Diplomatic results of Poltava. Poltava reassured the Russian Tsar with the speedy conclusion of peace. But this hope was not destined to come true. It took another 11 long years to end the war.
The direct diplomatic result of the Poltava victory was the restoration of the Northern Alliance with the participation of the Polish-Saxon (Peter returned the Polish throne to Augustus II) and the Danish kings. The Prussian king entered into a defensive alliance. Military consequences were also not long in coming. In 1710, Russian troops conducted a successful “fortress campaign”: they captured Riga (it was the largest city in the Kingdom of Sweden!), Revel and Vyborg. After Poltava, Russia waged war only on enemy territory.
Prut campaign against the Turks. However, the strengthening of Russia did not suit everyone in Europe. Türkiye received Charles XII in a friendly manner. Incited by Charles and European diplomats, the Sublime Porte declared war on Russia in 1711. Inspired by his victories, Peter led the Russian army deep into enemy territory to the banks of the Prut River and almost made a mistake similar to the one that led to the death of the Swedish army. Historians (starting with Peter I himself) have more than once compared Peter’s Prut campaign with the adventure of Charles XII in Ukraine.
Charles XII demands that the Turks resume
battles of the Prut
The Tsar recognized the error of his chosen strategy. 38 thousandth Russian army Far from its borders, it found itself surrounded by a 135,000-strong Turkish army. Heat and lack of water and food complicated the situation. Peter counted on the help of the population of Moldavia and Wallachia, but it turned out to be minimal. The ruler of Moldavia, Dmitry Cantemir, whom Voltaire compared with Mazepa, went over to the side of the Russian Tsar. The situation seemed critical. The threat of captivity loomed not only over the army, but also over the king, who was in the camp with his wife.
True, Russian soldiers repulsed all attacks of the Janissaries, who suffered heavy losses and finally refused to go into battle. Therefore, the Turkish commander-in-chief Baltaci Pasha entered into negotiations. The courage of Russian soldiers, the skill of diplomats (and, perhaps, the diamonds of Tsarina Ekaterina Alekseevna) determined the relatively easy conditions of the Prut Treaty: Russia ceded Azov to Turkey and pledged not to interfere in Polish affairs. Russian troops could return home without hindrance. Charles XII, who was located nearby in Bendery, was most dissatisfied with the agreement. He demanded troops to pursue Peter, but the Turks cooled his warlike ardor. Regretting the losses, the Tsar found consolation in the fact that he could now concentrate entirely on Baltic problems.
Battle of Cape Gangut. 1715 A. Zubov
Victories at Gangut and Grengam. The war with the Swedes continued in Pomerania (Northern Germany) and Finland. The war had to be waged not for the sake of new conquests, but in order to persuade the Swedes to a peace beneficial for Russia (as the Tsar wrote, so that “the Swedish neck would bend more softly”). In 1714, under the leadership of Peter I, the first victory of the Russian galley fleet was won at Cape Gangut, which had great moral significance. A real attempt to make peace with Sweden at the Congress of Åland in 1718 was unsuccessful due to the death of the Swedish king (he died during the siege of a fortress in Norway). By that time, the Northern Alliance had collapsed, and Sweden had found an ally in Great Britain. A new victory of the Russian fleet near the island of Grengam on July 27, 1720 and the subsequent landing of Russian troops in Sweden made the Swedish queen Ulrika-Eleanor more accommodating.
Nystadt world. A peace treaty was signed in the Finnish city of Nystadt on August 30, 1721. Livonia, Estland, Ingria and part of Karelia with Vyborg went to Russia. Peter returned Finland to the Swedes and paid compensation of 2 million Reichstaller for the lost territories. An exchange of prisoners took place.
As a result of the war, Russia received much more than what it had hoped to receive when starting hostilities. She found not only a way out Baltic Sea, but also a number of economically developed territories. The war became a harsh school for the Russian state. The tsar himself called it a “three-year school,” because he believed that schoolchildren should study for 7 years. Russia emerged from the war with a strong army and navy. Actually Russian empire became a powerful European power, although it had to confirm this status in the subsequent wars of the middle and second half of the XVIII V.
The nature of the war. The war with Sweden was not for Russia " Patriotic War" Even such a talented historian as E.V. Tarle, in essence, failed to prove its liberating character. Of course, when the troops of Charles XII committed outrages in Ukraine, robbed and killed the local population, they rose up to fight the invaders. There was partisan warfare, which the Swedes also faced in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The general bitterness of the people and the actions of the partisans were considered in Europe a violation of the “rules of Christian and political peoples” in the conduct of war. But, as we have seen, in the war there were cases of betrayal and the transfer of part Ukrainian Cossacks on the side of the Swedish king.
