The history of the battle for the Caucasus - how the situation developed on the fronts before it began, what was the balance of power. How the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus went, the victories and defeats of the Soviet command. What is famous about the second stage of the battle in the Caucasus, the main battles and results.
The Battle of the Caucasus 1942-1943 – a serious turning point in the course of the war
The battle for the Caucasus was of decisive importance for the outcome of the Great Patriotic War. Had the Soviet Union lost this battle, it is quite possible that the entire Second World War would have been lost. It was one of the longest and lasted from July 25, 1942 to October 9, 1943.
Time is inexorable. Today there are very few WWII veterans left - participants in that great struggle against the enemy. They try their best to surround them with care and attention, especially on the memorable dates of these events. Poems are dedicated to heroes in which their exploits are glorified. Children's drawing competitions are held on the theme of the Battle of the Caucasus, where children often depict warriors with orders and medals. These pictures in once again remind us of how important it is to take care of the world.
Heroes and ordinary participants in the battle for the Caucasus can be seen in the photo on May 9 during the procession of the Immortal Regiment.
This victory came at a huge cost to us. What we call "the battle" was in reality a series of military operations. The battle for the Caucasus has a strategic division into two stages - the first was defensive (throughout 1942), and the second offensive (from the beginning of 1943).
Military-political situation in the first half of 1942
The beginning of the 1942 military campaign for our country was unsuccessful. Serious miscalculations were made in the planning and conduct of operations along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.
Previous Events
Having carried out several successful operations in the winter of 1941, in particular, near Moscow, Yelets, Rostov and other settlements, the military leadership Soviet Union made erroneous conclusions about the unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht army for combat operations in winter conditions (which were partly true). The military potential of the Nazi group on the Eastern Front as a whole was greatly underestimated.
Attempts to seize the initiative in the winter and spring of 1942 through numerous private offensive operations led to failure. Thus, the Rzhev-Vyazemsk, Smolensk, Kharkov operations, also in the Crimea, the battle for the Demyansk cauldron and others, in a number of cases, were marked by local successes. As a result, Soviet troops even managed to capture part of the territories, but in general they ended in failure with a huge number of losses in manpower and equipment.
By the summer, the Red Army switched to positional defense. Another strategic mistake was the assumption put forward by the Soviet command that the Nazis’ summer campaign would again develop in the old directions (Moscow, Leningrad), assigning secondary importance to the south. It was there that the main battles were expected. The attack on the Caucasus came as a surprise.
The importance of the Caucasus during the war
By 1942, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Crimea, Donbass were lost, Leningrad was under siege. The economic base of the USSR narrowed. A number of industrial areas were lost, and the evacuated enterprises had not yet reached the required capacity. Significant agricultural areas were lost. As a result, steel production decreased by 10 million tons, grain harvests decreased by more than 3 times. We should not forget about the significant reduction in mobilization resources due to the loss of vast territories.
Under the current conditions, the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia turned out to be key industrial and agricultural regions for the Soviet Union. They accounted for 86.5% of all-Union oil production, 65% of natural gas, 56.5% of manganese ore. In addition, the trade route through the Persian Gulf, Iran and the Caspian Sea was second only to the Northern Sea Route for Lend-Lease supplies.
The balance of forces and means before the start of the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus
For Nazi Germany, the Caucasus was also vitally important, mainly due to the lack of oil and petroleum products. The technical equipment of the army grew, and so did their consumption. Germany's own industry was struggling. Even the captured oil-bearing territories of Europe, as well as the production of synthetic, or “ersatz fuel” from coal, alcohol, benzene and others, barely met the needs.
Plans of the German command
During the unsuccessful Kharkov offensive operation of the Soviet troops, the Nazis reached the Don and occupied Rostov. On the basis of the fascist army group “South”, two army groups were created - “A” and “B”.
Group “A” included 3 armies - one tank and two infantry. Their task at the first stage was to cross the Don, occupy part of the Kuban, the North Caucasus, and the eastern coast of the Azov and Black Seas. On the second, they were supposed to go around the Main Caucasus Range from the west and east and through the passes into Transcaucasia. In addition, with access to the border of Turkey, force it to enter into a war with “Soviet Russia”.
Field Marshal List was appointed commander. He was instructed to solve the combat mission by consistently implementing the plan Operation Edelweiss. List was later recalled by Hitler from the front and a new commander, Colonel General Kleist, was appointed in his place. Thus, from November 1942, the reins of power passed to him.
Group "B" was intended for the attack on Stalingrad. It is obvious that the Stalingrad direction was initially of secondary importance.
In the Caucasian direction, 3 fronts were deployed: Southern, North Caucasian, Transcaucasian.
Southern Front had 5 armies, whose task was to prevent the crossing of the Don and the development of an offensive in the Kuban and the Caucasus. General Malinovsky was appointed commander.
North Caucasus Front consisted of one army and two separate corps. They were tasked with defending the northeastern and eastern coasts of the Black and Azov Seas. The commander was Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny.
Transcaucasian Front consisting of two armies and one cavalry corps, defended the Black Sea coast with our naval bases located in Georgia. Part of the forces was located in northern Iran to cover the Iranian-Turkish border.
All three fronts were not fully equipped, and there were problems with logistics support.
The Black Sea Fleet experienced difficulties due to the loss of Crimea and its main base - the city of Sevastopol. At this time, Novorossiysk became his replacement. In addition, enemy aircraft from Crimean airfields caused significant damage.
The Caucasus as a theater of military operations began to be equipped back in 1941, but the work proceeded extremely slowly and ineffectively. In addition, nothing was done in terms of fortification on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. It seemed that they were not going to fight in the mountains at all. Everything had to be corrected in a short time and during the course of hostilities.
Developments in the defense of the Caucasus
By July 25, Wehrmacht formations unexpectedly reached the Don. Soviet units had to urgently prepare for defense.
Alignment of forces at the 1st stage of the battle
The superiority of Army Group A over the troops of the Southern Front turned out to be as follows:
- in personnel by 1.5 times;
- in tanks 9.3 times;
- in airplanes 7.7 times.
The enemy had the advantage necessary for an offensive to force a water barrier only in tanks and aircraft. But the troops of the Southern Front defended a strip 320 kilometers wide, and their forces were stretched thin. There was no opportunity to form strong second echelons and reserves. All these prerequisites led to the fact that in some places the Nazis, through skillful maneuvering, were able to create the necessary advantage.
German offensive
In the first two days, the Nazis managed to cross the Don in certain sectors of the front and break through the defenses. Further, developing the offensive, enemy formations reached Bataysk. In some places, the preconditions arose for the encirclement of parts of the Southern Front. In addition, with the entry of German tank units into the steppe, it became possible to cut the front into two parts.
Under these conditions, our command decided to retreat. However, due to the rapid advance of the Nazis, our troops failed to organize an organized retreat, much less maneuverable defense. The retreat turned into flight. Thus, the combat effectiveness of the Southern Front was partially lost, therefore July 28 it was disbanded and included in the North Caucasus.
After this date, a partial regrouping of both our and German troops took place. The Nazis continued to rapidly develop their offensive and by the end of August 19 they had practically completed their immediate task. Most of the Kuban was captured, the cities of Maykop, Stavropol, Armavir, Elista, and Krasnodar fell. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. The Azov flotilla was forced to evacuate and subsequently became part of the Black Sea Fleet.
Battles for Novorossiysk, Malgobek and in the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range. Defense of Tuapse
The Red Army was able to organize serious resistance only on the approaches to Tuapse, thereby preventing a large group of our troops from being surrounded and blocking the path to the Black Sea.
Further plans of the command of the German Army Group A consisted of a simultaneous offensive along three main transport arteries:
- along the Black Sea coast Anapa-Poti-Batumi;
- through the Main Caucasus Range in the direction of Sukhumi-Kutaisi;
- from the east, bypassing the ridge through Pyatigorsk-Prokhladnoye-Ordzhonikidze in the direction of Grozny, Makhachkala and Baku.
The Soviet leadership took a number of measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. First of all, the Transcaucasian Front was strengthened with two rifle corps and eleven separate rifle brigades from the Headquarters reserve. A number of formations were transferred from the Makhachkala and Baku region to occupy defensive lines along the Terek and Urukh rivers.
At the end of August, Lavrentiy Beria arrived in the Caucasus to provide general supervision of defense preparations. According to his instructions, work was carried out on the engineering equipment of protective lines, strongholds, and nodes of engineering barriers on the passes of the Caucasus Range, the engineering and sapper group was significantly strengthened, and the main mountain roads were prepared for collapse, flooding and destruction.
On August 19, the German offensive resumed with simultaneous attacks on Anapa and Temryuk and the Taman Peninsula. It was not possible to take Anapa the first time. The Germans succeeded only on August 31st. At the same time, they cut off marine units from the main forces on the Taman Peninsula. As a result of the partially successful actions of September 11, almost all Novorossiysk.Subsequent attempts to capture the city were completely unsuccessful. His the defense lasted almost a year.
On August 23, 1942, attempts to attack Mozdok began. Two days later the city fell. Subsequently, having crossed the Terek, the Germans managed to advance 10 km with heavy losses. However, this offensive was not continued. A little further they managed to move along the Prokhladnoye-Ordzhonikidze-Grozny railway in the direction of the Grozny oil region. However, the troops did not allow them further than Malgobekanashi. The Nazis were forced to go on the defensive in this sector as well.
Simultaneously with offensive actions in the Grozny and Novorossiysk directions, the Wehrmacht organized attempts to cross the Main Caucasus Ridge. The soldiers of the German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps even managed to plant a fascist flag on Elbrus. In February 1943, it was removed from the mountain top and installed by the Soviets.
Towards the end of September 1942, the situation in the North Caucasus was relatively stabilized, thanks to successful defensive actions, as well as due to the transfer of part of the German forces to the area of the Battle of Stalingrad. The enemy's offensive potential was exhausted. Therefore, by the end of September, the Germans launched only isolated attacks in the Novorossiysk and Grozny directions.
On September 25, 1942, an attempt was made to advance towards Tuapse. After five days of stubborn fighting, there was a danger of the city being captured, but the enemy was stopped by two counterattacks. Subsequently, the Germans made two more attempts - in October and November, which were also unsuccessful. As a result of prolonged positional defensive battles, the enemy was stopped and forced to switch to defense in December 1942.
At the end of October, a series of successful actions allowed the enemy to capture Nalchik and Gizel. The Soviet command partially minimized these losses when they liberated Gisel with counterattacks and the encirclement of a large group of Germans.
In addition, in a number of sectors of the Mozdok front, during November the preconditions were created for counter-offensive actions. However, due to miscalculations in the development of the operation and an incorrect assessment of the enemy, it was not possible to break into the Nazi defenses until mid-December. The offensive was delayed until January 1943.
Results of the 1st stage of the battle for the Caucasus
The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus in 1942 for the Red Army turned out to be very difficult and bloody. Our troops suffered heavy losses. Despite their stubborn resistance, the enemy continued to advance deeper into the country. The main positive results of the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus can be considered the following:
- Operation Edelweiss failed, the Caucasian nut was too tough for Hitler;
- the Germans never managed to capture the oil-bearing regions of our country;
- The Wehrmacht was unable to penetrate the Middle East;
- Türkiye never entered the war;
- the enemy lost more than 100 thousand killed.
The defeat of the German group during the counteroffensive
By January 1943, the Red Army managed to create an advantage in manpower and equipment in the zones of action of the Southern and Transcaucasian fronts.
Alignment of forces at the beginning of the 2nd stage of the battle
IN numerically superiority was:
- in personnel by 1.4 times;
- in guns and mortars by 2.1 times;
- in tanks 1.8 times;
- in airplanes 1.7 times.
Some problems arose with the logistical support of the fronts. Firstly, difficult terrain and unstable weather. Secondly, the main routes for delivering material and personnel from the depths of the country were possible only by sea. Therefore, the main burden fell on the Caspian Flotilla and, to a lesser extent, on the Black Sea Fleet.
Both fronts had the task of encircling and not letting the enemy out of the North Caucasus and Kuban with coordinated strikes with the support of the Black Sea Fleet and two air armies. It was not possible to complete this task.
The German command understood the complexity of the situation. In the Stalingrad direction the German- fascist troops suffered a crushing defeat. There was a risk of getting another encirclement of Army Group “A” in the North Caucasus direction. Therefore, the decision was made to retreat. It was planned to be carried out by a sequential retreat to pre-selected lines, of which there were four planned, with cover by strong rearguards (classical maneuverable defense).
At the beginning of January, parts of the Wehrmacht began to retreat. At the beginning, the situation turned out well for the Germans. They managed to significantly break away from the Soviet troops. At this stage, our command did not have a sufficient number of mobile formations that could constrain the maneuver by actions on the flanks. There were only cavalry corps, which could not cope with this task.
The Nazis managed to stay ahead of our units and formations for several days. Therefore, it was decided not to scatter forces and resources, but to concentrate on the right flank and reach possible escape routes.
In the first weeks of the persecution, Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, and Mineralnye Vody were liberated. On January 21, Stavropol was cleared of fascist units. And yet, pushing the enemy out of the North Caucasus was unprofitable; it had to be locked in, and our troops acted late. Under these conditions, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was reorganized on January 24 into the North Caucasus Front under the command of Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov.
The Red Army failed to immediately capture Bataysk and Krasnodar; the battles near Tuapse became protracted. There were not enough forces to block the Nazis' retreat to Rostov.
In the current situation, plans required adjustment. As a result, the Soviet command decided to concentrate its main efforts on preventing the enemy from retreating to Rostov, the Taman Peninsula and his retreat to Crimea through the Kerch Strait. In addition, Krasnodar had to be captured as soon as possible.
On February 14, Rostov was liberated. Almost simultaneously, to the south, our troops defeated the encircled Krasnodar enemy group and liberated the city itself.
In the sky over Kuban from April 17 to 24 The largest air battle unfolded, from which Soviet aviation emerged victorious.
Decisive battles on the Taman Peninsula
The retreat to the Taman Peninsula could not be prevented. In this sector, the front narrowed and the enemy managed to thicken the battle formations. Our troops met stubborn resistance. The Nazis concentrated a group of 400 thousand on the peninsula. They wanted to hold this bridgehead at any cost. On its territory, the Nazis erected a well-known defensive line - the “Blue Line”.
Soon the protracted Novorossiysk-Taman operation began, which became the final one in the battle for the Caucasus.
The fighting continued there from February to October 1943. The enemy units did achieve some success here. After the start of the offensive of our troops in Ukraine in September of the same year, the Nazis managed to evacuate over two hundred thousand personnel, all horses, equipment and supplies from the Taman Peninsula to Crimea.
