Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov at the beginning of 1942 was one of the most popular personalities in the USSR. After the battle of Moscow, where he was named in Stalin’s order as one of the most distinguished army commanders, a ditty was sung about him: “The guns spoke in a deep voice, / the thunder of the guns rumbled, / General Comrade Vlasov / gave the Germans pepper.” But just six months later, his name was branded as a symbol of betrayal.

Background

In the winter of 1941/42, after the Germans were driven back from Moscow, the Soviet high command was going to complete the ongoing defeat of the occupiers. In addition to continuing the offensive in the central direction, it was planned to strike the enemy in Ukraine and near Leningrad. It was planned not only to lift the blockade of the city on the Neva, but also to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy Army Group North and push it back from the northern capital.

The plan of the Headquarters provided for the delivery of two counter strikes. Having crossed the Volkhov, the Volkhov Front under the command of Army General Kirill Meretskov was supposed to advance to the rear of the enemy troops besieging Leningrad. From the Neva, the Leningrad Front, commanded by Lieutenant General Mikhail Khozin, was to be struck. Two fronts captured the German 18th Army in a pincer movement.

In the offensive of the Volkhov Front, the decisive role was assigned to the 2nd Shock Army under the command of Lieutenant General Grigory Sokolov. This army was formed in November 1941 in the Volga region as the 26th combined arms army. Initially, it was intended to cover the area east of Moscow in the event of a German breakthrough there. In December 1941, she was transferred to the Volkhov Front, which had just successfully completed the Tikhvin offensive operation. The Germans planned to surround Leningrad with a second ring and link up with Finnish troops east of Lake Ladoga, but were forced to retreat across the Volkhov River.

Grigory Sokolov, who joined the army from the NKVD, turned out to be unsuitable for his new position. Marked by a whole series of ridiculous orders, he alienated the commanders of all formations. His leadership, when attempting to go on the offensive on January 7, 1942, brought great losses to the army. After only two weeks in office he was dismissed. On January 10, Lieutenant General Nikolai Klykov became the new commander of the army.

Failure of the winter offensive

On January 13, 1942, the 2nd Shock Army crossed the Volkhov River again, this time successfully. Biting into enemy defenses and repelling frequent German counterattacks, it gradually formed a bridgehead up to 60 km deep to the west of the Volkhov River. All army formations crossed to this bridgehead. Its bottleneck, figuratively and literally, remained the neck between Myasny Bor and Spasskaya Polist, connecting it with the eastern bank of the Volkhov. Since February, the Germans have been trying to localize the breakthrough of Soviet troops, narrow the corridor of the 2nd Shock Army, or even cut it off completely.

In turn, the Soviet command was preparing to continue the offensive. Great importance was attached to the capture of the city and the Lyuban railway station. The 2nd Shock Army approached it from the south. The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front attacked from the north. With the capture of Lyuban, the German group in the area of ​​Chudovo station would have been cut off.

On February 25, the 2nd Shock Army resumed its offensive and three days later, individual units reached the outskirts of Lyuban. But the Germans restored the situation with a counterattack. By this time, Soviet offensives on Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk, near Vyazma and Rzhev had failed. The headquarters, however, planned to try their luck in the Leningrad direction. On March 9, a group of its representatives led by Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and GKO member Georgy Malenkov arrived at the headquarters of the Volkhov Front “to strengthen it.” The group also included General Vlasov.

Meanwhile, the front command already knew from the prisoners that the Germans were going to go on the offensive with the goal of cutting off the 2nd Shock Army in the bridgehead. The information was true: the decision on this offensive was made on March 2 at a meeting with Hitler.

2nd drum environment

On March 15, 1942, the Germans launched an offensive on both sides of the neck that connected the 2nd strike with the “mainland”. Fierce fighting raged here until April 8. Several times the Germans managed to cut the corridor at Myasny Bor, but Soviet troops again restored it in counterattacks. In the end, the corridor remained with the Soviet troops, but the ability to supply the army along it sharply deteriorated: in mid-April, ice drift and flooding on the Volkhov began, and enemy aircraft dominated the clear spring sky.

The failure of the offensive was followed by organizational conclusions. The commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Klykov, was dismissed and replaced by Vlasov. The Volkhov Front was abolished and a group of troops became part of the Leningrad Front. Based on Vlasov’s report, General Khozin sent a proposal to Headquarters to stop further offensive attempts and withdraw the 2nd Shock Army beyond the Volkhov. On May 12, the Headquarters agreed to this. The withdrawal of the 2nd strike from the “bag” began.

In the first days, we managed to withdraw a cavalry corps, a tank brigade, two rifle divisions and two brigades. But on May 22, the Germans went on the offensive with the goal of cutting off the escape route for the remaining units, which they succeeded in doing. Seven divisions and six brigades, numbering more than 40 thousand soldiers, 873 guns and mortars, were completely surrounded. Attempts to break through the encirclement again and ensure the supply of troops in the “cauldron” by air did not lead to success.

On June 9, the Volkhov Front, led by Meretskov, was restored. He was tasked with saving the 2nd strike. In fierce battles on June 22, it was possible to establish land communication with it. By this time, the bridgehead of the 2nd strike had narrowed so that it was shot right through by German artillery. Over the next three days, the corridor was either cut by the Germans or restored again. Several times the 2nd strike, on Vlasov’s orders, went for a breakthrough. On June 25, the ring closed completely.

Surrender of Vlasov

General Vlasov, until the last moment, while there were still chances to save the army, remained with it and led the operation on the western bank of the Volkhov. After the Germans established complete control over the breakthrough area, Vlasov gave the order to the remaining units to break out of the encirclement as best they could. Vlasov himself headed a group of staff workers. He had already emerged from encirclement in September 1941 near Kiev, when he commanded the 37th Army. This time he failed. His group dispersed. Vlasov himself was captured by the Germans on July 11, 1942.

It is obvious that until the moment of capture, Vlasov did not plan to cooperate with the enemy. Otherwise, he would have announced the surrender of the 2nd strike even earlier. This would be an unprecedented precedent during the Great Patriotic War, which would have a great resonance in the world, and in addition would greatly increase Vlasov’s shares among his new owners. But he didn’t go for it then. The betrayal began later - when Vlasov, in captivity, proposed to the Germans to create an army of collaborators.

In blessed memory of the soldiers and commanders

2nd Shock Army, who fell in battles with the Germans

Dedicated to the fascist invaders.

During the Great Patriotic War, seventy Soviet combined arms armies fought with the enemy. In addition, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed five more strike forces - intended for operations in offensive operations in the directions of the main attack. At the beginning of 1942 there were four of these. The fate of the 2nd strike turned out to be tragic...

The year two thousand was coming to an end. The clock impassively counted down the time remaining until the new millennium. TV channels and radio stations, newspapers and magazines pushed the theme of the millennium to the max. Forecasts were made by politicians, scientists, writers, palmists, and sometimes outright charlatans.

The results were summed up. Lists of the “most-most” outstanding people and events of the past century and millennium were widely circulated. All different. Yes, it could not be otherwise in a world where momentary conjunctures constantly prevail over historical objectivity.

Russia was deeply affected by the Kursk tragedy. Society wanted to receive full information about the tragedy. In the meantime, only versions were expressed, rumors multiplied...

And in this huge stream of messages about past and future disasters, accomplishments and anniversaries, information about the opening of a monument-memorial to the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front on November 17 in the village of Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod Region, was somehow lost, not being distinguished from other news. Have you opened it? Well, good. Thanks to the sponsors - they gave money for a holy cause.

Sounds cynical, doesn't it? But, nevertheless, life is life. The Second World War has long receded into history. And there are fewer and fewer veterans of the Great Patriotic War on the streets. And more of them are quite young people with medal bars for other wars - Afghan, Chechen. New time. New people. New veterans.

So the St. Petersburg authorities did not delegate anyone to the opening of the monument to the soldiers of the 2nd shock. And again, from the point of view of modern bureaucratic formalism, it is true: a foreign region. And the fact that the army, through its actions, forced the Germans to finally abandon their plans to capture Leningrad, played a vital role in the operations to break through and completely lift the blockade, and drove the last German units out of the territory Leningrad region in the battles near Narva... Well, let historians do this.

But historians did not study the combat path of the 2nd Shock Army separately. No, of course, in numerous monographs, memoirs, reference books, encyclopedias and other literature devoted to the Second World Army, the Army is mentioned repeatedly and its combat operations in specific operations are described. But there is no research available to a wide range of readers about the 2nd shock. Only graduate students preparing a dissertation on a specialized topic will rummage through the heap of literature in order to get a real idea of ​​​​her combat path.

It comes to something amazing. The whole world knows the name of the Tatar poet Musa Jalil. Both in literary and in any “general” thick Big and Small encyclopedic dictionaries you will read that in 1942, having been wounded, he was captured. In a fascist prison he wrote the famous “Moabit Notebook” - a hymn to the fearlessness and perseverance of man. But nowhere is it noted that Musa Jalil fought in the 2nd Shock Army.

However, writers still turned out to be more honest and persistent than historians. Former TASS special correspondent on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts Pavel Luknitsky in 1976 in the Moscow publishing house " Soviet writer" released a three-volume book "Leningrad is Acting...". The author managed to overcome censorship obstacles, and from the pages of his most interesting book openly stated:

“The feats accomplished by the warriors of the 2nd Shock are countless!”

It would seem that in 1976 the ice broke. The writer spoke in as much detail as he could about the army soldiers and described their participation in operations. Now historians must pick up the baton! But... they remained silent.

And the reason here is an ideological taboo. For a short time, the 2nd Shock was commanded by Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who later became a traitor to the Motherland. And although the term “Vlasovites,” which usually characterizes the fighters of the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA), cannot in any way refer to the veterans of the 2nd shock, they are nevertheless (so that the name of the traitor does not come to mind once again) from the history of the Great Patriotic War , as far as possible, we tried to cross them out. And the collection “2nd Shock in the Battle of Leningrad”, published in 1983 in Lenizdat, could not fill this gap.

It’s a strange situation, you’ll agree. Books have been written about the traitor Vlasov, and historical and documentary films have been made. A number of authors are seriously trying to present him as a fighter against Stalinism, communism, and a bearer of some “lofty ideas.” The traitor was convicted and hanged long ago, and discussions around Vlasov’s personality do not subside. The last (!) veterans of the 2nd shock, thank God, are alive, and if they are remembered at all, it will be on Victory Day, along with other participants in the war.

There is obvious injustice, since the role of the 2nd shock and the role of Vlasov in the history of the Great Patriotic War are incomparable.

To see this, let's look at the facts.

... Army Group North was advancing towards Leningrad. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb led to the city that Hitler so wanted to destroy, the 16th and 18th armies of Colonel Generals Busch and von Küchler, and the 4th Panzer Group of Colonel General Hoepner. A total of forty-two divisions. From the air, the army group was supported by over a thousand aircraft of the Luftwaffe I Fleet.

Oh, how the commander of the 18th Army, Colonel General Karl-Friedrich-Wilhelm von Küchler, rushed forward! In 1940, with his invincible fellows, he had already crossed Holland, Belgium, and marched under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. And here is Russia! Sixty-year-old Küchler dreamed of a field marshal's baton, which was waiting for him on the first street in Leningrad - all he had to do was bend down and pick it up. He will be the first of the foreign generals to enter this proud city with an army!

Let him dream. He will receive the field marshal's baton, but not for long. Küchler's military career would end ingloriously under the walls of Leningrad on January 31, 1944. Enraged by the victories of the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Hitler would throw Küchler, who by that time commanded the entire Army Group North, into retirement. After this, the field marshal will be revealed to the world only once - in Nuremberg. To be tried as a war criminal.

In the meantime, the 18th Army is advancing. It has already become famous not only for its military successes, but also for its brutal massacres of civilians. The soldiers of the “Great Fuhrer” did not spare either the inhabitants of the occupied territories or prisoners of war.

During the battles for Tallinn, not far from the city, the Germans discovered three reconnaissance sailors from a combined detachment of sailors and Estonian militias. During a short bloody battle, two scouts were killed, and a seriously wounded sailor from the destroyer "Minsk" Evgeniy Nikonov, unconscious, was captured.

Evgeniy refused to answer all questions about the location of the detachment, and torture did not break him. Then the Nazis, angry at the Red Navy man’s stubbornness, gouged out his eyes, tied Nikonov to a tree and burned him alive.

Having entered the territory of the Leningrad region after heavy fighting, von Küchler’s wards, whom Leeb called “a respected man with fearlessness and composure,” continued to commit atrocities. I'll give just one example.

As the documents of the Trial in the case of the Supreme High Command of Hitler's Wehrmacht irrefutably testify, “in the area occupied by the 18th Army ... there was a hospital in which 230 mentally ill and other women suffering from other illnesses were placed. After a discussion during which the opinion was expressed , that “according to German concepts” these unfortunates “were not worth living any longer”, a proposal was made to liquidate them, an entry in the combat log of the XXVIII Army Corps for December 25-26, 1941 shows that “the commander agreed with this decision” and ordered its implementation by the SD forces."

Prisoners in the army of the “respected” and “fearless” Küchler were sent to clear the mines in the area and were shot at the slightest suspicion of wanting to escape. Finally, they simply starved. I will quote only one entry from the combat log of the chief of the intelligence department of the 18th Army headquarters for November 4, 1941: “Every night 10 prisoners die from exhaustion.”

On September 8, 1941, Shlisselburg fell. Leningrad found itself cut off from southeastern communications. The blockade began. The main forces of the 18th Army came close to the city, but were unable to take it. Strength collided with the courage of the defenders. Even the enemy was forced to admit this.

