Who is Lavrenty Beria's nationality? Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich - biography. Pre-war and war periods of the life of L. P. Beria

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria
2nd Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR 9 during the period March 5, 1953 - June 26, 1953)
Head of Government: Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov
Predecessor: Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov
Successor: Sergey Nikiforovich Kruglov
3rd People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
November 25, 1938 - December 29, 1945
Head of Government: Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov
Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin
6th First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia
November 14, 1931 - August 31, 1938
Predecessor: Lavrenty Iosifovich Kartvelishvili
Successor: Kandid Nesterovich Charkviani
First Secretary of the Tbilisi City Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (Bolsheviks)
May 1937 - August 31, 1938
First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
October 17, 1932 - April 23, 1937
Predecessor: Ivan Dmitrievich Orakhelashvili
Successor: Position abolished
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR
April 4, 1927 - December 1930
Predecessor: Alexey Alexandrovich Gegechkori
Successor: Sergey Arsenievich Goglidze

Birth: March 17 (29), 1899
Merkheuli, Gumistinsky district, Sukhumi district, Kutaisi province,
Russian empire
Death: December 23, 1953 (age 54)
Moscow, RSFSR, USSR
Father: Pavel Khukhaevich Beria
Mother: Marta Vissarionovna Jakeli
Spouse: Nino Teymurazovna Gegechkori
Children: son: Sergo
Party: RSDLP(b) since 1917, RCP(b) since 1918, CPSU(b) since 1925, CPSU since 1952
Education: Baku Polytechnic Institute

Military service
Years of service: 1938-1953
Affiliation: (1923-1955) USSR
Rank: Marshal Soviet Union
Commanded by: Head of the GUGB NKVD USSR (1938)
People's Commissar of the USSR Internal Affairs (1938-1945)
Member of the State Defense Committee (1941-1944)

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria(Georgian ლავრენტი პავლეს ძე ბერია, Lavrenti Pavles dze Beria; March 17, 1899, village of Merkheuli, Sukhumi district, Kutaisi province. - 23 December 1953, Moscow) - Soviet statesman and politician, General Commissioner of State Security (1941), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1945). Lavrentia Beria - One of the main organizers of Stalin's repressions.

Since 1941 Lavrenty Beria- Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Sovnarkom until 1946) of the USSR Joseph Stalin, with his death on March 5, 1953 - First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov and at the same time Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Member of the USSR State Defense Committee (1941-1944), deputy chairman of the USSR State Defense Committee (1944-1945). Member of the USSR Central Executive Committee of the 7th convocation, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st-3rd convocations. Member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1934-1953), candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee (1939-1946), member of the Politburo (1946-1953). He was part of J.V. Stalin's inner circle. He oversaw a number of the most important sectors of the defense industry, including all developments related to the creation of nuclear weapons and missile technology.

On June 26, 1953, L.P. Beria was arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy to seize power. Executed by the verdict of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR on December 23, 1953.

Childhood and youth

Lavrenty Beria born on March 17, 1899 in the village of Merkheuli, Sukhumi district, Kutaisi province (now in the Gulrypsh region of Abkhazia) into a poor peasant family. His mother Marta Jakeli (1868-1955) - a Mingrelian, according to Sergo Beria and fellow villagers, was distantly related to the Mingrelian princely family of Dadiani. After the death of her first husband, Martha was left with a son and two daughters in her arms. Later, due to extreme poverty, the children from Martha’s first marriage were taken in by her brother, Dmitry

Father Lawrence Beria, Pavel Khukhaevich Beria(1872-1922), moved to Merheuli from Megrelia. Martha and Pavel had three children in their family, but one of the sons died at the age of 2, and the daughter remained deaf and dumb after an illness. Noticing Lavrenty's good abilities, his parents tried to give him a good education - at the Sukhumi Higher Primary School. To pay for studies and living expenses, parents had to sell half of their house.

In 1915, Lavrenty Beria, with honors (according to other sources, he studied mediocrely, and was left in the fourth grade for the second year), having graduated from the Sukhumi Higher Primary School, left for Baku and entered the Baku Secondary Mechanical and Technical Construction School. From the age of 17, he supported his mother and deaf-mute sister, who moved in with him. Working since 1916 as an intern at the main office of the Nobel oil company, he simultaneously continued his studies at the school. He graduated from it in 1919, receiving a diploma as a construction technician-architect.

Since 1915, he was a member of the illegal Marxist circle of the Mechanical Engineering School and was its treasurer. In March 1917, Beria became a member of the RSDLP (b). In June - December 1917, as a technician of a hydraulic engineering detachment, he went to the Romanian front, served in Odessa, then in Pascani (Romania), was discharged due to illness and returned to Baku, where from February 1918 he worked in the city organization of the Bolsheviks and the secretariat of the Baku Council workers' deputies. After the defeat of the Baku Commune and the capture of Baku by Turkish-Azerbaijani troops (September 1918), he remained in the city and participated in the work of the underground Bolshevik organization until the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan (April 1920). From October 1918 to January 1919 - clerk at the Caspian Partnership White City plant, Baku.

In the fall of 1919, on the instructions of the leader of the Baku Bolshevik underground A. Mikoyan, he became an agent of the Organization for Combating Counter-Revolution (counterintelligence) under the State Defense Committee of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. During this period, he established close relations with Zinaida Krems (von Krems (Kreps)), who had connections with German military intelligence. In his autobiography, dated October 22, 1923, Beria wrote:
“During the first time of the Turkish occupation, I worked in the White City at the Caspian Partnership plant as a clerk. In the autumn of the same 1919, from the Gummet party, I entered the counterintelligence service, where I worked together with comrade Moussevi. Around March 1920, after the murder of Comrade Moussevi, I left my job in counterintelligence and worked for a short time at the Baku customs. »

Beria did not hide his work in counterintelligence of the ADR - for example, in a letter to G.K. Ordzhonikidze in 1933, he wrote that “he was sent to Musavat intelligence by the party and that this issue was examined by the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (b) in 1920,” that the Central Committee of the AKP(b) “completely rehabilitated” him, since “the fact of working in counterintelligence with the knowledge of the party was confirmed by the statements of comrade. Mirza Davud Huseynova, Kasum Izmailova and others.”

In April 1920, after the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, he was sent to work illegally in the Georgian Democratic Republic as an authorized representative of the Caucasian regional committee of the RCP (b) and the registration department of the Caucasian Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army. Almost immediately he was arrested in Tiflis and released with an order to leave Georgia within three days. In his autobiography, Beria wrote:
“From the very first days after the April coup in Azerbaijan, the regional committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) from the register of the Caucasian Front under the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army was sent to Georgia for underground work abroad as an authorized representative. In Tiflis I contact the regional committee represented by Comrade. Hmayak Nazaretyan, I spread a network of residents in Georgia and Armenia, establish contact with the headquarters of the Georgian army and guard, and regularly send couriers to the register of the city of Baku. In Tiflis I was arrested together with the Central Committee of Georgia, but according to negotiations between G. Sturua and Noah Zhordania, everyone was released with an offer to leave Georgia within 3 days. However, I manage to stay, having entered the service under the pseudonym Lakerbaya in the representative office of the RSFSR with Comrade Kirov, who by that time had arrived in the city of Tiflis. »

Later, participating in the preparation of an armed uprising against the Georgian Menshevik government, he was exposed by local counterintelligence, arrested and imprisoned in Kutaisi prison, then deported to Azerbaijan. He writes about this:
“In May 1920, I went to the register office in Baku to receive directives in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Georgia, but on the way back to Tiflis I was arrested by a telegram from Noah Ramishvili and taken to Tiflis, from where, despite the efforts of Comrade Kirov, I was sent to Kutaisi prison. June and July 1920, I was in custody, only after four and a half days of hunger strike declared by political prisoners, I was gradually deported to Azerbaijan. »

In the state security agencies of Azerbaijan and Georgia

Returning to Baku, Beria tried several times to continue his studies at the Baku Polytechnic Institute, into which the school was transformed, and completed three courses. In August 1920, he became the manager of the affairs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan, and in October of the same year, he became the executive secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and improvement of the living conditions of workers, working in this position until February 1921. In April 1921, he was appointed deputy head of the Secret Operations Department of the Cheka under the Council. People's Commissars(SNK) of the Azerbaijan SSR, and in May he took the positions of head of the secret operational unit and deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Cheka. The Chairman of the Cheka of the Azerbaijan SSR at that time was Mir Jafar Bagirov.

In 1921, Beria was sharply criticized by the party and KGB leadership of Azerbaijan for exceeding his powers and falsifying criminal cases, but escaped serious punishment. (Anastas Mikoyan interceded for him.)
In 1922, he participated in the defeat of the Muslim organization “Ittihad” and the liquidation of the Transcaucasian organization of right-wing Social Revolutionaries.
In November 1922, Beria was transferred to Tiflis, where he was appointed head of the Secret Operations Unit and deputy chairman of the Cheka under the Council of People's Commissars of the Georgian SSR, later transformed into the Georgian GPU (State Political Administration), with the combined position of head of the Special Department of the Transcaucasian Army.

In July 1923, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of the Republic by the Central Executive Committee of Georgia. In 1924, he participated in the suppression of the Menshevik uprising and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of the USSR.
From March 1926 - Deputy Chairman of the GPU of the Georgian SSR, Head of the Secret Operations Unit.
December 2, 1926 Lavrenty Beria became chairman of the GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the Georgian SSR (until December 3, 1931), deputy plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in the TSFSR and deputy chairman of the GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the TSFSR (until April 17, 1931). At the same time, from December 1926 to April 17, 1931, he was the head of the Secret Operational Directorate of the Plenipotentiary Representation of the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in the Trans-SFSR and the GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the Trans-SFSR.

At the same time, from April 1927 to December 1930 - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR. His first meeting with Stalin apparently dates back to this period.

June 6, 1930, by resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of the Georgian SSR Lavrenty Beria was appointed a member of the Presidium (later the Bureau) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (Bolsheviks). On April 17, 1931, he took the positions of Chairman of the GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the ZSFSR, the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in the ZSFSR, and the head of the Special Department of the OGPU of the Caucasian Red Banner Army (until December 3, 1931). At the same time, from August 18 to December 3, 1931, he was a member of the board of the OGPU of the USSR.

At party work in Transcaucasia

The promotion of Beria from the KGB to party work was facilitated by the leader of Abkhazia Nestor Lakoba. On October 31, 1931, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks recommended L. P. Beria to the post of second secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee (in office until October 17, 1932), on November 14, 1931 he became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (by August 31, 1938), and on October 17, 1932 - the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee while maintaining his position First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia, was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Armenia and Azerbaijan. On December 5, 1936, the TSFSR was divided into three independent republics; the Transcaucasian Regional Committee was liquidated by a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on April 23, 1937.

On March 10, 1933, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks included Beria in the distribution list of materials sent to members of the Central Committee - minutes of meetings of the Politburo, Organizing Bureau, and Secretariat of the Central Committee. In 1934, at the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he was elected a member of the Central Committee.
Since February 10, 1934 L. P. Beria- Member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
On March 20, 1934, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was included in the commission chaired by L. M. Kaganovich, created to develop a draft Regulation on the NKVD of the USSR and the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR

In December 1934, he attended a reception with Stalin in honor of his 55th birthday. At the beginning of March 1935, he was elected a member of the USSR Central Executive Committee and its presidium. On March 17, 1935 he was awarded the Order of Lenin. In May 1937, he concurrently headed the Tbilisi City Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (b) (in this position until August 31, 1938).
From left to right: Philip Makharadze, Mir Jafar Bagirov and Lavrenty Beria, 1935.

During the leadership of L.P. Beria, the national economy of the region developed rapidly. Beria made a great contribution to the development of the oil industry of Transcaucasia; under him, many large industrial facilities were commissioned (Zemo-Avchala hydroelectric station, etc.). Georgia was transformed into an all-Union resort area. By 1940, the volume of industrial production in Georgia increased 10 times compared to 1913, agricultural production - 2.5 times, with a fundamental change in the structure of agriculture towards highly profitable crops of the subtropical zone. High purchasing prices were set for agricultural products produced in the subtropics (grapes, tea, tangerines, etc.), and the Georgian peasantry was the most prosperous in the country.