In early February, a landing was carried out south of Novorossiysk. The Marines managed to capture part of the coastal areas. Subsequently, this bridgehead will be called “Malaya Zemlya”. Fierce fighting there continued until the liberation of Novorossiysk. This only happened on September 16th.
By October 9, 1943, the Taman Peninsula was completely liberated. Thus ended the battle for the Caucasus.
Residents of the mountainous regions helped our army as guides. Maps of that time did not fully reflect mountain roads and trails. In addition, a paper map could not replace an experienced mountaineer.
After summing up the results of this great historical battle in May 1944, the Medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus"
Results of the 2nd stage of the battle for the Caucasus
The second stage of the battle for the Caucasus was generally positive for the Soviet Union. The results are as follows:
- all the republics of the North Caucasus, most of the territory of Kuban, the eastern coast of the Black and Azov Seas were liberated;
- the main cultivated areas and the Maikop oil regions were returned;
- a major military defeat was inflicted on Nazi Germany.
The negative aspects include the fact that the Germans managed to retain most of Army Group “A”; they were never able to lock it in the Caucasus.
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Our victory is woven from many battles. Among them, the battle in the Caucasus of 1942-1943 became the longest in the entire Great Patriotic War. The Russian soldier has once again shown that no matter where he fights, be it the forests of the Moscow region, the swamps near Leningrad, the Kuban steppes or the Caucasus mountains, he will survive and win.
The heroic defense of the Caucasus became part of military history Soviet Union, and later Russia. This battle took its rightful place in the list of feats of Russian weapons.
Defense of the Caucasus 1942-1943
Defense of the Caucasus (Battle for the Caucasus) is a major defensive-offensive operation of Soviet troops during the second period of the Great Patriotic War in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.
From July 25 to December 31, 1942, an offensive was carried out by the Germans, who managed to capture part of the territories;
From December 31 to October 9, 1943, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive, recaptured territory and forced German troops to retreat.
By the beginning of autumn 1942, German troops were able to conquer most of the Kuban and North Caucasus, but after the defeat at Stalingrad they were forced to retreat again, as they suffered serious losses and feared that Soviet troops would encircle them. In 1943, the Soviet army planned an operation, as a result of which German troops were to be surrounded in the Kuban territory and defeated, but the operation failed - the Germans were evacuated to Crimea.
Background and balance of power
By June 1942, the Soviet army was in a weakened state after the failure at Kharkov. The German command, seeing that the Soviet troops could not provide worthy resistance, decided to launch an offensive in the Caucasus, taking advantage of the situation. After a series of battles, German troops were able to conquer several cities, including Rostov-on-Don, which opened the way for Hitler to the Caucasus.
The Caucasus, like Ukraine, was a very important strategic point that German troops sought to capture as early as possible. The Caucasus and Kuban contained large reserves of Soviet oil, grain and other crops, which could provide serious support for the German army to conduct further battles on the territory of the USSR. In addition, Hitler hoped that by reaching the sea he would be able to turn to Turkey for help. Moreover, the German command also counted on the help of the residents themselves, since they were aware that part of the local population did not accept Soviet power.
After the fall of Rostov-on-Don, communication between the Soviet command and the Caucasus could only be carried out by sea or by rail passing through Stalingrad. That is why Stalingrad became an important point that the Germans needed to capture. Despite the fact that Hitler threw enormous forces into the fight at Stalingrad, he was never able to take the city. The Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad. They suffered significant losses and, largely thanks to this, later they never managed to conquer the Caucasus.
Progress in the defense of the Caucasus
The battle took place in two stages. During the first stage, the German army, not without difficulty, managed to take a number of cities: Stavropol, Armavir, Maykop, Krasnodar, Elista, Mozdok and part of Novorossiysk. In September 1942, the German army approached the Malgobek area, where it was stopped by Soviet troops.
On September 9, after fierce three-day fighting, most of the city of Novorossiysk, located on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, was abandoned. The eastern part of the city was held by Soviet troops until the complete liberation of Novorossiysk in September 1943. For the courage shown by the defenders of the city, Novorossiysk was awarded the title “Hero City”.
The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus took place from July to December 1942. The German army was able to approach the foothills of the Caucasus Range and the Terek River, but this victory was not easy - Hitler’s troops suffered colossal losses. The original plan to capture Transcaucasia was never completed, despite the fact that the Germans were still leading in this operation - Soviet troops were able to stop the German offensive in time and force the army to stop fighting, since most of the army was simply destroyed. Türkiye also failed, which never decided to enter the war and come to the aid of Hitler.
The German offensive failed largely due to the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad. Hitler, who had too high hopes for the capture of this city, simply did not foresee the possibility that the Soviet army could defend Stalingrad and, therefore, one of the routes to the Caucasus.
As a result of numerous losses, by the beginning of 1943 the German army was numerically inferior to the Soviet one several times.
The second stage of the battle for the Caucasus can be considered a counter-offensive of Soviet troops, which became extremely successful for the Soviet Union. Territories previously captured by the Germans were recaptured, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Rostov region, Stavropol Territory and other areas were completely liberated. Oil fields and grain crops were again returned under the control of the Soviet Union, which gave a colossal advantage in the war.
Despite the fact that the Soviet army was able to achieve serious successes, it cannot be considered that the victory definitely belonged to the Soviet Union, since the main goal that Stalin set for his army - to capture and destroy the Germans in Kuban - was never achieved. The German army fled to Crimea, however, despite this, the Caucasus returned again to the command of the USSR.
The meaning and results of the battle for the Caucasus
The successes of the Soviet Union in the battle for the Caucasus can be considered one of the most important parts of the general counter-offensive of the USSR in the second period of the war. At this time, the Soviet army not only began to recapture its territories and return captured people, but also greatly increased its combat power and could concede on equal terms in battles with the German army. The return to the jurisdiction of the USSR of such an important strategic point as the Caucasus can be considered as one of greatest victories USSR in the Great Patriotic War.
Unfortunately, the battle for the Caucasus also had negative consequences. Part of the population was accused of assisting the enemy and many of the local residents were later exiled to Siberia.
With the victory at Stalingrad and the battle in the Caucasus, the victorious march of the Soviet Union in the Second World War began.
1942, Defense of the Caucasus
The situation in the Caucasus in July 1942 and measures to strengthen the defense of the Caucasus
The Caucasus is an important economic region. On the eve of the war, a large fuel and energy base was created here. The North Caucasus and Transcaucasia accounted for 86.5 percent of all-Union oil production, 65 percent of natural gas, and 56.5 percent of manganese ore. The Baku region provided almost three-quarters of all oil produced in the USSR. The Caucasus is a rich agricultural region.
Geographical location The Caucasus determines its strategic importance. In the pre-war period, significant foreign trade turnover of the Soviet Union was carried out through the Caucasus and ports on the Black and Caspian Seas. During the war, trade routes passing through the Persian Gulf, Iran, and the Caspian Sea occupied second place after the Northern Sea Route in the supply of weapons and strategic raw materials from the United States and the countries of the British Empire.
By the summer of 1942, with the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other areas, the economic base of the Soviet Union had narrowed sharply: steel production had decreased by more than 10 million tons per year; grain harvest - more than three times; mobilization resources decreased due to the enemy’s occupation of part of Soviet territory. Under the current conditions, the defense of the Caucasus acquired vital importance for the Soviet state. The Soviet Supreme High Command assigned it to the troops of the Southern, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts.
During the period of deterioration of the situation on the Don, Headquarters demanded that the troops, and above all the command of the Southern Front, prevent the enemy from crossing to the left bank of the river. By a directive dated July 22, 1942, the commander of the Southern Front was tasked with immediately occupying the southern bank of the Don from Konstantinovsky to Bataysk. All units of the North Caucasus Front defending in this sector were transferred to the subordination of the commander of the Southern Front, under his leadership the aviation of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts was united, which was entrusted with the task of destroying enemy crossings from Konstantinovsky to the mouth of the Don. The line of defense along the banks of the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Konstantinovsky was (exclusively) occupied by troops of the 51st Army of the North Caucasus Front, which from July 25 were transferred to the Southern Front. The actions of the troops of this army were supported from the air by aviation of the 8th Air Army of the Stalingrad Front.
Thus, from July 25, the troops of the Southern Front under the command of General R. Ya. Malinovsky occupied defense along the left bank of the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Azov. The front included seven combined arms armies. All of them were small in number and totaled about 112 thousand people, 121 tanks, 2160 guns and mortars. In the first echelon of the front, the width of which was about 320 km, there were the 51st, 37th, 12th and 18th armies. After the battles for Rostov, the 56th Army was withdrawn to the second echelon. The front reserve consisted of rifle and cavalry divisions located in the 37th Army zone in the area west of the Vesely village, as well as the remnants of the 9th and 24th armies, weakened in the battles for Donbass, which were concentrated in the Salsk region. The front troops were supported by the 4th Air Army under the command of General K. A. Vershinin, which had 130 aircraft.
The southern front was tasked with destroying the enemy who had broken through to the left bank of the Don, and, having restored the situation, firmly occupying the defense from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Azov. Subsequent events showed that such a task was beyond the capabilities of the Southern Front: the armies of the left wing numbered only 17-20 thousand people. Only the 51st Army, whose defense front reached 170 km, had 40 thousand people. All this did not allow us to achieve the necessary density of forces and means in defense. The armies were stretched along the front and did not have the opportunity to create strong second echelons and reserves. There was also not enough artillery. There was not a single gun left in the artillery units of the 37th Army; there was a shortage of ammunition. The army's artillery had from 0.3 to 3 rounds of ammunition for anti-tank guns, up to 3 rounds of ammunition for guns of 76 mm caliber and larger, and up to 1 round of ammunition for mortars. There were not enough hand grenades and rifle cartridges. Due to a lack of fuel, the aviation of the 4th Air Army was forced to sharply reduce the number of combat sorties.
The armies of the first echelon of the front went over to the defensive hastily, under continuous attacks from superior enemy forces, and occupied lines that were not fully prepared in engineering terms. Only in the zone of the 51st Army was it possible to prepare the defensive line by 50-60 percent. Engineering structures on the front from Tsimlyanskaya to the Sea of Azov, previously built by the forces of the North Caucasus Military District, were flooded during the spring floods, and many of them could not be used by the retreating troops.
A difficult situation has arisen regarding logistics. The planned supply was disrupted. The troops received food mainly from local resources. During the withdrawal, control of formations and units was disrupted, communications were often interrupted: there was no wired communication, and the radio was not always used skillfully.
The responsible task was assigned to the troops of the North Caucasus Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny. The front included the 47th Army, the 1st Separate Rifle Division and the 17th Cavalry Corps. They defended the northeastern and eastern coasts of the Azov and Black Seas from Azov to Lazarevsky. The 5th Air Army of the front, commanded by General S.K. Goryunov, had only about 100 aircraft. The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were promptly subordinate to the front.
The Transcaucasian Front, commanded by General I.V. Tyulenev, defended the Black Sea coast from Lazarevskoye to Batumi and the border with Turkey. Part of his troops were stationed in Northern Iran and covered the Iranian-Turkish border. The front included the 45th and 46th armies and the 15th cavalry corps. In the Makhachkala region, the newly formed 44th Army covered the Baku direction from the north. Front aviation consisted of 14 regiments with 164 serviceable combat aircraft. In addition, 3 reserve aviation regiments and 8 aviation schools were stationed in Transcaucasia, with a total of 232 serviceable combat aircraft.
By the beginning of the battle for the Caucasus, the formations of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts were not fully staffed. There were also no necessary reserves. The commander of the Transcaucasian Front had in his reserve an infantry division, a tank brigade and four artillery and mortar regiments. Therefore, in the directive of July 8, 1942, the Headquarters demanded that the commanders of the troops of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts “...use all opportunities to create reserves using internal resources..., having them on prepared defensive lines or in anti-tank areas and in advance aiming for a counterattack in the directions where the enemy is most likely to appear.”
The Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, despite the losses suffered in the first year of the war, maintained superiority in ships. However, with the loss of Sevastopol - the main naval base on the Black Sea - and Crimean peninsula The situation for the Black Sea Fleet has become significantly more complicated. The fleet began to be based at the Caucasian ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Poti, which had a small ship repair base, while many ships needed urgent repairs. The relocation of German aviation to Crimea allowed it to attack ships and naval bases of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, the Black Sea Fleet aviation was forced to use poorly equipped Caucasian airfields and even unpaved sites, which limited its use, especially in rainy weather. There was an acute shortage of fighter aircraft to provide reliable cover for ships operating at sea. The Azov military flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, together with the ground forces, carried out the task of defending the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.
By July 25, 1942, fascist troops advancing in the Caucasian direction reached the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the river. The enemy managed to seize bridgeheads in the areas of Tsimlyanskaya, Nikolaevskaya, Razdorskaya and Bataysk. Capture of bridgeheads and the presence of a strong group that was far superior to Soviet troops in Lower Don, allowed the German command to launch an offensive operation to capture the Caucasus virtually without pause. The plan for the operation called “Edelweiss” was contained in OKB Directive No. 45 of July 23, 1942.
The implementation of the plan was entrusted to Army Group A, whose troops were commanded by Field Marshal General V. List. It consisted of the 1st Tank Army (eleven divisions), the 4th Tank Army (three tank divisions), the 17th Army (fifteen divisions, infantry and cavalry brigades), the 3rd Romanian Army (seven divisions) and the in Crimea the 11th Army (fifteen divisions).
The 17th Army, 1st and 4th Tank Armies operated in the first echelon against the Southern Front from Verkhne-Kurmoyarsk to the mouth of the Don. The enemy group consisted of 167 thousand people, 1,130 tanks, 4,540 guns and mortars, and up to 1 thousand combat aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet. The enemy achieved significant superiority over the troops of the Southern Front: in personnel - 1.5 times; guns and mortars - 2.1; tanks - 9.3; on airplanes - 7.7 times.
The enemy's main strike group, consisting of three tank corps (40, 3 and 57), acted against the troops of the center of the Southern Front in the Salsk direction.
The immediate task of Army Group A was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov and Novocherkassk. It was planned to launch two strikes in converging directions on Tikhoretsk: the main one - with large forces of tank and mechanized formations of the 1st and 4th Tank Armies from bridgeheads in the Konstantinovsky and Tsimlyanskaya areas, auxiliary - with the forces of the 17th Army after crossing the Don near Rostov and from the bridgehead in the Bataysk region.
After the capture of the North Caucasus, the enemy planned to develop an offensive on Tuapse and Batumi in order to enter Transcaucasia and deprive the Black Sea Fleet of its bases. The Nazi offensive in this direction was facilitated by the 42nd Army Corps of the 11th Army, which was supposed to strike through the Kerch Strait to Krasnodar and Novorossiysk.