Infantry General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who at the beginning of the war held the post of Oberquartiermeister IV (chief of the main intelligence department) of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, wrote irritably:

“German troops reached the southern outskirts of the city, but due to the stubborn resistance of the defending troops, reinforced by fanatical Leningrad workers, the expected success was not achieved. Due to a lack of forces, it was also not possible to oust the Russian troops from the mainland...”.

Continuing the offensive on other sectors of the front, units of the 18th Army came close to Volkhov in early December.

At this time, in the rear, on the territory of the Volga Military District, the 26th Army was formed anew - for the third time after the battles near Kiev and in the Oryol-Tula direction. At the end of December it will be transferred to the Volkhov Front. Here the 26th will receive a new name, with which it will pass from the banks of the Volkhov River to the Elbe, and will forever remain in the history of the Great Patriotic War - the 2nd shock!

I specifically described in such detail the methods of warfare by the Nazi 18th Army so that the reader would understand what kind of enemy our 2nd Shock Army would have to face. There was very little time left before the start of the most tragic operation in 1942 in the North-West of the country.

In the meantime, headquarters on both sides of the front were assessing the results of the 1941 campaign. Tippelskirch noted:

“During the heavy fighting, Army Group North, although it inflicted significant losses on the enemy and partially destroyed his forces... however, did not achieve operational success. The planned timely support by strong formations of Army Group Center was not provided.”

And in December 1941, Soviet troops launched a strong counterattack near Tikhvin, defeated and routed the Germans near Moscow. It was at this time that the defeat of the Nazis in the northwestern and Moscow directions was predetermined.

In military science there is such a concept - analytical strategy. It was developed by the Prussians - great experts in all kinds of teachings on how to kill more people better, faster and more. It is no coincidence that all the wars with their participation, starting with the Battle of Grunwald, were included in world history as the bloodiest. The essence of the analytical strategy, if we omit all the complicated and long explanations, comes down to the following: you prepare and you win.

The most important component of the analytical strategy is the doctrine of operations. Let us dwell on it in more detail, since without this the course of the described operations and battles, the reasons for successes and failures, will be difficult to understand.

Don’t be too lazy to take a sheet of paper and put on it the coordinate system you know from school. Now, just below the X-axis, start drawing an elongated capital letter S so that its “neck” makes an acute angle with the axis. At the point of intersection, put the number 1, and at the top, at the point where the letter begins to bend to the right, put the number 2.

So here it is. There is a preparatory stage up to point 1 military operation. At the very point it “starts” and begins to develop rapidly, at point 2 it loses momentum and then fades away. The attacking side strives to go from the first to the second point as quickly as possible, attracting maximum forces and resources. The defender, on the contrary, tries to stretch it out in time - the resources of any army are not unlimited - and, when the enemy is exhausted, crushes him, taking advantage of the fact that at point 2 the phase of extreme saturation has begun. Looking ahead, I will say that this is what happened during the Lyuban operation of 1942.

For the German divisions, the “neck” of the letter S on the way to Leningrad and Moscow turned out to be prohibitively long. The troops stopped at both capitals, unable to advance further and were beaten almost simultaneously - near Tikhvin and near Moscow

Germany did not have enough strength to conduct the 1942 campaign along the entire front. On December 11, 1941, German losses were estimated at 1 million 300 thousand people. As General Blumentritt recalled, in the fall “...in the troops of the Center armies, in most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people.”

However, the German command had the opportunity to transfer troops to the Eastern Front from the territories occupied by the Third Reich in the West (from June to December, outside the Soviet-German front, fascist losses amounted to about 9 thousand people). Thus, divisions from France and Denmark ended up at the disposal of the 18th Army of Army Group North.

Today it is difficult to say whether Stalin counted on the opening of a second front in 1942 at a time when the Headquarters was planning a number of upcoming operations, including the liberation of Leningrad. At least the correspondence between the Supreme Commander regarding the need to open a second front with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain was quite lively. And on January 1, 1942, in Washington, representatives of the USSR, USA, England, China and 22 other countries signed a United Nations declaration on an uncompromising struggle against the states of the fascist bloc. The governments of the USA and Great Britain officially announced the opening of a second front in Europe in 1942.

Unlike Stalin, the more cynical Hitler was convinced that there would be no second front. And he concentrated the best troops in the East.

"Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be driven back so far that they can never touch the cultural soil of Europe... I will see to it that Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed."

Our Headquarters did not intend to give Leningrad to the enemy. On December 17, 1941, the Volkhov Front was created. It included the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd and 59th armies. Two of them - the 4th and 52nd - have already distinguished themselves during the counterattack near Tikhvin. The 4th was especially successful, as a result of a decisive attack on December 9, which captured the city and inflicted serious damage on enemy personnel. Nine of its formations and units were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In total, 1,179 people were awarded in the 4th and 52nd armies: 47 with the Order of Lenin, 406 with the Order of the Red Banner, 372 with the Order of the Red Star, 155 with the medal “For Courage” and 188 with the medal “For Military Merit”. Eleven warriors became Heroes Soviet Union.

The 4th Army was commanded by Army General K.A. Meretskov, the 52nd Army by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov. Now one army commander led the front, the other was to command the 2nd shock. The headquarters set a strategic task for the front: to defeat Nazi troops, with the help of units of the Leningrad Front, to carry out a breakthrough and complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad (this operation was called “Lyubanskaya”). Soviet troops failed to cope with the task.

Let us give the floor to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, who traveled to the Volkhov Front and is well acquainted with the situation. In the book “The Work of a Whole Life,” the famous marshal recalls:

“Almost the entire winter, and then the spring, we tried to break through the ring of the Leningrad blockade, striking at it from two sides: from the inside - by the troops of the Leningrad Front, from the outside - by the Volkhov Front, with the goal of uniting after the unsuccessful breakthrough of this ring in the Lyuban region. The main role in the Lyuban operation played by the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhovites. It entered the breakthrough of the German defense line on the right bank of the Volkhov River, but failed to reach Lyuban, and got stuck in the forests and swamps. The Leningraders, weakened by the blockade, were all the more unable to solve their part. common task. The matter hardly moved. At the end of April, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were united into a single Leningrad front, consisting of two groups: a group of troops in the Volkhov direction and a group of troops in the Leningrad direction. The first included troops of the former Volkhov Front, as well as the 8th and 54th armies, which were previously part of the Leningrad Front. The commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Khozin, was given the opportunity to unite actions to eliminate the blockade of Leningrad. However, it soon became clear that it was extremely difficult to lead nine armies, three corps, two groups of troops separated by an enemy-occupied zone. The decision of the Headquarters to liquidate the Volkhov Front turned out to be erroneous.

On June 8, the Volkhov Front was restored; it was again headed by K.A. Meretskov. L.A. Govorov was appointed to command the Leningrad Front. “For failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the timely and rapid withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army, for paper and bureaucratic methods of command and control of troops,” said the order of the Headquarters, for separation from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and the latter was placed in an exceptionally difficult position, remove Lieutenant General Khozin from the post of commander of the Leningrad Front" and appoint him commander of the 33rd Army Western Front. The situation here was complicated by the fact that the commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, turned out to be a vile traitor and went over to the enemy’s side.”

Marshal Vasilevsky does not disclose the very course of the Lyuban operation (little has been written about it at all), limiting himself to stating the negative result achieved. But, please note, neither he nor the Headquarters make any accusations against the 2nd Shock units at their disposal. But the following quote is extremely far from objectivity. Although, to be honest, it’s hard to accuse the authors of the major work “The Battle of Leningrad” of deliberate bias (and in our uncensored era, many people adhere to this point of view). I quote:

“In the first half of May 1942, fighting resumed on the western bank of the Volkhov River in the Lyuban direction. Our attempts to expand the breakthrough in the enemy’s defenses in order to develop a subsequent attack on Lyuban were unsuccessful. The fascist German command was able to pull up large forces to this area and, having applied strong blows on the flanks of the advancing Soviet troops, created a real threat of their destruction. In mid-May 1942, the Supreme Command headquarters ordered the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army to the eastern bank of the Volkhov River. However, as a result of the treacherous behavior of General Vlasov, who subsequently surrendered, the army found itself in a catastrophic situation, and it had to escape from encirclement with heavy fighting."

So, from the above text it logically follows that the failure of the army is the result of Vlasov’s betrayal. And in the book “On the Volkhov Front”, published in 1982 (and, by the way, published by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Military History), the following is generally categorically stated:

“Inaction and betrayal of the Motherland and the military duty of its former commander, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, is one of the most important reasons that the army was surrounded and suffered huge losses.”

But this is clearly too much! The army was surrounded by no fault of Vlasov, and the general had no intention of surrendering it to the enemy. Let's take a brief look at the progress of the operation.

The commander of the Volkhov Front, Army General K.A. Meretskov, made a well-founded decision to attack with two fresh armies - the 2nd shock and the 59th. The offensive of the strike group had the task of breaking through the German defense front in the Spasskaya Polist area, reaching the line of Lyuban, Dubrovnik, Cholovo and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, defeating the enemy’s Lyuban-Chudov group. Then, having built on the success, break the blockade of Leningrad. Of course, Meretskov, who held the post of Chief of the General Staff before the war, was aware that it would be extremely difficult to carry out the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, but he made every effort to do this - an order is an order.

The offensive began on January 7. For three days, our troops tried to break through the German defenses, but were unsuccessful. On January 10, the front commander temporarily stopped the attacking actions of the units. On the same day, the 2nd Shock received a new commander.

“Although a change of command is not an easy matter... we still took the risk of asking the Supreme High Command Headquarters to replace the commander of the 2nd Shock Army,” recalled K.A. Meretskov. Kirill Afanasyevich spoke about G.G. Sokolov not in the best way:

“He got down to business ardently, made any promises. In practice, nothing worked out for him. It was clear that his approach to solving problems in a combat situation was based on long-outdated concepts and dogmas.”

It was not easy for Meretskov to contact Headquarters with a request to remove the army commander. The former chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, repressed and only miraculously not sharing the fate of many senior military leaders, Kirill Afanasyevich proposed (before the start of the strategic operation!) to remove from office not just General Sokolov, but, in the very recent past, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Sokolov.

However, precisely because it was before the offensive, Meretskov asked to replace the army commander. And... a few days later G.G. Sokolov was recalled to Moscow. Open the latest edition of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary - there you will find articles about all the commanders of the 2nd shock. Besides Sokolov...

But let's go back to 1942. On the Volkhov Front, forces were regrouped and reserves were concentrated. On January 13, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the offensive resumed along the entire area of ​​​​the deployment of front troops from the village of Podberezye to the city of Chudovo in the north-west direction from the original lines. Unfortunately, only the 2nd Shock Army, commanded by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from January 10, had the main and only success in this operation.

This is what Pavel Luknitsky, an eyewitness, writes in the Leningrad Diary:

“In January, in February, the initial excellent success of this operation was achieved under the command of... G.G. Sokolov (under him, in 1941, the 2nd Shock was created from the 26th, which was in the reserve of the Army High Command and some units of the Volkhov ... front...) and N.K. Klykov, who led it on the offensive... The army had many brave soldiers, selflessly devoted to the Motherland - Russians, Bashkirs, Tatars, Chuvash (the 26th Army was formed in the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ), Kazakhs and other nationalities."

The war correspondent did not sin against the truth. The onslaught was truly terrible. Reinforced by reserves transferred from other sectors of the front, the troops of the second shock wedged themselves in a narrow strip into the location of the enemy's 18th Army.

Having broken through the deeply echeloned defense in the zone between the villages of Myasnoy Bor - Spasskaya Polist (about 50 kilometers northwest of Novgorod), by the end of January the advanced units of the army - the 13th Cavalry Corps, the 101st Separate Cavalry Regiment, as well as units of the 327th 1st Infantry Division reached the city of Lyuban and enveloped the enemy group from the south. The remaining armies of the front practically remained at their original lines and, supporting the development of the success of the 2nd Shock Army, fought heavy defensive battles. Thus, even then Klykov’s army was left to its own devices. But it was coming!

In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Franz Halder, there were entries one more alarming than the other:

January 27. ...On the front of Army Group North, the enemy achieved tactical success on Volkhov.

Feeling a serious threat from the connection of units of the 2nd shock with units of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front of General I.I. Fedyuninsky, located 30 kilometers northeast of Lyuban, the Germans are strengthening their 18th Army. In the period from January to June 1942, 15 (!) full-blooded divisions were transferred to the area of ​​operations of the Volkhov Front to eliminate the offensive of the 2nd Shock Army. As a result, the command of Army Group North was forced to abandon plans to capture Leningrad forever. But the tragic fate of the 2nd shock was a foregone conclusion.

On February 27, the Germans attacked the exposed flanks of the Soviet troops. Our units that reached Ryabovo found themselves cut off from the main forces of the front and only after many days of fighting did they break out of the encirclement. Let's take another look at Halder's diary:

2nd of March. ...Conference with the Fuhrer in the presence of the commander of Army Group North, army commanders and corps commanders. Decision: go on the offensive on Volkhov on March 7 (until 13.03.). The Fuhrer demands that aviation preparations be carried out several days before the start of the offensive (the bombing of warehouses in forests with super-heavy caliber bombs). Having completed the breakthrough on Volkhov, one should not waste energy on destroying the enemy. If we throw him into the swamp, it will doom him to death."

And from March 1942 until the end of June, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army, surrounded and cut off from their communications, fought fierce battles, holding the Germans in the southeastern direction. Just look at the map of the Novgorod region to be convinced: the battles were fought in wooded and swampy areas. In addition, in the summer of '42, the level of groundwater and rivers sharply increased in the Leningrad region. All bridges, even on small rivers, were demolished, and the swamps became impassable. Ammunition and food were supplied by air in extremely limited quantities. The army was starving, but the soldiers and commanders honestly performed their duty.