In 1935 he published the book “On the Question of the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia.” Beria is credited with poisoning the then leader of Abkhazia Nestor Lakoba.
In September 1937, together with G.M. Malenkov and A.I. Mikoyan sent from Moscow, he carried out a “cleansing” of the party organization of Armenia. The “Great Purge” also took place in Georgia, where many party and government workers were repressed. Here the so-called a conspiracy among the party leadership of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, whose participants allegedly planned the secession of Transcaucasia from the USSR and transition to the protectorate of Great Britain.
In Georgia, in particular, persecution began against the People's Commissar of Education of the Georgian SSR Gaioza Devdariani. His brother Shalva, who held important positions in the state security agencies and the Communist Party, was executed. In the end, Gayoz Devdariani was accused of violating Article 58 and, on suspicion of counter-revolutionary activities, was executed in 1938 by the verdict of the NKVD troika. In addition to party functionaries, local intellectuals also suffered from the purge, even those who tried to stay away from politics, including Mikheil Javakhishvili, Titian Tabidze, Sandro Akhmeteli, Yevgeny Mikeladze, Dmitry Shevardnadze, Giorgi Eliava, Grigory Tsereteli and others.
Since January 17, 1938, from the 1st session of the USSR Supreme Council of the 1st convocation, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR.

In the NKVD of the USSR

On August 22, 1938, Beria was appointed first deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. I. Yezhov. Simultaneously with Beria, another 1st Deputy People's Commissar (from 04/15/37) was M.P. Frinovsky, who headed the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR. On September 8, 1938, Frinovsky was appointed People's Commissar Navy USSR and left the posts of 1st Deputy People's Commissar and Head of the NKVD Directorate of the USSR, on the same day, September 8, he was replaced in the last post by L.P. Beria - from September 29, 1938 at the head of the Main Directorate restored in the structure of the NKVD state security(On December 17, 1938, Beria will be replaced in this post by V.N. Merkulov - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD from December 16, 1938). On September 11, 1938, L.P. Beria was awarded the title of State Security Commissioner of the 1st rank.
November 25, 1938 Beria was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

With the arrival of L.P. Beria as head of the NKVD, the scale of repressions sharply decreased and the Great Terror ended. In 1939, 2.6 thousand people were sentenced to capital punishment on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes, in 1940 - 1.6 thousand. the overwhelming majority of persons not convicted in 1937-1938 were released; Also, some of those convicted and sent to camps were released. The Moscow State University expert commission estimates the number of people released in 1939-1940. 150-200 thousand people. “In certain circles of society, he has since had a reputation as a person who restored “socialist legality” at the very end of the 30s,” notes Yakov Etinger.

According to archival documents, Beria organized the execution of Polish prisoners and the deportation of their relatives in 1940, while sources claim that deportations in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were directed primarily against a part of the Polish population hostile to the Soviet regime and nationalist-minded.

Oversaw the operation to eliminate Leon Trotsky.

Since March 22, 1939 - candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). On January 30, 1941, L.P. Beria was awarded the title of General Commissioner of State Security. On February 3, 1941, he was appointed deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. As deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, he oversaw the work of the NKVD, NKGB, people's commissariats of the forestry and oil industries, non-ferrous metals, and river fleet.
Great Patriotic War [edit]
See also: Great Patriotic War

During the Great Patriotic War, from June 30, 1941, L.P. Beria was a member of the State Defense Committee (GKO). By the GKO decree of February 4, 1942 on the distribution of responsibilities between members of the GKO, L. P. Beria was assigned responsibilities for monitoring the implementation of GKO decisions on the production of aircraft, engines, weapons and mortars, as well as for monitoring the implementation of GKO decisions on the work of the Red Air Force Armies (formation of air regiments, their timely transfer to the front, etc.). By decree of the State Defense Committee of December 8, 1942, L. P. Beria was appointed a member of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee. By the same decree, L.P. Beria was additionally assigned responsibilities for monitoring and monitoring the work of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry and the People's Commissariat of Railways. In May 1944, Beria was appointed deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee and chairman of the Operations Bureau. The tasks of the Operations Bureau included, in particular, control and monitoring of the work of all People's Commissariats of the defense industry, railway and water transport, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, coal, oil, chemical, rubber, paper and pulp, electrical industries, and power plants.

Beria also served as permanent adviser to the Headquarters of the Main Command of the USSR Armed Forces.

During the war years, he carried out important assignments of the country's leadership and the ruling party, both related to the management of the national economy and at the front. Oversaw the production of aircraft and rocketry.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated September 30, 1943, L.P. Beria was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor “for special merits in the field of strengthening the production of weapons and ammunition in difficult wartime conditions.”

During the war, L.P. Beria was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (Mongolia) (July 15, 1942), the Order of the Republic (Tuva) (August 18, 1943), the Hammer and Sickle medal (September 30, 1943), two Orders of Lenin (30 September 1943, February 21, 1945), Order of the Red Banner (November 3, 1944).
Start of work on the nuclear project [edit]

On February 11, 1943, J.V. Stalin signed the decision of the State Defense Committee on the work program for the creation of an atomic bomb under the leadership of V.M. Molotov. But already in the decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR on the laboratory of I.V. Kurchatov, adopted on December 3, 1944, it was L.P. Beria who was entrusted with “monitoring the development of work on uranium,” that is, approximately a year and ten months after their supposed start, which was difficult during the war.
Deportation of peoples [edit]
Main article: Deportation of peoples to the USSR

During the Great Patriotic War, peoples were deported from their places of compact residence. Representatives of peoples whose countries were part of Hitler's coalition (Hungarians, Bulgarians, many Finns) were also deported. The official reason for the deportation was mass desertion, collaboration and active anti-Soviet armed struggle of a significant part of these peoples during the Great Patriotic War.

On January 29, 1944, Lavrentiy Beria approved the “Instructions on the procedure for the eviction of Chechens and Ingush,” and on February 21, he issued an order to the NKVD on the deportation of Chechens and Ingush. On February 20, together with I. A. Serov, B. Z. Kobulov and S. S. Mamulov, Beria arrived in Grozny and personally led the operation, which involved up to 19 thousand operatives of the NKVD, NKGB and SMERSH, and also about 100 thousand officers and soldiers of the NKVD troops, drawn from all over the country to participate in “exercises in the mountainous areas.” On February 22, he met with the leadership of the republic and the highest spiritual leaders, warned them about the operation and proposed to carry out necessary work among the population, and the eviction operation began the next morning. On February 24, Beria reported to Stalin: “The eviction is proceeding normally... Of the persons scheduled for removal in connection with the operation, 842 people have been arrested.” On the same day, Beria suggested that Stalin evict the Balkars, and on February 26, he issued an order to the NKVD “On measures to evict the Balkar population from the Design Bureau of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.” The day before, Beria, Serov and Kobulov held a meeting with the secretary of the Kabardino-Balkarian regional party committee Zuber Kumekhov, during which it was planned to visit the Elbrus region in early March. On March 2, Beria, accompanied by Kobulov and Mamulov, traveled to the Elbrus region, informing Kumekhov of his intention to evict the Balkars and transfer their lands to Georgia so that it could have a defensive line on the northern slopes of the Greater Caucasus. On March 5, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the eviction from the Design Bureau of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and on March 8-9, the operation began. On March 11, Beria reported to Stalin that “37,103 Balkars were evicted,” and on March 14 he reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Another major action was the deportation of Meskhetian Turks, as well as Kurds and Hemshins living in the areas bordering Turkey. On July 24, Beria addressed I. Stalin with a letter (No. 7896). He wrote:
“For a number of years, a significant part of this population, connected with the residents of the border regions of Turkey through family ties and relationships, has shown emigration sentiments, engaged in smuggling and serves as a source for the Turkish intelligence agencies to recruit spy elements and plant gangster groups. »

He noted that “the NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient to resettle 16,700 farms of Turks, Kurds, Hemshins from the Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki, Adigeni, Aspindza, Bogdanovsky districts, some village councils of the Adjarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.” On July 31, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution (No. 6279, “top secret”) on the eviction of 45,516 Meskhetian Turks from the Georgian SSR to the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek SSRs, as noted in the documents of the Special Settlements Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

The liberation of the regions from the German occupiers also required new actions against the families of German collaborators, traitors and traitors to the Motherland, who voluntarily left with the Germans. On August 24, an order from the NKVD followed, signed by Beria, “On the eviction from the cities of the Caucasian Mining Group resorts of the families of active German collaborators, traitors and traitors to the Motherland who voluntarily left with the Germans.” On December 2, Beria addressed Stalin with the following letter:

“In connection with the successful completion of the operation to evict from the border regions of the Georgian SSR to the regions of the Uzbek, Kazakh and Kirghiz SSR 91,095 people - Turks, Kurds, Hemshins, the NKVD of the USSR requests that the NKVD workers who most distinguished themselves during the operation be awarded with orders and medals of the USSR. NKGB and military personnel of the NKVD troops."

Post-war years[edit]
Supervision of the USSR nuclear project [edit]
See also: The creation of the Soviet atomic bomb

After testing the first American atomic device in the desert near Alamogordo, work in the USSR to create its own nuclear weapons was significantly accelerated.

The Special Committee was created based on the GKO resolution of August 20, 1945. It included L. P. Beria (chairman), G. M. Malenkov, N. A. Voznesensky, B. L. Vannikov, A. P. Zavenyagin, I. V. Kurchatov, P. L. Kapitsa (then removed due to disagreements with L.P. Beria, formally based on personal hostility), V.A. Makhnev, M.G. Pervukhin. The Committee was entrusted with “the management of all work on the use of intra-atomic energy of uranium.” Later it was transformed into a Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. L.P. Beria, on the one hand, organized and supervised the receipt of all necessary intelligence information, on the other hand, he provided general management of the entire project. In March 1953, the Special Committee was entrusted with the management of other special works of defense significance. Based on the decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee of June 26, 1953 (the day of the removal and arrest of L.P. Beria), the Special Committee was liquidated, and its apparatus was transferred to the newly formed Ministry of Medium Engineering of the USSR.

On August 29, 1949, the atomic bomb was successfully tested at the Semipalatinsk test site. On October 29, 1949, L.P. Beria was awarded the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree “for organizing the production of atomic energy and the successful completion of the test atomic weapons" According to the testimony of P. A. Sudoplatov, published in the book “Intelligence and the Kremlin: Notes of an Unwanted Witness” (1996), two project leaders - L. P. Beria and I. V. Kurchatov - were awarded the title “Honorary Citizen of the USSR” with the wording “for outstanding services in strengthening the power of the USSR,” it is indicated that the recipient was awarded a “Certificate of Honorary Citizen of the Soviet Union.” Subsequently, the title “Honorary Citizen of the USSR” was not awarded.

The test of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, the development of which was supervised by G. M. Malenkov, took place on August 12, 1953, shortly after the arrest of L. P. Beria.
Career [edit]

On July 9, 1945, when special state security ranks were replaced with military ones, L.P. Beria was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

On September 6, 1945, the Operations Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was formed, and L.P. Beria was appointed its chairman. The tasks of the SNK Operations Bureau included work issues industrial enterprises and railway transport.

Since March 1946, Beria has been one of the “seven” members of the Politburo, which included I.V. Stalin and six people close to him. This “inner circle” covered the most important issues of public administration, including: foreign policy, foreign trade, state security, armaments, and the functioning of the armed forces. On March 18, he became a member of the Politburo, and the next day he was appointed deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. As Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he oversaw the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of State Control.

In March 1949 - July 1951, there was a sharp strengthening of L.P. Beria's position in the country's leadership, which was facilitated by the successful testing of the first atomic bomb in the USSR, the work on which L.P. Beria supervised.

After the 19th Congress of the CPSU, which took place in October 1952, L. P. Beria was included in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, which replaced the former Politburo, in the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and in the “leading five” of the Presidium created at the suggestion of J. V. Stalin.

Former USSR MGB investigator Nikolai Mesyatsev, who conducted an audit of the “doctors’ case,” claimed that Stalin suspected Beria of patronizing the arrested ex-Minister of State Security Viktor Abakumov, who was accused of falsifying criminal cases.
Death of Stalin. Reforms and the struggle for power [edit]

On the day of Stalin's death - March 5, 1953, a Joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held, where appointments to the highest posts of the party and the Government of the USSR were approved, and, by prior agreement with the Khrushchev group -Malenkov-Molotov-Bulganin, Beria, without much debate, was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. The newly formed Ministry of Internal Affairs merged the previously existing Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security.