Mountain and ranger divisions were given the task of crossing the Kuban River, capturing the areas of Maykop, Armavir, the mountain passes of the western part of the Main Caucasus Range and advancing into Transcaucasia.
The 1st and 4th tank armies with the main forces were supposed to advance through the Stavropol region to Grozny, Makhachkala and capture the Baku oil region. Part of the forces was planned to take passes through the Main Caucasian ridge on the Ossetian Military and Georgian Military roads with subsequent access to Transcaucasia.
Thus, at the first stage of the operation according to the Edelweiss plan, the fascist German command intended to capture the North Caucasus, and at the second - Transcaucasia, bypassing the Main Caucasian ridge from the west and east and at the same time overcoming it from the north through the passes. The Wehrmacht command hoped to force Turkey to enter the war with the Soviet Union by leaving its troops in Transcaucasia. At the same time, the fascists pinned great hopes on the fact that they would be able to set the peoples of the Caucasus at odds, destroy their friendship with the Russians and other fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union, and use this to strengthen their dominance in the Caucasus.
Ensuring the offensive of the troops of the left wing of Army Group A was entrusted to Army Group B, which was striking at Stalingrad. After capturing the city, part of its tank and motorized troops was supposed to advance along the Volga with the task of reaching Astrakhan and paralyzing movement along the river. The right wing of the troops of Army Group A was supported by naval forces located in the Black Sea. Their task was to provide ground forces with passage through the Kerch Strait and deprive the Soviet fleet of the opportunity to strike at German troops advancing along the coast in a southeastern direction. The General Headquarters of the German Navy was also tasked with preparing light ships for transfer to the Caspian Sea to disrupt sea communications.
The existing superiority in tanks and artillery allowed the German command to create large attack groups in certain directions, primarily tank ones, and, in the event of a breakthrough in the defense, to conduct an offensive at a high tempo, especially in the North Caucasus. The enemy's great advantage in conducting combat operations both on land and at sea was superiority in aviation. Due to the small number of fighter aircraft in the air armies of the Southern and North Caucasus fronts and weak air defense, enemy aircraft often acted with impunity.
The unfavorable balance of forces for the Soviet troops was aggravated by the difficulties of logistically supporting the formations operating in the Caucasian direction. In the summer of 1942, the country's industry could not yet fully satisfy the needs of the Soviet army. It has just completed its transition to military production. The lack of fuel, food, and technical equipment made it impossible to quickly make up for losses. In addition, a large amount of military equipment, weapons and ammunition was required for the armies operating in the Stalingrad direction, which was turning into the center of the struggle on the Soviet-German front.
The rear units and institutions of the Southern Front suffered heavy losses in vehicles when withdrawing from Donbass and crossing the Don. Supplying troops from the rear of the country became more difficult. The railway lines connecting the Caucasus with the center of the country were cut by the enemy. The railway communications of the Stalingrad direction carried out the supply of reserves to the Stalingrad area and the evacuation of material assets from the North Caucasus. Ports on the Caspian Sea were not suitable for loading and unloading military equipment. All this slowed down transportation from Astrakhan, Guryev, Krasnovodsk to the ports of the western coast of the Caspian Sea by more than 1.5-2 times.
The delivery of the necessary funds to the front was made difficult by the accumulation of a huge number of people on highways and railways, bridges and ferries, at railway stations of the North Caucasus, as well as industrial equipment, agricultural products and livestock evacuated deep into the Caucasus from the regions of the Don, Kuban and Stavropol. Road and horse-drawn transport mobilized from the national economy was not used effectively enough to transport goods.
Preparation of the Caucasus territory as a theater of military operations began before the Great Patriotic War and continued throughout 1941.
The Supreme High Command's directive of October 2, 1941 demanded that the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District immediately begin organizing the defense of the Caucasus from the north, building fortified field lines on the Taman Peninsula and strengthening the defense of the Black Sea bases and ports from land. On October 9, she indicated specific defense lines that should be built by November 25. On November 22, Headquarters once again drew the attention of the district command to accelerating the construction of defensive lines, primarily on the Taman Peninsula and in the areas of fleet bases and ports on the Black Sea coast. She demanded “defensive work in the port areas... to be carried out not only from the sea, but also from land, having coordinated the defense system with representatives of the Navy.”
Back in November - December 1941, the construction of field fortified lines began on the Lower Don from Nizhnechirskaya to Azov, along the Kuma and Manych rivers. However, there were shortcomings in the preparation of defensive lines in the North Caucasus before the spring of 1942: engineering work unfolded slowly; the main positions of the defensive lines were chosen in the floodplains of the Lower Don and Kuban rivers; in the spring they were flooded with water, as a result of which some of the structures collapsed and their restoration was delayed until mid-summer; the work was carried out on a wide 700-kilometer front, which scattered the already insignificant forces and resources of the district; not enough attention was paid to creating a deeply layered defense in the most important operational areas.
In the spring and especially early summer of 1942, when the Nazi troops were getting closer to Rostov and there was an immediate threat of an enemy attack on the Caucasus from the north, Headquarters and the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District (from May 19, 1942 - North-Caucasus Caucasian Front) took more decisive measures to strengthen the defense of the North Caucasus.
On April 3, the territory of the North Caucasus was divided into eleven combat areas. The defense of each of them was entrusted to the formations, units and military institutions stationed within the boundaries of these areas. In regional centers and militarily important settlements in the district, 138 fighter battalions were formed, mainly from those liable for military service who received a deferment from conscription. The main task of the battalions was to, in cooperation with units and units of the NKVD troops and police, eliminate possible enemy airborne assaults and sabotage groups.
In order to create a deeply layered defense from the north, in May the construction of defensive lines began between the Don and Kuban, along the Terek and on the external defensive contours around Tikhoretsk, Voroshilovsk (Stavropol), Grozny, Mineralnye Vody and Krasnodar. On June 16, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front decided to equip 580 battalion defense areas on these lines. However, by the beginning of hostilities in the North Caucasus, there were less than one third of the planned number. Significant disadvantages of the defensive lines were their poor anti-tank preparation and insufficient camouflage.
On July 19, the General Staff pointed out to the headquarters of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts the shortcomings in the organization of defense, the lack of proper management of engineering work and the low quality of prepared lines. The directive noted that the troops are slowly restoring flooded structures on the Lower Don; units and formations do not have close contacts with local authorities authorities, which also slows down the conduct of defensive work.
In order to organize defense in the Stavropol direction, the commander of the Southern Front troops on July 23 set the task of the 8th Engineer Army, consisting of 8 engineer brigades and 19 construction battalions, to build a line along the banks of the Sal, Susat, and Podpolnaya rivers by July 28. The 25th Defense Construction Directorate was supposed to prepare a line along the southern bank of the Manych Canal, along the Manych and Nizhny Don rivers. To protect large administrative and industrial centers, it was planned to create special defensive regions: Makhachkala, Grozny, Ordzhonikidze. The bulk of the troops in these areas were NKVD divisions. Improvement of the borders on the coast of the Taman Peninsula continued.
At the same time, the defense of the Main Caucasus Range and the Baku direction was strengthened: formations and units of the 46th and 44th armies built fortifications on the roads and passes; The main forces of the 44th Army prepared lines in the Baku direction along the Terek and Sulak rivers, equipped Derbent and Samur positions and built two intermediate lines.
Despite the measures taken, the defensive lines in the North Caucasus and the Main Caucasus Ridge were not ready for the start of the battle due to lack of time. Engineering and construction work had to be carried out during the battle under the continuous influence of aviation and strong tank and mechanized enemy groups.
To strengthen the defense of the Caucasus, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command carried out other measures. New formations and units were formed in the Transcaucasian Military District, which on May 1, 1942 was again renamed the Transcaucasian Front. The air defense of the most important facilities and industrial areas of the Caucasus was strengthened. Based on the resolution of the State Defense Committee adopted on November 9, 1941, the Rostov, Krasnodar and Grozny divisional air defense regions were formed. In April 1942, due to the increased threat of air raids, the Baku Air Defense Corps was transformed into the Baku Air Defense Army under the command of General P. M. Beskrovnov. However, the cover of these objects by fighter aircraft was insufficient. On August 1, there was only one fighter aviation regiment to solve the air defense problems of Grozny and Krasnodar. The Baku Air Defense Army consisted of 5 fighter aviation regiments.
With the arrival of fascist troops on the Don, the question arose about the evacuation of material assets from the North Caucasus. In a short time, with the active participation of the population, it was removed huge amount national economic property, equipment industrial enterprises and food. Equipment from oil fields and oil refineries was evacuated first. It was sent to the Volga region, Bashkiria and Central Asia to expand oil production and refining in these areas. Crude oil from Maikop was transported to Grozny oil refineries, and from there finished products went directly to the front.
The oil workers of Baku found themselves in the most difficult conditions. Oil export became possible only through the Caspian Sea. But there were not enough tankers, and the Caspian Shipping Company could not cope with such a task. There were also not enough oil storage tanks. Despite this, its extraction continued, and the mountain hollows were turned into unique storage facilities.
Agricultural workers worked selflessly to harvest a rich harvest in a timely manner. Work in the fields did not stop until the enemy approached. The grain was sent in trains to the rear of the country, transferred to the troops of the Soviet army and partly to workers and collective farmers. Bread reserves were created for partisan detachments. Tractors and combines, free from harvesting, were driven under their own power into the depths of the Caucasus. The cattle were taken to the foothills; The horse train was sent mainly to staff the cavalry, artillery and rear units of the Soviet army.
The evacuation of material assets was carried out by the Caspian Merchant Shipping Company and ships of the Caspian Military Flotilla. The bulk of cargo was sent through the Makhachkala, Baku, and Astrakhan ports to Guryev and Krasnovodsk. However, due to the lack of transport, the constant impact of enemy aircraft, as well as its rapid advance, it was not possible to remove everything. The remaining material assets were destroyed: the engines of tractors and combines were disabled, grain was burned in the fields and barns, industrial equipment was destroyed, oil wells, oil pumping compressors, railway depots and other structures were rendered unusable.
The approaching danger rallied the Soviet people and made everyone want to give all their strength to defeat the enemy. Under the leadership of the Ordzhonikidze regional party committee, whose first secretary was M. A. Suslov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and the Krasnodar regional party committee, headed by the first secretary P. I. Seleznev, local party and Soviet bodies prepared the underground and formed partisan detachments. As a result of their continuous painstaking work together with the command and political bodies of the fronts, the combat unity of the front and rear was created. Through the heroic efforts of fighters, commanders and workers, all measures were taken to bleed, stop, and then defeat the hordes of Nazi invaders.
The beginning of the battle for the Caucasus. North Caucasus defensive operation
The defensive battle in the North Caucasus began on July 25, 1942 at the turn of the Don River in the zone from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth. Nazi troops, with the support of aviation and artillery, began to implement the Edelweiss plan. Fighting between the Don and the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range continued until August 17.
Fierce fighting broke out in the center of the Southern Front, where the troops of the left flank of the 51st and 37th armies defended. Tank and mechanized units of the enemy’s 4th and 1st tank armies were advancing here.
The 51st Army, under the command of General T.K. Kolomiets, bravely met the enemy and successfully repelled attacks during the day.
A very difficult situation was created in the defense zone of the 37th Army, commanded by General P. M. Kozlov. When it retreated to the left bank of the Don, many units and subunits, as well as the civilian population, accumulated at the crossings. Due to the insufficient number of anti-aircraft artillery and aviation, the crossings were not reliably covered. Therefore, enemy aircraft acted with impunity. Nazi troops managed to break through to the area of Nizhny and Verkhny Solenye.
In the area of the village of Aksayskaya, the enemy tried to cross the Don and advance on Olginskaya. Here, two motorized, one tank divisions and two tank regiments operated against the small units of the 12th Army, commanded by General A. A. Grechko. However, all attempts by the Nazis to cross the Don were thwarted.
In the zone of the 18th Army of General F.V. Kamkov, the enemy managed to break through to Bataysk.
Despite the steadfastness and courage of the soldiers and officers, the troops of the Southern Front were unable to delay the further advance of superior enemy forces. The 1st Tank Army of General E. Kleist continued to develop an offensive in the direction of the Vesely farm, and the 17th Army of General R. Ruoff along the railway to Yegorlykskaya. In the defense zone of the 51st Army, separate enemy mobile groups broke through to the Sal River.
As a result, already on the first day of fighting, the situation in the entire zone of operations of the Southern Front sharply deteriorated. There was a real threat of an enemy breakthrough into the Salsk region. With its successful development, the enemy had the opportunity to cut the Southern Front into two parts and open the way for his tank group to reach the rear of the main forces of the Soviet troops, who continued to hold positions south of Rostov.
Hitler's command took all measures to encircle Soviet formations south of Rostov. On July 27, the chief of the operational department of the general staff of the ground forces, General A. Heusinger, conveyed the following to the chief of staff of Army Group A, General G. Greiffenberg: “... from the bridgehead of Rostov, do not press too hard to the south, so as not to force the enemy to retreat before than he will be surrounded by the advancing left flank of the army group."
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the command of the Southern Front foresaw such actions of the enemy. Therefore, in order to improve the operational situation, it was decided to withdraw on the night of July 28 the formations of the left wing of the front to the line running along the southern bank of the Kagalnik River and the Manych Canal.
Meanwhile, the enemy, under the cover of large aviation forces, transported formations of seven corps to the left bank of the Don and created overwhelming superiority there, especially in tanks and artillery. By the end of the day on July 28, large gaps had formed between the armies of the Southern Front. The defense front was broken. The troops could no longer hold back the enemy's onslaught and continued to retreat south. With the entry of enemy tank and motorized formations into the Zadonsk and Salsk steppes and into the vast expanses of the Krasnodar Territory, an immediate threat arose of his breakthrough into the depths of the Caucasus.
The situation required emergency measures. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to combine the efforts of all troops located in the North Caucasus. According to the directive of July 28, the Southern and North Caucasian fronts were united into one North Caucasian Front. Marshal S. M. Budyonny was appointed front commander, and General A. I. Antonov was appointed chief of staff. The Military Council included: S. M. Budyonny, L. M. Kaganovich, L. R. Korniets, I. S. Isakov and P. I. Seleznev. The Headquarters directive stated: “ The main task For the North Caucasus Front, Headquarters aims to not only stop further advance of the enemy to the south at the occupied lines by stubborn struggle, but at all costs to return Bataysk with active actions and restore the situation along the southern bank of the river. Don". At the same time, the Headquarters demanded that part of the front forces be allocated to occupy the line along the southern bank of the Kuban River, the Krasnodar bypass to Temizhbek (30 km east of Kropotkin).
