Theft of money from the cash register by an unauthorized person. Postings, documents. Lack of cash in the cash register

But in addition to the above-mentioned places that fall into the risk zone, thefts have also begun to occur more and more often at workplaces.

Firms and corporations develop, people use property legal entities.

That is why every employee tries to take something he needs out of offices, enterprises and factories.

Sometimes such thefts are quite harmless - there is nothing wrong with the fact that an employee took home a couple of pens and a package of paper.

But sometimes theft at the workplace reach the absurd. Let's talk about this.

Concept

Theft at work is a serious crime.

You risk not only being caught, but also being fired from your income-generating job.

But many people are obsessed with the desire to appropriate other people's property.

There is no separate article in the Criminal Code for theft at work.

But, in the criminal code there is article 158, which covers all types of thefts committed, which means it is quite possible that theft at work can also be qualified under this article.

Let's take a closer look.

What, in essence, is it?

Theft of money from the company's cash register


Stealing money from the company's cash register- the crime is very serious.

The fact is that major theft is considered to be theft of more than a thousand rubles.

It is unlikely that someone would commit a similar crime for less money, so the risk of being caught for this crime very big.

Both an employee directly related to the cash register and an employee engaged in other functions can commit such a crime.

From the store cash register as a cashier

Employee thefts often occur in stores, working at the cash register.

We're talking about theft from a store cash register by a cashier.

That is why many large stores now install surveillance cameras directly above the cash register.

This is done in order to stop the crime in time.

Cashier has direct access to cash. That is why it is in the interests of the cashier to maintain the safety and strict accountability of funds.

What to do if you are accused of stealing money at work?


Sometimes it happens that the theft is committed, but employers, not wanting to understand who is to blame for what happened, accuse someone of a crime, namely stealing money At work.

At its core, if you are not to blame for the crime that occurred, the employer himself is violating the law by accusing you of a crime, which means reporting slanderous information to everyone.

Ask for a thorough investigation And certainly evidence that the crime was committed by you.

Also inform the employer that until your guilt is established, no one has the right to disseminate such information that not true, otherwise, you will go to court with a claim.

How to register theft at an enterprise?

Theft at an enterprise entails responsibility.

It should be formalized as a criminal offense and a statement will be filed regarding it.

The statement is made by a police officer, which is why if a theft is discovered at the workplace, you must immediately call a squad.

If a theft has been committed at an enterprise, from a factory, or in a warehouse, under no circumstances approach the place of the theft so as not to leave your fingerprints.

Give your testimony clearly and to the point.

As practice shows, the first hours after the theft are the most important, because at this time the thief may not have had time to sell the stolen things.

Watch the video of how a hidden camera recorded an employee stealing a laptop:

Qualifying features


The qualifying feature, as in any other crime, is theft by an organized group.

Of course, such a crime will be punished much more severely than a theft committed alone.

Damage to the victim’s property during the theft is also a qualifying feature.

For example, breaking locks, damaging furniture, etc..

Another qualifying feature is theft of property worth more than one thousand rubles.

Distinction from related crimes

Related crime is when a crime is committed not secretly, but in public.

This happens when, for example, someone witnesses your actions.

Many people believe that there is no difference between theft and robbery, but this is far from the case.

In fact, robbery is a more serious crime, which is why it is punished more severely.

What criminal penalties and liability are provided?


Article one hundred fifty-eighth of the Criminal Code provides for theft in the form of imprisonment for up to five years, depending on the severity of the crime committed.

Also, theft is punishable by a fine of up to three hundred thousand rubles.

If you have committed a crime that was burdened with qualifying features, then the term of imprisonment will be up to eight years, and the fine may increase to five hundred thousand.

What happens to theft at work?

Each employee must understand what will happen to them for theft at work.

Committing theft at work threatens you not only criminal liability.

Labor Code Russian Federation provides for the possibility of imposing a disciplinary sanction on an unscrupulous employee.

This is a personal reprimand, deprivation of bonuses, and in some cases even dismissal.

Therefore, even if one of your colleagues took a statement from the police, or simply did not write it, this does not mean that you will avoid any punishment.

In any case, you will, to one degree or another, be responsible for your actions, in this case, for an offense.

Responsibility of a security guard for theft of property


Often V judicial practice There are cases when a security guard becomes a thief or a citizen who commits a theft.

Everything happens in a banal way.

A security guard does not arouse suspicion among employees of a store, organization, or factory, so a person working in the security service could easily commit theft.

In this case, the person took advantage of his official position, which means that his guilt will be significantly higher than the guilt of a citizen who is not related to the organization.

Such a security guard is responsible for theft of property: he faces a fine, a reprimand, and possibly dismissal and imprisonment.

Judicial practice

If we consider interesting, and most importantly, revealing cases at enterprises, then one of the most famous occurred in Moscow.

In a company that produced exclusive perfumes, there was a citizen who was involved in packaging batches.

Every time she came to work with a thermos and left with it.

Many thought that this was how a woman was trying to keep warm in the winter, but one day the company found out that every week large number perfumes do not end up in bottles. It turned out, a woman carried perfume in a thermos.


It didn’t take long to prove guilt - the employee was caught red-handed and the police were called.

Currently female serving a suspended sentence.

Another incident occurred in the St. Petersburg office.

One of the managers was stealing office supplies, and when the amount of things he stole reached one hundred thousand, the managers contacted the police.

Guilty paid a fine of one hundred thousand rubles.

Unfortunately, thefts occur everywhere and we are unable to influence their number to decrease.

We just have to be careful and keep an eye on those around you.

Be vigilant and you will never become a victim of theft.


Good afternoon, dear lawyers! I would like to get advice on how to behave in this situation. The situation is as follows. I am an economist in the operational department of an additional office of a commercial bank. I am directly subordinate to the manager of the additional office and his deputy. The fact of theft of funds from the income account has been established bank in the amount of 124,000 rubles. In total, 5 expense orders were issued under the account of the same employee, who denies any involvement in this.

Where can I get a document confirming the absence of perpetrators in the theft of funds from the organization’s cash desk? Can a taxpayer, applying the simplified tax system with the object of taxation of income, take into account the property damage incurred in the form of theft of funds from the enterprise's cash register when calculating tax?

According to paragraphs. 5 p. 2 art. 265 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, non-operating expenses are equivalent to losses received by the taxpayer in the reporting (tax) period, in particular expenses in the form of shortages of material assets in production and warehouses, at trading enterprises in the absence of culprits, as well as losses from theft, the culprits of which are not installed. In this case, the fact that there are no perpetrators must be documented by an authorized government body.

We will prove the fact of theft of funds and property!

Lawyer Roman gave very constructive advice, and subsequently represented my interests in court. He managed to win the case and win decent alimony. Thank you so much for your help!

When I was fired without warning or pay, I was shocked. Unfortunately, this happens often in our country, and many do not know what to do. I was lucky - I found your website on the Internet and ordered a call from a lawyer, who called almost immediately.

He listened carefully, supported me and gave very informative advice.

How to prove the fact of theft of funds

Question: Money was stolen from the organization's cash register. A criminal case was opened into the theft. In what terms and on what grounds can an organization write off stolen funds in tax accounting?

Answer: Tax legislation gives the taxpayer the right to recognize as non-operating expenses losses from theft, the perpetrators of which have not been identified (clause

How to Prove Theft

Proving theft is a very complex process that first requires identifying it and then bringing charges against the suspected person or persons. How to prove theft cannot be answered unequivocally, since you have to perform a number of rather labor-intensive and time-consuming procedures.

First of all, a commission is appointed to conduct an accounting check or audit.

Dangerous contracts

In the economic and financial activities of defense industry enterprises, situations quite often arise that can be interpreted by law enforcement officers as aimed at preparing or committing an offense. The previous publication discussed risky schemes that involve individuals, including fictitious performers and “dead souls”. Today, readers are offered an analysis of common schemes involving legal entities.

Scheme No. 1 (inclusion of affiliated companies in the procurement scheme for goods, works or services for the purpose of inflating costs and stealing funds that make up the difference in price) is popular not only among defense industry enterprises.

Help: Theft during the performance of work duties by employees

Theft, in accordance with the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus (hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus), is understood as the intentional unlawful gratuitous seizure of someone else’s property or the right to property for mercenary purposes through theft, robbery, robbery, extortion, fraud, abuse of official powers, misappropriation, embezzlement or use of computer equipment . Theft of property legal entity by theft, fraud, abuse of official powers, embezzlement and embezzlement in an amount not exceeding ten times the base amount established on the day the act was committed (petty theft), entails administrative liability.

If theft is detected, the owners or the head of the organization can apply to law enforcement agencies (the prosecutor's office or the police) to protect their property rights.

The procedure for dismissal for committing theft of someone else's property at the place of work

According to sub. "d" clause 6 of Art. 81 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, dismissal of an employee is permitted in the event of theft (including petty theft) of someone else’s property, embezzlement, or intentional destruction or damage at the place of work.

In December 1937, the Methodological Council of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, in collaboration with the Institute of National Economic Accounting at the TsUNKhU of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, published a circulation of 10,000 copies. “Methodological guide to the investigation of cases of embezzlement and theft of monetary assets during cash transactions: A manual for investigators and expert accountants,” edited by A.Ya. Vyshinsky. We invite you to familiarize yourself with it.

Scans of the manual were posted by LJ user clervo in the history-russia community.

I. Features of the methodology for investigating cases involving cash transactions *

Transactions with monetary values ​​differ from transactions with commodity values ​​in much greater simplicity. There is no processing, no natural loss, no revaluation, which so complicate the investigation of cases of embezzlement and theft of goods. For cash transactions, we only have the inflow and outflow of cash.

Further, each cash transaction is always very clearly documented.
Both the receipt of money at the cash desk and the withdrawal of money from the cash register can only take place according to certain documents. Therefore, when investigating cases of this type, documentary evidence becomes extremely important. Finally, with the correct organization of the work of state and public institutions and enterprises, the execution of cash transactions is always concentrated in the hands of a certain person - the cashier, who is fully responsible for the monetary values ​​entrusted to him. There is no such situation as, for example, in warehouses or stores where goods come into contact with a whole series persons in diverse positions.

This does not mean, of course, that the investigator can, as soon as a shortage of money in the cash register is discovered, automatically charge the cashier as accused of embezzlement of this money. As will be indicated in detail below, there may be cases when a cash shortage is formed even in the absence of embezzlement on the part of the cashier, but in all cases of this kind at the initial stage of the investigation the investigator always has in front of him a certain person - the cashier, who, due to his official position, is obliged to be in charge knowledge of all the circumstances that could have caused the shortage and from which the investigator can receive from the very first steps of the investigation the most detailed explanations on issues of interest to him.

These explanations, of course, always require the most careful verification, but they provide the investigator with a framework on the basis of which he can quite thoughtfully and comprehensively outline a plan for investigating the case.

These are the main features that distinguish cash transactions from transactions with other types of valuables, which are important from the point of view of the investigation methodology. But when investigating all cases of this kind, the investigator must always keep in mind that not a single cash transaction has an isolated, self-sufficient nature. Any cash transaction is always associated either with some commodity transaction (for example, payment of the price for a purchased product), or with settlements of a given organization with all counterparties (for example, receipt or payment of debt), or, finally, with transactions on accountable amounts (issuance advances to accountable persons).

Each investigator must firmly grasp the following basic methodological rule: when investigating any case concerning cash transactions, the investigator should not limit himself to checking only the purely cash side of these transactions, but must also check those material, settlement or other transactions that are related to the cash transaction being investigated by the investigator .

For example, checking a transaction involving the payment of 1000 rubles from the cash register of organization X by representatives of organization Y. for goods purchased from organization Y, the investigator should not limit himself to checking whether the cashier had the proper documents to pay this amount and whether there is a receipt from the recipient for its receipt. The investigator must also check whether the purchased goods arrived at the warehouse of organization X. When, in what quantity, what is the actual value of the goods and what is its further fate.

In this example, only by comparing the results of checking both the cash and material side of the transaction and comparing the data obtained with each other can a comprehensive investigation be carried out and ensure the identification of abuses if they have occurred.

It goes without saying that this Guide is not possible to outline all the methodological techniques used for such a parallel check, since this would mean providing guidance not on the investigation) of cases of embezzlement and theft of monetary assets but cash transactions, but a methodology for investigating all and any cases about waste and theft of public socialist property in general.

Therefore, when applying the methods specified in this Guide, the investigator must also keep in mind the rules set out in the methodological manuals relating to the investigation of the type of transactions with which this cash transaction is associated.

