Combat forces of the parties:
1. Finnish army:
A. Human reserves
By the end of November 1939, Finland concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.
The land army cooperated and was supported by the Finnish Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were added to the army's roster of 337 thousand people as a military force:
Paramilitary formations of Shutskor and Lotta Svyard - 110 thousand people.
Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.
The total number of manpower involved in the war on the part of Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.
A 150,000-strong Anglo-French expeditionary force was also being prepared and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - beginning of March 1940 to help Finland, whose arrival only disrupted the conclusion of peace.
B. Armament
The Finnish army was well armed and had everything it needed. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 naval warships.
During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent it weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, and Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million cartridges.
90% of financial assistance came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavian countries.
B. Fortifications
The basis of Finland's military power was its unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its front, main and rear lines and defense nodes.
The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bed) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, canals) of Finland in combination with highly technical engineering structures to create a defense line capable of multi-layered fire on the advancing enemy (at different levels and under different angles) along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.
The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, rubble, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and ceilings of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. Forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.
On all three stripes of the “Mannerheim Line” there were over 1000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.
The space between the fortification lines, as well as the forefield in front of the entire “Mannerheim Line”, was literally covered with continuous military engineering structures.
The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire fences, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete obstacles. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, and all roads were prepared for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were built - craters 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 minutes were set for each linear kilometer. Forest debris reached 250 m in depth.
D. Finnish war plan:
Using the "Mannerheim Line", tie down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the arrival of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with allied forces go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Lake Onega line.
D. Directions of combat operations and command of the Finnish army:
1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: on the “Mannerheim Line” itself and in its forefield stood the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).
2. To the north, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Käkisalmi) - Sortavala - Laimola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.
3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later replaced by E. Heglund).
4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.
5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.
Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed commander-in-chief of the active army of Finland.
The Chief of Staff of Headquarters is Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.
The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is Swedish Army General Ernst Linder.
II.Soviet army:
In combat operations along the entire 1,500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, during the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.
Established number of ground forces: 916 thousand people. They consist of: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal troops and engineers.
The ground forces were supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.
The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.
Thus, up to 1 million Red Army personnel took part in the Soviet-Finnish war and Navy, and taking into account the necessary reinforcements during the war to replace the dead and wounded - over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:
11266 guns and mortars,
2998 tanks,
3253 combat aircraft.
A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:
1. Arctic:
14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three D-type boats, seven Shch-type boats, six M-type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.
2. Karelia:
a) Northern and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).
Army commander - corps commander M.P. Dukhanov.
b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).
Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.
3. Karelian Isthmus:
7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).
The commander of the 7th Army is Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.
The 7th Army was supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.
The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.
Nevertheless, the fortifications and deep-echeloned defense of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not only insufficient to break through them, but even to destroy during combat operations a deep and extremely complex fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield.
As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they were unable to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally expected, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.
Another factor complicating the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely harsh winter of 1939/40 with its frosts of up to 30-40 degrees.
The lack of experience in warfare in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army's actions.
Progress of hostilities
Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:
First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.
Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.
In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.
1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.
2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.
3. The troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.
4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:
5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.
During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.
At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of Corps Commander V.D. Grendal for a breakthrough across the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.
Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.
The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.
6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a group of corps commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.
7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.
Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.
Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).
Front Commander: Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko.
Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov.
Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.
Commander of the 7th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov (from December 26, 1939).
Commander of the 8th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern.
Commander of the 9th Army: Corps Commander V.I. Chuikov.
Commander of the 13th Army: Corps Commander V.D. Grendal (from March 2, 1940 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov).
Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.
Commander of the 15th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank M.P. Kovalev (from February 12, 1940).
8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and strengthened:
a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments).
b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).
9. The main task during this period was the active preparation by the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as the preparation by the command of the troops better conditions for the offensive.
To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.
In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day.
Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy's front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.
10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves.
In the near rear, the troops were practicing new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.
