Introduction
The period of the “Time of Troubles” had a great influence on Russian history, leaving a deep mark in the memory of descendants and contemporaries. The huge number of events that occurred in such a short period of time amazes every person. The people's liberation struggle, interventionist invasions and all kinds of coups on the royal throne, the emergence of prominent personalities on a national scale make this era incredibly interesting for studying both the general problems of the history of the Troubles and its specific stages.
The Time of Troubles is a special period in Russian history. Bringing this to the Russian people large number disasters and destruction, the Troubles showed a very important history lesson the entire state. The knowledge and experience that the Troubles gave, positive and negative, although not always taken into account by the people, always affected to one degree or another the historical development of Russia.
This topic of work is relevant today, because, despite the identification by modern researchers of new sources on the history of the Time of Troubles, there are no special studies on the first zemstvo militia in modern historiography. There is still no single point of view in the literature about the nature of the activities of the First Militia. All this makes us re-visit the study of this topic.
The chronological scope of this study covers January - August 1611.
The purpose of the work is to study the main issues of the formation and activities of the first militia.
Job objectives:
1.Trace the development of historical thought related to this topic. .Identify the features of the process of forming the first militia. .To trace the evolution of the activities of representatives of the people's liberation movement of the period of 1611. .Analyze the main results of the activities of the first militia and determine its contribution to the process of the liberation struggle against foreign invaders. The object of the study is the problem of the formation of the first zemstvo militia. The subject is the study of the formation, activities and collapse of the first zemstvo militia. The practical significance of this study is that it allows us to gain knowledge on this important historical issue, as well as explore the approaches of various scientists, which is necessary in further consideration of issues related to the struggle of the Russian people for independence and freedom at the beginning of the 17th century. The work consists of an introduction, 3 chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature. The study is based on the study of both documentary and narrative sources. An important source for studying the events of the Time of Troubles, including the activities of the first militia of this period, are the discharge records of the early 17th century, published by S.A. Belokurov. They contain information about the military and administrative appointments of the participants in the first militia, about military operations at the time of interest to us. The sources of primary importance for the disclosure of the topic are documents emanating from the very first militia - I.E. Zabelin. The verdict on June 30, 1611 and various kinds of letters of the Militia, collected and published by S.B. Veselovsky. Valuable information about the composition of the first militia is contained in the Fed Books of the quarters of the early 17th century, which recorded increases in the salaries of servicemen, including increases for participation in the activities of the first militia. When conducting our research, we also used the latest publications of official material, which also contain letters related to the history of the first militia. The study of narrative sources is of great interest. Among them is the Legend of Abraham Palitsyn, who was a participant and eyewitness to the events that took place at the beginning of the 17th century, and was close to the militia. Much of the information reported by Palitsyn is unique and not available in other sources. The chronicle of Konrad Bussow is one of the most important narrative sources of foreign origin. It covers the period from the reign of Boris Godunov to the liberation of Moscow by Minin and Pozharsky. The author was at the center of the events he described and managed to record this in his notes. The new chronicler is a monument of official historiography, compiled in Filaret’s circle. This source gave the official concept of Russian history from the end of the reign of Ivan IV and had a great influence on the subsequent historiography of the Time of Troubles. The approved letter of election of Mikhail Fedorovich is an official document depicting not only the activities of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613, but also giving a look at the events of the Time of Troubles, including the activities of the Zemstvo militias from the position of the new Romanov dynasty. 1. Historiography 1Pre-revolutionary and Soviet historiography In historical studies of events in Russia at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. the term "Troubles" is used. In Russian historiography early XIX V. The stereotype of the Troubles as a Polish-Swedish intervention was established. In the 19th - early 20th centuries, it was understood as a struggle between the people and the state. Contemporaries of those events considered the Troubles a punishment for sins. IN Soviet era views on this topic have changed. N.I. Kostomarov considered one of the reasons for the Time of Troubles to be the desire of the Western Church, led by the Pope, to subjugate all of Russia. IN. Klyuchevsky was the first to create a holistic concept of the Russian Troubles as a result of a severe social crisis. The reason for it, according to the historian, was the indignant state of the people after the oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible and the end of the Rurik dynasty. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, the cause of the Troubles was “the very structure of the state with its heavy tax basis and the uneven distribution of state duties.” The pinnacle of pre-revolutionary historiography of the Time of Troubles was the fundamental work of S.F. Platonov “Essays on the history of the Time of Troubles in the Moscow State of the 16th-17th centuries.” The cause of the Troubles S.F. Platonov considered the result of the crisis that the Muscovite kingdom was experiencing in the 16th century. At the same time, disagreements in the social sphere appeared, on the one hand, between the supreme power and the tribal aristocracy, which resulted in the defeat of the aristocracy and the emergence of a noble elite, on the other hand, between the feudal lords for land and labor. The dissatisfaction of the enslaved mass of peasants was expressed in their increased movement to new lands and to the Cossacks. For S.F. Platonov’s characterization of spiritual life in the Moscow state of the early 17th century is also important: according to the historian, at this time minor deviations from old Moscow customs became universal. This was caused by the events of the Time of Troubles, as well as the influx of foreigners under Mikhail Fedorovich. These deviations gave rise to the ideas of protection and the fight against Protestant propaganda. Then a monograph by G.A. was published. Zamyatina. The author of this book consistently pursues the idea that the candidacy of M.F. Romanova was not the main one at the Council in February 1613 and earlier, in the summer of 1612, important persons The Second Militia, including Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, supported the plan to elect a Swedish prince to the Moscow throne, and this idea was formulated back in the First Militia. G.A. Zamyatin criticized not only the official ideologists of the Romanov reign ― from the Moscow boyars of 1615 to their contemporaries, but also S.F. Platonov, who doubted the legitimacy of the Council of the Whole Land in 1611 and its competence to choose the tsar. The main source for research by G.A. Zamyatin was inspired by the collection “Swedish Affairs” from the former archives of the Ambassadorial Prikaz. The scientist managed to recreate an accurate picture of the negotiations between the Novgorodians and the First and Second militias and the promotion of the idea of electing a Swedish prince to the Moscow throne. The Soviet paradigm in understanding the Troubles of the 17th century. arose as a contrast to the pre-revolutionary one. At the heart of this paradigm was an international, rather than national, awareness of history. The main ideologist of this approach to the study of Russian history was M. N. Pokrovsky. It was he who first formulated the thesis that the Troubles were a class conflict. All the complexity of the events of the early 17th century. he only reduced it to social movements. Impostors False Dmitry I and False Dmitry II, according to M.N. Pokrovsky, - peasant kings. And only because of the unification of the nobles and boyars against the peasant kings, the agitated people were forced to cooperate with foreigners and fight the nobles together with them. And the militia, including the Nizhny Novgorod militia led by K. Minin and D.M. Pozharsky is a social direction against the revolution. Thus, M.N. Pokrovsky wrote that in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. there was a great surge of class struggle, otherwise known as a peasant uprising, and the emergence of impostors was generated by internal reasons, and not just by the Polish invasion. Moreover, the book dedicated to the Troubles is named M.N. Pokrovsky - Peasant Revolution. “Bourgeois” historians, according to M.N. Pokrovsky, sought to hide the class essence of this movement, so they “began to say that the new Tsar False Dmitry or the Named Dmitry, as he was called, was nominated precisely by the Polish landowners and the Catholic Church.” Here the historian draws a parallel with modernity, but not with Soviet-Polish war, and with the revolution in Russia: in 1917, “bourgeois newspapers also said that the Germans organized this business, that all this was bribed, arranged with foreign money, etc.” B.D. Grekov, following M.N. Pokrovsky, concluded that the enslavement of peasants in the 16th century. created the ground for the revolution of the early 17th century. From the beginning of 1934, the national question and the teaching of history began to be discussed in historiography in such a way that autocracy did not represent the interests exclusively of the ruling classes, which, of course, was directly opposite to the views of M.N. Pokrovsky, who died in 1932. Approach of M.N. Pokrovsky was subjected to official condemnation, to which his students were also involved. In the post-war period, it was important in the study of the beginning of the 17th century. Research by I.S. began to play a role. Shepeleva. Shepelev considered False Dmitry II a protege of the governing circles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and used the term “hidden intervention” in relation to him. And the material he collected on the history of the First Militia, which until then had almost always found itself in the shadow of the more successful Second (Nizhny Novgorod) Militia, was especially fresh. Despite the unattractive title, it contained a lot of new and useful material. Book by I.S. Shepelev is distinguished by the completeness of the materials used. Shepelev made the First Militia the subject of his interests, independently exploring a large array of sources. He paid his main attention to the role of the Cossacks in the liberation of Moscow, for the first time showing them not just as a destructive environment, but as an important social force. Books by I.S. Shepelev, the materials he collected and analyzed facilitated and even prepared the transition to a new understanding of the Time of Troubles. N.P. Dolinin studied known sources on the history of the first militia. He was able to dispel the myth that Patriarch Hermogenes organized the patriots’ campaign against Moscow and prove Procopius Lyapunov’s involvement in this. The historian also examined the preparatory steps of Prokopiy Lyapunov to organize the militia, related to negotiations with the Polish hetman Sapega, Cossack ataman Ivan Zarutsky and Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy. The contribution of N.P. is important. Dolinin in the study of the geography of the first militia. R.G. Skrynnikov argued that the main social