After 1933, two opposing camps began to emerge more and more clearly in the world. On the one hand, these are fascist regimes with clearly aggressive goals, led by Germany. On the other hand, these are anti-fascist forces led by the USSR. A special niche in the system of contradictory international relations was occupied by the capitalist countries of the West - France and Great Britain. About contradictions and international relations developed countries world on the eve of World War II will be discussed in this lesson.
On the third side was the Soviet Union, which created in Europe " collective security system”, not wanting to also drag himself into a military conflict on anyone’s side, but constantly monitoring the actions of German fascism and Anglo-French policy.
At the end of the 1930s. The world was shocked by an unprecedented disregard for international law and laws.
In March 1938, German troops crossed the border into Austria and occupied this country, annexing it to Germany. Happened Anschluss Austria, to which the world community mostly turned a blind eye. At the same time, Hitler laid claim to the Czechoslovak Sudeten region, where the majority of the population were Germans. Czechoslovakia was under threat of military invasion. The USSR offered help to Prague, but for this it had to lead its troops through Poland, relations with which were very bad. As a result, the international community first forced Prague to give up the Sudetenland, and then, in the fall of the same 1938, dismembered Czechoslovakia itself. In the autumn of 1938, the heads of 4 states - Germany, France, Italy and England - gathered in Munich. Following " appeasement policy", England and France handed over independent Czechoslovakia to Hitler, thereby predetermining its fate. This agreement went down in history as " Munich agreement" Czechoslovakia was divided between Germany (most of it), Poland and Hungary. British Prime Minister returning to London Chamberlain self-confidently declared to the British: (Fig. 2) .
Rice. 2. “I brought you peace” ()
On Far East The Japanese army occupied the eastern coast of China and staged provocations against the USSR in 1938 on Lake Khasan, and in 1939 on the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia, which the Soviet Union promised to defend from the Japanese. Both military provocations were broken by the Red Army.
Seeing the tense situation in Europe and the world, the USSR invites the Western countries - England and France - to move towards rapprochement, thereby opposing Germany, as in the First World War, realizing that it will not be able to fight on two fronts. Such a proposal could not satisfy the British and French, because their policy was aimed at expanding Hitler’s aggressive aspirations to the East - Poland, the USSR, the Balkans. Making concession after concession, believing that Germany, for “turning a blind eye” to the violation of all international laws, would never turn force against them, the British and French were seriously mistaken.
Seeing that England and France do not want to conclude mutual assistance agreements, the USSR begins to pursue its policy without looking back at Western countries. Overnight he changes his foreign policy orientation and August 23, 1939 signs Non-Aggression Pact with Germany(Fig. 3), thereby turning Hitler from East to West, buying himself a couple of years to prepare for war, because in Moscow, few doubted that sooner or later war with Germany would happen. This was a decisive move in the world political system. Western countries, conniving with Germany, themselves became hostages of such a system.
Rice. 3. After the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany ()
1. Aleksashkina L.N. General history. XX - beginning of XXI century. - M.: Mnemosyne, 2011.
2. Zagladin N.V. General history. XX century Textbook for 11th grade. - M.: Russian word, 2009.
3. Plenkov O.Yu., Andreevskaya T.P., Shevchenko S.V. General history. 11th grade / Ed. Myasnikova V.S. - M., 2011.
1. Read Chapter 11 of the textbook by Aleksashkina L.N. General history. XX - early XXI centuries and give answers to questions 3-6 on p. 122.
2. What was the essence of the “policy of appeasement”?
3. Why did the rapprochement between Germany and the USSR become possible?
The development of the Soviet Union in the pre-war years took place in a difficult international situation. The presence of hotbeds of tension in Europe and the Far East, the secret preparation of the countries of the capitalist world for the Second World War, and the rise to power in Germany of a fascist party clearly indicated that the international situation was actively and rapidly approaching a military conflict.
During the period between the end of the First and the beginning of the Second World War, qualitative changes occurred in the balance of power in the world community: the emergence of the first socialist state, the aggravation of contradictions between the world's metropolises and colonies, the restoration and new rapid economic rise of those defeated in the First World War and dissatisfied with their position in the world state - Germany. The consequence of these changes in the international arena was a change in the nature of the approaching conflict. From the dispute between the imperialist powers over the redivision of the world, which, according to V.I. Lenin, there was the First World War, the approaching war was supposed to turn into an arena of opposition and clashing interests of both the imperialist states among themselves, and the entire bloc with a state of a different socio-economic formation - the Soviet Union. It was this circumstance, in our opinion, that determined the policies of the leading capitalist states and the USSR on the eve of the Second World War.
2. Participation of the USSR in international events preceding the Second World War.
2.1 The struggle of the Soviet Union to prevent war. Development of relations with capitalist states on the eve of the conflict.
Let us now see how events developed in international politics on the eve of the Second World War.
We can begin counting down events from 1933, as the date of the Nazi National Socialist Party, led by A. Hitler, coming to power in Germany, who already in 1934 concentrated in his hands all the power in the country, combining at the same time the posts of Chancellor and Fuhrer. The fascists established a dictatorship in the country, a regime of reaction, annulled the Versailles Peace Treaty, which did not suit this rapidly developing imperialist power, and began active preparations for a war to redistribute the world.
During the same period (the 1930s), there was a significant intensification of Italian foreign policy, in which fascism had been the dominant ideology since 1922, and its influence on the balance of power in the world community increased.
One of the first aggressive acts committed by these states was the seizure in 1935-36. Ethiopia and the establishment of a fascist regime there.
In 1936-37, Germany, Japan and Italy concluded the “Anti-Comintern Pact”, which marked the beginning of the formation of new military blocs, further progress towards military conflict, and also testified to the manifestations of fascism aggression against the USSR.
Thus, a most dangerous hotbed of future war has emerged in the Center of Europe.
At this time, political circles in England, the USA, and France pursued a policy of encouraging Germany, trying to direct its aggression against the Soviet Union. This policy was carried out both on the world stage and within the states themselves. For example, in almost all countries a campaign was waged against the USSR, the idea of a “growing Soviet danger” and the idea of “Russian military preparations” were actively promoted. In foreign policy British and French leaders, as evidenced by documents, were deciding how to ward off the threat of German aggression and defuse the energy of Nazism and expansion to the East.
In this situation, the USSR comes up with proposals to ensure peace and collective security. In response to the policies of capitalist states, our country is taking the following steps:
1933 - establishment of diplomatic relations with the USA.