On March 9, 1953, L.P. Beria participated in the funeral of I.V. Stalin, and made a speech at a funeral meeting from the rostrum of the Mausoleum.

Beria, along with Khrushchev and Malenkov, became one of the main contenders for leadership in the country. In the struggle for leadership, L.P. Beria relied on the security agencies. L.P. Beria’s proteges were promoted to the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Already on March 19, the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were replaced in all union republics and in most regions of the RSFSR. In turn, the newly appointed heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs replaced personnel in the middle management.

Already a week after Stalin’s death - from mid-March to June 1953, Beria, as head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with his orders for the ministry and proposals (notes) to the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee (many of which were approved by relevant resolutions and decrees), initiated a number of legislative and political transformations directly or indirectly exposing the Stalinist regime and the repressions of the 30-50s in general, subsequently called by a number of historians and specialists “unprecedented” or even “democratic” reforms:

Order on the creation of commissions to review the “doctors’ case”, the conspiracy in the USSR MGB, the Headquarters of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the MGB of the Georgian SSR. All defendants in these cases were rehabilitated within two weeks.

Order on the creation of a commission to consider cases of deportation of citizens from Georgia.

Order to review the “aviation case”. Over the next two months, People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin and Commander of the USSR Air Force Novikov, as well as other defendants in the case, were completely rehabilitated and reinstated in their positions and ranks.

Note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on the amnesty. According to Beria’s proposal, on March 27, 1953, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee approved the decree “On Amnesty,” according to which 1.203 million people were to be released from places of detention, and investigations against 401 thousand people were to be terminated. As of August 10, 1953, 1.032 million people were released from prison. the following categories of prisoners: those sentenced to a term of up to 5 years inclusive, those convicted of official, economic and some military crimes, as well as minors, the elderly, the sick, women with young children and pregnant women.

A note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on the rehabilitation of persons involved in the “doctors’ case.” The note admitted that innocent major figures in Soviet medicine were presented as spies and murderers, and, as a result, as objects of anti-Semitic persecution launched in the central press. The case from beginning to end is a provocative fiction of the former deputy of the USSR MGB Ryumin, who, having embarked on the criminal path of deceiving the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in order to obtain the necessary testimony, secured the sanction of I.V. Stalin to use physical coercion measures against the arrested doctors - torture and severe beatings. The subsequent resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee “On the falsification of the so-called case of pest doctors” dated April 3, 1953, ordered support for Beria’s proposal for the complete rehabilitation of these doctors (37 people) and the removal of Ignatiev from the post of Minister of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, and Ryumin by that time was already arrested.

A note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on bringing to criminal liability those involved in the death of S. M. Mikhoels and V. I. Golubov.

Order “On the prohibition of the use of any measures of coercion and physical influence on those arrested” The subsequent resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee “ON THE APPROVAL OF MEASURES OF THE USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs TO CORRECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW” dated April 10, 1953, read: “Approve the ongoing comrade. Beria L.P. measures to uncover criminal acts committed over a number of years in the former Ministry of State Security of the USSR, expressed in the fabrication of falsified cases against honest people, as well as measures to correct the consequences of violations of Soviet laws, bearing in mind that these measures are aimed at strengthening the Soviet state and socialist legality."

A note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the improper handling of the Mingrelian affair. The subsequent resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee “On the Falsification of the Case of the So-Called Mingrelian Nationalist Group” dated April 10, 1953 recognizes that the circumstances of the case are fictitious, release all defendants and completely rehabilitate them.

Note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee ON THE REHABILITATION OF N. D. YAKOVLEV, I. ​​I. VOLKOTRUBENKO, I. A. MIRZAKHANOV AND OTHERS

Note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee ON THE REHABILITATION OF M. M. KAGANOVICH

Note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee ON THE ABOLITION OF PASSPORT RESTRICTIONS AND REGIME AREAS

The son of L.P. Beria, Sergo Lavrentievich, published a book of memoirs about his father in 1994. In particular, L.P. Beria is described there as a supporter of democratic reforms and an end to the violent construction of socialism in the GDR.
Arrest and sentence [edit]
Circular from the head of the 2nd Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR K. Omelchenko on the seizure of portraits of L. P. Beria. July 27, 1953

In June, Beria officially invited famous writer Konstantin Simonov and showed him execution lists from the 1930s signed by Stalin and other members of the Central Committee. All this time, the hidden confrontation between Beria and the Khrushchev-Malenkov-Bulganin group continued. Khrushchev feared that Beria would declassify and present to the public archives where the participation of him (Khrushchev) and others in the repressions of the late 30s would become obvious.

All this time, Khrushchev put together a group against Beria. Having secured the support of the majority of members of the Central Committee and high-ranking military personnel, Khrushchev convened a meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers on June 26, 1953, where he raised the question of his suitability for his position and his removal from all posts. Among others, Khrushchev voiced accusations of revisionism, an anti-socialist approach to the situation in the GDR, and espionage for Great Britain in the 1920s. Beria tried to prove that if he was appointed by the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, then only he could remove it, but at the same moment, following a special signal, a group of Marshals of the Soviet Union led by Zhukov entered the room and arrested Beria.

The arrested Beria was accused of spying for Great Britain and other countries, striving to eliminate the Soviet worker-peasant system, restore capitalism and restore the rule of the bourgeoisie. Beria was also accused of moral corruption, abuse of power, as well as falsifying thousands of criminal cases against his colleagues in Georgia and Transcaucasia and organizing illegal repressions (Beria, according to the accusation, also committed this while acting for selfish and enemy purposes).

At the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, almost all members of the Central Committee made statements about the sabotage activities of L. Beria. On July 7, by a resolution of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Beria was relieved of his duties as a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and removed from the CPSU Central Committee. At the end of July 1953, a secret circular was issued by the 2nd Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, which ordered the widespread seizure of any artistic images of L.P. Beria.

On December 23, 1953, Beria’s case was considered by the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Marshal I. S. Konev. L.P. Beria was accused along with his closest associates from the state security agencies, immediately after his arrest and later called the “Beria gang” in the media:

Merkulov V.N. - Minister of State Control of the USSR
Kobulov B.Z. - First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Goglidze S. A. - Head of the 3rd Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs
Meshik P. Ya. - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Dekanozov V.G. - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR
Vlodzimirsky L. E. - head of the investigative unit for particularly important cases of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs

All defendants were sentenced to death and executed on the same day. Moreover, L.P. Beria was shot several hours before the execution of other convicts in the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District in the presence of the USSR Prosecutor General R.A. Rudenko. On his own initiative, Colonel General (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) P. F. Batitsky fired the first shot from his personal weapon. The body was burned in the oven of the 1st Moscow (Don) crematorium. He was buried at the Donskoye Cemetery (according to other statements, Beria's ashes were scattered over the Moscow River). Brief message the trial of L.P. Beria and his employees was published in the Soviet press.

In subsequent years, other, lower-ranking members of Beria's gang were convicted and shot or sentenced to long prison terms:

Abakumov V.S. - Chairman of the Collegium of the USSR MGB
Ryumin M.D. - Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR

on the Bagirov case:

Bagirov. M. D. - 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan SSR
Markaryan R. A. - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
Borshchev T. M. - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Turkmen SSR
Grigoryan. Kh. I - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Armenian SSR
Atakishiev S.I. - 1st Deputy Minister of State Security of the Azerbaijan SSR
Emelyanov S.F. - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR

on the “Rukhadze case”:

Rukhadze N. M. - Minister of State Security of the Georgian SSR
Rapava. A. N. - Minister of State Control of the Georgian SSR
Tsereteli Sh. O. - Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR
Savitsky K.S. - Assistant to the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Krimyan N. A. - Minister of State Security of the Armenian SSR
Khazan A.S. -
Paramonov G.I. - Deputy Head of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs
Nadaraya S.N. - Head of the 1st Department of the 9th Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs

and others.

In addition, at least 50 generals were stripped of their ranks and/or awards and dismissed from the authorities with the wording “discredited during their work in the authorities... and therefore unworthy of the high rank of general.”
“The state scientific publishing house “Great Soviet Encyclopedia” recommends removing pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 from volume 5 of the TSB, as well as the portrait pasted between pages 22 and 23, in return for which you will be sent pages with new text.” The new page 21 contained photographs of the Bering Sea.
“Beria is accused of seducing about 200 women, but you read their testimonies about their relationships with the People’s Commissar, and it is clear that some openly used their acquaintance with him to great benefit for themselves.
A. T. Ukolov
»
“I have already shown the court what I plead guilty to. I hid my service in the Musavatist counter-revolutionary intelligence service for a long time. However, I declare that, even while serving there, I did nothing harmful. I fully admit my moral and everyday decay. The numerous relationships with women mentioned here disgrace me as a citizen and former party member.
... Recognizing that I am responsible for the excesses and distortions of socialist legality in 1937-1938, I ask the court to take into account that I did not have any selfish or hostile goals. The reason for my crimes is the situation of that time.
... I do not consider myself guilty of trying to disorganize the defense of the Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War.
When sentencing me, I ask you to carefully analyze my actions, not to consider me as a counter-revolutionary, but to apply to me only those articles of the Criminal Code that I really deserve.
From Beria's last words at trial
»

In 1952, the fifth volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia was published, which contained a portrait of L.P. Beria and an article about him. In 1954, the editors of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia sent out a letter to its subscribers (libraries)[clarify] in which it was strongly recommended to cut out both the portrait and the pages dedicated to L.P. Beria “with scissors or a razor”, and instead paste in others (sent in that same letter) containing other articles starting with the same letters. As a result of Beria's arrest, one of his closest associates, 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan SSR, Mir Jafar Bagirov, was arrested and executed. In the press and literature of the “Thaw” times, the image of Beria was demonized; he was blamed for both the repressions of 1937-38 and for the repressions of the post-war period, to which he had no direct connection.

By the ruling of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated May 29, 2002, Beria, as the organizer of political repressions, was recognized as not subject to rehabilitation:

...Based on the above, the Military Collegium comes to the conclusion that Beria, Merkulov, Kobulov and Goglidze were the leaders who organized at the state level and personally carried out mass repressions against their own people. And therefore, the Law “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression” cannot apply to them as perpetrators of terror.

...Guided by Art. Art. 8, 9, 10 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On the rehabilitation of victims of political repression” of October 18, 1991 and Art. 377-381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined:
“Recognize Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria, Vsevolod Nikolaevich Merkulov, Bogdan Zakharyevich Kobulov, Sergei Arsenievich Goglidze as not subject to rehabilitation.”

Extract from the ruling of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. bn-00164/2000 dated May 29, 2002.
Family [edit]

His wife, Nina (Nino) Teymurazovna Gegechkori (1905-1991), gave an interview in 1990 at the age of 86, where she fully justified her husband’s activities.

The son - Sergo Lavrentievich Beria (1924-2000) - advocated the moral (without claiming to be complete) rehabilitation of his father.

After Beria’s conviction, his close relatives and close relatives of those convicted along with him were deported to the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Sverdlovsk Region and Kazakhstan.
Interesting facts [edit]

In his youth, Beria was fond of football. He played for one of the Georgian teams as a left midfielder. Subsequently, he attended almost all the matches of Dynamo teams, especially Dynamo Tbilisi, whose defeats he took painfully..

Presumably, with his intervention, a replay of the semi-final match for the 1939 USSR Cup between Spartak and Dynamo (Tbilisi) was carried out, when the final had already been played.

In 1936, Beria, during interrogation in his office, shot and killed the Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia A.G. Khanjyan

Beria studied to be an architect. There is evidence that two buildings of the same type on Gagarin Square in Moscow were built according to his design.

“Beria's Orchestra” was the name given to his personal guards, who, when traveling in open cars, hid machine guns in violin cases and a light machine gun in a double bass case.

Awards [edit]

By court verdict he was deprived of all awards.