So, for example, when investigating cases of payment by the cash desk of a warehouse of any amount for goods purchased by this warehouse, the investigator must use not only the instructions set out in this Guide, but also all the methodological instructions set out in the “Guide on the Methodology for Investigating Cases of Embezzlement and Theft.” in state trade authorities."

When investigating cases of improper issuance of money by a cashier to accountable persons, the investigator must also use the methodological instructions contained in the “Guidelines for the investigation of cases of embezzlement of accountable amounts,” etc. It is especially important to emphasize the need to apply, when investigating cases of this kind, the general rules of investigation methodology embezzlement and theft set out in the “Basic principles of the methodology for investigating cases of embezzlement and theft of public (socialist) property” 1.

The most thorough check of the cashier's identity, his past activities, his connections with other employees of a given institution or enterprise or with other persons, etc. the techniques used in the investigation of any case of embezzlement and theft, of course, must be applied in the investigation of cases of embezzlement and theft of monetary assets in connection with cash transactions.

II. The procedure for storing and accounting for monetary assets and reporting on cash transactions

§ 1. Procedure for storing monetary valuables

Credit institutions and non-cash payments

Normally, monetary assets are stored in credit institutions (banks, savings banks). All payments between state and public organizations in amounts over 1000 rubles. should but general rule carried out by so-called non-cash payment. This means that no one actually transfers any banknotes to anyone. The payer writes an order to the credit institution where his current account is located to transfer the appropriate amount from his account to the recipient. The credit institution, through appropriate accounting entries, makes this transfer, notifies the parties to the transaction, and the payment is considered completed.

Strict adherence to this procedure is one of the main guarantees against embezzlement and theft of funds. Therefore, in all cases when the investigator comes across the making of significant payments by one institution or enterprise to another not in the specified non-cash payment order, but by paying in cash through the cash desk of the institution or enterprise, the investigator must check the pattern of these operations and identify whether in this case there was violations established by law procedure for payment made for criminal purposes 2.

Credit institutions also provide services to institutions and enterprises when performing cash transactions that must be carried out by paying money in cash, for example, when issuing salaries. In these cases, the institution or enterprise enters into an agreement with the relevant credit institutions, which determines the nature and conditions of cash services from the credit institution.
This service may concern individual cash transactions: collection of revenue in stores, issuance of salaries, etc.

And in these cases, cash services are carried out through the periodic entry of a bank teller into the serviced institution or enterprise. But a credit institution can also take over full servicing of all cash transactions of the corresponding institution for an enterprise by opening in this institution or enterprise the so-called assigned cash desk of the State Bank.

This cash desk, located on the territory of an institution or enterprise, carries out all cash transactions of this institution or enterprise without exception, and at the same time appears as a body of the State Bank, to which it submits daily reports on its work. In this case, these reports are certified by employees of the serviced enterprise. In this way, mutual control is obtained on the part of bank employees over the work of the serviced institution or enterprise and on the part of the latter’s employees over the work of the assigned cash desk of the State Bank.

Independent cash offices, institutions or enterprises

In cases where an institution does not have an agreement with the State Bank on cash services, it must have an independent cash desk to carry out those cash transactions that cannot be performed through non-cash payments through a bank. The amount of cash that can be kept in the cash registers of enterprises or institutions is determined by the nature and volume of activity of the enterprise or institution.
As a general rule, the bank issues cash to such cash desks within the following limits:
a) for payment of wages - in the amounts established by pay slips:
b) for travel expenses - in the amount of actual need;
c) for business expenses - usually up to 1000 rubles, but on special requests and more.
The amount of cash required is determined by each institution or enterprise submitting cash plans to the bank, within which bash; and releases funds.

In cases where, due to any special reasons of an emergency nature, an institution or enterprise requires cash in an amount in excess of that provided for by the cash plan, this institution or enterprise must submit a special reasoned request to the bank.

When investigating cases of embezzlement and theft related to cash transactions, the investigator often faces questions about whether significant amounts of cash were legally stored in the cash desk of a given institution or enterprise.
To resolve this issue, the investigator must request the cash plan and check whether the bank has presented any special requirements for the issuance of funds in excess of the plan; If there are such requirements, the investigator must check their validity. For example, at one of the large construction sites the cashier escaped, stealing several tens of thousands of rubles from the cash register. There were no traces of where the cashier might have gone, and the case, in all likelihood, would have had to be dropped if the investigator had not raised the question of how such a large amount of cash ended up in the cash register.
When clarifying this issue, the investigator found that 45,000 rubles. was received the day before from the bank upon special request. This requirement was justified by the fact that, due to heavy rains and rivers overflowing their banks, a number of construction structures are in danger of erosion, to prevent which it is necessary to recruit massively additional labor from the local population.

Checking the validity of this requirement, the investigator found that it was exaggerated by more than 10 times compared to the actual need.
This gave him reason to suspect the persons who took part in drawing up this demand that they were accomplices of the escaped cashier.
The investigation carried out confirmed this assumption. In this way, it was possible to discover the location of the cashier, arrest him and take away a significant part of the stolen money from him.

In these cases, in addition to the use of the above-mentioned documentary materials, interrogation as witnesses of those employees of the financing bank who are aware of the affairs of the enterprise or institution that is affected by the investigation can also bring useful results.

Cash desks of institutions and enterprises come in various types. But from the point of view of the investigation methodology, they can be reduced to two main types: the first type includes all those cash desks that carry out almost exclusively expense transactions. This group includes cash desks of all state budgetary institutions and cash desks of industrial enterprises. These cash desks receive cash almost exclusively from the bank. Other income receipts can only occur as rare exceptions (return of unused advance payment, payment of some random small bills, etc.).

The second group includes cash desks, which, on the contrary, primarily perform incoming transactions. This includes cash registers of shops, canteens and restaurants, enterprises, railway and water transport, entertainment enterprises, etc.

In these cash desks, expense transactions can take place only as an exception, within the limits precisely established by a higher organization, in agreement with the financing bank. As a general rule, all cash accumulating in these cash desks must be deposited daily with the bank either directly or through a field connection.

Only in special cases can local authorities of the State Bank set other deadlines for the delivery of cash for certain enterprises of this type.

An intermediate position is occupied by the cash desks of housing associations, etc. farms. These cash desks carry out both incoming and outgoing transactions (on the one hand, receipt of rent, etc. payments, on the other hand, payments for operating expenses for the house).

Arrangement of cash registers of institutions and enterprises. Cash desks of institutions and enterprises should be located in an isolated room, and there should be no one except the cashier.
This room must be equipped with a window through which the cashier receives and issues money. The cashier's premises must have a fireproof cabinet for storing money and monetary documents. Violation of these rules for the arrangement of the cash register premises, from the point of view of the investigation methodology, acquires special meaning when the cashier explains the lack of money in the cash register by the theft of this money committed by some unauthorized person, and partly also when the cashier refers to the possibility of a miscalculation due to abnormal working conditions.

In these cases, the investigator must conduct a thorough inspection of the cash register premises, draw up a detailed inspection report, attach to it a schematic drawing of this premises, and preferably a photograph.

Cashiers. As already mentioned above, the execution of cash transactions must be entrusted to one specific person - the cashier. Combining this position with any other position in the same institution or enterprise, in particular with the position of an accountant, is in no way acceptable. In the presence of such a case, the possibility of embezzlement is greatly facilitated.

Having come across the fact of such illegal combination, the investigator should always keep in mind that it could have been allowed specifically in order to facilitate the possibility of embezzlement and carefully find out when, by whose order, for what reasons such unacceptable combination was allowed.
The only exceptions to this rule are small cooperative stores and small Narpit organizations (trays, buffets, etc.), in which the functions of a cashier are combined with the functions of a seller.

But some cooperative associations do have special cashiers, in which the execution of cash transactions is usually entrusted to one of the board members, who at the same time bears a number of other responsibilities.

If, in general, checking people hired is always the responsibility of the head of an institution or enterprise, then this responsibility takes on special importance when selecting people for the position of cashier.

In this case, special care must be taken in checking the identity of the cashier and his past activities.

In practice, there are numerous cases where criminal elements managed to infiltrate the cashier’s position and escape, stealing the first large sum received at the cash desk. In such cases, the most thorough clarification of questions about who hired this cashier, on the basis of what data, who recommended him, to whom he was known, etc., is necessary not only because to resolve the issue of liability for the negligence of the person who accepted an unverified employee for the position of cashier, but also to solve the crime committed and discover the hidden cashier.

Such a case took place at one of the large Moscow factories. A certain X was hired as a cashier, who, three days after joining the job, having received about 70,000 rubles from the bank to pay wages in one of the plant’s workshops, disappeared with this money. When the investigator began the investigation, it turned out that neither in the personnel department of the plant, nor in the accounting department, not only from labor list and any documentary data about the identity of the hidden cashier, but no one really knows his last name.
Finding out how it could have happened that a completely untested person got the position of cashier, the investigator found that he was allowed to work as deputy chief accountant U during the illness of the chief accountant. U referred to the recommendation of a certain M, a responsible employee who had died two days earlier in a car accident. The investigator quite correctly raised the question of whether Deputy Chief Accountant U was an accomplice to the crime. By monitoring them and his correspondence, it was possible to establish his connection with X, detain X and return a significant part of the stolen money to the state.

Finding out the cashier's past activities is also necessary in cases where the cashier is not hiding and is present. This is necessary not only in order to check whether he has committed crimes in the past, but also in order to obtain his characteristics in general; in particular, to establish the degree of his qualifications as a cashier; the latter is especially important in cases where the cashier, to explain the shortage in the cash register, refers to a miscalculation he made.

§ 2. Cashier reporting on cash transactions

a) Upon arrival

The basic principle of the correct organization of a cash transaction, as stated above, is the rule that no amount of money can be received at the cash desk without the appropriate document.

In bodies in which there is no massive receipt of funds, any receipt of money at the cash desk must be formalized by a receipt order from the accounting department (Appendix No. 1).
This order, signed by the accountant, must indicate, in addition to the number and date, from whom, for what and what amount should be accepted at the cash desk.

This order is issued either on a separate form, or in the form of a stamp of the same content, applied by the accounting department on the receipt order (for example, on an application by an accountable person for the return of an unused advance).

When depositing money into the cash register, the person paying the money and the cashier receiving it must certify the fact of payment and receipt of money with their signatures on the cash receipt order. At the same time, the cashier fills out a receipt that is integral with the receipt order form, signs it and gives it to the person paying the money. Even in cases where money is received from the bank by check, its receipt at the cash desk must be formalized by issuing the same receipt order by the accounting department.

The situation is different at the cash desks of enterprises that have a massive influx of cash from clients of this enterprise. At these cash desks, receipt orders are not issued, but the cashier must issue a prescribed receipt for each amount received. These receipts can also be of a standard nature (for example, tickets for entertainment enterprises, tickets for railway and water transport, etc.). In whose cases no copy or duplicate of the document issued to the person who paid the money at the cash desk is left. The receipt of funds is accounted for through preliminary strict accounting and delivery of tickets handed over to the cashier against receipt.

IN established deadlines(different for various organizations) the availability of remaining tickets is checked. The difference between the cost of tickets accepted by the cashier and those available must be equal to the amount of money deposited by the cashier during the reporting period.
In those institutions or enterprises in which incoming payments are of such a standard nature, the cashier, when receiving money, each time fills out a special receipt form, which he gives to the person who paid the money. In this case, the counterfoil of the receipt should remain at the cash desk indicating when, from whom, for what and what amount was received; the receipt must bear the signature of the person who paid the money. Receipt books must be numbered, laced and sealed. On the back last sheet The book must contain an inscription signed by the person who issued the book about how many receipts there are in this book.

When conducting investigations in cases concerning this type of enterprise, it often becomes necessary to carry out a complete reconciliation of the data indicated in the receipt stubs with the data indicated in the text of the receipts themselves issued to payers. Such checks had to be carried out, for example, very often in cases of embezzlement by employees of village councils of amounts received by them in payment of taxes, payments for compulsory salary insurance, etc. With the change in the procedure for collecting taxes, such cases should no longer exist; however, the need for such a check still remains in a number of cases (but cases of embezzlement of cooperative shares, etc.).