The majority of the Russian population, experiencing the hardships of wartime, suffering from taxes and duties, did not very well understand the goals of the massacre that dragged on for 21 years. It is no coincidence that uprisings broke out in the country; opponents of the tsar condemned the war and construction new capital on the marshy banks of the Neva. To the Tsar himself in 1717, in the afterword to the book by P.P. Shafirova about the reasons Swedish war had to prove the need to continue hostilities. “Because any war at the present time cannot bring sweetness, but burden, for this reason many are indignant about that burden.” But when great sacrifices have already been made, is it possible to cede conquered lands and fortresses to the enemy? - asked Peter. “And won’t the whole world laugh at the fact that, having already endured the 17th year and received such glory, and moreover security, we will expose ourselves to constant misfortune and eternal shame without any need?”
The price and meaning of victory. Indeed, victory in the war was not easy for Russia. The combat losses of the Russian army amounted to 120-130 thousand people, of which approximately 40 thousand were killed. Even more human lives(up to half a million) were carried away by disease.
Main event Northern War- The Battle of Poltava turned out to be truly fateful for Russia. She prepared for the country the fate of an empire - a state with multinational population formed as a result of conquest. On this path, the country faced not only victories, but also difficult trials.
Read also other topics Part III ""European Concert": the struggle for political balance" section “West, Russia, East in the battles of the 17th – early 18th centuries”:
- 9. "Swedish flood": from Breitenfeld to Lützen (September 7, 1631-November 16, 1632)
- Battle of Breitenfeld. Winter Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus
- 10. Marston Moor and Nasby (2 July 1644, 14 June 1645)
- Marston Moor. Victory of the parliamentary army. Cromwell's army reform
- 11. “Dynastic wars” in Europe: the struggle “for the Spanish inheritance” at the beginning of the 18th century.
- "Dynastic Wars". The fight for the Spanish inheritance
- 12. European conflicts are becoming global
- War of the Austrian Succession. Austro-Prussian conflict
- Frederick II: victories and defeats. Treaty of Hubertusburg
- 13. Russia and the “Swedish question”
During the Northern War in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, Russia inflicted a crushing defeat on the Swedish army of King Charles 12. The Swedish army was practically destroyed, and Charles 12 fled to Turkey. There he hid in the Bendery fortress (on the territory of modern Transnistria) and for 2 years persuaded the Sultan Ottoman Empire to war with Russia.
As a result, in 1711 the Sultan declared war on Russia. But military operations were inactive. The Turks did not want a large-scale war, and limited their participation only to sending their vassals - the Crimean Tatars - on regular raids across the territory modern Ukraine and Moldova. Peter the Great also did not want an active war, he simply wanted to raise a peasant uprising against the Ottomans.
Many historians argue that Peter himself is to blame for declaring war. Because after the Battle of Poltava, the Swedish army was almost completely destroyed, and the Russian Tsar did not pursue Charles 12, allowing him to freely leave the territory of the state.
The pursuit began only three days after the end of the battle, when precious time had already been lost and it was impossible to catch up with the enemy. This mistake was worth the fact that during the 2 years of his stay in Turkey, Charles 12 was able to turn the Turkish Sultan against Russia.
The Russian army, as well as the Moldovan corps, took part in this military campaign on the Russian side. The total number of troops was about 86,000 people and 120 guns.
On the part of the Ottoman Empire, the army of the Turks and the army of the Crimean Khanate took part in the war. The total strength of the enemy army was about 190,000 people and 440 guns.
For the Prut campaign, Peter the Great transferred his army through Kyiv to the territory of Poland. On June 27, 1711, the Russian army, under the leadership of Peter the Great, as well as his closest ally Sheremetev, crossed the Dniester River and began its movement towards the Prut River. This campaign lasted less than a week, but the poor quality of its organization led to the fact that this transition (during which there were no battles with the enemy) cost the lives of many Russian soldiers. The reason was lack of supplies. The soldiers died from basic dehydration.
On July 1, Sheremetev’s troops approached the eastern bank of the Prut and here they were suddenly attacked by the Crimean Tatar cavalry. After a short battle, 280 Russian soldiers died. The raid was repelled.
On July 6, Peter the Great ordered to cross the Prut River. After crossing the river, the Moldavian ruler Dmitry Cantemir joined the Russian army.
On July 14, the army united again. 9,000 soldiers remained in the city of Iasi to protect the garrison. The rest of the army continued to participate in the campaign.
On July 18, the first battle of this campaign began. At 14:00 the Turkish army attacked the rear of the Russian army. Despite their numerical superiority, the Turkish troops were forced to retreat, as their offensive was unorganized. They had no artillery, and their infantry was poorly armed.