Circumstances were such that in mid-April Army Commander N.K. became seriously ill. Klykov - he had to be urgently evacuated by plane across the front line. At this time, the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov (who, by the way, arrived at the front on March 9) was at the army’s disposal. And it was quite natural that he, who had proven himself well as an army commander in the battles near Moscow, was appointed to act as commander of the encircled army.

Veteran of the 2nd Shock I. Levin testifies to the conditions under which they had to fight in his notes “General Vlasov on both sides of the front”:

“The situation with ammunition was desperate. When vehicles and carts could not get through the neck to us, the soldiers carried the shells - two ropes over their shoulders - on themselves. Junkers, Heinkels, Messers literally hung over their heads and in during the daylight hours we hunted (I’m sure with passion) for every moving target - be it a soldier or a cart. There was nothing to cover the army from the air... Our native Volkhov forest saved us: it allowed us to play hide and seek with the Luftwaffe.”

In May the situation worsened. This is how the commander of the 327th Infantry Division, Colonel (later Major General) I.M., remembers it. Antyufeyev:

“The situation on the line occupied by the division was clearly not in our favor. The forest roads had already dried up, and the enemy brought tanks and self-propelled guns here. He also used massive mortar fire. And yet the division fought on this line for about two weeks... Finev Lug passed from hand to hand several times. Where did our soldiers get their physical strength and energy!... In the end, at this line, a critical moment came, to the left of us, between the lakes, a partisan detachment was defending itself, which was pushed back by the enemy. Being completely surrounded, we were forced to retreat. This time we had to part with almost all the heavy weapons... By that time, there were no more than 200-300 people in each rifle regiment. They were no longer capable of any maneuver. In one place they still fought, literally clinging their teeth to the ground, but the movement was unbearably difficult for them.”

In mid-May 1942, the command of the 2nd Shock received a directive to leave the army beyond the Volkhov River. This was more than difficult to achieve. When the enemy closed the only corridor in the Myasny Bor area, the very possibility of an organized breakthrough became unlikely. As of June 1, in 7 divisions and 6 brigades of the army there were 6,777 commanding officers, 6,369 junior command personnel and 22,190 privates. A total of 35,336 people - approximately three divisions. It should be taken into account that the command lost operational control over the troops, the units were scattered. Nevertheless, Soviet soldiers offered heroic resistance to the enemy. The fighting continued.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, as a result of the failed operation of the troops of the Volkhov Front and the remaining combat-ready units of the 2nd Shock Army to break through the encirclement ring from Myasnoy Bor and the withdrawal of the remaining groups of fighters and commanders, the army command decided to fight their way to their own, breaking into small groups (soldiers and army officers have already done this).

When leaving the encirclement, the chief of staff of the 2nd shock, Colonel Vinogradov, died under artillery fire. The head of the special department, State Security Major Shashkov, was seriously wounded and shot himself. Surrounded by fascists, member of the Military Council Zuev saved the last bullet for himself, and the head of the political department Garus also did the same. The head of army communications, Major General Afanasyev, went to the partisans, who transported him to the “mainland.” The Germans captured the commander of the 327th division, General Antyufeev (who refused to cooperate with the enemies of the division commander and was subsequently sent to a concentration camp). And General Vlasov... surrendered to a patrol of the 28th Infantry Corps in the village of Tukhovezhi (together with the chef of the army military council canteen, M.I. Voronova, who accompanied him).

But our own people were looking for him, trying to save the army commander! On the morning of June 25, officers who emerged from the encirclement reported: Vlasov and other senior officers were seen in the area of ​​the narrow-gauge railway. Meretskov sent there his adjutant, Captain Mikhail Grigorievich Boroda, a tank company with an infantry landing force. Of the five tanks in the German rear, four were blown up by mines or were knocked out. M.G. Boroda, on the last tank, reached the headquarters of the 2nd strike - there was no one there. By the evening of June 25, several reconnaissance groups were sent to find the Army Military Council and withdraw it. Vlasov was never found.

After some time, a message was received from the partisans of the Oredezh detachment F.I. Sazanov: Vlasov went over to the Nazis.

When, many days later, the surviving soldiers of the 2nd Shock found out about this, they were simply shocked. “But how they believed this heroic general, scolder, joker, eloquent speaker! The commander of the army turned out to be a despicable coward, betrayed everyone who, not sparing their lives, went into battle on his orders,” wrote Pavel Luknitsky.

“The question arises: how did it happen that Vlasov turned out to be a traitor?” Marshal Meretskov writes in his book “In the Service of the People.” “It seems to me that only one answer can be given. Vlasov was an unprincipled careerist. His behavior before that It may well be considered a disguise behind which his indifference to the Motherland was hidden. His membership in the Communist Party was nothing more than a path to high positions. His actions at the front, for example in 1941 near Kiev and Moscow, were an attempt to distinguish himself in order to demonstrate his professional abilities and quickly. move forward."

During the trial of the ROA command, when asked why he surrendered, Vlasov answered briefly and clearly: “I was faint-hearted.” And you can believe it. Surrendering on July 12, the general, who did not have the courage to shoot himself, was already a coward, but not yet a traitor. Vlasov betrayed his Motherland a day later, when he ended up at the headquarters of the commander of the 18th German Army, Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann. It was to him that he described in detail the state of affairs on the Volkhov front. A photograph has been preserved: Vlasov with a pointer bent over the map, Lindemann standing next to him carefully follows his explanations.

Here we will leave the traitor. He has nothing to do with the further fate of the 2nd strike.

Despite Vlasov’s betrayal, the entire army was not blamed for the failure of the Lyuban operation. And in those days, just the slightest suspicion of betrayal was enough for the very name “2nd Shock” to disappear forever from the lists of the Red Army. In addition, none of the army units lost their battle flags.

This means that Stavka correctly assessed its role: despite tragic outcome The army operation buried the enemy's hopes of capturing Leningrad. The losses of Hitler's troops were too heavy. Pavel Luknitsky also reports this in the three-volume book “Leningrad is Acting...”:

“...it (the 2nd strike motor vehicle) destroyed a lot of enemy forces: six German divisions, pulled from Leningrad to Volkhov, were exsanguinated by it, the fascist legions “Netherlands” and “Flanders” were completely defeated, many remained in the swamps enemy artillery, tanks, airplanes, tens of thousands of Nazis..."

And here is an excerpt from a leaflet issued by the political department of the Volkhov Front shortly after the 2nd shock fighters left the encirclement:

"Valiant warriors of the 2nd Shock Army!

In the fire and roar of guns, the clang of tanks, the roar of airplanes, and fierce battles with Hitler’s scoundrels, you won the glory of the valiant warriors of the Volkhov borders.

Courageously and fearlessly, during the harsh winter and spring, you fought against the fascist invaders.

The military glory of the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army is etched in golden letters in the history of the Great Patriotic War..."

However, Hitler, unlike his commanders, who did not abandon his obsession with taking and destroying Leningrad, demanded from the Wehrmacht representative at the Finnish headquarters, General Erfurt, to achieve an offensive by the Allied units from the north. But the Finnish command turned Hitler’s envoy away, declaring: since 1918, our country has been of the opinion that the existence of Finland should not pose a threat to Leningrad. Apparently, the Finns, who carefully assessed both the international and military situation, were then groping for a way out of the war into which Germany had dragged them.

But Hitler did not let up. He took an unprecedented step: he transferred the victorious 11th Army of Field Marshal von Manstein from the southern borders to Leningrad. Manstein took Sevastopol! Manstein “figured out” the Kerch operation of the Russians! Let Manstein take Leningrad!

Manstein has arrived. I didn’t take Leningrad. In his memoirs he wrote:

“On August 27, the headquarters of the 11th Army arrived on the Leningrad Front to find out the possibilities of striking here in the zone of the 18th Army and draw up a plan for an attack on Leningrad. It was agreed that then the headquarters of the 11th Army would occupy part of the front of the 18th Army , facing north, while the eastern part of the front along the Volkhov remained behind the 18th Army."

And the 11th Army entered into heavy fighting with Soviet troops, which lasted until the beginning of October. Actually. Manstein had to solve the problems of the 18th Army, which had been badly beaten during the Lyuban operation by units of the 2nd strike and was no longer capable of large-scale operations.

The field marshal managed to destroy a number of our formations, but did not have enough strength to take the city. Manstein would later remember these autumn battles in 1942:

“If the task of restoring the situation on the eastern sector of the 18th Army’s front was completed, the divisions of our army nevertheless suffered significant losses. At the same time, a significant part of the ammunition intended for the attack on Leningrad was used up. Therefore, there could be no talk of a quick offensive and speeches. Meanwhile, Hitler still did not want to give up his intention to capture Leningrad. True, he was ready to limit the tasks of the offensive, which, naturally, would not lead to the final liquidation of this front, and in the end everything came down to this liquidation (emphasis added). - author). On the contrary, the headquarters of the 11th Army believed that it was impossible to begin the operation against Leningrad without replenishing our forces and without having sufficient forces at all. October passed by discussing these issues and drawing up new plans."

In November, the situation was such that the presence of the 11th Army was required in other sectors of the Eastern Front: the decisive battle for Stalingrad was approaching. Manstein's headquarters was transferred to Army Group Center. Except unsuccessful attempt take Leningrad, fate dealt the German commander another terrible blow. On October 29, the 19-year-old son of the field marshal, infantry lieutenant Gero von Manstein, who fought in the 16th Army, died on the Leningrad Front.

Many years later, after the events described, while working on his book “Lost Victories,” the old field marshal, always stingy in his praise of the enemy, would pay tribute to the heroic warriors of the 2nd Shock (an army at that time was only in name; the eight-thousandth infantry fought against the enemy division and one rifle brigade). He will appreciate their courage in a military way, clearly and concisely:

"The enemy's casualties in killed were many times greater than the number captured."

And in the forty-second year, another thing happened on the Volkhov front an important event, at first glance, not directly related to the development of hostilities. A song was born that soon became popularly known and loved. Because it sounded truthful and, most importantly, it was already victorious!

Songs that raise the morale of soldiers sometimes mean more than new weapons, plentiful food, and warm clothes. The time of their appearance rightly takes its rightful place in military chronology. In 1941, it became “Get up, huge country!”, in 1942 - “Volkhov Table” to the words of the front-line poet Pavel Shubin.

They didn't sing then:

Let's drink to the Motherland, let's drink to Stalin,

Let's drink and pour again!

They didn’t sing because such lines had never been written before. but, you see, it sounded great:

Let's drink to the meeting of the living!

These words fully applied to all soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army.

At the end of 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided at the beginning of the next year to carry out an operation to relieve the siege of Leningrad, better known in history as Operation Iskra.

From the Leningrad Front, the 67th Army was assigned to the strike group. The Volkhov Front again entrusted this task to the 2nd Shock. The almost completely renewed army (only about ten thousand people emerged from the encirclement) included: 11 rifle divisions, 1 rifle, 4 tank and 2 engineer brigades, 37 artillery and mortar regiments and other units.

The fully equipped 2nd Strike continued its combat path. And he was nice!

On January 18, 1943, the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, in cooperation with the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, broke the blockade of Leningrad. The course of this operation is described in detail both in fiction and in special military literature. Numerous documentaries and feature films have been made about her. Every year, January 18 was celebrated in Leningrad, is celebrated and will be celebrated in St. Petersburg as one of the main city holidays!

Then, in the cold January days of 1943, the main thing happened: conditions were created for land and transport communications with the entire country.

For the courage and bravery shown in breaking the blockade, about 22 thousand soldiers of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts received state awards. The 122nd Tank Brigade, which interacted with units of the 2nd Shock Brigade, became the Red Banner Brigade. And in the army itself, the 327th Rifle Division was transformed into the 64th Guards Rifle Division. The chest of the commander of the newly minted guardsmen, Colonel N.A. Polyakov, was decorated with the Order of Suvorov, II degree. The commander of the 2nd attack, Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky, was awarded one of the highest military leadership insignia - the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree.

Since April 1943, already operating as part of the Leningrad Front, the army participated in the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, and with its active participation from the Oranienbaum bridgehead in January 1944, it ensured the final liberation of Leningrad from the siege.

In February-March - liberated Lomonosovsky, Volosovsky, Kingiseppsky, Slantsevsky and Gdovsky districts of the Leningrad region, reached the Narva River and Lake Peipus. In April-August she fought with German troops on the Narva Isthmus and successfully carried out an operation to liberate Narva. In September forty-four, in the successful Tallinn operation, the territory of Estonia was liberated from the invaders.

How were things going for the long-no longer victorious German 18th Army? Tippelskirch writes:

"On January 18 (1944 - author), that is, a few days after the start of the Russian offensive on the northern sector of the 18th Army front, the troops of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive from a wide bridgehead north of Novgorod with the aim of striking the flank of the 18th Army It was impossible to prevent this breakthrough, and it led to the withdrawal of the entire army group. The very next day we had to leave Novgorod."

But, true to its tradition of smashing and destroying everything, the 18th Army continued the practice of “scorched earth”!: out of the almost fifty thousand population of Novgorod, only fifty people survived, out of 2,500 buildings - only forty. Colonel General Lindemann, already familiar to us, ordered the famous monument “Millennium of Russia”, which is still located on the territory of the Novgorod Kremlin, to be dismantled into parts and sent to Germany. They dismantled it, but they didn’t have time to take it out - they had to run away from the rapidly advancing Soviet army.