contradiction within the stratum of service people was the hatred of the small children of the boyar southern districts, poorly provided with estates and monetary salaries (who only relatively recently became part of the Moscow state) towards the well-to-do Moscow service people, i.e. the capital's nobles, stewards, and even more so, the Duma ranks. It was the serving small fry of the southern districts that became the breeding ground for all anti-government endeavors. Detachments of all the impostors marched through these counties, quickly gaining participants from among the local service people. Works by A.L. Stanislavsky and R.G. Skrynnikov presented a special view of the Troubles - as a civil war. It was these two researchers who challenged the idea of the Troubles as a peasant war. A.L. Stanislavsky argued that the main destructive force acting during the Time of Troubles was the free Cossacks. But these were not Don or Volga Cossacks, who had long lived on the outskirts of the country. The free Cossacks were a gathering of people from different social strata right in the center of the Moscow state. These were people who had lost their previous social status, who, as a result of the economic crisis, found themselves thrown out into the streets and did not receive protection from the tsar: former service people, former peasants, former townspeople, and former serfs. The decisive role among them was played by combat serfs, professional military men. They, the free Cossacks, became the main force of all anti-government forces in the Time of Troubles. They were the ones who were interested in continuing the unrest, because... they did not have a strong position, service and salary necessary for life, and obtained their means of living mainly through robberies or were in the pay of impostors. According to the historian, the Cossacks fought both as interventionists and government troops, on the side of the “oppressed classes.” Ultimately, A.L. Stanislavsky and R.G. Skrynnikov moved away from understanding the Troubles as a peasant war. Instead of class conflict, they pointed to the struggle within the layer of service people. The core of the Troubles lay in the internal difficulties of the Moscow state, and not in the invasion of foreigners, which only aggravated the situation. R.G. Skrynnikov opposed the assessment of the movement of False Dmitry II as a hidden intervention, separately showing that this impostor was put forward by Russian rebels. 2Modern historiography Among modern historians dealing with this issue, noteworthy is the study of B.N. Flory. It shows some aspects of the mentality of the urban nobility, which are revealed in the sources of the Time of Troubles, primarily in the Verdict of the Moscow Militia. He also studied international relations in Central and Eastern Europe during the period of late feudalism. Here the researcher writes about Russia’s struggle for access to the Baltic Sea and about relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Identification of many new aspects related to Moscow-Polish relations during the Time of Troubles is the strength of B.N.’s monograph. Flory, in which he talks about the intervention of the Polish-Lithuanian state in the internal political life of Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. I.O. Tyumentsev, student of R.G. Skrynnikov, refutes the view of the Tushenites as foreign invaders, and shows them as Russian rebels. I.O. Tyumentsev not only showed that the Tushins were not interventionists, but also explained the mass nature of this movement. In his opinion, the inhabitants of the districts who went over to the side of False Dmitry II, especially service people, received great benefits for themselves. Those who, in the normal course of affairs, could not count on promotion through the ladder of ranks, now, having become part of the impostor’s court, received a higher status, as well as estates and estates from among the possessions of noble supporters of Vasily Shuisky. They also received previously unavailable to them posts of governor in cities that went over to the side of the impostor, even Duma ranks in his Boyar Duma. In addition, False Dmitry II actively distributed palace lands that came under his rule to his supporters. All this was especially important for the outlying (small southern and also northwestern) urban communities of service people, whose members had never previously had access to power and wealth. In an extensive and informative study about the Troubles by V.N. Kozlyakov, valuable observations are made. The most important of them is the rejection of attempts to understand the personal composition of the “Seven Boyars”, instead of which it is advisable to treat this term as a successful rhetorical image. Important for understanding the events of 1612 is also considered by V.N. Kozlyakov specifically identified the composition of the First Militia after the death of P. Lyapunov, which allowed the researcher to get rid of the traditional naming of it “Cossack”. As a result of his research, he abandoned the interpretation of the Troubles as a confrontation between patriotic nobles and traitor boyars with the entire period and generally lost its old content. The personnel of the First Militia, the biographies and social strategies of its participants - these problems have hardly been studied in science. And an example of such research, the purpose of which is to create a large-scale database, was the monumental work of A.A. Selina, built on Novgorod material. It is extremely interesting to study the services and destinies of officials of the Novgorod orders. The study of behavior strategies and everyday life Novgorodians, as well as the relationship between Novgorodians and Swedes during the occupation. In general, from the pen of A.A. Selina published many extensive studies of the Time of Troubles period. It's important to note that this problem tika is of interest not only to domestic but also to foreign researchers. For example, British historian Maureen Perry in her works explores various aspects of the relationship between government and social groups, including during the period of the first militia. Having traced the development of historical thought in this period, we can say that at different times researchers treated this period of Russian history differently. Since the 19th century. In historiography, the problems of the emergence of the Troubles were considered; many reasons for its occurrence were proposed, from a severe social crisis to the desire of the Catholic Church to seize Russia, as well as the difficult situation of the peasants. In Soviet historiography, ideas about the Troubles changed; historians of this period highlighted the factor of class struggle to comply with the ideological doctrine of the new state. A new stage of research - the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. New historians appeared, new materials were introduced into scientific circulation (for example, A.A. Selin in the study of the Novgorod land). In general, it should be noted that the events that took place in this short period of time left behind a significant number of monuments in which researchers of the 19th century became interested. beginning of the XXI V. The achievements of modern researchers of the Time of Troubles have generally rethought the old policy of the history of the Time of Troubles. The events taking place during the Time of Troubles (including Bolotnikov's uprising, the change of impostors, the invasion of interventionists) are examined in a new way. However, in modern historiography the question of the formation and activities of the first militia remains incompletely explored. The conclusions of Soviet and pre-revolutionary historiography related to the first militia require rethinking in the light of the achievements of modern historiography in general. Therefore, the task of my research is to examine the formation and activities of the first militia using the achievements of modern historiography of the Time of Troubles. 2. Militia formations: initial stage
1 Formation of the militia July 1610 saw the overthrow of Vasily Shuisky, who established himself as an indecisive and short-sighted ruler. A group of boyars received power, and a month later they entered into an agreement with Stanislav Zolkiewski (Polish hetman) to recognize Vladislav, heir to the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Sigismund III, as sovereign of Moscow. Two months later, in September, Polish-Lithuanian troops and mercenaries serving the crown entered Moscow. Alexander Korwin Gosiewski was chosen as the head of the garrison of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Piotr Barkovski was chosen as the commander of the mercenaries. Foreigners built their own system of relations with Russians: · they were provided by collecting taxes from the population outside Moscow, while treating them with disdain and arrogance, considering them a defeated people; · representatives of the elite were expelled from Moscow - nobles and military men, boyar children, archers, atamans from villages; · they robbed the treasury and wealthy people, brought to the Kremlin all the artillery, gunpowder, and handguns that had previously belonged to Muscovites and were used by them for defensive purposes. The sources record many specific examples characterizing the relationship between the local population and the interventionists. For example, it is known that in the period from September 23, 1610 to March 3, 1611, mercenaries, foot and horse, received about 35,000 rubles in money and other items. Among the things they seized were gold items, diamonds, pearls and other jewelry. The officer of the Polish garrison, Samuil Maskevich, indicated in his testimony that his colleagues, collecting provisions from Russian villages, behaved as they wanted, and could even forcibly take the wife or daughter of a big boyar. The Russian people very soon realized that the foreigners who had settled in Moscow were a cruel and powerful enemy who must be expelled and destroyed. However, for this it was necessary to rouse the entire people to the liberation struggle, which was not so easy. At the end of 1610, the residents of Moscow kissed the cross on how to unite all Russian lands in order to expel every last one of the Lithuanian people. Muscovites turned to their brothers, Orthodox Christians, with an appeal for the need for unity to fight the common enemy, insisting on sending this appeal to all cities in order to avoid the destruction of Russia. Along with this, the provisions of the charter of Russian prisoners from the camp of the Polish king near Smolensk circulated within the society of service people. They wrote with pain and bitterness about their killed and wealthy captive compatriots, desecrated shrines, and devastated Russian land. They also warned about the plans of Sigismund III to take the Moscow throne instead of Prince Vladislav. The prisoners called for their appeal to be sent to the north of Russia, while they were still free, so that these lands would unite in the fight for the Orthodox peasant faith. The message of Patriarch Hermogenes also had a great influence, who called for clearing the country of the enemy and electing a ruler “from his own blood, who will be the patron and protector of his subjects.” L.M. Sukhotin, who studied the patriarch’s message, doubted that he helped the first militia. The researcher writes: “Lyapunov’s uprising and the annexation of the cities of Ryazan, Ukrainian and Zaotsky to his uprising occurred independently of Hermogenes.” As N.P. Dolinin notes, “serious doubts arise that Hermogenes wrote these letters at all. He could write them only on December 6, 1610, when he spoke at the Assumption Cathedral against the oath of the population to the Polish king Sigismund. After this, it was almost impossible for him to communicate with the population, since “he had no one to write to, deacs and clerks and all sorts of courtyard people were caught, and his entire yard was plundered.” Later V.I. Koretsky published Hermogenes' message to the first militia. “Although the published message of Hermogenes was written at a time when the first militia was already standing near Moscow, it, undoubtedly testifying to the connections of the patriarch with the militias, seriously undermines the opinion of L.M. Sukhotin about Hermogen’s non-involvement in the case of the first militia and makes one assume the existence of such connections