As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.
11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.
It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.
12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification center. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.
Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern for the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.
13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.
On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.
14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.
15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies advanced in the direction of Laimola,
Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice could still withstand tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.
The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.
By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.
16. At this time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, still hoping that Western help would arrive in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position forced the war to continue until the last minute and led to huge losses on both the Soviet and Finnish sides.
Losses of the parties*:
A. Losses of Soviet troops:
From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter,
What happened in the forties
Killed on ice in Finland.
It lay somehow awkwardly
Childishly small body.
The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew far away.
It seemed that the boy was not lying down,
And he was still running,
Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...
Among great war cruel,
Why, I can’t imagine, -
I feel sorry for that distant fate
Like dead, alone,
It's like I'm lying there
Broken, small, killed,
In that unknown war,
Forgotten, small, lying.
Alexander Tvardovsky
Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.
Of these, 65,384 people were killed.
Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.
Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.
Prisoners - 5567 people.
Total: the total loss of troops during the period of hostilities was 391.8 thousand people. or, in round numbers, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!
B. Losses of Finnish troops:
Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).
(The Finnish Blue and White Book of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)
Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.
Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war was 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called up or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.e. 20%, while Soviet losses amount to 40% of those involved in operations or, in other words, in percentage terms 2 times higher.
Note:
* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and in journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and decrease in Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryagi, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later, - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Pharmacists in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while data from Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.
Baryshnikov V.N. From a cool world to a winter war: Finland’s eastern policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state univ. - St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.
Winter War 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ross. acad. Sciences, Institute of General Sciences. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history/ Rep. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehviläinen. - 381s.
["Winter War" 1939-1940]: Selection of materials //Motherland. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons of a forgotten war / V. Prokhorov // New time. - 2005. - N 10.- P. 29-31
Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999
Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999
Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: according to doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541 p. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Name. decree: p. 517 - 528.
Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [transl. from English V. D. Kaydalova]. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.
Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa: talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla: , 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: pp. 109 - 184
Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.
Materials used from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999
Materials used from the book: Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999
The Finnish War lasted 105 days. During this time, over one hundred thousand Red Army soldiers died, about a quarter of a million were wounded or dangerously frostbitten. Historians are still arguing whether the USSR was an aggressor and whether the losses were unjustified.
A look back
It is impossible to understand the reasons for that war without an excursion into the history of Russian-Finnish relations. Before gaining independence, the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” never had statehood. In 1808 - an insignificant episode of the twentieth anniversary of the Napoleonic Wars - the land of Suomi was conquered by Russia from Sweden.
The new territorial acquisition enjoys unprecedented autonomy within the Empire: the Grand Duchy of Finland has its own parliament, legislation, and since 1860 - its own monetary unit. For a century, this blessed corner of Europe has not known war - until 1901, Finns were not conscripted into Russian army. The population of the principality increases from 860 thousand inhabitants in 1810 to almost three million in 1910.
After the October Revolution, Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war, the local version of the “whites” won; chasing the “reds”, the hot guys crossed the old border, and the First Soviet-Finnish War began (1918-1920). Bleeded Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, chose to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: as a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.
It is difficult to say how historically fair this verdict turned out to be; The Vyborg province inherited by Finland belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years, from the time of Peter the Great until 1811, when it was included in the Grand Duchy of Finland, perhaps also as a token of gratitude for the voluntary consent of the Finnish Diet to pass under the hand of the Russian Tsar.
The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.
Geography is a sentence
Look at the map. It's 1939, and Europe smells of a new war. At the same time, your imports and exports mainly go through seaports. But the Baltic and the Black Sea are two big puddles, all the exits from which Germany and its satellites can clog in no time. The Pacific sea routes will be blocked by another Axis member, Japan.