Under the blows of the Soviet troops, the 18th Army rolled back further and further until, together with the 16th Army, it was blocked as part of the Courland group. Together with her, the failed conquerors of Leningrad laid down their arms on the night of May 9. And then a terrible panic began among the soldiers of the 16th and 18th armies. General Gilpert, who commanded the group, was seriously afraid. It turns out that the Nazis “miscalculated.” Pavel Luknitsky says in his narration:

“Before accepting the ultimatum, Gilpert did not know that Marshal Govorov was in command of the Leningrad Front, he believed that they would surrender to Marshal Govorov, the “commander of the 2nd Baltic Front,” - this seemed to the Germans who committed atrocities near Leningrad not so terrible: “Baltic people,” Having not experienced the horror of the blockade, they have no reason to take such “merciless revenge” as the Leningraders allegedly will.”

You should have thought earlier when they were executed at the walls of the Neva Stronghold, dying of hunger, but not surrendering!

On September 27, 1944, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, transferring the 2nd strike to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, addressed its troops with the words:

"The 2nd Shock Army as part of the front troops played a big role in lifting the blockade of Leningrad, conquering Great victory near Leningrad and in all the battles for the liberation of Soviet Estonia from the Nazi invaders.

The victorious path of the 2nd Shock Army on the Leningrad Front was marked by brilliant successes, and the battle banners of its units were covered with unfading glory.

The working people of Leningrad and Soviet Estonia will always sacredly cherish in their memory the military merits of the 2nd Shock Army, its heroic warriors - the faithful sons of the Fatherland."

At the final stage of the war, the 2nd Shock Division, as part of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, fought in East Prussia and participated in the East Pomeranian operation. In his memoirs, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky more than once noted her skillful actions:

“The 2nd Shock Army fought through a strong defensive line on the outskirts of Marienburg, which in ancient times was a crusader fortress, and on January 25 reached the Vistula and Nogat rivers. With part of its forces, it crossed these rivers in several places and captured small bridgeheads. Capture Elbing the troops could not move on the move... I.I. Fedyuninsky (commander of the 2nd shock - author) had to organize an assault on the city according to all the rules of military art. The battles lasted for several days until the 2nd shock captured the city."

Together with the 65th Army and a separate tank brigade of the Polish Army, the 2nd Shock Division played decisive role in the assault on Danzig - the Polish city of Gdansk.

“On March 26, the troops of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, having broken through the enemy defenses to their entire depth, approached Danzig,” wrote K.K. Rokossovsky. “In order to avoid senseless losses, the garrison was given an ultimatum: it is useless to continue resistance. In the event, If the ultimatum was not accepted, residents were advised to leave the city.

Hitler's command did not respond to our proposal. The command was given to begin the assault... The fight was for every house. The Nazis fought especially stubbornly in large buildings, factory buildings... On March 30, Gdansk was completely liberated. The remnants of the enemy troops fled to the swampy mouth of the Vistula, where they were soon captured. The Polish national flag soared over the ancient Polish city, which was hoisted by soldiers - representatives of the Polish Army."

From East Prussia the army's route lay in Pomerania. The Germans understood perfectly well that Soviet soldiers had every right to take revenge. The memories of how the Nazis treated prisoners of war and civilians were too fresh. And even in the May days of 1945, living examples almost constantly appeared before our eyes.

On May 7, units of the 46th Division of the 2nd Shock cleared the island of Rügen from the Germans. Our soldiers discovered a concentration camp in which our compatriots were languishing. In his book “From the Neva to the Elbe,” the division commander, General S.N. Borshchev, recalled the incident on the island:

“Our Soviet people, liberated from concentration camps, were walking along the road. Suddenly a girl ran out of the crowd, rushed to our famous intelligence officer Tupkalenko and, hugging him, screamed:

Vasil, my brother!

And our courageous, desperate intelligence officer, Vasily Yakovlevich Tupkalenko (full holder of the Order of Glory - author), on whose face, as they say, never moved a single muscle, cried..."

But the winners, to the surprise of the local population, did not take revenge. On the contrary, they helped as best they could. And when a column of young men in fascist soldier’s uniforms came across the 90th Rifle Division, division commander General N.G. Lyashchenko simply waved his hand to the teenagers:

Go to mom, to mom!

Naturally, they happily ran home.

And the Great Patriotic War ended for the 2nd Shock with participation in the famous Berlin operation. And our soldiers had their own “meeting on the Elbe” - with the 2nd British Army. Soviet and English soldiers celebrated it solemnly: with a football match!

Over the four years of war, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army were expressed gratitude to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief twenty-four times, and the sky over Moscow was colored with victorious volleys of fireworks. For heroism, courage and bravery, 99 formations and units were given honorary names of liberated and captured cities. 101 formations and units attached the Order of the Soviet Union to their banners, and 29 formations and units became guards. 103 soldiers of the 2nd shock were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

History has given everyone what they deserve. Soldiers, officers and generals of the 2nd Shock Army found themselves on the heroic pages of the chronicle of Victory. And General Vlasov - to the gallows. The execution took place on the night of August 1, 1946 in Tagansk prison according to the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. And with this we could have parted ways with the traitor, if not for certain circumstances.

Our country entered the new millennium without a textbook on the history of Russia. Well - nothing surprising: too many idols in the previous decade were overthrown from their pedestals, not all heroes were pulled out of oblivion. And the history of any state is made up of the actions of individuals.

But when scientists thoroughly shook the flask with the historical cocktail of the twentieth century, many strange and sometimes terrible personalities appeared on the surface, whom the “independently-minded” pseudo-chroniclers, quick to hand, immediately began to present to us as heroes misunderstood by the people. A kind of Don Quixote modern history, not at all concerned with the fact that, unlike Mr. La Mancha, the knights are not of a sad, but rather of a bloody image.

General Vlasov was also included in the category of such “Don Quixotes”. His defense is based mainly on two positions (everything else is verbal fluff): the general is not a traitor, but a fighter against the regime, which collapsed anyway, and Vlasov is the Soviet analogue of Stauffenberg.

Not noticing such statements is dangerous. Our country is rightly called the most reading country in the world. But we must add to this that for the most part the Russian people are accustomed to believing the printed word: once it is written, so it is. That is why expositions are so popular among us and refutations often go unnoticed.

Without intending to engage in refutations of the arguments of Vlasov’s supporters in this narrative, I invite readers to consider only the factual side of the matter.

So, Vlasov and Stauffenberg. The German colonel never fought against Prussian militarism - the main opponent of Stauffenberg and his like-minded people was the Nazi elite. A competent officer of the General Staff could not help but understand that preaching the idea of ​​​​the superiority of one nation cannot build a “thousand-year Reich.” It was planned to replace key figures with less odious ones, abandon the most unacceptable Nazi principles - and that’s all. The world is for a certain period of time. More from a student of German military school, initially accustomed to planning wars and offensive actions, it was impossible to expect. Stauffenberg did not consider himself a traitor to Germany, since he ultimately acted in its interests.

Oath to the Fuhrer? But we should not forget: for the hereditary aristocrat Count Klaus Philipp Maria Schenck von Stauffenberg, the son of the Chief Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg and the queen's lady-in-waiting, a descendant of the great Gneisenau, Hitler was a plebeian and an upstart.

Stauffenberg led the military conspiracy while on the territory of his country, fully understanding the inevitability of death in case of failure. Vlasov simply chickened out when danger threatened him personally and surrendered. And the next day he laid out to Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann not plans to fight the communist regime, but military secrets that he owned as deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

At the beginning of the war, Stauffenberg actively pushed through the General Staff his ideas for creating national volunteer armies. Consequently, Vlasov, who eventually headed the ROA, was considered no more than the commander of one of these legions.

For the Germans, Vlasov was not a person; he was not assigned any serious role in military and political plans. Hitler repeated more than once: “Revolution is made only by those people who are inside the state, and not outside it.” And at a meeting in the summer of 1943 he said:

“...I don’t need this General Vlasov in our rear areas at all... I only need him on the front line.”

Leaders on whom they place a serious bet in the hope of a successful outcome of the war, as is known, are not sent there - it is dangerous. The order of Field Marshal Keitel dated April 17, 1943 stated:

“...in operations of a purely propaganda nature, Vlasov’s name may be required, but not his personality.”

Moreover, in the order, Keitel calls Vlasov a “Russian prisoner of war general” - and nothing more. But that’s what they called him on paper. IN colloquial speech they chose harsher expressions, for example: “This Russian pig is Vlasov” (Himmler, at a meeting with the Fuhrer).

Finally, Soviet historians, unwittingly, played a significant role in “perpetuating” the memory of A.A. Vlasov, calling all ROA fighters “Vlasovites.” In fact, they never were.

The "Russian Liberation Army" was formed from traitors and prisoners of war. But the soldiers surrendered and were captured by the enemy, and the traitors went to serve the Germans, and not Vlasov. Before the war, his name was not widely known in the USSR, and after the transition to the Germans, Vlasov was known only as a traitor. They didn’t go to him the way they went to Denikin or Kolchak, Petliura or Makhno - not the same figure.

And he didn’t behave like a leader. The same Denikin, at the end of the civil war, refused an English pension, rightly noting that only the Russian government could pay a Russian general. Vlasov willingly ate in German kitchens; when he was arrested in 1945, they found thirty thousand Reichsmarks in his possession, hidden “for a rainy day.” He lived comfortably - he even got a German wife - the widow of SS officer Adele Billingberg (after the war she will try to receive a pension for her hanged husband, like a general's widow).

One of the commanders of the White Guard corps, General Slashchev, did not wear shoulder straps during the civil war, believing that the volunteer army had disgraced them with robberies and violence. Vlasov also did not wear epaulettes among the Germans, but he gladly donned the comfortable overcoat of a Wehrmacht general. “Just in case” I kept the book of the commanding staff of the Red Army and... my party card.

Well, Vlasov was not a leader. But maybe then he is a fighter for the people’s happy lot? Many refer to his so-called “Smolensk appeal” to the people and other propaganda speeches. But Vlasov himself subsequently explained that the texts of the appeals were compiled by the Germans, and he only slightly edited them. The former general complained:

“Until 1944, the Germans did everything themselves, and they used us only as a sign that was profitable for them.”

And, by the way, they did the right thing, because an unedited Vlasov would hardly have been perceived by Russian people as a patriot.

As already mentioned, in the spring of 1943 he made a “tour” to parts of Army Group North. The kind of “love for the Motherland” that the speeches of the former army commander were imbued with can be judged by the occasion at the banquet in Gatchina.

Believing in his own importance, the distraught Vlasov assured the German command: if they now give him two shock divisions, he will quickly take Leningrad, since the residents are exhausted by the blockade. And then he, Vlasov the victor, will arrange a luxurious banquet in the city, to which the Wehrmacht generals invite him in advance. As you already know, Hitler, outraged by such impudence, recalled Vlasov from the front and even threatened death penalty.

As a result, the Fuhrer still had to put the ROA into action - there was not enough “cannon fodder” at the front and in the Reich they formed units even from teenagers. But the ROA no longer had any “liberation” character. And the German command did not have much hope for it. The same Tippelskirch will write after the war that the “Vlasov army,” despite its large numbers, was a stillborn fetus.

And how the Soviet units perceived it is clearly demonstrated by the memories of 2nd Shock Veteran I. Levin:

“In the sector of our 2nd Shock Army, I remember only one battle with the Vlasovites. Somewhere in East Prussia, near Koenigsberg, our tank landing came across a large German unit, which included a battalion of Vlasovites.

After a fierce battle, the enemy was scattered. According to reports from the front line: they took many prisoners, Germans and Vlasovites. But only the Germans reached the army headquarters. Not a single person with the ROA badge was brought in. You can say a lot of words about this... But no matter what they say, no one has the right to condemn our paratroopers, who have not cooled down from the battle, who have just lost their friends at the hands of traitors...”

The Vlasov army, in principle, had nothing to count on. In the thirties and forties of the twentieth century in our country, the power of personal example was of great importance to people. Hence the Stakhanov movement, the Voroshilov riflemen. During the war, fighters deliberately repeated Matrosov's feat, pilots - Talalikhin, snipers - Smolyachkov's achievements. And an example of civil courage for people was the feat of Kosmodemyanskaya, and not the activities of Vlasov. He could not find a place in this row.

At that time, the word “SS man” was the worst curse word—nothing to do with sometimes kindly Russian swearing. And Vlasov conducted propaganda with the help of SS Obergruppenführer Goebbels, equipped and armed the ROA under the leadership of Reichsführer SS Himmler, and chose an SS widow as his life partner. And finally, the official ID of the commander of the “Russian (!) Liberation Army” for Vlasov was signed by SS General (!) Kroeger. Isn't the attraction to the security forces of the Nazi Party too strong for a “carrier of high ideas”, a fighter for a “free Russia”?

In the historical period described, a person who had any connection with the SS could, at best, count on a place in a prison cell. But not on the political Olympus. And this opinion was held not only in the USSR.

After the war, traitors were tried throughout Europe. Quisling was shot in Norway, and the Belgian king Leopold III, who signed the capitulation to Germany, was forced to abdicate. Marshal Petain was sentenced to death in France, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. By the verdict of the people's tribunal, Antonescu was executed as a war criminal in Romania. If such punishment befell traitors of the first magnitude, then what could smaller fry like Vlasov count on? Only for a bullet or loop.

And presenting an obvious traitor today in the role of a martyr and “sufferer for the people” means deliberately engaging in false patriotic propaganda. This is much worse than selling from the stalls of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Because it has long been the custom - sufferers in Rus' are loved and pitied. But Vlasov is not a holy cripple. And a scaffold instead of a platform was erected for him according to his merits.