earlier.” Further, V.N. spoke on this topic. Kozlyakov, he stated that the connection between Hermogenes and the militia is one of the controversial moments in the history of the Time of Troubles. However, in the notes in his work, he still points out that the creation of the zemstvo militia in the southern parts is the merit of Procopius Lyapunov, and not Patriarch Hermogenes. The initial symptoms of a crisis of Polish power in Moscow appeared in 1610, when princes Vorotynsky and Golitsyn were convicted for their relations with False Dmitry. Then there was a story connected with the steward Buturlin, who was reproached for the fact that, together with Lyapunov, he “secretly persuaded the Germans in Moscow” to beat the Poles. It is not clear whether these reproaches were enough, but they led to significant results. The Poles considered them important enough to invade Moscow's affairs: take the keys to the city gates, raise the entire capital to a war situation, and completely close most of the city gates. Moscow was like a besieged territory: people were not allowed to have weapons, suburban peasants were forbidden to be within the city limits, a curfew was introduced, during which it was forbidden to move on the streets at night. Peaceful obedience to Tsar Vladislav looked like humiliating captivity and foreign possession. At the same time, when this martial law was being created in the city, the first secret letters from the ambassadors were accepted, sent by them at the end of October, warning about Sigismund’s plan. Robbery in Moscow, linked to news of violence in Smolensk. The attack on Smolensk, which occurred on November 21, failed. Information about it should have alarmed the Moscow consciousness, which did not understand how the ruler could resume hostilities during the discussion of the unarmed unification of states. The blood at Smolensk was for the Russian population a justification for the king’s duplicity and made it possible to finally not trust either the ruler or his Moscow entourage. Patriarch Hermogenes refused all kinds of concessions and showed his dissatisfaction when M.G. came to him on November 30. Saltykov tried to talk about the king, although, probably, to induce the patriarch to make concessions to Sigismund. On another day, the rest of the boyars came to him and asked him to “bless the cross to kiss the king.” Hermogenes did not accept this proposal, and a quarrel arose between him and Saltykov; according to some sources, a verbal altercation arose, and according to others, he almost attacked the patriarch with a knife. We don’t know for sure whether the patriarch’s boyars asked about kissing the cross in the name of the monarch, but he literally interpreted their proposal this way. The Patriarch immediately invited Moscow guests and traders to the Assumption Cathedral. At the meeting, he explained the situation to them and forbade them to swear allegiance to the king. Thus, he openly opposed King Sigismund. At the beginning of this struggle, Hermogenes did not consider it possible to attract the people to direct unrest against the Poles. Several factors changed his mood and forced him to take decisive action. One of these circumstances is the death of False Dmitry, and the other is the disintegration of the great embassy and the departure of its participants to Moscow, which also happened in December. On all orders, after the death of False Dmitry, he began to think and speak out about the direct struggle against foreign subjugation in Moscow. The departure of zemstvo nominees from near Smolensk, who were staying with the ambassadors, would help legitimize for the patriarch the appeal to the protest of the population. In the fall, an extraordinary action took place - a coup d'etat, which consisted in replacing the government of the boyars with a layer of royal confidants. In winter, in December, this political process ended with the destruction of the zemstvo council, which was under the ambassadors. Polish military leaders and officials, Russian traitors who were among the king, replaced the components of the Moscow government. The territory of the country fell under the influence of foreign and heterodox invaders. Hermogenes dared to directly activate his flock to rebel in full combat readiness against the enemy. The Patriarch began sending his own letters throughout the country, in which he wrote about the royal betrayal, and asked the city population to immediately march on Moscow against the foreign conquerors. At Christmas time in 1610, the Poles were able to catch this letter for the first time. After this, they received at their disposal the lists from the charters of Hermogenes, which bear the dates of the beginning of January of the next year. In these letters, the patriarch hoped for Lyapunov and the service population of Ryazan under his control, and the letters were also addressed to Nizhny Novgorod and Suzdal. Apparently, he went to Lyapunov, probably earlier than to the others, and Lyapunov began the uprising a month after the death of False Dmitry, somewhere in early January 1611. Sigismund knew about Ryazan’s refusal already around mid-January based on information from the capital. This revealed Hermogenes’ aggressive activity against Sigismund and his absolute opposition to the reorganized Moscow administration. The clerks who helped him contact various cities were captured, and the entire court was destroyed. About this robbery in early January in Nizhny Novgorod were already aware. Information about this also came to Lyapunov. He immediately stood up for the patriarch and sent his own letter to Moscow. This letter influenced the conditions of Hermogenes' detention; he was given more freedom, but this did not last long, and he continued to be under close supervision while in the Kremlin. Continuing the conversation about the active actions of the people's militia, we must say that the patriarch, unable to take action through the state apparatus subject to him, rushed directly to the population, calling on them to defend their native land. In such an unusual situation, in a state in which the government now has an unusual metropolitan structure, the population was forced to rally around its own leaders and their entourage. It is understandable that in such a situation the most important role fell on the people who occupied the positions of leaders of local communities. Accordingly, the larger and more powerful this organization, the wider and more capable was the power of its supporters, the more famous they themselves were. Following from this reasoning, we conclude that the most important position in the people's liberation movement should have been taken by the military leaders and nobles of the largest cities and the elected authorities of the most populous and wealthy cities. In the tax-paying strata, the awakening of popular unity caused a willingness to donate their property and people, while in the strata of the provincial nobility there was seen not only a willingness to sacrifice what was necessary, but also to lead the people’s militia, with a full understanding of the responsibilities assigned in this case. 2 The composition of Russian cities and the march on Moscow At a time when they learned that traitors and foreigners “own everything” in Moscow, that clerks came to Gonsevsky with reports not only to the palace, but also to his home, then the provincial service population came to the conclusion that it was they who needed to take over security public order. They were often related to the Moscow nobility; people were chosen from among them to serve in government positions in the capital, so it can be argued that what was happening in Moscow was clear to them. More noticeable than anyone else in this regard was the Ryazan population, which developed close relations with Moscow during the siege of Tushino. Due to these relations, Ryazan residents are accustomed to playing an important role in the capital’s processes. At a certain period of time, Prokopiy Lyapunov settled as a leader. He belonged to a noble Ryazan family. In 1605, after the death of Boris Godunov, Lyapunov, leading the army of Ryazan nobles, went over to the side of False Dmitry I. It is known that at the beginning of 1606 he and his detachment took part in the peasant uprising led by Ivan Bolotnikov, pursuing their own goals. However, frightened by its scale, Lyapunov confessed to Tsar Vasily Shuisky in November 1606. Subsequently, in 1607, he became a Duma nobleman. In the period from 1608-1610, he led the Ryazan movement of service people, directed against collaborators and the peasant uprising. At the same time, as R.G. points out. Skrynnikov, Patriarch Hermogenes could not completely trust Lyapunov, knowing his speeches against Shuisky. Moreover, it was the Lyapunovs who subsequently played the most important role in the deposition of Vasily Shuisky, when the patriarch himself was subjected to serious persecution. A number of authors agree that the first zemstvo militia on Ryazan land was also formed under the influence of Hermogenes’ correspondence with Archbishop Theodoret of Ryazan. Already by 1611, the central point of the liberation struggle moved from the northern lands to the Ryazan region. When Hermogenes' appeals reached Ryazan, Lyapunov ordered them to be sent out to nearby cities, adding his own appeals. Procopius Lyapunov was in a fairly comfortable position on his territory, this allowed him to have extraordinary strength and power. On the one hand, he was a Duma nobleman and close to the court of Vasily Shuisky, and was also the leader of the district nobility. That is, he had both administrative power and power over the everyday situation in his hands. He was a governor in one of the most significant regions of the country, providing Moscow with bread and a military garrison on his land. He had the trust of the people, understood the importance of his territory and therefore thought that he should interfere in state affairs. After addressing the Boyar Duma, Lyapunov began sending letters throughout the state, in which the question of the transition from disagreement to active action was already raised. The idea of a campaign against Moscow was clearly borrowed from the patriarch’s letters. When Lyapunov learned about the assault on Smolensk, he decided to openly challenge the Seven Boyars. The leader of the Ryazan nobles accused the king of violating the Moscow agreement on the division of power with the boyars and threatened to immediately launch a campaign against Moscow in order to free the capital from the interventionists. Soon Lyapunov sent a messenger to Moscow, who called on everyone to patriotically fight against the invaders. In turn, the Seven Boyars turned to Sigismund with a request to send new troops to Moscow. Voivode Isaac Sunbulov was sent to Ryazan, whose troops united with the Zaporozhye Cossacks and besieged Prontsk, in which Lyapunov and a detachment of rebel troops were hiding. In this situation, Lyapunov sent calls for help in all directions. The first to respond was Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, the Zaraisky governor. He came from the princely family of Starodubsky. In 1610, Vasily Shuisky appointed him governor of Zaraysk and gave him control of 20 villages. After the deposition of Shuisky, Pozharsky swore allegiance to the son of the Polish king Vladislav, however, when Sigismund III expressed claims to the Russian throne, Pozharsky entered into opposition to the Poles. Having joined his ranks with detachments along the road from Kolomna and Ryazan, he went to help Lyapunov. As a result, Sunbulov was forced to retreat, and Pozharsky and Lyapunov, at the head of a single zemstvo army, entered Ryazan. After this, returning to Zaraysk, Dmitry Pozharsky defeated the detachments of Sunbulov and the Cossacks, who tried to seize the city suddenly. At the same time, events took place near Tula. Along with these processes in the Ryazan lands, a similar situation arose in the rest of the Moscow regions. One of these points was Nizhny Novgorod. This city had a great influence on the eastern part of the country. It had a huge market and a powerful fortress; it served as the most important point during the fighting. As early as the winter of 1610, this city developed a strong relationship with the patriarch, which continued into the following year. The people of Nizhny Novgorod often sent their people to Hermogenes, even when he was in captivity, and at the beginning of January 1611 