Any discrepancy between the data indicated on the counterfoil of the receipt and the data indicated on the receipt itself proves the fact of forgery. In these cases, the investigator is faced with the question of who committed the forgery? Was it done by the cashier on the counterfoil of the receipt in order to understate the amount received, or was it committed by the payer on the receipt itself in order to exaggerate the amount paid?
The answer to this question can be given by forensic examination of both of these documents.

b) By consumption

The expenditure of money from the cash registers of state and public institutions and enterprises is carried out either in the form of cash delivery to the local branch of the State Bank, or by issuing money for one or another expense within the cash plan.

The deposit of money to the bank is carried out either directly by the cashier of the institution or enterprise, who receives a receipt from the bank for the amount deposited, or through a traveling bank teller, or through field communication.
In the latter case, the money is handed over to the traveling cashier in a special sealed bag. This bag is usually leather, sometimes canvas, without seams, locked with an automatic lock, the key to which is kept in the bank branch. The bag is filled and sealed by the cashier of the institution or enterprise. A receipt in duplicate for the amount deposited is placed in the bag, which is signed by the cashier of the institution. The third copy of the receipt remains with the cashier. The traveling cashier who accepts money gives the cashier of the institution or enterprise a receipt for receiving the bag, without indicating the amount of money contained in this bag.

The opening of the bag and checking that the amount contained in it corresponds to the amount indicated on the receipt is carried out at the bank. If there is any discrepancy between these amounts, the bank must draw up a report and immediately notify the institution or enterprise from which the money was received. In the absence of such a discrepancy, the bank notifies the institution or enterprise of the receipt of the amount indicated but included in the receipt bag. Except for cases where the above discrepancy is the result of an obvious mistake (for example, the cashier of an institution accidentally forgot to put a wad of money in a bag), the institution or enterprise, having received a statement of discrepancy from the bank, is obliged to immediately transfer the case of a shortage of money to the prosecutor's office. The beam separation should do the same.
On similar grounds, sums of money are handed over when they are collected by field communications.
Spending money from the cash register for any needs of an institution or enterprise is allowed only with expenditure cash orders (Appendix No. 2).

An expense cash order is issued by the accounting department, signed by the loan manager and the chief accountant, or in the form of a special document, or in the form of imposing a special stamp on the document that serves as the basis for the payment of money (an invoice for goods sold or for work performed, an application from an accountable person to issue him advance payment, etc.). In addition to the number and date, the cash order must indicate to whom the order is issued, what amount is to be paid, for what, and on what basis.

The document that serves as the basis for issuing money must be attached to the order. This is important because this method makes it difficult to receive money on a forged order, since to do this it would be necessary to forge not only the order, but also the document attached to it. If an expense cash order is issued for several documents, then the text of the order indicates how many documents are attached to it.
When issuing money, the cashier checks with a passport (or other identification document) whether the representative of the order is the same person to whom it was issued. The recipient of the order signs on the order for the receipt of money, making sure to indicate in words the amount received (kopecks are indicated in numbers) and the date of receipt of the money.
This data is also certified by the cashier's signature.

The expenditure of money from the cash register for the payment of salaries is processed somewhat differently. In this case, the accounting department hands over to the cashier a payroll sheet or payslips, which indicate the amount of salary due for payment; the recipient signs for receipt of the money on the paysheet or payslip.
These documents with recipients' receipts provide the cashier with justification for spending the amounts paid.

c) Cash book

All cash transactions, both incoming and outgoing, are recorded by the cashier immediately upon completion in a special book of the attached form (Appendix No. 3).
Entries are made in duplicate using carbon paper. A special sheet is filled out for each day. The sheet title indicates the date (day, month, year) to which the sheet belongs. All transactions are entered under the next serial number, starting from the first, and for each transaction the number of attached documents, the content of the transaction and in the corresponding column - the amount received or paid are noted.
But at the end of the operations for a given day, the cashier sums up the graph of receipts and expenses, adds the balance of the cash register from the previous day to the total receipt and thus displays the overall total of the movement of amounts in the cash register for a given day and the balance of money in the cash register at the end of the day.
Following the result, the cashier indicates how many documents are attached to this cash report and seals it with his signature.

One of the copies of this report is torn out of the book and, together with all both incoming and outgoing documents, will be submitted to the accounting department on the same day. The accountant receiving the report checks the number of attached documents and signs for acceptance of the report and documents on another copy of the same report, which remains with the cashier in the cash book.

§ 3. Accounting of cash transactions

As already mentioned above, each cash transaction is necessarily associated with some kind of material, production or settlement operation. The task of accounting for cash transactions is, firstly, to correctly reflect this relationship, and secondly, to control the cashier.

a) Registration of cash documents and cash account

All incoming and outgoing orders issued by the accounting department must be numbered and registered at the time of their issuance. This registration is necessary so that upon receipt of the cash report, it is possible to compare the orders executed by the cashier with the orders issued by the accounting department. Such a comparison must be carried out by accounting employees on a daily basis for each cash report.
All cash transactions, both incoming and outgoing, are reflected by the accounting department in the cash account. The debit of this account records all amounts received at the cash desk, and the credit records all amounts withdrawn from the cash register, including amounts deposited at the bank.

The cash account must exactly match the entries in the cashier's cash book. Any discrepancy between them marks some kind of abnormality in the work of the cash register or accounting department (error, abuse, etc.).

Any entry in the cash register account, both on the debit and credit sides, must always be justified by the document that served as the basis for the receipt or issuance of money.
The cash account is closely related to the current account account at the bank. This account reflects the movement of amounts of a given institution or enterprise stored in a banking institution. The debit of this account records all amounts received into the current account of this institution or enterprise. and for credit - all amounts withdrawn from this account.
Bank checking account records must be periodically reconciled with bank records. To do this, the bank sends all its clients statements of the movement of amounts in their current account.

These statements have a very important control value, since they will inevitably reveal any receipt of money from the current account to the institution or enterprise reflected in the accounting department. So, for example, if an accountant, intending to commit embezzlement, when writing a check to receive money from a bike, indicates a large amount on the check and a smaller amount on the counterfoil of the check, and if the loan manager negligently does not pay attention to this, then such a trick will inevitably be discovered when upon receipt of the first bank statement, on the credit side of the current account, the bank will record an amount corresponding to the amount indicated on the counterfoil of the check, and the bank statement will indicate the amount actually issued on the check.

A comparison of these two amounts immediately reveals the abuse.
Thus, any operation to receive money from a bank account to the cash desk of an institution or enterprise is reflected in the accounts of the accounting department as follows: in the account of the current account in the bank, this amount, as withdrawn from the current account, is posted to the credit, and in the cash account the same amount as received at the cash desk is posted to debit; the same thing, but only in reverse order, is done when handing over cash from the cash register to the bank.

b) Corresponding accounts

The accounts specified in the previous paragraph enable an enterprise or institution to know exactly at each at the moment, how much money it has in the cash register and in the bank account. However, these accounts do not yet make it possible to establish a connection between cash or banking operations with those material, production or settlement operations to which they relate. Therefore, each receipt of money at the cash desk or its receipt in the current account, as well as each payment from the cash register or from the current account must be reflected, in addition to the indicated accounts, also on the material, production or settlement account to which this operation concerns.

For example, payment of money to the seller’s account for a purchased product must be reflected simultaneously in the cash register account (or in the current account at the bank, if the payment was made through a bank), and in the material accounting accounts for which the purchased product is accounted for. Payment of a debt to a creditor or receipt of a debt from a debtor is reflected simultaneously in the cash account or current account in the bank, and in the current accounts of creditors and debtors.

The issuance of money to an accountable person is reflected simultaneously both in the cash register account and in the personal account of this accountable person, etc. To carry out all these transactions when issuing receipt or expense orders, the accountant indicates in the text of the order itself which accounts this operation should be reflected in , for this, as can be seen in the attached sample orders, they have special columns.

When investigating cases of embezzlement of funds in connection with cash transactions, this correspondence of accounts is of utmost importance for the investigator.
In this way, you can check the receipt of the equivalent for the amount paid from the cash desk or from the bank.

So, for example, if a cashier, by agreement with an accountant, covers the embezzlement he has committed by attaching a false invoice for a purchased product to his cash report, then a check of the material accounting accounts will show that this product was not received at all, or that it was received in less, against the indicated quantity, size.

Of course, even in this case it is possible that if the cashier and accountant also participate in the crime and the person financially responsible for the goods (warehouse manager, storekeeper, etc.), the matter will not be limited to the preparation of only a false invoice, but a false one will be drawn up acceptance certificate for supposedly received goods. In this case, checking according to material accounting data will not yield anything, since the goods will be recorded there using a false acceptance certificate.

But then there will inevitably be a corresponding shortage of this type of goods in the warehouse, and the investigation of the case will have to be carried out using the methods by which cases of shortages of material assets in the warehouse are investigated 3 .
It is especially important to check the accuracy of the correspondence of accounts in cases where the question of embezzlement of money when issuing salaries arises.
Therefore, we consider it necessary to dwell in more detail on the accounting rules for these transactions.

The first task that faces the investigator in these cases is to establish and compare the accruals of actually paid wages.
With proper accounting, this does not present any difficulties. The accrued salary, that is, the salary due for payment, is calculated by the accounting department on the payroll or payslips.

Each amount included in these documents must be justified. With a time-based wage system, the basis for this is an order to enroll a particular employee for work and to establish his salary.
With a piece-rate wage system, the basis for calculating wages is the established norms of production and release and information about the work performed by the given employee during the pay period. This information is presented to the accounting department in writing by production personnel (foremen, foremen, etc.) and certified by higher officials (foremen, shop managers, etc.).

Abuses in the payment of wages are most likely when accounting for work performed that is subject to piecework payment; therefore, in all cases where the investigator is faced with. materials of this kind, he must carefully find out, on the basis of orders and instructions in force in a given institution or enterprise, all the details of the total accounting procedure: who, how and in what forms takes into account the actual work performed, who controls the actual implementation of these works, who and when and but in what forms does he submit information about this to the accounting department, etc.

Having found out all these circumstances, the investigator must check with the help of an expert accountant. whether the established procedure was actually observed in this enterprise, and if any deviations from this procedure were made, then the investigator must ask the expert accountant whether these deviations could have been used by someone for criminal purposes, by whom exactly and for what purposes? namely abuse.
As in all cases of this kind, an expert accountant can only give an answer to this question about what abuses and on whose side could have taken place in a given state of affairs; It is up to the investigator himself to establish whether these abuses actually took place and on whose part exactly.

The amount of wages accrued on the payroll or payslips is entered into the credit account of workers and employees. When a check is received from the bank in the amount necessary to pay wages, this operation is reflected in the manner indicated above in the cash account - and in the current account account at the bank (the current account account with the bank is credited and the cash account is debited).

The cashier indicates the amount actually paid on the statement or pay slips in his cash report for a given day; to this report he attaches a statement or payslips with recipients' receipts.
The amount actually paid is recorded as a credit to the Cash Account and to a debit to the Workers and Employees Account.
Thus, a comparison of records in these accounts makes it possible to establish what part of the accrued salary was actually paid; the remaining unpaid wages are credited to the depositors' account.

But as soon as this salary is paid, the amounts paid are entered into the debit of the depositors' account.
A person who has not received his salary on time and is on the list of depositors can receive his salary from the cash desk only using an accounting department order. Such an expenditure order can be issued simultaneously to several persons. In this case, it is accompanied by a statement of depositors, drawn up in approximately the same form as the payroll statement.

The indicated transactions do not complete the accounting of salary payment transactions. These transactions are also reflected in a number of other accounts corresponding to them (accrual account, salary expense account, etc.), and the nature of the accounting entries in these accounts depends on a number of features of a particular institution or enterprise (stable composition of employees or unstable , whether wages are paid only for the past time or several days in advance before the end of the payment period, etc.).
Of all these additional entries, the most important entries for the investigator are the entries for salary expenses and production accounting accounts.

In manufacturing enterprises, wages are included as one of the elements in the calculation of product costs, and therefore accounting must take into account not only to whom and how much wages were paid, but also to which production facilities the wages paid relate to.

This will give the investigator the opportunity, with the help of an expert accountant, to determine whether a given enterprise has exceeded production costs in terms of wages against planned assumptions.

As will be indicated below, establishing this circumstance can in some cases be very important for the investigation of the case.
The given data, of course, does not exhaust all the rules for accounting cash transactions.

In each system of industrial, commercial, administrative and other institutions and enterprises, there are annually renewed accounting plans that detail the accounting procedure for certain transactions.