Following the instructions of Headquarters, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, in order to improve command and control of troops, by his directive of July 28, divided the front forces into two operational groups - Don and Primorsky. The Don operational group under the command of General R. Ya. Malinovsky included the 51st, 37th and 12th armies. She covered the Stavropol direction. Aviation support for the group was assigned to the 4th Air Army. Primorskaya task force under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko united the 18th, 56th and 47th armies, the 1st separate rifle and 17th cavalry corps. The group was supported by the Azov military flotilla, the Kerch naval base of the Black Sea Fleet and the 5th Air Army. Its task included the defense of the Krasnodar direction and the Taman Peninsula. The departments of the 9th and 24th armies were ordered to be stationed in Nalchik and Grozny, respectively.
The soldiers of the North Caucasus Front continued to offer stubborn resistance to the enemy, and he failed to encircle the Soviet troops south of Rostov. But the situation in the North Caucasus remained tense.
On July 30, the front troops were read the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 227 dated July 28, 1942. “All commanders participated in the explanation of the People’s Commissar’s order,” wrote the former head of the political department of the 47th Army, General M.Kh. Kalashnik. They spoke at service meetings, party and Komsomol meetings, held conversations with fighters, and made passionate, mobilizing speeches at rallies before battles. The main burden of responsibility for bringing the demands of the order to every defender of the Motherland lay with the party-political apparatus of the troops.” To strengthen the party layer in the units operating on the front line and to clarify the requirements of the order, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front sent 1,400 communists from the rear units and 200 political workers. More than 6 thousand communists were sent from party organizations in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia to strengthen the political apparatus in the troops. Four special strike detachments of 500 communists and Komsomol members each were created to strengthen the most dangerous areas. The formation of detachments was entrusted to General V.F. Vorobyov, Brigade Commissar L.I. Brezhnev, Colonels V.I. Rozhkov and S.I. Svintsov.
Activities carried out by the Headquarters, the Military Council of the Front, and regional party organizations to strengthen the morale of Soviet soldiers played an important role in the defense of the Caucasus.
However, a turning point in the fight against the enemy was not achieved immediately. Possessing overwhelming superiority in tanks, aircraft and artillery, the enemy continued to push back Soviet troops along the entire front. He stubbornly strived for Salsk, where strong formations of the 48th Tank Corps were sent. The defense of the troops of the Don Group was poorly organized and almost completely unprepared in engineering terms. The rear units lost contact with the active troops. Therefore, during the intense period of fighting, the group’s formations had almost no ammunition. By the end of July, the situation on the Don Group front became especially complicated. The 51st Army found itself cut off from the main forces of the front, and communication between the army headquarters and the headquarters of the group and the front was disrupted. Therefore, on July 31, Headquarters transferred the 51st Army to the Stalingrad Front. As a result, a new demarcation line was established between the Stalingrad and North Caucasus fronts, which passed through Nikolaevskaya, Remontnoye, and Astrakhan.
The failure of the attempt to capture Stalingrad on the move forced the Nazi command on July 31 to turn the 4th Tank Army (except for the 40th Tank Corps, transferred to the 1st Tank Army) from the Caucasian direction to Stalingrad and transfer it to Army Group B. This weakened the enemy troops operating in the North Caucasus. However, the enemy still had enough strength to continue the offensive. By wedging the 40th Tank Corps into the gaps between the 51st and 37th Armies, and the 57th Tank Corps between the 12th and 37th Armies, it created a threat to envelop the right flank of the Primorye Group. To avoid encirclement, the troops of the Primorsky Group left their positions on the Kagalnik River and retreated to the line of the Eya and Kugoey rivers.
On August 2, large forces of fascist German troops, supported by almost 200 tanks, resumed the offensive on Salsk and by the end of the day captured the settlements of Krasnaya Polyana, Zhukovka, and Rassypnoye.
In connection with the current situation, on August 3, the Military Council of the front decided to withdraw the Don group beyond the Kuban River. Acting with shock tank groups, the enemy overcame the resistance of the rearguard units of the 37th Army and captured Voroshilovsk on August 5. Then he slowed down the advance in the southeast direction, covering himself with the 40th Tank Corps from the east in order to regroup the troops. The 37th Army managed to break away from the enemy and by the end of August 5th had retreated beyond the Kalaus and Yankul rivers. On the same day, the 12th Army was included in the Primorsky Group. This ended the defensive operation of the Don Group in the Stavropol direction.
The situation was also difficult on the left wing of the North Caucasus Front, where the Primorye Group of Forces was defending. The main blow of the enemy's 17th army on July 28 was taken by the 18th and 56th armies. The enemy, having reached the Kagalnik River, was unable to immediately break through the defense front of the Soviet troops on the left bank of this river and was forced to bring the 44th Army Corps into battle.
In order to finally stop the advance of the Nazi troops, the commander of the North Caucasus Front ordered the 18th Army on July 30 to launch a counterattack in the direction of Olginskaya (30 km east of Bataysk) and in cooperation with the 12th Army and the 17th Cavalry Corps, which was supposed to strike at Bataysk, restore the situation on the Don. The 56th Army was withdrawn to the line along the southern bank of the Kuban River and to the Krasnodar defensive contour.
The measures taken by Headquarters and the Front Military Council significantly improved the position of the Primorsky Group. Nevertheless, the superiority in forces and means on its right wing remained on the enemy’s side: in personnel - 1.4 times, in tanks - absolute, in guns and mortars - 3 times. Enemy aircraft dominated the air. The defense front of the Soviet troops was also disrupted. During the retreat, a gap formed between the Don and Primorsk groups, into which the enemy introduced the 13th Panzer Division and the SS Viking Motorized Division and struck in the direction of Armavir. There was a threat of envelopment by the troops of the right wing of the Primorsky group. Therefore, on August 3, the front commander ordered them to be taken to the left bank of the Kuban.
On August 5, the Headquarters ordered the front commander to firmly cover the Maikop area and the Maikop-Tuapse road in order to prevent the enemy from reaching the Black Sea coast and isolating the Primorye Group of Forces.
On August 6, the enemy's 17th Army rushed towards Krasnodar. For several days, small formations of the 56th Army of General A.I. Ryzhov and soldiers of the Krasnodar detachment people's militia courageously repelled the onslaught of the infantry and motorized divisions of the 5th Army Corps.
Particularly fierce fighting broke out in the area of the Pashkovo crossing, where the 30th Irkutsk Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Colonel B. N. Arshintsev fought selflessly. Being semi-surrounded and experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition, the division repelled all enemy attacks. And only on August 12, by order of the command, she left Krasnodar, blowing up the Pashkovskaya crossing and retreating to the left bank of the Kuban.
The Azov coast was defended by the Azov military flotilla until August 10. She held Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, her main base, until the arrival of the forces defending Yeisk. On August 10, after blowing up military facilities, the flotilla was evacuated. Ships and vessels delivered more than
4 thousand soldiers, 30 coastal defense guns and other equipment, as well as 1,670 tons of various cargo.
The fascist German command decided to encircle Soviet troops south of Kuban. To this end, the 1st Tank Army struck through Armavir to Maykop in order to break through to Tuapse. On August 6, with powerful air support, the enemy captured Armavir in battle and continued the attack on Maykop. For four days there were fierce battles along the lines of the Kuban, Laba, and Belaya rivers. By the end of August 9, the mobile units of the 1st Tank Army broke into Maykop. The Nazis hoped to capture fuel and oil, but all supplies were removed in advance, the drilling wells were plugged, and the equipment was partially evacuated and partially buried in the ground.
Having captured Maykop, the enemy launched fierce attacks in the Tuapse direction, trying to reach the Black Sea coast. On August 10, the Headquarters indicated to the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front: “In connection with the current situation, the most important and dangerous for the North Caucasus Front and the Black Sea coast at the moment is the direction from Maykop to Tuapse. With the enemy’s entry into the Tuapse area, the 47th Army and all front troops located in the Krasnodar area will be cut off and taken prisoner.”
The commander of the forces of the North Caucasus Front made a decision: the 17th Cavalry Corps should concentrate southeast of Krasnodar, the 12th Army would gain a foothold on the left bank of the Laba River, the 32nd Guards Rifle Division would cross on ships of the Black Sea Fleet to the area north of Tuapse and, together with 236 1st rifle division to take up defense in several lines in depth to cover the road from Maikop to Tuapse.
On August 12, the enemy managed to capture Belorechenskaya, and on August 13, Tverskaya. His further advance was stopped.
During three weeks of fighting (from July 25 to August 17), the enemy forced the troops of the North Caucasus Front to retreat from the Don to the foothills of the northwestern part of the Main Caucasus Range. This stage of the fighting was extremely difficult. Soviet troops were unable to comply with the Headquarters directive to restore the situation on the Don.
The commander of the North Caucasus Front did not have sufficient reserves with which to reinforce the first echelon of troops in the most dangerous areas. There were no large mobile formations, while the Nazis had more than 40 percent of their tank and motorized divisions. Often this allowed them to get ahead of Soviet troops when occupying defense lines. The small number of its aviation had a negative impact on the actions of the North Caucasus Front. By maintaining air superiority, the enemy had a fairly effective impact on the defending armies, especially in open areas. The command and headquarters of the front and armies often lost control of the troops. Formations and units were in dire need of ammunition, fuel, and food.
And yet, despite this, the Nazis were unable to encircle the Soviet group between the Don and Kuban. The heroic defenders of the Caucasus defended Tuapse and blocked the enemy’s path to the Black Sea. Retreating, the troops of the North Caucasus Front exhausted the enemy in fierce battles and destroyed their manpower and equipment. According to the headquarters of Army Group A, the Nazi losses during this period amounted to about 54 thousand soldiers and officers.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command promptly revealed the enemy's plans, accurately determined the directions of his possible attacks and provided assistance to the troops. It took urgent measures to strengthen the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts using its reserves with weapons, tanks and anti-aircraft guns, communications equipment, fighter and bomber aircraft.
The commanders of the fronts, armies and their headquarters began to more quickly carry out the instructions of Headquarters and take energetic measures to delay the advance of the Nazi troops.
During this most crucial period, the battle for the Caucasus was carried out by the party organizations of the autonomous and union republics under the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. great job to mobilize internal resources for the needs of the front. Many enterprises began producing ammunition, weapons and equipment (mainly for the troops of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts).
Military councils of fronts and armies, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of units and formations carried out extensive educational work in the troops aimed at maintaining a high political and moral state of personnel, raising the morale of the troops and ensuring reliable protection of the defensive lines covering the Caucasus. A huge army of propagandists and agitators daily explained to the soldiers the internal and foreign policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the fair nature of the Great Patriotic War, the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system, the requirements of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 of July 28, 1942, and promoted labor successes Soviet people in the rear and feats of arms at the fronts, educated personnel in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, friendship of the peoples of the USSR and proletarian internationalism.
The main motto of all party-political work in the troops was the party’s call: “Fight to the death, not a step back without the order of the commander!” As a result, it was possible to strengthen the political and moral state of the troops, discipline in units, and increase the stability of defense. Operating in difficult conditions, experiencing interruptions in the supply of ammunition and food, without sleep and rest, the heroic defenders of the Caucasus, in the forefront of which were communists and Komsomol members, showed steadfastness, courage and bravery in the fight against the enemy, striving at all costs to avoid allow the enemy to advance deep into the Caucasus. The troops of the North Caucasus Front, having detained the enemy, made it possible for the Transcaucasian Front to timely take up defense along the Terek and Bak-san rivers in the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range and cover Transcaucasia from the north.
Having regrouped his forces, the enemy tried to achieve success in the areas of Novorossiysk, Malgobek and on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. The intense defensive battles of the Soviet troops that unfolded here continued until September 28.
Due to the deterioration of the situation in the Caucasus, the Party Central Committee, the State Defense Committee and Headquarters took urgent measures to strengthen its defense. The Headquarters directive to the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front dated August 20 indicated that the enemy, seeking to invade the Transcaucasus, would not limit himself to the actions of large forces in the main directions. “The enemy, having specially trained mountain units, will use every road and trail through the Caucasus Range to penetrate into Transcaucasia, acting both in large forces and in separate groups of thugs and saboteurs. Those commanders are deeply mistaken, the directive emphasized, who think that the Caucasus Range itself is an impassable barrier for the enemy. Everyone must firmly remember that only the line that is skillfully prepared for defense and stubbornly defended is impassable...”
The headquarters demanded, along with the creation of strong defenses in the main operational directions, to strengthen the defense of the Main Caucasus Ridge, and especially the Georgian Military, Ossetian Military and Sukhumi Military roads, in order to exclude any possibility of enemy penetration in these directions. The directive also indicated specific urgent measures to strengthen the defense of the Caucasus.
The number of engineering troops on the Transcaucasian Front increased. By the beginning of September, it already had 146 engineer and sapper battalions, that is, six times more than by August 1, 1942. In these units there were 63,686 people - seven times more than on August 1. The number of engineering units increased due to the manning of the withdrawing engineering troops of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts.
In addition to troops, local residents were also involved in the construction of defensive lines. On September 16, the State Defense Committee adopted a special decision to mobilize 90 thousand people of the local population for the construction of Makhachkala, Derbent and Baku defensive lines. Intense work was in full swing on the thousand-kilometer front. Under heavy bombing, fortifications were erected, stone barriers were built on the roads and paths of high mountain passes, sappers prepared rubble in the wooded foothills, and dug trenches on the banks of Urukh and Terek.
The commander of the Transcaucasian Front, in a directive dated August 3, assigned the following tasks to the troops. The 44th Army under the command of General I.E. Petrov was ordered to create a deeply echeloned defense on the approaches to Grozny and Baku from the north and northwest and, in cooperation with the Caspian Military Flotilla, to prevent the enemy from crossing the Terek in the area from the mouth to Chervlennaya. The army group of General V.N. Kurdyumov, consisting of four rifle divisions and the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, takes up defense along the Terek and Urukh rivers. Particular attention was paid to covering the approaches to Grozny, Ordzhonikidze, the Georgian Military and Ossetian Military roads. The 46th Army was entrusted with the defense of the passes through the western part of the Main Caucasus Range and the Black Sea coast from Lazarevskoye to the mouth of the Sarp River, as well as covering the border with Turkey to Mount Uch-Tepelyar. The 45th Army and the 15th Cavalry Corps were supposed to stop any attempt to violate the state border with Turkey and Iran.
The front reserve included five reserve rifle brigades, military schools and several artillery and mortar units. Their task was to eliminate possible enemy airborne assaults in the rear of the Transcaucasian Front.
Front aviation was given the task of covering the troops and preventing the landing of sea and airborne assault forces.
To strengthen the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, significant forces were allocated from the Headquarters reserve. From August 6 to September, the Transcaucasian Front received 2 guards rifle corps and 11 separate rifle brigades. Transportation of units was carried out from Astrakhan and Krasnovodsk along the Caspian Sea to Makhachkala. The headquarters allocated 840 vehicles to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, which to some extent facilitated the transfer of reserves.