On July 19, the Turks began to encircle the Russian army. In the middle of the day, the Turkish cavalry completed a complete encirclement, but did not attack. Peter the Great decided to go upstream the river to find more comfortable spot to take the fight. The movement began at night.
On July 20, during the movement, a significant gap opened up in the Russian army, which the Turks immediately took advantage of and attacked the convoy, which was left without cover. After this, the pursuit of the main forces began. Peter the Great took up defensive positions near the village of Stanilesti and prepared for battle. By evening, large forces of the Turkish army, Crimean Tatars and Zaporozhye Cossacks began to arrive here. The battle has begun. The Turks were unable to defeat the Russians; their attack was repulsed. The losses of the Russian army during this battle amounted to 750 people killed and more than a thousand wounded. Turkish losses were even more significant, amounting to about 8,000 killed and wounded.
On July 21, the army of the Ottoman Empire began a massive artillery shelling of the positions of the Russian army. In between shelling, Russian positions were attacked by cavalry and infantry. Despite the enormous superiority of their army, the Turks could not break the Russian resistance. Peter the Great, realizing the hopelessness of the position of his army, proposed at a military council to make peace with the Turks. As a result, Shafirov was sent to the Turks, who was given the broadest powers of the ambassador.
The wife of Peter the Great, Catherine, gave away all her jewelry to hand them over to the Turkish Sultan, prompting him to conclude peace. This once again proves that the position of the Russian army in this war was so difficult. Peter the Great himself, sending his ambassador, told him to agree to any peace conditions except one - the loss of St. Petersburg is unacceptable.
Negotiations between the parties to conclude peace lasted two days. As a result, on July 22, Peter’s ambassadors returned. The requirements were:
Russia undertakes to transfer the Azov fortress to Turkey;
the Taganrog fortress, built to protect the exit to the Black Sea, must be destroyed;
complete renunciation of political and military interference in the affairs of Poland and the Zaporozhye Cossacks;
free pass for King Charles 12th to Sweden.
General Russian army Sheremetyev, remained hostage to the Ottoman Empire until Charles 12 passed through Russian territory.
The Prut campaign was completed with the signing of a peace treaty on July 23, 1711. The signing of the agreement took place at 18:00, after which the Russian army retreated to the city of Iasi, and then returned to Moscow through Kyiv. As for Charles 12, he opposed this peace agreement and insisted that the Ottoman Empire continue the war.
“You fought with them. We also saw their valor. If you want to fight with Russia, fight on your own, and we will conclude a peace treaty” (Baltaji Mohmed Pasha)
The signing of peace between Russia and Turkey was of great political importance, because Russian Tsar, being under threat of the complete destruction of his army, was able to make peace through diplomatic persuasion. But one very significant amendment needs to be made - the signing of such a peace became permissible only because of Turkey’s interest. The Sultan understood that the destruction of the Russian army would contribute to the rise of Sweden, which was also unacceptable.
Russia lost everything it had conquered over the years in one day. The loss of the Black Sea Fleet was especially painful.
It was possible to restore the Northern Alliance. IN Torun On October 9, 1709, a new treaty of alliance with Saxony was signed. On October 11, a new peace treaty was concluded with Denmark, according to which it pledged to declare war on Sweden, and Russia - to begin military operations in the Baltic states and Finland. During the military campaign 1710 The Russian army managed to take seven Baltic fortresses (Vyborg, Riga, Kexholm, Elbing, Revel, Pernov, etc.) with little loss of life.). Estland and Livonia were completely occupied by Russia.
At this time, the Swedish king was in the Ottoman Empire, intriguing in every possible way against the Russian Tsar. His pressure on the Turkish nobility made itself felt, as a result of which Turkey at the end of 1710 began preparations for war with Russia. Having learned about this, Peter began to prepare his troops for the campaign. In 1711 he declared war on the Ottoman Empire and advanced to Prut campaign.
The Prut campaign of 1711 got its name because the outcome Russian-Turkish war 1710-1711 happened on the banks Prut River. Karl lived in Turkey after the Poltava defeat, and he was repeatedly threatened with extradition into the hands of Peter. Peter counted on the help of the Turkish Slavs, on an alliance with the vassal Turkish rulers (lords) of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as on the support of Poland. Spring 1711 Mr. Peter went on a campaign, thinking before the Turks to take possession of Moldavia, Wallachia and the crossings of the Danube. However, none of the allies came to help in right time. The accession of the Moldavian ruler Cantemir to Peter did not save the Russian army from hunger; the transition through the steppes exhausted the people. To top it all off, the Turks had previously crossed the Danube and surrounded Peter’s army with enormous forces on the banks of the Prut. Due to the lack of provisions and water (the Russians were cut off from the Prut), it was impossible to stay in place, and due to the comparative small number of troops, it was impossible to successfully break through the Turks.