1934 - The USSR joins the League of Nations, where it makes its proposals regarding the creation of a system of collective security and resistance to conquerors, which, however, do not find support. At the beginning of 1934, the Soviet Union came up with a convention on the definition of the attacking party (aggressor), which emphasized that aggression is an invasion of the territory of another country with or without a declaration of war, as well as bombing the territory of other countries, attacks on ships, blockade coasts or ports. The governments of the leading powers reacted coldly to the Soviet project. However, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and later Finland signed this document in the USSR.
1935 - France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union sign a mutual assistance pact. This pact could have played a significant role in preventing Hitler's aggression, but at the insistence of France a clause was included in this treaty. Its essence was that military assistance to Czechoslovakia from the USSR could be provided only if France also provided it. Soon it was this reservation and the indecisiveness of the then Czechoslovak government that facilitated aggression on the part of Germany.
Events began to take on particular urgency in 1938, when Germany occupied Austria and included it in the Third Reich and intervened in civil war in Spain, where she helped establish a fascist dictatorship, demanded that Czechoslovakia transfer the Sudetenland and annexed it after the approval of this action by the Munich Conference of Heads of Government consisting of England, France, Germany, Italy, which decided to dismember Czechoslovakia, at which the USSR and Czechoslovakia were not present. This “Munich agreement” encouraged the aggressor and pushed him to further intensify his actions; under its terms, about 20% of its territory was torn away from Czechoslovakia, where a quarter of the country’s population lived and about half of the heavy industry capacity was located.
The leaders of capitalist states, continuing to support fascist aggression, signed a number of non-aggression treaties with Germany (1938 - England and France).
Having untied his hands in this way, Hitler continued his aggression: in March 1939 he completely captured Czechoslovakia and seized the port of Klaipeda from Lithuania in favor of Germany. In April 1939, Italy captured Albania.
The USSR, continuing its peaceful policy, did not recognize the occupation of Czechoslovakia and offered it military assistance, which the government of this country refused. France did not fulfill its obligations under military assistance agreements with this country and did not provide support to it.
Thus, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in 1930 (until 1939) can be considered an example of the desire to prevent war and curb the aggressor. Our country was the most implacable and consistent opponent of fascism, exposed it, identified it with war.
However, by the summer of 1939 the situation had changed, and the result of this change was subsequently the signing of the treaties of August 23 and September 28, 1939 and secret protocols to them, under the terms of which the USSR became almost a partner of Germany. What caused this turn of events? In our opinion, there were several such reasons.
First of all, it should be noted that the very situation that had developed on the world stage by the spring of 1939 objectively contributed to the fact that the Soviet Union could not continue its activities alone, and it had to take care of its security, since by the spring of 1939 .second world war in its locally focal phase was already a reality. In the current military-political situation, the USSR had three alternatives: reach a military agreement with France and England; to be left alone; conclude an agreement with Germany. The most beneficial seemed to be the Anglo-French-Soviet agreement on mutual assistance, directed against Nazi Germany. It would lead to the creation of a unified anti-fascist coalition, would effectively serve to deter fascist aggressors and, perhaps, would prevent the outbreak of a world war.
In the summer of 1939, on the initiative of the Soviet side, negotiations began between the USSR - England - France on concluding a mutual assistance pact and creating an anti-German coalition. At these negotiations, the Soviet Union made radical proposals to resolve the issue of collective security, but for Western states that continued the policies developed at the Munich meeting, these proposals turned out to be unacceptable. By August 20, negotiations had reached a dead end and effectively failed. At the request of the British and French, a break was announced for an indefinite period, although both Moscow and London knew that aggression against Poland was scheduled for the end of August. The USSR failed to reach an agreement with the Western powers. Both sides are to blame for this. But the guilt of the Western powers, especially England, is much greater than that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet side did not have enough restraint, it showed haste, overestimated the degree of hostility of the Western powers towards the USSR and the possibility of their collusion with Nazi Germany. The Western powers did not have a sincere desire to move closer to the USSR, which can be explained, apparently, by various reasons, including fears of possible betrayal, and the inhumane internal policy of the Stalinist leadership, which contradicts his assurances on the world stage, and an underestimation of his strength as a possible ally in the fight against fascist bloc, and deep hostility towards a country of a different socio-economic formation. The Western powers conducted negotiations with the USSR primarily in order to put pressure on Germany, to force it to make concessions to them, they tried to impose Soviet Union own conditions, neglected his interests. “The blame for the failure to create a broad alliance of England, France and the USSR, capable of containing German ambitions,” admits the English researchers R. Hight, D. Maurice and A. Peters, “should be placed directly on the Western allies. It is precisely those methods "with which they resolved the major international crises of the 1930s, gradually undermined faith in the cause of collective security... French and British leaders consistently preferred to pacify Berlin, Rome and Tokyo rather than attempt to use Soviet power to protect international stability."
Thus, by the beginning of the autumn of 1939, the Soviet Union failed to solve the problem of reaching a military agreement with England and France. It would be appropriate to emphasize the following here. At this time, England and France had already formalized their non-aggression agreements with Germany and, thus, were objectively in an advantageous position over the USSR.
However, despite the failure, the beginning of Anglo-French-Soviet contacts caused alarm among the leadership of Nazi Germany. It realized that an agreement on mutual assistance between the three great powers could pose a serious obstacle to Hitler's expansionist plans, and began to make persistent efforts to prevent such an agreement.
Since May 1939, employees of the German foreign policy department, following the instructions of Ribbentrop, repeatedly came into contact with representatives of the USSR in Berlin, making it clear in various unofficial and official ways about Germany’s readiness to move closer to the USSR. Until mid-August 1939, while there was hope for concluding an agreement with England and France, the Soviet government left the German side’s probing unanswered, but at the same time closely monitored its actions. For a long time, a major role in countering the German “courtship of Moscow” was played by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, who believed that no concessions could be made to Nazi Germany. However, in May 1939 he was removed from his post, where he was replaced by V.M. Molotov. Such a replacement could not go unnoticed and, probably, it indicated some changes in the orientation of the Soviet leadership. Therefore, the second reason that the union of the USSR and Germany became possible, in our opinion, must be the personal ambitions and expansionist plans nurtured by the Stalinist government. It seems to us that the similarity between these aspirations and Hitler’s plans for the conquest of the world largely contributed to the signing of the illegal secret protocols of 1939.