The concentration of large forces for defense along the Terek and Urukh rivers and the great distance of the front headquarters from this line required the creation of a separate control body. On August 8, by order of the Headquarters, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was created in the 44th and 9th armies, the 11th Guards Rifle Corps. General I. I. Maslennikov was appointed commander of the Northern Group of Forces. On August 11, the 37th Army of the North Caucasus Front was included in it, and the Don Group of Forces was disbanded.
Thus, by mid-August 1942, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front regrouped their forces and organized the defense of the Caucasus from the north. A second line of defense was created along the Terek and Urukh rivers, on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. Particular attention was paid to covering the Baku direction and the approaches to Grozny.
With the advance of fascist German troops to the foothills of the western part of the Main Caucasus Range, the command of Army Group A informed Hitler's headquarters that Soviet troops were no longer able to offer stubborn resistance. “The army group command is of the opinion that this resistance [in the Novorossiysk area] can be broken with a strong onslaught. Also, strong enemy units in the bend of the Terek can provide only temporary resistance to the massive offensive of German formations.” And further: “It seems that the enemy along the entire front has placed all the forces at his disposal on the front line and that after breaking through this line, the enemy’s resistance will be broken.”
In the current situation, the main command of the ground forces decided to regroup the forces of Army Group A, and then continue the attack on the Caucasus simultaneously in three directions: by the 17th Army along the Black Sea coast from Anapa to Poti and then to Batumi; 49th Mountain Rifle Corps - through the Main Caucasus Range to Sukhumi and Kutaisi; 1st Tank Army - from the areas of Pyatigorsk and Prokhladny to Ordzhonikidze, Grozny, Makhachkala, Baku.
On August 23, the enemy began to implement a plan to complete the capture of the Caucasus. On this day, two tank and infantry divisions of Army Group A went on the offensive directly towards Mozdok. For three days, the combined detachment of Major Korneev and cadets of the Rostov Artillery School, together with units of the 26th reserve rifle brigade, fought fierce battles, but under pressure from superior enemy forces they were forced to leave Mozdok and retreat to the right bank of the Terek. In the future, the enemy intended to seize the crossings across the Terek with strong detachments and secure a starting point for an attack on Ordzhonikidze.
Simultaneously with the attack on Mozdok, the 23rd German Panzer Division launched an attack from the north and east on Prokhladny. Having captured it, the enemy began an offensive on August 25 south along the Prokhladny - Ordzhonikidze railway. However, all his attempts to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops were unsuccessful. The Nazis were forced to stop the offensive in the Prokhladny area and begin preparing an attack on Malgobek. A serious threat was created of a breakthrough of enemy tank and mechanized forces to the Grozny and Baku oil regions.
To prevent this threat, a new 58th Army was formed in the Makhachkala region, consisting of four rifle divisions, a rifle brigade and two artillery regiments under the command of General V. A. Khomenko. This made it possible to significantly strengthen the position of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front. By the end of August it included the 9th, 37th, 44th and the 58th Army, which was in the second echelon. As a result, the Soviet command managed to create a general superiority in forces and means, except for tanks and aircraft, along the entire front of the Northern Group of Forces. But these forces and means were distributed evenly along the entire front. Of the 2,356 guns and mortars available in the direction of the enemy’s main attack, in the Malgobek area, at the beginning of the fighting there were only 237 guns and mortars. The Nazis outnumbered the Soviet troops here in tanks by 4.2 times, in artillery by 6.5 times.
On the morning of September 2, the enemy began crossing the Terek in the Mozdok area. Having captured a small bridgehead on the southern bank of the river, fascist German troops attacked swipe and advanced 10 km south of Mozdok. Soviet soldiers put up stubborn resistance, repeatedly launching counterattacks in order to restore their positions.
Soldiers of the 4th Air Army under the command of General K. A. Vershinin fought in close cooperation with the ground forces. On September 6 alone, they carried out 460 sorties in the areas of Predmostny and Kizlyar, where the enemy had captured a small bridgehead. Thanks to good interaction between aviation and ground forces, the enemy tank attack was repulsed. At the foot of the ridge there were up to 30 damaged and burned tanks, half of which were destroyed by aircraft.
The Mozdok area became a “valley of death” for the Nazis. By the end of September, the enemy had lost more than 6 thousand soldiers and officers and a large amount of equipment. Stubborn resistance and counterattacks by Soviet troops sharply weakened the advancing enemy units.
Hitler's headquarters expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of Army Group A. Field Marshal W. List was removed from his post as commander of the group. Some commanders of tank divisions who failed to encircle Soviet troops between the Don and Kuban were also displaced. All this testified to the impending crisis of Hitler’s strategy to conquer the Caucasus. However, the fascist leadership did not lose hope of success. It still hoped to capture the Grozny oil region. Hitler demanded that the 1st Tank Army quickly capture Grozny. After all, on September 1, the command of this army, outlining the plan for the attack on Baku, informed the commander of Army Group A that “advance from Grozny is possible from September 6, and from Makhachkala - on September 16.” September was ending, and the 1st Tank Army had only advanced slightly south of Mozdok.
Hitler's command began to look for new ways and means to capture Grozny. The SS motorized division "Viking" was transferred from the Tuapse direction to strengthen the Mozdok group. The enemy now decided to advance through the Elkhotov Gate (along the valley along the Terek) in the direction of Ordzhonikidze and along the Prokhladny - Grozny railway along the Sunzha River valley to Grozny. On September 24, his tank and motorized formations resumed their attacks. After four days of stubborn fighting, they managed to capture Elkhotovo, but they were unable to break through to Grozny and were forced to abandon further attacks.
During the period of fierce fighting from September 1 to 28, the enemy suffered heavy losses. Having thrown large infantry forces and up to 300 tanks into the offensive, General Kleist, an ardent supporter of the tank ramming, was confident that the divisions of his 1st Tank Army would break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and easily break through to Grozny. However, the 1st Tank Army was defeated in the Mozdok direction. The plan of the Nazi command to seize the Grozny and Baku oil regions was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of the defenders of the Caucasus.
Simultaneously with the fierce battles of the Northern Group of Forces in the Mozdok direction, Soviet troops fought defensive battles in the Novorossiysk area. Here the enemy decided to take revenge for the failure of his first attempt to break through the defenses in the Tuapse direction. At first, he intended to capture Novorossiysk, then develop an offensive on Tuapse and Sukhumi along the Black Sea coast. Having regrouped the troops, the fascist German command concentrated two infantry and three cavalry divisions for the attack on Novorossiysk, and five infantry and two motorized divisions in the Tuapse direction.
The approaches to Novorossiysk from the north and northeast were defended by the 47th Army of General G.P. Kotov. It was also supposed to defend the Taman Peninsula. A gap of about 40 km opened between the 47th Army and the troops of the 56th Army, which had retreated to the south. Fearing for this direction, on August 10, the Headquarters ordered the command of the North Caucasus Front to organize a strong defense of Novorossiysk, removing the 77th Infantry Division from the Taman Peninsula.
In order to unite the efforts of the troops and navy defending Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front decided on August 17 to create the Novorossiysk defensive region, which included troops of the 47th Army, the 216th Infantry Division of the 56th Army, the Azov military flotilla, Temryuk, Kerch, Novorossiysk naval bases and a combined aviation group (237th Air Division and units of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force). The command of the Novorossiysk defensive region (NOR) was entrusted to the commander of the 47th Army, General G.P. Kotov. The commander of the Azov military flotilla, Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, was appointed his deputy for naval affairs. On the evening of August 18, this decision was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region were faced with the task of preventing the Nazis from breaking through to Novorossiysk both from land and from the sea. The defense of Novorossiysk from the sea was entrusted to coastal artillery, ships of the naval base and fleet aviation. To solve this problem, 87 guns, 2 gunboats, 26 water area security ships, 17 torpedo boats and other watercraft, and 112 naval air group aircraft were involved. The air defense of Novorossiysk was carried out by a fighter aviation regiment, 84 anti-aircraft guns and about 50 anti-aircraft machine guns.
In total, by August 18, the Novorossiysk defensive region numbered about 15 thousand soldiers. In the direction of the main enemy attack there were 2,200 people, 36 guns, 30 mortars and 36 tanks. The enemy forces numbered 27 thousand people, 260 guns, 172 mortars, 64 tanks and assault guns. In the ports of Kerch and Feodosia, the enemy had 15 torpedo boats, 30 self-propelled barges and other vessels. 150 aircraft (60 fighters and 90 bombers) were based at the Kerch and Marfovka airfields; There were 12 seaplanes in the Feodosia Gulf.
On August 19, Nazi troops went on the offensive. Despite the enormous numerical superiority, they were only able to capture the city of Temryuk by the end of August 24, and Anapa on August 31. Marine units defending the Taman Peninsula found themselves cut off from the main forces of the 47th Army, and the ships of the Azov military flotilla were forced to break through into the Black Sea.
For the convenience of controlling the troops operating in the Caucasus and improving their supply, the Headquarters, by directive of September 1, transformed the North Caucasus Front into the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. The group included troops of the 12th, 18th, 47th, 56th armies and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps, which continued to carry out their previous combat missions. From the air, the Black Sea Group was supported by the 5th Air Army and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet began to be operationally subordinate to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front.
On September 3, enemy troops began crossing from Crimea to the Taman Peninsula. The position of the defending marine units became even more difficult, and two days later they were evacuated to Gelendzhik.
The evacuation of Soviet troops from the Taman Peninsula and the concentration of enemy forces on it created a real threat of the capture of Novorossiysk from the west. The directive of the Transcaucasian Front dated September 6 stated: “The ongoing battles in the Novorossiysk direction are becoming more intense every hour. It is clear from everything that the enemy is suffering heavy losses, but is sending fresh forces to this section of the front, with the goal of capturing this large and convenient seaport, advantageous for further actions along the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea.
Units of the NOR defending the approaches to Novorossiysk must, without sparing strength and life, defend their positions, destroying the enemy by all means and means.
Novorossiysk and its region cannot be abandoned by us, and the enemy must not appear on the shores of the Tsemes Bay.
This is the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief comrade. Stalin.
In this task, the 47th Army and all the troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region should be assisted in every possible way by the command of the Black Sea Group. Everything is for the defense of Novorossiysk...”
To stop the enemy’s advance towards Novorossiysk, the Front Military Council ordered the urgent transfer of the 16th Separate Rifle Brigade and two battalions of the 81st Separate Marine Rifle Brigade from the 12th Army, the rifle regiment of the 318th Rifle, to the city to reinforce the 47th Army divisions from Gelendzhik and a marine regiment from Poti, as well as provide the army troops with ammunition. On September 8, General A. A. Grechko was appointed commander of the 47th Army and the troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region instead of General G.P. Kotov.
On the evening of September 7, the Headquarters approved the front's measures to strengthen the defense of Novorossiysk. However, in the morning of the same day, the Nazis broke through to the northern outskirts of the city. Fierce fighting raged for three days. But the forces were unequal, and on September 9, the 47th Army was forced to abandon most of Novorossiysk.
Nevertheless, the measures taken by the Front Military Council yielded positive results. The new commander of the army, General A. A. Grechko, as well as the newly appointed member of the Military Council, regimental commissar E. E. Maltsev and chief of staff, General A. G. Ermolaev, during these tense days, put a lot of effort into stopping the enemy in the area of the cement plant. October" on the south-eastern outskirts of the city. The 305th, 14th Marine Battalions and units of the 83rd Separate Marine Rifle Brigade stubbornly defended here and stopped the enemy. The enemy's attempt to develop an offensive on Tuapse along the coast was unsuccessful.
However, the fascist German command did not abandon its intentions to break through along the Black Sea coast on Tuapse in order to connect with the 57th Tank and 44th Army Corps, which were advancing on Tuapse from the north. In the Abinskaya area, the enemy concentrated the 3rd Romanian Mountain Division. On September 19, after strong air preparation, it went on the offensive and in three days of bloody battles, at the cost of heavy losses, captured several heights and wedged itself into the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of 6 km.
The NOR command decided to deliver two converging strikes on the flanks of the wedged enemy group, encircle it and destroy it. For this purpose, an infantry division and two combined marine brigades were involved. In the hot battles that erupted from September 22 to 26, the 3rd Romanian Mountain Division was almost completely destroyed. She lost up to 8 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded and captured.
In the Novorossiysk direction, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive and no longer attempted to attack here with large forces. He was unable to use the Novorossiysk port as his naval base, since the eastern shore of Tsemes Bay was occupied by Soviet troops, who constantly bombarded the bay with machine gun, mortar and artillery fire.
The heroic defenders of Novorossiysk stopped the enemy’s advance along the Black Sea coast in Transcaucasia. Their feat is immortalized in the memory of the people. Near the highway on the southeastern outskirts of Novorossiysk, a railway carriage riddled with bullets and shell fragments stands on a pedestal - a relic of the Great Patriotic War. It says: “Here, on September 11, 1942, the valiant warriors of units of the Soviet Army and the Black Sea Fleet blocked the enemy’s path to the Caucasus, and 360 days later, in cooperation with the amphibious assault and units from Malaya Zemlya, they began the assault on Novorossiysk and on September 16, 1943, defeating the fascist troops , liberated the city."
In recognition of the services of the defenders of the Caucasus, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated September 15, 1973, Novorossiysk was awarded the honorary title “Hero City” with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. On the same day, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev, in an address to the workers of Novorossiysk, wrote: “This truly historic act expresses the gratitude and gratitude of the Soviet people, the party and the government, and highly appreciates the military feats of all those who, not sparing their lives, , showed unparalleled courage, resilience and heroism at the city walls, blocking the enemy’s path to the pearl of the Soviet south - the North Caucasus.”
Back at the end of August, the command of Army Group A believed that after breaking through the defenses of the Soviet Army troops near Novorossiysk, their resistance would be broken. However, its hopes were not justified, and after the capture of most of Novorossiysk it received “an order in principle from the Fuhrer for a defensive battle.”
Simultaneously with the battles in the Grozny and Novorossiysk directions, in mid-August fierce battles began between units of the 46th Army of the Transcaucasian Front on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. The German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps operated here, consisting of two mountain rifle and two light infantry divisions. In addition, the command of Army Group A targeted two Romanian mountain rifle divisions for operations in the mountain passes. By the time the Nazis reached the Main Caucasian Range, not only the northern slopes, but also many passes were not occupied by Soviet units, and on those occupied there were almost no defensive structures. This was explained by the fact that the army’s troops were scattered along a large front and some commanders did not attach due importance to preparing the passes for defense, considering the Main Caucasus Range an insurmountable barrier for the enemy.
