UDC 1(091)+299.512+299.513+141.82

ABOUT THE ANTI-CONFUCIAN CHARACTER OF THE “CULTURAL REVOLUTION” IN CHINA (1966-1976)

Gutsulyak Oleg Borisovich
Precarpathian National University named after Vasyl Stefanyk (Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine)

annotation
The article analyzes the phenomenon of the struggle between the ideological and metaphysical doctrines of Confucianism and Taoism, traditional for Chinese civilization, in the new conditions of influence from Western ideological doctrines. Examples of specific facts from the history of the “cultural revolution” in China (1966 – 1976), from the texts of leading representatives of the Communist Party of China and ideological campaigns to carry out “criticism”, “eradication” and “correction” are given. The Maoist criticism of Confucianism was also inspired by the fact that there had previously been similar sharp criticism from Mo Tzu, the founder of his own teaching (Moism) and, accordingly, the so-called. the subsequent "great proletarian cultural revolution" was also considered important stage this anti-Confucian movement.

ON ANTI-CONFUCIAN CHARACTER OF THE "CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION" (1966-1976)

Gutsulyak Oleg Borisovich
PreCarpathian National University named Vasyl Stefanyk (Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine)

Abstract
The article analyzes the phenomenon of the struggle for traditional Chinese civilization, world outlook and metaphysical doctrines of Confucianism and Taoism in new conditions influence from the Western philosophical doctrines. The examples of the specific facts of the history of the "cultural revolution" in China (1966 – 1976), the text of the representatives of the Communist Party of China, and ideological campaigns for the "critics", "eradication" and "correction" ". Inspired by Maoist critique of Confucianism as the actual fact of the existence and earlier similar sharp criticism from the Mo-tzu – the founder of his own teaching (moizm) and, accordingly, the so-called follow "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was also considered an important step in this anti-Confucianism movement.

Previously, the author in the article [Gutsulyak, 2013] examined the philosophical and worldview bases for the formation of the national version of Chinese communist ideology, where the conclusion was made that significant influence on it of the Taoist tradition, the use of Taoist principles in the ideological practice of the CCP in the 20-70s is analyzed. XX century in order to legitimize her position of power, as well as the phenomenon of competitive struggle between the ruling regime and neo-Daoist sects for influence in the ideological sphere. If we consider the history of modern China in the historical aspect traditional for China itself, it turns out that the 20th century, like the previous ones, was also filled with religious wars. But if earlier religion was a cover for social confrontation, now the actual ideology of social confrontation (antagonistic classes, Periphery - Center, etc.) is a cover for religious-metaphysical confrontation. In particular, a view is proposed according to which, at the beginning of its spread in China, the communist idea appeared in the form of a certain “new neo-Daoist teaching,” as if developing the line of “neo-Daoism” (“xuan xue”), which recognized the participation of everyone in public life.

This text continues the analysis of the relationships, influences and oppositions of ideologies and principles used by different factions of Chinese communists from traditional culture - Taoism, Neo-Taoism, Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism.

During a search at the apartment of the fugitive “traitor” Marshal Lin Biao (1907-1971), who was the Minister of Defense of the PRC, the only Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and was officially called the “Successor of Chairman Mao,” numerous clippings and extracts from classical Confucian texts were discovered, which Lin Biao allegedly exchanged with his like-minded people. Supporters of Mao Zedong could not help but use such “weighty evidence” to “incriminate” not only Lin Biao, but also Teacher Kun himself, of being reactionary. Moreover, there was a good reason for the fight against the cultural heritage of the latter. It had long been necessary for Mao Zedong to eradicate from the consciousness of the people those Confucian ideas that were incompatible with his ideal of a ruler and a professional communist worker. He had long been concerned about the traditional strength of family ties, which determined the role of the family and the older generation in many matters. Respect for parents and respect for elders has always been one of the distinctive features the Chinese nation, in which Confucius played a significant role, one of the main tenets of whose teaching was the idea of ​​xiao - “filial piety.” Under the Maoist regime, which sought to subjugate the individual and break traditional family ties, national stereotypes began to interfere with the education of the new generation. And if earlier denunciation of parents was declared a commendable act, now all the “extra” moral foundations of Chinese society were subject to complete transformation.

From the very beginning of the company, the new magazine “Xuexi Yu Pipan” (“Study and Criticism”), which reflected the views of the proponents of the “cultural revolution”, took an active part in criticizing Confucius and praising the legalists, which began to be published in October 1973 in Shanghai. In addition, the Peking University Bulletin, as well as pseudonymous authors from Peking University, Tsinghua University and other educational institutions, played an active role in fueling the campaign. A little later, at the beginning of 1974, the “Journal of Literature, Philosophy and History” also became involved in active “polemical” work, whose authors fiercely criticized the “bourgeois careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, traitor and traitor Lin Biao” and his spiritual teacher Confucius, who at one time “showed exemplary reactionary behavior by advocating the preservation of the decaying slave system.” At the end of 1973 - beginning of 1974, the second stage of the campaign began, when the broad masses of the people acted as the main critics of Confucius. Special courses were organized in higher educational institutions that prepared programs for criticizing certain provisions of Confucius used by Lin Biao. Tens of thousands of workers and peasants attended these courses, joining the ranks of “Marxist theorists.” The involvement of the lower strata was stimulated by open flirting with the broad masses: in the Chinese press they increasingly began to quote Mao’s saying that “the low and small are the smartest. The highest and most revered are the most stupid.” Dozens of pamphlets were published criticizing those sayings of Confucius that were used by Lin Biao. Popular publications, which were simplified critical commentaries on the sayings of Confucius, were distributed in millions of copies with a price of one fen. During the years of the “criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius” campaign, the educational process that began in 1970-1971 in the country’s schools and universities was interrupted. Curricula were again condemned for not introducing enough of the “right ideas.” Confucius was criticized for forcing Chinese schoolchildren to read books rather than work in the fields, and for promoting the idea of ​​“cultivating talent” instead of teaching how to grow vegetables. It followed that the ideas of Confucius, which were shared by Lin Biao, prevented the merging of schoolchildren with the worker-peasant masses. Confucius was condemned for allegedly trying to instill in students a spirit of respect for the past and trying to educate a spiritual aristocracy. The Teacher’s reputation as an “eternal enlightener”, as an “eternal model for all teachers” was declared artificial [Critique of Lin Biao and Confucius].

Allegedly, the praise of the pedagogical ideas of Confucius was done with the aim of pursuing a revisionist line in order to “emasculate the class character of proletarian enlightenment.” Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao and others like them allegedly “wanted to turn our educational institutions into places for training the bourgeois shift.” This threat has not disappeared, because despite the fact that “the old bourgeois, revisionist system of transformation is bursting at all the seams, however, in the process of its development, the new certainly faces stubborn resistance from the old ideology, old traditions and old habits.” (Quoted from: [Delyusin, 2004, 165]).

However, the organizers of the campaign thought that for greater effect, criticism of Confucius should be made by a specialist in the study of Confucianism, a supporter of Confucius’s ideas, who has global recognition. The choice fell on Professor Feng Yulan, the ideologist of the Kuomintang who remained on the mainland and the creator of the “new neo-Confucianism.” Only an opponent with not only supreme power, but also the same authority, could persuade the old professor to abandon his usual assessments. After several nightly conversations with Mao Zedong, Feng Yulan publicly, on the pages of People's Daily, revised his views. The scientist’s repentance had a stunning resonance: in Japan, Feng’s performance was compared to the explosion of an atomic bomb [Perelomov, 1976, 71]. Feng Yulan became an adviser to the most radical group (the Group/Proletarian Headquarters for the Cultural Revolution under the CPC Central Committee, 1966-1976), which included Jiang Qing (Mao Zedong’s wife), which launched the well-known campaign to “close the shop of Confucius”, “critics Confucius and Lin Biao” and “for streamlining the style”, appealing to the Legist (“fajia”) tradition. The campaign was accompanied by a direct appeal to the authority of Qin Shi Huangdi, who in China has become one of the main national heroes since the time of the Cultural Revolution. [Wang Ming, 1979, 241-258], and the Legist teaching of Shang Yang (390-338 BC) was extolled due to the fact that the laws adopted on its basis by the Taoist Emperor Qin Shi Huang Di provided the people with a happy life for ten years: no one appropriated things lost on the road things, there were no bandits, no thieves, every family, every person enjoyed prosperity [Krymov. 1972, 192-193].

The traitor Lin Biao, for example, was accused of “agreeing” with the position of Confucius, who preached morality, humanity, honesty, loyalty and concern for others, while “revolutionary violence” and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” were necessary, and accusations were also poured in adherence of Lin Biao and his supporters to the tactics of subsequent Confucians (Chen Hao, Chen Yi, Zhu Xi) “zhongyong” - “stick to the golden mean” in the context of the struggle between the “red banner of Mao’s ideas” and the revisionism of the Soviet social imperialists [Wang Ming, 1979, 289], or even generally accused of a capitulatory position to the USSR, by analogy with the Confucians of the period of the Western Han dynasty in their relationship with the northern tribes (People's Daily, 1974, May 18): “... The Confucians attacked the “war of resistance” of the Xiongnu, calling it is a rejection of the principles of virtue and the solution of problems through military means. They said that there were no root causes for the clash and blamed a few influential courtiers who were inciting the emperor to war, claiming that it was inevitable. They screamed that the war of resistance was disastrous for the state, the lands on the border were useless for us, and a large army would be an irreparable burden on the people. They proposed to recall the troops and stop the clash on the border. The Confucians argued that there should be agreement between the two great states and proposed to destroy the defensive structures on the border and begin negotiations with the Xiongnu on the basis of mutually beneficial conditions. In addition, they wanted to conclude a reactionary political alliance with the Huns-aggressors" (Quote from: [Tikhvinsky, 1976, 317-318]), while the legalists strongly advocated strengthening preparations for war and advocated “destroying war with war.”