Hero of Socialist Labor No. 80 September 30, 1943
5 Orders of Lenin
No. 1236 March 17, 1935 - for outstanding achievements over a number of years in the field of agriculture, as well as in the field of industry
No. 14839 September 30, 1943 - for special services in the field of enhancing the production of weapons and ammunition in difficult wartime conditions
No. 27006 February 21, 1945
No. 94311 March 29, 1949 - in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of his birth and for his outstanding services to the Communist Party and the Soviet people
No. 118679 October 29, 1949
2 Orders of the Red Banner
No. 7034 April 3, 1924
No. 11517 November 3, 1944
Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, March 8, 1944 - for the deportation of Chechens
7 medals
Anniversary medal "XX years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army"
Order of the Red Banner of the Georgian SSR July 3, 1923
Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Georgian SSR April 10, 1931
Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Azerbaijan SSR March 14, 1932
Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Armenian SSR
Order of the Republic (Tuva) August 18, 1943
Order of Sukhbaatar No. 31 March 29, 1949
Order of the Red Banner (Mongolia) No. 441 July 15, 1942
Medal "25 Years of the Mongolian People's Revolution" No. 3125 September 19, 1946
Stalin Prize, 1st degree (October 29, 1949 and 1951)
Badge “Honorary Worker of the Cheka-OGPU (V)” No. 100
Badge “Honorary Worker of the Cheka-GPU (XV)” No. 205 December 20, 1932
Personalized weapon - Browning pistol
Monogram watch

Works [edit]

L.P. Beria. On the history of Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia. - 1935.
Under the great banner of Lenin-Stalin: Articles and speeches. Tbilisi, 1939;
Speech at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 12, 1939. - Kyiv: Gospolitizdat of the Ukrainian SSR, 1939;
Report on the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia at the XI Congress of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia on June 16, 1938 - Sukhumi: Abgiz, 1939;
The greatest man of our time [I. V. Stalin]. - Kyiv: Gospolitizdat of the Ukrainian SSR, 1940;
Lado Ketskhoveli. (1876-1903)/(Life of remarkable Bolsheviks). Translation by N. Erubaev. - Alma-Ata: Kazgospolitizdat, 1938;
About youth. - Tbilisi: Detyunizdat of the Georgian SSR, 1940;

Objects named after L.P. Beria [edit]

In honor of Beria they were named:

Berievsky district - now Novolaksky district, Dagestan, in the period from February to May 1944.
Beriaaul - Novolakskoe village, Dagestan
Beriyashen - Sharukkar, Azerbaijan
Beriakend is the former name of the village of Khanlarkend, Saatli district, Azerbaijan
Named after Beria - the former name of the village of Zhdanov in the Armavir region, Armenia

In addition, villages in Kalmykia and the Magadan region were named after him.

The name of L.P. Beria was previously named after the current Cooperative Street in Kharkov, Freedom Square in Tbilisi, Victory Avenue in Ozyorsk, Apsheronskaya Square in Vladikavkaz (Dzaudzhikau), Tsimlyanskaya Street in Khabarovsk, Gagarin Street in Sarov, Pervomaiskaya Street in Seversk.

Tbilisi Dynamo Stadium was named after Beria.
Film incarnations [edit]

? (“Battle of Stalingrad”, 1 episode, 1949)
? (“Lights of Baku”, 1950)
Nikolai Mordvinov (“Donetsk Miners”, 1950)
David Suchet (Red Monarch) (England, 1983)
Valentin Gaft (“The Feasts of Belshazzar, or a Night with Stalin”, USSR, 1989, “Lost in Siberia”, UK-USSR, 1991)
Roland Nadareishvili (“Little Giant of Big Sex”, USSR, 1990)
B. Goladze (“Stalingrad”, USSR, 1989)
V. Bartashov (“Nikolai Vavilov”, USSR, 1990)
Vladimir Sichkar (“War in the Western Direction”, USSR, 1990)
Yan Yanakiev (“Law”, 1989, “10 years without the right of correspondence”, 1990, “My best friend is General Vasily, son of Joseph”, 1991, “Under the sign of Scorpio”, 1995)
Vsevolod Abdulov (“To hell with us!”, 1991)
Bob Hoskins (“Inner Circle”, Italy-USA-USSR, 1992)
Roshan Seth (Stalin, USA-Hungary, 1992)
Fedya Stojanovic (“Gospodja Kolontaj”, Yugoslavia, 1996)
Paul Livingstone (Children of the Revolution, Australia 1996)
Farid Myazitov (“Ship of Doubles”, 1997)
Mumid Makoev (“Khrustalev, car!”, 1998)
Adam Ferenczi (“Journey to Moscow” Podróz do Moskwy, (Poland, 1999)
Viktor Sukhorukov (“Desired”, Russia, 2003)
Nikolay Chindyaykin (“Children of Arbat”, Russia, 2004)
Seyran Dalanyan (“Convoy PQ-17”, Russia, 2004)
Irakli Macharashvili (“Moscow Saga”, Russia, 2004)
Vladimir Shcherbakov (“Two Loves”, 2004; “The Death of Tairov”, Russia, 2004; “Stalin’s Wife”, Russia, 2006; “Star of the Epoch”; “Apostle”, Russia, 2007; “Beria”, Russia, 2007; “ Hitler kaput!”, Russia, 2008; “The Legend of Olga”, Russia, 2008; “Wolf Messing: who saw through time”, Russia, 2009, “Loss”, Russia, 2010)
Yervand Arzumanyan (“Archangel”, England-Russia, 2005)
Malkhaz Aslamazashvili (“Stalin. Live”, 2006).
Vadim Tsallati (“Utyosov. A Lifelong Song”, 2006).
Vyacheslav Grishechkin (“The Hunt for Beria”, Russia, 2008; “Furtseva”, 2011, “Countergame”, 2011, “Comrade Stalin”, 2011)
Alexander Lazarev Jr. (“Zastava Zilina”, Russia, 2008)
Sergey Bagirov “Second”, 2009
Adam Bulguchev (“Burnt by the Sun-2”, Russia, 2010; “Zhukov”, Russia, 2012, “Zoya”, 2010, “Cop”, 2012)
Vasily Ostafiychuk (Ballad of a Bomber, 2011)
Alexey Zverev (Serving the Soviet Union, 2012)
Sergey Gazarov (Spy, 2012)
Alexey Eibozhenko Jr. (“Second Uprising of Spartak”, 2012)
Roman Grishin (“Stalin is with us”, 2013)

During the existence of the Soviet Union, the history of the country was rewritten many times. Due to modest funding, school textbooks were sometimes not reprinted; students were simply instructed to black out in ink portraits of leaders who suddenly became enemies.

Yagoda, Yezhov, Uborevich, Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Bukharin, Kamenev, Radek and many others were erased in this way from books and from memory. But the most demonized figure of the Bolshevik Party was, without a doubt, His biography was supplemented by work for British intelligence, which, of course, was not true, otherwise MI6 would proudly recall such success today.

In fact, Beria was a very ordinary Bolshevik, no worse than others. He was born in 1899 into a peasant family, and from childhood he was drawn to knowledge. At the age of sixteen, having graduated with honors from the Sukhumi primary school, he expressed a desire to continue his education at the Secondary Mechanical and Technical Construction School, where he received a diploma in architecture. A year later, he entered the Baku Polytechnic Institute, where he became involved in underground work. He was deported, but not far away, to Azerbaijan.

Thus, at the top of the social democratic underground there were few such intellectual people as Biography after the revolution demonstrates his desire to control the situation. He is involved in secret operational matters, and over time, having ousted Redens (the son-in-law of Stalin himself), he occupies the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Georgia. Not without the knowledge, of course, of the secretary himself, who believed that business qualities were more important than those closest to him.

Having successfully dealt with the Mensheviks and other enemies of Soviet power, Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria, whose biography could not stall in this post due to his active nature, covered Stalin with his chest during the shooting on Lake Ritsa, which was opened by no one and why.

This readiness for self-sacrifice was appreciated, but the main factor was still not it, but truly outstanding organizational skills and amazing performance. Yezhov's deputy, who soon took his place, was a candidate member of the Politburo - these steps of the career ladder were completed in 1938.

It is believed that Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich was Stalin’s main executioner; his biography, however, refutes this. He managed state security affairs for only a short time (until 1941). The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars is much higher than just the chief security officer. His field of attention includes the entire defense industry of the USSR during the war years, including the creation of nuclear weapons, which he supervised since 1943.

A special article for conversation - Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich and women. The wife of Stalin's closest ally, the beautiful Nino, took all the allegations about his amorous-maniacal habits with great skepticism. Her husband was known to her; he didn’t even have enough time to sleep. He had a mistress, very young, but she gave evidence that Beria committed violence against her under pressure from the investigation. In fact, the girl received an apartment on Gorky Street in Moscow, and her mother even had her teeth treated at the Kremlin hospital. So everything was entirely voluntary.

Much has been written about the bold conspiracy, as a result of which Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich was arrested and soon executed (or killed). His photo was just as quickly erased from all textbooks, like the images of previous exposed enemies of the people. The projects proposed by him for economic and political reforms, in particular, the limited introduction of private property and were further implemented during Gorbachev's perestroika.

Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich short biography and Interesting Facts from the life of a Russian revolutionary, Soviet statesman and party leader are presented in this article.

Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich short biography

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was born on March 29, 1899 in Merheuli into a family of impoverished peasants. From an early age he showed great interest and zeal for knowledge and books. To give their son a decent education, the parents sold half of their house in order to pay for the Sukhumi Higher Primary School.

In 1915, Lavrentiy graduated from college with honors and went on to study at the Baku Secondary Construction School. He combined his studies with work at the Nobel Oil Company. The future revolutionary also organized an illegal communist party and organized an uprising against the Georgian government apparatus. Beria in 1919 became a certified technical builder-architect.

In 1920 for active position he was deported to Azerbaijan from Georgia. But soon he returns to Baku and is engaged in security work. Here his mercilessness and toughness manifested themselves. Lavrenty Pavlovich completely concentrated on party work and met with, who saw in Beria a close comrade-in-arms and associate.

In 1931, he was elected to the post of first secretary of the Georgian Central Committee of the party, and 4 years later - a member of the Presidium and Central Executive Committee of the USSR. In 1937, Beria became the leader of the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan and Georgia, winning the recognition of his comrades and the people. They began to call him “the beloved Stalinist leader.”

But real fame came to him in 1938: Stalin appointed Lavrenty Pavlovich head of the NKVD and he became the second person in the country after Stalin. The first thing he did was carry out repressive reprisals against former security officers and a purge of the government apparatus.

During the Great Patriotic War, the figure joined the State Defense Committee of the country. Beria decided on issues related to the production of mortars, weapons, engines, aircraft, and the formation of air regiments. When hostilities ended, Lavrenty Pavlovich was engaged in the development of the country's nuclear potential and continued mass repressions.

In 1946, Lavrentiy Beria became deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. At the same time, Stalin saw his competitor in the successful figure and began checking his documents. After the death of the head of the Soviet Union, Beria tried to create his own cult of personality, but members of the government formed an alliance against him and organized a conspiracy. The initiator of the conspiracy was. Lavrenty Pavlovich was arrested in July 1953 right at a meeting of the Presidium on charges of treason and connections with British intelligence. The trial of the revolutionary lasted from December 18 to December 23, 1953. As a result, Lavrenty Pavlovich was convicted without the right to appeal or defense, and was sentenced to death.

The death of Lavrentiy Beria overtook him on December 23, 1953. By decision of the court, the activist was shot in the bunker of the Moscow military district headquarters. Where was Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria buried after his death? His body was burned in the Donskoy crematorium, after which the ashes were buried in the Donskoy New Cemetery.

Beria Lavrentiy interesting facts

  • His sister was deaf and dumb.
  • He oversaw the construction of the atomic bomb and the testing of nuclear weapons. For this, in 1949, Beria was awarded the Stalin Prize.
  • He was married to Nina Gegechkori. The marriage produced a son, Sergo, in 1924. Although there is information that Beria lived with another woman in a civil marriage, with a certain Lyalya Drozdova, who gave birth to his daughter Martha.
  • Scientists are inclined to believe that he had a sick psyche, and Beria was a pervert. In 2003, lists were published that said he had raped more than 750 girls.
  • He didn’t believe in God, he didn’t wear a cross, but he believed in psychics.
  • On Sundays he liked to play volleyball.

Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union
Hero of Socialist Labor (1943)

Andrey Parshev

It is BITTER to begin an anniversary article not with a description of merits, but with a refutation of slander, but one cannot do without this.