Thus, the only potentially protected channel for exports, for which the Soviet Union receives the gold it desperately needs to complete industrialization, and the import of strategic military materials, remains only the port on the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, one of the few year-round ice-free harbors in the USSR. The only one railway to which, suddenly, in some places it passes through rugged, deserted terrain just a few tens of kilometers from the border (when this railway was laid, back under the Tsar, no one could have imagined that Finns and Russians would fight on opposite sides of the barricades). Moreover, at a distance of three days from this border there is another strategic transport artery, the White Sea-Baltic Canal.
But that’s another half of the geographic troubles. Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, which concentrated a third of the country's military-industrial potential, is within the radius of one forced march of a potential enemy. A metropolis, whose streets have never been hit by an enemy shell before, can be shelled from heavy guns from the very first day of a possible war. Baltic Fleet ships are losing their only base. And there are no natural defensive lines, right up to the Neva.
friend of your enemy
Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.
In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.
Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state’s ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was undergoing intense discussions about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).
Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.
Yes, at that time the idea of attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.
Negotiation
Stalin was anything but a fool. If to improve the strategic situation it is necessary to move the border away from Leningrad, so it should be. Another question is that the goal cannot necessarily be achieved only by military means. Although, honestly, right now, in the fall of ’39, when the Germans are ready to grapple with the hated Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, I want to quietly solve my little problem with the “Finnish White Guard” - not out of revenge for an old defeat, no, in politics following emotions leads to imminent death, - and in order to test what the Red Army is capable of in a battle with a real, small, but trained European military school enemy; in the end, if the Laplanders can be defeated, as our General Staff plans, in two weeks, Hitler will think a hundred times before attacking us...
But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not tried to settle the issue amicably, if such a word is appropriate for a person of his character. Since 1938, the negotiations in Helsinki had been neither shaky nor slow; in the fall of 1939 they were moved to Moscow. In exchange for the Leningrad underbelly, the Soviets offered twice the area north of Ladoga. Germany, through diplomatic channels, recommended that the Finnish delegation agree. But they did not make any concessions (perhaps, as the Soviet press transparently hinted, at the suggestion of “Western partners”) and on November 13 they left for home. There are two weeks left until the Winter War.
On November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila on the Soviet-Finnish border, the positions of the Red Army came under artillery fire. The diplomats exchanged notes of protest; According to the Soviet side, about a dozen soldiers and commanders were killed and wounded. Whether the Maynila incident was a deliberate provocation (as evidenced, for example, by the absence of a named list of victims), or whether one of the thousands of armed men, tensely standing for long days opposite the same armed enemy, finally lost their nerve - in any case , this incident was the reason for the outbreak of hostilities.
The Winter Campaign began, where there was a heroic breakthrough of the seemingly indestructible “Mannerheim Line”, and a belated understanding of the role of snipers in modern warfare, and the first use of the KV-1 tank - but for a long time they did not like to remember all this. The losses turned out to be too disproportionate, and the damage to the international reputation of the USSR was severe.
At the beginning of the 20th century, there were crisis relations between the USSR and Finland. For a number of years, the Soviet-Finnish war, alas, was not brilliant and did not bring glory to Russian weapons. Now let’s look at the actions of the two sides, which, unfortunately, could not agree.
It was alarming in these last days of November 1939 in Finland: the war continued in Western Europe, there was unrest on the border with the Soviet Union, the population was being evacuated from large cities, the newspapers stubbornly repeated the evil intentions of their eastern neighbor. Part of the population believed these rumors, others hoped that the war would bypass Finland.
But the morning that came on November 30, 1939, made everything clear. The coastal defense guns of Kronstadt, which opened fire on the territory of Finland at 8 o'clock, marked the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War.
The conflict was brewing gradually. Over the two decades between
There was mutual distrust between the USSR and Finland. If Finland was afraid of possible great-power aspirations on the part of Stalin, whose actions as a dictator were often unpredictable, then the Soviet leadership, not without reason, was concerned about Helsinki’s major connections with London, Paris and Berlin. That is why, to ensure the security of Leningrad, during the negotiations held from February 1937 to November 1939, the Soviet Union offered Finland various options. Due to the fact that the Finnish government did not consider it possible to accept these proposals, the Soviet leadership took the initiative to resolve controversial issue by force, with the help of weapons.