On July 21, the Turks completely surrounded the Russian army, pressed against the river, with a semicircle of field fortifications and artillery batteries. About 160 guns continuously fired at Russian positions. The Janissaries launched an attack, but were again repulsed with losses. The situation of the Russian army became desperate; there was still ammunition left, but the supply was limited. There was not enough food before, and if the siege dragged on, the troops would soon be in danger of starvation. There was no one to expect help from.
At the morning military council, Peter I and his generals decided to offer peace to the Turkish Sultan; in case of refusal, burn the convoy and break through “not to the stomach, but to death, not having mercy on anyone and not asking for mercy from anyone.” A trumpeter was sent to the Turks with a peace proposal. Vizier Baltaci Mehmed Pasha, without responding to the Russian proposal, ordered the Janissaries to resume attacks. However, they, having suffered great losses on this and the previous day, became agitated and began to murmur that the Sultan wanted peace, and the vizier, against his will, was sending the Janissaries to slaughter.
Eminent historian IN. Klyuchevsky This is how he described the event:
With an excessive supply of hopes for Turkish Christians, empty promises on the part of the Moldavian and Wallachian rulers and with a significant amount of his own Poltava self-confidence, but without a sufficient supply and study of the circumstances, Peter in the summer of 1711 set off into the sultry steppe in order not to protect Little Russia from the Turkish invasion, and to defeat the Turkish Empire and on the Prut River he received more new lesson, being surrounded by five times the strongest Turkish army, he was almost captured and, by agreement with the vizier, gave all his Azov fortresses to the Turks, losing all the fruits of his 16-year Voronezh, Don and Azov efforts and sacrifices.
Peter entered into peace negotiations with the Grand Vizier. Sending proxies to him, Peter gave them the authority to release the army and make peace to cede Azov, all conquests on the Baltic Sea (if the Turks demand this for Charles), and even Pskov. However, Peter wanted Petersburg and east coast The Gulf of Finland remained at all costs in the hands of the Russians. However, much less was conceded than what Peter was ready for. This happened due to the fact that the Turks wanted to end the war, into which they were drawn by outside influences. In addition, the matter was helped by the dexterity of the Russian diplomat Shafirov and the rich gifts sent by Peter to the vizier. Peace was concluded, and the Russian army was released on the following conditions: Peter gave Azov and some fortified points near the Black Sea to Turkey, refused to interfere in the affairs of Poland (it should be noted that at that time there were already projects for the division of Poland that enjoyed Peter’s sympathy); finally, Peter gave Karl free passage to Sweden. Peter considered such conditions, even despite obvious concessions, to be relatively easy, because he managed to retain St. Petersburg and not allow Sweden to end the war with the surrender of Russia.
The appearance of Russian soldiers during the Prut campaign
However, Peter did not achieve the expulsion of Charles from Turkey, which, being in the possession of the Ottoman Pasha, brought him financial losses. It was precisely because of the failure to fulfill this clause of the treaty that Peter ordered the suspension of compliance with the requirements of the Prut Treaty. In response to this, Türkiye again declared war on Russia at the end of 1712. However, things did not come to military action, largely thanks to Peter the Great’s diplomat Shafirov. Ultimately in 1713 was signed Adrianopole Peace Treaty, which basically repeated the terms of the Prut Agreement.
Winter 1710 - 1711 Russian regiments set out from the Neva to the Dniester.
Peter secured the alliance of the rulers of Moldavia - Cantemir and Wallachia - Brancovan, as well as the assistance of Poland. Cantemir pledged to field 10 thousand troops, Brankovan - 50 thousand (of which 20 thousand Serbs).
Augustus moved 30 thousand people to northern Bulgaria, to reinforce which Dolgorukov’s Russian corps (12 thousand people) was sent.
In total, Peter had about 50 thousand people. With the one hundred thousand auxiliary troops promised by the allies, this would constitute an impressive force - "more than sufficient to maintain our victory" - in the words of the Tsar himself.
In addition to this main army, two more were formed: one - Count Apraksin consisting of 20 thousand regular troops, 40 thousand Cossacks and 20 thousand Kalmyks - was supposed to go along the Muravsky Way to the Crimea, the other - Prince Golitsyn (15 thousand regular troops, 30 thousand Cossacks ) from Chigirin moved to Ochakov.
Thus, for the war with Turkey, Russia fielded up to 90 thousand regular troops, 80 thousand Cossacks and 20 thousand Kalmyks - with the forces promised by the allies, this will amount to 300 thousand troops.