Russia had other generals. During the Great Patriotic War, one of the leaders of the White Guard movement and an irreconcilable enemy of Soviet power, Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin, called on White emigrants to fight the Germans in order to support the Red Army. And Soviet Lieutenant General D.M. Karbyshev preferred martyrdom in a concentration camp to treason.

How did the fates of other commanders turn out? Lieutenant General Nikolai Kuzmich Klykov (1888-1968), after recovery, from December 1942, was assistant to the commander of the Volkhov Front, participated in breaking the siege of Leningrad. In June 1943, he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Moscow Military District. In 1944-1945 he commanded the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. Having led the 2nd Shock Army before the operation to break through the blockade ring, Valery Zakharovich Romanovsky (1896-1967) subsequently became deputy commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front and in 1945 received the rank of Colonel General. After the war, he commanded troops in a number of military districts, worked in military educational institutions.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky (1900-1977), who replaced him as army commander in December 1943, also commanded district troops in 1946-47 and 1954-65. He again had the opportunity to serve his Motherland on already peaceful German soil: in 1951-54, he was deputy and first deputy commander-in-chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany. Since 1965, Army General Fedyuninsky worked in the group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1969, as a participant in the battles in Mongolia, a veteran of the famous Khalkhin Gol, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann (1884-1963), who opposed the 2nd shock at the head of the 18th German Army - the same one who wanted to remove the Millennium of Russia monument from Novgorod - led Army Group North on March 1, 1944, but for military failures in early July of the same forty-fourth, he was removed from office. Commanding German troops in Denmark at the end of the war, he surrendered to the British on May 8, 1945.

Field Marshals Wilhelm von Leeb and Karl von Küchler were tried as war criminals by the Fifth American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. On October 28, 1948, the verdict was announced: von Leeb (1876-1956) received an unexpectedly lenient sentence - three years in prison. Von Küchler (1881-1969) was treated more strictly. No matter how much he lied, no matter how he dodged, no matter how he referred only to the exact execution of orders, the “respected” and “fearless” field marshal, the tribunal turned out to be inexorable: twenty years in prison!

True, in February 1955, Küchler was released. From the beginning of the fifties, many “Fuhrer soldiers” began to be released and amnestied - in 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO and “experienced specialists” were required to form units of the Bundeswehr.

They had a lot of “experience”! Suffice it to say that soon after the formation of the Bundeswehr, the fascist General Ferch, one of the leaders of the artillery shelling of Leningrad, was appointed its commander. In 1960, Wehrmacht Major General, former head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Adolf Heusinger became the chairman of the NATO Permanent Military Committee. The same Heusinger who calmly gave orders for punitive expeditions and reprisals against the civilian population of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.

However, these are different times now. But, you must admit, historical facts- a stubborn thing. And it is necessary to remember them - evidence of the bloodiest war of the twentieth century!

Every year on May 9, Moscow salutes the Winners. Alive and dead. Majestic monuments and modest obelisks with red stars remind us of their exploits.

And in Myasny Bor there is a memorial in memory of the feat of the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army, which cannot be erased from History!

2002-2003

P. S. HIS MEAT BOR

In memory of N.A. Shashkova

Businessmen are different. Some love to shine in front of television cameras, others love to support “high-profile” projects, sanctified by the patronage of statesmen. Still others engage in charity work, receiving in return laureate badges of various awards - from literary to fence-building (the main thing is to hang a beautiful diploma in the office).

My longtime acquaintance, the general director of the BUR mining company, Leonid Ivanovich Kulikov, did not belong to any of the above categories. But if there was a need to support an interesting and necessary initiative, he helped. True, having first made sure that the money will go to a good cause, and not into the pocket of the initiator.

Therefore, in Kulikov’s office one could often meet writers and poets, officials, generals, and scientists. And I was not at all surprised when several years ago, on one hot June day, I found a tall, gray-haired old man in the uniform of a vice admiral at Leonid Ivanovich’s. He was talking animatedly, walking around the table. The star of the Hero of the Soviet Union swayed above the order bars in time with the movements.

Shashkov. Nikolai Alexandrovich,” the admiral extended his hand. “It’s good that you came.” “We are just discussing one important topic,” explained Leonid Ivanovich. “You, of course, have heard about the Second Shock Army?”

Lyuban operation of 1942?

You see!” exclaimed Shashkov. “He knows.” And he didn’t tell me, like this idiot (the name of one official was mentioned): Vlasov’s army.

Well, Vlasov is Vlasov, and the army is an army. In the end, she later broke the blockade of Leningrad and took part in the East Prussian operation.

Because of Vlasov, little was written about her, but we heard a lot about the heroism of the fighters. After all, he worked as a city reporter for a long time. I met different people.

I know, for example, that the brother of the famous BDT artist Vladislav Strzhelchik fought in the Second Shock. The mother of the writer Boris Almazov, Evgenia Vissarionovna, was the senior operating sister of an army field hospital in 1942. In Yakutia - God bless him for long years- lives unique person- Sergeant Mikhail Bondarev. He was drafted from Yakutia and spent the entire war as part of the Second Shock! In a rare case, she was born again three times. And the son of Eduard Bagritsky, war correspondent Vsevolod, died during the Lyuban operation.

Just like my father, Alexander Georgievich. “He was the head of a special department of the army,” Shashkov interrupted.

We talked for a long time that day. About heroes and traitors. Memory and unconsciousness. About the fact that the recently opened memorial to the fallen soldiers in Myasny Bor needs to be equipped, but there is no money. The surviving veterans are very old people. Businessmen are not interested in them, so they don’t try to help.

We’ll help, we’ll help,” Kulikov reassured Admiral every time.

We also talked about search engines who are absolutely disinterestedly engaged in a holy cause - searching for and burying the remains of fighters. About officials who give vague answers to all proposals to perpetuate the memory of the fallen.

It was firmly stuck in their heads: the Vlasov army,” Shashkov got excited. - When I was still an assistant to the USSR Minister of Defense, I spoke many times to the head of Glavpur (Main Political Directorate Soviet army and the Navy - author) - it is necessary to prepare and publish a normal history of the Second Shock. And this old wood grouse answered me: let’s see, let’s wait. We waited...

Listen. I have read some of your historical essays. Maybe you'll take up this. You see, it is necessary to briefly and clearly reflect the entire battle path. Young people will not read the Talmud. And she definitely needs to know this page of history.

What happens: they write and make films about Vlasov, this bastard, a traitor. And they forgot about the army that actually saved Leningrad!

Since then we began to meet quite often.

What was striking about Nikolai Alexandrovich was, first of all, his irrepressible energy and determination. He constantly shuttled between St. Petersburg and Moscow. And not in the "SV" carriage - at the wheel of his own "nine". He made his way into high offices - he persuaded, proved, signed the necessary papers. It seemed that he no longer needed anything in this life except to perpetuate the memory of the soldiers of the Second Shock. It was largely thanks to the efforts of Shashkov that the memorial appeared in Myasnoy Bor in the Novgorod region.

Many wondered: why does a respected and honored person need all this trouble? At such a respectable age, with such merits and, let us note in parentheses, connections, you can calmly rest on your laurels. And sometimes - decorate the presidium of some important forum with your ceremonial admiral's uniform.

But the fact of the matter is that Shashkov was not a “wedding general.” In the full sense of the word, a combat commander (it was his submarine that was ready to fire missiles at the Promised Land during the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1968), he felt personally responsible for returning from oblivion the names of his father’s comrades. With the help of the FSB, he installed a memorial plaque at the memorial. But how many more nameless heroes lie in the Novgorod land! And Shashkov continued to act.

In Kulikov’s office, which became our headquarters, Nikolai Alexandrovich prepared requests and letters, copied and sent out documents, and met with potential sponsors. Here we made clarifications to the manuscript of the story.

He came to this office on May 8, 2003, after a meeting with Valentina Ivanovna Matvienko, who then held the post of presidential plenipotentiary representative in the North-West, joyfully excited:

Valentina Ivanovna was more attentive to my proposals than she expected. Now things will move forward.

And indeed, it has moved. We were convinced of this a few months later, when we arrived on August 17 - the next anniversary of the opening of the memorial - in Myasnoy Bor.

Nikolai Alexandrovich told us what still needs to be done. And, knowing his ability to achieve his goal, I, Kulikov, and everyone involved in this work by the admiral had no doubt: so be it.

Throughout the fall, winter and spring, Shashkov was engaged in routine and, as he put it, bureaucratic work. On May 1, the phone rang in my apartment.

I just arrived from Moscow. Lots of interesting news about the memorial. As I said before, a film will be made about Second Impact. Vladimir Leonidovich Govorov (Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Chairman of the Pobeda Foundation - author) is actively promoting this idea. By the way, I brought you a letter from him thanking you for the story.

Yes. Remember when you scanned photos for me? So...

And we went deeper into discussion technical issues. In parting, Nikolai Alexandrovich reminded us: we will meet on May 9, in Myasnoy Bor. But fate decreed differently.

...On May 7, I stood in the large funeral hall of the crematorium and looked at the portrait of the admiral displayed in front of the closed coffin. The artificial light reflected dimly in the orders resting on scarlet cushions.

The night after our conversation, a fire broke out in the Shashkovs’ apartment. Nikolai Alexandrovich and his wife Valentina Petrovna died in the fire. The apartment itself was completely burned out.

...The volleys of farewell fireworks died down. The sailors removed the Navy flag from the coffin. Vice Admiral Shashkov passed away into eternity.

A man who fought all his life to preserve the names of fallen heroes in our history has passed away, leaving only a memory of himself. Like a true Patriot of the Motherland, a man of Honor and Duty.

How much this is, and not everyone has it...

June 2004

___________________________

Musa Jalil (senior political instructor Musa Mustafievich Dzhalilov) was executed in the terrible Nazi prison Moabit on August 25, 1944. Shortly before his death, the poet wrote the following lines:

I'm leaving this life

The world may forget me

But I'll leave the song

Which will live.

The homeland did not forget Musa Jalil: in 1956 - posthumously - he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the next year he was awarded the Lenin Prize. And today his poems are widely known in Russia.

After the war, one of the streets in Tallinn was named after Hero of the Soviet Union Evgeniy Aleksandrovich Nikonov. Now you won’t find a street with this name on the city map. In recent years, in Estonia, on whose territory the Nazis killed 125 thousand local residents, history has been carefully rewritten...

One of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (1897-1968) - later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the highest military order "Victory". After the war - Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since 1964, Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal K.A. Meretskov worked in the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

As an example of Sokolov’s “commander’s skill,” in his book “In the Service of the People,” Marshal Meretskov cites an excerpt from Army Commander Order N14 dated November 19, 1941:

“1. I abolish walking like the crawling of flies in the fall, and I order from now on in the army to walk like this: a military step is a yard, and that’s how you walk. Accelerated - one and a half, and keep pressing.

2. Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle they have lunch and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is in the dark, before dawn, and lunch is in the dark, in the evening. During the day you will be able to chew bread or crackers with tea - good, but not - and thank you for that, fortunately the day is not particularly long.

3. Remember to everyone - commanders, privates, old and young, that during the day you cannot march in columns larger than a company, and in general in war it is night to march, so then march.

4. Don’t be afraid of the cold, don’t dress up like Ryazan women, be brave and don’t succumb to the frost. Rub your ears and hands with snow."

“Why not Suvorov?” comments K.A. Meretskov. “But it is known that Suvorov, in addition to issuing catchy orders that penetrate the soldier’s soul, took care of the troops... Sokolov thought that it was all about a dashing piece of paper, and limited mainly to orders."

Of the 2,100 people of the “Netherlands” legion, 700 remained alive. As for the “Flanders” legion, its strength was reduced threefold in just a few days of fighting.

The war spares no one - neither the marshals nor their children. In January 1942, the son of the famous Soviet commander Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze - aviation lieutenant Timur Frunze. Posthumously, pilot T.M. Frunze was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Here is the full text of “The Volkhov Table,” written by Pavel Shubin in 1942:

Rarely, friends, do we meet,

But when it happened,

Let's remember what happened and drink, as usual,

How it happened in Rus'!

Let's drink to those who spent many weeks

Lying in frozen dugouts,

Fought on Ladoga, fought on Volkhov,

He didn't take a step back.

Let's drink to those who commanded the companies,

Who died in the snow

Who made their way to Leningrad through the swamps,

Breaking the enemy's throat.

They will be glorified forever in legends

Under a machine gun blizzard

Our bayonets are on the heights of Sinyavin,

Our regiments are near Mga.

Let the Leningrad family be with us

He sits next to the table.

Let us remember how Russian soldier strength

She drove the Germans for Tikhvin!

Let's stand up and clink glasses, standing we -

Brotherhood of fighting friends,

Let's drink to the courage of the fallen heroes,

Let's drink to the meeting of the living!

Around the same time, the traitor Vlasov, traveling around German headquarters, visited Riga, Pskov, and Gatchina. He spoke to the population with “patriotic” speeches. Hitler became enraged and ordered Vitia to be placed under house arrest: the 2nd Shock Strike was beating Wehrmacht units, and its former army commander was carrying all sorts of nonsense about victory in the rear of the suffering Army Group North. By the way, the Fuhrer ordered Vlasov to be executed if he allowed anything like that to happen again. It is clear how “highly” he valued the traitor.

By May 14, 1945, 231,611 Germans with all their weapons, including 436 tanks, 1,722 guns, and 136 aircraft, surrendered to the troops of the Leningrad Front in Courland.

All those who surrendered were guaranteed life, as well as the preservation of personal property.