they received instructions from the patriarch to fight Sigismund. They spread this news to other regions, thereby taking upon themselves a leading role in the cause of resistance. One of the leading positions was occupied by a large city - Yaroslavl. The trials against the Poles spread here before Hermogenes began sending his own letters to Lyapunov. The Yaroslavl people themselves rose up against the Poles, and throughout their entire territory. Own military organization for the campaign they had formed by the end of February. Yaroslavl considered itself the center of the northern regions and attracted other cities to create a common militia in the north for the subsequent campaign. Having analyzed the state of affairs in the main regions and the patriarch’s appeals, in which he addresses his flock, attracting them to the fight, it can be noted that this speech then fell on fertile soil, which bore corresponding fruits. People living in large centers were ready to rise to the defense of their state and drive out foreigners. And immediately after the first appeal of Hermogenes, they rushed to the capital. Somewhere at the beginning of 1610, the patriarch began his appeal to the population of Ryazan and Yaroslavl, so at the beginning of February the Nizhny Novgorod detachments set off, and at the end of February the Yaroslavl ones recovered. At the end of March 1611, people who met in the zemstvo militia began a war near Moscow. So on March 25, the first detachments began to come to the city and stopped at the Simonov Monastery. Looking at the burnt capital, the recent burials, seeing the grief of people who had lost their property, they could not remain indifferent. In documents sent back from the militia, April 1, 1611 was named as the start of the siege of Moscow. After this, the militia took up positions at the gates of the White City. Instead of creating a ring around the stone city, the militia tried to capture those gates, the capture of which would help further attack the walls of China Town. There was no longer any strength left to storm the wooden structures of Zamoskvorechye. The battles that began immediately became protracted, and the militia had to solve many problems in order to strengthen its role as a recognized zemstvo authority. A new kissing cross record was created for the militia, which stated that the accession of Vladislav was completely excluded. They quickly abandoned him as a real Russian monarch. The militia included representatives from various territories of the country. So, for example, the Ryazan cities went from Ryazan with Lyapunov, the Murom residents came with F. Masalsky, together with A.A. Repinin, people from Nizhny Novgorod, together with A. Izmailov and A. Prosovetsky, people from Suzdal and Vladimir, with F. Nashchekin, Pomor settlements and others. That is, there is a fairly extensive geography of Russian cities. Also, after the calls of Hermogenes, everyone who was keen on Tushino was now carried away by the processes associated with the overthrow of Polish rule. Cossacks from Moscow, Circassians, children of boyars, who had previously worked with False Dmitry, and after his death, overtaken by surprise by the popular movement, went to cleanse Moscow, joining the militia. The appearance of old enemies did not affect the mood of the militia; they, rather, rejoiced at the expansion of their formation with new people. Lyapunov consciously sought out that part of society that wanted social reforms and had previously taken different paths in pursuit of change. The people's struggle against the Poles and traitors arose and was organized when the core of people surrounding False Dmitry in Kaluga had not yet disappeared. The number of False Dmitry's associates decreased after his removal from Tushino in 1610, the Cossacks stopped serving him, and the boyars fled to Sigismund. The last boyars who remained at the final stage of False Dmitry’s stay in Kaluga were D.T. Trubetskoy and D.M. Cherkassky, the rest belonged to the Cossacks. Some were in Kaluga, and the rest in Tula with Zarutsky. These people still posed some kind of threat even after the death of False Dmitry, for the people and for the authorities. Both the Moscow authorities and Lyapunov from Ryazan are trying to improve relations with Kaluga. The protégé from Moscow could not come to an agreement with his cousin; for Lyapunov it was vital to conclude an alliance, because he could not leave the left flank and rear with foreign troops. Lyapunov, with the help of his nephew, was able to come to an agreement with Kaluga and Tula in January 1611, an action plan was created, according to which the militia from Ryazan should gather in Kolomna, and detachments from Kaluga, Severa, and Tula should gather in Serpukhov. Thus, former enemies met in common service. Because of these events, which brought Lyapunov closer to former supporters of False Dmitry and the Cossacks, he should have felt the irreversible results of such consolidation. Now it seemed to him that the oldest “thieves” should be considered on an equal basis with the rest of the militias, some and others were now fighting for the independence of the Russian state. There was also Lyapunov’s appeal, in which he wanted to invite all Cossacks to serve in the militia, and to some extent this appeal worked. At that time, various boyar people and all kinds of representatives of the Cossacks began to come to Moscow, hoping to receive a salary and freedom. In general, more or less several layers can be traced in the militia: .Former military personnel of Tsar Vasily, the territory of the Oka, Volga places, Skopin’s troops. .From Kaluga, companions of False Demetrius. .Cossacks, from Tula, from Suzdal, and with conscription letters. Each layer had its own leader. So, for example, Lyapunov was at the head of the first, Trubetskoy was at the head of the Kaluga detachments, Zarutsky and Prosovetsky were atamans of large Cossack formations. Situated near the capital walls, various troops formed their camps. For example, the camp of Trubetskoy and Zarutsky was located between Lyapunov’s camp and the other camps of the zemstvo militias. The disunity between the nobles and the Cossacks of the weak first militia was fatal for the entire first militia. 3. Final stage 1 The verdict of the first militia and the fight against the interventionists Militarily, the militia's goal was not simple. The foreign corps was located in the two main points of Moscow, the Kremlin, Kitay-Gorod, and in the west of the city they had at their disposal the White-Gorod towers. They needed to occupy these defensive structures, but with the technology that existed at that time this was impossible. Sitting around the walls, not being ready to carry out a general assault and not having sufficient weapons, everything led to a blockade of the fortress, cutting off the approaches from all sides. And a complete siege could only be established by July 1611. Until this time, the nobles and militia were sentenced to the usual displacement and not to allow reinforcements to reach the defenders and to stand their ground in their own fortified point between the Yauza and Neglinnaya. The most important and difficult goal was the institutional one - to create governance not only for the squad, but also for the entire territory of the country that gave birth to and supported this militia. The diversity of the layers of the people's militia was a direct factor in conflicts within the army. Unity had to be created within. At the very beginning of the siege of Moscow, in the spring of 1611, this problem was raised for discussion. All the zemstvo people began to discuss who would lead the militia. As a result, they decided to choose Trubetskoy, Lyapunov and Zarutsky together. From the very beginning, when the militia settled in Moscow, a council was formed around Lyapunov, which included boyars, military leaders, boyar children and the serving population. The powers of this council included not only the militia, but the entire country. It is not clear who was part of it, but according to the charter of April 11, 1611, we can definitely say that such a body existed. Service people and taxable townspeople - two layers of the population who created the militia had their representatives, with the help of which they could communicate and exchange information with the council. These representatives were also near the capital, creating their own zemstvo council. Lyapunov did not want to unite these bodies around himself and lead in this way, so he had a military council subordinate to him. In the spring of 1611, other elected governors began to rule together with Lyapunov. The unification of Lyapuny's militia with both the Cossacks of Zarutskoy and the thieves' people of Trubetskoy into a single body occurred at the end of spring. It turns out that the entire structure of the militia management was developed in its form back in the spring, but this process still did not allow establishing agreements within the militia, as well as creating the necessary conditions for the territory recognizing it. And still, the governors who met near Moscow did not succeed in building a zemstvo union. The lack of finances and food could still be overcome, but it turned out that there was no escape from the conflict of interests. Understanding their own weakness to cope with disorder and crisis, the leadership turned to the adoption of a single order that would define the powers of the authorities and streamline the service and everyday life of people. This order was created on June 30, 1611, and it reflected the entire disorder of social life, the struggle of different interests, and in general everything that the Moscow people did not like so much. When the population agreed with each other about a campaign against Moscow, it was one thing, but when detachments of nobles and Cossacks began to act side by side in a single vein, the past mistrust and resentment returned. There was no agreement, first of all, among the main leaders of the people's liberation struggle. The “New Chronicler” mentioned the beginning of conflicts near the walls of Moscow: “There was great discord between them near Moscow, and there was no ergot between them.” The elections of the heads of the militia did not help calm the differences. On the contrary, it turned out that in the past the Tushino boyars had to confirm in the regiments the awards made to servicemen for the defense of Moscow from the adherents of False Dmitry. The verdict was needed, first of all, by the nobles in order to slow down the “disorder” of the leadership, which already concerned the authority of “the whole earth.” The “New Chronicler” mentions that the creation of the document on June 30, 1611 was preceded by a joint petition of the “military people” of the militia - the Cossacks and nobles who united because of this. In it they wrote, “so that the boyars should be allowed to be near Moscow and would be in the council and military men should be granted according to number, according to wealth, and not in excess.” It turned out, as the chronicler wrote, that the three main leaders of the two “their petitions were not so quick,” and simply “Prokofey Lyapunov came to their council and ordered them to write a sentence.” It turns out that the people who gathered in the militia already wanted to stop the conflicts that had arisen and the destructive desires for new ranks and profit of those who found themselves near Moscow. Unfortunately, the boyars who found themselves in the militia were no exception to this number. The boyars were called upon to “take for themselves estates and estates according to the boyar property; Any boss would take one boyar.” Instead, the militia began a race for countless distributions of public lands to private hands. Those forming the composition of the Judgment sought to take into account the differences of the layers that were part of the militia. It was this composition that set itself the task of creating a new administration for the state and resolving issues that were relevant at that time. Because of this, the document turned out to be very extensive and informative. It included all the decrees and resolutions since the beginning of the militia, in the sequence in which they were created. At the beginning, the decree on the creation of the government of Trubetskoy, Lyapunov and Zarutsky. Then it talks about how to run the state, after which a decree is given on the return of escaped people to their owners. The text of