In all cases where the investigator is faced with the question of the correctness of accounting entries for cash transactions, in order to resolve this issue it will be necessary to establish whether the entries actually made by the accounting department correspond to the specified accounting plan.
Any deviation from this plan is either the result of an error on the part of the accounting department, or a way of masking the waste or other abuses committed.

It is extremely difficult for an investigator to understand these issues without the help of an expert accountant.
The nature of the questions that can be posed to an accountant-expert in matters of this kind, of course, cannot be foreseen in advance, but basically these questions boil down to the following:
a) whether the accounting entries for such and such specific transactions correspond to the accounting plan.
b) whether these postings are justified by appropriate documents,
c) if there are entries that contradict the accounting plan or are unsubstantiated by documents, then what explains such entries, in particular, did they open up the possibility of any abuse for anyone, for whom and what kind of abuse.
According to the circular of the USSR Prosecutor dated October 7, 1936 No. 61/19 “On forensic investigative examinations” (“Sots. zak.” 1936 No. 11, p. 94), such questions can be posed to the expert only in relation to specific operations on based on specific materials available to the investigator.

If the investigator does not have such materials and the question arises of a complete check of accounting entries, then such a check should be carried out by an audit of the corresponding higher departmental organization.
In this case, the investigator may only require the following from the expert accountant:
a) instructions on what operations and to what extent should be reviewed to clarify issues of interest to the investigator;
b) conclusions about whether the work of the audit commission is being carried out correctly, and if incorrectly, then what needs to be done to properly organize this work;
c) at the end of the audit - a conclusion on how much one can rely on the materials collected by the audit, as well as conclusions on all specific issues arising from these materials.

c) Accounting control over the activities of the cashier

From everything stated above, it is already clear that the accounting department must exercise daily control over the work of the cashier. This control is expressed primarily in the daily check of cash reports, in the comparison of the data indicated in these reports with the registration data of incoming and outgoing orders and others. accounting documents(for example, statements of a story about the issuance of amounts to the cashier from a current account), and verification of the authenticity of all documents attached by the cashier to his cash report. With proper thoroughness of such a check, the accounting department must, no later than one or two days after the transaction being checked, identify any abnormality in this transaction, of course, provided that the accountant checking the cash statements is not an accomplice of the cashier-embezzler.

At least once a month, the cash in the cash register must be checked and compared with the book balance in the cash register account. Such an inspection must be carried out by persons authorized by the head of the institution or enterprise.

A month is the maximum period for such verification. Since this check is much simpler and easier for people to inventory goods and material assets, it can be done much more often. At many institutions, such checks are carried out once every five days.

Thus, with proper accounting control over the cashier’s work, long-term accumulation of waste on the part of the latter is impossible.
As a general rule, such embezzlement should be uncovered 1-2 days after it was committed and, in any case, no later than within a month.
Cases that have taken place in practice, when some cashiers managed to accumulate embezzlement over several years and thus bring it to a huge amount, could only occur with extreme neglect of accounting, with laxity on the part of the accounting department, or with the direct complicity of its employees and the commission waste.
Therefore, when investigating cases of embezzlement of sums of money related to cash transactions, the investigator must always check how the accounting department actually exercises control over these operations. Such verification can be carried out by various methods, but the main methods for this are as follows:

1. Interrogation as a witness of the accounting employee who was assigned to check the cashier's reports. This person should be asked to tell in detail what he specifically did on the reports he received from the cashier, whether he compared these reports and the documents attached to them with the registration data for receipt and debit orders, bank statements on the issuance of cash amounts by the cashier and with other accounting documents, related to cash transactions; whether he separately checked each of the documents attached to the cashier’s reports and what actions he generally performed to check cash reporting.
2. Interrogation of the chief accountant of an institution or enterprise about how the accounting department supervised the work of the cash register and how he personally monitored the correctness of accounting entries in cash transactions.

If the investigator already has certain data at this point that allows him to focus special attention on one or another of these operations, then both of these witnesses must be asked what exactly was done to verify these particular operations.
It is advisable to interrogate these persons in the presence of an expert accountant.
3. Asking the accountant-expert questions whether the accounting department’s supervision over the cash register’s work was carried out correctly, and if it was incorrect, then what this incorrectness was, and what could be the consequences of the mistakes made in relation to the monetary values ​​passing through the cash register.

III. Basic methodological rules for investigating cases of embezzlement of funds in connection with cash transactions

§ 1. Possible reasons lack of money in the cash register

Investigations into cases of embezzlement of sums of money and connections with cash transactions can begin either due to the fact that the criminality of a particular operation will be revealed (for example, the forgery of a document presented by the cashier will be established), or due to the establishment of a shortage of monetary valuables in the cash register in the absence of investigation of data on the causes of this shortage,

In the first case, the investigator’s task is made easier; he immediately begins to investigate a certain specific operation using all the methods that should be applied in this case, depending on the nature of the operation under investigation 4 .
If, at the time of initiating a criminal case, it is only known that a certain amount is missing from the cash register, but the reasons for the formation of this shortage are not yet known, then the primary task of the investigator is to establish these reasons.
A shortage of cash on hand may result from one of the following four reasons:
a) an error by the cashier and accounting department in recording the movement of amounts in the cash register;
b) miscalculation by the cashier when receiving or issuing sums of money;
c) theft of money from the cash register by unauthorized persons;
d) waste of money by the cashier.

Regarding last reason, that is, embezzlement of money by a cashier, then the methods of investigating this crime change depending on the specific operation during which this embezzlement was committed and what methods were used for this.
The investigative methods used in these cases are set out in the following paragraphs of this chapter. As for the first three reasons for the shortage, the investigative methods that should be applied in these cases by the investigator are as follows:

a) Error of the cashier and accounting department

From the procedure described above for recording cash transactions, it is clear that the accounting of these transactions is always carried out in parallel by the cashier and the accounting employee of the institution or enterprise. Therefore, a mistake made by these persons, as a general rule, should be immediately corrected by another and immediately eliminated. In order for such a mistake to lead to the initiation of a criminal case, it is necessary that both the cashier and the accounting employee checking his work make the same mistake. It goes without saying that the possibility of such an error is very unlikely, although the possibility of such cases cannot be completely excluded. In order for an error to lead to the formation of an imaginary cash shortage, it must consist either in the omission of some expense document, or in double counting of a receipt document, or, finally, simply in an arithmetic error when summing up the results.

Reverse errors (omission of a receipt document or double counting of an expense document) will lead to the formation of an imaginary surplus at the cash register. With proper supervision of the accounting department over the work of the cashier, the period to which such an error may relate cannot exceed a month (since, as stated above, the cash register must be checked at least once a month).

Under these conditions, it is not particularly difficult to carry out a complete check of all receipts and expenditure documents that have passed through the cash desk since the last check of cash. If the cashier refers to the possibility of an error, if, moreover, the possibility of such an error is not excluded due to the circumstances of the case (according to the initial materials, it is not clear whether a complete check of documents was carried out, there is no data causing the cashier to be suspected of embezzlement, etc.), then The investigator or prosecutor initiating the case must require the interested institution or enterprise or higher organization to appoint an audit of cash transactions to carry out such a complete check of cash documents and the results thereof.

As a result of such an audit, one of two things should happen: either the error will be discovered, and then the very basis for conducting an investigation will disappear, or it will be established that there is no error, and then the cashier will no longer be able to refer to such an error to explain the reasons for the shortage.

b) Cashier counting money

Miscalculation of money by the cashier when receiving or issuing large sums is, of course, possible, but it is impossible to establish it from documentary data. Therefore, if there are grounds to assume the possibility of such a miscalculation, the investigator can verify such an assumption, mainly through testimony.

Documentary data can be used by the investigator in this case only to establish the size of the cash register turnover for the period to which the shortage occurred.

It goes without saying that with a turnover of, for example, 10,000 rubles. there can be no miscalculation of 20,000 rubles. In order for the possibility of a miscalculation to be more or less reasonably assumed, the size of the shortfall in the cash register should be a relatively small percentage of the cash register turnover for the period under review. But of course, this data can only have indirect significance for the investigation of the case.

Of decisive importance in these cases is checking the identity of the cashier using all the methods specified in the “Basic principles of the methodology for investigating cases of embezzlement and theft of public (socialist) property.”

The investigation in these cases usually boils down to the following elements:

a) Find out the cashier’s work experience in this specialty and the characteristics of his previous work.
It goes without saying that a cashier who has worked in the lathe for many years with monetary valuables and has never been found guilty of any crimes has less reason to be suspected of embezzlement than someone recently involved in this work; but, on the other hand, long experience as a cashier also has the opposite meaning, since the more qualified the cashier, the less likely it is that he can make a miscalculation.

b) Checking the personal life conditions of the cashier.
The investigator must find out whether in the personal life of the cashier during the period to which the shortage occurred, there were any special circumstances that could have pushed him to commit embezzlement, and also check with all the methods practiced for this (interrogation of roommates, etc.) . p.), whether during the period to which the shortages occurred the cashier spent on his personal needs such amounts, the amount of which clearly exceeds the cashier’s legal income sources 5 .

c) Checking the cashier’s working conditions for the period to which the shortage occurred.
The investigator should try to establish whether there were any special conditions during this period that could have facilitated the miscalculation, for example, whether there were cases of a cashier reporting to work sick, whether there were cases of significant cash transactions (for example, the payment of salaries) in an unusual and abnormal environment (for example, not in an isolated room), etc.

d) Questioning the recipients of cash from the cash register for a given period as to whether there were any cases of giving them larger amounts than they were owed.
In most cases, this method will not produce any results; In addition, given the massive nature of cash transactions, it is impossible to carry out a comprehensive interrogation of all persons involved in these transactions.

Therefore, the investigator must, in each individual case, depending on the circumstances of the case, decide whether or not to resort to this method in this case and who exactly needs to be interrogated.

But while checking by all the above methods the cashier’s explanation about the possibility of a miscalculation on his part, the investigator at the same time should not lose sight of the possibility of other explanations for the shortage, in particular embezzlement.
Therefore, if before the initiation of the case a complete audit of cash transactions for the audited period was not carried out, the investigator must demand such an audit and take into account the results when deciding on the final direction of the case.
The investigator must keep in mind that none of the above signs separately will almost never give him a definite clear answer to the question of whether there was a miscalculation or not.

The result of an investigation using the methods described above in most cases will be one of two things: either it will be established that, under the given circumstances, the possibility of a miscalculation is very likely and that there is no reason to suspect the cashier of embezzlement of the missing amount; or, on the contrary, it will be established that there is no reason to consider a miscalculation possible in this case, but there is some reason to suspect the cashier of embezzlement.
Depending on one or another of these conclusions, the investigator must decide on the further direction of the investigation.

c) Theft of money from the cash register by unauthorized persons

Theft of money from the cash register by unauthorized persons can be committed either in the form of theft, robbery and robbery, or in the form of receiving money from the cash register using forged documents.
In both of these cases, the investigation methodology is different.
If the cashier refers to the fact that the reason for the lack of money in the cash register is theft, robbery and robbery on the part of unauthorized persons, the case is investigated using the methods by which all cases of theft, robbery and robbery are generally investigated, but a specific feature of the investigation in this case is the need for investigators Every time, ask yourself the question whether the cashier’s statement about the theft, robbery or robbery that took place is deliberately false, whether the cashier is trying to hide the embezzlement he has committed in this way.

Therefore, in all cases of this kind, the investigator must apply the methods of uncovering the simulation of theft, robbery and robbery, described in the “Basic principles of the methodology for investigating cases of embezzlement and theft of public (socialist) property.”
In addition to the most thorough examination of the crime scene and the most accurate clarification of all the smallest circumstances under which it occurred, checking the cash flow in the cash register is of particular importance in these cases.

The investigator must instruct an expert accountant to establish, on the basis of the cash book and cash register account, firstly, whether the amount that was allegedly stolen could have been in the cash register on the day when the theft, robbery or robbery was allegedly committed; secondly, the investigator must put before the expert the question of whether, in the time preceding the moment of the alleged theft, robbery or robbery, there was an accumulation of large sums of cash in the cash register, contrary to the cash plan. If it turns out that for several days before the commission of a cash theft, robbery or robbery, the proceeds from the cash register were not deposited at the bank, or that for these days large sums were taken from the bank into the cash register, without any special need for this, it is always reasonable to assume either presence of simulation of theft, robbery or robbery, or complicity of the cashier in the commission of one of these crimes.

If the question arises in the case that the theft of money from the cash register was committed by the thief receiving this money using a forged document, then the main question that faces the investigator is the question of whether the document was actually forged and used to obtain money by an outsider , or the forgery was committed by the cashier to conceal the embezzlement he made.

