work with guns.

Bredal's ships began to arrive, which improved the supply of troops. The blockade of the fortress from the sea intensified. Bredal's ships were supposed to interrupt the boat traffic of Azov, part of the fleet was sent to the mouth of the Don to block the path of the Turkish fleet. The artillery power of the Russian army strengthened. In total, all ships had over 200 guns of 18 and 24 pounds caliber. Having received siege artillery, Russian troops began intensive bombardment of the fortress from May 13 (24). The city was also shelled from the river. On June 1 (12), one fire opened fire, and from June 2 (13), three fires opened fire. The shelling of the naval artillery was successful, so the command added six more guns to them, which fired until the day the fortress was surrendered. The Turks responded with their artillery fire, but rather weakly.

On May 16 (27), the Turks made a large sortie in order to interfere with the siege work. More than 2 thousand soldiers left the fortress. The Ottomans attacked the left flank of the position and began to push back the Russian infantry. Lassi himself saved the situation. He personally led 500 grenadiers and 100 dragoons into an attack, outflanked the attackers, overthrew them and drove them towards the fortress. The battle lasted five hours. On the Russian side, 2 officers and 19 soldiers were killed. Another 191 people were injured. The dispatch of 6 ships under the command of Lieutenant Kostomarov to the mouth of the Don turned out to be very timely, since the fleet of Kapudan Pasha himself soon appeared. However, due to the shallow waters, the Ottoman ships were unable to move along the river, and the presence of Russian boats prevented the Turks from entering the mouth in boats. Unable to get through to Azov, Kaputan Pasha retreated. On June 3 (14), the Ottomans made another big foray, striking the left flank. The Russians killed 33 people and injured 823 people.

Capitulation of the fortress

By June 4 (15), the Russian aprosh were only forty steps from the earthen outpost, which covered the approaches to the fortress. Four days later, one of the Russian shells hit the fortress's powder magazine. A powerful explosion occurred, as a result of which five mosques, more than a hundred houses were destroyed in Azov and 300 people were killed.

By June 10 (21), the Aprosh reached the base of the outstadt. Wanting to speed up the course of events, Commander Lassi ordered preparations for an open assault on Turkish fortifications. The solution to this task was entrusted to a special detachment consisting of 300 grenadiers and 700 fusiliers under the command of Colonel Loman. On the night of June 17-18, under the cover of artillery fire from all batteries and ships stationed on the Don, Loman's assault detachment launched an attack. The Turks desperately defended themselves and detonated two mines, but, as Lassi later reported, “with considerable difficulty and fighting, our people took the nearby palisades near Azov.” Russian losses during the attack were small: 5 soldiers killed, 38 soldiers and 2 officers wounded. The total number of Lassi's army by that time had reached 25 thousand people.

After the fall of the suburb, the commandant of the fortress, Mustafa Agha, sent a letter to the Russian camp with an offer to surrender the city. Negotiations began on June 19. At first the Russian commander insisted on complete surrender, but the Ottomans resolutely refused. The commandant even said that he would prefer to “perish under the ruins of the fortress.” In the end, the Azov garrison was allowed to proceed under the escort of Russian troops to the Turkish fortress of Atsuka. The garrison left the fortress without military honors with the condition not to fight against the Russians for one year; the military was allowed to keep personal weapons in the amount of one gun, bow, pistol and saber; all state-owned weapons remained with the Russian army; artillery, its accessories, provisions, with the exception of the amount necessary to feed the Turkish soldiers during the transition, powder magazines and mines remained Russian; Turkish subjects could stay in the city for 14 days to complete their affairs, they were provided with security and fair treatment to property. Until the return of the convoy, commanded by Admiral Bredahl, three Turkish senior commanders remained hostages. The city of Azov was considered to have passed “to the citizenship of Her Imperial Majesty.”

On July 8 (19), the Turkish garrison of 3,463 people left the fortress. Together with the garrison, 2,233 citizens and 121 merchants from Armenians and Greeks left. 119 prisoners were released in the city different nations. The trophies of the Russian army were: 136 copper cannons, 68 cast iron, 6 copper shotguns, 24 cast iron shotguns, 2 copper mortars, 5 cast iron mortars, 23 copper bases and large number ammunition.

Depiction of the siege of Azov in 1736. The moment of the explosion of the powder magazine is shown

Results

According to the prisoners, before the start of the siege, the garrison of the Azov fortress was about six thousand people (and not two thousand, as Minikh thought). That is, at the beginning of the siege, when Minich had only about 5 thousand people, the Russian army was inferior in number to the Turkish one. The losses of the Turkish army amounted to 2,487 people. In addition, 1,200 city residents were killed or died from disease. The Russians lost 295 people killed and died from wounds, 1343 people wounded, 22 missing. In total, over 17 thousand cannonballs and about 5 thousand bombs were fired at the Turkish citadel.