the verdict concludes with a provision that states that people elected to positions in the government may lose their powers if they do not justify themselves or are unable to govern the country. B.N. Florya sees in the Verdict of June 30, 1611, first of all, a reflection political ideas the “noble class”, service people who pushed all other ranks out of participation in the “Council of All the Earth” and made their choice in favor of a “strong central government”. Such power, which is not limited to “any elected bodies” and relies on the “original political elite.” Probably, in general, such sentiments of returning to the times of Ivan the Terrible really existed. However, in the articles of the Verdict there is a solution not only to, relatively speaking, “noble” issues; in it an attempt was made to organize the Cossacks, townspeople and even peasants. Rather, those who in the Verdict spoke about the power of the boyars, elected by the land, expressed the “desire for order that had long arisen in the Time of Troubles, as happened under previous sovereigns,” and were not busy searching for some kind of strong power to which the estates voluntarily give up their right to rule the country . According to the verdict, all power rested with the council. The boyars and military leaders were subordinate according to the verdict; they had administrative and judicial powers in their hands. By death penalty fought against the arbitrariness of the governors. In terms of property, the boyars and other officials divided it in accordance with their social status, and the power of the governor was consolidated in the militia. A central administration was to exist under the authority of the council and the boyars. Instead of the orders in force in occupied Moscow, the militia created their own. They were not created immediately, when it was necessary to put in order one or another area of the life of the militia. The authorities failed to achieve their own authority in the eyes of the population, due to all sorts of conflicts and disagreements within the militia. Although the provisions of the Judgment of June 30 tried to soften the existing contradictions within the militia. However, they not only did not bring results, but, on the contrary, fueled the situation in which the militia of 1611 completely collapsed. There were also prerequisites for this, the first was the arbitrariness of the military leaders, who were forced to plunder property to provide for the militia. These people grew rich, and ordinary militias died of hunger. The next premise was that the Cossacks were given power and, taking advantage of this, they rob the people. Outraged by the chaos, the militia even met together and sent a petition to the boyars to change this. The arbitrariness of military leaders in the allocation of land was part of the foundation of the military organization. Service people were equipped only with a land estate and with the loss of it they could not be in the service. The verdict established that the salaries of the entire service population were to return to the levels before the Moscow devastation. Some territories were confiscated, for example, Tushino or royal ones. The verdict on June 30 was primarily devoted to the land problem. His first article could be the most important: “And for the estates for the boyars to be boyars, and for them to take for themselves the estates and estates of the boyars, and for the okolniki and duma nobles, for the boyar, for the boyar, and for the okolnichi, okolnicheskoe, trying to resemble the former great boyars, as was the case with the former Russian natural sovereigns.” . From the point of view of the militia participants, it was an ideal zemstvo organization. The verdict treated the problem of the Cossacks with the same sentiment. From the army of Zarutsky and Prosovetsky, the Cossacks drove along the roads, approached populated areas and committed robberies and robberies everywhere. Because of this, traffic on the roads decreased and people were afraid to go to militia camps near Moscow. Lyapunov told other military leaders many times that it was necessary to stop the robberies and not let the Cossacks leave the regiments. The verdict on June 30 sought to preserve and strengthen the old order without any concessions to the wishes of the free Cossacks. Now they were under the careful control and supervision of service people. It should be noted that, as in the old days, serfdom prevailed in the army. It was the cause of an acute social contradiction between landowners, who included service people and, on the other hand, Cossacks, who represented a different type of military service people of the Moscow population, in contrast to the nobles. The June verdict demanded the abolition of Cossack bailiffs, that is, the quartering of Cossacks in areas that were supposed to support them. Knowing the Cossacks of that time, it is not difficult to imagine what the population experienced when they received such guests to support them. This article of the sentence was violated, and this is explained by the fact that the governors pulled together all their forces near Moscow to besiege the Poles. In any case, they used a softened form of bailiffs, that is, they gave the Cossack village a city to maintain with the right to send large or small detachments there for food. With this method of collecting income, the population paid with all their might, constantly thinking that military men would be sent to them in full. The Cossacks, of course, understood the situation that was created for them by the decree of June 30, and they did not want to agree with it. They did not have the opportunity to change the situation in a legal way, and they could not influence the revision of the document in their favor. That is why the Cossacks decided to stage an uprising against the authorities. Mainly, they reacted most of all to the one whom they found to be the source of the verdict - to Lyapunov. The reason was the active application of the sentence of June 30, aimed against the robberies of the Cossacks. During the next outbreak of conflict, Lyapunov’s enemies invited him to their place and treacherously killed him. In the June verdict, the council demanded that customs and taverns be taken from the military leaders to the treasury, but the military leaders violate this article and, directly or indirectly, stretch their hands to the taverns that bring in money. In Przemysl, a peasant Zarutsky Shipov buys a tavern. Clerk Volkov with two Cossacks of Zarutsky goes to Mikhailov to the customs office in the head’s office (at that moment it was an elective position) and asks to appoint them, citing the fact that they do not have enough funds. Appointed by order of Zarutsky, these heads then quarrel with the local military leader and accuse each other of theft. The June verdict demanded the destruction of regimental orders, and from one document we learn about the existence of a special category for Zarutsky. In this rank sits Evdokimov, who shortly before was promoted to clerk from the clerks of the Novgorod land. The Poles managed to prepare a false document with Lyapunov’s signature. It said that he allegedly called on all townspeople to mercilessly fight the Cossacks. This document appeared in the militia camp. The angry Cossacks got together and invited Lyapunov. CM. Solovyov describes these events as follows: “Lyapunov entered the circle: Ataman Karamyshev began shouting that he was a traitor, and showed a letter signed by his hand, Lyapunov looked at the letter and said: The hand looks like mine, but I didn't write . Discord began and it ended with Lyapunov lying dead. He died just when the militia achieved real success and conquered almost all the main towers of the White City, staging a real siege of Moscow for the first time. The death of Lyapunov greatly impressed the entire army, especially the noble zemstvo and service people, who hurried to escape from the capital. There were also those who were able to buy a voivodeship or some position from Zarutsky, but they also immediately fled from Moscow. The Cossacks did not hide their hostility towards the noble militia and threatened the serving people with robberies and reprisals. They robbed Lyapunov's home in a camp near Moscow and other neighboring buildings of the nobles. Riots on the roads and violence against the population have reached unprecedented proportions. The noble units could not fence themselves off from the Cossacks, because their camp, as previously said, divided their camp, where it would be possible to wait out and fight off the Polish attack and Cossack violence. The militia of 1611 disintegrated due to internal contradictions, all kinds of conflicts within the allies, at a time when in a legal way “the whole earth” developed the entire organization of the administrative and social structure of the state. The Moscow and Ryazan military men went to their territories, and starting in August, a relatively small part of the nobility remained near Moscow. The Cossacks and Cossack authorities continued to be under the leadership of Trubetskoy and Zarutsky. The government, which arose with the help of the zemshchina, began to work for the Cossacks. Possession of such a central administrative apparatus directed leaders into government power and gave them the ability to dominate the entire state. This was a real threat of attracting large sections of the population to the militia. There were now two governments above society, the Polish-Lithuanian one in the capital and near Smolensk and the Cossack one near Moscow. The threat from the first is a political takeover, and from the second a social revolution. One posed a real military threat, and the second threatened to seize what had just been created. government structure. At that time, society could not resist any of them. Conclusion militia zemsky cossack Based on the tasks set, we were able to draw the following conclusions: 1.Detailed history analysis people's militias was carried out by the famous historians S.M. Solovyov, V.O. Klyuchevsky and S.F. Platonov. And the Soviet period, when the very term “Troubles” was considered a historiographical anachronism, the history of the national and liberation movement of the First Militia and Cossack camps was studied by I.S. Shepelev. Historian L.V. Cherepnin studied zemstvo cathedrals near Moscow in 1611-1612, and A.L. Stanislavsky reconstructed the biographies of Cossack atamans, members of the people's militias. The history of the First Militia is still being developed. As a modern researcher, we can highlight B. N. Florya, who studied the details of the initial formation of the zemstvo movement and wrote a separate work devoted to the content of the Verdict of June 30, 1611. Based on the study of historical thought on this topic, it was possible to establish that many studies have been devoted to Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence, but specifically the question of the history of the first militia at the beginning of the 17th century. has not been fully developed, which means this problem is promising from a research point of view. 2. The collapse of the central apparatus of power, which began at the end of September 1610 due to the acquisition of full control of the royal throne by Polish proteges, contributed to the activation of local zemstvo and provincial government, which was gaining an increasingly important role in creating military resistance to the invaders. The creation of the rebel forces according to the Cossack principle was characteristic feature all popular movements of the 17th century. In the cities of Moscow and Ryazan, the organization of local military forces began, designed to cleanse the main city of the Russian state. The highest degree of expression of the liberation people's movement in the Time of Troubles was the zemstvo militia. By 1611, the center of the people's liberation movement moved from the north of the country to the Ryazan lands. Zemstvo troops began to organize there, in February 1611, heading towards Moscow. The unification among the noble detachments from Ryazan and the Cossacks from Kaluga became the basis for the formation of the First Zemstvo Militia, and later formations from Nizhny Novgorod, Vladimir, Yaroslavl and other cities joined it. In the new military-political organization that emerged, at first there was no unity, which was required for the successful conduct of the war of liberation. Based on the demands of the nobles and Cossacks, the Verdict of the first militia was written. The verdict consolidated and approved the estate-representative organization of the government and the regulations for governing the state. The main body of the militia was the temporary zemstvo government, transformed on the basis of the Verdict. After the Judgment on June 30, serious disagreements intensified in the camp near Moscow. Prokopiy Lyapunov’s actions against the Cossacks and the focus of the militia leadership on Sweden caused particular irritation among the troops. The people's liberation activities of the representatives of the first militia had several important directions: attempts to besiege Moscow and the territories close to it to liberate it from the invaders, mobilize the population to fight for freedom, formulate a zemstvo government opposition to the Poles, etc. And, although the First Zemstvo Militia did not solve the problems facing it, the experience of its creation and functioning was of great importance for the organization of the Second Militia and its future victory. Literature 1.Azovtsev A.V. Letters of 1571-1612 from the archives of the Ryazan Noble Assembly // Russian Diplomat. M., 2001. Issue. 