At the end of May 1711, the Russian army approached the Dniester. Sheremetev's vanguard reached the Prut, where he linked up with Kantemir.
Here the Russians learned that there were no reserves in Moldova, and the recruitment of the Moldavian army was difficult: in the 17 regiments, organized according to the Russian model, there were no more than seven thousand people; convoys with food for the army coming from Kyiv were intercepted in Podolia by the Tatars.
The situation was becoming serious.
Having crossed the Dniester near the town of Soroki, Peter convened a military council on June 20, at which it was decided to move forward. Only General Galard noticed that the Russian army was in the same position that Charles XII was in when entering Ukraine.
Experiencing great difficulties due to lack of supplies, overcoming intense heat, the Russian army entered Bessarabia. Hoping for allies - the Poles and Vlachs, Peter boldly moved forward.
However, the Polish army and Dolgoruky's corps, having reached the Moldavian border, stopped in Bukovina and took a wait-and-see attitude.
Meanwhile, the Grand Vizier Baltaji Pasha approached the Danube with 300 thousand troops and five hundred guns.
Overestimating the strength of the Russian Tsar, he stopped indecisively at Isakchi.
The Sultan, fearing a general uprising of Christians, offered peace to Peter through the mediation of the Patriarch of Jerusalem and Brankovan (who went over to the side of the Turks).
Türkiye offered Russia all the lands up to the Danube: New Russia with Ochakov, Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia.
Peter I refused, making the biggest mistake of his reign. Having occupied Iasi, Peter moved along the right bank of the Prut to the Danube, sending forward the vanguard of General Renne, which included almost all the cavalry, and ordered him to take possession of Brailov.
Renne quickly moved to Wallachia, took Brailov and began purchasing food and forming Wallachian troops. However, his report was intercepted, and Peter never learned about the capture of Brailov.
The Grand Vizier, crossing the Danube c. with the main forces, quickly moved up the Prut to Iasi.
In July, his first clash occurred with the Russian-Moldavian vanguard, and the Moldovans fled. At night, the entire Russian army retreated to join Repnin’s rearguard, adding extra weight to the fire. The Turks did not pursue. July, the Russian army united in Stanilesti and began to strengthen the camp, but the Turks launched a fierce attack and captured part of the convoys that did not have time to enter the camp. This attack, as well as the next two, were repulsed. great damage to the Turks. There were 38 thousand Russians with 122 guns, Turks - 170 thousand and 479 guns. The Russians lost 2,882 people, while the Turks lost up to 7 thousand people.
Nevertheless, the position of the Russian army became desperate: its position was a quadrangle, the rear face of which abutted the river.
The Turks, having installed artillery at commanding heights, could destroy the Russian camp with impunity. The masses of Turkish riflemen made it even impossible to use water.
The army was surrounded by an enemy five times superior. The fate of Russia that day was in the hands of the Grand Vizier. Even if the Russians managed to break through the ring of enemies, the retreat would have turned into a disaster for them - all crossings across the Prut were in the hands of the Turks. The remnants of the army would have found themselves in Moldova, as if in a mousetrap, and they would have suffered the fate of the Swedes at Perevolochna.
According to Anton Kersnovsky, the greatness of Peter was reflected in these tragic minutes in full splendor.
Preparing for the last battle, he prepared a decree for the Senate: “in the event of his capture by the sovereign, do not consider his orders from captivity.” But God protected Russia. Vizier Baltaci agreed to negotiations and did not use his exceptional strategic position.
The vizier's compliance is explained differently: some believe it is a consequence of the ransom (Catherine's jewelry), others explain it as a rebellion of the Janissaries. The last hypothesis is much more plausible. In addition, the vizier should have been impressed by the resilience of the Russian troops in the battle on July 9 and the significant losses in the best Turkish troops.
The interests of Sweden and its restless king did not touch the phlegmatic Asian, who decided to make peace since it was offered on terms acceptable and even beneficial for Turkey. Negotiations were conducted slowly (in order to warn Charles XII, who rode to the Turkish camp demanding not to concede) and on July 11 led to the Treaty of Prut.
Russia returned Azov and its district to Turkey, and pledged to demolish the fortifications on the Dnieper and Don, as well as the Taganrog fortress. In addition, Peter pledged not to interfere in Polish affairs and gave Charles XII a gtshlgusk to Sweden.
It is difficult to imagine, notes Anton Kersnovsky, what would have happened to Russia if Peter had died on the Prut... Under the unfortunate Alexei Petrovich, she would have had to go through something new Time of Troubles. All of Peter’s efforts and achievements would have been in vain.