This summer, search groups, who had a little money from the Ministry of Defense for their search, were brought for a week to raise and bury a grandfather who fought in the 42nd in the 2nd Shock. He is 86 years old (God bless him) and is a former junior military technician of the 1102nd Infantry Regiment, who miraculously survived. At the funeral he began to speak his mind:

""" If Vlasov had not appeared in April 1942, we would all have died here. Our group took the regiment's banner out of the encirclement, several people from the regiment headquarters left us here, if not for Vlasov, Khozin would have rotted us here (general Khozin commanded the Leningrad Front and temporarily the 2nd Shock) We stood here because Vlasov was with us all spring, Vlasov every day, either in the artillery regiment, then with us, then with the anti-aircraft gunners - always with us, if it weren’t for the general. if we would have given up back in May"""
The cameras were immediately turned off, the organizers began to make excuses that the old man was in captivity, etc. And the grandfather went wild, little puny, almost no hair, and began to scald: “we ate bark before Vlasov, and drank water from the swamp, we were animals, our 327th division was CROSSED OUT from the Leningrad Front’s food certificates (Khrushchev later restored the Voronezh 327th Yu).

The death of the 1102nd Infantry Regiment, the feat of these Voronezh guys, is not noted anywhere. They died (the regiment died, unlike other units that surrendered) in battle. In all materials of TsAMO, the 1102nd regiment died a heroic death. It is not in the reports of the Volkhov Front, it is not in the reports of the Leningrad Front, there is no 1102nd infantry regiment yet, there are no fighters of it. The 1102nd regiment is not there.

On March 9, A. Vlasov flew to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front, on 03/10/42 he was already at CP 2 Ud.A in Ogoreli, and on 03/12/42 he led the battle to capture the ill-fated Krasnaya Gorka, which was taken by the 327th Infantry Division along with the 259th Infantry Division, 46th Infantry Division, 22 and 53 OBR 03/14/42. Krasnaya Gorka is almost the farthest section of the ring; staff commanders almost never came there, limiting themselves to control through an intermediate point in Ozerye, where there was a small task force of officers, medical battalions, a food warehouse, and the place was not marshy. Krasnaya Gorka had no significance, but it was like a thorn. And then a whole lieutenant general appeared with her and immediately established control and interaction between the formations, since they often beat each other, especially at night. Then the Germans blocked the corridor at Myasnoy Bor for the first time on March 16, 1942. The blame for this lies entirely with the commanders of 59 and 52 A (Galanin and Yakovlev) and the front commander Meretskov. He then personally led the clearing of the corridor, sending 376 Rifle Division there and pouring in 3,000 non-Russian reinforcements 2 days before. Those who came under bombing for the first time, some died (many), some fled without breaking through the corridor. One regiment commander, Hatemkin (as he was called - both Kotenkin and Kotenochkin) shot himself after that. Meretskov was confused, he clearly speaks about this in his memoirs. The main action to break through the ring was carried out by 2 Ud.A itself from the inside. Who do you think led these efforts? That's right, A. Vlasov, personally commanding in the area east of Novaya Keresti units of the 58th Specialized Brigade and 7th Guards Tank Brigade, as well as courses for junior lieutenants.

During his stay in the 2nd Ud.A from March 9 to June 25, 1942, Lieutenant General A. Vlasov did everything he could, as a military man and as a person, including while surrounded at Myasny Bor. In a situation where, instead of food and ammunition, fresh newspapers are dumped into the cauldron, it is unlikely that anyone would have done more. When, at the moment of the greatest concentration of encirclement (by the way, most of those who had time, dressed in clean clothes, going into the last battle, fortunately they managed to bring in supplies of new underwear and summer uniforms before the complete encirclement) before the breakthrough on the night of 06.25.42 west of the Polist River in 20 minutes Before the appointed hour, 2 regiments of guards mortars (28 and 30 Guards Minp) deliver a concentrated attack directly on them with four regimental salvoes, there is no time for sentimentality. Nevertheless, even on the night of June 25, 1942, he made an attempt to exit the ring towards Lavrentiy Palych’s bullet, trying to refuse the task assigned to him, but no luck...

Three times loyal general. The last secret Andrey Vlasov.

http://www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/10243/34/

So - autumn 1941. The Germans attack Kyiv. However, they cannot take the city. The defense has been greatly strengthened. And it is headed by a forty-year-old Major General of the Red Army, commander of the 37th Army, Andrei Vlasov. A legendary figure in the army. He has gone all the way - from private to general. He went through the civil war, graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod Theological Seminary, and studied at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. Friend of Mikhail Blucher. Just before the war, Andrei Vlasov, then still a colonel, was sent to China as military advisers to Chai-kan-shi. He received the Order of the Golden Dragon and a gold watch as a reward, which aroused the envy of all the generals of the Red Army. However, Vlasov was not happy for long. Upon returning home, at the Alma-Ata customs, the order itself, as well as other generous gifts from Generalissimo Chai-kan-shi, were confiscated by the NKVD...

Even Soviet historians were forced to admit that the Germans “got punched in the face for the first time,” precisely from the mechanized corps of General Vlasov.

This has never happened in the history of the Red Army, possessing only 15 tanks, General Vlasov stopped Walter Model’s tank army in the Moscow suburb of Solnechegorsk, and pushed back the Germans, who were already preparing for the parade on Moscow’s Red Square, 100 kilometers away, liberating three cities.. There was something to earn him the nickname “Savior of Moscow.” After the battle of Moscow, the general was appointed deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

Andrei Vlasov understood that he was flying to his death. As a person who had gone through the crucible of this war near Kiev and Moscow, he knew that the army was doomed, and no miracle would save it. Even if this miracle is himself - General Andrei Vlasov, the savior of Moscow.

Troops 59 A already from 12/29/41 fought to break through enemy fortifications on the river. Volkhov, suffering heavy losses in the zone from Lezno - Vodosje to Sosninskaya Pristan.
The commissioning of 2 Ud.A only complemented the almost continuous attacks of formations 52 and 59 A, the battles took place on January 7 and 8.
The target of the offensive of 2 Ud.A on January 27 was not Lyuban, but the city of Tosno; on 10-12.02.42 a joint offensive of 2 Ud.A from the south, 55 A from the north, 54 A from the east, 4 and 59 A from southeast in the direction of Tosno, but it did not happen for a number of reasons; only at the end of the 3rd decade of February did the redirection of attacks from 2 Ud.A to Lyuban take shape, in order to at least cut off the Germans in the Chudovsky Cauldron; 54 A also hit there in March.
59 A did not have any instructions to connect with 4 A, it was breaking through the German defense to connect with 2 Ud.A, advancing from the southwest both towards Lyuban and towards Chudovo; 59 A, putting more than 60% of its initial l / s, was withdrawn to the south into the breakthrough zone, and its strip north of Gruzino was occupied by 4 A; to unite with 4 Moreover, there was no need due to the fact that both armies had the closest connection in the elbow connection in the Gruzino region.
The Germans blocked the corridor at Myasny Bor for the first time not on 03/16/42; the corridor was restored only on March 28, 1942 with a narrow thread of 2 km.
General A. Vlasov flew to 2 Ud.A already on 03/10/42, by 03/12/42 he was already in the Krasnaya Gorka area, which, under his leadership, on 03/14/42 units of 2 Ud.A were able to take; from 03/20/42 he was transferred to lead the breakthrough of the intercepted corridor from inside the boiler, which he did - the corridor was broken through from the inside, not without help, of course, from the outside.
On May 13, 1942, not only I. Zuev flew to Malaya Vishera - how can one imagine the flight of only one member of the Military Council without the army commander to report to the front commander M. Khozin; All three flew out for the report - Vlasov, Zuev, Vinogradov (NS Army); there was no talk of any hopelessness in Vlasov’s report; There, a counter-offensive plan was approved 2 Ud. and 59 And towards each other by cutting off the German “finger” hanging over the corridor - in TsAMO there are maps, sweepingly signed by Vlasov’s hand (approximately as in the photo) with an offensive plan and dated around 05/13/42; the plan for a joint offensive appeared because before that the attempt of the 59th A alone to break through the “finger” from the outside with the forces of the Arkhangelsk fresh 2nd Infantry Division towards its own 24th Guards, 259th and 267th Infantry Division inside ended in complete failure, while the 2nd Infantry Division lost on the battlefield in 14 days, 80% of their fighters were surrounded and barely escaped with the remnants.
The withdrawal of troops did not begin on 05/23/42, and the headquarters near the village of Ogoreli was moved by fire due to the news of the appearance of the Germans in the village of Dubovik in the rear of our troops (and this was just reconnaissance), the troops behind the headquarters panicked, but quickly recovered; the withdrawal was not massive, but planned, this is a more precise word, since they retreated along lines that had been previously developed and approved and prepared in detail.
The first time the corridor was breached was on 06/19/42, it lasted until the evening of 06/22/42, during which time about 14,000 people came out.
On the night of June 25, 1942, a decisive assault on the city was planned. positions, before this our units received a massive attack in their concentrated battle formations at 22.40-22.55 by several regimental salvoes of two regiments of our RS (28 Guards and 30 Guards Minp); from 23.30 the units began to break through, about 7,000 people came out; The fighting inside the ring continued actively for another 2 days.

The total number of our prisoners from units 2 Ud.A in the cauldron ranged from 23,000 to 33,000 people. together with several parts 52 and 59 A; About 7,000 people died in the cauldron and during a breakthrough from inside.
http://www.soldat.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=23515

Note to the head of the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front

To Senior Major of State Security Comrade MELNIKOV

In accordance with the tasks set by you for the period of your business trip in the 59th Army from June 21 to June 28, 1942, I report:

By the end of the day on June 21, 1942, units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area and formed a corridor along the narrow-gauge railway. approximately 700–800 meters wide.

In order to hold the corridor, units of the 59th Army turned their front to the south and north and occupied combat areas parallel to the narrow-gauge railway.

A group of troops covering the corridor from the north with its left flank, and a group covering the corridor from the south with its right flank, bordered the pore. Gain weight...

By the time units of the 59th Army reached the river. It turned out that the message from Shtarm-2 about the allegedly occupied lines of the 2nd Shock Army along the river. To gain weight were unfaithful. (Base: report of the commander of the 24th Rifle Brigade)

Thus, there was no ulnar connection between units of the 59th Army and the 2nd Shock Army. This connection did not exist subsequently.

The resulting corridor on the night from 21 to 22.06. Food products were delivered to the 2nd Shock Army by people and on horses.

From 21.06. and until recently, the corridor was under fire from enemy mortar and artillery fire; at times, individual machine gunners and machine gunners infiltrated into it.

On the night of June 21-22, 1942, units of the 2nd Shock Army advanced towards units of the 59th Army, approximately in the corridor with forces: the first echelon of the 46th Division, the second echelon of the 57th and 25th Brigades. Having reached the junction with units of the 59th Army, these formations went through the corridor to the rear of the 59th Army.

In total, on the day of June 22, 1942, 6,018 wounded people and about 1,000 people left the 2nd Shock Army. healthy soldiers and commanders. Both among the wounded and among the healthy there were people from most of the formations of the 2nd Shock Army.

From 06/22/42 to 06/25/42 no one left the 2nd UA. During this period, the corridor remained on the western bank of the river. Gain weight. The enemy fired strong mortar and artillery fire. fire. In the corridor itself there was also infiltration of machine gunners. Thus, the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army was possible with battle.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, a detachment under the overall command of Colonel KORKIN, formed from Red Army soldiers and commanders of the 2nd Shock Army who emerged from encirclement on June 22, 1942, was sent to reinforce units of the 59th Army and secure the corridor. measures taken to resist the enemy in the corridor and on the western bank of the river. The plumpness was broken. Units of the 2nd UA moved in a common flow from approximately 2.00 on June 25, 1942.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids during 06/25/42, the flow of people leaving the 2nd UA was stopped at 8.00. On this day, approximately 6,000 people came out. (according to the calculations of the counter standing at the exit), 1,600 of them were sent to hospitals.

From surveys of commanders, Red Army soldiers and operational personnel of the Special Divisions of the formations, it is obvious that the leading commanders of units and formations of the 2nd UA, when organizing the withdrawal of units from encirclement, did not count on leaving in battle, as evidenced by the following facts.

Detective officer 1st department OO NKVD front lieutenant state. security comrade ISAEV was in the 2nd Shock Army. In a report addressed to me, he writes:

“On June 22, it was announced in hospitals and units that those who wish could go to Myasnoy Bor. Groups of 100–200 soldiers and commanders, lightly wounded, moved to M. Bor without orientation, without signs and without group leaders, ending up on the front line of the enemy’s defense and captured by the Germans. Before my eyes, a group of 50 people wandered into the Germans and were captured. Another group of 150 people walked towards the German front line of defense, and only with the intervention of a group of the Special Department of 92 pages div. switching to the enemy's side was prevented.

At 20 o'clock on June 24, by order of the division's logistics chief, Major BEGUNA, the entire division's personnel, about 300 people, set off along the clearing of the central communication line to M. Bor. Along the route, I observed the movement of similar columns from other brigades and divisions, numbering up to 3,000 people.

The column, having passed from the Drovyanoe Pole clearing up to 3 km, was met by a strong barrage of machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. enemy fire, after which the command was given to move back to a distance of 50 meters. When retreating back, there was mass panic and groups fleeing through the forest. We split into small groups and scattered through the forest, not knowing what to do next. Each person or small group solved their further task independently. There was no single leadership for the entire column.

Group 92 page div. 100 people decided to go the other way, along the narrow-gauge railway. As a result, we passed through a barrage of fire to Myasnoy Bor with some losses.”

The detective officer of the 25th Infantry Brigade, political instructor SHCHERBAKOV, writes in his report:

“June 24 this year. From early morning, a barrier detachment was organized, which detained all passing military personnel capable of carrying weapons. Together with the remnants of units and subunits, the brigades were divided into three companies. In each company, an operative, an employee of the NKVD OO, was assigned for maintenance.