7. .Acts collected in libraries and archives Russian Empire Archaeographic expedition imperial academy Sci. T.2. St. Petersburg 1836. .Acts of the Moscow State: Volume I. Discharge order. Moscow table. 1571-1634. St. Petersburg, 1890. .Acts of service landowners from the 15th to early 17th centuries. T. 1-4. /comp. A.V. Antonov. M., 1997-2002. .Belokurov S.A. Discharge notes for the Time of Troubles (713-7121) M., 1907. .Bussov K. Moscow Chronicle. 1584 - 1613 // Chronicles of the Time of Troubles. M., 1998. .Zabelin I.E. Minin and Pozharsky. “Straight” and “crooked” in the Time of Troubles. M., 1896. .New chronicler of the Chronicles of the Time of Troubles. M., 1998. .New acts of troubled times. Acts of the Moscow Region militias and the Zemsky Sobor 1611-1613 // Readings in the Society of Russian History and Antiquities. M., 1911. Book. 4. .Literary monuments Ancient Rus'. The end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries. M., 1987. .The story of Abraham Palitsyn. M., 1955. .Sukhotin L.M. Fours of the Time of Troubles (1604-1611). M., 1912. .Sukhotin L.M. Land grants in the Moscow State under Tsar Vladislav 1610-1611. Readings, M., 1911. .Grekov G.D. Peasants in Rus' M., 1954. - Book. 2. .Dolinin N.P. Regiments near Moscow (“Cossack camps”) in the national liberation movement of 1611 - 1612. 1958. .Zamyatin G. A. On the issue of the election of Karl Philip to the Russian throne (1611-1616). Yuriev, 1913. .Zamyatin G.A. Russia and Sweden at the beginning of the 17th century. Essays on political and military history. St. Petersburg, 2008. .Klyuchevsky V.O. Course of Russian history M., 1988. T. 3. .Kozlyakov V.N. Heroes of Troubles. M., 2012. .Kozlyakov V.N. Troubles in Russia. 17th century M., 2007. .Koretsky V.I. Message from Patriarch Hermogenes // Cultural Monuments. New discoveries. Writing. Art. Archeology. Yearbook 1975. M., 1976. .Kostomarov N.I. The Time of Troubles of the Moscow State at the beginning of the 17th century. Moscow, Ch., 1994. .Platonov S.F. Essays on the history of the Time of Troubles in the Moscow State of the 16th-17th centuries. St. Petersburg, 1899. .Platonov S.F. Collected works on Russian history. St. Petersburg, 1993. .Pokrovsky, M.N. Russian history in its most condensed form M., 1920. - Part I. .Selin A.A. Novgorod society during the Time of Troubles. St. Petersburg 2008. .Selin A.A. Prosopographical database “Novgorod society of the early 17th century.” .Selin A.A. Time of Troubles in Russia: conflict and dialogue of cultures. // Materials of the scientific conference. St. Petersburg, October 12-14, 2012. St. Petersburg, 2012. .Skrynnikov R.G. Minin and Pozharsky: Chronicle of the Time of Troubles. M., 1981. .Skrynnikov R.G. Saints and authorities. L., 1990. .Soloviev S.M. Works: History of Russia since ancient times. Kn4., M., 1989. .Tyumentsev I.O. Troubles in Russia at the beginning of the 17th century. Movement of False Dmitry II. M., 2008. .Florya B.N. About the verdict of the First Militia // Historical notes. T. 8 (126). 2005. pp. 85-114. .Florya B.N. Polish-Lithuanian intervention in Russia and Russian society. M., 2005. .Florya B.N. Russian-Polish relations and the Baltic question at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries. M., 1978. .Florya B.N. Russian-Polish relations and political development of Eastern Europe in the second half of the 16th - early 17th centuries. M. 1978 .Shepelev I.S. On the issue of class struggle in the Russian state during the years of the Polish-Lithuanian intervention // Scientific notes (humanities). Pyatigorsk, 1955. T. 10. 40.Perrie M. Pretenders and Popular Monarchism in Early Modern Russia. Cambridge, 1995.
The time of troubles in the history of Russia can be called a period lasting 14–15 years (from 1598 to 1613) from the time of the death of Fyodor Ivanovich (son of Ivan IV) until the election to the throne of the founder of the new dynasty - Mikhail Romanov, a relative of the first wife of Ivan IV.
This is a period of civil war, interregnum, imposture and intervention. The causes of the unrest were the aggravation of social, class, dynastic and international relations at the end of the reign of Ivan the Terrible and under his successors. All social strata of society come into conflict. The boyars fought to limit the tsarist power and restore their privileges, the nobility sought the possibility of promotion for personal qualities, and not for the nobility of the family, the peasantry opposed the strengthening of serfdom, the free Cossacks refused to obey the authorities in general and turned to robbery. There is a “great destruction of the Moscow state”, weakness state power leads to disobedience of the outskirts to the center. Hard times affected all aspects of Russian life and raised the question of the very existence of the Russian state.
The Troubles can be roughly divided into three periods.
Dynastic period. The main content of this period of Troubles (1598–1606) was the struggle of various boyar families and political forces for the royal throne, that is, the supreme power in the state. After the death of Ivan the Terrible's eldest son, Tsar Fedor, in January 1598, the Rurik dynasty ceased to exist. There were no legitimate heirs to the throne, since the youngest son of Ivan IV, Tsarevich Dmitry, under very mysterious circumstances, died in Uglich at the age of eight and a half years.
Despite the resistance of the Boyar Duma, on February 17, 1598, the Zemsky Sobor, at the proposal of Patriarch Job, elected Boris Godunov (1598–1605) as tsar. Thus, taking into account his reign under Tsar Feodor, Boris Godunov led the Russian state for at least 16 years. As a ruler and then sovereign, B. Godunov was distinguished by his talents as an administrator and diplomat. Under him, silence and relative order were established in Rus'. However, in the beginning XVII century The reign of B. Godunov was complicated by the appearance in Russia in 1603 of an impostor in the person of the monk Grigory Otrepyev. The latter declared himself to be the miraculously saved youngest son of I. the Terrible - the Uglich prince Dmitry, which is why he went down in history under the name of False Dmitry I.
Famine in the country, imposture, as well as the unexpected, sudden death of Boris Godunov on April 13, 1605 led to the fact that the boyars recognized False Dmitry I as king. But he reigned for less than a year. On the night of May 17, 1606, about 200 armed nobles led by V. Shuisky and the Golitsyn brothers broke into the Kremlin, killed the guards and killed the impostor. The throne passed to the boyar Tsar V. Shuisky (1606–1610). He was not elected by the Zemsky Sobor; he was brought to power by the boyars, who shouted him tsar on Red Square.
Social period. With the accession of V. Shuisky, the 2nd period of the Troubles began (1606–1610). It is characterized by three main events.
One of them was the country's plunge into the abyss of civil war. Its most dramatic pages are associated with the name of Ivan Bolotnikov. On Bolotnikov’s side there was also the nobility, who fought against the boyar aristocracy, its protege V. Shuisky and the oprichnina boyars; and the old boyar oligarchy (Mstislavskys, Shuiskys, Golitsyns, etc.), who wanted to restore the pre-oprich order; and the new (oprichnina) boyars (Belskys, Shakhovskys, Romanovs, Sheremetevs, etc.), who fought against the old boyars and sought to destroy them together with V. Shuisky; and peasants (owners and black-sown farmers) who fought against the strengthening of serfdom and the “fake” Tsar Shuisky; and the Cossacks, who opposed the extension of serfdom to the Cossack regions and the reduction of their privileges; and the townspeople, opposed to the boyars, and then against Bolotnikov. Thus, all major segments of the country's population were involved in the war.
Another important event was the appearance in the summer of 1607 of a new impostor - False Dmitry II. He was a protege of large Polish magnates and nobility. Thus, the civil war in Russia was complemented and complicated by hidden foreign (Polish) intervention. In the summer of 1608, the impostor approached Moscow and began its siege, setting up his camp in Tushino. Hence his nickname “Tushino thief”. A situation arose when both Shuisky and the impostor did not have enough strength to defeat each other.
The third event of the social period of the Troubles was the beginning of an open Polish-Swedish military-Catholic intervention against Russia. In 1609, Shuisky, in exchange for territorial and political concessions, concluded an agreement with Sweden, according to which the king gave 2 thousand cavalry and 3 thousand infantry to the mercenary army. This allowed the Russian-Swedish army under the command of the young (24 years old) but talented commander M.V. Skopin-Shuisky in the spring of 1610 to defeat the impostor and release Moscow. However, Poland, which was then at war with Sweden, began an open intervention in Russia, besieging Smolensk in the fall of 1609. The robberies and violence committed by the Poles, their attempts to impose Catholicism in an Orthodox country, awakened the Russian people to fight against foreigners and infidels. Sweden also decided to take advantage of Russia's difficult situation. She began an open intervention against our country, occupying most of the Novgorod region (in July 1611, Novgorod was also captured).
National period. The main content of this period was the real threat of the loss of national independence by the Russian people and their struggle against the Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish intervention.
In July 1610, Tsar Vasily Shuisky was overthrown by the boyars. As a result, the power of the Boyar Duma was established in the country in the form of the Seven Boyars - the power of the seven most noble members of the Duma, led by Prince F. Mstislavsky.
The Seven Boyars committed an act of national treason by concluding an agreement with the Polish king Sigismund III on the calling of his son Vladislav (Catholic) to the Russian throne instead of the deposed Orthodox king. On September 21, 1610, Polish invaders occupied Moscow. At the same time, mercenary Swedish troops captured Novgorod on July 16, 1611. King Charles IX nominated his son Prince Charles Philip to the Russian throne. By the spring of 1612, in the north-west of Russia, the Swedes captured Yam, Oreshek, Porkhov, Ladoga, Tikhvin.
Thus, in the third period of the Troubles, the question was not only about the earthly existence of the Russian people, but also (which was considered much more important then) about the Catholicization of their soul, that is, about their loss of eternal life. This threat became one of the main reasons for the beginning and growth of the popular movement against the Swedish and Polish military-Catholic intervention.
The most important event of the national period of the Time of Troubles was the popular movement against the military-Catholic intervention, the creation of two people's militias.
First militia was formed in the spring of 1611 on Ryazan land under the leadership of the Ryazan governor Prokopiy Lyapunov, his brother Zakhary and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky. However, there was still no spiritual unity in him. Therefore, this militia, which blocked the Poles in Moscow, split from within.