In general, the siege and capture of the Azov fortress became a real hymn to a proper siege with complete blocking, the construction of numerous engineering structures and heavy enemy shelling. As during the Azov campaign of 1696, the success of the operation was ensured by the active interaction of the army and navy. Ground forces and navy completely blocked the fortresses from land and water. The approaching Turkish fleet was unable to transport reinforcements and supplies, which predetermined the outcome of the siege. The capture of the Azov fortress was of strategic importance. The Russian Empire received a powerful fortress at the mouth of the Don and access to the Sea of ​​Azov.

Having taken the Turkish fortress, Lassi gave the troops some time to rest. Already on July 4 (14), the field marshal gave instructions to Lieutenant General Douglas with the Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod dragoon regiments to go through the city of Izyum to Perekop to help Minich’s army. Then he himself headed there, with one dragoon and eight infantry regiments. Lieutenant General Zagryazhsky was left as commandant of Azov. Levashov took over the overall command in this direction (in Azov and in the fortress of St. Anna).

Russian-Turkish War of 1735-1739 - a war between Russian Empire and Ottoman Turkey for access to the Black Sea and to suppress the raids of the Crimean Tatars. Russia fought the war in alliance with Austria (Austro- Turkish war 1737-1739). Russian troops under the command of B.K. Minikh was taken by Azov, Ochakov, Khotin, Yassy, ​​and occupied Crimea twice. The war ended with the Peace of Belgrade in 1739.

Russo-Turkish War 1735-1739 was a consequence of the aggravation of Russian-Turkish contradictions in connection with the Russian-Polish war of 1733-1735 (Polish inheritance) and the intensified raids of the Crimean Tatars. This war was a continuation of Russia's struggle for access to the Black Sea. Russia managed to provide a favorable international situation by concluding treaties with Persia in 1732-1735, which waged a war with Turkey in 1730-1736, and establishing Augustus III (1735) on the Polish throne instead of the French protege Stanislav Leszczynski, who was supported by Turkey associated with France. Austria has been Russia's ally since 1726. The reason for the outbreak of the war was the raids of the Crimean Tatars at the end of 1735 on Ukraine and the campaign of the Crimean Khan in the Caucasus. The plan of the Russian command for 1736 provided for the capture of Azov and Crimea. On May 20 (31), 1736, the Dnieper Army of Field Marshal B.K. Minikha (62 thousand people) stormed the Perekop fortifications, occupied Bakhchisarai on June 17 (28), but the lack of food, water and the outbreak of epidemics forced Minikha to retreat to Ukraine. On June 19 (30), 1736, the Russian Don Army of General P.P. Lasi (28 thousand people) with the assistance of the Don Flotilla of Vice Admiral P.P. Bredalya captured Azov. In July 1737, Minich's army (60-70 thousand people) stormed the Turkish fortress of Ochakov, and Lasya's army (about 40 thousand people) in June crossed the Genichesk Strait to the Arabat Spit, crossed Sivash and entered the Crimea in July. Russian troops inflicted a number of defeats on the troops of the Crimean Khan and occupied Karasubazar, but due to lack of water and food they were forced to leave Crimea again.

In July 1737, Austria entered the war against Turkey, but its troops suffered a number of defeats. In August, peace negotiations between Russia, Austria and Turkey began in Nemirov, which ended without result. In 1738, there were no active hostilities. Due to the plague epidemic, Russian troops abandoned Ochakov and Kinburn. In 1739, Minich's 58,000-strong army crossed the Dniester and on August 17 (28) defeated the Turkish army at Stavuchany, occupied the Khotyn fortress (August 19 (30)) and Iasi. However, Austria suffered defeats and on September 7 (18) concluded a separate peace. This circumstance, along with the threat of an attack from Sweden, forced Russia to conclude the Belgrade Peace Treaty (1739) with Turkey, according to which it acquired Azov.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE RF

FSBEI HPE "MOSCOW STATE CIVIL UNIVERSITY"

Department of History and Cultural Studies

Abstract on the topic: Russia's struggle for access to the Black Sea: Russian-Turkish wars in the 18th century.

Completed:

Shaveleva Margarita Sergeevna

ISA, 1st year, 33rd group

Checked:

Scientific supervisor-

Byzova Olga Mikhailovna

Moscow 2014

Russian-Turkish relations in the 16th – 19th centuries were quite tense. Information about the first conflicts between Russia and the Crimean Tatars dates back to the 1500s. The main reason for the Russian-Turkish wars was the desire to control the territories of the Northern Black Sea region, the Caucasus, the Northern and, later, the Southern, and the desire to gain the possibility of navigation in the straits. And also Russia’s struggle for the rights of Christians living in the Ottoman Empire.