In general, the Prut campaign is a war of missed opportunities. Had Peter agreed to the Sultan’s proposal, the Russian border would have followed the Danube. Svyatoslav’s dream would be fulfilled... There would be no need to shed streams of blood near Ochakov, Izmail, Rushchuk, in Silistria, and fight five wars in a hundred years. However, Baltaci Pasha also made a mistake of approximately the same order. We owe a lot to this vizier.
Of all the wars between Russia and Turkey, the war of 1711, known as the Prut Campaign of Peter I, was the most unsuccessful for Russia. Among the most important reasons for the defeat were the consequences of the conflict Russian state with the Cossacks and, as a result, the insignificant participation of the Cossacks in this war on the side of Russia.
It was the Cossacks who had experience of constant and at times very successful struggle against Turkey. In 1641, the Donets fought off a 250,000-strong Turkish-Tatar army in Azov. The Cossacks, together with the Don people (outnumbering them by an order of magnitude at that time) constantly carried out sea raids on the shores of Crimea and Turkey. These raids were even called the “Bosphorus War”.
But an attempt to catch fugitives among the Don Cossacks and enroll them (as recruits) in the standing army being created led to the famous Bulavin uprising of 1708 and the brutal suppression of the freemen. “For this saryn,” as Peter I wrote, “except for cruelty, cannot be appeased.” And yet, in the spring of 1709, 2,000 Cossacks were sent from the Don Army to serve near Smolensk to join the detachment of B.S. Korsak.
Peter I left for the Russian army stationed in Ukraine. Even before Peter I finally “pacified” the Don army, Hetman Mazepa opposed the emperor. On October 24, 1708, he crossed the Desna and himself arrived at the Swedish outposts. Since the treason was being prepared secretly, he took about 2,000 people with him.
On November 6, Colonel Skoropadsky was elected the new hetman of Ukraine in Glukhov. On November 12, Mazepa was anathematized in Moscow in the Assumption Cathedral. Only the Cossacks supported Mazepa. And Peter sent A.D. Menshikov ordered to take and ruin the Sich. Most of the defenders were killed, 300 people were captured.
On June 27, in the battle of Poltava, the Swedes suffered a terrible defeat. Late in the evening of June 30, the wounded Charles XII crossed the Dnieper. Mazepa crossed with the king and soon died on September 22, 1709 in Varnitsa near Bendery.
The entire year of 1710 was especially successful for Peter’s achievements in the Baltic states. On July 4, Riga capitulated. Participation in the siege of Riga is the only specific event of the Don people noted by the first Don historian Rigelman. He speaks sparingly and vaguely about others: “And beyond this number, many were usefully used throughout the ongoing war against the Swedes in many places and in Finland itself, also in 711 with the Sovereign against the Turks in Moldavia at the Prut River. And on the Don you will leave together with the Kalmyks under the leadership of Admiral General Count Feodor Matveyevich Apraksin to guard against a Tatar and Turkish attack on the Russian borders.”
One of the consequences of the victory at Poltava was an unwanted war with Turkey. Naturally, in the Ottoman Empire there were forces that sought war against Russia, primarily the Tatars. Maintaining peace between Russia and Turkey deprived them of their most important source of income - the capture of prisoners and the slave trade. As soon as Peter, before leaving for Poltava, appeared on the Don and Azov, the Tatar population became agitated, calling on the Turkish authorities for war with the Russians.
In October 1710, Peter demanded the removal of the Swedish king from Turkish territory and threatened war, but on November 20, at a ceremonial meeting of the diwan, the Turks themselves decided to start a war. The campaign of their army led by the Grand Vizier was supposed to take place in the spring of 1711. The first to start hostilities Crimean Tatars. The Turks had been waiting for them for a long time. After the completion of the Azov campaign and the conclusion of peace between the Sultan and the Russian Tsar, the Turkish authorities forbade the Crimeans to attack Russian lands.
In December 1710, the initiator of the war, the Crimean Khan Devlet-Girey, met in Bendery with the Swedish king Charles XII and the hetman of Right Bank Ukraine Philip Orlik. We calculated the forces. In addition to the Crimeans and the Nogais vassal to the Crimea, the parties had at their disposal the registered Philip Orlik who fled with Mazepa and the Cossacks knocked out of the Sich by Menshikov, and Poles hostile to Tsar Peter and King Augustus II were expected from the west.
After consulting, the khan, the king and the hetman decided to strike at Right Bank Ukraine with the combined forces of the khan’s son Mehmed-Girey with the Orlikovites and Poles and at the same time at the Left Bank Ukraine with the forces of the Crimean Khan himself and the Cossacks.