In continuation of German attempts at rapprochement with Moscow, in early July, the Soviet embassy in Berlin received an anonymous letter proposing the idea of rehabilitating the 1926 neutrality treaty or concluding a non-aggression and borders treaty. The German side, the letter said, proceeded from the assumption that both governments had a natural desire to restore their 1914 borders. At the beginning of August 1939, in a conversation with the Soviet plenipotentiary in Berlin Astakhov, Ribbentrop had already officially stated that the USSR and Germany could agree on all problems related to the territory from the Black Sea to the Baltic. The Soviet side left these attempts at rapprochement unanswered. Apparently, Stalin first wanted to clarify what results could be obtained from the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations.
It should be noted that the Germans had a backup plan in case the Soviet leadership refused to accept Germany's proposals. At secret negotiations in mid-August, London and Berlin agreed on the trip of the second-ranking figure of the “Third Reich” Goering to the British Isles on August 23 for a secret meeting with Chamberlain. Judging by the documents, the two empires were going to work out a “historic compromise,” ignoring the interests of not only the USSR, Poland and a number of other Eastern European countries, but even France.
On August 15, 1939, the German Ambassador in Moscow F. Schulenburg asked for an urgent appointment with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov. The ambassador read out Ribbentrop's statement, which proposed that all existing controversial issues be resolved to the full satisfaction of both parties, for which the German Foreign Minister was ready to arrive in Moscow in the very near future. Although the statement did not openly talk about resolving territorial issues, they were meant. This side of Soviet-German relations, along with the non-aggression pact and increased trade with Germany, interested the Soviet government to the greatest extent.
The situation for the Soviet government was very difficult. It began a risky political game. Negotiations with England and France were still ongoing, but reached a dead end. Germany, on the contrary, made concessions to the USSR, expressed its readiness to take into account its state interests, it even promised to influence Japan in order to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations, which was beneficial for the Soviet Union, since at that time there were fierce battles between the Soviet and Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River. In such a situation, Stalin gave permission for Ribbentrop to come to Moscow.
Soviet-German negotiations were carried out under political time pressure. On the night of August 23-24, 1939, in the presence of Stalin, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed hastily agreed upon Soviet-German documents: the Non-Aggression Treaty, under the terms of which the parties pledged not to interfere in armed conflicts against each other for 10 years from the date of signing the document, and the Secret Protocol, according to which Germany assumed a number of unilateral obligations:
In the event of a German-Polish armed conflict, German troops were not to advance beyond the border of the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers and not to invade Finland, Estonia and Latvia;
The question of preserving a unified Polish state or its dismemberment had to be decided during further development political situation in the region;
Germany recognized the USSR's interest in Bessarabia.
The non-aggression treaty was published on August 24, 1939. The top leadership of the USSR did not inform either the party or state bodies about the existence of a secret agreement. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 31, 1939, without discussion, ratified only the text of the Non-Aggression Treaty.
The news of the conclusion of a Soviet-German non-aggression treaty came as a complete surprise not only to the world, but also to the Soviet public. It was difficult to comprehend the revolution that had taken place in relations between the USSR and Germany. After the signing of this treaty, London and Paris completely lost interest in the USSR and began to look for ways to obtain from Germany commitments for the future that were stronger than those that it gave during the Munich Conference. Documents show that the day after the signing of the non-aggression pact with Germany, Stalin, being in extreme uncertainty about Hitler's integrity, tried to persuade England and France to continue the military Moscow negotiations. But there was no response to these proposals.
There are different points of view on the question of the need to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany.
Serious researchers - Soviet, Polish, British, West German and others - admit that on August 19-20, 1939, at the moment Stalin agreed to Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow to finally clarify Germany's intentions, the Soviet Union was left with no choice. The USSR alone could not prevent the war. He failed to find allies in England and France. All that was left was to think about how not to fall into the maelstrom of war, for which the USSR was even less prepared in 1939 than in 1941.
True, there is another point of view on this matter. Some historians believe that Germany in 1939 was also not ready for war with the USSR. This may be true, but at the same time it was impossible not to take into account the very obvious likelihood of Berlin’s deals with other Western powers against the Soviet Union.
Assessing the non-aggression treaty from the standpoint of today, it can be noted that for the USSR it had both positive and negative consequences. Positive:
The Soviet Union avoided a war on two fronts, since the agreement created a crack in Japanese-German relations and deformed the terms of the Anti-Comintern Pact in favor of the USSR;
The line from which the Soviet Union could conduct its initial defense was moved several hundred kilometers away from Leningrad, Minsk and other centers;
The treaty contributed to the deepening of the split of the capitalist world into two warring camps, thwarted the plans of the Western powers to direct aggression to the east, and prevented their unification against the USSR. Western powers began to be forced to reckon with the Soviet Union as a military and political power that had the right to outline its interests on the political map of the world.
Negative:
The treaty undermined the morale of the Soviet people, the combat effectiveness of the army, lulled the vigilance of the military-political leadership of the USSR, disoriented the democratic, peace-loving forces, and, therefore, became one of the reasons for the failures of the Soviet side in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War;
The treaty provided fertile ground for accusations against the Soviet Union by Western powers of supporting the aggressor and starting a war;
For a long time, it was considered a positive result of the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Treaty that the USSR received about two years to prepare for war and strengthen its defense capabilities. However, this time was used less effectively by the Soviet Union than by Germany, which in 22 months to a greater extent increased its military potential. If at the beginning of 1939 the military-political leadership of Germany assessed the Red Army as a very strong enemy, a clash with which was undesirable, then at the beginning of 1941 they already noted the weakness of the USSR Armed Forces, especially their command staff.
The legal, political and historical assessment of the Secret Protocol attached to this agreement may, in our opinion, be more unambiguous and categorical. This protocol can be considered as a great power request for “territorial and political reorganization” in the region, which, from a legal point of view, was in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of a number of states. It did not comply with the treaties that the USSR had previously concluded with these countries, with our obligations to respect their sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability in all circumstances. This protocol completely contradicted the official assurances about the abolition of secret diplomacy that the leadership of the USSR made to the world community, was a revision of the strategic course towards collective security and actually authorized an armed invasion of Poland.
Having freed its hands by signing a non-aggression pact and secret protocols, Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939.
England and France declared war on Germany, but did not provide effective military assistance to Poland and it was defeated.
The USSR and the USA declared their neutrality in the war.
On September 17, 1939, units of the Red Army entered the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus, which was provided for by the provisions of the secret protocol.
So, the Second World War began.