Taking into account that in July 1973 Mao Zedong criticized the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was subordinate to Zhou Enlai, and in December made critical comments on the activities of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee under the leadership of Ye Jianying, Jiang Qing decided to take advantage of this and direct the spearhead of her attacks on Zhou Enlai and other veterans of the revolution. In one of her speeches, she openly stated that “at present there is one respectable follower of Confucius” and this “modern Confucian must be criticized.” (Quoted from: [Usov, 2005, vol. 2, 214]). At the beginning of 1974, Jiang Qing said: “And now there is a major Confucian. This is not Liu Shaoqi or Lin Biao.” In the article “What kind of man is Confucius,” published in the seventh issue of 1974 of the Hongqi magazine, a portrait of the ancient sage was drawn that reminded the reader of the portrait of Zhou Enlai. Historical facts it was distorted to make the portrait of Confucius more similar to Zhou Enlai. Thus, in this article, Confucius appeared at the age of 71 (the same age as the Prime Minister of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at that time). He was seriously ill, which also brought to mind Zhou Enlai, and if the reader was well acquainted with ancient history, then he knew that Confucius was not ill at that age. To make the portrait of Confucius even more similar to Zhou Enlai, the “stiff hand” was mentioned, which everyone who saw the Chinese premier knew about [Delyusin, 2004, 158].

The Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, was accused in Red Guard publications (dazibao) of belonging to the bureaucratic stratum ("shenshi") of the feudal class, and it was also indicated that the family name of the premier was identical (the same hieroglyphs) with the name of the reactionary Zhou dynasty (XI-VIII centuries. BC), a supporter of the restoration of which was Confucius. For several days and nights, Zhou Enlai was besieged by the Red Guards in his residence and it took him a lot of effort to convince the thugs who burst into his room that he was pursuing exactly the “line of Chairman Mao.” The walls of Beijing were covered with calls to “burn Zhou Enlai alive,” “crush the dog head of the black bandit Zhou,” etc. By order of Jiang Qing, she was arrested and subsequently tortured in prison stepdaughter Zhou Enlai actress and director Sun Weishi [China, 1991, 56-57].

Such hidden and at the same time purposeful persecution of Zhou Enlai was not accidental. After Lin Biao's death, the Prime Minister of the State Council of the People's Republic of China took the initiative into his own hands and initiated a program of "criticism of revisionism and correction of work style", during which again it was supposed to blame the excesses of the "Cultural Revolution" on Lin Biao (who was portrayed as " leftist") and return political and economic development The PRC is at least at the level of 1966. However, criticism of “leftism” and the desire to return the “old guard” to leadership positions, in particular Deng Xiaoping, could not but alert the proponents of the “cultural revolution”, the legitimacy of whose stay in power was now called into question. It was these political realities that forced them to group around Jiang Qing, who did not intend to give up her positions without a fight [ Forster, 1986].

Russian researcher Lev Delyusin believed that the locals had a passive, formal attitude towards the campaign of “critics of Lin Biao and Confucius” and sabotaged it. Did the researcher draw a similar conclusion based on the fact that articles periodically appeared in People's Daily and Hongqi? from which it was clear that Beijing was not satisfied with the progress of the “criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius” campaign on the ground. “It is no coincidence, therefore, that from time to time complaints and reproaches were heard from Beijing against those who tried to change the direction of the campaign and give it other forms, other goals. The distortion of the meaning of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was combined with attempts to disrupt it through formal open statements about the importance of this campaign, and in practice - to curtail it and deal with specific cases. Finally, there were quite a few workers who were simply tired of the endless shouting of meaningless slogans.” [Delyusin, 2004, 179]. A similar point of view is shared by the prominent Russian sinologist V.N. Usov, according to whose information the initiative to convene mass rallies was received coolly locally. She was ignored by 11 provincial-level party committees, party committees of 7 large and 16 provincial military districts, 14 provincial committees of the KSMK, federations of unions and women's federations of 13 provinces [Usov, 2005, vol. 2, 214]. However, when considering Western historiography, it becomes obvious that the relationship between the central and local authorities was far from so simple. American researcher Keith Forster, examining in detail the company “Critics of Lin Biao and Cofnutius” on the specific example of Zhejiang province, using regional periodicals from the company’s times as sources, came to the conclusion that a balance was maintained between the two levels of government, central and local, during this period, and cases of local government not subordinating to the central government were the exception rather than the rule [ Forster, 1986].

Even earlier, a Chinese Marxist and leader of the CPC came out with sharp criticism of Confucianism, against its concepts of honesty and chastity, and against the moral principles of politics. XX century Chen Duxiu: “... While defending democracy, one cannot help but fight against Confucianism” (Quoted from: [Krymov, 1972, 306]). And further: “... If we build the state and society on the basis of Confucian principles... this means that there is no need for either a republican constitution, or reform, or new policy, no new education, in vain then blood was shed for the revolution, for parliament and laws. This means a return to the old regime" (Quoted in: [Krymov, 1972, 317]). Another Chinese Marxist, Li Dazhao, also wrote articles against the attempt to include the following article in the text of the Chinese Constitution: “Moral improvement according to the teachings of Confucius is the basis of national education.” [Krymov, 1972, 313]. The Marxist writer Lu Xun also criticized the “cannibalistic morality” of Confucius: “... If we want to achieve progress and prosperity,” he wrote, “it is necessary to completely eradicate the “dual ideology.” No matter how great the earth is, there should be no place on it for wanderers” (Quoted from: [Krymov, 1972, 315]).

The Marxist criticism of Confucianism was also inspired by the fact that there had previously been similar sharp criticism from Mo Tzu (468-376 BC) – the founder of his own teaching (Moism) [ see: Titarenko, 1985].

And so-called the subsequent "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was also considered an important stage of this anti-Confucian movement. Mao Zedong motivated this with the following considerations.

“... In China, the factory industry arose under the influence of foreign capital and the imperialist policies of the colonial powers, when the lower forms of entrepreneurship and capitalism were far from exhausted historical role. It developed under conditions of slow decomposition subsistence farming, while maintaining pre-capitalist and partly early capitalist relations, when the impoverishment of the countryside significantly outpaced the process of formation of the working class, and the absence of a single national market predetermined the underdevelopment of the labor market. In the 20-40s, capitalism began to determine the life of Chinese cities, especially on the coast (Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei and Liaoning - O.G.)... Features of the development of capitalism in China determined the uniqueness of the process of formation of the industrial proletariat. The first and most important specific feature of this process was the simultaneous existence of historically different categories of workers while maintaining their predominant mass in the simplest forms of capitalist production. As part of the working class of China, one can distinguish artisans..., manufacturing workers and, finally, factory workers, or the industrial proletariat itself... The labor movement not only did not go beyond the framework of the national liberation struggle of the entire Chinese people, but also did not acquire independent national significance ... work among the working class was carried out primarily by the Kuomintang and “yellow” trade unions, but not by the CPC... It is significant that by the time of the victory of the revolution, only 4% of party members considered themselves to come from working class backgrounds. The weak ties of the CPC with the labor movement did not contribute to a clearer awareness among workers of their special class interests and the historical tasks of the labor movement...” [ Worker, 1978, pp. 6, 8, 9, 13, 14].

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the official doctrine of the CPC believed that in China, unlike Russia, the bourgeoisie, who preserved the ideals of Confucianism, like the rest of the Chinese people, was subject to oppression by foreign imperialism and local feudal lords, and therefore should be considered an ally of the CPC, and not as an enemy and, accordingly, do not push her away [China, 1991, 145-146]. The national flag of the People's Republic of China - four stars, located in a semicircle around a large star, symbolizing the CPC, personified the working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie.

Mao Zedong called this form of class cooperation “new democracy” (“xinminzhuzhui”), indicating that in this way the free development of private capital will be ensured, and the volume of foreign investment in all sectors of the economy “will be unusually large.” This doctrine of “new democracy” was officially proclaimed at the 7th Congress of the CPC in 1945. True, the consolation was offered in the fact that “new democracy” is only a transitional stage to socialism. “... Under the leadership of the state economy, which is socialist in nature, through cooperation, rebuilding the individual economy and through state capitalism, rebuilding the private capitalist economy - this is the main way to transform a new democratic society into a socialist one” (Resolution of the 2nd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee in March 1949, village of Sibaipo , Hebei Province), then confirmed in the resolution of the CPC Central Committee “Theses on the propaganda of the general line of the party during the transition period” (December, 1953) [ Worker, 1978, 29].