The Russians expected something like this kind of raid. Lieutenant General, Prince M.M. Golitsyn, the brother of the Kyiv governor, reported from Yaroslav on December 26: “And their very intention, as their rivers become, is for them to go: to the Khan and Orlik to Ukraine, and to the Turks themselves with the Swedish king and others through Kamenets-Podolsk to Poland.”
And on the very first day of the new year 1711, Peter decided to distract the Tatars, organize a campaign from the Volga and from the Don across the steppe to the Kuban. To do this, they deployed a corps near Voronezh under the command of Admiral F.M. Apraksin, subordinating to him the Don Cossacks in the service of 5 thousand people. War has not yet been declared in Russia, but troops from Livonia moved south. Lieutenant General M.M. Golitsyn advanced to the Moldavian border with ten dragoon regiments.
On Epiphany, January 6, 1711, the Crimeans crossed Perekop and poured into Ukraine in two streams. The Khan's son Mehmed-Girey, at the head of 40,000 Tatars and 7,000-8,000 Orlik Cossacks, moved along the right bank of the Dnieper. He was reinforced by 700 Swedes under Colonel Zülich and 400 Janissaries. The Budzhak Tatars and 3,000-5,000 Poles hostile to Tsar Peter, who crossed the Dniester at Bender, moved towards Mehmed-Girey. Khan Devlet-Girey himself, with the same number of Tatars and 2000 Cossacks, went along the left bank, with 40 Swedish officers as advisers.
The raid was resisted by a few troops covering Right Bank Ukraine (formally Polish territory). Prince Volkonsky with four dragoon regiments stood “at the border of the Volskoye and with him the Cossack and Volokonsky regiments are standing, and Major General Widman with 4 regiments was placed close to him, Volkonsky.”
Eleven thousandth corps of Major General F.V. Shidlovsky stood on the left bank of the Dnieper in the Kharkov region. These troops were clearly not enough for battle in the field, and the Russians had hope of defending themselves in fortresses until the tsar himself came to the rescue with troops from the north.
On the Russian left bank side, the khan managed to capture the New Sergius fortress (in the upper reaches of the Samara River), whose population, mostly former Cossacks, surrendered without a fight. Then Devlet-Girey’s troops went in the direction of Kharkov and Izyum, but, colliding with the Belgorod and Izyum fortress defensive lines, they were repulsed. Khan was counting on the help of the Nogais from Kuban, but the Nogais did not come, and the Tatars turned to the Crimea in early March. In the Novosergievskaya fortress, Devlet-Girey left a garrison - 1.5 thousand Cossacks and Tatars under the overall command of the Zaporozhye Colonel Nestuley.
On the right bank the campaign continued with varying degrees of success. In the first half of February 1711, the Tatars easily captured Bratslav, Boguslav, and Nemirov. The garrisons there were small and did not offer much resistance to the Tatars.
Orlik began distributing station wagons so that local registries would join him and begin the fight against “Moscow bondage.”
But on March 25, the Tatars of Mehmed-Girey and the Cossacks of Orlik (over 30,000 people in total) approached the White Church and here, trying to storm the city, were defeated. On the Left Bank, a detachment of F.V. Shidlovsky with a sudden blow returned the Novosergievskaya fortress, thus clearing the left bank of the Dnieper from the Tatars and Cossacks. After these failures, the Tatar troops, feeling that they would soon have to return to Crimea, abandoned pretense and began to engage in robbery and capture of civilians.
Commander-in-Chief of Russian forces in Ukraine, General M.M. Golitsyn assessed the situation in time, gathered 9 dragoon and 2 infantry regiments and put pressure on the Crimeans, burdened by the full load. Mehmed-Girey, saving the booty, began to leave for Bendery, into the Ottoman possessions. Naturally, Orlik began to leave with him. On April 15, 1711, near Boguslav, Golitsyn overtook part of the Crimeans and recaptured over 7,000 captured prisoners. The raid is over.
Now the Russians had to pay a return visit to the Tatars and Ottomans.
Formally, the manifesto on the war with Turkey was read out in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin in the presence of Tsar Peter on February 25, 1711. But the war plan was drawn up long before its announcement. For the first time, the plan envisaged the conduct of military operations on three theaters- Danube, Crimean and Caucasian. And this subsequently became a kind of tradition in Russia’s wars against Turkey.
The main blow was planned to be delivered at the Danube Theater. Peter I, hoping for help from the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia, decided to raise local Christians, vassals of the Ottoman Empire, on both banks of the Danube to fight the Turks.