At this time (end of September 1939), the leadership of the USSR, led by Stalin and Molotov, overstepped the bounds of reason in relations with Germany. On August 28, 1934, in Moscow, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the Treaty of Friendship and Borders with the annex of several secret protocols, which, like the previous secret protocol, were not ratified. According to these documents, the spheres of influence of the USSR and Germany changed, the borders of countries in Poland were determined, the parties agreed on economic cooperation and the prevention of agitation directed against the other side. The territory of the Lithuanian state was recognized as a sphere of interests of the USSR, provided that the existing economic agreements between Germany and Lithuania would not be affected by the activities of the Government of the Soviet Union in this region. At the same time, the Lublin and Warsaw voivodeships were transferred to the German sphere of influence with appropriate amendments to the demarcation line. In one of the protocols, each side pledged to prevent “Polish propaganda” directed at the region of the other country.
At the same negotiations, Molotov made a statement in which he substantiated the idea that the fight against fascism was unnecessary and that an ideological agreement with Germany was possible. Together with Ribbentrop, he signed a note in which all responsibility for starting the war was shifted to England and France and stipulated that, if these countries continued to participate in the war, the USSR and Germany would consult on military issues.
The assessment of these agreements, in our opinion, should be unambiguous. If the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty in the minds of the Soviet people was justified by the need to avoid participation in the war, then the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Borders between the USSR and Germany was completely unnatural. This document was signed after the occupation of Poland and, consequently, was an agreement concluded with a country that committed an overt act of aggression. He questioned, if not undermined, the status of the USSR as a neutral party and pushed our country into unprincipled cooperation with Nazi Germany.
In our opinion, there was no need for this agreement at all. The change in the boundary of division of interests, recorded in the secret additional protocol, could have been formalized in a completely different way. However, motivated by the strengthening of personal power, Stalin went to great political and moral expense at the end of September in order to secure, as he believed, Hitler in a position of mutual understanding, but not with the USSR, but with him personally. It should be recognized that Stalin’s desire for parallel actions with Germany, which had been established since the end of September, expanded the freedom of maneuver of the Nazi leadership, including in carrying out a number of military operations.
Thus, in modern historical science, the Treaty of Friendship and Borders of September 28, 1939 is assessed sharply negatively. The conclusion of this agreement should be considered a mistake by the then leadership of the USSR. The treaty and everything that followed it in the media and in practical politics disarmed Soviet people spiritually, contradicted the will of the people, Soviet and international legislation and undermined the international authority of the USSR.
Summing up the story about the Soviet-German treaties of August 23 and September 28, 1939, it should be noted that according to the conclusions of the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies, the Non-Aggression Treaty and the Treaty of Friendship and Borders lost their force at the time of the German attack on the USSR, and the secret protocols , as signed in violation of existing Soviet legislation and international law, are not valid from the moment of signing.
After the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the secret protocols, the Soviet Union began to steadily implement all their provisions. In addition to the moral damage caused to the Soviet people by the terms of these documents, the practical activities of the Soviet leadership caused great damage to the country. For example, discontent among anti-fascists living in the USSR was caused by individual unfriendly actions of the government towards some of them. Thus, in the fall of 1939, orphanage No. 6, previously created specifically for the children of German political emigrants, was closed in Moscow. At the beginning of 1940, several groups of German and Austrian anti-fascists who were repressed in the 30s and were under investigation or imprisoned were transferred to the German authorities. In most cases, this was done against the will of those being transferred. In addition, there were many cases of repression against Soviet citizens conducting anti-fascist propaganda. After the introduction, under the terms of the last Treaty, of the Red Army into the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus, Lithuania and Poland, repression began there, the imposition of command and administrative methods of leadership, and the suppression of the national movement in these areas.
From 1939 to 1941, almost until the start of the Great Patriotic War, the external rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union continued. The USSR, right up to the German attack in 1941, strictly complied with all the terms of the treaties it signed. So he did not participate in the events of 1940 -1941, when Hitler subjugated almost all European states, including France, and defeated the European contingent of British troops. Soviet diplomacy did everything to postpone the war and avoid fighting it on two fronts, in order to allow the USSR to prepare for war. For example, in 1941 the following were signed:
A note with Turkey, in which both sides pledged to remain neutral;
Non-aggression pact with Japan.
However, these measures could not solve the main problem of foreign policy and prevent war.
International situation on the eve of the Second World War
After Soviet Russia's hopes for a world revolution collapsed, Soviet leaders had to think about how to establish trade and diplomatic relations with the “capitalists.” An obstacle to recognition of the Bolshevik government was the refusal to recognize debts incurred by the Tsarist and Provisional governments, as well as to pay foreigners for the property taken from them by the Soviets. But there was a more serious reason. In addition to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in Soviet Russia there was another body that pursued its own unofficial foreign policy - the Comintern (Communist International), whose task was to undermine the state foundations of countries with whose governments Soviet diplomacy tried to establish normal relations.
Fearing the communists, but at the same time needing a market for their industrial products and Russian raw materials, the European powers and the United States compromised. Not recognizing Soviet power, they began a lively trade with the Soviets. Already in December 1920, the United States lifted the ban on trade transactions of its private firms with Soviet Russia. Many European powers followed their example.
On April 10, 1922, an international conference opened in Genoa, to which the Soviet delegation was invited for the first time. Its head, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Chicherin, announced the Soviet government’s readiness to recognize the tsar’s debts if it is recognized and if loans are opened to it. Germany was the only one of all the 33 countries present to accept this proposal, and on April 16 in Rapallo it concluded not only a trade but also a secret agreement with Soviet Russia - “Operation Kama”. According to which the Junkers plant was built, which by 1924 produced several hundred military aircraft for Germany, submarines began to be built for it at the shipyards of Petrograd and Nikolaev; in Lipetsk and Borsoglebsk, aviation schools were opened for German pilots and a whole network of airfields was built, where, starting in 1927, German pilots received training; tank was opened in Kazan, and artillery in Lutsk German schools.
In 1926, a neutrality treaty was signed between Germany and the USSR. German-Soviet cooperation continued further.
England took a particularly hostile position towards the Bolsheviks while the Conservatives, led by Churchill, were in power there. When power passed to the workers' party in 1924, England established diplomatic relations with the USSR. Almost everyone followed her example European states, as well as Japan, China and Mexico. Only Yugoslavia and the United States held firm to non-recognition. This, however, did not prevent the Americans from conducting brisk trade with the Soviets.
In 1927, due to a scandal over secret British War Office documents, the British government broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviets, but continued trade between both countries.
During the first 16 post-war years, the situation in Europe, from the outside, was calm. True, in Germany, after the Social Democratic experiment, the people entrusted power to Field Marshal Hindenburg, but his presidency did not pose any threat to the world.
At the insistence of France, Germany joined the League of Nations in 1925. On October 4th of the same year, a conference was convened in Locarno, at which England, Italy, France, Germany, and Belgium signed an agreement on mutual guarantees between these countries and on guaranteeing the inviolability of the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia.