Accordingly, on May 5, 1966, at the XI Plenum of the 8th CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong personally wrote and hung his dazibao “Fire at the headquarters!” in the meeting room. In September 1966, Mao’s closest ally, Defense Minister Lin Biao, said: “... The main goal of the current movement is to reach those party members who, while in power, are following the capitalist path. To subject headquarters to artillery fire means to subject to artillery fire a handful of people walking along the capitalist path” (Quoted in: [Burlatsky, 1967, 13]). In November 1967, the People's Daily newspaper pointed to a specific head of the “counter-revolution headquarters”: “... In 1962, at an extended meeting of the CPC Central Committee (meaning the X Plenum of the CPC Central Committee in September 1962 - O.G.) The proletarian headquarters, headed by Chairman Mao, began a fierce battle with the bourgeois headquarters... A close ally of Chairman Mao, Comrade Lin Piao, holding high the red banner of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, confirmed at this meeting the absolute authority of Chairman Mao and the ideas of Mao Zedong, and the Chinese chief revisionist ( Liu Shaoqi - O.G.) at the meeting launched a frantic attack on Chairman Mao and the ideas of Mao Tse-tung. He exclaimed beside himself with anger: “To oppose Chairman Mao means to oppose an individual... After the meeting, the Chinese chief revisionist gathered his anti-Party disciples and, with tenfold fury, intensified his conspiratorial activities for counter-revolutionary restoration, secretly preparing public opinion for the usurpation of power in the Party and state" (Quoted by: [Burlatsky, 1968, 5]). The object of criticism at the end of 1966 was the book by Liu Shaoqi, published back in 1939, “On the work of communists on themselves,” which allegedly stated that the main fundamental issues were resolved by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and therefore there was no special “Sinicization of Marxism” need to. On May 8, 1966, Jiefangjun Bao published Gao Ju's article "Let's Open Fire on Anti-Party and Anti-Socialist Bandits." The latter included Deng Tuo, secretary of the Beijing City Committee of the CPC, editor-in-chief of the Qianxian magazine (and previously editor-in-chief of the People's Daily), and Liao Mosha, philosopher and literary critic, head of the United Front department of the Beijing City Committee of the CPC. On May 10, 1966, Yao Wenyuan published a large article in Shanghai publications “on the reactionary essence” of Deng Tuo’s collections of feuilletons and parables “Evening Conversations at the Foot of Yanshan” and “Notes from the Village of Three,” written by Deng Tuo in collaboration with Wu Han and Liao Mosha. A year earlier, the writer and vice-mayor of Beijing Wu Han was ostracized for his play “The Demotion of Hai Rui,” which allegedly justified the “right-wing opportunists” led by Peng Dehuai, who were convicted at the VIII Plenum of the CPC Central Committee (Lushan. July-August 1959 G.). For example, Deng To was charged with the fact that he “... cynically called the Marxist-Leninist scientific position “The wind from the East overcomes the wind from the West” as “idle talk”, thereby he “... scolds not a children’s poem, but the ideological weapon of our party” ( Quote for: [Bovin, Delyusin, 1968, 18-19]). The poet Yang Shu, who worked in the propaganda department of the same Beijing City Committee of the CPC, for the lines “People are waiting for spring, and soon the rays of the spring sun will warm them” and “Plum blossoms are the herald of the coming Spring. The gardens are filled with spring flowers. Her arrival is near! was accused of “giving away his hopes for the restoration of capitalism this spring” (Quoted by: [Bovin, Delyusin, 1968, 20-21]). The deputy head of the department of agitation and propaganda, Zhou Yang, was accused of “... in the field of literature and art, he propagated the ideas of Russian bourgeois literary critics Belinsky, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, and in the field of theater - the system of Stanislavsky” (Quoted for: [Burlatsky, 1968, 8]). Peking University Rector and Party Committee Secretary Lu Ping was similarly ostracized as the leader of the “monarchist group.” [Burlatsky. 1968, 7]. One of the students at the Faculty of Chemistry wrote: “I came to the university to master the ideas of the reddest of all red suns - Chairman Mao, and Lu Ping demanded that we study formulas that no one needed” (Quoted by: [Bovin, Delyusin, 1968, 26]). Law students accused teachers of not having a course that systematically and comprehensively introduced the works of Mao Zedong. “...The course of Peking University in the field of education,” declared the People’s Daily on June 4, 1966, “as the broad masses of university students discovered, was aimed not at preparing successors to the cause of the revolution, but at preparing a replacement for the bourgeoisie” (Quoted by: [Bovin, Delyusin, 1968, 30]). This was followed by groups of articles hinting that Deng Tuo, Wu Han, Liao Mosha, Yang Shu, Lu Ping and others had high patrons. Soon they were “found” in the person of a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, the first secretary of the Beijing City Committee of the CPC Peng Zhen, who, by decision of the CPC Central Committee of May 25, 1966, was relieved of his posts (Li Xuefeng, who replaced him, was also soon accused and removed from his posts) . He was accused of distributing in February 1966 within the party the “Theses of the report of the group of five on the affairs of the cultural revolution on the ongoing scientific discussion”, prepared in the department of agitation and propaganda of the CPC Central Committee, which called for a discussion on scientific problems in the spirit of the course “let everyone compete” scientists,” so that the disputing parties do not label each other, do not resort to administration, but strive to know the truth, because “before the truth, everyone is equal,” the enemy must be suppressed not only politically, but also in scientific and professional terms. Although the document was guided by similar words of Mao Zedong himself, spoken by him in 1957, now the Message of the CPC Central Committee of May 16, 1966 disavowed the “February theses” and the words previously spoken on behalf of the CPC Central Committee by candidate member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee Lu Dini, that “... the people have not only the freedom to propagate materialism, but also the freedom to propagate idealism,” which were characterized as preparing public opinion for the restoration of capitalism [Bovin, Delyusin, 1968, 22-24, 37]. Since September 1967, Tao Zhu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and the head of all ideological work in the Central Committee, became the object of “great criticism” with the stigma of “counter-revolutionary double-dealer”. Yao Wenyuan, in the fourteenth issue of the party magazine Hongqi, published a devastating article “On the Two Books of Tao Zhu” (“Ideal”, 1962; “Teaching”, 1964).

During the XI Plenum of the CPC Central Committee on August 5, 1966, Mao Zedong wrote a new dazibao: “... for more than 50 days, some leading comrades in the center and locally went in the completely opposite direction. Taking a reactionary bourgeois position, they exercised the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and tried to suppress the violent movement of the great proletarian cultural revolution. Distorting the true state of affairs and presenting black as white, they organized punitive campaigns against revolutionaries, suppressed dissidents, established white terror, rejoiced at their imaginary successes and, as a result, inflated the arrogance of the bourgeoisie and reduced the morale of the proletariat. How vile!” (Quoted by: [Bovin, Delyusin, 1968, 29]). The decision of the CPC Central Committee to reorganize the Beijing City Party Committee was advertised as “a new victory for the ideas of Mao Zedong” and was presented as the result of the will of the people, the initiative of the broad masses.

The events in Beijing and Lin Biao's speeches served as a signal for the start of mass revelations and the "four purges" campaign (political, ideological, organizational and economic) throughout the country, collectively called the "socialist education movement." On July 17, 1967, People's Daily reprints Lu Xun's article “The time has not yet come for a noble game,” written back in 1925 and directed against counter-revolutionaries (“Beat the dog that fell into the water!”). “We, the proletarian revolutionaries,” the editorial comment states, “must keep in mind the words of Lu Xun and, just as mercilessly as those who “beat a dog that has fallen into the water,” launch mass criticism and struggle against a handful of the most prominent figures in the party, standing in power and following the capitalist path... They are paper tigers, but not dead tigers. They will remain living tigers until our criticism finally overthrows and discredits them... If we lose our vigilance and do not unleash mass criticism, then they may carry out a restoration, unite counter-revolutionary forces and drown the working people in blood" ( Quote for: [Bovin, Delyusin, 1968, 123]). At the same time, it was called upon to learn from the People’s Liberation Army, take up “military affairs”, carry out the general arming of the people and strengthen preparations in case of war (“Trust in the Liberation Army, rely on the Liberation Army, learn from the Liberation Army!”, “Introduce the spirit of the Army!” ). Essentially, this was a repetition of the slogans of the August (1958) extended meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee (“The situation in which all the people are soldiers inspires and gives more courage”) and the famous statement of the Great Helmsman “A rifle gives birth to power!” In May 1965, the so-called "revolutionization" of the armed forces, which meant the abolition military ranks and insignia under the pretext of further “strengthening the connection between commanders and the masses.” At enterprises and institutions, “political departments” began to be created, which were formed from army personnel. At the beginning of 1967, the establishment of “direct military/army control” over party and government bodies was officially announced [Burlatsky, 1968, 17-18], down to county institutions, and rural communes and below were placed under the control of the militia. The slogan “Arm the organization, revolutionize the worldview, increase the political activity of rural brigades” was thrown into the village. The report “Implementation of the military system at the factory is the way to manage socialist enterprises” spoke about the situation at the tractor factory in Jiangxi Province, about the establishment of a military production management system in the fourth workshop of the plant. 380 workers of the workshop are divided into three companies. The company is headed by a company commander, his deputy, a political instructor and his deputy. A grassroots unit is a department with 10-12 people. “...The implementation of the military management system,” wrote Jiangxi Daily on September 18, 1968, “fully meets the conditions of an industrial enterprise,” “the military system on the shop floor is a great victory for Chairman Mao’s ideas regarding the construction of a proletarian army in industrial enterprises.” In addition, as the People's Daily wrote on March 19, 1969, a system of "red watchmen" ("hongshaobings") is being introduced at enterprises from among the loyal Maoists. Which are given the right to control workers, after a shift to “certify comrades”, “suppress all erroneous ideas, statements and actions that do not correspond to the ideas of Mao”, and even “monitor the work of shift supervisors and personnel workers” [Vyatsky, Demin. 1970, 127-128]. A similar “army system” was introduced in educational institutions and universities. Instead of classes and courses, companies were introduced. Platoons and squads, the training system was transformed according to the model of military-political training in the army [Vyatsky, Demin. 1970, 130]. To provide for rural teams and deprivation of wages, medical and trade workers are transferred, free labor and youth in cities are “mobilized” to send them to remote areas and the countryside. During this campaign, about 20 million people were “mobilized” and evicted from cities.

The striking force of the “cultural revolution” was the youth detachments of the “red guards” (Red Guards) and “revolutionary rebels” (Zaofan), singing the anthem “You can’t do without a helmsman on the high seas.”