Second militia was formed in the fall of 1611 in Nizhny Novgorod, headed by Kuzma Minin (?–1616), the Nizhny Novgorod headman. Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky (1578–1642) was elected voivode. The spiritual father of the Second Militia was the head of the Nizhny Novgorod clergy, Archpriest Savva Efimiev. Patriarch Hermogenes played a huge role in the all-Russian cause, calling on the Russian people to rise up to fight against the Catholic invaders. In March 1612, the Second Militia set out on a campaign against Moscow, and already on October 26 liberated it from the interventionists, having previously (August 22–24) crushed a strong regular Polish army led by Hetman Chodkiewicz, which was rushing to the aid of the Polish garrison in the Kremlin. Currently November 4th is the day military glory Russia - The day of the liberation of Moscow by the people's militia under the leadership of Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky from the Polish invaders. Inspired by the liberation of Moscow, the people began to drive out the invaders everywhere.
On February 21, 1613, the Zemsky Sobor elected the 16-year-old son of Metropolitan Philaret, Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov (1613–1645), the nephew of the former Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich, the son of Ivan the Terrible, as Russian Tsar. Continuity with the Rurikovichs was respected. Filaret, who returned from Polish captivity, was elected Patriarch of All Rus' in 1619. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, “the end of the Troubles was put by the accession to the throne of Mikhail Romanov, who became the founder of a new dynasty” that existed for 304 years.
With the coming to power of the Romanovs, the restoration of the Russian state begins on the religious, moral, spiritual traditions and socio-political foundations of civilization of the Orthodox type.
It was very difficult. The siege of Smolensk lasted for almost two years, which fell in June 1611. The Polish troops that found themselves in Moscow behaved like conquerors. Swedish mercenaries held Novgorod. Detachments of Tushinites “walked” around the country; Robber gangs appeared, which included both Russian “thieves” and Poles. They plundered lands, destroyed cities and monasteries.
The Boyar Duma did not enjoy authority and power; the boyars practically did not govern the country. IN different parts states recognized different authorities: some - the Polish prince, others - the newly born baby Marina Mnishek as the legitimate son of Tsarevich Dmitry; third - False Dmitry II.
The Russian kingdom was threatened with loss of integrity and independence. The Troubles led to such a sad result. The question was: either the people will “wake up” and defend their country themselves, or Russia will perish. Decisive and bold steps were needed. The deadlock political situation created by the selfishness of the Seven Boyars and the stubbornness of King Sigismund could not remain forever.
The initiative to create a militia was taken by the elected authorities of the cities. They began to send letters to each other calling on them to give up the power of the “traitors” entrenched in the Kremlin. Only by rising up “with the whole earth” could it be possible to liberate Moscow and legally, at the Zemsky Sobor, choose a new tsar.
Having initiated the rise of the people by Patriarch Hermogenes, a Zemsky Sobor of service people was convened - “The Council of the Whole Earth.” The first militia was led by governor Prokopiy Lyapunov, as well as Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy and Cossack ataman Ivan Zarutsky. The participants of the campaign pursued not only selfish goals. Patriotic sentiments are clearly visible in their actions: the desire to cleanse Moscow of interventionists and place an Orthodox Tsar on the throne.
Composition of the First Militia
After the death of False Dmitry II, the Cossack ataman I. S. Zarutsky became his political heir, who proclaimed the newly born son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek Ivan king. Together with Prince D.T. Trubetskoy, Zarutsky led his regiments to Moscow. At the same time as the former Tushins, detachments of Ryazan nobles under the command of P. P. Lyapunov moved towards Moscow.
From the beginning of 1611, detachments of the First Militia from different cities moved towards the capital and in March 1611 approached Moscow.
Residents of Moscow were burdened by the presence of foreigners. In March 1611, the townspeople of the capital rebelled against the Poles. However, the Poles and their Russian henchmen managed to save the situation by starting a fire. Fires started in the city. Forgetting about the rebellion, the townspeople rushed to save their property. The raging fire destroyed most of the Moscow suburb, almost all of Moscow burned out. Material from the site
The army of Lyapunov, Trubetskoy and Zarutsky approached Moscow a few days after the fire. The militia had already entered the burning city. They managed to capture the White City. The Poles took refuge behind the walls of Kitay-Gorod and the Kremlin, which were not damaged by the fire. An attempt to storm the powerful city fortifications was repulsed by the besieged.
Soon, discord began in the militia camp, and enmity broke out between the nobles and the Cossacks. It was skillfully inflated by the Poles and supporters of the Seven Boyars. The leader of the movement, Lyapunov, was summoned to the Cossack circle, suspected and accused of treason, and killed by the Cossacks. After this, the nobles who had lost their leader went home. The militia as a single force ceased to exist. However, the Cossack troops continued to stand near Moscow and from time to time made attempts to storm it.
Thus, the First Militia disintegrated without liberating the capital from the Poles. The situation in the country became almost hopeless.
The catastrophic situation that developed by the end of 1610 stirred up patriotic sentiments and religious feelings, forced many Russian people to rise above social contradictions, political differences and personal ambitions. The weariness of all layers of society from the civil war and the thirst for order, which they perceived as the restoration of traditional foundations, also affected them.
Gradually it became clearer that solving problems was impossible only within a local framework, a mature understanding of the need for an all-Russian movement. This was reflected militias, collected in Russian provincial cities. The church conducted continuous preaching in favor of the unity of all Orthodox Christians.
In the spring of 1611, the first militia was formed from different parts of the Russian land. Soon the militia besieged Moscow, and on March 19 a decisive battle took place, in which the rebel Muscovites took part. It was not possible to liberate the city. Remaining at the city walls, the militia created the highest authority - the Council of the Whole Land. It served as the Zemsky Sobor, in whose hands there was legislative, judicial and partially executive power. The executive branch was headed by P. Lyapunov, D. Trubetskoy and I. Zarutsky and began to recreate the orders. On June 30, 1611, the “Verdict of the Whole Land” was adopted, which provided for the future structure of Russia, but infringed on the rights of the Cossacks and also had a serfdom character. After the murder of Lyapunov by the Cossacks, the first militia disintegrated.
By this time, the Swedes had captured Novgorod and besieged Pskov, and the Poles, after a months-long siege, had captured Smolensk. Sigismund 3 declared that it was not Vladislav, but he himself, who would become the king of Russia, which would thus become part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. A serious threat to Russian sovereignty has arisen.
The critical situation that developed in the fall of 1611 accelerated the creation of a second militia. Under the influence of the letters of Patriarch Hermogenes and the appeals of the monks of the Trinity - Sergius Monastery in Nizhny Novgorod, the Zemsky elder K. Minin and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky in the fall of 1611 created a second militia with the goal of liberating Moscow and convening the Zemsky Sobor to elect a new king and restore the national monarchy. The put forward program: the liberation of the capital and the refusal to recognize a sovereign of foreign origin on the Russian throne, managed to rally representatives of all classes who abandoned narrow group claims for the sake of saving the Fatherland. In the spring of 1612, the militia moved to Yaroslavl. In conditions of anarchy, the second militia takes over the functions of state administration, creates in Yaroslavl the Council of the Whole Land, which included elected representatives of the clergy, nobility, civil servants, townspeople, palace and black-growing peasants, and forms orders. In August 1612, the militia, supported at a critical moment by Trubetskoy’s Cossacks, prevailed over the army of Hetman K. Khodkevich and entered Moscow. After the liquidation of the attempts of the Polish detachment of Khodkiewicz to penetrate the Kremlin to help the Polish there, the garrison surrendered. On October 26, 1612, Moscow was liberated.
The beginning of the Romanov reign. Results and consequences of the Time of Troubles.
In specific historical conditions beginning of the 17th century the priority was the restoration of central power, which meant the election of a new king. A Zemsky Sobor met in Moscow, at which, in addition to the Boyar Duma, the highest clergy and the capital's nobility, numerous provincial nobility, townspeople, Cossacks and even black-sown (state) peasants were represented. 50 Russian cities sent their representatives.
The main question was the election of a king. A fierce struggle broke out around the candidacy of the future tsar at the council. Some boyar groups proposed calling a “prince’s son” from Poland or Sweden, others nominated candidates from the old Russian princely families (Golitsyns, Mstislavskys, Trubetskoys, Romanovs). The Cossacks even offered the son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek (“warren”).
After much debate, the members of the cathedral agreed on the candidacy of 16-year-old Mikhail Romanov, the cousin of the last tsar from the Moscow Rurik dynasty, Fyodor Ivanovich, which gave reason to associate him with the “legitimate” dynasty. The nobles saw the Romanovs as consistent opponents of the “boyar tsar” Vasily Shuisky, while the Cossacks saw them as supporters of “Tsar Dmitry”. The boyars, who hoped to retain power and influence under the young tsar, did not object either. This choice was determined by the following factors:
The Romanovs satisfied all classes to the greatest extent, which made it possible to achieve reconciliation;
Family ties with the previous dynasty, the youthful age and moral character of 16-year-old Mikhail corresponded to popular ideas about the shepherd king, an intercessor before God, capable of atonement for the sins of the people.
In 1618, after the defeat of the troops of Prince Vladislav, the Deulin Truce was concluded. Russia lost the Smolensk and Seversk lands, but Russian prisoners returned to the country, including Filaret, who, after being elevated to the patriarchate, became the de facto co-ruler of his son.
On February 21, 1613, the Zemsky Sobor announced the election of Mikhail Romanov as Tsar. An embassy was sent to the Kostroma Ipatiev Monastery, where Mikhail and his mother “nun Martha” were hiding at that time with a proposal to take the Russian throne. This is how the Romanov dynasty established itself in Russia, ruling the country for more than 300 years.
One of the heroic episodes of Russian history dates back to this time. A Polish detachment tried to capture the newly elected tsar, looking for him in the Kostroma estates of the Romanovs. But the headman of the village of Domnina, Ivan Susanin, not only warned the tsar about the danger, but also led the Poles into impenetrable forests. The hero died from Polish sabers, but also killed the nobles lost in the forests.
In the first years of the reign of Mikhail Romanov, the country was actually ruled by the Saltykov boyars, relatives of the “nun Martha,” and from 1619, after the return of the Tsar’s father, Patriarch Filaret Romanov, from captivity, the patriarch and “great sovereign” Filaret.