BERIA, Lavrenty Pavlovich, did not and could not have anything to do with the organization of the so-called. "repressions" in 1937, either due to official position or due to physical absence from the center of events. The decision to carry out repressions was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1937, and L.P. Beria was at that time at party work in Transcaucasia. He was transferred to Moscow in the summer of 1938, and appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in December 1938, when the repressions had already ended.

L.P. Beria was People's Commissar of Internal Affairs from December 1939 to 1945, and then for only three months in 1953. For 8 years after the war, contrary to popular belief, he did not supervise law enforcement agencies, as he was completely occupied with more important matters.

The young man who wanted to study

BERIA, Lavrenty Pavlovich, was born on March 17 (30), 1899 in the village of Merkheuli, Sukhumi region, into a poor peasant family. In 1915, after graduating from the Sukhumi Higher Primary School, L.P. Beria left for Baku and entered the Baku Secondary Mechanical and Construction Technical School.

Now in the capital's universities there is an ironic attitude towards students from the Caucasus - “children of the mountains”, not interested in anything other than dyed blondes and foreign cars. 16-year-old Lavrenty had neither money nor patronage. There were no scholarships then, even less so, and he could only study by earning his own living. In Sukhumi he gave lessons, and in Baku he had to work in a variety of places - as a clerk, a customs officer. From the age of 17, he also supported his mother and deaf-mute sister, who moved in with him.

In March 1917, L.P. Beria organized a RSDLP (Bolshevik) cell at the school in Baku. In June 1917, L.P. Beria went to the Romanian front as part of an army technical unit (in his autobiography he indicated that he was a volunteer, in official biography it was written that he was enrolled. IN Soviet time patriotism shown during the First World War was not welcomed). After the collapse of the army, he returned to Baku and continued his studies at a technical school, participating in the activities of the Baku Bolshevik organization under the leadership of A.I. Mikoyan.

In 1919, L.P. Beria entered the world of “war in the twilight.” At that time, Azerbaijan was ruled by the “Musavatist” party - that was the name of the puppet organization created by the British to control the oil fields of the Caspian Sea. In 1919-1920, he worked in the counterintelligence of the Musavatists, transmitting the information obtained to the headquarters of the Xth Bolshevik Army in Tsaritsyn. Beria wrote about this in his autobiography, no one denies it, nevertheless, it was his infiltration into the Musavat secret service that was the main accusation against him in 1953.

From the beginning of 1919 (March) until the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan (April 1920), L.P. Beria also led an illegal communist organization of technicians. In 1919, L.P. Beria successfully graduated from a technical school, received a diploma as an architect-builder technician and tried to study further - by that time the school had been transformed into the Polytechnic Institute. But... L.P. Beria was sent to work illegally in Georgia to prepare an armed uprising against the Menshevik government, was arrested and imprisoned in Kutaisi prison. In August 1920, after he organized a hunger strike of political prisoners, L. P. Beria was expelled in stages from Georgia. Returning to Baku, L.P. Beria again went to study at the Baku Polytechnic.

In April 1921, the party sent L.P. Beria to KGB work. From 1921 to 1931 he held senior positions in Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. Obviously, by that time the young security officer was well known in his circles for his services. It is unlikely that he was introduced into the leadership of the Cheka only because he was a foreign agent - this organization was somewhat different from the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee of the 80s.

L.P. Beria was the deputy chairman of the Azerbaijani Extraordinary Commission, the chairman of the Georgian GPU, the chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU and the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the Trans-SFSR, and was a member of the board of the OGPU of the USSR.

Several times he tried to continue his studies at the Baku Polytechnic. Now in the world ranking of universities this educational institution is in second place from the end of the list, but at the beginning of the century it was very high level teaching. Baku was then one of the centers of scientific and technological progress, this is evidenced by Landau, who studied there at the same time.

During his activities in the bodies of the Cheka-GPU in Georgia and Transcaucasia, L.P. Beria did a lot of work to defeat the Mensheviks, Dashnaks, Musavatists, Trotskyists, and foreign intelligence agents. Georgia was engulfed in rampant banditry, as in the 90s, - the GPU restored relative order. Armenian peasants worked in the field with a rifle on their shoulders - Kurdish robbers visited from abroad as if it were their storeroom. By the 1930s, the border was firmly sealed.

The interests of Transcaucasian intelligence agencies also included neighboring countries - Turkey, Iran, the English Middle East... but the details will forever remain a secret.

For the successful fight against counter-revolution in Transcaucasia, L.P. Beria was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Georgian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR. He was also awarded with a personalized weapon.

At the same time, in the characteristics they wrote about him - “intellectual”. Then this word did not have a negative connotation, it meant educated, cultured person capable of applying theoretical knowledge to practical activities. He wanted to study, most of all, to study, but time did not allow it. Three polytechnic courses and a diploma in architecture are all that he managed to achieve by the age of 22 in the intervals between the fronts, prisons, underground and operational work.

Style

“In 1931, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) revealed gross political mistakes and distortions committed by the leadership of party organizations in Transcaucasia, and ordered party organizations to put an end to the unprincipled struggle for influence of individuals observed among the leading cadres of both Transcaucasia and the republics (elements of the “atamanshchina”).” This was written in the biography of L.P. Beria in 1952.

Transcaucasia is an ancient land; people have lived there since time immemorial. The tribal system has taken deep roots there; behind the façade of the state there is always a complex social structure from clans, clans, families. National and public interests are too often an empty phrase there, serving as a cover for inter-tribal struggle.

In November 1931, L.P. Beria was transferred to party work - he was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (Bolsheviks) and secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b), and in 1932 - first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b) and secretary of the Central Committee Communist Party (b) of Georgia.

“Under the leadership of L.P. Beria, the Transcaucasian party organization quickly corrected the errors noted in the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on October 31, 1931, eliminated the distortions of party policy and excesses in the countryside, and achieved the victory of the collective farm system in Transcaucasia..... "

L.P. Beria tamed the appetites of khans and princes with party cards, gaining good memory among ordinary people and the inescapable hatred of the tribal elite.

It was Beria who had a special lifestyle that distinguished him from the leadership. In the 70s, the first secretary of the regional committee would have looked strange, kicking a soccer ball with the boys, and not for show, but for himself. While working in Tbilisi, in the mornings he spun the “sun” on a homemade horizontal bar in the yard, together with the same boys.

Having later moved to Moscow, he began to live differently, which, in general, is natural, but he did not change his habits. A minimum of security, and more often than not only a driver and a guarantor. The Georgian has an Armenian guarantor. Can you imagine?

Beria was unmercenary, although he was known as a hospitable host. In fact, after his death there was nothing to confiscate, and this is how he always lived. Did the people know about this? In Georgia they knew, and it’s easy to understand how they treated it.

Therefore, at the beginning of his career, Shevardnadze “mowed” under Beria. As Minister of Internal Affairs, he lived in a communal apartment, and when he became First Secretary, he fought corruption. Then it didn’t cost him anything to throw a million dollars at charity. Saved from my salary...

When the First House has nothing, then it is somehow inconvenient for the others to have a house - a full cup. That is why, despite the popularity of this lifestyle among the people, not all leaders were happy with it.

Technocrat

The land of Transcaucasia is one of the most fertile in the world. With very little effort, a person can more than provide for himself and his family, if only there was land. But even on the most fertile land, poor people can live if this land is not enough. And in Transcaucasia there is always little land. All Caucasian languages ​​have a proverb roughly similar to the Ossetian one: “there are always skulls lying on the boundary.” Why?

The Caucasian family has many children, but high birth rates are not at all a consequence of low culture, as is sometimes completely unfoundedly thought. The clan system assumes that a person’s status directly depends on the number of relatives both in peace and even more so in war. Few children mean few warriors, and in the struggle for land you can lose. The price of losing is death. But the father must leave four plots to his four sons, but he has one! Where to get it if the land was divided before our era?

From time immemorial, “human surplus” was destroyed in wars, in ancient times with swords and daggers, now with salvos of Alazan missiles and shells with potassium cyanide. Wild mountain tribes exported slaves to Turkey, external aggressors tried to seize the priceless land, exterminating its inhabitants.

Russia covered Transcaucasia from external enemies, the mountain bandits were tamed by Soviet power, but where to get bread, where to get land?

In Russia, the problem was solved by the nationalization of estates and collectivization. Collective farm fields cultivated by tractors made it possible to forget about hunger. But collectivization in Transcaucasia, due to special local conditions, did not immediately allow for such a radical increase in productivity. And there were too many free hands. Where is the way out?

The only correct solution was found. The newly created industry absorbed peasant youth, Georgian metallurgists and Azerbaijani oil workers appeared in Transcaucasia.

But where to get bread? Is there no more earth?

Again the only right decision. What could not be done in private fields was made possible by collectivization. Transcaucasia became a zone of subtropical cultures unique to the USSR. Do you think the tangerines that now cover the ground in a thick layer in the gardens of Abkhazia have always grown there? No, citrus orchards appeared in the 30s. Where previously only grains and vegetables were grown, so much tea, grapes, citrus fruits, and rare industrial crops that even had defense significance were now harvested that Transcaucasia became a land of rich people. And Russia was not offended - since the mid-30s, there was already enough collective farm grain for bread and enough to exchange for Caucasian tangerines.

Appeared and new land, for the first time since ancient times. Unusual agricultural technology and planting of eucalyptus trees made it possible to drain the Colchis lowland, which was previously a disastrous malarial area. But a section of primeval swamps was also left, in memory of posterity, and after the war received the status of a nature reserve.

“Great work was carried out to reconstruct and develop the oil industry of Baku. As a result, oil production increased sharply, and in 1938, almost half of the total production of the Baku oil industry came from new fields. Significant successes were achieved in the development of the coal, manganese and metallurgical industries, the use of gigantic opportunities agriculture of Transcaucasia (development of cotton growing, tea culture, citrus crops, viticulture, high-value special and industrial crops, etc.) for the outstanding successes achieved over a number of years in the development of agriculture, as well as industry, the Georgian SSR and Azerbaijan. The Soviet Socialist Republics, which were part of the Transcaucasian Federation, were awarded the Order of Lenin in 1935."

Maybe you think that the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee had nothing to do with it?

Professional

In 1938, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks transferred L.P. Beria to work in Moscow.

By that time, the defeat of Trotskyist and other opposition cadres, begun by decision of the Politburo in 1937, for which the NKVD was headed by high-ranking party workers from the personnel department of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was completed. It is difficult to say how sincere the Politburo’s position was, but excesses were seen in the activities of the NKVD. To carry out the rehabilitation of those illegally repressed, L.P. Beria was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

The NKVD had to be returned to the work for which it was intended. Therefore, in December 1938, the party personnel officer Yezhov was replaced by the professional security officer Beria.

From 1938 to 1945 L.P. Beria was the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. He was a good commissar, the best assessment in such cases is the assessment of the enemy.

Collection "World War 1939-1945", section "War on Land", General von Buttlar:

“The special conditions that existed in Russia greatly interfered with the production of intelligence data regarding the military potential of the Soviet Union, and therefore this data was far from complete. The extremely skillful camouflage by the Russians of everything related to their army, as well as strict control over foreigners and the impossibility of organizing a wide espionage networks made it difficult to verify the little information that the intelligence officers were able to collect..."

Specifically and personally in the USSR, L.P. Beria was responsible for the “impossibility of organizing a wide network of espionage.”

But even under the leadership of the NKVD, L.P. Beria’s special style of work, unique only to him, emerged. He understood the role of new technologies much better than many leaders, both military and civilian, which of course meant not only new technology, but also its correct use.

The name of L.P. Beria is associated with the development of communications of the border troops, which made it possible not only to provide telephone communications to every border guard on many sections of the Far Eastern border. A striking contrast was the readiness of the Border Troops and the NKVD troops for the outbreak of war, compared with the situation in the army. Unlike the army, the communications of the Border Troops were staffed by line supervisors, which made it possible to completely maintain control, although all control went by wire, as in the army. All outposts, except those who died in the all-round defense, moved away from the border by order, and subsequently formed units whose work is accurately described in V. Bogomolov’s book “In August 44th”.

This is based on a deep understanding of the role of communication in the management process.