When reaching the starting line, the command did not take into account the fact that the first and second companies had not yet moved to the starting line.

Having pushed the third company forward, we placed it under heavy enemy mortar fire.

The company command was confused and could not provide leadership to the company. The company, having reached the flooring under enemy mortar fire, scattered in different directions.

The group moved to the right side of the flooring, where there were detective officer KOROLKOV, platoon commander - ml. Lieutenant KU-ZOVLEV, several soldiers of the OO platoon and other units of the brigade, came across enemy bunkers and lay down under enemy mortar fire. The group consisted of only 18–20 people.

The group could not attack the enemy in such numbers, so the platoon commander KUZOVLEV suggested returning to the starting line, joining other units and leaving on the left side of the narrow-gauge railway, where enemy fire was much weaker.

Concentrating on the edge of the forest, the head of the OO comrade. PLAKHAT-NIK found Major KONONOV from the 59th Infantry Brigade, joined his group with his people, with whom they moved to the narrow-gauge railway and left together with the 59th Rifle Brigade.”

Operative officer of the 6th Guard. mortar division, state security lieutenant Comrade LUKASHEVICH writes about the 2nd division:

- All brigade personnel, both privates and command staff, were informed that the exit would begin by assault at exactly 23.00 on June 24, 1942 from the starting line of the river. Gain weight. The first echelon was the 3rd battalion, the second echelon was the second battalion. No one from the brigade command, service chiefs, or battalion commands came out of the encirclement due to the delay at the command post. Having broken away from the main body of the brigade and, obviously, starting to move in a small group, one must assume that they died along the way.

An operative of the reserve OO of the front, Captain GORNOSTAYEV, working at the concentration point of the 2nd Shock Army, had a conversation with those who had escaped the encirclement, about which he writes:

“Through our workers, commanders and soldiers who came out, it is established that all units and formations were given a specific task about the order and interaction of entering the formation in battle. However, during this operation, a disaster occurred, small units were confused, and instead of a fist, there were small groups and even individuals. The commanders, for the same reasons, could not control the battle. This happened as a result of heavy enemy fire.

There is no way to establish the actual position of all the parts, because no one knows. They say that there is no food, many groups are rushing from place to place, and no one will bother to organize all these groups and fight to connect.

This is how the situation in the 2nd Shock Army that developed at the time of its exit and when it left the encirclement is briefly characterized.

It was known that the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to leave on the morning of June 25, but their exit did not take place.

From conversations with Deputy Head of the NKVD OO of the 2nd Shock Army Art. State Security Lieutenant Comrade GORBOV, with the soldiers accompanying the Military Council of the Army, with the driver of the Member of the Military Council, comrade. ZUEVA, from Beginning. chemical services of the Army, the Prosecutor of the Army and other persons, to one degree or another, aware of the attempt to escape from the encirclement of the Military Council, the following is obvious:

The Military Council came out with security measures in front and from the rear. Having encountered enemy fire resistance on the river. Plump, head guard under the command of Deputy. The head of the 2nd Shock Army, Comrade GORBOV, took the lead and went to the exit, while the Military Council and rear guards remained on the western bank of the river. Gain weight.

This fact is indicative in the sense that even when the Military Council left, there was no organization of the battle and control of the troops was lost.

Persons who went out individually and in small groups after June 25 of this year know nothing about the fate of the Military Council.

To summarize, it should be concluded that the organization of the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army suffered from serious shortcomings. On the one hand, due to the lack of interaction between the 59th and 2nd Shock armies to secure the corridor, which to a large extent depended on the leadership of the Front headquarters, on the other hand, due to confusion and loss of control of the troops of the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army and the headquarters of the formations when leaving the encirclement.

As of June 30, 1942, 4,113 healthy soldiers and commanders were counted at the concentration point, among them there were persons who came from encirclement under very strange circumstances, for example: on June 27, 1942, one Red Army soldier came out and said that he lay in the crater and is now returning. When he was offered food, he refused, declaring that he was full. The route to the exit was described by a route that was unusual for everyone.

It is possible that German intelligence used the moment of leaving the encirclement of the 2nd UA to send in converted Red Army soldiers and commanders who had previously been captured by them.

From a conversation with Deputy the head of the PA Army - Comrade GORBOV, I know that in the 2nd UA there were facts of group betrayal, especially among Chernigov residents. Comrade GORBOV in the presence of the Head. OO 59th Army Comrade NIKITIN said that 240 people from Chernigov betrayed their Motherland.

In the first days of June, in the 2nd UA there was an extraordinary betrayal of the Motherland on the part of the assistant. the head of the encryption department of the Army headquarters - MALYUK and an attempt to betray the Motherland of two more employees of the encryption department.

All these circumstances suggest the need for a thorough check of all personnel of the 2nd UA by strengthening security measures.

Beginning 1 branch of the NKVD organization

Captain of State Security - KOLESNIKOV.

Top secret
DEPUTY People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to Commissar of State Security 1st Rank Comrade ABAKUMOV

REPORT

About the disruption of the military operation

On the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army

From the enemy environment
According to agent data, interviews with commanders and soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army who emerged from encirclement, and personal visits to the site during combat operations of units and formations of the 2nd, 52nd and 59th armies, it was established:

The enemy managed to encircle the 2nd Shock Army consisting of the 22, 23, 25, 53, 57, 59th Rifle Brigades and 19, 46. 93, 259, 267, 327, 282 and 305th Rifle Divisions only because the criminally negligent attitude of the front commander, Lieutenant General Khozin, who did not ensure the implementation of the Headquarters directive on the timely withdrawal of army troops from Lyuban and the organization of military operations in the Spasskaya Polist area.

Having taken command of the front, Khozin from the village area. Olkhovki and the Gazhi Sopki swamps brought the 4th, 24th and 378th rifle divisions into front reserve.

The enemy, taking advantage of this, built a narrow-gauge railway through the forest to the west of Spasskaya Polist and freely began to accumulate troops to attack the communications of the 2nd Shock Army Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest.

The front command did not strengthen the defense of communications of the 2nd Shock Army. The northern and southern roads of the 2nd Shock Army were covered by the weak 65th and 372nd Rifle Divisions, stretched out in a line without sufficient firepower on insufficiently prepared defensive lines.

The 372nd Rifle Division by this time occupied a defense sector with a combat strength of 2,796 people, stretching 12 km from the village of Mostki to mark 39.0, which is 2 km north of the narrow-gauge railway.

The 65th Red Banner Rifle Division occupied a 14 km long defense sector with a combat strength of 3,708 people, stretching from the corner of the forest of the southern clearing of the flour mill to the barn 1 km from the village of Krutik.

The commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, hastily approved the raw diagram of the division's defensive structures, presented by the commander of the 372nd Infantry Division, Colonel Sorokin; the defense headquarters did not check it.

As a result, of the 11 bunkers built by the 8th company of the 3rd regiment of the same division, seven turned out to be unusable.

The front commander Khozin and the front chief of staff, Major General Stelmakh, knew that the enemy was concentrating troops against this division and that they would not provide defense of the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, but they did not take measures to strengthen the defense of these sectors, having reserves at their disposal.

On May 30, the enemy, after artillery and air preparation with the help of tanks, launched an attack on the right flank of the 311th Regiment of the 65th Infantry Division.

The 2, 7 and 8 companies of this regiment, having lost 100 soldiers and four tanks, retreated.

To restore the situation, a company of machine gunners was sent out, which, having suffered losses, withdrew.

The Military Council of the 52nd Army threw its last reserves into battle - the 54th Guards Rifle Regiment with 370 reinforcements. The reinforcements were introduced into battle on the move, uncoupled, and at the first contact with the enemy they fled and were stopped by barrage detachments of special departments.

The Germans, having pushed back units of the 65th Division, came close to the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky and cut off the 305th Infantry Division with their left flank.

At the same time, the enemy, advancing in the sector of the 1236th Infantry Regiment of the 372nd Infantry Division, broke through the weak defenses, dismembered the second echelon of the reserve 191st Infantry Division, reached the narrow-gauge railway in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bmark 40.5 and linked up with the advancing units from South.

The commander of the 191st Rifle Division repeatedly raised the question with the commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, about the need and advisability of withdrawing the 191st Rifle Division to Myasny Bor in order to create a strong defense along the northern road.

Korovnikov did not take any measures, and the 191st Rifle Division, inactive and not erecting defensive structures, remained standing in the swamp.

Front commander Khozin and commander of the 59th Army Korovnikov, being aware of the concentration of the enemy, still believed that the defense of the 372nd division had been broken through by a small group of machine gunners, and, therefore, reserves were not brought into battle, which enabled the enemy to cut off the 2nd shock army.

Only on June 1, 1942, the 165th Rifle Division was brought into battle without artillery support, which, having lost 50 percent of its soldiers and commanders, did not improve the situation.

Instead of organizing the battle, Khozin withdrew the division from the battle and transferred it to another sector, replacing it with the 374th Infantry Division, which moved back somewhat at the time of the change of units of the 165th Infantry Division.

The available forces were not brought into battle in a timely manner; on the contrary, Khozin suspended the offensive and began moving division commanders:

He removed the commander of the 165th Infantry Division, Colonel Solenov, and appointed Colonel Morozov as the division commander, releasing him from the post of commander of the 58th Infantry Brigade.

Instead of the commander of the 58th Infantry Brigade, the commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion, Major Gusak, was appointed.

The chief of staff of the division, Major Nazarov, was also removed and Major Dzyuba was appointed in his place; at the same time, the commissar of the 165th Infantry Division, senior battalion commissar Ilish, was also removed.

In the 372nd Rifle Division, the division commander, Colonel Sorokin, was removed and Colonel Sinegubko was appointed in his place.

The regrouping of troops and the replacement of commanders dragged on until June 10. During this time, the enemy managed to create bunkers and strengthen the defense.

By the time it was encircled by the enemy, the 2nd Shock Army found itself in an extremely difficult situation; the divisions numbered from two to three thousand soldiers, exhausted due to malnutrition and overworked by continuous battles.

From 12.VI. to 18.VI. 1942, soldiers and commanders were given 400 g of horse meat and 100 g of crackers, on subsequent days they were given from 10 g to 50 g of crackers, on some days the fighters received no food at all; which increased the number of exhausted fighters, and deaths from starvation appeared.

Deputy beginning The political department of the 46th division, Zubov, detained a soldier of the 57th rifle brigade, Afinogenov, who was cutting a piece of meat from the corpse of a killed Red Army soldier for food. Having been detained, Afinogenov died of exhaustion on the way.

Food and ammunition in the army ran out, they were transported by air due to white nights and the loss of the landing site near the village. Finev Meadow was essentially impossible. Due to the negligence of the army's logistics chief, Colonel Kresik, the ammunition and food dropped by planes into the army were not fully collected.
Total Sent to the Army Collected by the Army 7.62mm rounds 1,027,820 682,708 76mm rounds 2,222 1,416 14.5mm rounds 1,792 Not received 37mm anti-aircraft rounds 1,590 570 122mm rounds 288 136

The position of the 2nd Shock Army became extremely complicated after the enemy broke through the defense line of the 327th Division in the Finev Lug area.

The command of the 2nd Army - Lieutenant General Vlasov and the division commander, Major General Antyufeev - did not organize the defense of the swamp west of Finev Lug, which the enemy took advantage of, entering the division's flank.

The retreat of the 327th division led to panic, the army commander, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was confused, did not take decisive measures to detain the enemy, who advanced to Novaya Keresti and subjected the rear of the army to artillery fire, cut off the 19th Guards and 305th from the main forces of the army rifle divisions.

Units of the 92nd Division found themselves in a similar situation, where, with an attack from Olkhovka by two infantry regiments with 20 tanks, the Germans, with the support of aviation, captured the lines occupied by this division.

The commander of the 92nd Rifle Division, Colonel Zhiltsov, showed confusion and lost control at the very beginning of the battle for Olkhovka.

The withdrawal of our troops along the Kerest River line significantly worsened the entire position of the army. By this time, the enemy artillery had already begun to sweep the entire depth of the 2nd Army with fire.

The ring around the army closed. The enemy, having crossed the Kerest River, entered the flank, penetrated our battle formations and launched an attack on the army command post in the Drovyanoye Pole area.

The army command post turned out to be unprotected; a special department company of 150 people was brought into battle, which pushed back the enemy and fought with him for 24 hours - June 23. The military council and army headquarters were forced to change their location, destroying communications facilities and, essentially, losing control of the troops. The commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, and the chief of staff, Vinogradov, showed confusion, did not lead the battle, and subsequently lost all control of the troops.

This was used by the enemy, who freely penetrated into the rear of our troops and caused panic.

On June 24, Vlasov decides to withdraw the army headquarters and rear institutions in marching order. The entire column was a peaceful crowd with disorderly movement, unmasked and noisy.

The enemy subjected the marching column to artillery and mortar fire. The Military Council of the 2nd Army with a group of commanders lay down and did not emerge from the encirclement. The commanders heading for the exit safely arrived at the location of the 59th Army. In just two days, June 22 and 23, 13,018 people emerged from encirclement, of which 7,000 were wounded.

The subsequent escape from the encirclement of the enemy by the 2nd Army soldiers took place in separate small groups.

It has been established that Vlasov, Vinogradov and other senior officials of the army headquarters fled in panic, withdrew from the leadership of combat operations and did not announce their location, they kept it under wraps.

The military council of the army, in particular in the persons of Zuev and Lebedev, showed complacency and did not stop the panicky actions of Vlasov and Vinogradov, broke away from them, this increased the confusion in the troops.