British politicians wanted conditions to be created in the East that would exclude the possibility of a German-Soviet clash. But Germany did not want to give up its claims in the East and come to terms with the loss of its lands, which went to Poland, and rejected this offer.
Germany is arming itself
While the victorious countries enjoyed peaceful life and dreamed of a long-term peace, Germany armed itself. Already in 1919, German Minister Retenau created conditions for the restoration of the military industry. Many old factories and factories were converted, and new ones (built with American and British money) were built so that they could be quickly adapted to wartime needs.
To circumvent the ban on containing regular army, the German General Staff, from the authorized contingent of one hundred thousand, created a cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers for an army of millions. Cadet corps were opened and many youth organizations were created, in which military training took place secretly. Finally, a general staff was created to develop a plan for a future war. Thus, everything was created so that, under favorable conditions, a powerful military force could be quickly created. All that remained was to wait for the appearance of a leader who would break the external barriers preventing the creation of this force.
Hitler's rise to power
In the 20s, a new, hitherto unknown figure appeared on the political arena of Germany - Adolf Hitler. An Austrian by birth, he was a German patriot. When the war began, he volunteered for the German army and rose to the rank of corporal. At the end of the war, during a gas attack, he became temporarily blind and was hospitalized. There, in his thoughts, he explained his misfortune with the defeat of Germany. In search of the reasons for this defeat, he came to the conclusion that it was the result of betrayal on the part of the Jews, who undermined the front with their intrigues, and the machinations of the Bolsheviks - participants in the “world Jewish conspiracy.”
In September 1919, Hitler joined the German Workers' Party. A year later he had already become its leader - the “Fuhrer”. In 1923, the French occupation of the Ruhr region aroused the indignation of the German people and contributed to the growth of Hitler's party, which from then on became known as the National Socialist Party.
After unsuccessful attempt to seize power in Bavaria, Hitler had to spend 13 months in prison, where he wrote his book “Mein Kampf” (“My Struggle”).
Hitler's popularity grew rapidly. In 1928, he had 12 deputies in the Reichstag (parliament), and in 1930 there were already 230.
At that time, Hindenburg was already over 80 years old. The leaders of the General Staff had to find a deputy for him. Since Hitler was striving for the same goal as them, they chose him. In August 1932, Hitler was unofficially invited to Berlin. After meeting him, Hindenburg said: “This man as chancellor? I'll make him postmaster and he can lick the stamps with my head on them." However, on April 30, 1933, although reluctantly, Hindenburg agreed to appoint him chancellor.
Two months later, Hitler opened the first Reichstag of the Third Empire, the next day the majority (441 versus 94) of deputies gave him emergency, unlimited powers for four years.
In 1929, after a period of economic prosperity, the United States suddenly experienced a severe crisis. Very quickly it spread throughout the world, and it did not bypass Germany. Many factories and plants closed, the number of unemployed reached 2,300,000. Germany became unable to pay reparations.
When the international disarmament conference met in Geneva in April 1932, German representatives began to seek the abolition of reparation payments. Having received a refusal, they demanded the abolition of all weapons restrictions. Without receiving consent to this demand, they left the conference. This caused a stir among representatives of the Western powers, who made every effort to bring back the German delegation. When Germany was offered equality in arms with other powers, its delegation returned.
In March 1933, the British government proposed the so-called “Macdonald Plan”, according to which the French army should be reduced from 500 to 200 thousand, and the German one could be increased to the same size. Since Germany was prohibited from having military aircraft, the allied states had to reduce theirs to 500 aircraft each. When France began to demand a 4-year delay to destroy its heavy weapons, Hitler ordered the German delegation not only to leave the conference, but also the League of Nations.
Having received power, Hitler immediately set about implementing his idea - the unification of all German nationalities into one state - Greater Germany. The first object of his claims was Austria. In June 1934 he made an attempt to capture her. But the Nazi uprising that broke out was soon suppressed, and Hitler decided to temporarily retreat. On March 9, 1935, the government officially announced the creation of an air force, and on the 16th the introduction of universal conscription. In the same year, Italy sided with Germany and captured Abyssinia.
After the introduction of universal conscription, by a special agreement with England, Germany received the right to restore the navy with submarines. The secretly created military aviation has already caught up with the English one. Industry openly produced weapons. All this did not meet with serious opposition from Western countries and the United States.
On March 7, at 10 a.m., an agreement was signed on the demilitarization of the Rhineland, and 2 hours after that, by order of Hitler, German troops crossed the borders of this region and occupied all the main cities in it. Until mid-1936, all of Hitler's illegal actions were based solely on the indecision of France and England and the self-isolation of the United States. In 1938, the situation became different - Germany could now rely on the superiority of its military power, its military industry operating at full capacity, and its alliance with Italy. This was enough to begin to capture Austria, which was needed not only to implement part of his plan - the unification of all German nationalities, but also opened the door to Czechoslovakia and Southern Europe. After appropriate diplomatic pressure, Hitler presented an ultimatum, which was rejected. On March 11, 1938, German troops crossed the Austrian border. After occupying Vienna, Hitler proclaimed the annexation of Austria to the German Empire.
To determine the combat effectiveness of the Red Army, in the summer of 1938, the Japanese provoked a border incident in the Vladivostok area, which turned into a real battle that lasted about two weeks, ending with the Japanese retreating and a truce was concluded.
In May 1939, in order to test the Soviet-Mongolian defense capability, the Japanese invaded Mongolia. The Soviet command, located 120 km away. from the scene of hostilities, led the operations sluggishly and ineptly. When command was entrusted to General Zhukov, the situation changed. After 4 months of stubborn fighting, Zhukov managed to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces. The Japanese asked for peace.
The tense situation in the Far East forced the Soviets to maintain a 400,000-strong army there.
Negotiations between England and France with Nazi Germany
Despite the growing danger of German and Japanese aggression, the ruling circles of England, France and the USA tried to use Germany and Japan to fight against the Soviet Union. They wanted, with the help of the Japanese and Germans, to destroy or at least significantly weaken the USSR and undermine its growing influence. This was precisely one of the main reasons that determined the policy of “appeasement” of the fascist aggressors by the ruling circles of the Western powers. The reactionary governments of England and France, with the support of the United States, tried to come to terms with Hitler's Germany at the expense of the USSR, as well as the states of South-Eastern Europe. England showed the greatest activity in this regard.