Unfortunately, the exploits of the NKVD troops are less well known; this topic is closed for study, even battle paintings about their exploits near Rostov and Stalingrad lie in the storerooms of museums. The “blue caps” did not retreat without orders and did not surrender; they were well armed and loaded with automatic weapons.

During the war, L.P. Beria, in addition to his many duties, paid great attention to special equipment. In special laboratories of the NKVD, walkie-talkies, radio direction finders, advanced sabotage mines, silent weapons, and infrared sights were created. During the defense of the Caucasus, the use of special groups of border guard officers armed with silent rifles with night sights thwarted the offensive impulse of the Kleist group - the usual German tactics turned out to be impossible due to the extermination of about 400 radio operators and aviation and artillery guidance officers.

How can we evaluate the merits of our “authorities” who organized round-the-clock wiretapping of allied delegations at the Tehran Conference? The dream of any diplomat is to know the real positions of the opposing side. Of course, such information also requires real diplomats, because the information must be used in such a way that partners do not become wary.

Unfortunately, a significant amount of falsification about the activities of L.P. Beria dates back to this period. Thus, democratic “historians” thoughtfully discuss the famous text written by Yu. Semenov: “Ambassador Dekanozov is bombarding me with misinformation...... erasing me into camp dust.......” They don’t even bother to think why on earth the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, bypassing his immediate superior, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, would bombard some outside People’s Commissar, not even a member of the Politburo, with information of Special Importance.

Until 1994, L.P. Beria’s accusations of deportation of Chechens and Ingush were very popular. Indeed, 100 thousand soldiers and 20 thousand operatives under his command in just a few days evicted 600 thousand Chechens with losses on both sides of only a few people. But in 1941, these peoples refused mobilization and created, in fact, their own armed forces in the rear of the Red Army, with party secretaries as commanders.

So L.P. Beria deservedly received the Order of Suvorov, but now this is clear to everyone.

By the way, as a result of the “Beria genocide,” the number of Chechens has now doubled.

He protected his native land from death...

"In February 1941, L.P. Beria was appointed deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and remained in this post until the end of his life. During the Great Patriotic War, from June 30, 1941 he was a member of the State Defense Committee, and from May 16, 1944 - deputy chairman State Defense Committee and carried out the most important assignments of the party both in the management of the socialist economy and at the front.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 30. 1943 L.P. Beria was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for special services in the field of strengthening the production of weapons and ammunition in difficult wartime conditions. On July 9, 1945, L.P. Beria was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union."

It’s sad, but there is no available information about the essence of the problems being solved then - this is unplowed ground for the historian. But one merit of L.P. Beria is still mentioned, even his enemies do not dare to keep silent about it. Judge for yourself how big it is.

In one of the books from the time of perestroika, the “Song of Beria” is quoted with irony. The lyrics of the song are really awkward, but there are these words:

"Gardens and fields sing about Beria

He protected his native land from death..."

From what death and how did you protect? Not the people, not the party, but the whole motherland? After all, he is not Stalin, not Zhukov, although he is the Marshal of the Soviet Union. He is a Hero, but a Hero of Socialist Labor. What's the matter?

“Since 1944, Beria oversaw all work and research related to the creation of atomic weapons, demonstrating extraordinary organizational skills.”

This phrase from the biography of L.P. Beria, given in the computer encyclopedia "Cyril and Methodius", is perhaps the only information there, besides the name and date of birth, that is close to reality.

The creation of Soviet nuclear weapons is an epoch-making event that completely changed the face of the world for tens, if not hundreds of years. We see now how Western countries behave, with the relative weakness of other countries. But this despite the fact that a dozen countries in the world still have atomic bombs. There is no doubt that if the bomb had not been made in our country during several years of peaceful respite, then, starting with the Korean War, history would have turned out differently. Where? Read the book “Orbital Patrol” by the American science fiction writer R. Heinlein, which was published immediately after the war and became extremely popular in the USA. There as the main goal American politics it was proposed to create a network of orbital stations with nuclear bombs under the command of the Americans, which, if any country disobeyed, would immediately destroy its capital. This may sound strange (what is it, some kind of science fiction writer), but this book greatly influenced the public consciousness of the United States in terms of introducing the idea of ​​world domination based on the US monopoly on nuclear and orbital technology. In our country, it was not translated until the 90s, and without reading it, it is impossible to understand why there was complete panic in the United States after the launch of the Soviet satellite.

The dictatorship of the West was abolished, and, no matter what happens, forever.

Didn’t L.P. Beria deserve at least a modest monument on Red Square for this?

Merits

The second merit is the organization of major breakthroughs in the scientific and technical field. And not in the form that has been actively promoted in our country since the 50s (dubious discoveries without practical usefulness). It has already been written about the development of an air defense missile ring around Moscow, carried out under the leadership of L.P. Beria. In its own way, no less revolutionary, this work was done contrary to all the canons of technology and, nevertheless, turned out to be successful. Despite its seemingly local significance, even if it concerned our capital, this development significantly influenced the direction of technical progress in the military field, and for all countries of the world. What neither cannon artillery nor aviation could provide, missiles could do. Neither the Germans, nor the Japanese, nor the Western allies were able to do something like this before us, although they were directly affected by the problem of bombing during the war. This is where the victorious march of guided missiles around the world began.

These projects produced concrete results during the life of L.P. Beria, and it is impossible to deny his role - too many witnesses and documents have survived. But his role in missile projects is not covered, since TASS’s victorious messages were announced only in 1957. Was L.P. away from heavy missiles? It’s unlikely, because the development of nuclear weapons and rocket launch vehicles for them formed a single whole. I think that it was not without Beria’s participation that the 1946 government “Resolution on the Development of Jet Technology” was developed.

IN mass consciousness There is an opinion that a boss can be a complete ignoramus, he just needs to surround himself with smart, but not responsible, advisers, and the deal will be in the bag. That's where it eventually ended up.

This can be clearly seen from economic policy. The growth rates of the Soviet economy in the 30s - 50s are well known. But in 1965, Kosygin, at the instigation of a group of “advisers,” carried out the first official reform of the Stalinist economy (it is known abroad as the “Liberman reform”, after the name of the head of the group of advisors). The result was not fatal, but “the process began.” Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, for their mind-blowing experiments on transferring funds from non-cash to cash with the help of small enterprises, attracted another group of “economists”, presumably from Shatalin, but everyone knows about the current advisers, and about the results of the reforms too.

Starting with Khrushchev, life shows that if a leader, instead of getting into the swing of things himself, begins to trust advisers, then the results of his rule can be bad. Expressing the same idea, but in other words, I will say: a leader must be educated and smart not only in the science of coming to power. The fate of the country depends on this. How to achieve this is another question, but attracting advisers is not a replacement for brains. Well, Gorbachev brought in Bovin, Burlatsky and Yakovlev as political advisers - and what did he come to, what did he lead the country to? But you can’t say anything, they are smart people, smarter than Gorbachev.

After all, you also need to be able to evaluate advisors. Some people, with all their ranks, are real sheep; among the specialists there are both adventurers and swindlers.

As a historical anecdote, I’ll tell you this story. We had this Lev Theremin, inventor of electric musical instruments, famous for that he showed his “theremin” to Lenin himself. Then Theremin lived in America, then he was in a sharashka. So when Beria asked him if he could make an atomic bomb, he said that he could. And when asked what he needed for this, he replied that “a personal car with a driver and one and a half tons of steel angle.”

But this is a curiosity, but there were critical moments in the history of the “uranium project”. How did we begin work on the “bomb”?

Physicist Flerov was at the front, serving as an aircraft technician without any armor. And it was at the front, looking through the Western scientific journals(if someone missed this place, I repeat - being at the front and looking through Western scientific journals), he noticed that articles on the uranium problem had disappeared from them. He concluded that military work had begun in this area in the West, which is why they were classified, and began writing letters to Stalin (and not to the leadership of domestic physics, apparently having a good idea of ​​his level), and one of them reached the addressee.

The Soviet leadership paid attention to Flerov's warning, which was the impetus for the implementation of the uranium project. The corresponding tasks were assigned to our strategic intelligence, and they were set, as you may have guessed, by L.P. Beria. It was he who was in charge of our intelligence, among other things.

And Stalin had an unpleasant conversation with our “leading” physicists. For some reason, not some venerable scientist was chosen for the scientific leadership of the project, but not the very famous Kurchatov.

Please note that neither Flerov nor Kurchatov was perceived as valuable by the “scientific community”. Kurchatov, instead of evacuating to the East, demagnetized the hulls of ships under German bombs in Sevastopol, and Flerov generally fought, not on the “Kazan Front”. He didn't even get the armor!

This suggests that the Soviet leadership of that time itself understood the problem sufficiently to listen not to authorities, but to little-known scientists.

Imagine what would have happened if Stalin and Beria had relied on advisers!

CONSPIRACY

After the war, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria formed a stable group. Jealous senior members of the Politburo mockingly called them "Young Turks." Beria did not believe until recently and, perhaps, never found out that he was betrayed by those whom he considered friends - Malenkov and Khrushchev.

So why did Beria become hated by everyone?

The reason is the unhealthy situation in the country after the war, and especially the leadership. Stalin, apparently due to illness, clearly “let go of the reins” that he had previously controlled so well. Proof of this is the fact of a fierce struggle for power between factions - this is a clear sign of the absence of a real cause. There was no one to set tasks for the “ruling elite” and ask for their solution.

War is not a school of humanism. Any, no matter how fair it may be. War is a catastrophe that disfigures all aspects of public and state life.

Ask any veteran front-line soldier, a wounded hero, and he will tell you that there were better people than him, but they died. The best died in the war.

At the end of the war, people and structures associated with war and military production begin to play an incongruously important role. After the war, they become unnecessary and must lose their significance, but do they want this?

Paradoxically, the defeated countries, whose military elite has been destroyed, suffer less from this. In Japan and Germany there were no problems with the orientation of politics - only towards peaceful creation. But in France and the USA, for example, instead of the peace-loving pre-war leaders, generals and hawks came to power, who soon plunged their countries into new inglorious wars.

The USSR no longer needed a 10-million-strong army. Where should the generals go?

Look at the statistics - how much unnecessary military equipment was produced in 1945. The manufacturers themselves understood that it was no longer needed, so they pushed for a real defect. Switch to products that still have to win over the buyer? This is a risk. You can't persuade the buyer! It’s a completely different matter when it’s enough to persuade a military receiver, even if he’s wearing marshal’s stars. Who will make consumer goods? Someone will do it.

These are captains of industry, instructors of departments of district committees, regional committees, republican committees. They gave a military plan, and they gave it well. Of course, who is unhappy that the war is over? But giving power to people who can sew dresses and assemble televisions better and, most importantly, cheaper...? Sorry!

That is why the development of the economy took a paradoxical path - consumer goods were not valued by the consumer with their ruble, but by something like the Defense Council, only it was not called that.

And without special analysis, it is clear who the main governing body of the country, the Central Committee, consisted of after the war.

And the problem was deeper - when the direction of the country’s development had already been chosen in the 30s, when politics managed to defend itself from the adherents of the “world revolution” (Trotskyists) and supporters of a return to the primitive communal system (rightists), after which the party was no longer needed , more precisely, it remained needed only as a personnel sieve - after all, it was theoretically possible to democratically block the advancement of the unworthy at the initial stage.

But after the war the party lost its importance. In the late 40s and early 50s, everyone seemed to understand this. The words “Politburo”, “Central Committee”, “General Secretary” seemed to be completely banished from the lexicon. Looking ahead, I note that all decisions on the “Beria case” were made, judging by reports, by the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Council.

The course of the conspiracy against Beria is a separate topic, but it is obvious that two currents collided. One is Beria's approach: the party is a political instrument that requires supervision and should not deal with economic issues, which should be the responsibility of the Council of Ministers.

As we know now, the other line won then. It is now clear that the duplication of the Council of Ministers by the industrial departments of the Central Committee, which developed in the 50-80s, was a perversion, the result of the victory of the party nomenklatura.

The leaders of the line opposing Beria were Malenkov and Khrushchev, and Khrushchev was not very significant - he was the main party personnel officer, like Yezhov until 1937.

But after Stalin's death the situation worsened. There were two key events and main pain points.