In connection with the looming threat of a Nazi breakthrough through the Main Caucasus Ridge to the Black Sea coast, the command of the Transcaucasian Front, in accordance with the Headquarters directive of August 20, hastily began to move troops to the passes and organize their defense. The belated advance, poor logistics, and poor organization of intelligence and communications made the situation on the mountain passes extremely difficult. The population, party and Soviet bodies came to the aid of the soldiers. The help and experience of local residents was widely used to transport food and ammunition to the passes. They delivered to the passes more than 60 thousand various things from military warehouses, about a million rifle cartridges, 4 thousand hand grenades, 2 thousand cartridges for anti-tank rifles and a large number of mines and shells. Mountain rifle detachments, led by mountaineering instructors, were sent to the most inaccessible areas. In order to strengthen the defense of the passes, responsible employees of the Council of People's Commissars, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia were assigned to each direction. All these measures significantly improved the supply of troops at the passes and their defense.
By mid-August, units of the 1st German mountain rifle division "Edelweiss" approached the Klukhorsky pass. The fighting here continued until the onset of winter, and only in January 1943 was the enemy driven back.
On August 18, the Nazis reached the southern slopes of Elbrus, captured the Khotyu-tau and Chiper-azau passes and the Krugozor and Shelter of Eleven tourist bases. The Nazi mountain riflemen decided to plant two flags on the top of Elbrus. They had been preparing for this operation for a long time and carefully. The ascent was carried out by several Alpine companies. In the second half of August they managed to reach the goal, “but this significant achievement of mountaineering,” according to the former Nazi general Tippelskirch, “had neither tactical, nor even more strategic significance.” Fascist flags did not have to fly for long on the very high mountain Caucasus. In mid-February 1943, Soviet soldiers under the leadership of lieutenants N.A. Gusak, N.P. Morenz, military engineer 3rd rank A.M. Gusev and senior political instructor A.A. Tettov hoisted the Soviet Red Flag over Elbrus.
Taking advantage of significant superiority in firepower, on September 7 the enemy captured the Marukh Pass. Units of the 46th Army of General K. N. Leselidze made repeated attempts to return the pass, but to no avail. The Nazis continued to hold it until the Soviet troops went on the offensive in January 1943.
In the Sanchar direction, the enemy, having concentrated more than a regiment of the 4th Mountain Rifle Division in the Laba River valley, went on the offensive on August 24 and, having captured the Sancharo Pass, began to move south. To restore the situation, the Military Council of the 46th Army created the Sanchar group of troops consisting of the 307th regiment of the 61st rifle division, two battalions of the 155th and 51st rifle brigades, the 25th border regiment of the NKVD, the consolidated regiment of the NKVD and detachment 1 -th Tbilisi Infantry School. She stopped the Nazis and then threw them back to the northern bank of the Bzyb River. On October 16, units of the Sanchar group went on the offensive and by October 20 captured the Sanchar group of passes. The remnants of the Nazi troops retreated to the northern slopes of the Main Caucasus Range. The enemy's attempts to overcome the Main Caucasus Range through the Umpyrsky and Belorechensky passes were repelled.
The fascist occupiers, planning to penetrate Transcaucasia through the Main Caucasus Ridge, had high hopes that they would be able to deceive, bribe the local residents and win them over to their side. But the peoples of the Caucasus, like all Soviet people, without sparing their strength and life itself, fought in the name of victory over the enemy. The mountaineers, especially the Svans, excellent climbers, led Soviet soldiers along unknown paths, showing them ways to bypass the enemy’s flanks in order to strike from the rear.
In the deep autumn of 1942, thanks to the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops and the implementation of important measures by the military councils of the front and the 46th Army, as well as local party and Soviet bodies to strengthen the defense of the passes, the Nazi offensive was stopped. The threat of the enemy entering Transcaucasia in this direction was eliminated.
Tuapse and Nalchik defensive operations
By the end of September 1942, the situation in the North Caucasus had stabilized somewhat. Soviet troops inflicted on the enemy big damage, stopped his advance in the Caucasian direction. Hitler's plan for a breakthrough in Transcaucasia was thwarted. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gained time to accumulate reserves and strengthen the Transcaucasian Front with them.
Exhausted enemy troops were no longer able to advance on a wide front. The Nazi command could not transfer reserves to the Caucasus from Stalingrad. Drawn into heavy fighting on the banks of the Volga, the 6th and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies themselves needed reinforcements. “From mid-August it became clear,” writes former Nazi general G. Doerr in his book “The March on Stalingrad,” that operations in the south of Russia were not going according to plan; The army, instead of a “victorious march,” moved forward with difficulty. In such a situation, it is customary to throw reserves into battle or change the plan of operation.” But the Nazi command had no reserves.
Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht command did not intend to abandon plans to seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Army Group A had 29 divisions. It was decided to launch successive attacks with the 17th Army on Tuapse, and then with the 1st Tank Army on Ordzhonikidze. In the Tuapse direction, the enemy hoped to reach the Black Sea coast in the Tuapse area, cut off the Black Sea Group of Forces from the main forces of the Transcaucasian Front, deprive the Black Sea Fleet of bases and ports and free up part of its forces for transfer to other sectors of the front. The 1st Tank Army was supposed to break through to the Grozny oil region. The fascist German command attached to the implementation of such a plan great value. In a conversation with Keitel on September 18, 1942, Hitler, analyzing the situation in the Caucasus, emphasized: “The decisive thing is the breakthrough on Tuapse, and then the blocking of the Georgian Military Road and the breakthrough to the Caspian Sea.”
Thus, Soviet troops had to carry out two defensive operations in these directions: Tuapse and Nalchik. They were carried out in close operational connection, in difficult conditions of mountainous and forested terrain and ended in the defeat of the strike forces of the 17th and 1st Panzer armies of the German armies.
The Tuapse defensive operation began on September 25 and lasted until December 20. Even during the fighting in the Novorossiysk area, the Supreme High Command Headquarters demanded that the front command not weaken the defense in the Tuapse direction. On her instructions, the defense of the Black Sea Group of Forces was strengthened from the north and along the Black Sea coast from Novorossiysk to Sochi. The Tuapse defensive region was created, and two rifle divisions and two rifle brigades were transferred from the reserve of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front to strengthen the Black Sea Group. The defense of the eastern shore of Tsemes Bay, passes and mountain passes through the Main Caucasus Range was strengthened.
The Black Sea Group of Forces, whose defense front was about 250 km, included the 18th, 56th, and 47th armies (the 12th Army was disbanded, and its personnel were transferred to replenish the first three armies). In total these armies had 109,134 men, 515 guns and 637 mortars. The troops of the Black Sea Group were supported by the aviation of the 5th Air Army (71 aircraft) and partially by the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet.
The command of the German 17th Army planned an offensive through the Main Caucasus Range from the Khadyzhenskaya area in the direction of Tuapse. The essence of the plan was to launch two strikes in converging directions with the goal of encircling the main forces of the 18th Army northeast of Shaumyan. The main attack was planned from the Neftegorsk area towards Shaumyan and a secondary attack - from the Goryachiy Klyuch area towards Shaumyan. To deliver the main blow, the Tuapse group was created, mainly from mountain rifle and light infantry divisions, specially equipped and undergoing extensive training in combat operations in the mountains. In total, the 17th Army had 162,396 men, 147 tanks and assault guns, 1,316 guns and 950 mortars. Its troops were supported by the 4th Aviation Corps of the 4th Air Fleet, which had 350 aircraft. The balance of forces was thus in favor of the enemy, who outnumbered the troops of the Black Sea group: in personnel - 1.5 times, in guns - 2.6 times, in mortars - 1.5 times, in tanks - absolutely, in aircraft - 5 times.
On September 25, after air strikes carried out for two days on communications and battle formations of the 18th Army, the enemy went on the offensive.
Having failed to achieve success during the first two days, the fascist German command threw the divisional group of General X. Lanz into battle against the formations of the center of the 18th Army. By the end of September 30, its units managed to penetrate the defenses of the 18th Army to a depth of 5-10 km.
The fighting took place simultaneously on several directions. Particularly fierce battles took place over communications, which were extremely important for operations in mountainous conditions. On the right flank of the 56th Army of the Transcaucasian Front, the enemy advanced to a depth of 8 km. His further offensive was stopped by the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops.
In order to eliminate the threat hanging over Tuapse, on October 4, the Headquarters set the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front with the specific task of restoring the situation in the breakthrough areas. She demanded to immediately destroy the enemy in the Sosnovka area, firmly cover the Perevalny, Shaumyan direction and restore the situation in the Kotlovina area. Subsequently, the Black Sea group was supposed to strike from the Rozhet, Maratuk area in the direction of the Red Cemetery and from the Belaya Glina area to Pervomaisky, Khadyzhenskaya. The headquarters indicated what additional forces needed to be deployed to solve the task.
Fulfilling the requirements of the Headquarters, the front command regrouped the troops, strengthening them in the enemy’s offensive directions and creating appropriate groups to carry out counterattacks.
By the end of October 9, the 18th Army had stopped the Nazi advance in all directions with counterattacks. Their attempt to break through to Tuapse failed. The enemy lost more than 10 thousand soldiers and officers.
On October 14, the enemy resumed an offensive simultaneously from the east to Shaumyan, Sadovoe and from the area east of Fanagoriysky to Sadovoe with the goal of encircling the main group of troops of the 18th Army and breaking through to Tuapse. By the end of October 15, its units were forced to retreat to the southern outskirts of Shaumyan and the railway bridge near Ostrovskaya Shchel. The troops of the right flank of the 56th Army were also somewhat pushed back - here the Nazis tried to reach the Sadovoye area. The Nazis' attempts to go on the offensive in other sectors of the front were unsuccessful.
In connection with the intensification of enemy actions in the Tuapse direction, the Headquarters, in a directive dated October 15, ordered the commander of the Transcaucasian Front to focus on the Black Sea Group. She demanded that the 18th Army be reinforced with three guards rifle brigades from the reserve of the Northern Group, and that the reserve be created by transferring three rifle brigades from Baku. At the direction of Headquarters, a cavalry division was transferred from the 46th Army to the Tuapse direction, and the mountain rifle division that had arrived at the front was concentrated in the Tuapse area. Four anti-tank artillery regiments, two air defense regiments and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion of 85-mm guns were placed at the disposal of the front. Six rifle divisions were being completed. Three of them were ordered to be deployed on the Black Sea coast in the Novomikhailovsky, Tuapse, Lazarevskoye areas. These events turned out to be timely. On October 16 and 17, the Nazis, continuing the offensive, captured the Shaumyan area and started fighting for the Elisavetpolsky pass. At the junction of the 56th and 18th armies, they advanced deep into the defenses of the Soviet troops and tried to capture Mount Kochkanova.
On October 17, the commander of the Black Sea group, General I.E. Petrov, and the chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front, General P.I. Bodin, went to the troops and resolved a number of issues on the spot regarding the organization of sustainable defense and control of the 18th and 56th armies. The measures taken contributed to the creation of conditions for launching powerful counterattacks against the enemy group that had broken through to the Shaumyan area.
The command and headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Group of Forces strengthened military order in formations and units and improved control of combat operations. They paid special attention to the 18th Army defending in the Tuapse direction, the commander of which was General A. A. Grechko from October 19.
Much attention was paid to party-political work, which was carried out under the leadership of the front commander, General I.V. Tyulenev, member of the Military Council, brigade commissar P.I. Efimov, and head of the political department, regimental commissar A.F. Khromov. The main efforts of party bodies were directed towards ensuring that soldiers carried out combat missions. The mobilization of communists and Komsomol members of Tuapse was carried out. Political workers were sent to the party organizations of the units to explain the need to detain the enemy at any cost and prevent him from approaching the city.
The measures taken made it possible to stop the enemy offensive by the end of October 23. He failed to capture Mount Oplepen and Maratuk.
He did not achieve success in the areas of Sarai Gora and Kochkanova Mountain. However, the advanced units of the Nazis were in the valley of the Tuapsinka River, from which little more than 30 km remained to Tuapse.
Soviet troops were completing preparations for launching counterattacks on the flanks of the enemy group that had broken through. On October 24, the 383rd and 353rd Rifle Divisions struck and began to slowly advance in the northern and northeastern directions. On October 27, the troops of the right flank of the 56th Army launched a counterattack on the enemy. As a result of stubborn fighting in mountainous and forested areas, the Nazis were thrown back across the Pshish River. By the end of October, with the arrival of new formations in the Black Sea Group, the balance of forces and means began to change in favor of the Soviet troops.
From October 31, fascist German troops were forced to stop offensive operations and go on the defensive. The German 17th Army had used up all its reserves. The commander of Army Group A also did not have reserves. In addition, during this period in the Ordzhonikidze area, the 1st Tank Army also suffered heavy losses.
And yet, in mid-November, the enemy made one more, last attempt to reach Tuapse through Georgievskoye. By November 23, he had penetrated the defenses in the center of the 18th Army to a depth of 8 km and along the front up to 10 km. His further advance in this direction was stopped by the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops.
The commander of the Black Sea Group of Forces decided to intercept communications with a counterattack on the flanks of the broken through enemy and, encircling, destroy him. According to by decision two strike groups were created. Each included a rifle division and a rifle brigade.
On November 26, the troops of both groups went on the offensive. They operated in difficult conditions of mountainous and forested terrain. Due to heavy fog, visibility sometimes did not exceed twenty meters. But, despite all the difficulties, by December 17, the enemy group was eliminated, and its remnants were thrown back across the Pshish River. Thus, the last threat of a breakthrough of fascist German troops to Tuapse was eliminated.
During the Tuapse defensive operation, intense battles were fought by the 5th Air Army. The enemy had a three- to five-fold numerical superiority in the air. And yet, in October - December, more than 11,300 sorties were flown, 175 air battles were carried out, 99 fascist aircraft were shot down and 32 were destroyed at airfields.
The marines, coastal artillery, aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet took an active part in the Tuapse defensive operation. Following the instructions of the Headquarters and the Military Council of the front, warships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet in September - November transferred three rifle brigades, cavalry and mountain rifle divisions, artillery and other units to the Tuapse defensive region. In total they delivered 52,844 people and 57,796 tons of cargo and evacuated more than 2,500 wounded to Poti.
The Tuapse defensive operation of the Black Sea Group ended, and preparations for the offensive began. The enemy, who tried three times to break through to Tuapse, suffered heavy losses and was forced to go on the defensive along the entire front of the Black Sea group.
A month after the start of the Tuapse defensive operation, on October 25, fascist German troops launched a new offensive in the Nalchik direction. The Nalchik defensive operation began - the last defensive operation of the Transcaucasian Front, which lasted until November 12.
The northern group of forces of this front occupied defense in a strip about 350 km wide, consisting of the 9th, 37th, 44th and 58th armies, two separate rifle and cavalry corps, two cavalry divisions and the 4th air army.