If the cash register and accounting department are properly organized, it is very difficult to receive money using a forged document; To do this, it is necessary to forge, firstly, a cash order, and secondly, the document that serves as the basis for issuing this order (as stated above, this document will definitely be transferred to the cash desk along with the expense order).
In order to make these documents anew, the forger must have a cash order form and be able to forge the signature of an accountant and a loan manager, well known to the cashier issuing the money.

It is easier to commit forgery by changing the amount on a genuine cash order to increase this amount, but then the forger must accordingly change the amount on the document serving as the basis for issuing this order, and on this document this amount must be indicated twice in words: once in the text the document itself, and the second time - in the resolution of the loan manager on payment of the document.

The forger must change the amount in both of these places and each time in a different handwriting. This forgery is so complex that, in most cases, it should be noticed by the cashier when a forged document is presented to him.
But even if at this moment the cashier does not notice the forgery, then this forgery must be detected no later than the next day after the money is issued, since when comparing the cash report, to which the forged document is attached, with the accounting data on the registration of issued expenditure orders, the forgery should inevitably catch the eye.

Therefore, in cases where a reference to the issuance of money on a forged document is made long after the issuance of money on this document, such a reference should always seem suspicious. Only under extreme negligence of the accounting employee, whose responsibility is to check the cashier's reports, can it happen that a forged document will remain undetected for a long period of time.

Further, the forensic examination of the forged document itself is very important in these cases. The investigator must immediately send this document for examination to the forensic laboratory of the scientific and technical department of the local police department (and if the case under investigation is particularly important, to the laboratory of the scientific and investigative department of the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR) for a comprehensive study of this document and examination of the handwriting on it.

For comparison, the investigator must send samples of handwriting: the loan manager who signed the cash order and imposed the resolution on payment of documents, the accountant who issued the cash order, the cashier and all those persons who, due to the circumstances of the case, would be falsely suspected of complicity in the commission of this crime.

At the same time, the investigator must interrogate in detail the accountant who issued the debit order and the cashier who paid it. about all the details of this operation, in particular from these persons, it is necessary to find out the stake in which this order was issued and what the arrivals of this person are.

The further course of the investigation will depend on two conditions:
a) whether the investigator, on the basis of all the indicated investigative actions, comes to the conclusion that the forgery and theft of money was actually committed by an outsider, or whether he comes to the conclusion that the forgery was committed by the cashier himself.
In the latter case, the investigation is carried out using the methods specified in § 4 of this chapter;
b) if the investigator comes to the conclusion that the forgery and theft of money was committed by an outsider, the further course of the investigation will depend on whether this person is known to the accounting staff and the cashier who issued the money or not.

In the first of these cases no particular difficulties arise. The investigator must find the person named to him, take samples of his handwriting for examination and interrogate him in detail about all the circumstances under which he received an order from the accounting department and money under this order from the cash register. If there is a discrepancy between his testimony on this issue and the testimony of the accounting staff or cashier, a confrontation should be held between them.
As a result of handwriting examination and verification of the explanations given by this person, it will almost always be possible to establish his guilt or innocence.

A useful auxiliary technique in these cases is to conduct a search of this person. During such a search, sometimes it is possible to find in an unlit stove, in a basket for unnecessary papers, etc., pieces of paper on which the person practiced forging a document; sometimes imprints of words on a forged document can be found on blotting paper, on written table of a suspected person.
It goes without saying that the discovery of one of these pieces of evidence will be critical to the case.

If the person who received the order from the accounting department on which the forgery was committed is personally unknown to neither the accountant who issued the order nor the cashier, then the investigator will have to establish his identity based on the nature of the document on the basis of which the money was issued.

Any payment is made by an institution or enterprise only in connection with some legal relationship between that institution or enterprise and the person receiving the money. The nature of these relationships can always be established from documentary data.

Having established this, the investigator will also establish the circle of persons who could have submitted the forged document for payment.

All of the above applies to the most common cases when the forgery is committed by changing the amount on a genuine document and on a genuine cash order. In cases where the forgery is committed by re-making both a payment document with a resolution on it and a cash receipt order, the methods of investigation must be different; in these cases, interrogation of accounting employees will not yield any results, since these employees did not issue the order and In all likelihood, they also saw the person who submitted the forged order. In the same way, in this case, an attempt to establish the accuracy of the forger by the nature of those operations that concern the forged document will not yield results.
Since the thief forges the document again from beginning to end and himself draws up a false cash receipt order based on it, then he, naturally, can pour into these documents any content that he finds necessary. Therefore, in these cases, it becomes especially important, firstly, to interrogate the cashier about the characteristics of the person who presented the forged document for payment, and, secondly, to establish the circle of persons who could have at their disposal the forms of expense orders and sample signatures of loan administrators and the accountant of this institution or enterprise.

When the circle of suspects has thus been established, further investigation is carried out using the same methods as described above. In both cases indicated, if the suspected person denies the fact that he received money from the cash register of a given institution or enterprise, it becomes necessary to present this person for personal identification to the cashier who issued the money, and if the forgery was made by changing the amount on a false cash order, then to the accountant who issued order.

§ 2. Embezzlement of money by a cashier, not complicated by forgery

a) Establishing the fact of embezzlement

If a cashier embezzles money without resorting to drawing up forged documents to conceal it, then establishing the fact of embezzlement itself should present no difficulty.
From the above description of the cash reporting system, it is clear that with such waste in the cashier’s cash report for a given day there must necessarily be a discrepancy between receipts and expenses at the cash register. The most that the cashier can do is to include the wasted amount in the cash balance in his report. In this case, this balance will be transferred from report to report until the next cash check. With such a check, embezzlement must be identified, unless the cashier finds out in advance the day of the check and borrows the missing amount from somewhere on that day.

Under any other conditions, the embezzlement will inevitably be discovered by the accounting department either the next day after it was committed, when checking the cash report, or, in extreme cases, during the next cash check.

Therefore, embezzlement of this kind (that is, not associated with forgery of documents) is usually committed in one of the following two cases:
a) in this way minor embezzlements are committed, which the cashier expects to cover from some of his income, but manages to do this before the embezzlement is discovered:
b) large embezzlements are committed in this way, when the cashier, having seized a large sum of money from the cash register, disappears himself, not caring about hiding the traces of the crime he committed.
In the first of these two cases, the investigation of cases does not present any difficulties. And in these cases, cashiers usually admit to the embezzlement they committed; the investigator’s task comes down to establishing the motives for the crime and data characterizing the degree of public danger to the embezzler’s personality.

In the second of these cases, that is, when a cashier escapes with a large sum of money, establishing the fact of embezzlement also does not present any particular difficulties.
The task of the investigator in this regard is to, by analyzing cash records for the time preceding the commission of the crime, establish what the cash balance was at that moment. However, it must be borne in mind that a cashier who plans to commit such a crime may, for some time, resort to forgery in reporting (for example, not receiving receipts to the cash register in order to accumulate more money). Therefore, if the investigator determines that the check of cash reporting was not carried out carefully enough by the accounting department of an institution or enterprise, he must either check it himself, or, if this is difficult, demand verification by auditing all cash transactions for the time from the last withdrawal of cash balances until the crime was committed.

In this way, it is sometimes possible to establish that the cash in the cash register at that moment was greater than the balance of the cash register account.
But the main difficulties in cases of this kind lie in finding the hidden cashier, and, if possible, the money embezzled by him.

b) Search for the embezzler

If the investigators have direct indications of this at the time of initiation of the case. Where the embezzler may be at this moment, his first action should be a search at this point. But this happens relatively very rarely.
In most cases, such information is not available at the initial stage of the investigation; it must be collected through investigative actions. The main methods that can be used for this are:

a) The investigator must obtain from the personnel department all possible information about the identity of the disappeared cashier, his profile, work list, photographic cards, etc.
b) Interrogate all witnesses who may have encountered the escaped embezzler during the last days before his escape: employees of the same institution or enterprise, neighbors in the apartment and all other persons who may have any information of interest to the investigator. During the interrogation of these persons, the investigator should try to establish, in detail, all the actions of the embezzler in the last days before the crime was committed, especially those of these actions that could serve as an indication of preparations for departure.

It is especially important by questioning the neighbors in the apartment to find out whether they observed the packing of things by this person, whether this person spoke to them about the upcoming departure and what exactly, whether they saw the very fact of his departure. Sometimes it is possible to establish through testimony even the number of the cab driver or car in which the person left, and therefore to establish at least the station railway, towards which it was heading. In any case, the investigator must find the person who last saw the embezzler who disappeared, and by interrogating this person, establish where, when and under what circumstances the person saw the embezzler, how he was dressed, whether he had any bream with him and what kind of fish exactly. where he was going, did he talk about anything, and if he did, what exactly, etc. Every little thing in this regard, random mention of the name of a person, the name of a geographical location, a telephone number or trains, etc. Can be extremely important for finding the criminal.

c) Based on all these data, the investigator should immediately give. a telegram about the arrest of the embezzler to all those points where, judging by the circumstances of the case, he could go.
Often in these cases, criminals stock up on a false passport, so reporting such telegrams with just the name of the wanted person usually will not yield anything. It is advisable to state in as much detail as possible in the telegrams about the search for the signs of the escaped person, the signs of his suit and his luggage.
How the investigator will be able to fulfill this requirement depends on how fully he will interview the witnesses specified in paragraph (b).

d) Having carried out these urgent actions, the investigator must begin to thoroughly ascertain all the conditions for the escaped embezzler’s admission to work and this institution or enterprise, when he entered, with whom he negotiated, by whom he was accepted, who recommended him, who instructed him, who supervised him work.
A detailed clarification of all these circumstances can lead not only to the identification of a number of additional data that can be used in the search for the embezzler, but also to the identification of possible accomplices in the crime.

Above, in chapter one, an example was given when the deputy. The chief accountant of the plant hired his accomplice as a cashier, who absconded with a large sum of money during the first payment of wages. It is important to identify such accomplices both in order to hold them accountable for complicity, and in order to use them to find the embezzler himself. The possibility of complicity on the part of certain employees of the accounting department, institution or enterprise in the commission of a crime of this kind is especially likely in cases where the amount appropriated by the cashier accumulated in the cash register for a relatively long time in violation of the cash plan. If the accounting employees did not take measures to eliminate these violations, they did not demand immediate surrender; excess cash, then they are in any case guilty of negligence, and perhaps of complicity and commission of embezzlement.

e) The investigator must, both through the use of documentary data (questionnaire, work list, etc.) and through witness testimony, collect, as far as possible, complete information about the previous work and connections of the absconding embezzler.
If it turns out that this embezzler previously worked together with the same accounting employee who showed connivance in violation of the cash plan, especially if it also turns out that this accounting employee in one way or another contributed to the hiring of the embezzler, the likelihood of complicity with his parties to the crime increases significantly.

In addition, establishing the connections of a hidden embezzler based on his previous activities is also very important for successfully searching for him. After his escape, the embezzler most likely could go to the point where he has friends, or let his friends know about his whereabouts.

f) If the investigator manages to identify persons especially closely associated with the escaped embezzler, then it may be advisable to impose in accordance with Art. 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR arrest their correspondence and confiscate this correspondence in accordance with Art. 187, 188 Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR. Among this correspondence there may be letters from the embezzler to this person; even if they say nothing about committed crime, they can serve to establish the location of the embezzler.

g) If there is strong evidence that a person is particularly closely associated with an absconding embezzler and that he may have maintained contact with him after his escape, it may be advisable to search the person's home.

There have been cases where during such searches it was possible to discover both the embezzler himself and the money he had embezzled. But much more often, of course, the result of such a search may be the discovery of letters from the embezzler, any notes about his address or other indirect data that can be used to detect him. However, the investigator must keep in mind that the inviolability of the home of citizens of the USSR was guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR and that it would be completely unacceptable to carry out mass searches of all the acquaintances of an escaped embezzler in the hope that perhaps something could be found during one of these searches.

The investigator can conduct a search only if he has certain data to assume that it is from this person that he can find traces of the whereabouts of the embezzler.

But in any case, an immediate search must be carried out in the apartment occupied by the embezzler himself, since among the things he left behind, scraps of paper, old envelopes, etc., there may be data that will help the investigator draw correct conclusions about the possible location of the embezzler .
Depending on the results of the described investigative actions, the initial orders of the investigator to search for the escaped embezzler should be modified and supplemented accordingly.