During the “cultural revolution,” the supposedly bureaucratic constitutional system of state bodies and statutory bodies of the CPC was destroyed, the apparatus of the CPC Central Committee, all six territorial bureaus of the Central Committee, county and provincial committees were dispersed, and primary party organizations were inactive. As of 1968 alone, out of 172 members and candidate members of the CPC Central Committee, more than 130 people were repressed or defamed, 12 out of 17 members of the Polituro of the CPC Central Committee, 4 out of 6 candidate members of the Politburo, 4 out of 7 members of the Politburo Standing Committee, 7 out of 10 secretaries The CPC Central Committee were called "time bombs hidden next to Chairman Mao." Eight of the nine former Chinese marshals fell into disgrace. In December 1966, the governing bodies of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its branches were dispersed, and the Komsomol disappeared into oblivion. General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Deng Xiaping and his family become the target of the Red Guards. The Red Guards captured his son, whom they first tortured and then threw from a 4th floor window, as a result of which he becomes disabled. Deng himself was removed from all posts in 1966 and sent as a simple worker to a tractor factory in Jiangxi province. Chinese President Liu Shaoqi is put on trial and then dies in prison. In 1974, Mao Zedong returned Deng to politics and he became vice-premier. But already in 1976, after the incident in Tiananmen Square, he was removed from all posts, accused of organizing the riots there, and placed under house arrest. One of the main enemies and the “high priest of economism” was declared to be the director of the Institute of Economics at the Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the State statistical office Sun Yefang, who argued that the economy should be guided by the law of value and profitability, and not by teams of politicians, whose views he called “the economy of lazy people.” He proposed that the “red line” of economic work be considered the principle: “With the least cost of social labor, in a planned manner, produce the largest amount of products to satisfy social needs.” [Vyatsky, Dimin, 1970, 118]. His main patron was Liu Shaoqi, who, as the People's Daily stated in an article dated September 5, 1967, saw “... the goal of the economy is to expand production, and the goal of production is to increase individual income and improve living conditions,” defended the slogan “Engage living conditions and stimulate production" [Burlatsky, 1968, 20, 114-115]. Together with Sun Yefang, well-known scientists and practitioners were attacked as “representatives of the black line in the economy”: the head of the Central Administrative Industrial and Trade Department Xu Dixin, the deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee of the People's Republic of China Luo Genmo, the chairman of the Price Committee Xue Muqiao. Editor of the journal “Economic Research” Qin Liufang, director of the Institute of World Economy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Jiang Junchen and many others.

Based on the army, new authorities were formed - revolutionary committees (revolutionary committees), connecting military, party and administrative power, then legitimized in the Constitution of 1975. They began to organize public trials of “counter-revolutionaries”, handed down death sentences and immediately carried them out . The most active “proletarian rebels” also came across them, who began to be accused of anarchism, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois groupism and sectarianism, replacing the “struggle with words” with “struggle with force”, subversive activities (for example, former members of the Cultural Revolution Group Wang Li, Guan Feng and Qi Benyu). In the third issue of 1967, the magazine “Khuntsy” published an editorial “It is necessary to approach cadres correctly”: “... For more than six months, a powerful counter-offensive against a handful of people in power in the ranks of the party, following the capitalist path, some had the wrong idea the impression that all workers in power are bad and cannot be trusted and all of them must be overthrown. This view is completely erroneous" (Quoted in: [Burlatsky, 1967, 16])

On March 5, 1967, the People's Daily published an "Emergency Notice" to help communes with spring plowing. The address noted that along with the fight against counter-revolution and anti-Party elements, it is necessary to “carry out field work in a timely manner,” guided by Mao Zedong’s instructions: “We will prepare for war, we will prepare for natural disasters!” [Burlatsky, 1967, 15].“... It can be foreseen,” the Hongqi magazine wrote during the mobilization campaigns (December, 1966), “that revolutionary enthusiasm ... will inevitably manifest itself in the struggle for the development of industrial and agricultural production and in scientific experiments, causing a great leap in the national economy in China” ( Quote for: [Vyatsky, Dimin, 1970, 133]).

Also, during the campaign of struggle “For the Study of the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” which began in 1974, distribution according to labor, the right to personal plots, and commodity-money relations were declared “bourgeois right,” which must be “limited,” i.e. introduce equalization, material incentive measures were abolished, overtime work was practiced, and household plots were liquidated. A joint editorial in People's Daily and Hongqi stated: “... Economism is a form of bribery that undermines the revolutionary will of the broad masses... by encouraging them to ignore long-term national interests and care only for immediate interests. Its goal is to strangle the great proletarian cultural revolution... to undermine social production, the national economy and socialist property" (Quoted in: [Burlatsky, 1967, 72]). Among the “counter-revolutionary methods” “People’s Daily” included the use of profit as a stimulating and comprehensive indicator of the enterprise’s activity, material incentives for workers, as well as a system of unity of command in the management of enterprises by specialists, engineers and technicians. The publication “Dongfanghong” dated January 16, 1967 branded the specific demands of workers to improve living conditions, restore the level of wages, resume the previously existing payment of bonuses, benefits, etc., as well as the demands of peasants to raise grain standards for food [Vyatsky, Dimin, 1970, 120]. In May 1967, a propaganda campaign began to promote Mao's claims that "the slogan 'to each according to his work' is bourgeois" and that "the system of rationed free supplies is a Marxist style, a condition for the transition to a communist way of life." [Vyatsky, Dimin, 1970, 128]. Especially zealous revolutionaries from among the Red Guards provoked refusals of material incentives (bonuses and salary increases). It was assumed that, following the transport workers in Nanjing and the machine builders in Beijing, all the working people of the country would take the path of voluntary self-restraint. In one of the “revolutionary plays” it was declared: “... You walked barefoot, then in canvas slippers, then in rubber shoes, then you, who knows, will want to show off in leather shoes or even boots. Where will you ultimately reach in your bourgeois degeneration?” (Quoted by: [Vidal, 1967, 125]). Or, for example, in the report to the IX Congress of the Chinese Komsomol (June, 1964), the first secretary of the Communist Youth League, Hu Yaobang, named the “desire for leisure” among the “ideological influences exerted by the exploiting classes” (Quoted in: [Vidal, 1967, 266]).

Based on the incorrect premise of Mao Zedong’s passion for anarchism in his youth and exclusive orientation toward the peasantry, A. Tarasov, however, correctly defined the philosophical component of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”: “...Mao introduced the theory of “balance and lack of balance.” He believed that the events of social history develop as follows: at first there is an equilibrium, then, due to the accumulation of internal contradictions, a crisis occurs - an imbalance, as a result of which the “top” and “bottom” of the social system change places, then a new equilibrium sets in, within which new contradictions that will cause new crises and social upheavals. And so on endlessly. It is clearly seen that such a concept is much closer to classical Chinese philosophy, to the concept eternal struggle two principles “yin” and “yang”, the change of two elements in a closed cycle, than to the Hegelian-Marxist spiral of social development... The number of crises does not affect the integrity of the system, sooner or later it will still reach a state of equilibrium, but the longer the period drags on equilibrium, the stronger the impending crisis will be. And in order not to be thrown to the bottom of the social system as a result of the crisis, it is advisable to provoke the impending crisis yourself in order to be able to manipulate its course in the direction you want... Then, of course, new opponents will appear, Mao believed, because contradictions still remain - but during the next crisis, if it is properly organized and provoked in time, they will emerge again and be destroyed.” [Tarasov, 1996-1997]. In the end, as the loyal Maoist, head of the department of agitation and propaganda of the CPC Central Committee Lu Ding-yi, summed up, revolutions will remain the locomotives of history not only in class society, but also in the future communist [Burlatsky, 1968, 50]. This, by the way, was also proclaimed a century earlier by the Russian revolutionary democrat A.I. Herzen: “... Socialism will develop in all phases to extreme consequences, to absurdities. Then the cry of denial will again burst from the titanic chest of the revolutionary minority, and the mortal struggle will begin again, in which socialism will take the place of the current conservatism and will be defeated by the coming revolution, unknown to us.” (Quoted from: [Korolkova, 2005, 95]).

Those. From what has been discussed above, we can come to the conclusion that Maoist Marxism in its mental and ideological basis is a neo-Daoist anti-Confucian revolution, similar to the Taoist anti-Confucian “revolution” of the Qin dynasty.

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“The “cultural revolution” was not and cannot be a revolution or social progress in any sense... it was a turmoil caused from above through the fault of the leader and used by counter-revolutionary groups, a turmoil that brought serious disasters to the party, the state and the entire multinational people.” .

From the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. China on some issues of the history of the Party, since the formation of the Chinese People's Republic(1981)

Disagreements within the leadership of the CPC on the problems of determining the domestic political course and foreign policy orientation of the country reached great severity by the end of 1965. Mao Zedong and his supporters advocated a return to the “Yan’an” norms of the political and socio-economic organization of society. Mao Zedong put forward the idea of ​​class struggle in a socialist society back in 1957, and after the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 8th convocation (1962), he began to propagandize and impose on the country the idea of ​​“exacerbating the class struggle”, put forward the position of “continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." In this regard, a thesis emerged that some members of the CPC had taken the path of “revisionism.” Moreover, from the very beginning, the fight against “revisionism” within the country began to be inextricably linked with the fight against “international revisionism”; this concept included the CPSU and. a number of other communist and workers' parties.

Mao Zedong began to especially emphasize the idea of ​​​​the “emergence of revisionism in China” from the second half of 1965. He believed that a large number of representatives of the bourgeoisie and “counter-revolutionary revisionists” had penetrated into the party, government, army and cultural circles, and, only having begun the “great proletarian cultural revolution,” it is possible to win back the power usurped by “persons who have power in the party and follow the capitalist path.” Thus, the “cultural revolution”, conceived and unleashed by Mao Zedong in 1966, was aimed at eliminating from the leading organs of the party all those who disagreed with his policies, primarily supporters of the 8th Congress of the CPC, and imposing his scheme for the development of China on the party and people in the spirit of leftist concepts of “barracks communism”, accelerated construction of socialism, and rejection of methods of economic stimulation.

These ideas were clearly reflected in the calls: “In industry, learn from Daqing oil workers, in agriculture- from the Dazhai production team”, “The whole country should learn from the army”, “Strengthen preparations in case of war and natural disasters”. At the same time, the cult of Mao Zedong's personality continued to inflate. Constantly violating the principles of collective leadership in the party, Mao Zedong had by this time placed himself above the CPC Central Committee, the Politburo of the Party Central Committee, and often did not discuss with the latter the decisions he made on behalf of the party. It was he who, bypassing the party leadership of the country, launched the “cultural revolution” and led it.

Most Chinese scholars divide the history of the “cultural revolution” into three stages.