The British government sought to conclude a bilateral Anglo-German agreement. To do this, it was ready to provide long-term loans and agree on the delimitation of spheres of influence and sales markets. The course towards collusion with Hitler became especially intensified after N. Chamberlain came to power. In November 1937, the British Prime Minister sent his closest collaborator, Lord Halifax, to Germany. The recording of Halifax's conversation with Hitler in Obersalzberg on November 19, 1937 shows that the Chamberlain government was ready to give Germany "a free hand in Eastern Europe“, but on condition that Germany promises to redraw the political map of Europe in its favor peacefully and gradually. This meant that Hitler would undertake to coordinate with England his aggressive plans in relation to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig.
Soon after this conversation between Halifax and Hitler, the British government invited the French Prime Minister Shotan and Foreign Minister Delbos to London. The latter stated that the support which France considered giving Czechoslovakia under the Mutual Assistance Pact went far beyond what was approved in England. Thus, the Chamberlain government began to put pressure on France to abandon its obligations under the mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia. In London, not without reason, it was believed that the mutual assistance pacts that Czechoslovakia had with France and the USSR strengthened its international position and therefore the Chamberlain government pursued tactics aimed at undermining these pacts.
The policy of complicity with Hitler's aggression in Europe was aimed not only at “pacifying” Hitler and directing the aggression of Nazi Germany to the East, but also at achieving the isolation of the Soviet Union.
On September 29, 1938, the so-called Munich Conference was convened. At this conference, Daladier and Chamberlain, without the participation of representatives of Czechoslovakia, signed an agreement with Hitler and Mussolini. According to the Munich Agreement, Hitler achieved the fulfillment of all his demands on Czechoslovakia: the dismemberment of this country and the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany. Also, the Munich Agreement contained an obligation for England and France to participate in “international guarantees” of the new Czechoslovak borders, the determination of which was the responsibility of the “international commission”. Hitler, for his part, accepted the obligation to respect the inviolability of the new borders of the Czechoslovak state. As a result of the dismemberment, Czechoslovakia lost almost 1/5 of its territory, about 1/4 of its population and lost almost half of its heavy industry. The Munich Agreement was a cynical betrayal of Czechoslovakia by England and France. The French government betrayed its ally and did not fulfill its allied obligations.
After Munich, it became obvious that the French government was not fulfilling its obligations under the alliance treaties. This applied primarily to the Franco-Polish alliance and the Soviet-French mutual assistance treaty of 1935. And, indeed, in Paris they gathered at the most short terms denounce all agreements concluded by France, and especially the Franco-Polish agreements and the Soviet-French mutual assistance pact. In Paris they did not even hide their efforts to pit Germany against the Soviet Union.
Such plans were hatched even more actively in London. Chamberlain hoped that after Munich Germany would direct its aggressive aspirations against the USSR. During the Paris negotiations with Daladier on November 24, 1938, the British prime minister said that “the German government may have the idea of starting the dismemberment of Russia by supporting agitation for an independent Ukraine.” It seemed to the countries participating in the Munich Agreement that the political course they had chosen was triumphant: Hitler was about to launch a campaign against the Soviet Union. But on March 15, 1939, Hitler very expressively showed that he did not take into account either England or France, or the obligations that he had accepted before them. German troops suddenly invaded Czechoslovakia, completely occupied it and liquidated it as a state.
Soviet-German negotiations of 1939
In a tense political situation in the spring and summer of 1939, negotiations began and took place on economic and then political issues. The German government in 1939 was clearly aware of the danger of war against the Soviet Union. It did not yet have the resources that the capture provided it with by 1941. Western Europe. At the beginning of 1939, the German government invited the USSR to conclude a trade agreement. On May 17, 1939, a meeting was held between German Foreign Minister Schnurre and USSR Charge d'Affaires in Germany G.A. Astakhov, where they discussed the issue of improving Soviet-German relations.
At the same time, the Soviet government did not consider it possible, due to the tense political situation in relations between the USSR and Germany, to negotiate on expanding trade and economic ties between both countries. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs pointed this out to the German ambassador on May 20, 1939. He noted that economic negotiations with Germany in lately started several times, but were unsuccessful. This gave the Soviet government a reason to declare to the German side that it had the impression that the German government, instead of business negotiations on trade and economic issues he is playing a kind of game, and that the USSR is not going to participate in such games.
However, on August 3, 1939, Ribbentrop, in a conversation with Astakhov, stated that there were no unresolved issues between the USSR and Germany and proposed signing a Soviet-German protocol. Still counting on the opportunity to achieve success in negotiations with England and France, the Soviet government rejected this proposal.
But after negotiations with England and France reached a dead end due to their reluctance to cooperate with the USSR, after receiving information about secret negotiations between Germany and England, the Soviet government became convinced of the complete impossibility of achieving effective cooperation with the Western powers in organizing a joint rebuff to the fascist aggressor. On August 15, a telegram arrived in Moscow in which the German government asked to host the Foreign Minister in Moscow for negotiations, but the Soviet government hoped for success in negotiations with England and France and therefore did not react to this telegram. On August 20, there was a new urgent request from Berlin on the same issue.
In the current situation, the USSR government then made the only right decision - to agree to Ribbentrop’s arrival to conduct negotiations, which ended on August 23 with the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. His conclusion for some time freed the USSR from the threat of war without allies and gave time to strengthen the country's defense. The Soviet government agreed to conclude this agreement only after the reluctance of England and France to repel Hitler’s aggression together with the USSR was finally revealed. The agreement, which was intended to last for 10 years, came into force immediately. The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol delimiting the spheres of influence of the parties in Eastern Europe: Estonia, Finland, and Bessarabia were included in the Soviet sphere; in German - Lithuania. The fate of the Polish State was passed over in silence, but in any case, the Belarusian and Ukrainian territories included in its composition under the Riga Peace Treaty of 1920 should have gone to the USSR after Germany’s military invasion of Poland.
Secret protocol in action
8 days after the signing of the treaty, German troops attacked Poland. On September 9, the Soviet leadership notified Berlin of its intention to occupy those Polish territories that, in accordance with the secret protocol, were to go to the Soviet Union. On September 17, the Red Army entered Poland under the pretext of providing “assistance to Ukrainian and Belarusian blood brothers” who were in danger as a result of the “collapse of the Polish state.” As a result of the agreement reached between Germany and the USSR, a joint Soviet-German communiqué was published on September 19, which stated that the purpose of this action was “to restore peace and the order disrupted due to the collapse of Poland.” This allowed the Soviet Union to annex a huge territory of 200 thousand km 2 with a population of 12 million people.