The fighting in the first period of the war was unfavorable for the Soviet side. The calculation of quickly achieving the goal with small forces was not crowned with success. Finnish troops, relying on the fortified Mannerheim Line, using a variety of tactics and skillfully using terrain conditions, forced the Soviet command to concentrate larger forces and launch a general offensive in February 1940, which led to victory and the conclusion of peace on March 12, 1940.
The war lasted 105 days and was difficult for both sides. Soviet wars, following command orders, in difficult conditions snowy winter off-roaders showed mass heroism. During the war, both Finland and the Soviet Union achieved their goals not only through military operations, but also through political means, which, as it turned out, not only did not weaken mutual intolerance, but, on the contrary, exacerbated it.
The political nature of the Soviet-Finnish War did not fit into the usual classification, limited by the ethical framework of the concepts of “just” and “unjust” war. It was unnecessary for both sides and not righteous mainly on our part. In this regard, one cannot but agree with the statements of such prominent Finnish statesmen as Presidents J. Paasikivi and U. Kekkonen that Finland’s fault was its intransigence during the pre-war negotiations with the Soviet Union, and the latter’s fault was that he did not use to the end political methods. Gave priority to a military solution to the dispute.
The unlawful actions of the Soviet leadership consist in the fact that Soviet troops, who crossed the border without declaring war on a broad front, violated the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1920 and the non-aggression treaty of 1932, extended in 1934. The Soviet government also violated its own convention concluded with neighboring states in July 1933. Finland also joined this document at that time. It defined the concept of aggression and clearly stated that no considerations of a political, military, economic or any other nature could justify or justify threats, blockades or attacks on another participating State.
By signing the title of the document, the Soviet government did not allow that Finland itself could commit aggression against its great neighbor. She was only afraid that her territory could be used by third countries for anti-Soviet purposes. But since such a condition was not stipulated in these documents, it follows that the contracting countries did not recognize its possibility and they had to respect the letter and spirit of these agreements.
Of course, Finland's one-sided rapprochement with Western countries and especially with Germany burdened Soviet-Finnish relations. The post-war President of Finland U. Kekkonen considered this cooperation a logical consequence of foreign policy aspirations for the first decade of Finnish independence. The common starting point of these aspirations, as was believed in Helsinki, was the threat from the east. Therefore, Finland sought to provide support to other countries in crisis situations. She carefully guarded the image of an “outpost of the West” and avoided a bilateral settlement of controversial issues with her eastern neighbor.
Due to these circumstances, the Soviet government accepted the possibility of a military conflict with Finland since the spring of 1936. It was then that the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the resettlement of the civilian population
(we were talking about 3,400 farms) from the Karelian Isthmus for the construction of training grounds and other military facilities here. During 1938, the General Staff at least three times raised the issue of transferring the forest area on the Karelian Isthmus to the military department for defense construction. On September 13, 1939, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Voroshilov specifically addressed the Chairman of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov with a proposal to intensify these works. However, at the same time diplomatic measures were taken to prevent military clashes. Thus, in February 1937, the first visit to Moscow by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland since its independence, R. Hopsti, took place. Reports of his conversations with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov said that
“within the framework of existing Soviet-Finnish agreements there is an opportunity
to uninterruptedly develop and strengthen friendly good neighborly relations between both states and that both governments strive and will strive for this.”
But a year passed, and in April 1938 the Soviet government considered
timely offer to the Finnish government to negotiate
regarding the joint development of measures to strengthen security
sea and land approaches to Leningrad and the borders of Finland and
concluding a mutual assistance agreement for this purpose. Negotiation,
continued for several months, were unsuccessful. Finland
rejected this offer.