First stage lasted from May 1966 to April 1969 - this was the most active and destructive phase of the “cultural revolution”, which ended with the convening of the IX Congress of the CPC. The reason for the start of the movement was the publication in November 1965 in the Shanghai newspaper “Wenhui Bao” of Yao Wenyuan’s article “On the new edition of the historical drama “The Demotion of Hai Rui.” The play was written in 1960 by a prominent Chinese historian, Deputy Mayor of Beijing Wu Han. He was accused of the fact that, while telling in his drama about an episode from the history of medieval China, he allegedly hinted at the injustice of the persecution and demotion of Marshal, former Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of China Peng Dehuai, who in 1959 gave a negative assessment of the "Great Leap Forward" and people's communes in China. The play was called "anti-socialist poisonous weed" in the article. This was followed by accusations against the leaders of the Beijing City Committee of the CPC and the propaganda department of the CPC Central Committee. At the end of 1965, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the PRC, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Luo Ruiqing was removed from his posts, accused of “speaking against the party” and “usurping power in the army.”

In May 1966, at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, the “Message of the CPC Central Committee of May 16” was adopted, which outlined the main ideas of Mao Zedong on the “cultural revolution”. At the meeting, a number of senior leaders of the party, government and army were sharply criticized and then removed from their posts, including Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, First Secretary of the Beijing City Party Committee Peng Zhen, Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Head of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee Lu Dingyi, candidate members of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee Yang Shangkun. Then the Cultural Revolution Affairs Group under the CPC Central Committee (hereinafter referred to as the CRP) was created, headed by the former secretary of Mao Zedong, Chen Boda. Mao's wife Jiang Qing and the secretary of the Shanghai City Party Committee Zhang Chunqiao became his deputies, and the secretary of the CPC Central Committee Kang Sheng, who oversaw the state security agencies, became an adviser to the Group. The GKR gradually replaced the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and turned, with the help of Mao, into the “headquarters of the cultural revolution.”

To suppress opposition forces in the party, Mao Zedong and his supporters used politically immature youth, from whom they formed assault troops of the Red Guards - the “Red Guards” (the first Red Guards appeared at the end of May 1966 at the high school at Beijing Tsinghua University). The first “Manifesto” of the Red Guards said: “We are the guardians protecting the red power, the Central Committee of the Party. Chairman Mao is our support. The liberation of all humanity is our responsibility. Mao Zedong Thought is the highest guidance in all our actions. We swear that for the sake of defending the Central Committee, defending the great leader Chairman Mao, we will not hesitate to give our last drop of blood and will decisively complete the cultural revolution.”

Classes in schools and universities were stopped on the initiative of Mao Zedong, so that nothing would prevent students from carrying out the “cultural revolution,” and persecution of the intelligentsia, party members, and Komsomol began. Professors, school teachers, literary and artistic figures, and then prominent party and government workers were taken to the “court of the masses” in jester’s caps, beaten, and mocked allegedly for their “revisionist actions,” but in reality for their independent judgments about the situation in the country, for critical statements about the domestic and foreign policies of the PRC. According to far from complete data provided by the Beijing branch of the Ministry of State Security, from August 23 to the end of September 1966, the Red Guards in Beijing alone killed 1,722 people, confiscated property from 33,695 families, searched and expelled more than 85 thousand people from Beijing. . By October 3, 1966, 397,400 people who fell into the category of “evil spirits” had already been expelled from cities throughout the country.

In August 1966, the XI Plenum of the 8th CPC Central Committee was convened, in which many members of the Central Committee who were victims of persecution did not participate. On August 5, Mao Zedong personally wrote and hung in the meeting room his dazibao “Fire at the headquarters!” He announced to the plenum participants the existence of a “bourgeois headquarters” in the party, accused many party leaders in the center and locally of carrying out a “dictatorship” bourgeoisie,” and called for opening “fire on the headquarters,” intending to completely destroy or paralyze the leading party bodies in the center and locally, people’s committees, mass organizations of workers, and then create new “revolutionary” authorities.

After the “reorganization” of the party leadership, at the plenum, of the five vice-chairmen of the Party Central Committee, only one remained, Minister of Defense Lin Biao, who was spoken of as the “successor” of Mao Zedong. As a result of Mao Zedong’s flirtations with the Red Guards before and during the plenum (meaning his correspondence with the Red Guards, meetings with them), calls to open “fire on the headquarters,” and the excesses of the Red Guards after the plenum acquired even greater proportions. The destruction of government bodies, public organizations, and party committees began. The Red Guards were essentially placed above the party and government agencies.

Life in the country was disorganized, the economy suffered severe damage, hundreds of thousands of CCP members were subjected to repression, and persecution of the intelligentsia intensified. Of the 97 members and 73 candidate members of the 8th CPC Central Committee, respectively, 60 and 37 were declared “special agents and traitors”, “counter-revolutionary revisionist elements”, 60 out of 115 members of the 3rd NPC Standing Committee were slandered as “traitors”, “ revisionists”, “persons maintaining secret ties with foreign countries”. More than 30 secretaries of the RSC city committees, mayors and their deputies were repressed, many of them died. More than 2,600 literary and art workers became victims of repression. Such famous writers as Lao She, Zhao Shuli and dozens of others died. In 17 provinces and cities alone, more than 142 thousand education personnel and teachers were defamed. More than 53 thousand people working in the field of science and technology were subjected to repression.

During the years of the “cultural revolution,” said the indictment in the case of the “four” (1981), “a large number of leading employees of the department of the CPC Central Committee for organizational work, public security bodies at various levels, the prosecutor’s office, the court, army, propaganda organs." According to the document, the victims of the “four” and Lin Biao were a total of more than 727 thousand people, of whom over 34 thousand were “brought to death.” According to official Chinese data, the number of victims during the Cultural Revolution was about 100 million people.

In December 1966, along with the Red Guard detachments, zaofan (rebel) detachments appeared, which involved young, usually unskilled workers, students, and employees. They had to transfer the “cultural revolution” to enterprises and institutions and overcome workers’ resistance to the Red Guards. But the workers, at the call of the CPC committees, and sometimes spontaneously, fought back against the rampaging Red Guards and Zaofans, sought to improve their financial situation, went to the capital to present their claims, stopped work, declared strikes, and entered into battles with the pogromists. Such prominent party, state and military figures as Zhu De, He Long, Chen Yi and others spoke out against the destruction of party organs.

To break the resistance of opponents of the “cultural revolution”, a campaign to “seize power” was launched. In January 1967, the zaofan of Shanghai, incited and led by the GKR, in particular its members Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, seized party and administrative power in the city. Following this, a wave of “seizure of power” from “those in power and following the capitalist path” swept throughout China. In Beijing in mid-January, power was “seized” in 300 departments and institutions. Party committees and government bodies were accused of having, for 17 years since the founding of the PRC, sought to “restorate capitalism” and “instilled revisionism.”

The “seizure of power” was carried out with the help of the army, which suppressed resistance and exercised control over communications, prisons, warehouses, storage and distribution of secret documents, banks, and central archives. Special units were allocated to support the “rebels,” since there was dissatisfaction in the army with the atrocities of the Red Guards and Zaofan. This was confirmed by the Wuhan events of the summer of 1967.

But it was not possible to quickly implement the “seizure of power” plan. Workers' strikes spread, bloody clashes with the Zaofans occurred everywhere, as well as fights between various organizations of the Red Guards and the Zaofans. As Chinese historians write, “China turned into a state where chaos reigned and terror reigned. Party and government bodies at all levels were paralyzed. Leadership cadres and intellectuals with knowledge and experience were persecuted.”

Since January 1967, the creation of new anti-constitutional local government bodies - “revolutionary committees” - began. At first, the leaders of the Red Guards and Zaofan gained dominance in them, which caused discontent among party workers and the military. Political struggle intensified in the center and locally, and in a number of areas there were clashes between military units and organizations of the Red Guards and Zaofan. At the end of the summer of 1967, military control was effectively established in the country.

The XII Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, held in October 1968, which was attended by about a third of the Central Committee, since the rest had been repressed by that time, sanctioned all actions of the “cultural revolution” and “forever” expelled the Chairman of the PRC, Liu Shaoqi, from the party on the basis of trumped-up charges. and removed him from all posts, approved the draft of the new Charter of the CPC. Intensified preparations began for the convening of the IX Congress of the CPC.

The IX Congress of the CPC (April 1969), to which delegates were not elected but appointed, approved and legitimized all the actions taken in the country in 1966 - 1969. The main report delivered by Lin Biao at the congress put forward a plan to continue the purge of party organizations and government institutions, which began in the spring of 1968. The entire history of the party was presented as a struggle of the “Mao Zedong line” against various “deviators”, including Wang Mina, Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, and especially Liu Shaoqi. The IX Congress approved the course of “continuous revolution” and preparation for war.

The new Party Charter adopted by the congress, unlike the Charter adopted by the VIII Congress of the CPC in 1956, did not define the party’s tasks in the field of economic and cultural construction, improving the lives of the people, and developing democracy. The theoretical basis for the activities of the CPC was proclaimed “Mao Zedong Thought”. The program part of the Charter contained a provision on the appointment of Lin Biao as the “successor” of Mao Zedong. As the Chinese historian Li Honglin emphasized, the provision of a “successor”, characteristic of monarchical absolutism, was included in the CPC Charter by Kang Sheng, who considered it a “pioneering phenomenon” in the history of the international communist movement. “This was indeed ‘innovation’ in the sense that such a strange phenomenon had not yet occurred since the emergence of the international communist movement,” wrote Li Honglin. “It is difficult to say how “great significance” it had for the whole world, but it had a truly great influence on the fate of China, bringing the country to the brink of disaster.”

The “Decision on Some Issues in the History of the CPC” adopted by the 6th Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee (June 1981) states: “The 9th Party Congress, which legitimized the erroneous theory and practice of the “cultural revolution”, strengthened the positions of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing , Kang Sheng and others in the Party Central Committee."