Following this, the Soviet Union, in accordance with the provisions of the secret protocol, turned its gaze towards the Baltic countries. On September 28, 1939, the Soviet leadership imposed a “mutual assistance treaty” on Estonia, under the terms of which it “provided” its naval bases to the Soviet Union. A few weeks later, similar agreements were signed with Latvia and Lithuania.
On October 31, the Soviet leadership presented territorial claims to Finland, which built 35 km along the border running along the Karelian Isthmus. from Leningrad, a system of powerful fortifications known as the Mannerheim Line. The USSR demanded to demilitarize the border zone and move the border by 70 km. from Leningrad, liquidate the naval bases on Hanko and the Åland Islands in exchange for very significant territorial concessions in the north. Finland rejected these proposals, but agreed to negotiate. On November 29, taking advantage of a minor border incident, the USSR terminated the non-aggression pact with Finland. The next day military operations began. The Red Army, having failed to overcome the Mannerheim Line for several weeks, suffered heavy losses. Only at the end of February 1940 did Soviet troops manage to break through the Finnish defenses and capture Vyborg. The Finnish government asked for peace and, under an agreement on March 12, 1940, ceded the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg to the Soviet Union, and also provided it with its naval base on Hanko for 30 years. This short but very costly war for the Soviet troops (50 thousand killed, more than 150 thousand wounded and missing) demonstrated to Germany, as well as to the most far-sighted representatives of the Soviet military command, the weakness and unpreparedness of the Red Army. In June 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were incorporated into the USSR.
A few days after the Red Army entered the Baltic states, the Soviet government sent an ultimatum to Romania, demanding the transfer of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. At the beginning of July 1940, Bukovina and part of Bessarabia were included in the Ukrainian USSR. The rest of Bessarabia was annexed to the Moldavian SSR, formed on August 2, 1940. Thus, within one year, the population of the Soviet Union increased by 23 million people.
Deterioration of Soviet-German relations
Externally, Soviet-German relations developed favorably for both sides. The Soviet Union carefully fulfilled all the conditions of the Soviet-German economic agreement signed on February 11, 1940. For 16 months, until the German attack, he supplied agricultural products, oil and minerals totaling about 1 billion marks in exchange for technical and military equipment. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the USSR regularly supplied Germany with strategic raw materials and food purchased in third countries. Economic assistance and mediation of the USSR were of paramount importance for Germany in the conditions of the economic blockade declared by Great Britain.
At the same time, the Soviet Union followed the victories of the Wehrmacht with concern. In August-September 1940, the first deterioration in Soviet-German relations occurred, caused by Germany's presentation of foreign policy guarantees to Romania after the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. She signed a series of economic agreements with Romania and sent a very significant military mission there to prepare the Romanian army for war against the USSR. In September, Germany sent troops to Finland.
Despite the changes caused by these events in the Balkans, in the fall of 1940 Germany made several more attempts designed to improve German-Soviet diplomatic relations. During Molotov's visit to Berlin on November 12-14, very intense, although not leading to concrete results, negotiations were held regarding the USSR's accession to the Triple Alliance. However, on November 25, the Soviet government presented the German Ambassador Schuleburg with a memorandum outlining the conditions for the USSR to enter the Triple Alliance:
The territories located south of Batumi and Baku towards the Persian Gulf should be considered as the center of gravity of Soviet interests;
German troops must be withdrawn from Finland;
Bulgaria, having signed a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR, comes under its protectorate;
There is a Soviet naval base on Turkish territory in the Straits zone;
Japan renounces its claims to Sakhalin Island.
The Soviet Union's demands remained unanswered. On Hitler's instructions, the Wehrmacht General Staff had already been developing (since the end of July 1940) a plan for a lightning war against the Soviet Union, and at the end of August the transfer of the first military formations to the east began. The failure of the Berlin negotiations with Molotov led Hitler to make a final decision regarding the USSR on December 5, 1940, confirmed on December 18 by Directive 21, which set the start of the Barbarossa plan for May 15, 1941. The invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece forced Hitler on April 30, 1941 to change this date to June 22, 1941. The generals convinced him that a victorious war would last no more than 4-6 weeks.
At the same time, Germany used the memorandum of November 25, 1940 to put pressure on those countries whose interests were affected by it, and above all on Bulgaria, which in March 1941 joined the fascist coalition. Soviet-German relations continued to deteriorate throughout the spring of 1941, especially with the invasion of Yugoslavia by German troops hours after the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty. The USSR did not react to this aggression, as well as to the attack on Greece. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy managed to achieve a major success by signing a non-aggression pact with Japan on April 13, which significantly reduced tension on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR.
Despite the alarming course of events, the USSR, until the very beginning of the war with Germany, could not believe in the inevitability of a German attack. Soviet supplies to Germany increased significantly due to the renewal of the 1940 economic agreements on January 11, 1941. In order to demonstrate its “trust” to Germany, the Soviet government refused to take into account the numerous reports received since the beginning of 1941 about an attack on the USSR being prepared and did not take the necessary measures on its western borders. Germany was still viewed by the Soviet Union "as a great friendly power."
The Second World War was prepared and unleashed by the forces of the most aggressive states - fascist Germany and Italy, militaristic Japan with the goal of a new redivision of the world. It began as a war between two coalitions of imperialist powers. Subsequently, all states that fought against the countries of the fascist bloc began to accept the character of a just, anti-fascist war, which was finally formed after the USSR entered the war.
Stabilization in the field of international relations in the 20s. was replaced by a global economic crisis (1929 – 1933). The solution is increased government intervention in the social and economic life of a number of countries in Europe and the USA.
In Germany in 1933, as a result of democratic elections, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) led by A. Hitler came to power:
- economic policy - to expand living space, achieve world domination;
- ideological support - propaganda of the idea of racial exclusivity of the German nation, chauvinism;
- the social base of National Socialism is small owners, the unemployed, part of the intelligentsia, workers and youth.
Changes in German policy with the advent of the Nazis: withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), abandonment of the Geneva Disarmament Convention, growth of militarism.
Military-political cooperation of extremist regimes:
October 1936 - “Axis Berlin - Rome” - agreement between Germany and Italy, recognition of the annexation of Abyssinia, development of a unified line of behavior regarding the war in Spain. November 1936 “Anti-Comintern Pact” - cooperation between Germany and Japan directed against the Comintern. In 1937, Italy joined this pact.
By 1939 - expansion of the Anti-Comintern Pact to include Hungary, Spain, Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, Siam, Manchukuo, Denmark, Slovakia, Croatia. Britain and France adopted a policy of "Non-Intervention" when the fate of Spain was being decided.