Soon for informal negotiations on behalf of the Soviet
government arrived in Helsinki B.E. Matte. He brought it on principle
new Soviet proposal, which was as follows: Finland cedes
to the Soviet Union a certain territory on the Karelian Isthmus,
receiving in return a large Soviet territory and financial compensation
expenses for the resettlement of Finnish citizens of the ceded territory. Answer
the Finnish side was negative with the same justification - sovereignty and
neutrality of Finland.
In this situation, Finland took defensive measures. Was
military construction was intensified, exercises were held in which
Present was the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General F.
Halder, the troops received new types of weapons and military equipment.
Obviously, it was these measures that gave rise to second-rank army commander K.A.
Meretskov, who in March 1939 was appointed commander of the troops
Leningrad Military District, assert that Finnish troops from the very
began supposedly had an offensive mission on the Karelian Isthmus with
the goal was to wear down the Soviet troops and then strike at Leningrad.
France and Germany, busy with the war, could not provide support
Finland, another round of Soviet-Finnish negotiations has begun. They
took place in Moscow. As before, the Finnish delegation was headed by
Paasikivi, but at the second stage the minister was included in the delegation
Finance Gunner. There were rumors in Helsinki at that time that the Social Democrat
Ganner had known Stalin since pre-revolutionary times in
Helsinki and even once rendered him a proper favor.
During the negotiations, Stalin and Molotov withdrew their previous proposal
about leasing islands in the Gulf of Finland, but they suggested that the Finns postpone
border several tens of kilometers from Leningrad and rent for
creation of a naval base on the Haiko Peninsula, giving Finland half the size
large territory in Soviet Karelia.
non-aggression and the recall of their diplomatic representatives from Finland.
When the war began, Finland turned to the League of Nations asking for
support. The League of Nations, in turn, called on the USSR to end the military
actions, but received the answer that the Soviet country is not conducting any
war with Finland.
organizations. Many countries have raised funds for Finland or
provided loans, in particular the USA and Sweden. Most weapons
delivered by Great Britain and France, but the equipment was mostly
outdated. The most valuable contribution was from Sweden: 80 thousand rifles, 85
anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns and 112 field guns.
The Germans also expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the USSR. The war caused
a significant blow to Germany's vital supplies of timber and nickel
from Finland. Strong sympathy Western countries made it real
intervention in the war between northern Norway and Sweden, which would entail
means the elimination of the import of iron ore into Germany from Norway. But even
Faced with such difficulties, the Germans complied with the terms of the pact.
1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.
Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko Peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a larger area of Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.
The Finnish government believed that accepting Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state and lead to Finland losing its neutrality and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.
The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) ran just 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.
The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Maynila incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were allegedly killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the Finnish government and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.
The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was impossible to fulfill, because then Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.
On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was handed a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. November 30 at 8 a.m. troops Leningrad Front received orders to cross the border into Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyusti Kallio declared war on the USSR.
During "perestroika" several versions of the Maynila incident became known. According to one of them, the positions of the 68th regiment were fired upon secret unit NKVD. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary confirmation.
From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.
The group of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The remaining troops covered certain directions from Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.
The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line” - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of Mannerheim's line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The "Mannerheim Line" had a front width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers from the main one, and rear (Vyborg) defense line. Over two thousand long-term fire structures (DOS) and wood-earth fire structures (DZOS) were erected, which were united into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 strong points point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 resistance units, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. Strong points were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). In the gaps between the strong points and the nodes of resistance there were positions for field troops. Strongholds and positions of field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In the support zone alone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.
All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.
On November 30, 1939, after a lengthy artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and began an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, in separate directions they overcame the zone of operational obstacles and reached the main strip of the “Mannerheim Line”. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued for more than two weeks.
At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.
The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops received reinforcements. As a result, Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. By the beginning of February 1940, the Finnish side had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.
On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.