Second phase The “cultural revolution” - from the IX to the X Congress of the CPC - began in May 1969 and ended in August 1973.

Some leaders who managed to maintain their positions demanded adjustments to extremist attitudes in the economic field, taking into account the urgent needs of the country's development. On their initiative, since the early 70s. elements of planning, distribution by labor, and material incentives began to be carefully introduced. Measures were also taken to improve the management of the national economy and the organization of production. There have also been some changes in cultural policy, although strict control over cultural life still remains.

In 1970-1971 events occurred that reflected a new crisis within the Chinese leadership. In March 1970, Mao Zedong decided to revise the Constitution of the PRC, making a proposal to abolish the post of Chairman of the PRC. However, Lin Biao and Chen Boda spoke out in favor of retaining the post of Chairman of the People's Republic of China. In August 1970, the Second Plenum of the 9th CPC Central Committee was held in Lushan. Lin Biao and Chen Boda reiterated the need to preserve the post of Chairman of the People's Republic of China in the new version of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. A struggle broke out at the plenum. Mao Zedong wrote a document entitled “My Opinion” on August 31, 1970, in which he sharply criticized Chen Boda’s views, saying that the latter “carried out a surprise attack and engaged in provocative activities.” After this, criticism of Chen Boda unfolded, and an investigation was announced against him. Immediately after the Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the party decided to launch a campaign to “criticize Chen Boda and streamline the style.” On November 16, 1970, the Central Committee issued “Instructions on the issue of Chen Boda’s anti-Party activities,” which stated that he was a “false Marxist,” “schemer,” “careerist,” and “anti-Party element.”

The II Plenum of the 9th CPC Central Committee was a manifestation of serious political clashes in the leadership of the PRC, which led to the “September Crisis” of 1971. “Lin Biao and his supporters tried to create public opinion at the II Plenum of the Central Committee that would facilitate their seizure of power,” write Chinese historians . - Having failed, they developed a plan for a coup d'etat. However, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai defeated this conspiracy.”

Following the disappearance of Chen Boda from the political arena in September 1971, Defense Minister Lin Biao and a group of military leaders (six of them were members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee) disappeared. According to the Chinese side, on September 13, 1971, Lin Biao died in a plane crash near Underkhan on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, trying to escape abroad after a failed “coup.” Following this, a new purge took place in the army, during which tens of thousands of officers were subjected to repression. Since October 1971, Marshal Ye Jianying became responsible for the daily work of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee. A campaign to “criticize Lin Biao and streamline the style” was launched in the country.

In March 1973, the CPC Central Committee decided to rehabilitate former General Secretary of the Central Committee Deng Xiaoping and restore him to the post of Deputy Premier of the State Council. The process of restoring the activities of the Komsomol, trade unions, and women's federations, which began in 1972, intensified. Provincial congresses of the KSMK were held.

The focus of the Tenth Congress of the CPC (August 1973) was on internal political problems. The congress unanimously condemned Lin Biao and Chen Boda, called for “continuing to properly conduct the movement to criticize Lin Biao and streamline the style,” in fact, substantiated the inevitability internal struggle in the CCP. The congress recognized the correct line of the “cultural revolution”, oriented the party and the people to continue the previous political course, the theoretical basis of which was Mao Zedong’s guidelines on “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat”, on “intensifying the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.” “The 10th Congress continued the leftist mistakes of the 9th Congress and nominated Wang Hongwen to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Party Central Committee,” says the “Decision” of the 6th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee. “Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen formed the “group of four” in the Politburo of the Central Committee , which strengthened the forces of the counter-revolutionary Jiang Qing group.”

At the same time, the congress authorized measures aimed at resuming the activities of the NPC, trade unions and youth organizations, and actually approved the rehabilitation of some party and administrative personnel, including Deng Xiaoping, who was elected a member of the Central Committee, and in January 1975 became one of the deputies Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. The congress communiqué omitted some leftist policies of 1966-1969, the implementation of which caused severe damage to the country's economy.

Third stage The “cultural revolution” lasted from September 1973 to October 1976, i.e. from the Tenth Congress of the CPC until the defeat of the “counter-revolutionary” “gang of four” led by Jiang Qing, which marked the end of the “cultural revolution”.

Despite the compromise reached at the Tenth Congress between various forces in the CPC, the situation in the country continued to remain unstable. At the beginning of 1974, at the proposal of Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen and their supporters, approved by Mao Zedong, a new nationwide political and ideological campaign was launched to “criticize Lin Biao and Confucius.” It began with speeches in the press aimed at debunking Confucianism and praising Legalism, an ancient Chinese ideological movement that dominated under Emperor Qin Shihuang, the head of the first all-Chinese despotism (3rd century BC). A specific feature of the campaign, like some previous ones, was the appeal to historical analogies and arguments from the field of Chinese political thought in order to solve current ideological and political problems.

In January 1975, after a 10-year break, the 1st session of the 4th NPC was convened, which adopted the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China. The Constitution was the result of a compromise:
on the one hand, it included the installations of 1966-1969. (including calls to “prepare in case of war”), on the other hand, it secured the right of members of “communes” to personal plots, did not recognize the production team (and not the “commune”) as the main self-supporting unit, provided for the need for a gradual increase in material and cultural level people's lives, wages for work.

The NPC session formed the highest government bodies of the PRC. The Standing Committee of the NPC included the chairman, Zhu De, and 22 of his deputies, most of them senior cadres (Dong Biu, Liu Bocheng, Nie Rongzhen, Xu Xiangqian, Song Qingling, Chen Yun, Tan Zhenlin). At the same time, supporters of Jiang Qing (Kai Sheng, Wu De) also joined the government. Top positions in the army were also distributed among representatives of rival factions in the Chinese leadership.

Soon after the completion of the NPC session, the proponents of the “cultural revolution” made another attempt to strengthen their positions. To this end, on the initiative of Mao Zedong at the turn of 1974-1975. a campaign was launched under the slogan of the struggle “for the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.” An important task of this campaign was the fight against those representatives of the CPC leadership (Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping) who defended the need for increased attention to economic development and the use of more rational methods of managing the national economy.
During the new political campaign, distribution according to labor, the right to personal plots, and commodity-money relations were declared “bourgeois rights” that must be “limited,” that is, equalization must be introduced. Under the guise of a new campaign, the economic interests of workers were infringed upon in many industrial enterprises and “communes.” In a number of cases, measures of material incentives were abolished, overtime work was practiced, and personal plots were liquidated. All this caused mass discontent among workers, worker strikes, and peasant unrest.

After a serious illness in January 1976, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai died. In April of the same year, during a ceremony dedicated to his memory, there were mass demonstrations at main square Beijing - Tiananmen. Participants in the demonstrations condemned the activities of Jiang Qing and other members of the Cultural Revolution Group and demanded their removal. Later, in assessing these events, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the mass protests in Tiananmen Square, although spontaneous, still represented a movement that firmly supported the party leadership and opposed the Quartet.

After these events, a new wave of repressions swept through.” Deng Xiaoping was removed from all posts, and Minister of Public Security Hua Guofeng became Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. A new political campaign was launched in China to “fight the right-wing trend of revising the correct conclusions of the Cultural Revolution,” the spearhead of which was directed against Deng Xiaoping and his supporters. A new round of struggle has begun against “persons in power who are following the capitalist path.” After the Tiananmen Square speeches, the People's Daily wrote: “The incident proved even more convincingly that the bourgeoisie is located precisely within the Communist Party itself. If earlier some people did not understand that those following the capitalist path are precisely the inner-party bourgeoisie, which is the main object of the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, then the counter-revolutionary political incident in Tiananmen Square made them realize this.”

On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died in Beijing at the age of 83. The death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent events associated with the arrest and removal from power of the “four” - Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen - on the initiative of Marshal Ye Jianying, were an important milestone in the history of China. They put an end to the largest political campaign in the PRC, which lasted 10 years and brought so much grief and sacrifice to the Chinese people - the “cultural revolution”. A new stage in the country's development has begun.

Today the site decided to remember the famous Chinese “Cultural Revolution”, its founder Mao Zedong and how, under the pretext of “restoration of capitalism,” he got rid of the opposition, repressing 5 million party members.

In 1966, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong announced the beginning of a “cultural revolution” designed to “restorate capitalism” in the PRC and “fight internal and external revisionism.” As historians note, this series of ideological and political campaigns was aimed at eliminating from the leading bodies of the party all those who disagreed with his policies.

At the end of the 50s, there was discord in relations between the USSR and China, which led to a split in the international communist movement. Mao Zedong saw a threat to his own power in the Communist Party of China in the exposure of Stalin’s personality cult at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and Khrushchev’s course towards gradual liberalization in the economy.

In turn, the USSR was also dissatisfied with Mao’s policies and recalled all Soviet specialists working in the PRC. The climax of the conflict between the two countries was clashes on the border around Damansky Island on the Ussuri River.

Another reason for the “cultural revolution” was the failure of the “Great Leap Forward” policy. In 1958, China announced a policy of building a “new China.” Initially aimed at strengthening the industrial base and sharply boosting the economy, it turned into one of the greatest tragedies of the Chinese people.

The chosen course cost China almost $70 billion, and approximately 45 million people died from starvation. Those dissatisfied with this political course began to form an opposition, which also included Chinese President Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao, realizing that it was increasingly difficult to maintain power, began a policy of mass terror.

The beginning of the “cultural revolution” in China coincided with another campaign of “self-criticism”, which consisted in the fact that the Chinese (including party members) had to present their mistakes in writing to the party. This unique tradition was to be followed by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Liu Shaoqi, as well as his associates, which Mao used to his advantage.

Mao Zedong (left) and Liu Shaoqiw (right), 1966

At the XI Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, Liu Shaoqi’s letter was examined, after which he was suspended from work until “until the Communist Party of China determines the nature of his mistakes.” This was a common practice in China at that time. In this situation, a party member, not officially deprived of his post, but actually suspended from work and under house arrest, could remain indefinitely.