The Troubles shook the royal power, which inevitably increased the importance of the Boyar Duma. Mikhail could not do anything without boyar council. The local system, which regulated relationships within the ruling boyars, existed in Russia for more than a century and was exceptionally strong. The highest positions in the state were occupied by persons whose ancestors were distinguished by nobility, were related to the Kalita dynasty and achieved the greatest success in their careers.
The transfer of the throne to the Romanovs destroyed the old system. Kinship with the new dynasty began to take on paramount importance. But the new system of localism did not take hold immediately. In the first decades of the Troubles, Tsar Mikhail had to put up with the fact that the first places in the Duma were still occupied by the highest titled nobility and the old boyars, who had once tried the Romanovs and handed them over to Boris Godunov for execution. During the Time of Troubles, Filaret called them his worst enemies.
To enlist the support of the nobility, Tsar Mikhail, having no treasury and lands, generously distributed Duma ranks. Under him, the Boyar Duma became more numerous and influential than ever. After Filaret's return from captivity, the composition of the Duma was sharply reduced. The restoration of the economy and state order began.
In 1617, in the village of Stolbovo (near Tikhvin), an “eternal peace” was signed with Sweden. The Swedes returned Novgorod and other northwestern cities to Russia, but the Swedes retained the Izhora land and Korela. Russia lost access to the Baltic Sea, but it managed to get out of the war with Sweden. In 1618, the Truce of Dowlin was concluded with Poland for fourteen and a half years. Russia lost Smolensk and about three dozen more Smolensk, Chernigov and Seversk cities. The contradictions with Poland were not resolved, but only postponed: both sides were not able to continue the war any further. The terms of the truce were very difficult for the country, but Poland refused to claim the throne.
The Time of Troubles in Russia is over. Russia managed to defend its independence, but at a very heavy price. The country was ruined, the treasury was empty, trade and crafts were disrupted. It took several decades to restore the economy. The loss of important territories predetermined further wars for their liberation, which placed a heavy burden on the entire country. The Time of Troubles further strengthened Russia's backwardness.
Russia emerged from the Troubles extremely exhausted, with huge territorial and human losses. According to some estimates, up to a third of the population died. Overcoming economic ruin will be possible only by strengthening serfdom.
The country's international position has sharply deteriorated. Russia found itself in political isolation, its military potential weakened, and for a long time its southern borders remained practically defenseless. Anti-Western sentiments intensified in the country, which aggravated its cultural and, ultimately, civilizational isolation.
The people managed to defend their independence, but as a result of their victory, autocracy and serfdom were revived in Russia. However, most likely, there was no other way to save and preserve Russian civilization in those extreme conditions.
The main results of the turmoil:
1. Russia emerged from the “Troubles” extremely exhausted, with huge territorial and human losses. According to some estimates, up to a third of the population died.
2. Overcoming economic ruin will be possible only by strengthening serfdom.
3. The country’s international position has sharply deteriorated. Russia found itself in political isolation, its military potential weakened, and for a long time its southern borders remained practically defenseless.
4. Anti-Western sentiments have intensified in the country, which has exacerbated its cultural and, ultimately, civilizational isolation.
5. The people managed to defend their independence, but as a result of their victory, autocracy and serfdom were revived in Russia. However, most likely, there was no other way to save and preserve Russian civilization in those extreme conditions.
From the very beginning of 1611 there was a movement that finally brought the state out of ruin. It arose in the district, township and volost worlds (communities) of the North, accustomed to independence and self-government. These communities, which received district and zemstvo institutions of the 16th century, broader organization and involvement in the tasks of the state administration, built their own way of life, developed their internal relations and even were in charge of defense against enemies, maintaining Cossacks and datochny people who were recruited among themselves, under very soft leadership and influence of the central government.
Historical background
The cities and regions of the North, not affected by the development of service land ownership, were free from the sharp class division of the population. There was no strong division between rich and poor, so they were a socially cohesive force. The prosperous and energetic population of the Pomeranian cities awakened to the fight against the reorganization of the land and the defense of the state, as soon as they encountered an insight from the thieves' gangs of the Tushino thief.
That is, these forces were patriotic, but you need to remember that in history there is very little idealism. Despite the fact that among these people there were many sincerely Orthodox and patriotic, it was absolutely clear that the control of the Poles in Moscow, the weakening of state power, was leading them to material losses and disrupting their trade. That is, they had not only a national-class, but also a material interest in driving the Poles out of Moscow, and so that there would be a strong Central government. Strictly speaking, the first wave of this movement arose back in 1609, and objectively, Skopin-Shuisky could have become its leader. But in 1609 the situation was still too complicated. But in 1610 the situation changed.
First Zemstvo Militia
The so-called first Zemstvo militia arose. It was led by the Lipunov brothers (Prokopiy and Zakhar), as well as Ivan Zarutsky, who was once for the Tushintsev, and Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy (the so-called triumvirate). These were all adventurers, but this is a normal feature for the Time of Troubles in Russia. It is precisely such People who come to the fore during the Time of Troubles.
At this time, the Poles are in the Kremlin. In March 1611, the first militia led by the triumvirate began to storm Moscow to drive the Poles out of there. It was not possible to take the city, but the blockade of the Kremlin continued. The Poles have gone so far as to eat corpses. Why did it take on a very organized character? If a person in one company dies, only representatives of this company eat him. It was truly terrifying.
But the Poles held out. By the way, during this uprising the Poles set fire to the city, and almost all of Moscow burned down. And here the conflict begins between the Cossacks and the nobles, because the Lipunovs were the leaders of the noble part, and Zarutsky and especially Trubetskoy were the Cossacks. The Poles used it. They planted a letter according to which Lipunov was supposedly going to enter into some kind of agreement with the Poles. The Cossacks believed this and killed Lipunov. After the death of Lipunov, the noble part left, and the Cossacks were left alone. Meanwhile, another Tsarevich Dmitry appeared in Pskov. True, everyone knew that it was not Dmitry, but Sidorko from the locals. But Trubetskoy recognized him. In some areas, they kissed the cross for Marina Mniszek and her son, whom the official authorities called “Vorenko,” that is, the son of a thief. It was believed that he was the son of False Dmitry 2, but in fact he was the son of Ivan Zarutsky. Under these conditions, a new stage of the Zemstvo movement began in the province.
Second Zemstvo Militia
A second Zemstvo militia arose, led by Kuzma Minin, who at first simply raised funds and, first of all, the infantry was equipped, but a military leader was needed. The military leader was Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky, who came from the Starodubsky princes. That is, he was a descendant of Vsevolod the Big Nest. And he had more than serious reasons to sit on the Russian throne.
Actually, the second militia marched on Moscow under the coat of arms of Prince Pozharsky. Another thing is that Pozharsky failed to become the Russian Tsar, and the Romanovs then did everything to slander him and never pay attention to the fact that the coat of arms of the second militia was the coat of arms of Pozharsky. That is, the second militia marched in order to place Pozharsky on the throne. But this was not part of the Romanovs’ plans. The movement led by the second militia covered the entire Volga region and this entire army came to Yaroslavl, where they stayed for 4 months. Alternative governing bodies were created in Yaroslavl. Here funds were raised and the Council of All the Earth was convened. This Council became a provisional government. Temporary orders were established. An embassy from Novgorod arrived in Yaroslavl, which proposed to invite the Swedish prince Karl Philip to the kingdom. The cunning merchants in Yaroslavl refused nothing to anyone. They were simply stalling for time, making vague promises.
At this time, Zarutsky and Trubetskoy declare Minim and Pozharsky rebels. In addition, there is a conflict between Trubetskoy and Zarutsky himself. Zarutsky takes Marina Mnishek and leaves first for Kaluga, and then to the south. In 1614 he will be captured on Yaik and impaled, and his son will be hanged. That is, the reign of the Romanovs began with the murder of a child. And this is historical symmetry... When they say that they feel sorry for Tsarevich Alexei, who was shot by the Bolsheviks in 1918, they forget that there is some kind of historical symmetry in this. The Romanovs began their reign with the murder of a child, because many people kissed the cross for this child, the son of Marina Mnishek, as a possible heir to the throne. And it was like a historical boomerang that came back after many, many years. Marina herself was either drowned or strangled, but she also disappeared in 1614.
Expulsion of Poles from Moscow
But let's get back to current events. Trubetskoy remained in Moscow, who sent hired killers to Minin and Pozharsky so that they would kill at least Pozharsky. Nothing came of this, and in August 1612, the militia led by Minin and Pozharsky approached Moscow. The situation in Moscow is this: the Poles are sitting in the Kremlin, Trubetskoy and his Cossacks are also sitting in Moscow (but not in the Kremlin). Minin and Pozharsky come to Moscow, but Hetman Khodkevich comes to the rescue of the Poles. Hetman Khodkevich and the militia of Minin and Pozharsky meet near the Crimean Ford (where the Crimean Bridge is now). There was no bridge there then, there was a ford. And here they are standing opposite each other. On August 22, the first battle took place (it was more of a reconnaissance battle), and on August 24, the main battle unfolded. The Russian cavalry could not withstand the blow, but the Nizhny Novgorod infantry saved the situation.
The Poles began to reorganize for the next attack, and Pozharsky explained to Minin that the militia would not withstand the second blow. Then Pozharsky turned to Trubetskoy for help. But Trubetskoy refused, because the Cossacks strongly hated everyone who had or could have had at least a slightly better financial situation. And then Minin cheated... The battle began, success began to lean on the side of the Poles, and then Minin decided the matter. He sent Trubetskoy a messenger to the Cossacks with the promise that if the Cossacks help and hit the flank, then Khodkevich’s entire convoy will be theirs. For the Cossacks, this decided everything (the convoy is a sacred matter). The Cossacks struck the flank, Hetman Khodkevich was defeated and as a result, the Cossacks entered Russian history with a convoy. Looking ahead, the Cossacks will leave Russian history on the wagon.