The main group of Soviet troops was in the Grozny and Ordzhonikidze directions, while in the Nalchik direction the 37th Army, weakened by the battles, defended itself, against which the enemy planned to deliver the main blow. Here, on a six-kilometer breakthrough section, he created a three-fold superiority in men, eleven-fold in guns, ten-fold in mortars and absolute in tanks.
The command of the Transcaucasian Front did not expect an offensive in the Nalchik direction. Therefore, a weak group of Soviet troops was located here. Larger forces were concentrated in the zone of the 9th Army of General K. A. Koroteev, where an offensive operation was being prepared. The military councils of the 37th Army and the Northern Group of Forces were unable to unravel the enemy’s plan, despite intelligence reports from the 9th and 37th Armies about the regrouping they were making. It was seen as a measure to strengthen defense.
The offensive of the Northern Group troops in the Malgobek-Mozdok direction was scheduled to begin on November 3. However, on October 25, early in the morning, about 70 enemy aircraft carried out a powerful raid on the troops and headquarters of the 37th Army, located in Dolinskoye. Communication between the Northern Group and army headquarters was interrupted. At 10 o'clock the 2nd Romanian Mountain Division, reinforced by German units, went on the offensive after a short but strong fire attack. During the day, the enemy managed to advance up to 8 km in some areas. On the morning of October 26, he resumed the offensive and approached Nalchik in the afternoon. The Nazis believed that Soviet troops would no longer be able to stop them. On the same day, the headquarters of Army Group A reported to Hitler’s headquarters: “In the area of the 1st Panzer Army, the attack on Nalchik apparently took the enemy by surprise. The tank divisions already advanced to Psygansu on the first day, some of their units turned north and created the preconditions for encircling approximately four enemy divisions. The destruction of this group should be completed in a few days. The enemy is pushed into the mountains. It seems that the advance of tank forces in the southern and then eastern direction to Vladikavkaz [Ordzhonikidze] will open up broad prospects...”
The enemy continued to push the 37th Army to the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range. A gap formed between its parts in the area from Urukh to Chikola. The road to Ordzhonikidze was opened for the Nazis. The command of the Northern Group, trying to stop their advance, moved a tank brigade, reinforced with anti-tank artillery, to the Digora area on the night of October 30, and a rifle division from the 58th Army to the area of the mouth of the Ardon River, Suadag. This made it possible to slow down the enemy's advance. However, the situation remained tense.
Overcoming the resistance of Soviet troops, on November 1 the Germans occupied Alagir and crossed the Ardon River. Their aircraft subjected Ordzhonikidze to heavy bombardment. Fierce fighting broke out in the air, in which 18 enemy aircraft were shot down and 12 damaged.
Five regiments of anti-tank artillery and three regiments of rocket artillery were transferred to the Ordzhonikidze area from the 9th Army and the reserve of the commander of the Northern Group of Forces. Rifle formations were also strengthened.
On the morning of November 2, the enemy, with the support of almost 100 tanks, broke through the outer contour of the Ordzhonikidze defensive region in the Fiagdon sector (20 km west of Ordzhonikidze), Dzuarikau and reached the suburb of Ordzhonikidze. By the end of the day he had captured Gisel.
Soviet troops could not hold back the onslaught of a strong tank group, and yet they did everything to stop the enemy’s advance. In the Fiagdon area, units of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps under the command of General I.P. Rosly, having knocked out 30 German tanks, did not move away from the city walls.
In these difficult times autumn days A heavy burden fell on the pilots of the 4th Air Army. Despite the bad weather, they made about 2,200 sorties in the Nalchik direction and conducted about 100 air battles over 12 days, during which they shot down 60 enemy aircraft.
The Nazis continued to rush towards Ordzhonikidze. Having captured Gisel and concentrated up to 150 tanks in this area, on November 3 and 4 they tried to expand the breakthrough, but were thrown back everywhere with heavy losses for them. On November 4, the headquarters of the 1st German Tank Army informed the headquarters of Army Group A that “it will be necessary to suspend the attack on Vladikavkaz until the area south of the Terek River is cleared of the enemy and this eliminates the danger of an attack on the flank and rear of tank divisions." However, tactical considerations were not the reason why the Nazis suspended their attack on Ordzhonikidze. They were forced to do this by the stubborn resistance of Soviet soldiers and militia units, as well as heavy losses.
On November 5, the enemy was stopped. Now the fascist German command was not thinking about pursuing Soviet troops, but about saving their own. On that day, the headquarters of the 1st Tank Army received an order that stated: “...major offensive operations should be expected on the entire Eastern Front on the Russian revolutionary holiday of November 7; The Fuhrer expresses the hope that the troops will defend every inch of land to the last man.”
The narrow bag in which the enemy troops found themselves near Ordzhonikidze was being tightened more and more tightly by units arriving from the reserve of the Northern Group of Forces. A real possibility had arisen of completely encircling and destroying the enemy in the Giselle area. The commander of the Northern Group of Forces decided to launch a counterattack with three rifle and four tank brigades. The main forces of the group received defensive tasks. This decision reflected the caution of the command and fears for the Grozny direction, the desire to cover it with deeply echeloned defense.
On the morning of November 6, the 11th Guards Rifle Corps launched an attack along the eastern bank of the Fiagdon River on Dzuarikau with two rifle and two tank brigades. At noon, the 10th Guards Rifle Corps, with one rifle and two tank brigades, launched an attack on Gisel. Thanks to the successful advance of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, the main forces of the Nazi 23rd Tank Division were almost completely surrounded. They only had a narrow corridor in the Mayramadag region, no more than 3 km wide. The enemy made desperate attempts to break out of the bag and save his group.
Fierce fighting broke out in the Suar Gorge beyond Mayramadag (12 km west of Ordzhonikidze), where the 34th separate rifle brigade of Colonel A.V. Vorozhishchev, formed from cadets of naval schools, was defending. For more than ten days, the sailors heroically defended the line. They did not allow the enemy to capture Mayramadag and penetrate the Suar Gorge. He was also unable to provide assistance to his group, surrounded in Giselle.
On the morning of November 11, the troops of the left flank of the 9th Army broke the resistance of the Nazi rearguards, captured Gisel, and in the afternoon occupied New Saniba. The next day, the 9th Army reached the line of the Mayramadag and Fiagdon rivers. Its further advance was stopped by stubborn resistance from the enemy, who organized defense along the western bank of the Fiagdon River.
The Nalchik defensive operation of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front ended with the defeat of the Gisel fascist German group. 140 tanks, 70 guns of various calibers and other trophies were captured. On the battlefield, the enemy left over 5 thousand soldiers and officers killed.
Underestimation of the strength and capabilities of the Transcaucasian Front and the resilience of Soviet soldiers led to the failure of the plans of the command of the German 1st Tank Army. Its formations were unable to penetrate the entire depth of the Soviet defenses and develop tactical success into operational success. With the defeat of the enemy on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, his last attempt to break through to the Grozny and Baku oil regions, as well as in Transcaucasia, failed.
The Nalchik defensive operation took place during the period of fierce battles near Stalingrad. The unprecedented resilience of Soviet soldiers did not allow the enemy to capture the city on the Volga. The fascist German command was looking for new reserves to strengthen its Stalingrad group. It intended to take these reserves from the Caucasian direction.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front the task of actively pinning down the German 1st Tank Army and preventing the fascist German command from transferring troops from Army Group “A” to Stalingrad.
Following the instructions of Headquarters, the Northern Group of Forces launched several counterattacks in the Mozdok and Nalchik directions in the second half of November and December 1942. However, due to a lack of forces and means, these counterattacks did not bring the expected success.
On December 11, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command indicated to the commander of the Northern Group of Forces: “The enemy has already transferred part of his forces from the area of your troops to the north and thereby weakened himself. Judging by the course of the operation at Stalingrad, the enemy will continue to transfer part of its forces to the north. The enemy's unauthorized withdrawal on the northern bank of the Terek cannot be considered an accident. Thus, a favorable situation has been created for the offensive of all your troops. Your task is to seize the moment and act boldly.”
But the command of the Northern Group of Forces hesitated. The enemy managed to withdraw the tank and motorized divisions from the battle and throw them into the Kotelnikovsky area to help the encircled 6th Army. And yet, as a result of counterattacks, the Northern Group significantly improved its positions by the end of December and created conditions for an attack on the flank and rear of the main forces of the 1st German Tank Army.
Results of the defensive period of the Battle for the Caucasus
The defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus lasted five months. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to reach the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range and the Terek River. Inferior to the enemy in the number of aircraft, tanks and artillery, Soviet troops withstood the enemy's attack and did not give him the opportunity to break through to Baku, Transcaucasia and the Black Sea coast. The plans of the fascist German command, designed to seize the Grozny and Baku oil regions and to enslave the peoples of the Caucasus, were thwarted. The plans of the leadership of fascist Germany, through a breakthrough in Transcaucasia, to draw Turkey into the war against the Soviet Union, to unite with its troops operating in North Africa, and then to continue aggression in order to enslave the countries of the Near and Middle East failed. Thus, Hitler's Edelweiss plan failed.
The defense of the Caucasus was carried out in close connection with the actions of Soviet troops at Stalingrad, which had an exceptional influence on the course of the struggle in the Caucasus. In turn, the battles that took place here influenced the situation in the Battle of Stalingrad. The firm leadership of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the clear assignment of tasks to the troops operating in the Caucasus, the implementation of a number of important measures by the party and the Soviet government to strengthen the fronts and mobilize the local population were the most important factors that contributed to the build-up of resistance to the enemy.
At the beginning of the battle for the Caucasus, the main burden of the fight against the enemy fell on the North Caucasus Front, which included the formations and associations of the Southern Front weakened in the battles. The command of the North Caucasus Front took the necessary measures and managed to strengthen discipline among the troops, increase their combat effectiveness and organize stubborn resistance to the Nazi invaders. The armored and motorized formations of the German Army Group A were forced to slow down the pace of the offensive already in mid-August. Thus, conditions were created for the troops of the Transcaucasian Front to prepare a deeply echeloned defense.
In September, the enemy's onslaught in the Caucasian direction began to weaken. He could no longer continue the offensive along the entire front, but was forced to try to break through the defenses of the Caucasus defenders in certain directions. But these attempts were unsuccessful.
During the period of defensive battles in the Caucasus, Army Group A lost more than 100 thousand people. Everywhere her troops were eventually forced to go on the defensive. Stubborn defensive battles and then a counter-offensive by Soviet troops near Stalingrad not only prevented the German command from strengthening its Caucasian group, but also forced it to withdraw some formations from the Caucasian direction and transfer them to Stalingrad to the rescue of the encircled 6th and partially 4th tank armies .
During the defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus, battles unfolded along a front from 320 to 1000 km and to a depth of 400 to 800 km. Significant forces and resources of the parties were involved in them.
During the defense of the Caucasus, Soviet troops gained extensive experience in conducting combat operations in mountainous and forested areas.
Fighting in the mountains was fought mainly over valleys, roads and mountain passes; Large gaps often formed between the defending units and subunits. The rifle division's defense line reached 20-25 km, and in high mountain areas - up to 90 km. Such wide stripes forced divisions to form battle formations in one echelon. The defense of the passes required holding not only the passes themselves, but also the roads leading to them, as well as the dominant heights, which helped prevent the enemy from penetrating the rear of the defending units.
The forward detachments played a big role. By their active actions they delayed the enemy and thereby created conditions for the main forces to organize defense.
In the main directions of the enemy's offensive in the Caucasus, the Grozny, Makhachkala, Ordzhonikidze, Sukhumi and Tbilisi rifle divisions of the NKVD internal troops fought bravely.
Units of the border troops (23, 24, 25, 26, 32 and 95th border regiments) also made their contribution to the defense of the Caucasus. Together with units of the internal troops of the NKVD and troops of the Soviet army, they participated in the defense of the cities of Grozny, Ordzhonikidze, Novorossiysk and others, in the defense of the passes of the Main Caucasus ridge (Azishsky, Belorechensky, Klukhorsky and others). As on other fronts, they carried out combat service as part of the rear guard troops of the active army.
Party political work was of great importance in the successful outcome of the defensive battles in the Caucasus for the Soviet troops. All the activities of communists and Komsomol members in that period were aimed at increasing the combat effectiveness of units and formations, strengthening the moral and political state of personnel, and instilling in them perseverance, discipline and organization.
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics and local party bodies showed constant concern for strengthening the troops, supplying them with everything necessary, and actively influenced the activities of political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations.
The Soviet army preserved the Caucasus for the Motherland with its great economic resources and important communications connecting the USSR with the countries of the Middle East and, through them, with its allies.
The Nazis were not destined to achieve their economic goals. They never managed to get the oil from Maikop and Grozny.
The fascists’ hopes for the “disloyalty” of the Caucasian peoples to Soviet power did not come true. Representatives of more than 60 nationalities of the Caucasus, finding themselves in the occupied territory, rose up to fight the enemy. Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians, Armenians, Ossetians, and representatives of many other peoples of the USSR fought in partisan detachments, in underground organizations and groups.
The increased tenacity of the Soviet troops in defense, the heroism of the Soviet people in the rear and the expansion of the struggle in the occupied territory of the Caucasus were the main factors that contributed to the subsequent transition of the Soviet army to the offensive and the eventual expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the North Caucasus.
BATTLE FOR THE CAUCASUS - operations carried out by Soviet troops with the aim of defending the Caucasus and defeating the German troops that invaded its borders during the Great Patriotic War.
The battle for the Caucasus involved troops of the Southern, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Azov and Caspian military flotillas.
The main task of the Wehrmacht in the summer campaign of 1942 was to defeat the Soviet troops on the southern flank of the Eastern Front and gain access to the Volga and the Caucasus. Germany needed the oil and other resources of this region to continue its global war of attrition. Simultaneously with the start of the offensive in the Stalingrad direction (see Battle of Stalingrad), the German command developed operations to capture the Caucasus (directive of July 23, 1942). After the capture of Rostov, one group of German troops was to bypass the Main Caucasus Range from the west, capturing Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and the other from the east, capturing Grozny and Baku. At the same time, it was planned to break the Soviet defense in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range and reach the regions of Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi. The enemy intended to paralyze the bases of the Black Sea Fleet and establish direct contact with the Turkish army, 26 divisions of which were deployed near the USSR border. The further offensive was to develop in the direction of the Near and Middle East. The troops of Army Group A (commander - Field Marshal V. List) were supposed to break into the Caucasus, consisting of the 1st and 4th tank, 17th and 3rd (Romanian) armies, part of the forces of the 4th air force fleet (167 thousand people, 1130 tanks, up to 1000 aircraft).