If it is possible to detain the escaped embezzler, then the further part of the investigation will present serious difficulties.
The investigator’s task in this case comes down to establishing the motives for the crime and the degree of public danger to the embezzler’s personality.

If, when the embezzler is detained, the amount embezzled by him is not on him or is not in full, then the investigator must do everything possible to establish where the missing money went. To do this, he must try to find out the entire route of the embezzler from the moment of escape until the moment of his detention and at each point of the total route, find out where the embezzler stopped at this point, how much time he spent there, who he met with, what he did, what he spent on money, in what quantity.
This check can be based on the explanations of the embezzler himself, as well as all the indirect data that can be obtained when he is detained. notebook, found on the detainee, railway tickets and hotel bills, luggage stickers on the detainee’s belongings, etc.

§ 3. Embezzlement hidden by non-receipt of cash receipts to the cash desk

a) In the absence of complicity on the part of accounting employees

In the cash registers of institutions and enterprises that do not have massive receipts (industrial enterprises, Soviet institutions, etc.), where the receipt of any amount in the cash register is always formalized by a special receipt order from the accounting department, non-receipt of any of these amounts by the cashier is possible only if complicity or exceptional negligence of accounting employees. Under any other conditions, a simple comparison of the next cashier's report with the registration of receipt orders will immediately show that such and such an amount remains unreceived. In cash registers of this kind, non-receipt of received amounts by the cashier in the absence of complicity on the part of accounting employees is possible only in those exceptional cases when one of the clients of a given institution or enterprise, due to inexperience, deposits money into the cash register directly, but having first received a receipt order from the accounting department. In this case, the misappropriation of this amount by the cashier can only be revealed when an institution or enterprise that continues to hold the payer in debt presents a demand to him to repay this debt. In this case, such a person will present a cash receipt for the payment of money not recorded either in the cash book or in the accounting accounts. If, during the investigation of a case, the investigator comes across this kind of fact, then he will be faced with the question of which of the two possible crimes in this case is the misappropriation of the paid amount by the cashier, or the forgery of a cash receipt purchased by the payer in order to evade payment. To resolve this issue, the investigator must first of all pay attention to the receipt itself. If the receipt is issued on the prescribed form, then the investigator must find the stub of this receipt in the accountant of the given institution or enterprise. Cash receipts, according to which the persons who received the money report, are documents of strict accountability and it is always possible to establish who had the receipt book from which this receipt was issued.

Next, the investigator must conduct a handwriting examination by sending for examination the receipt being verified and samples of the handwriting of the cashier and the receipt bearer. However, when assessing the results of this examination, the investigator must keep in mind that a person who decides to forge such a receipt may not do it with his own hand, but entrust it to one of his friends. Therefore, a fairly substantiated expert’s conclusion that the text on the receipt was written either by the cashier’s hand or by the payer’s hand is strong evidence in the case.

If the examination concludes that the handwriting in which the text of the receipt is written is not similar to either the cashier’s handwriting or the payer’s handwriting, then such a conclusion does not say anything, and the issue must be resolved with the help of other evidence. Finally, in such cases, the investigator must question in detail the person who presented the receipt about when and under what circumstances he deposited the money into the cash register, whether anyone was present at the time, and why he deposited the money directly into the cash register without first contacting the accounting department . All explanations given by that person on these issues should be carefully verified.

It goes without saying that in this case, as in all others, a comprehensive verification of the identity of both the cashier and the bearer of the receipt is very important.
The considered form of embezzlement through non-receipt of incoming amounts in institutions and enterprises that, by the nature of their activities, have a massive influx of funds from outside (cars, entertainment enterprises, etc.) has a completely different meaning. In these enterprises, embezzlement by not posting incoming amounts is the main form of embezzlement when performing cash transactions.

We do not touch upon methods for investigating this type of crime in stores here, since comprehensive instructions on this issue are contained in the “Guide to the Methodology for Investigating Cases of Embezzlement and Theft in State Trade Bodies.”

As for all other enterprises of this kind, the investigation methodology of this type embezzlement depends on what the procedure for processing cash receipts is in a given enterprise, whether the payer is issued a ready-made standard document that has a strictly established value (transport enterprises, entertainment enterprises, etc.). or the receipt of money is documented by issuing a handwritten receipt for the amount paid.

In enterprises where the payer is issued a certain standard document (railway or theater ticket etc.), non-receipt of received amounts is possible only by collecting from the payer larger amount, what the ticket issued to him is worth. It is impossible to establish this crime based on documentary data, since the cashier’s entire reporting consists of counting the remaining tickets he has.

The money he received in excess of the cost of tickets sold is naturally not reflected in any documents. Cases of this kind usually arise from complaints from ticket buyers. If the cashier in this case denies receiving money in excess of the cost of the tickets, then the investigator first of all faces the question of who is giving false testimony - the cashier or the complainant. In order to resolve this issue, the investigator must first of all try to find witnesses to the very fact of payment of money by the complainant. This is made easier by the fact that very often queues form in front of the ticket offices of transport, entertainment, etc. enterprises and the people closest to the queue, if they can be found, can become such witnesses. Next, the investigator must thoroughly interrogate the cashier and the complainant about the circumstances of the ticket purchase and confront them. The investigator must check the complaint book of the given institution or enterprise to see if there have been previous complaints against the same cashier for similar reasons. If there were such complaints, the investigator must find the complainants and interrogate them as witnesses. Finally, the investigator must verify the identity of both the cashier and the complainant.

If the fact that the complainant overpaid money in excess of the cost of the ticket is established, then the investigator will be faced with the next question of whether in this case there is an intentional crime or a simple mistake on the part of the cashier. When resolving this issue, the investigator must apply all the methods specified in paragraph “b” of § 1 of this chapter; in particular, he should keep in mind that if the overpayment of money was made as a result of a cashier’s error, there should be a corresponding surplus in the cash register.
At the cash desks of institutions or enterprises, where a special receipt is issued each time to receive money, the main method of investigation is to compare the entries in the receipt stubs and in the original receipts in the hands of the payer. As already indicated above in § 2 of Chapter II of this manual, any discrepancy between these data, if the amount recorded on the counterfeit turns out to be less than the amount recorded on the receipt, can only be explained by one of two things - or the cashier assigning the difference between the amount indicated in the counterfoil, and the amount indicated in the receipt, or forgery in the receipt on the part of the payer, in order to exaggerate the payment made by him. The methods of investigation in this case are the same as in the case of depositing money into the cash register against a cashier's receipt without an accounting receipt order, described at the beginning of this paragraph.

b) With the complicity of accounting employees

The cashier's ability to not receive receipts into the cash register and to misappropriate uncredited amounts is significantly expanded if those accounting employees who are entrusted with accounting for cash transactions take part in the commission of a crime. Such accounting employees may not register a receipt order and may not reflect the receipt of money for that order in the accounting accounts. The results and methods of executing this criminal combination are different, depending on whether this combination concerns an amount coming from the bank, or from someone else and the counterparties of a given institution or enterprise.
In order not to capitalize and appropriate the amount received from the bank, the accountant writing the check must either completely destroy the counterfoil of this check, or show in it an amount less than on the check itself. During normal work, the credit card manager, filing a check, checks whether the entry on the counter of the check matches the text of the check itself. But in practice this is not always the case. There are also such cases when the loan manager, leaving somewhere and the institution, just in case, signs several check forms in advance, which the accountant can fill out as he pleases.

If there is reason to suspect a combination of this kind, the investigator should begin by checking the checkbooks to see if all the check counterfoils are present. Checks are strictly accountable documents, and in the banking institution that finances a given institution or enterprise, it is always possible to establish exactly which check books, with which checks were issued and to whom they were personally issued; in the same way, it is always possible to establish who kept the checks and who had access to them.

Next, the investigator must compare (or instruct an expert accountant to do this) the following documentary data:
1) check stubs with entries on the credit of the current account at the bank;
2) records on the credit of the current account in the bank with the bank’s data on the movement of amounts on the current account (if there are discrepancies between these data, the investigator must request from the bank genuine paid checks with receipts of the recipients of the money);
3) entries on the credit of the “Current Account” account in the bank with entries on the debit of the Cash Account. It goes without saying that there cannot be a complete match between these accounts, and we are talking about comparing with each other only those records that relate to transactions for receiving money from the bank to the cash desk of an institution or enterprise. Through such a check, any non-receipt or partial non-receipt of the amount will be It is inevitably revealed. After this, it may happen that the person whose receipt of money from the bank is on the bank document will declare that his signature on this document is forged. In this case, the investigator must, firstly, resort to an examination of signatures, and then -secondly, interrogate bank employees in detail about the circumstances under which money was issued under this document.

The situation is different in cases where the embezzlement was committed through unaccounted amounts received by the cash desk of an institution or enterprise from one of its counterparties.
In this case, according to the accounting of this institution or enterprise, a debt equal to the assigned amount remains with this counterparty. Repayment of this debt must be demanded first by presenting an invoice, and then, if the invoice is not paid, by filing a lawsuit.
It goes without saying that a counterparty who has received a demand for repayment of a debt that has already been repaid by him will refuse to do so, will report that he has paid this amount and present a cash receipt for payment of money. The criminal combination committed in this operation will then be revealed. Therefore, accounting employees who have made such a combination are delaying in every way the presentation of claims for the amounts appropriated to them in order to, after some time, transfer the corresponding debt to the account of doubtful debts, and from there finally write it off as a loss.

If this succeeds, then the traces of the crime will be completely buried. Therefore, when investigating cases of this kind, the investigator must pay attention to all cases of delay without sufficient grounds in presenting demands for payment of debt.
In all cases of this kind, if there are not very many of them, the investigator must himself, and if necessary, with the help of an expert accountant, check against the counter documents of those organizations that have such a debt. It can easily happen that it turns out that the debt has long been repaid. If there are so many similar cases that it is impossible to verify all of them through investigative means, the investigator must demand that a higher (departmental) organization appoint a special audit for this purpose.

c) Non-receipt and misappropriation of cash receipts by collectors

The term “collector” refers to employees whose duties include visiting the clients of the enterprise or institution they serve and receiving money from them due to them. One of the most typical examples This kind is the collection of fees for subscriptions to periodicals.

Each collector is given a laced and numbered receipt book against receipt, from which he writes out receipts for the amounts received by him.
The most common form of embezzlement practiced by collectors is to indicate smaller amounts on the receipt stubs than on the receipts themselves and pocket the difference. The methods of investigation in these cases are the same as when committing similar combinations by the cashier of an institution or enterprise (see paragraph (a) of this paragraph above).

§ 4. Embezzlement hidden by drawing up false expense documents (except for salary documents)

a) Establishing the fact of embezzlement and forgery

Waste of cash can be hidden not only by reducing cash receipts, but also by increasing expenses. In order for such an increase in cash expenses not to be immediately obvious from the cash report, it must be hidden by attaching some false expense document to this report. This forgery may consist in the fact that the corresponding forged document is produced again by the embezzler from beginning to end. Forgery may further consist in the fact that in a forged document the amount of the document is changed towards an increase.

Finally, results quite similar to forgery are obtained in the case when the same genuine expense document is entered twice in cash register reports.
The cashier cannot make one of these combinations independently, without the participation of accounting employees. If he tried to do this, then when checking his cash report it would immediately be discovered that a document was attached to this report for which no expense order was issued.

Further verification would inevitably reveal the falsity of this document. Therefore, this form of embezzlement usually occurs in cases where accounting employees also take part in the commission of the crime.
If, as was the case, for example, in the case of Inventorg Tsentrosoyuz, loan managers, an accountant and a cashier participated in the commission of the crime, then the possibility of this kind of abuse increases significantly.

The investigator’s task in these cases is, first of all, to establish the fact that the document was forged. The methods used for this: examination of the document, interrogation of workers who took part in the execution of the operation reflected in the document, confrontations between them are the same, which are described in paragraph “c” of § 1 of this chapter.
In any case, it is mandatory to interrogate the person who, according to the document being verified, is listed as the recipient of the money.

In addition to these methods, the investigator must check the corresponding accounting accounts and documents on them. This check, carried out with the help of an expert accountant, must reveal whether the institution or enterprise has received the equivalent of the amount of money that appears to have been paid on a forged document; if the document concerns the purchase of any goods, then whether these goods have been received; if it concerns the performance of any work, then whether this work was completed, etc.