Having broken through two lines of defense, Soviet troops reached the third on February 28. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to begin a retreat along the entire front and, developing an offensive, enveloped the Vyborg group of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, and cut the highway to Helsinki.
The fall of the Mannerheim Line and the defeat of the main group of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult situation. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government asking for peace.
On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.
In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the maritime territory around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.
As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international situation has worsened Soviet Union: he was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.
The losses of Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.
(Additional
On the eve of the World War, both Europe and Asia were already in flames with many local conflicts. International tension was due to the high probability of a new big war, and all the most powerful political players on the world map before it began tried to secure favorable starting positions for themselves, without neglecting any means. The USSR was no exception. In 1939-1940 The Soviet-Finnish war began. The reasons for the inevitable military conflict lay in the same looming threat of a major European war. The USSR, increasingly aware of its inevitability, was forced to look for an opportunity to move the state border as far as possible from one of the most strategically important cities - Leningrad. Taking this into account, the Soviet leadership entered into negotiations with the Finns, offering their neighbors an exchange of territories. At the same time, the Finns were offered a territory almost twice as large as what the USSR planned to receive in return. One of the demands that the Finns did not want to accept under any circumstances was the USSR’s request to locate military bases on Finnish territory. Even the admonitions of Germany (Helsinki’s ally), including Hermann Goering, who hinted to the Finns that they could not count on Berlin’s help, did not force Finland to move away from its positions. Thus, the parties who did not come to a compromise came to the beginning of the conflict.
Progress of hostilities
The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939. Obviously, the Soviet command was counting on a quick and victorious war with minimal losses. However, the Finns themselves were also not going to surrender to the mercy of their big neighbor. The president of the country, the military Mannerheim, who, by the way, received his education in the Russian Empire, planned to delay the Soviet troops with a massive defense for as long as possible, until the start of assistance from Europe. The complete quantitative advantage of the Soviet country in both human resources and equipment was obvious. The war for the USSR began with heavy fighting. Its first stage in historiography is usually dated from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 - the time that became the bloodiest for the advancing Soviet troops. The line of defense, called the Mannerheim Line, became an insurmountable obstacle for the soldiers of the Red Army. Fortified pillboxes and bunkers, Molotov cocktails, which later became known as “Molotov cocktails,” severe frosts that reached 40 degrees - all this is considered to be the main reasons for the failures of the USSR in the Finnish campaign.
The turning point in the war and its end
The second stage of the war begins on February 11, the moment of the general offensive of the Red Army. At this time, a significant amount of manpower and equipment was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. For several days before the attack, the Soviet army carried out artillery preparations, subjecting the entire surrounding area to heavy bombardment.
As a result of the successful preparation of the operation and the further assault, the first line of defense was broken within three days, and by February 17 the Finns had completely switched to the second line. During February 21-28, the second line was also broken. On March 13, the Soviet-Finnish war ended. On this day, the USSR stormed Vyborg. The leaders of Suomi realized that there was no longer a chance to defend themselves after a breakthrough in the defense, and the Soviet-Finnish war itself was doomed to remain a local conflict, without outside support, which is what Mannerheim was counting on. Given this, a request for negotiations was a logical conclusion.
Results of the war
As a result of protracted bloody battles, the USSR achieved satisfaction of all its claims. In particular, the country became the sole owner of the waters of Lake Ladoga. In total, the Soviet-Finnish war guaranteed the USSR an increase in territory by 40 thousand square meters. km. As for losses, this war cost the Soviet country dearly. According to some estimates, about 150 thousand people left their lives in the snows of Finland. Was this company necessary? Considering the fact that Leningrad was the target of German troops almost from the very beginning of the attack, it is worth admitting that yes. However, heavy losses seriously called into question the combat effectiveness Soviet army. By the way, the end of hostilities did not mark the end of the conflict. Soviet-Finnish War 1941-1944 became a continuation of the epic, during which the Finns, trying to regain what they had lost, failed again.