Liu Shaoqiwith his grandson Alyosha, his sister Sonya, as well as his mother and maternal grandfather, 1960

As a result, the suspended Liu Shaoqi and his family were subjected to numerous interrogations, and demonstrations in support of Mao gathered near their home. Liu Shaoqi was eventually imprisoned and died there in 1968.

Liu Shaoqi

“Resolution on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” August 8, 1966: “Now we set ourselves the goal of crushing those in power who follow the capitalist path, criticizing the reactionary bourgeois “authorities” in science, criticizing the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, transforming education, to transform literature and art, to transform all areas of the superstructure that do not correspond to the economic basis of socialism, in order to contribute to the strengthening and development of the socialist system.”

The photo shows dismantled statues from a Buddhist temple

Excerpt from a propaganda newspaper, June 1, 1966: “We will decisively, radically, completely and completely eradicate the dominance and evil plans of the revisionists! Let’s destroy the monsters—the Khrushchevite revisionists!”

The unclear definition of the class enemies of the proletariat led to a “war of all against all.” The greatest pressure was felt by the former feudal lords, the clergy and the intelligentsia. Young “rebels” - Red Guards (schoolchildren and students) and Zaofani (young workers) - began to fight the enemies.

"Dance of Loyalty" performed by a young Red Guard member in Tiananmen Square while waiting for Chairman Mao to appear in front of hundreds of thousands of Red Guards who had arrived in Beijing.

They formed gangs and looked for “revisionists,” who often became their teachers, weak local authorities, and so on. The caught "rebels" were dressed up in jester's caps, their faces were painted and they were subjected to all sorts of abuse.

In the photo, 15-year-old schoolgirl Miss Chu, a participant in the “rebel” movement

Marshal of the People's Republic of China, considered right hand and Mao Zedong’s heir, Lin Biao: “Well, people were killed in Xinjiang: whether they were killed for a cause or by mistake - still not so much. They also killed in Nanjing and other places, but still, overall, fewer died than die in one battle. So the losses are minimal, so achievements achieved maximum, maximum. This is a great plan that guarantees our future for a hundred years to come. The Red Guards are heavenly warriors who seize the leaders of the bourgeoisie from power.”

Already in August 1967, all Beijing newspapers began to call those who opposed Mao’s policies “rats scurrying through the streets” and openly called for their murder. At the same time, it was prohibited to arrest Red Guards (anti-Maoist fighters).

An excerpt from a letter from one of the students at the University of Xiamen in Fujian Province: “Some (teachers) cannot stand the meetings of criticism and struggle, begin to feel unwell and die, frankly, in our presence. I don’t feel an ounce of pity for them or for those who throw themselves out of windows or jump into hot springs and die by being boiled alive.”

Not only did they not interfere with the excesses of the Red Guards, but rather they contributed to them. Thus, the Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of China allocated free trains to “fighters against the enemies of the proletariat” to travel around the country for the purpose of “exchanging experience.” The cultural life of the country virtually stopped.

Bookstores were closed, it was forbidden to sell any books except Mao’s quotation book, which became a means of not only ideological, but also physical struggle. There have been many recorded cases of prominent party figures being beaten to death with a hardcover book, thus knocking out the “bourgeois poison” from them.

The theater produced only “revolutionary operas from modern life” written by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing. In this way the campaign for “socialist re-education” was carried out.

Mao Zedong and Jiang Qing

All the scenery and costumes of the Peking Opera performances were burned. Monasteries and temples were burned, part of the Great Wall of China was demolished. The latter was explained by a shortage of bricks for the "more necessary" pigsties.

Often the Red Guards attacked people simply walking along the streets. Many were stopped and read quotes from Mao. Women's braids were cut off and their dyed hair was shaved off, clothes that were too tight were torn, and shoes and heels were broken. Owners of shops and shops were also subjected to pressure and were forced to change their name. Searches were carried out in many houses in order to prove the unreliability of the owners. At the same time, the Red Guards often engaged in looting.

Most of the Red Guards were children from disadvantaged families. From childhood they were accustomed to cruelty and happily followed the instructions of Mao and his supporters. However, soon there was a stratification among them based on origin. The gangs were divided into “reds” (from families of the intelligentsia and party workers) and “blacks” (children from disadvantaged families). Soon they began to quarrel with each other.

Ultimately, Mao was forced to use the army against the Red Guards, who had become uncontrollable. They were deemed "incompetent" and "politically immature". The gangs entered into a fight with the army, for which they were threatened with complete destruction. In September 1967, the Red Guard detachments and organizations were disbanded. The leaders were sent to agricultural work in the provinces (in the fall of 1967 - about 1 million people, in 1970 - 5.4 million), some were publicly shot.

Another campaign carried out as part of the “cultural revolution” in China was the emergence of cadre schools on May 7 (they received their name from the “Remarks ..." of Mao Zedong, made on May 7, 1966, in which the creation of these schools was announced). 106 schools in 18 provinces trained 100 thousand central government officials. The training system was that a third of working time was allocated for classes physical labor, a third - theory and a third - production organization, management and written work

Another campaign was to send students, workers and military personnel to the villages and was called "Up to the Mountains, Down to the Villages". In fact, the goal of this campaign was to exile the undesirables away from the central government. More than 350 thousand people were subjected to repression (two thirds of them were Mongols), accused of underground hostile activities. When unrest among ethnic minorities broke out in Yunnan province due to mass expulsions, 14 thousand people were executed

The consequences of the Cultural Revolution were even more frightening than the consequences of the Great Leap Forward policy: about 100 million people suffered. About 5 million party members were subjected to repression. They were replaced by Mao's fanatical cult of personality followers

In addition, the “rebels” destroyed a significant part of the cultural heritage of the Chinese and other peoples of the PRC: thousands of ancient Chinese historical monuments, books, paintings, temples, monasteries and temples in Tibet.

From the decision of the CPC Central Committee, 1981: “The Cultural Revolution was not and cannot be a revolution or social progress in any sense. It was a turmoil caused from above through the fault of the leader and used by counter-revolutionary groups, a turmoil that brought serious disasters to the party, the state and the entire multinational people.”

To establish the views of their group in the leadership of the CPC (Maoism) as a state ideology and as part of the fight against the views of the political opposition. The objective content of the “cultural revolution” was the destruction of traditionalism and the creation of a generational conflict.

The term “cultural revolution” itself was first used by V.I. Lenin in 1923 in his work “On Cooperation”.

Causes of the "cultural revolution"

International background

The struggle for sole leadership in the party

Most researchers of the “cultural revolution” [ Who?] agree that one of the main reasons for the “cultural revolution” that unfolded in China was the struggle for leadership in the party.

Although the bourgeoisie has already been overthrown, it is nevertheless trying, with the help of the exploitative old ideology, old culture, old morals and old customs, to corrupt the masses, to win the hearts of the people, and is strenuously striving for its goal - the implementation of restoration. In contrast to the bourgeoisie, the proletariat must respond to any of its challenges in the field of ideology with a crushing blow and with the help of the proletarian new ideology, new culture, new morals and new customs change the spiritual appearance of the entire society. Today we set ourselves the goal of defeating those in power who follow the capitalist path, criticizing the reactionary bourgeois “authorities” in science, criticizing the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, transforming education, transforming literature and art, transforming all areas of the superstructure that do not correspond to the economic the basis of socialism in order to contribute to the strengthening and development of the socialist system.

The application of Mao's class theory in practice led to a real "war of all against all." Demagogic in nature, vague definitions of the class enemies of the proletariat that came from Mao could fall under any person: from an ordinary peasant to a senior party worker. But it was worst of all for the bearers of traditions: former feudal lords, clergy, intelligentsia, etc. Power, given to the hands of the masses, turned into elementary anarchy. It was captured by those who were simply stronger: gangs of young “rebels” (Red Guards (from schoolchildren and students) and Zaofan), who were eventually allowed to act with virtual impunity.

On June 1, 1966, after reading on the radio a dazibao written by Nie Yuanzi, a philosophy teacher at Beijing University: “We will decisively, radically, completely and completely eradicate the dominance and evil plans of the revisionists! Let’s destroy the monsters - the Khrushchev-type revisionists!” millions of schoolchildren and students organized themselves into groups and easily began to look for “monsters and demons” to be eradicated among their teachers, university management, and then among local and city authorities who tried to protect teachers. “Class enemies” were hung with dazibao, put on a jester’s cap, sometimes put on humiliating rags (usually on women), painted their faces with black ink, and forced to bark like a dog; they were ordered to walk bent over or crawl. The dissolution of students of all schools and universities on July 26, 1966 for a six-month vacation contributed to the revelry of youth and the replenishment of the ranks of the Red Guards with an additional 50 million underage students.

The Red Guard detachments cut off the braids and shaved off the dyed hair of women, tore off too-tight trousers, broke off the high heels on women's shoes, broke pointed shoes in half, and forced the owners of shops and shops to change their names. The Red Guards stopped passersby and read them quotes from Mao, searched houses in search of “evidence” of the owners’ unreliability, while requisitioning money and valuables.

During the "village surrounds the cities" campaign, 10 to 20 million young people with or receiving a college education were forcibly uprooted from their homes and deported to work in remote villages, regions and mountains.

The system of state control over society has virtually eliminated itself. The law enforcement and judicial systems were inactive, so the Red Guards and Zaofans were given complete freedom of action, which resulted in chaos. Initially, the Red Guards operated under the control of Mao and his associates. There were many careerists among them, and many of them managed to make a quick career for themselves on the wave of revolutionary demagoguery and terror. They climbed up over other people's heads, accusing their university teachers of “counter-revolutionary revisionism” and their “comrades in arms” of being insufficiently revolutionary. Thanks to Kang Sheng's courier detachments, contact was made with the leaders of the Red Guards.

Many Red Guards were children from disadvantaged families. Poorly educated and accustomed to cruelty from childhood, they became an excellent tool in the hands of Mao. But at the same time, for example, 45% of the rebels in the city of Canton were children of the intelligentsia. Even Liu Shaoqi’s children once told their father, who was already under house arrest, about what interesting things they had managed to expropriate from the family of bourgeois elements.