Firstly, of the things implemented by the new Minister of Internal Affairs, the main thing was not stopping the “case of the Kremlin doctors.” Especially not the 1953 amnesty. Such decisions - political - are not made at the level of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, this is a decision of the political leadership of the state, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is only the executor.

The main event was a meeting of the leadership of the ministry, at which Beria gave his vision of the tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Among these tasks was special control over the cleanliness of the ranks of party bodies - a task that was somewhat forgotten in those years.

The point is not that there were fewer repressions after the war by that time, although a kind of “era of mercy” had begun - the death penalty was abolished until 1953. For some crimes they were still shot, but to control the party elite they used... the party elite itself! It’s hard to believe, but to investigate the “Leningrad case” an investigative unit was created in the party apparatus, and even in Matrosskaya Tishina... a party detention center was allocated! The case was led by G.M. Malenkov. So the NKVD not only had nothing to do with this case, it was not allowed.

But let's go back to 1953. Information about the meeting of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was reported to the party bosses. In particular, his man, General Strokach, reported to Khrushchev. This figure managed to earn the sincere hatred of both Western Ukrainian rebels and, oddly enough, border guards. During the war, he had the idea to send “border regiments” to the German rear, which were immediately destroyed by the Germans in open battle. Thousands of the best people died.

Information about possible state control over the party leadership caused a unanimous reaction. It is difficult to say exactly how things happened. But the indictment in the Beria case said specifically: “an attempt to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the Party.”

Thus began an almost open confrontation. Khrushchev swore before the Central Committee that there would be no control from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

But for all his intelligence, L.P. Beria was completely unprepared for the fact that he, without any objective prerequisites, would be overthrown and shot. Why he did not understand the intentions of his friends is still a mystery.

In fact, in 1953, a coup d’etat took place in favor of those circles that wanted to rule the country in their own interests, without being in any way responsible for the results of their rule.

By 1953, after the murder of Beria, serious decisions were made regulating the activities of law enforcement agencies. Since then, when applying for a job, employees of the “organs” were informed that persons in vacated party positions were not available to them. They cannot be recruited, they cannot be monitored.

It was then that vile individuals like A. Yakovlev “got their shit.”

I will not hide that I believe that this development of events was generated by Stalin’s system. For its time, it was a strong, flexible weapon - the layer of managers was strictly controlled by the top leadership, monolithic and having no other goals than the prosperity of the country. What the action program of the then leadership was, what they wanted, is now unknown exactly. It is precisely the goals, objectives, and program of action of the Stalinist leadership of the 30s and 40s that are the most carefully hidden secret of “democratic historians.”

But this system also contained the seed of destruction. With the disappearance of the guiding and guiding force, the layer of managers begins to live their own lives, solve their own problems, following the problems of the state and society only insofar as they can.

Beria’s fault was that this man, having no personal interests, wanted to do something unprecedented, wanted to express himself in projects for the future and could force others to act not for personal, but for public purposes.

His enemies are tired of working for the future. They wanted to live “here and now” and not for others, but for themselves.

It was difficult to deceive such a person, but the conspirators succeeded for one simple reason. In the conspiracy against Beria, they relied on the full support of their class, which wanted to lead - and led - the country and people straight into the 90s.

Awards
Order of the Red Banner of the Georgian SSR (1923)
Order of the Red Banner (1924)
Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Georgian SSR (1931)
Order of Lenin (1935, 1943, 1945 and 1949)
Order of the Red Banner (1942 and 1944)
Order of the Republic (Tannu-Tuva) (1943)
Hero of Socialist Labor (1943)
Order of Sukhbaatar (1949)
Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Armenian SSR (1949)
Order of Suvorov, 1st class (1949)
Stalin Prize, 1st degree (1949)
Certificate of “Honorary Citizen of the Soviet Union” (1949)

I think you will be interested in reading this opinion about this historical figure. Someone is aware of this information, someone will not accept it in any case, and someone will learn something new for themselves.

Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria is one of the most famous and at the same time the most unknown statesmen of Russia. Myths, lies and slander against him almost exceed the amount of slop poured into the name of Stalin. It is all the more important for us to understand who Beria really was.

On June 26, 1953, three tank regiments stationed near Moscow received an order from the Minister of Defense to load up with ammunition and enter the capital. The motorized rifle division also received the same order. Two air divisions and a formation of jet bombers were ordered to wait in full combat readiness for orders for a possible bombing of the Kremlin. Subsequently, a version of all these preparations was announced: the Minister of Internal Affairs Beria was preparing a coup d'etat, which had to be prevented, Beria himself was arrested, tried and shot. For 50 years this version was not questioned by anyone. An ordinary, and not so ordinary, person knows only two things about Lavrentiy Beria: he was an executioner and a sexual maniac. Everything else has been removed from history. So it’s even strange: why did Stalin tolerate this useless and gloomy figure near him? Afraid, or what? Mystery. I wasn’t afraid at all! And there is no mystery. Moreover, without understanding true role This man is impossible to understand the Stalin era. Because in fact, everything was completely different from what was later imagined by the people who seized power in the USSR and privatized all the victories and achievements of their predecessors.

St. Petersburg journalist Elena Prudnikova, author of sensational historical investigations, participant in the historical and journalistic project “Riddles of History,” talks about a completely different Lavrentiy Beria on the pages of our newspaper. “Economic miracle” in Transcaucasia Many people have heard about the “Japanese economic miracle”. But who knows about Georgian? In the fall of 1931, the young security officer Lavrentiy Beria, a very remarkable personality, became the first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia. In 20, he led an illegal network in Menshevik Georgia. In 23, when the republic came under the control of the Bolsheviks, he fought against banditry and achieved impressive results - by the beginning of this year there were 31 gangs in Georgia, by the end of the year there were only 10 of them left. In 25, Beria was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle. By 1929, he became both the chairman of the GPU of Transcaucasia and the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the region. But, oddly enough, Beria stubbornly tried to part with the KGB service, dreaming of finally completing his education and becoming a builder. In 1930, he even wrote a desperate letter to Ordzhonikidze. “Dear Sergo! I know you will say that now is not the time to bring up the issue of studying. But what to do? I feel like I can’t do it anymore.” In Moscow, the request was fulfilled exactly the opposite. So, in the fall of 1931, Beria became the first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia. A year later he became the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee, in fact the owner of the region. And we really, really don’t like to talk about how he worked in this position. Beria still got that little district.

Industry as such did not exist. A poor, hungry outskirts. As you know, collectivization began in the USSR in 1927. By 1931, 36% of Georgian farms had been transferred to collective farms, but this did not make the population any less hungry. And then Beria made a move with his knight. He stopped collectivization. Left the private owners alone. But on collective farms they began to grow not bread or corn, which were of no use, but valuable crops: tea, citrus fruits, tobacco, grapes. And this is where large agricultural enterprises justified themselves one hundred percent! Collective farms began to grow rich at such a speed that the peasants themselves flocked to them. By 1939, without any coercion, 86% of farms were socialized. One example: in 1930, the area of ​​tangerine plantations was one and a half thousand hectares, in 1940 - 20 thousand. The yield per tree has increased, in some farms by as much as 20 times. When you go to the market for Abkhaz tangerines, remember Lavrenty Pavlovich! In industry he worked just as effectively. During the first five-year plan, the volume of gross industrial output of Georgia alone increased almost 6 times. During the second five-year period - another 5 times. It was the same in the other Transcaucasian republics. It was under Beria, for example, that they began to drill on the shelves of the Caspian Sea, for which he was accused of wastefulness: why bother with all this nonsense! But now there is a real war between the superpowers over Caspian oil and over its transportation routes. At the same time, Transcaucasia became the “resort capital” of the USSR - who then thought about the “resort business”? In terms of education level, already in 1938 Georgia took one of the first places in the Union, and in terms of the number of students per thousand souls it surpassed England and Germany. In short, during the seven years that Beria held the post of “main man” in Transcaucasia, he so shaken up the economy of the backward republics that until the 90s they were among the richest in the Union. If you look at it, the doctors of economic sciences who carried out perestroika in the USSR have a lot to learn from this security officer. But that was a time when it was not political talkers, but business executives, who were worth their weight in gold.

Stalin could not miss such a person. And Beria’s appointment to Moscow was not the result of apparatus intrigues, as they are now trying to imagine, but a completely natural thing: a person who works in this way in the region can be entrusted with big things in the country.

Lavrenty Beria in 1934

Mad Sword of Revolution

In our country, the name of Beria is primarily associated with repression. On this occasion, allow me the simplest question: when did the “Beria repressions” take place? Date please! She's gone. The then chief of the NKVD, Comrade Yezhov, is responsible for the notorious “37th year”. There was even such an expression - “tight-knuckle gloves.” Post-war repressions were also carried out when Beria was not working in the authorities, and when he arrived there in 1953, the first thing he did was stop them. When there were “Beria’s rehabilitations” - this is clearly recorded in history. And “Beria’s repressions” are in their purest form a product of “black PR”. What really happened? The country had no luck with the leaders of the Cheka-OGPU from the very beginning. Dzerzhinsky was a strong, strong-willed and honest person, but, extremely busy with work in the government, he abandoned the department to his deputies. His successor Menzhinsky was seriously ill and did the same. The main cadres of the “bodies” were the promoters of the times Civil War, poorly educated, unprincipled and cruel, one can imagine what kind of situation reigned there. Moreover, since the end of the 20s, the leaders of this department were increasingly nervous about any kind of control over their activities: Yezhov was a new person in the “authorities”, he started well, but quickly fell under the influence of his deputy Frinovsky. He taught the new People's Commissar the basics of security service work directly “on the job.” The basics were extremely simple: the more enemies of the people we catch, the better; You can and should hit, but hitting and drinking is even more fun. Drunk on vodka, blood and impunity, the People's Commissar soon openly “swimmed.”

He did not particularly hide his new views from those around him. “What are you afraid of? - he said at one of the banquets. - After all, all the power is in our hands. Whoever we want, we execute, whoever we want, we pardon: After all, we are everything. It is necessary that everyone, starting from the secretary of the regional committee, should walk under you: “If the secretary of the regional committee had to walk under the head of the regional department of the NKVD, then who, one wonders, should have walked under Yezhov? With such personnel and such views, the NKVD became mortally dangerous both for the authorities and for the country. It is difficult to say when the Kremlin began to realize what was happening. Probably sometime in the first half of 1938. But to realize - they realized, but how to curb the monster? The solution is to imprison your own man, with such a level of loyalty, courage and professionalism that he can, on the one hand, cope with the management of the NKVD, and on the other, stop the monster. Stalin hardly had a large choice of such people. Well, at least one was found. Curbing the NKVD In 1938, Beria, with the rank of Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, became the head of the Main Directorate of State Security, seizing control of the most dangerous structure. Almost immediately, right before the November holidays, the entire top of the People's Commissariat was removed and mostly arrested. Then, having placed reliable people in key positions, Beria began to deal with what his predecessor had done. Chekists who went too far were fired, arrested, and some were shot. (By the way, later, having again become the Minister of Internal Affairs in 1953, do you know what order Beria issued the very first? On the prohibition of torture! He knew where he was going. The organs were cleaned out abruptly: 7372 people (22.9%) were dismissed from the rank and file, from management - 3830 people (62%).

At the same time, they began to verify complaints and review cases. Recently published data have made it possible to assess the scale of this work. For example, in 1937-38, about 30 thousand people were dismissed from the army for political reasons. 12.5 thousand were returned to service after the change of leadership of the NKVD. It turns out about 40%. According to the most approximate estimates, since complete information has not yet been made public, up to 1941 inclusive, 150-180 thousand people out of 630 thousand convicted during the Yezhovshchina were released from camps and prisons. That is about 30 percent. It took a long time to “normalize” the NKVD and it was not completely possible, although the work was carried out right up to 1945. Sometimes you have to face completely incredible facts. For example, in 1941, especially in those places where the Germans were advancing, they did not stand on ceremony with prisoners - the war, they say, would write everything off. However, it was not possible to blame it on the war. From June 22 to December 31, 1941 (the most difficult months of the war!) 227 NKVD employees were brought to criminal liability for abuse of power. Of these, 19 people received capital punishment for extrajudicial executions. Beria also owned another invention of the era - the “sharashka”. Among those arrested there were many people, very needed by the country. Of course, these were not poets and writers, about whom they shout the most and loudest, but scientists, engineers, designers, who primarily worked for defense. Repression in this environment is a special topic. Who and under what circumstances imprisoned the developers of military equipment in the conditions of an impending war? The question is not at all rhetorical.