Russian-Turkish War 1735 – 1739

Russian-Turkish War 1735 – 1739 became a consequence of the noticeably more frequent raids of the Crimean Tatars and the contradictions that aggravated during the Russian-Polish war of 1733 - 1735. For Russia great value had access to the Black Sea. Russian troops inflicted a number of serious defeats Ottoman Empire in the period from 1735 to 37, but due to serious water shortages and a plague epidemic, they were forced to abandon their positions. Austria later entered the conflict, but also faced a shortage of fresh water. Negotiations in August 1737 did not bring any results, but there was no active hostilities over the next year. According to the Peace of Belgrade concluded in 1739, Russia returned Azov.

Russian-Turkish War (1768-1774)

Access to the Black Sea coast was necessary for Russia to develop trade. However, the government of Catherine 2 sought to postpone the start of the armed conflict until other problems were resolved. But such a policy was regarded by the Ottoman Empire as weakness. But the Russian-Turkish war of 1768 - 1774. turned out to be a failure for Turkey. Rumyantsev successfully blocked attempts by Turkish troops to penetrate deep into the country. The turning point in the war was 1770. Rumyantsev inflicted a number of defeats on the Turkish troops. Spiridonov's squadron made the first passage in history from the Baltic to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, to the rear of the Turkish fleet. The decisive Battle of Chesme led to the destruction of the entire Turkish fleet. And after the Dardanelles were blockaded, Turkish trade was disrupted. However, despite the excellent chances of developing success, Russia sought to conclude peace as quickly as possible. Catherine needed troops to suppress the peasant uprising. According to the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty of 1774, Crimea gained independence from Turkey. Russia received Azov, Lesser Kabarda and some other territories.

Reasons that led to the war with Turkey

The change in Russia's policy, expressed in its close alliance with Prussia and cooling towards Austria, led to the implementation of plans for the so-called “Northern System” and especially puzzled France. These plans consisted of the formation of an alliance of northern states: Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Poland, which, with the sympathy and material assistance of England, could not only constitute a counterweight, but even take on a threatening character against the southern European powers that were under the influence of Austria and France. The direct consequence of the fears of this latter state was the desire to weaken Russia through a war with Turkey, which, succumbing to the suggestions of France, in 1768 took advantage of an insignificant pretext and declared war on Russia.

War plan

Energetic measures were immediately taken to counter the enemy and, as Catherine put it, they began “ to scorch the Turkish Empire from all four corners" To discuss the plan of military action, following the example of the former “Conference,” a “Council” was formed from the most trusted persons, in which Catherine herself presided. It was decided to wage an offensive war and send one army to the Dniester to invade the enemy’s borders, and the other to Ukraine. In addition, it was proposed to move detachments of troops to Georgia and Kuban.

The ultimate goals of the war were the liberation of the Christian population of Turkey, the establishment of Russia on the shores of the Azov and Black Seas and the opening of a free trade route through them to the Mediterranean Sea. To achieve these goals, after the occupation of Azov and Taganrog, which remained unfortified due to the carelessness of the Turks, they hastily set about renewing the Don Flotilla. The most daring naval enterprise of this war was the project of Count Alexei Grigorievich Orlov to send a Russian squadron to the Mediterranean Sea to operate against Turkey from the Archipelago.

A.G. Orlov, who was in Italy due to illness with his brother Fedor, having become familiar with the situation of the Christian subjects of Turkey, had long had in mind in the event of war to take advantage of their discontent, organize among them a common simultaneous uprising against the Turks and help them regain their freedom and independence.

It was assumed that during the war such an uprising would be a very important diversion for diverting part of the Turkish troops from our main army, and during the conclusion of peace it would serve to somewhat weaken Turkey and, consequently, to greater security of our southern borders. Orlov reassured the empress of the success of the enterprise, if only a sufficiently strong Russian squadron was sent to help the rebel peoples. A detailed plan for naval operations in the Archipelago was presented by Alexei Orlov’s brother Grigory Orlov and approved by the Council; " the order and direction of this entire feat" was entrusted to Alexey Orlov.

In 1735, the war began, which is called the Russian-Turkish and Austro-Russian-Turkish. Its participants hoped to change the balance of power in the Black Sea region and the Balkans. Neither side was able to achieve its objectives, but the balance of power did change: the war contributed to the strengthening of Russia and the weakening of Austria. The Ottoman Empire, having returned a significant part of its possessions in the Balkans, lost its strategic advantage in the Black Sea region.

Main combat episodes of the war

Results of the war