Soon, stratification began among the Red Guards based on origin. They were divided into “reds” and “blacks” - the former came from families of the intelligentsia and party workers, the latter were children of the poor and workers. Their gangs began an irreconcilable struggle. Both of them had the same quotation books with them, but everyone interpreted them in their own way. The killer, after a gang clash, could say that it was “mutual assistance”; the thief who stole bricks from the factory justified himself by saying that “the revolutionary class must stick to its line.” Mao had worse and worse control over the bulk of the “generals of the Cultural Revolution,” but the main directions of development of chaos remained under his control.

The Red Guards then unleashed even more violence and factional fighting. Even in the small village of Long Ravine, under the guise of revolutionary struggle, there was a struggle between the clans that controlled the south and north of the village. In Canton in July - August 1967, in armed skirmishes between detachments of the Red Banner organization, on the one hand, and the Wind of Communism, on the other, 900 people were killed, and artillery was involved in the skirmishes. In Gansu province, people were tied to 50 cars with wires or wires and stabbed with knives until they turned into a bloody mess.

In the fall of 1967, Mao used the army against the Red Guards, whom he now denounced as “incompetent” and “politically immature.” Sometimes the Red Guards resisted the army. So, on August 19, 1967, 30 thousand soldiers and fighters of the people's peasant militia entered the city of Guilin after a long positional war. Within six days, almost all of the Red Guards were exterminated in the city. Mao threatened that if the Red Guards fought the army, killed people, destroyed vehicles or burned fires, they would be destroyed. In September 1967, the Red Guard units and organizations disbanded themselves. Five Red Guard leaders were soon sent to work on a pig farm in the deep provinces. On April 27, 1968, several leaders of the “rebels” in Shanghai were sentenced to death and publicly shot. In the fall of 1967, a million young people (up from 5.4 million in 1970) were exiled to remote areas, many staying there for more than ten years.

At the IX Party Congress, which took place from April 1 to April 24, 1969, the Maoist ideology was finally consolidated at the official level. The policies of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were finally condemned. The section of the general provisions of the party charter included the thesis that Lin Biao is the “successor” of Mao Zedong. The congress, which helped legitimize the theory and practice of the “cultural revolution,” strengthened the positions of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their supporters in the Central Committee.

Second stage - Personnel School May 7, “Up to the mountains, down to the villages”

The second stage of the Cultural Revolution began in May 1969 and ended in September 1971. Some researchers place the second stage beyond the “cultural revolution” itself and date its beginning to mid-1968.

Personnel schools May 7. The first May 7 personnel schools appeared towards the end of 1968. They received this name from Mao Zedong’s “Remarks...” made on May 7, 1966, in which he proposed creating schools in which cadres and intellectuals would undergo labor training with practical training in useful physical labor. 106 cadre schools were built for senior officials on May 7 in 18 provinces. 100 thousand central government officials, including Deng Xiaoping, as well as 30 thousand members of their families were sent to these schools. For officials of lower rank, there were thousands of cadre schools, in which an unknown number of medium and minor officials were trained. For example, by January 10, 1969, almost 300 cadre schools had been built in Guangdong Province on May 7, and more than one hundred thousand cadres were sent to the lower classes for labor.

The main system practiced in personnel schools was the "three-thirds" system. It consisted in the fact that a third of working time former cadres were engaged in physical labor, a third - theory and a third - production organization, management and written work.

During the “cultural revolution,” about 5 million party members were repressed, and by the 9th Congress of the CPC there were about 17 million people in the party. During the Tenth Congress of 1973, the number of CPC members was already 28 million people, that is, in 1970-1973, about 10-12 million people were accepted into the CPC. Thus, Mao replaced the “old” party members, who were capable of any disagreement, with “new” ones - fanatical followers of the cult of personality.

The "rebels" and the Red Guards destroyed a significant part of the cultural heritage of the Chinese and other peoples. For example, thousands of ancient Chinese historical monuments, books, paintings, temples, etc. were destroyed. Almost all the monasteries and temples in Tibet that remained at the beginning of the “cultural revolution” were destroyed.

The “Cultural Revolution” was not and cannot be a revolution or social progress in any sense... it was a turmoil caused from above through the fault of the leader and used by counter-revolutionary groups, a turmoil that brought serious disasters to the party, the state and the entire multinational people. /From the decision of the CPC Central Committee (1981)/

By placing responsibility for the “cultural revolution” only on Mao Zedong and party groups declared “counter-revolutionary,” the CCP legitimizes its power in the conditions of the market economy of the PRC.

see also

Notes

Literature

• Zhelohovtsev A. “Cultural Revolution” at close range. M.: Politizdat, 1973, 265 p.
• Usov V.N. "Cultural Revolution in China". China: history in persons and events. M.: 1991.
• Usov V. N. People's Republic of China: from the “Great Leap Forward” to the “Cultural Revolution” (1960-1966) IFES RAS. Moscow, 1998. Part 1, 221 pp.; Part 2.- 241 p.
• Usov V. N. People's Republic of China: from the “cultural revolution” to reforms and openness (1976-1984). IFES RAS, Moscow, 2003. - 190 p. - ISBN 5-8381-0064-8
• Sneath D. The Impact of the Cultural Revolution in China on the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. - Modern Asian Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 1994, p.409-430.
• Dittmer, Lowell. China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981

Links

• Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (August 8, 1966)
• Paul Johnson. Modernity. CHAPTER SIXTEEN. Experiment on half of humanity
• The Black Book of Communism. Chapter "China: The Long March into the Night"

First stage (May 1966 - April 1969) Second stage (May 1969 - August 1973) Third stage (September 1973 - October 1976) Subsequent events

Main figures
Central Committee of the CPC (Politburo of the CPC Central Committee) CPC Central Committee (Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee)

Popular movement

Cultural Revolution Researchers

Communist Party of China
Ideology and politics	Maoism · Socialist market economy · Three worlds theory · Great Khan chauvinism
Story

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a social experiment launched in 1966 by the CCP under the chairmanship of Mao Zedong, aimed at reigniting revolutionary spirit and purging the party of “bourgeois elements.”

The origins of the Cultural Revolution can be traced back to the mid-1950s, when Mao became seriously concerned that the country was moving away from socialism and was on the path to “restoration of capitalism.” According to him, the struggle between proletarian and bourgeois ideologies took on new, insidious forms after the capitalist classes were eliminated.

Mao concluded that the source of China's political regression lay in the false and self-serving belief of many of his political colleagues that class struggle had ceased under socialism. From his point of view, government officials became a “new class”, distant from the masses, and intellectuals were the “receptacle” of bourgeois, even feudal values.

However, the Cultural Revolution in China was also a struggle for power, in which the future, getting rid of political competitors, tried to regain the authority that it had lost as a result of failures in the Great Leap Forward policy.

It was seen by Mao as a tool for creating a new "generation of revolutionary successors" - those who led the Communist Party to victory.

Once those who were believed to be leading China back to capitalism were removed from power at all levels of society, the process of establishing socialist institutions, the "seeds of communism", began. Elitism in education was being replaced by updated, politicized curricula based on ideological correctness and political activism.

China has a long tradition of "yingshe" (shadow destruction), whereby writers use allegories to criticize high-ranking officials. In fact, the Cultural Revolution in China began with suspicions of “yingshe” regarding the historical drama “The Demotion of Hai Rui,” written by historian Wu Han, which was seen as an allusion to the fate of Marshal Peng Dehuai, who was dismissed after his criticism of the Great Leap Forward policy.

In fact, it was absurd, but Mao treated the work with suspicious seriousness, especially since by this time factions began to form in the party, dissatisfied with the policies of Mao Zedong. It was ordered that the name of the author be blackened in every possible way in the newspapers, who was then taken into custody, where he died after constant beatings. Wu Han became one of the first victims of the Cultural Revolution. In 1979, after Mao's death, he was posthumously rehabilitated.

After Wu Han, radical Maoists quickly purged other right-wing cultural institutions, and the theater became the main platform for the Gang of Four, a faction of Jiang Qing (Minister of Culture and Mao's wife), to attack their political opponents.

The “Gang of Four” (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen with groups of close “intellectuals” controlled everything: film studios, operas, theater troupes, radio stations. All old films were removed from distribution. Only the revolution in China and those related to it eight themes were to be depicted in films, theater plays. Even children's puppet theaters were closed under the pretext of their counter-revolutionary nature. Artists, writers, and performers were imprisoned or exiled. The Peking Opera troupes were disbanded, since it fell under the category of “four relics.” The Red Guards burned old books and destroyed them. architectural monuments, tore ancient scrolls, smashed art ceramics. The mass was lost forever.

The Cultural Revolution in China, which has a complex and intricate history, can be divided into three main phases: mass, military and succession.

The mass phase (1966-1969) is the most destructive, when China was dominated by the "Red Guards" (Red Guards), units created from more than 20 million high school students and students. They responded to Mao's call to "make a revolution" by being incredibly diligent in searching for "class enemies" wherever they hid. At this stage, most of Mao's political rivals in the highest echelons of power were overthrown, including Chinese Chairman Liu Shaoqi.

The military phase (1969-1971) began after the People's Liberation Army achieved dominance in Chinese politics by suppressing, with Mao's approval, the anarchy of the Red Guards. It ended with an alleged coup attempt in September 1971 by Mao's disgruntled heir, the Minister of Defense

The succession phase (1972-1976) was an intense political and ideological tug-of-war between radical ideologues and old cadres who decided to end or continue the policies of the Cultural Revolution. The conflict was a complex struggle during which the country was successively governed by the CCP's two main leaders—Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai. The decisive die was cast when members of the Gang of Four were arrested in October 1976 (a month after Chairman Mao's death) by a coalition of moderate leaders. The Cultural Revolution in China is believed to have ended with the arrest of the Gang of Four.