Firstly, there were real German agents in the NKVD who, on real assignments from real German intelligence, tried to neutralize people useful to the Soviet defense complex. Secondly, there were no fewer “dissidents” in those days than in the late 80s. In addition, this is an incredibly quarrelsome environment, and denunciation has always been a favorite means of settling scores and career advancement. Be that as it may, having taken over the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Beria was faced with the fact: in his department there were hundreds of arrested scientists and designers, whose work the country simply desperately needed. As it is now fashionable to say - feel like a people's commissar! There is a case before you. This person may or may not be guilty, but he is necessary. What to do? Write: “Liberate”, showing your subordinates an example of the opposite kind of lawlessness? Check things? Yes, of course, but you have a closet with 600 thousand things in it. In fact, each of them needs to be re-investigated, but there are no personnel. If we are talking about someone who has already been convicted, it is also necessary to get the sentence overturned. Where to start? From scientists? From the military? A time is running, people are sitting, war is getting closer... Beria quickly got his bearings. Already on January 10, 1939, he signed an order to organize a Special Technical Bureau. The research topic is purely military: aircraft construction, shipbuilding, shells, armor steels. Entire groups were formed from specialists from these industries who were in prison. When the opportunity presented itself, Beria tried to free these people. For example, on May 25, 1940, aircraft designer Tupolev was sentenced to 15 years in the camps, and in the summer he was released under an amnesty.

Designer Petlyakov was granted amnesty on July 25 and already in January 1941 he was awarded the Stalin Prize. A large group of military equipment developers was released in the summer of 1941, another in 1943, the rest received freedom from 1944 to 1948. When you read what is written about Beria, you get the impression that he spent the entire war catching “enemies of the people.” Yes, sure! He had nothing to do! On March 21, 1941, Beria became deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. To begin with, he supervises the People's Commissariats of the forestry, coal and oil industries, non-ferrous metallurgy, soon adding ferrous metallurgy here. And from the very beginning of the war, more and more defense industries fell on his shoulders, since, first of all, he was not a security officer or a party leader, but an excellent organizer of production. That is why he was entrusted with the atomic project in 1945, on which the very existence of the Soviet Union depended. He wanted to punish Stalin's murderers. And for this he himself was killed.

Two leaders

Already a week after the start of the war, on June 30, an emergency authority was established - the State Defense Committee, in whose hands all power in the country was concentrated. Naturally, Stalin became the chairman of the State Defense Committee. But who entered the office besides him? This issue is carefully avoided in most publications. For one very simple reason: among the five members of the State Defense Committee there is one unmentioned person. IN brief history World War II (1985), in the index of names given at the end of the book, where such vitally important figures for victory as Ovid and Sandor Petofi are present, Beria is not present. Wasn’t there, didn’t fight, didn’t participate...

So: there were five of them. Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov. And three commissioners: Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Kaganovich. But soon the war began to make its own adjustments. Since February 1942, Beria, instead of Voznesensky, began to oversee the production of weapons and ammunition. Officially. (But in reality, he was already doing this in the summer of 1941.) That same winter, the production of tanks also fell into his hands. Again, not because of any intrigue, but because he did better. The results of Beria's work are best seen from the numbers. If on June 22 the Germans had 47 thousand guns and mortars against our 36 thousand, then by November 1, 1942 these figures were equal, and by January 1, 1944 we had 89 thousand of them against the German 54.5 thousand. From 1942 to 1944, the USSR produced 2 thousand tanks per month, far ahead of Germany. On May 11, 1944, Beria became chairman of the GKO Operations Bureau and deputy chairman of the Committee, in fact, the second person in the country after Stalin. On August 20, 1945, he took on the most difficult task of that time, which was a matter of survival for the USSR - he became chairman of the Special Committee for the creation of an atomic bomb (there he performed another miracle - the first Soviet atomic bomb, contrary to all forecasts, was tested just four years later , August 20, 1949). Not a single person from the Politburo, and indeed not a single person in the USSR, even came close to Beria in terms of the importance of the tasks being solved, in terms of the scope of powers, and, obviously, simply in terms of the scale of his personality. In fact, post-war USSR was at that time a double star system: seventy-year-old Stalin and young - in 1949 he turned only fifty - Beria.

Head of state and his natural successor.

It was this fact that Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev historians hid so diligently in holes of silence and under piles of lies. Because if on June 23, 1953, the Minister of Internal Affairs was killed, this still draws on the fight against the putsch, and if the head of state was killed, then this is what the putsch is... Stalin's Scenario If you trace the information about Beria that wanders from publication to publication, to its original source, then almost all of it follows from Khrushchev’s memoirs. A person who, in general, cannot be trusted, since a comparison of his memories with other sources reveals an exorbitant amount of unreliable information in them. Who hasn’t done “political science” analyzes of the situation in the winter of 1952-1953. What combinations were not thought of, what options were not calculated. That Beria was blocked with Malenkov, with Khrushchev, that he was on his own... These analyzes have only one sin - as a rule, they completely exclude the figure of Stalin. It is silently believed that the leader had retired by that time and was almost insanity...

There is only one source - the memories of Nikita Sergeevich. But why, exactly, should we believe them? And Beria’s son Sergo, for example, who saw Stalin fifteen times during 1952 at meetings devoted to missile weapons, recalled that the leader did not at all seem to have weakened in mind... The post-war period of our history is no less dark than pre-Rurik Russia. Probably no one really knows what was happening in the country then. It is known that after 1949, Stalin withdrew somewhat from business, leaving all the “turnover” to chance and to Malenkov. But one thing is clear: something was cooking. Based on indirect evidence, it can be assumed that Stalin was planning some kind of very big reform, first of all economic, and only then, perhaps, political. Another thing is clear: the leader was old and sick, he knew this very well, he did not suffer from a lack of courage and could not help but think what would happen to the state after his death, and not look for a successor. If Beria had been of any other nationality, there would have been no problems. But one Georgian after another on the throne of the empire! Even Stalin would not have done this. It is known that in the post-war years, Stalin slowly but steadily squeezed the party apparatus out of the captain's cabin. Of course, the functionaries could not be happy with this. In October 1952, at the CPSU Congress, Stalin gave the party a decisive battle, asking to be relieved of his duties. Secretary General. It didn’t work out, they didn’t let me go. Then Stalin came up with a combination that is easy to read: an obviously weak figure becomes the head of state, and the real head, the “gray cardinal,” is formally in a supporting role. And so it happened: after Stalin’s death, the lack of initiative Malenkov became the first, but Beria was really in charge of politics. He not only carried out an amnesty. For example, he was responsible for a resolution condemning the forced Russification of Lithuania and Western Ukraine; he also proposed a beautiful solution to the “German” question: if Beria had remained in power, the Berlin Wall simply would not have existed. Well, and along the way, he again took up the “normalization” of the NKVD, launching the process of rehabilitation, so that Khrushchev and the company then only had to jump on an already moving locomotive, pretending that they had been there from the very beginning. It was later that they all said that they “disagreed” with Beria, that he “pressured” them. Then they said a lot of things. But in fact, they completely agreed with Beria’s initiatives. But then something happened. Calmly! This is a revolution! A meeting of either the Presidium of the Central Committee or the Presidium of the Council of Ministers was scheduled for June 26 in the Kremlin. According to the official version, the military, led by Marshal Zhukov, came to see him, members of the Presidium called them into the office, and they arrested Beria. Then he was taken to a special bunker in the courtyard of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District troops, an investigation was carried out and he was shot.

This version does not stand up to criticism. Why - it will take a long time to talk about this, but there are many obvious stretches and inconsistencies in it... Let's just say one thing: none of the outside, uninterested people saw Beria alive after June 26, 1953. The last person to see him was his son Sergo - in the morning, at the dacha. According to his recollections, his father was going to stop by a city apartment, then go to the Kremlin for a meeting of the Presidium. Around noon, Sergo received a call from his friend, pilot Amet-Khan, who said that there had been a shootout at Beria’s house and that his father, apparently, was no longer alive. Sergo, together with member of the Special Committee Vannikov, rushed to the address and managed to see broken windows, knocked out doors, a wall dotted with traces of bullets from a heavy machine gun. Meanwhile, members of the Presidium gathered in the Kremlin. What happened there? Wading through the rubble of lies, bit by bit recreating what happened, we managed to roughly reconstruct the events. After Beria was dealt with, the perpetrators of this operation—presumably these were military men from Khrushchev’s old, Ukrainian team, whom he dragged to Moscow, led by Moskalenko—went to the Kremlin. At the same time, another group of military men arrived there.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria with I.V. Stalin's daughter Svetlana. 1930s. Photo from the personal archive of E. Kovalenko. RIA News

It was headed by Marshal Zhukov, and among its members was Colonel Brezhnev. Curious, isn't it? Then, presumably, everything unfolded like this. Among the putschists were at least two members of the Presidium - Khrushchev and Defense Minister Bulganin (Moskalenko and others always refer to them in their memoirs). They confronted the rest of the government with a fact: Beria had been killed, something had to be done about it. The whole team inevitably found themselves in the same boat and began to hide their ends. Another thing is much more interesting: why was Beria killed? The day before, he returned from a ten-day trip to Germany, met with Malenkov, and discussed with him the agenda for the meeting on June 26. Everything was amazing. If something happened, it happened in the last 24 hours. And, most likely, it was somehow connected with the upcoming meeting. True, there is an agenda, preserved in Malenkov’s archive. But most likely it's a linden tree. No information has been preserved about what the meeting was actually supposed to be devoted to. It would seem... But there was one person who could know about this. Sergo Beria said in an interview that his father told him in the morning at the dacha that at the upcoming meeting he was going to demand from the Presidium a sanction for the arrest of the former Minister of State Security Ignatiev.

But now everything is clear! So it couldn't be clearer. The fact is that Ignatiev was in charge of Stalin’s security in the last year of his life. It was he who knew what happened at Stalin’s dacha on the night of March 1, 1953, when the leader had a stroke. And something happened there, about which many years later the surviving guards continued to lie mediocrely and too obviously. And Beria, who kissed the hand of the dying Stalin, would have torn all his secrets from Ignatiev. And then he organized a political trial for the whole world against him and his accomplices, no matter what positions they held. This is just in his style... No, these same accomplices under no circumstances should have allowed Beria to arrest Ignatiev. But how do you keep it? All that remained was to kill - which was done... Well, and then they hid the ends. By order of Defense Minister Bulganin, a grandiose “Tank Show” was organized (equally ineptly repeated in 1991). Khrushchev's lawyers, under the leadership of the new Prosecutor General Rudenko, also a native of Ukraine, staged the trial (staged to this day favorite hobby prosecutor's office). Then the memory of all the good things that Beria did was carefully erased, and vulgar tales about a bloody executioner and a sexual maniac were put into use.

In terms of “black PR,” Khrushchev was talented. It seems that this was his only talent... And he was not a sex maniac either! The idea of ​​​​presenting Beria as a sexual maniac was first voiced at the Plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953. Secretary of the Central Committee Shatalin, who, as he claimed, searched Beria's office, found in the safe "a large number of objects of a libertine man." Then Beria's security guard, Sarkisov, spoke and spoke about his numerous relationships with women. Naturally, no one checked all this, but the gossip was started and went for a walk around the country. “Being a morally corrupt person, Beria cohabited with numerous women...” the investigators wrote in the “sentence.” There is also a list of these women on file. There’s just one problem: it almost completely coincides with the list of women with whom General Vlasik, Stalin’s security chief, who was arrested a year earlier, was accused of cohabiting with them. Wow, how unlucky Lavrenty Pavlovich was. There were such opportunities, but the women came exclusively from under Vlasik! And without laughing, it’s as simple as shelling pears: they took a list from Vlasik’s case and added it to the “Beria case.” Who will check? Nina Beria many years later, in one of her interviews, said a very simple phrase: “It’s an amazing thing: Lavrenty was busy day and night with work when he had to deal with a legion of these women!” Drive along the streets, take them to country villas, and even to your home, where there was a Georgian wife and a son and his family lived. However, when it comes to denigrating a dangerous enemy, who cares what really happened?”

Elena Prudnikova