They were opposed by 7 greatly weakened armies of the Southern Front (commanded by Colonel General R.Ya. Malinovsky), numbering 112 thousand people, 121 tanks and 130 aircraft of the 4th Air Army. Malinovsky's reserve had only 2 divisions. Soviet troops did not have time to fully prepare their defensive positions and experienced an acute shortage of ammunition and fuel.
On July 25, the troops of Army Group A went on the offensive from bridgeheads on the lower reaches of the Don. In two days, German troops advanced 80 km. Their tank and motorized units reached the steppe expanses of the Krasnodar Territory, creating the threat of a breakthrough to the North Caucasus. On July 28, the Supreme Command Headquarters subordinated the armies of the Southern Front, which had retreated beyond the Don, to the North Caucasus Front (commander - Marshal S.M. Budyonny). In operational terms, Budyonny was also subordinate to the Black Sea Fleet (commander - Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky) and the Azov Military Flotilla (commander - Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov). The front was given the task of restoring the situation along the southern bank of the Don at any cost. At the end of July, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (commanded by Army General I.V. Tyulenev), who covered the border with Turkey with part of their forces, began occupying lines in the northern foothills of the Caucasus and the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. Here the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front was formed (commander - Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov), which covered the approaches to Grozny and Makhachkala. On September 1, the North Caucasian Front, renamed the Black Sea Group (commander - Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko) was included in the Transcaucasian Front.
The German offensive initially developed at a rapid pace. Until mid-August, Soviet units suffered heavy losses and were driven back from the lower reaches of the Don to the Kuban River, and then to the western foothills of the Caucasus. On August 5, the enemy captured Stavropol, on August 9 - Maykop, on August 12 - Krasnodar and Pyatigorsk. However, the Germans' attempt to break through to the Black Sea coast through the foothills of the western part of the Main Caucasus Range was unsuccessful. On August 25, units of Army Group A entered Mozdok, located 93 km from Grozny. Approximately the same distance separated them from the coast of the Caspian Sea. On August 31, they continued their offensive, hoping to capture the Grozny oil-bearing region. On September 2, units of the 1st Tank Army attempted to break through to Grozny through Ordzhonikidze, but formations of the Soviet Northern Group imposed heavy, exhausting battles on the enemy, forcing them to fight their way forward with heavy losses. Counterattacks by Soviet troops from November 6 to 12 forced the Germans to finally abandon the offensive on Grozny and go on the defensive.
On August 19, fierce battles broke out in the Novorossiysk direction, where the troops of the 17th Army were advancing. The Germans' attempt to break through to the city on the move failed. But on August 28, resuming the offensive, German units managed to break through the left flank of the Soviet 47th Army and on August 31 reach the Black Sea coast, capturing Anapa. The Soviet formations, retreating, left the Taman Peninsula, where 6 German divisions landed from the Crimea on September 1-2. Having received reinforcements, the troops of the 17th Army captured a significant part of Novorossiysk by September 10. Their further attempts to break through along the coast and through the mountains to Tuapse were thwarted by the troops of the Black Sea Group of the Transcaucasian Front. The enemy tried to break through into Transcaucasia and through the passes of the central part of the Caucasus Range. Experienced German and Italian units operated here, with many trained climbers in their ranks. Some passes fell into enemy hands, but thanks to the selfless actions of the defending troops, operating in difficult highland conditions, the threat of the enemy reaching the southern slopes of the passes was eliminated.
At the end of November, the enemy went on the defensive here too. At the end of 1942, German troops held the economically and strategically important Kuban region, but they were unable to complete the tasks assigned to them - the capture of the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus, the Black Sea coast and a breakthrough to the Near and Middle East - having completely exhausted their offensive capabilities in battles . Soviet troops paid a heavy price to stop the enemy. Only the irretrievable losses of Red Army units in this direction until the end of 1942 amounted to more than 192 thousand people. At the same time, the defensive period ended and the offensive period of the battle for the Caucasus began. By decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the troops of the Southern Front, Colonel General A.I. Eremenko (created on January 1, 1943 on the basis of the Stalingrad Front), building on the success of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the main forces launched an offensive on Rostov and part of the forces on Tikhoretsk. The Black Sea group of troops of the Transcaucasian Front received orders to advance towards the troops of the Southern Front - towards Krasnodar and Tikhoretsk. The Northern Group of Forces (from January 24 transformed into the North Caucasus Front) was supposed to pursue the German 1st Tank Army and strike at it, advancing in the direction of Mozdok and Armavir. By January 24, the Northern Group of Forces had already liberated Mozdok, Mineralnye Vody, Pyatigorsk, Stavropol and Armavir. At the same time, the troops of the Southern Front, advancing in the Rostov and Tikhoretsk directions, in the Salsk region united with the troops of the right wing of the Transcaucasian Front. On January 29, the Black Sea Group of Forces liberated Maykop. On February 5, it was included in the North Caucasus Front and, continuing the offensive, liberated Krasnodar on February 12. Offensive operations in the North Caucasus continued until mid-February. By this time, the troops of three fronts, with the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, had advanced from 160 to 600 km and liberated Checheno-Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, most of the Rostov region, the Stavropol Territory and the bulk of the territory of the Krasnodar Territory. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people were saved from being forcibly deported to work in Germany. But expelling the enemy required great sacrifices. In just 35 days of active hostilities, irretrievable losses of Soviet troops reached 69,600 people.
In the spring of 1943, Soviet troops reached the Taman Peninsula, where they met stubborn enemy resistance on a pre-prepared, deeply echeloned defense line (the so-called “Blue Line”), running from the Sea of Azov to Novorossiysk. The German 17th Army (16 divisions) held the defense here. Attempts to break it by the troops of the North Caucasus Front, weakened in previous battles, were unsuccessful. In the summer of 1943, the Red Army launched a powerful offensive in the southwestern direction of the Soviet-German front. This favored the resumption of the offensive in the North Caucasus. The North Caucasus Front (commander - Colonel General I.E. Petrov) received an order to eliminate the enemy Taman group. The front command prepared a plan for the Novorossiysk-Taman operation. The idea was to launch a joint attack from sea and land on Novorossiysk, capture it and launch an attack on Anapa, creating a threat for the enemy to envelop it from the south. At the same time, attacks were to be carried out north and south of the Kuban River with the aim of defeating the German group in parts. The main blow was aimed at Novorossiysk. The offensive began on the night of September 10 with a powerful artillery barrage and a naval landing in the port of Novorossiysk. At the same time, formations of the 18th Army went on the attack east and south of Novorossiysk. The assault on the city began and lasted six days. On September 11, the troops of the 9th Army went on the offensive, and on September 14, the 56th Army. The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla provided great assistance to the advancing troops. By landing troops behind enemy lines, they did not allow him to gain a foothold on intermediate lines. At the beginning of October, the fighting on the Taman Peninsula ended. On October 3, troops of the 18th Army liberated the city of Taman, and by the morning of October 9, troops of the 56th Army cleared the entire northern part of the peninsula. Entire territory Caucasus region was now cleared of the enemy.
Germany's plans to destroy Soviet troops, seize the richest agricultural areas, oil sources, and penetrate into the Near and Middle East were completely thwarted. German Army Group A suffered heavy losses. About 275 thousand were killed and over 6 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured. The enemy has lost large quantity military equipment and weapons. However, during the retreat, the German command managed to save a significant part of its forces from death and capture, which it subsequently used on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. In 1944, to reward Soviet soldiers who did not allow the Germans to access Caucasian oil, the medal “For the Defense of the Caucasus” was established, which was received by about 600 thousand people. Many units and formations were awarded the honorary names of Anapa, Kuban, Taman, Temryuk, and the city of Novorossiysk received the honorary title “Hero City” in 1973 for the massive heroism, courage and fortitude shown by its population and the soldiers of the Red Army.
Historical sources:
Grechko A.A. Battle for the Caucasus. M., 1967.
The Nazi leadership attached particular importance to the seizure of the Caucasus. Here Germany hoped not only to obtain oil sources, but also to create conditions for an invasion of the countries of the Near and Middle East, as well as to achieve Turkey’s entry into the war against the USSR. In accordance with the general plan of the summer campaign of 1942, the Nazi command developed a plan for the capture of the Caucasus (“Edelweiss”). The enemy’s plan was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov. Then, developing the offensive, it was planned to bypass the Main Caucasus Range from the west, capturing Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and from the east, capturing Grozny and Baku. Simultaneously with this roundabout maneuver, it was planned to overcome the ridge in its central part through passes with access to Transcaucasia. With a breakthrough in Transcaucasia, the enemy hoped to paralyze the bases of the Black Sea Fleet and achieve complete dominance in the Black Sea. Army Group A, created in July 1942, consisting of two tank armies, two field armies and part of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet, as well as the 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian armies, was intended to carry out such large-scale plans. The enemy group was opposed by the troops of the Southern and part of the forces of the North Caucasus fronts, consisting of the 51st, 37th, 12th, 18th, 56th combined arms and 4th air armies. The Soviet troops were faced with the task of stopping the enemy, exhausting him in stubborn defensive battles and preparing the conditions for launching a counteroffensive.
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On July 25, 1942, German troops launched an offensive in the Salsk, Stavropol and Krasnodar directions. The troops of the Southern Front, under pressure from superior enemy forces, were forced to retreat to the south and southeast. To improve leadership, the troops of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts were united into a single North Caucasian Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union SM Budyonny). The troops of the new front were tasked with stopping the enemy's advance. At the same time, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (commanded by Army General I.V. Tyulenev) were ordered to prepare a deeply echeloned defense along the pp. Terek, Urukh and the passes of the Main Caucasus Range, as well as create a multi-lane defense in the direction of Grozny and Makhachkala. The 9th and 44th armies operating here were united into the Northern Group of Forces
Transcaucasian Front (commander Lieutenant General \\. I. Maslennikov). The events of this period are characterized by high tension and dynamism of military operations. The enemy was rushing towards the coast, towards the passes. On September 1, 1942, the North Caucasus Front was transformed into the Black Sea Group and became part of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front. The Soviet Supreme High Command took decisive measures to replenish the troops with human reserves and material and technical means. At the same time, the party and Soviet bodies of the territories, regions and republics of the Caucasus intensified their work on the creation of militia and partisan formations, the production of weapons and military equipment, and the construction of defensive lines. Caucasian national formations (12 divisions) took part in the battle for the Caucasus.
During the enemy's strategic offensive, his efforts gradually moved towards the Stalingrad direction, and by October 1942, only two German armies remained in Army Group A - the 1st Tank and the 17th Field.
During August - December 1942, Soviet troops fought stubborn defensive battles. In the Ordzhonikidze direction, they stopped the enemy on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, and then forced them to go on the defensive. The enemy managed to capture almost all the passes in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range, but thanks to the measures of the Soviet command, the threat of a breakthrough by German troops in Transcaucasia was eliminated. The enemy's attempt to overcome the ridge in the Tuapse direction also failed. Fierce fighting continued here until mid-December 1942. Having suffered heavy losses, German troops were forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive. During the defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus, Soviet troops had to leave the areas of the North Caucasus and retreat to the passes of the Main Caucasus ridge and the river. Terek, but they managed to gain time to prepare a counteroffensive.
The offensive period of the battle for the Caucasus began on January 1, 1943. The troops of the Southern Front (commanded by Colonel General A.I. Eremenko), building on the success of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, advanced with the main forces on Rostov, and with part of the forces on Tikhoretsk. The Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front received the task of attacking Krasnodar, Tikhoretsk, and the Northern Group of Forces - Mozdok, Prokhladny, Armavir. Thus, the troops of the two fronts, through joint efforts, with the active assistance of the Black Sea Fleet and the support of aviation from the three air armies, were supposed to isolate and then destroy the main enemy forces in the North Caucasus. However, the Southern Front did not have enough forces to implement this plan, and the regrouping of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front from the Mozdok to the Krasnodar direction was carried out in difficult conditions, along difficult mountain roads, and was not completed in a timely manner. In an effort to avoid encirclement, enemy troops began to retreat from the Mozdok area in a northwestern direction. The Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front, pursuing the retreating enemy, liberated Mozdok, Mineralnye Vody, Stavropol and other cities of the North Caucasus by January 24. At the same time, the troops of the Southern Front in the Salsk region united with the troops of the right wing of the Transcaucasian Front. The Black Sea Group of Forces, which went on the offensive, liberated Maikop on January 29, and then liberated Krasnodar during the Krasnodar operation on February 12. The offensive of the Soviet troops was actively supported by partisan formations. On the night of February 4, the Black Sea Fleet landed a naval landing southwest of Novorossiysk, in the Myskhako area (more than 15 thousand people with artillery and tanks), which captured a small bridgehead, which went down in history as Malaya Zemlya and played an important role in the liberation of Novorossiysk . It was not possible to implement the General Headquarters' plan - to complete the encirclement of the troops of the enemy Army Group "A" in the North Caucasus, but the enemy was forced to withdraw his main forces to the Donbass, and with formations of the 17th Field Army he went on the defensive at a prepared line in the lower reaches of the river. Kuban - the so-called Blue Line. During the further offensive, by the beginning of May, Soviet troops reached the Taman Peninsula and met stubborn enemy resistance on the Blue Line, where 16 divisions of the 17th Field Army numbering up to 500 thousand people defended. Attempts by Soviet troops to break through the Blue Line in the spring of 1943 were unsuccessful. At the same time, the largest air battle took place in Kuban, which was won by Soviet aviation. It carried out 35 thousand sorties, destroying more than 1.1 thousand enemy aircraft.
In the summer of 1943, the Red Army launched a new powerful offensive in the central and southwestern directions, which favored the resumption of the offensive in the North Caucasus. On September 10, the Novorossiysk-Taman operation began, as a result of which the enemy’s Blue Line was broken, and on September 16, Novorossiysk was liberated by a bold amphibious landing. Soviet troops completed the defeat of the enemy group and on October 9 cleared the Taman Peninsula, the last enemy bridgehead in the Caucasus, from fascist invaders. The total losses of the enemy in the battle for the Caucasus amounted to more than 380 thousand soldiers and officers. Soviet troops lost about 950 thousand people (including 344 thousand irrevocably).
The feat of arms of the soldiers was highly appreciated by the Motherland. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 1, 1944, the medal “For the Defense of the Caucasus” was established, which was awarded to about 600 thousand people. Many units and formations were awarded the honorary names of Anapa, Kuban, Novorossiysk, Taman, Temryuk. The city of Novorossiysk for outstanding services to the Motherland, mass heroism, courage and fortitude,
by its workers and soldiers of the Red Army, Navy and Aviation during the Great Patriotic War, and in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the defeat of fascist troops in the defense of the North Caucasus, on September 14, 1973, the honorary title “Hero City” was awarded with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.