However, the investigator must keep in mind that qualified embezzlers rarely resort to producing false documents for transactions that were never carried out at all. Typically, a false document is prepared for a transaction that actually took place, but the amount paid for this transaction is exaggerated in the document. In other cases, as indicated above, embezzlers do not even exaggerate the amount of the actual expense incurred, but simply transfer the same document, already paid once, a second time to another account. So, for example, in the aforementioned Inventorg case, the director of base R in September 1933 received 4,000 rubles from the cash register against a private receipt. This receipt remained in the cash register for more than six months. When in 1934 the accounting department demanded that R repay the debt, he presented a certificate from one of the factories that supplied the base, dated September 1933, stating that the plant received 4,000 rubles for the goods supplied to the base. Based on this certificate, the accounting department wrote off the specified debt from P.

Subsequently, it turned out that the same amount, but not according to a backdated certificate, but according to a formal receipt from the plant, had been written off several months earlier from the account of accountable person L, who indicated the same expense in his advance report. Therefore, when entrusting forensic accounting with checking how the transactions specified in the document being checked were reflected in the corresponding accounts, the investigator should not formulate his question to the expert in any way. general form: whether such and such goods arrived, whether such and such work was completed and accepted properly, etc. He must also raise the question of whether the cost of these goods or work is normal. In case of doubt on this issue, the investigator may resort to assigning a technical or commodity examination.

Further, the investigator must also ask the expert accountant the question of whether in this case there could have been double transportation of the same expense document. If a document being checked by an investigator was issued for a large amount (as a general rule, an amount over 1000 rubles), then the investigator must always ask himself and find out the question of why payment for this document was made in cash through the cash register, and not by bank transfer. through the bank.
In addition to these methods, the investigator in this case must use all the methods of document verification described in the “Basic principles of the methodology for investigating cases of embezzlement and theft of public (socialist) property.”

b) Identifying the perpetrators of the forgery

By applying the above methods, the investigator is often able to establish not only the fact of forgery itself, but also the person who committed this forgery. However, this does not always happen.
Sometimes a situation will arise where the fact of forgery of a document and embezzlement of money is indisputable, but who committed the forgery and who embezzled the money remains unclear. In this case, the investigator must first resort to handwriting examination, sending for examination, along with a forged document, samples of handwriting of all those persons who could be related to the values ​​​​mentioned in this document.
Handwriting examination can always give an accurate, definite conclusion. Therefore, regardless of the examination, the investigator must carefully establish through whose hands the document that turned out to be forged passed, who came into contact with the operation reflected in this document, and who actually received the money from it.
There are four different options for appropriating money using a false expense document:
1. The money is appropriated directly by the cashier, who shares it with his accomplices.
2. Money is received from the cash register or directly from the bank using a check by a nominee.
3. Money is transferred by mail to a figurehead.
4. Money is transferred to the name of non-existent organizations and received on their behalf by accomplices in the crime under false powers of attorney.
The last three options for embezzlement of money can occur without the participation of the cashier in the commission of the crime.

In these cases, embezzlement can be committed either by accounting employees alone, or by these employees with the complicity of the loan manager.

In order to reveal the personal guilt of certain persons. the investigator must carefully check all the actions of each of the employees of a given institution or enterprise who took one or another part in the execution of the operation being inspected.
So, for example, if it is established that the accountant took measures to conceal this accounting operation, for example, he attributed this operation directly to some accounting accounts, bypassing the cash account, then the investigator will have good reason to believe that this The accounting employee is an accomplice to the crime. If it is established that the loan manager ordered any deviations from the usual procedure for this operation, in the absence of special reasons for this, then the investigator will have reason to believe that the loan manager had a special interest in this operation.

So, for example, at one of the construction sites in Moscow, the construction manager, having sold a batch of boards to one of the regional trade union committees, demanded, firstly, that payment for these boards be made in cash, and not by transferring money through a bank, and secondly, sent a representative of the regional trade union committee to formalize this operation not to the construction accounting department, but to the apartment of the chief accountant, who was ill at that time. The latter compiled everything in his apartment necessary documents and received the money there. The concept that under such circumstances there is every reason to believe that the loan administrator - the construction manager - knew about the criminal nature of this operation. It is not possible to foresee in advance all possible facts of this kind that could give the investigator a basis for concluding that certain individuals are personally guilty of committing a crime.

When an investigator carefully studies all the activities of employees of a given institution or enterprise, related to one degree or another with the operation being checked by the investigator, he will always find data in order to judge the degree of guilt of certain individuals.
In any case, the investigator must carefully check the identity of all employees related to the criminal combination being investigated: the cashier, accounting employees, operational employees of the institution or enterprise, and the loan manager. It is especially necessary to clarify the relationship between these individuals and their previous activities.

§ 5. Waste when calculating and issuing wages

The process of determining the salary to be paid and the actual payment of it to workers and employees goes through three main stages:
a) Determination of the grounds for issuing wages.
The basis for calculating and issuing wages in institutions and enterprises with a piece-rate wage system are orders for the enrollment of a particular employee and the establishment of his salary, as well as reports on the actual appearance of this employee at work. With piecework wages, the basis for calculating wages is information from production and technical personnel (foremen, foremen, etc.) about the amount and nature of the work performed by this employee during the pay period.
b) Payroll calculation, which consists of the accounting department drawing up, on the basis of the data specified in paragraph “a,” pay slips or pay slips indicating the amounts due for handout to each employee.
c) Actual payment of wages.
At each of these stages, criminal combinations are possible with the aim of appropriating amounts allocated to pay salaries.

a) When determining the grounds for calculating wages

When determining the basis for calculating wages, the possibilities for various types of abuse are widest, especially in enterprises with a piece-rate wage system. Of these enterprises, the most favorable environment for abuse of this kind is created in construction enterprises, due to the significant turnover of workers and the wide variety of work performed.

With complicity between the technical personnel providing information about the work performed and the accounting employees making payroll calculations, it is possible to draw up pay slips or pay slips for non-existent persons and for work that has never been performed.

In practice, and in this case, it is rarely practiced to draw up documents that are one hundred percent forged, that is, relating to work that was never performed at all. The most common technique in these cases is to exaggerate the amount of work actually performed.

False information about work performed provided by technical staff provides the accounting department with a “legitimate” basis for calculating wages for all this work. All excessively accrued wages, after the payment to employees of the wages actually due to them, remain in the enterprise's cash desk, while the cashier's report and all accounting accounts show the full amount of accrued wages. This makes it possible for the participants in this operation to appropriate and divide among themselves all the excess amounts accrued.
The main difficulty of the investigation in this case is that the most thorough check of documentary data may not give the investigator anything. Outwardly, everything in the accounting department appears to be in perfect order. Documentary data and accounting data in these cases can be used by the investigator only by the following methods:
1. By carefully examining the receipts of recipients on pay slips, the investigator can establish that the signatures of a number of persons were made by the same hand.
If there is doubt in this regard, the investigator should send such a suspicious report to a forensic laboratory for examination.
2. Since wages are included as one of the elements in determining the cost of production, an artificial increase in the volume of work should lead to overexpenditure against the estimate and to an increase in the planned cost of production. Therefore, the investigator can ask the expert accountant: is the accounting department’s reporting calculation of the cost of part of the salary expenses correct and is there an excess of the actual cost of production against the planned one?

If such an excess is established, the investigator must carefully follow up with questions about its reasons. For this purpose, in addition to interrogating the chief accountant and technical managers of the enterprise, the investigator must resort to the help of technical expertise. During this examination, the investigator must raise the question of whether the data on the volume and nature of the work performed, which served as the basis for calculating wages, corresponds to the actual state of work at this enterprise.

To resolve this issue, for example, in construction, the investigator will have to, together with a technical expert, inspect the work performed, instruct the expert to compare the results of this inspection with the technical project and with working drawings, on the one hand, with the information that served as the basis for calculating wages - on the other side.

Another method of investigation in these cases may be to interrogate individuals. listed as salary recipients on those statements that inspire suspicion in the investigator.
Of course, it is completely impossible to carry out a comprehensive interrogation of all salary recipients according to all statements, even in a medium-sized enterprise. Therefore, this method of investigation must be used in cases where the investigator has any grounds for singling out certain individuals from the total mass of salary recipients.

Such grounds may be the dubiousness of the signatures on the statements, the conclusion of a technical examination that for such and such specific objects the salary was calculated in an exaggerated amount, information from the public of a given enterprise, etc.
It often happens that when an investigator tries to interrogate such individuals, it turns out that they do not exist in nature at all. But even if it turns out that the persons indicated in the statement really exist, this does not mean that there is no crime in this case. These persons may turn out to be frontmen for embezzlers and their names may be used to obtain embezzled amounts through them.

Therefore, the investigator should not be reassured by the discovery of the persons indicated in the suspicious statement. He must carefully interrogate these persons about when, where and what work it performed, to what extent they performed this work, who worked with them, who gave them the task, who accepted the brave work they performed.

When checking such testimony, it often turns out that the data obtained during the interrogation of such persons about the place, time and nature of the work they performed do not at all correspond to the data underlying the calculation of wages, that the technical personnel named by them in reality or do not work at all at the enterprise or work in completely different areas, etc.

The establishment of such discrepancies is undoubtedly strong evidence of the fictitiousness of the information that served as the basis for calculating wages. When investigating cases of this kind, it is necessary, however, to keep in mind that always exaggerating the volume of work performed is a means of committing waste. Individual employees of manufacturing enterprises, but not yet properly disciplined in the skills of capitalist production, resort to this method to secretly increase prices for work in order to lure labor from other enterprises and thus achieve more successful fulfillment of the production plan.

In this case, workers receive their salaries in full according to exaggerated calculations. Administrative and technical personnel of enterprises who are guilty of such combinations may be subject to disciplinary or criminal liability under Art. 109 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the criminal codes of other union republics, but they cannot be held accountable for embezzlement in such cases. In order to qualify a crime as embezzlement, the investigator must establish not only the very fact of accruing wages in an exaggerated amount, but also that the excessively accrued amounts were not given to all the workers who actually performed the work, but were appropriated by the compilers of the information. , which served as the basis for calculating salaries, by accounting employees and the cashier of the enterprise.

b) If there is a salary

Accounting workers who calculate wages can, of course, include “dead souls” in the payroll sheets or even draw up sheets for work that has never been performed and appropriate for themselves, together with the cashier, the excess salary accrued in this way.
However, if production and technical personnel do not participate in the commission of this crime and provide information about the work performed, then uncovering such a crime is much easier than in the case described above.

By simply comparing payroll statements with the basis for calculating wages, it can be established that certain data on these statements are included in them without sufficient grounds. For example, the list includes a person for whose appointment there is no order and who has never been checked on the report card; a salary slip has been drawn up for work for which there is no information from production and technical personnel, etc. Therefore, qualified embezzlers rarely resort to such simplified combinations. If they prepare such false statements, then at the same time they also prepare false bases for such statements (forged time sheets, false information from foremen, foremen, etc. about work performed, etc.). Therefore, in these cases, the investigator should not limit himself to just checking the formal validity of a particular salary accrual; he must, in addition, use the methods described in the previous paragraph to verify the correctness of the grounds for these accruals. Such a check in these cases is made easier, but in comparison with the cases described in the previous paragraph, the fact that the investigator can begin this check by interrogating those timekeepers, foremen, foremen and other production and technical personnel on whose behalf the documents that served as the basis for payroll verified by the investigator.

Without being accomplices to the crime, these persons, upon presentation of the specified documents, will immediately detect the forgery of these documents, if they are indeed forged, and the investigators will pay attention to this. After this, it will no longer be difficult to establish the fact of forgery through examination of handwriting, interrogation of workers in whose names wages were written out on forged documents, inspection of work related to these documents, etc.

c) When issuing wages

The cashier issuing the salary, in the absence of the complicity of the accounting staff, has only very limited opportunities to commit embezzlement. The most common form of such embezzlement is when the cashier makes false signatures on the statement for workers who did not appear to receive their salaries, and misappropriates the amounts due to these workers. This crime is revealed as soon as such an employee comes to receive the salary due to him and discovers a signature on the statement that he never committed. Examination of this signature in most cases of this kind immediately leads to solving the crime.

A more qualified, but much more difficult to implement and therefore more rarely used form of embezzlement when issuing wages is the cashier’s drawing up of a second pay sheet with amounts reduced from the original sheet.
On this payroll, the cashier selects receipts from salary recipients, paying them a reduced amount. At the end of the payment of wages, the cashier transfers the signatures of the recipients using carbon paper through glass or other means onto the original statement, which he presents with his cash report. The difference between the amounts of both statements is assigned.