Thus, the growth of militarism and revanchism in Germany, the aggressive actions of Japan and Italy with the connivance of Great Britain and France led to a sharp aggravation of international relations, to the emergence of three centers of military tension.
Steps taken by the USSR to prevent war:
1. Geneva International Conference on Disarmament - from 1932 to 1935. with the participation of representatives from 63 countries. She did not support the USSR's idea of complete and general disarmament.
2. Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties on mutual assistance (1935).
3. The USSR's proposal to create a system of collective security and protect independent countries that were threatened by aggression. However, this initiative was perceived as an attempt to impose communist ideas on the West; negative role Stalin’s repressions also played a role, undermining the international authority of the USSR.
4. “Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact” - a Soviet-German agreement for a period of 10 years (August 23, 1939), as well as a secret additional protocol “on the issue of delimitation of mutual interests in Eastern Europe.” The treaty did not make Germany and the USSR allies, either formally or in fact, and there were no articles on military cooperation between the two countries.
Under the influence of the reactionary regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan, an aggressive bloc is being created. The USSR initiative to create a collective security system did not find understanding from Great Britain, France and Poland. As a result, the Soviet Union was faced with an alternative: face the threat of war in the west and east or sign the non-aggression pact proposed by Germany. The last option was chosen.
Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of World War II.
1. International situation on the eve of the Second World War.
2. International relations of the USSR with England, the USA and France.
3. Soviet-German relations.
4. Development of relations between the USSR and small states.
5. Assessment of the foreign policy of the USSR 30 - 40.
6. List of references.
International situation on the eve of the Second World War.
During the period between the end of the First and the beginning of the Second World War, qualitative changes occurred in the balance of power in the world community: the emergence of the first socialist state, the aggravation of contradictions between the world's metropolises and colonies, the restoration and new rapid economic rise of those defeated in the First World War and dissatisfied with their position in the world state - Germany. The consequence of these changes in the international arena was a change in the nature of the approaching conflict. From the dispute between the imperialist powers over the redivision of the world, which, according to V.I. Lenin, there was the First World War, the approaching war was supposed to turn into an arena of opposition and clashing interests of both the imperialist states among themselves, and the entire bloc with a state of a different socio-economic formation - the Soviet Union. It was this circumstance, in my opinion, that determined the policies of the leading capitalist states and the USSR on the eve of the Second World War.
2 International relations of the USSR with England, the USA and France.
At the end of the 30s, England and its allies took an openly hostile position towards the USSR. Despite the failure of the Munich Agreement and the forced entry into the war with Germany, the policy of the Anglo-French bloc and the United States of America that supported it was strongly anti-Soviet. This was manifested during the Polish events in September 1939, and in various intrigues in the Balkans, the Middle and Far East, in the active assistance of the reactionary government of Finland and the Baltic countries, in the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations for Finnish war and in many other anti-Soviet actions.
On September 1, 1939, Germany began the war against Poland, which gave rise to the Second World War. A complex knot of contradictions has formed in international relations: democratic countries (England, France, USA) - the USSR - countries of the fascist bloc (Germany, Italy, Japan).
A considerable share of the responsibility for the pre-war political crisis falls on the ruling circles of England and France. The caution, or even just distrust of the foreign policy course of the USSR, which was demonstrated by the governments of Great Britain, France, the USA and other countries, was caused by many reasons. But one of them was undoubtedly caused by the internal political situation of the USSR. In the ruling circles of the West, fear was felt of the unpredictable decisions of the Soviet leadership in foreign policy and of the terrorist regime, established by Stalin inland. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that it was precisely at this difficult moment that the Soviet leaders also abandoned their sense of realism and restraint. Apparently, the words of A.N. Yakovlev are quite applicable to this position of Stalin and his circle: “To justify one’s own downfalls with the sins of others is not a path to honest self-knowledge and renewal, but to historical unconsciousness.”
The Soviet leadership could not help but know that the Munich Agreement was not the last foreign policy step of the Western powers. It was aware of Hitler's global plans. Therefore, along with the policies of England and France, Stalinism became one of the main reasons why the Soviet Union was not ready to reach an agreement with these countries on joint actions against fascism.
Relying on military force to implement his aggressive plans, Hitler attached great value and diplomatic means. The foreign policy apparatus of the Nazi Reich was entrusted with the task of preventing the possibility of unification against German aggression by the USSR, France and Great Britain. Taking advantage of the reactionary sentiments of the British ruling circles, the Nazis sought to convince them that Germany wanted to live in peace and friendship with Great Britain and was thinking only about the fight against the Soviet Union. Among a significant part of the British ruling circles, these assurances of the Nazi leadership aroused confidence and found support. They tended to view Germany as an ally. Chamberlain believed that he could agree with Hitler on the division of spheres of influence, and German aggression would be directed against the USSR.
However, Germany only hid their true intentions. The tasks of German diplomacy were to “put together an alliance against England” in deep secrecy, but with all possible determination.
The US government, which made concessions to internal reaction and tried to create the appearance of “non-interference” in European affairs, actually adhered to a policy of connivance with Germany’s aggressive intentions. The ruling circles in the United States hoped that the United States would only benefit from the clash between other countries, and that the aggressive course of Germany and its allies would help contain communism in Europe and Asia.
In the face of a growing military threat, the Soviet Union April 17, 1939. proposed that England and France begin negotiations on mutual obligations to provide each other with the necessary assistance, including military assistance, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states. Under pressure from public opinion, England and France were forced to negotiate. However, the negotiations reached a dead end.
In the summer of 1939, the USSR proposed to England and France a military convention providing for joint actions by the armed forces of the three states in the event of aggression. The ruling circles of England and France did not respond to this proposal. The threat of foreign policy isolation loomed over the USSR.
With the coming to power of the Churchel cabinet in England and especially after the defeat of France by Germany, the situation began to improve little by little. The conviction gradually strengthened that the anti-Soviet course was tantamount to a split in potential anti-Hitler forces and only helped Hitler isolate his opponents from each other. Already in May 1940, the British government decided to send its “special and extraordinary commissioner” Stafford Clipps to Moscow for trade negotiations, which the Chamberlain government led to a dead end.
The nature of American-Soviet relations also changed somewhat. The US government was slow and inconsistent about this. Nevertheless, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States gradually improved. In January 1941, the US State Department notified the Soviet Ambassador in Washington that "the policy set forth in the statement transmitted by the President to the Press on December 2, 1939, commonly referred to as the 'moral embargo,' will no longer apply to the Soviet Union." Thus, the Roosevelt government abandoned the anti-Soviet measure introduced during the Soviet-Finnish conflict.