On April 12, a military council was held in Slutsk. Peter conferred with Field Marshal B.G. Sheremetev and General L.N. Allart, as well as Chancellor G.I. Golovkin and the Russian Ambassador to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth G.F. Dolgorukov. The council decided to approach the Danube before the Turks and seize the crossings. The troops for the campaign were planned to be concentrated on the banks of the Dniester, in the Polish part of Ukraine. The advanced units of the Russian army were supposed to reach the Dniester by May 15. Sheremetev and his infantry were supposed to arrive there no later than May 20, having a three-month supply of food. The troops reached the Dniester, but Peter himself was late to them, as he was negotiating with the Polish king and Saxon elector Augustus II.
Due to the absence of Peter and food difficulties, Sheremetev and his troops crossed the Dniester on May 30, 10 days later than planned. But then it became known that the Turks had already crossed the Danube, they could not be intercepted or held at the crossings, and Sheremetev turned towards Iasi. So, at the Danube Theater initially everything did not go according to plan and ended, as we know, in defeat.
In the Crimean theater, the campaign was led by Chief General Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin and Hetman Skoropadsky himself. The Russian troops consisted of 7 infantry regiments and 1 dragoon regiment (7178 people), with the hetman there were 20,000 Cossacks. Preventing the Russian attack on Crimea, Nuraddin Bakhti-Girey launched an attack on Tor and Bakhmut. The Tatar raid was repulsed, but the march was delayed.
Finally, on May 30, the same day as Sheremetev, Buturlin and Skoropadsky set out from Perevolochna and, weighed down by a cumbersome convoy, dragged themselves towards the Crimea. On June 7 they reached the Novobogoroditsk fortress. “Languages” informed them that 30,000 Tatars of Bakhti-Girey were standing in the upper reaches of the Samara River and were waiting for the Russian offensive. To go further to Crimea means to leave them behind you. But Buturlin was not embarrassed by this. Leaving part of his forces to guard communications, he slowly moved through the Dnieper rapids. The Dnieper protected itself from the Yedikul horde and from the Dzhambuilutsk horde, and the Ingulets - from the Yedisan horde.
On the left flank, on the Caucasian Theater, movement also began. Even in winter, the Russians contacted the Kabardian rulers, convincing them to oppose the Tatars. The Kabardians replied that they and the Kuban Tatars had “great unfriendship and until our death there will never be friendship between us.”
Later, 20,000 Kalmyks from Taisha Ayuki arrived. This entire army moved across the steppe and the Don to Azov, in order to also be strengthened by the Azov garrison.
On June 30, Prince Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky wrote to Peter from Kabarda that he had agreed with the local rulers: just as boyar Apraksin with the Russian army and Kalmyks would go against the Kuban Tatars, the Kabardians would also immediately oppose the Kuban. Distances and primitive communications did not allow the Russians to strike in all three theaters simultaneously.
On July 2, Buturlin’s troops arrived in Kamenny Zaton. This fortress was once built on the banks of the Dnieper to prevent the Zaporozhye Cossacks from going out to sea along the Dnieper without the royal will and causing a quarrel between the Sultan and the Tsar. Stone Zaton was guarded by a Russian garrison - the infantry regiments of Gulits and Yankovsky. From here it was a stone's throw to the Crimea, and the hetman and Buturlin were already making plans on how to land troops on the Crimean coast.
On July 7, intelligence reported that the main forces of the Tatars were leaving Perekop. The movement of the Russian army was stopped, and a Tatar attack was expected. Only four battalions of Captain Postelnikov were sent forward, who burned the empty smokehouses of the New Zaporozhye Sich and took four cannons there. There were no Cossacks in Novaya Sich; at that time they were fighting across the Dniester with the army of Tsar Peter himself.
The position of Buturlin's troops was extremely difficult. They haven’t crossed their border yet, but they’ve already used up their supplies. And no wonder - for a whole month they were marking time practically in one place. Hunger set in and I had to eat horse meat. The soldiers and Cossacks began to scatter little by little. The Horde loomed beyond the Dnieper not far away, distracting. Meanwhile, 15,000 Tatars of Bakhti-Girey moved to Sloboda Ukraine, to the Donets, Mirgorod, Bakhmut and Tor were under threat.
On July 23, Buturlin and Skoropadsky gave their troops the order to retreat. Thus, the campaign against Crimea was unsuccessful. As it became known, a day earlier, the troops of Tsar Peter himself, having signed an agreement with the Turks, began crossing back across the Prut. On August 1-3, the Russians crossed the Dniester.
But the Kuban campaign, which had been prepared for so long, entered its decisive stage. On August 17, Apraksin, who had not received information that the war was over and peace had been signed, left Azov with 9,000 soldiers and moved south. The Kalmyk horde also reached there.
On August 26, according to Apraksin’s victorious report, the headquarters of Nureddin Bakhti-Girey - Kopyl was ruined.