This technique can only be used in those enterprises where workers do not know the exact amount of their earnings (for example, in logging, when work is performed by collective farmers temporarily hired for this work).

But it is enough for one of the salary recipients to pay attention to the incorrect calculation of his earnings and show sufficient persistence in clarifying this misunderstanding for the entire criminal combination to be discovered. For an investigator, when investigating cases of this kind, it is not difficult to solve this crime by examining the signatures on the statement attached to the cash report and by selectively interrogating the salary recipients indicated in this statement. The most common way for a cashier to waste the amounts allocated for paying salaries is to waste these amounts when performing so-called deposit transactions.

As stated above in paragraph (b) § 3 of Chapter II of this “Manual”, wages not received on time are credited to the depositors’ account. If the accounting department's work is properly organized, the depositor can receive the money due to him only according to the accounting department's expense order, but this order is often violated. Deposit cards or statements are often kept by the cashier, and the amounts due to him are paid to him as the recipients appear, without any orders from the accounting department.

This gives the cashier the opportunity, if any of the depositors fail to appear for a long time to receive the salary due to him, to forge his signature and appropriate the amount due to him. If subsequently this person nevertheless appears to receive the unclaimed salary in a timely manner, the cashier pays him this salary. and the resulting shortfall in the cash register is covered by forging the signature on a document of some other depositor, etc. With this method, the cashier can hide the embezzlement for a very long time. With them, deposit documents are stored in the accounting department and money is paid on them only according to an expense order, then the same exact combination is possible with the complicity of an accountant, who at any moment will issue an expense order for any depositor, and forge the signature himself. or let the cashier do it.

The method of investigation in such cases is the examination of the depositor's signature on the document on receipt of money and the interrogation of the depositor himself as a witness. If the investigator does not have specific information about that. that the salary due to such and such depositors has been appropriated, but there is a suspicion that the deposited amounts were wasted in the manner indicated above, he must check using the methods mentioned (examination of signatures and interrogation of the depositor) first of all those transactions for which the salary was paid with the greatest delay .

Often, accounting workers and cashiers before the end of the reporting year, that is, around December, carry out a kind of “cleansing” of the depositors’ accounts, that is, they appropriate for themselves in the manner described above the salaries of those depositors whose appearance, in their opinion, cannot be expected.

This phenomenon most often occurs in enterprises with significant labor turnover (in construction, logging, etc.). Therefore, the investigator, having discovered the massive repayment of debt to depositors by the end of the reporting year, must always check, using the methods indicated above, the actual payment to depositors of the amounts due to them.
The simplest form of embezzlement of amounts intended for payment of wages on the part of the cashier is a simple shortchange of workers: the worker signs on the statement that he has received the entire amount due to him in full, and is given less in his hands than indicated on the statement.

It is impossible to solve this crime based on documentary data.
The only method that can be used here is to interrogate as witnesses the victims and persons who were present when they received their salaries.
Since many employees of a given institution or enterprise usually arrive at the same time to receive their salaries and a queue forms at the cash register, it is almost always possible to find such witnesses.

* Compiled by S. A. Golunsky. Accounting questions compiled by L. B. Galpert
1 The listed manuals were compiled by the Methodological Council of the USSR Prosecutor's Office in 1937 and published by the publishing house of the People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR
2 Embezzlement and theft committed within credit institutions themselves (banks, savings banks, etc.) are distinguished by a number of specific features arising from the operating techniques of these institutions. We do not touch upon methods for investigating these types of embezzlement and theft in our guide.
3 See “Guide to the Methodology for Investigating Cases of Embezzlement and Theft in State Trade Bodies” and “Guide to the Methodology for Investigating Cases of Embezzlement and Theft of Material Assets in Construction.”
4 These methods are outlined in the following paragraphs of this chapter.
5 When assessing this data, extreme caution must be exercised and all methods specified in the “Basic principles of methods for investigating cases of embezzlement and theft of public (socialist) property” must be used.

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Cashiers-operators trading enterprises are one of the most “risky” categories of store workers. Risky from at least three points of view. First, cashiers often suffer from robberies involving money. The second is cashiers serving customers, i.e. Those on the “front line” of sales experience severe psychological stress. The third point of view, no matter who it offends, is that cashiers are more likely than other store employees to commit thefts, in particular of funds, and also contribute to the theft of goods in collusion with other persons.

We are not talking about a blanket accusation of all cash workers, but only about dishonest people to whom employers entrusted money. Unfortunately, this problem exists and has become extremely relevant today.

The object of theft by cashiers is money or goods (to a lesser extent). Money can be stolen both for the entire transaction or operation, or for part of the purchase, for “extra” goods (its quantity or weight), for unreturned goods, for the amount of discounts, for differences in cost, etc., including, of course , banal theft from the cash register. The cashier can implement most methods of theft independently, without the participation of “his” customers and without collusion with colleagues.

In this case, the subject of direct damage will not always be the store itself; in approximately half of the cases, it is the buyer who will be deceived and, as a rule, will not receive the goods for which he paid money. Here we can already talk about the reputation of the store and everything that comes with it. In addition, some of the illegal manipulations of cashiers distort cash balances for some time, which may be the reason for sanctions from inspection authorities.

More than half of the schemes for causing damage to the store itself are based on a conspiracy with the buyer, sometimes with the senior cashier (other person), especially in cases where certain operations (cancelling a check, making a return) require the sanction or technical presence of a senior official (for example , senior cashier).

The main methods of theft of goods are simple theft by removing unpaid goods from the store and manipulating the contents of a cash receipt. In the event of a theft, the cashier is no different from any other employee or customer who has decided to take this step. Manipulations with the contents of the receipt by reducing the total amount payable lead to the fact that unpaid or only partially paid goods are taken out of the store by a relative, acquaintance or other “friend” buyer. The buyer here becomes the recipient of the benefit, who then “thanks” the cashier.

There are, of course, more ways to steal money directly from the cashier than there are goods. The main ones are related to various manipulations with the contents of the check; cashiers do not disdain basic theft. Some of the schemes are implemented by violating the established rules of sales at discounts, with discount cards, and also with credit cards.

To detect fraud and control settlement transactions at cash registers, the CASHCONTROL system was created.

CashControl is:

· A powerful cash control tool in on-line and off-line modes;

· Monitoring of cash registers and obtaining a high-quality video image of any event for any period of time with a receipt displayed on the monitor;

· Database of cash transactions, analysis of cashiers' labor productivity, reasons for returning goods, cash register transactions, check cancellation, cash theft;

· Analysis of data according to any criterion printed on the receipt;

· Possibility of integration into a comprehensive security system;

· Simple user-friendly interface for querying and data analysis;

· Wide range of remote access capabilities;

· Work with any type of cash registers.

So thefts can be divided into 2 categories: through simple theft and through various manipulations with the contents of a cash receipt.

Theft in this case is the unauthorized, illegal removal of unpaid goods from a store secretly or under the guise of a purchase. At the same time, the cashier is no different from any other employee or customer who has decided to take this step.

Manipulations with the contents of the check are as follows. The first, simplest, so-called. not carried out return, when the cashier accepts the returned product from the buyer and gives him money for it, but does not carry out the return operation at the checkout, does not transfer this product to other employees for rejection, but steals the product himself, or by transferring it to “his” buyer. So banal that only a novice cashier could fall for it. By the way, there’s not even a check here.

But the scheme is more complicated. We called it the "bounced check." The cashier gives an accomplice - a buyer or colleague - an outstanding check from previous customers, the accomplice collects the goods against this check and passes it through “his” cash register, simulating payment together with the cashier. Outwardly everything looks very decent. With this scheme, there is not even manipulation with the contents of the check, but rather manipulation with the check itself.

Let's move directly to the schemes of theft of goods associated with changes in the contents of the cash receipt in favor of the cashier. All of them are associated with making changes to the content of the operation that reduce the total amount payable - reducing the quantity of goods in a position (one bottle of vodka is included instead of three bottles taken out), reducing the number of product positions in a receipt (some positions are not included at all), reduction in the weight or volume of the product (a chekushka is made available instead of a liter bottle of vodka), as well as a breakdown of a cheap product instead of an expensive one (instead of an expensive coffee being taken out, a cheaper variety is made available).

All these illegal operations lead to the fact that cashiers, in collusion with accomplices, steal goods from the store for quite large sums. And not only for home use, but also for sale in markets, specializing in any one product group.

Theft of funds

This simple type of theft of money by a cashier as theft is carried out in two ways. The cashier simply steals money from the cash register, taking it out on his own, or, with a more developed control system, transfers the “earned” money to an accomplice-buyer under the guise of change. Sometimes the amount of such change is very impressive, so we called it “super change”.

In case of a fictitious return, using the moment of lack of control, the cashier makes a non-existent return through the cash register, removes money from the cash drawer in the amount of the refund made and appropriates it. In this case, of course, no goods are returned to the store and the result is a double loss - neither money nor goods.

Failure to clear a receipt is a fairly common scheme when a cashier receives money from a buyer for purchases, does not complete the transaction at the cash register, and misappropriates the money. In this case, of course, the buyer does not receive his check. Thus, there will be no discrepancies at the cash register.

Canceling a check is carried out by canceling the transaction after settling with the buyer and appropriating the money received from him. No deal - no money. The successful implementation of this method depends on the control measures applied, and on the completeness of all operations reflected in the operation protocol of a specific cash register and on other factors.

These frauds are possible if they do not require additional permission or the technical presence of a senior cashier or controller, although they can also be carried out in collusion with them.

The next group of illegal transactions is also associated with a decrease or increase in the final amount of the transaction in favor, of course, of the cashier.

A decrease in the total is similar to previous operations and is associated with the failure to break through or the cancellation of one or more product items in the receipt. The cashier does not mark part of the goods on the receipt or cancels these items, but receives the buyer’s money in full and appropriates this “saved” amount. The subject of the damage here is the store.

But schemes to steal money by increasing the final amount of the transaction cause damage to the buyer, the so-called. classic "cheating". These schemes are based on adding to the contents of the receipt what the buyer does not purchase: increasing the quantity of goods (instead of two jars of black caviar, the receipt will indicate three), adding one or more items (the receipt will contain something that the buyer did not intend to purchase, for example , one hundred branded bags), an increase in the weight of the weight of the goods (instead of the carried out one hundred grams of frog legs, two hundred will be indicated), as well as the breakdown of an expensive product instead of the purchased cheap one (instead of the carried out instant coffee, beans of the same weight will be punched). Of course, the inattentive buyer pays the full total amount, and the cashier pockets the money for that very “extra” item, and everything is screwed.

The following groups of methods of theft by cashiers are less common and occur where there are sales with discounts or discount cards, as well as in credit card payments.

We called a “hidden discount” a scheme when the cashier sells an item with a discount set at that moment, without informing the buyer about it, but telling him the full cost of the item and, of course, taking all the money. The resulting difference is assigned. Once again the buyer suffers.

The next two ways of manipulating discounts cause damage to the store for the sake of its customers. The cashier uses his employee discount card, usually with an increased discount, and again serves his customer with it. The accomplice receives an increased amount, i.e. illegal discount and pays less than expected. The same result is associated with a manual, without a card, increase in discount on any product beyond the discount established by the administration.

There are many methods of credit card fraud, and we will present here some of the most common ones, the success of which depends on both control and technical parameters of the process. At the end of the payment with the buyer on the credit card, the cashier finally sends a repeated request (the “repeat” scheme) for authorization and payment, the buyer leaves and after that a positive response to the payment is received, the same amount is again withdrawn from the buyer’s account for which the cashier or his accomplice dialed product.

When returning goods by a buyer who paid using a credit card, the refund is made not to the buyer’s account, but to the account of the cashier or his accomplice (the “own card” scheme).

Fraudulent schemes associated with the production and use of counterfeit slips from credit cards, and the subsequent withdrawal of money from the card account by fraudsters, one of whom is the cashier, are also well known.

Thus, in total we examined about three dozen ways of causing damage by cashiers, committed both independently and in collusion with outsiders. These practices increase when cashiers collude with other store employees, especially senior cashiers, supervisors, or administrators.

You can say - these are instructions for cashiers on how to steal. I will answer - dear ones, they already know all this, and, unfortunately, they know better than those who are obliged to control them and prevent the mentioned losses. This material is an instruction for you. To know how to deal with this phenomenon, you need to understand what to fight with. Good luck to you!