The head of the special department of the army, state security major Shashkov, did not take decisive measures in a timely manner to restore order and prevent betrayal at the army headquarters itself:

On June 2, 1942, during the most intense combat period, he betrayed his Motherland - he went over to the enemy’s side with encrypted documents - pom. beginning 8th Department of the Army Headquarters, 2nd Rank Quartermaster Technician Semyon Ivanovich Malyuk, who gave the enemy the location of the 2nd Shock Army units and the location of the army command post. There have been cases of voluntary surrender to the enemy by some unstable military personnel.

On July 10, 1942, German intelligence agents Nabokov and Kadyrov, who we arrested, testified that during the interrogation of captured servicemen of the 2nd Shock Army, the following were present in the German intelligence agencies: the commander of the 25th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Sheludko, the assistant chief of the army's operational department, Major Verstkin, and quartermaster 1st rank. Zhukovsky, deputy commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Colonel Goryunov, and a number of others who betrayed the command and political composition of the army to the German authorities.

Having taken command of the Volkhov Front, Army General Comrade. Meretskov led a group of troops of the 59th Army to join forces with the 2nd Shock Army. From 21 to 22 June this year. units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area and formed a corridor 800 m wide.

To hold the corridor, army units turned to the south and north and occupied combat areas along the narrow-gauge railway.

By the time units of the 59th Army reached the Polnet River, it became clear that the command of the 2nd Shock Army, represented by Chief of Staff Vinogradov, had misinformed the front and had not occupied defensive lines on the western bank of the Polnet River. Thus, there was no ulnar connection between the armies.

On June 22, a significant amount of food was delivered to the resulting corridor for units of the 2nd Shock Army by people and on horseback. The command of the 2nd Shock Army, organizing the exit of units from the encirclement, did not count on leaving in battle, did not take measures to strengthen and expand the main communications at Spasskaya Polist and did not hold the gates.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids and shelling of ground troops on a narrow section of the front, exit for units of the 2nd Shock Army became difficult.

Confusion and loss of control of the battle on the part of the command of the 2nd Shock Army completely aggravated the situation.

The enemy took advantage of this and closed the corridor.

Subsequently, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was completely at a loss, and the chief of staff of the army, Major General Vinogradov, took the initiative into his own hands.

He kept his latest plan a secret and didn’t tell anyone about it. Vlasov was indifferent to this.

Both Vinogradov and Vlasov did not escape the encirclement. According to the chief of communications of the 2nd Shock Army, Major General Afanasyev, who was delivered on July 11 on a U-2 plane from behind enemy lines, they walked through the forest in the Oredezhsky region towards Staraya Russa.

The whereabouts of members of the military council Zuev and Lebedev are unknown.

The head of the special department of the NKVD of the 2nd Shock Army, State Security Major Shashkov, was wounded and shot himself.

We continue to search for the military council of the 2nd Shock Army by sending agents behind enemy lines and partisan detachments.

Head of the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front Senior Major of State Security MELNIKOV

REFERENCE

on the situation of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front for the period JANUARY - JULY 1942

Army Commander - Major General VLASOV
Member of the Military Council - divisional commissar ZUEV
Chief of Army Staff - Colonel VINOGRADOV
Beginning Special Department of the Army - State Major. safety checkers

In January 1942, the 2nd Shock Army was tasked with breaking through the enemy’s defense line in the Spasskaya Polist - Myasnoy Bor sector, with the task of pushing the enemy to the north-west, jointly with the 54th Army, capturing the Lyuban station, cutting the Oktyabrskaya railway , completing its operation by participating in the general defeat of the enemy’s Chudov group by the Volkhov Front.
Fulfilling the assigned task, the 2nd Shock Army on January 20–22 of this year. broke through the enemy's defense front in an area of ​​8–10 km indicated to her, brought all units of the army into the breakthrough, and for 2 months in persistent bloody battles with the enemy, she advanced to Lyuban, bypassing Lyuban from the southwest.
The indecisive actions of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, which was marching to join the 2nd Shock Army from the northeast, extremely slowed down its advance. By the end of February, the offensive impulse of the 2nd Shock Army ran out of steam and the advance stopped in the area of ​​Krasnaya Gorka, southwest of Lyuban.
The 2nd Shock Army, pushing back the enemy, drove into its defenses in a wedge stretching 60–70 km through wooded and swampy terrain.
Despite repeated attempts to expand the initial breakthrough line, which is a kind of corridor, no success was achieved...
March 20–21 this year the enemy managed to cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, closing the corridor, with the intention of tightening the ring of encirclement and complete destruction.
Through the efforts of the 2nd Shock Army, units of the 52nd and 59th armies, the corridor was opened on March 28th.
May 25 this year Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave the order from June 1 to begin the withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army to the southeast, i.e. in the opposite direction through the corridor.
On June 2, the enemy closed the corridor for the second time, having carried out a complete encirclement of the army. From that time on, the army began to be supplied with ammunition and food by air.
On June 21, in a narrow area 1–2 km wide in the same corridor, the enemy’s front line was broken through for the second time and the organized withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army began.
June 25 this year the enemy managed to close the corridor for the third time and stop leaving our units. From that time on, the enemy forced us to stop supplying the army with air due to the large loss of our aircraft.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 21 this year. ordered units of the 2nd Shock Army, retreating from the northwest to the southeast, firmly covering themselves at the Olkhovka-Lake Tigoda line from the west, striking the main forces of the army from the west and simultaneously striking the 59th Army from the east to destroy the enemy in the Priyutino-Spasskaya salient Polish...
Commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General KHOZIN hesitated to carry out the order from Headquarters, citing the impossibility of moving equipment off-road and the need to build new roads. By the beginning of June this year. units did not begin to withdraw, but to the General Staff of the Red Army, signed by KHOZIN and the beginning. Staff of the STELMAKH front sent a report about the beginning of the withdrawal of army units. As it was later established, KHOZIN and STELMAKH deceived the General Staff, by this time the 2nd Shock Army was just beginning to pull back the rear of its formations.
The 59th Army acted very indecisively, launched several unsuccessful attacks and did not complete the tasks set by Headquarters.
Thus, by June 21 of this year. formations of the 2nd Shock Army in the amount of 8 rifle divisions and 6 rifle brigades (35-37 thousand people), with three regiments of the RGK 100 guns, as well as about 1000 vehicles, concentrated in an area several kilometers south of N. Kerest on an area of ​​6x6 km.
According to data available from the General Staff as of July 1 of this year, 9,600 people with personal weapons left the units of the 2nd Shock Army, including 32 employees of division headquarters and army headquarters. According to unverified data, the head of the Special Barma came out.
According to data sent to the General Staff by an officer of the General Staff, Army Commander VLASOV and member of the Military Council ZUEV on 06.27. They reached the western bank of the Polist River, guarded by 4 machine gunners, ran into the enemy and scattered under his fire; supposedly no one else saw them.
Chief of Staff STELMAKH 25.06. on HF reported that VLASOV and ZUEV reached the western bank of the Polist River. The withdrawal of troops was controlled from the destroyed tank. Further fate theirs is unknown.
According to the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front on June 26 of this year, by the end of the day 14 thousand people had left the units of the 2nd Shock Army. There is no information about the actual position of army units and formations at the front headquarters.
According to the commissar of the separate communications battalion PESCOV, Army Commander VLASOV and his headquarters commanders were moving towards the exit in the 2nd echelon; the group led by VLASOV came under artillery and mortar fire. VLASOV ordered to destroy all radio stations by burning, which led to the loss of command and control of the troops.
According to the head of the Special Department of the Front, as of June 17 The situation of the army units was extremely difficult; there were numerous cases of exhaustion of soldiers, illnesses from hunger, and an urgent need for ammunition. By this time, according to the General Staff, passenger planes daily supplied air to army units with 7–8 tons of food with a requirement of 17 tons, 1900–2000 shells with a minimum requirement of 40,000, 300,000 rounds, a total of 5 rounds per person.
It should be noted that, according to the latest data received from the General Staff on June 29. this year, a group of military personnel from units of the 2nd Shock Army entered the sector of the 59th Army through enemy rear lines into the area Mikhaleva, with absolutely no losses. Those who came out claim that in this area the enemy forces are few in number, while the passage corridor, now tightened by a strong enemy group and targeted by dozens of batteries of mortars and artillery, with daily intensified air strikes, is today almost inaccessible for the breakthrough of the 2nd Shock Army from the west, as well as the 59th Army from the east.

It is characteristic that the areas through which 40 servicemen leaving the 2nd Shock Army passed were precisely indicated by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army, but neither the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army nor the Military Council The Volkhov Front did not ensure the implementation of the Headquarters directive.

Creation

On October 24, 1941, Directive No. 004097 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was adopted, according to which the commander of the Volga and Oryol military districts was ordered to form the 26th reserve army. For this purpose, seven rifle divisions from these districts were transferred to its composition: 327th, 329th, 331st, 338th, 340th, 344th and 354th. Lieutenant General G. G. Sokolov was appointed commander of the newly created army, and Major General V. A. Vizzhilin was appointed chief of staff. The Soviet command initially intended to use it for, transferring it to the Voskresensk area. However, only a few divisions were sent to the front, which is why by mid-December 1941 only one rifle division and seven rifle brigades remained in its composition. On December 18, 1941, it was reassigned to the Volkhov Front, its headquarters was relocated from Kolomna to the village of Falkovo, Novgorod region. On December 25, 1941, the army was transformed into the 2nd shock. From that day on, she was considered part of the active army.

Lyuban operation

The Lyuban offensive operation was the first military operation in which the 2nd Shock Army took part. By the beginning of 1942, it had not completed the deployment of combat formations, supply lines were not established, and personnel experienced an acute shortage of weapons, transport, communications, fodder and food. However, the command set before it the task of attacking from the Volkhov River with the further development of the attack on the city.

On January 7, 1942, the 2nd Shock Army made its first attempt to cross the Volkhov, but was unsuccessful. The next day a second attempt was made, also unsuccessful. On January 10, 1942, Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov was appointed to the post of army commander instead of G.G. Sokolov. On January 13, 1942, some units of the army managed to overcome fierce enemy resistance and capture several bridgeheads. Over the next three days, the main forces broke through the enemy's forward defense line and liberated several settlements. However, then the offensive stalled - the command had to reduce the offensive front and bring into action the second echelon, thanks to which the village of Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod region, was taken. During the further five-day offensive, army units covered more than 30 kilometers.

On January 25, 1942, Klykov, trying to expand the breakthrough, brought into action the 13th Cavalry Corps (commander - Major General N.I. Gusev). During the February offensive, he managed to reach the outskirts of the city of Lyuban, but was unable to expand the breakthrough throat - it was only 12 kilometers. However, the command continued to expand the liberated territory beyond enemy lines, introducing new units into battle, demanding that Lyuban be taken by the beginning of March.

On March 15, 1942, German troops launched an offensive in the Myasnoy Bor area and liquidated the breakthrough in the next two days. The 2nd Shock Army was surrounded. Soviet units broke through the ring several times - by the beginning of April, the width of the corridor connecting the army with the main forces was only 2.5 kilometers. The lack of supplies and replenishment led to the fact that the army was unable to complete its offensive tasks. On April 16, 1942, Klykov was removed from command and a lieutenant general was appointed in his place. The army was reassigned Leningrad Front(commander - Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin).

The threat of defeat of the 2nd Shock Army became obvious to the command. In an effort to preserve it, on April 30, 1942, it gave the order to stop the offensive and take its banner to the rear. On May 12, 1942, the withdrawal of army units from the Myasnoy Bor area began. Throughout May there were fierce battles for the corridor, which remained the only way to save the almost surrounded units. On May 31, 1942, large German forces with air support managed to close it. More than 40 thousand soldiers and commanders were surrounded, many of whom were wounded. The supply of the army stopped completely. Having suffered huge losses, on June 21, 1942, as a result of a joint operation of the 2nd Shock Army from the west and units of the 59th Army from the east, they managed to break through a small corridor up to 400 meters wide, through which some of the units subordinate to Vlasov managed to escape. Fierce fighting did not subside for four days; the narrow corridor was repeatedly blocked by the Germans and broken through again by Soviet units. By the morning of June 25, 1942, German troops, bringing in new forces, closed it completely.

About 30 thousand soldiers and commanders, led by General Vlasov, were surrounded in a small area. Some of them managed to reach their own people in small groups, but most of them ended up in German captivity. Vlasov, who refused to be evacuated by plane, separated from the main forces of the encirclement and on July 11, 1942, ended up in the village of Tukhovezhi, where he asked for help from the local headman, who handed him over with his companion, cook M.I. Voronova, to the occupation police. The next day, Vlasov, who tried to pass himself off as a civilian refugee, was identified by the arriving Germans and sent to Vinnitsa, to a prisoner of war camp.

The defeat of the 2nd Shock Army led to the removal of General Khozin from the post of commander as he had failed to cope with the assigned tasks of liberating it.

Participation in the Sinyavinsk operation and Operation Iskra

The restoration of the destroyed army was carried out on the basis of the 327th Infantry Division - one of the few units that preserved the structure of its units. General Klykov was again appointed commander instead of Vlasov, who was captured. By the end of the summer, it included 2 rifle divisions, 1 mortar regiment and 2 rocket mortar divisions. Despite the incomplete formation, the command decided to introduce it into the breakthrough previously made by the 8th Army during the Sinyavin offensive operation. Klykov's units managed to defeat a number of strong points and repel German counterattacks. However, soon there was a threat of a repeat of the disaster at Myasny Bor. On September 10, 1942, German troops launched an offensive, and on September 21, 1942, they closed the encirclement ring in the area of ​​​​the settlement of Gaitolovo. On September 29, 1942, when the hopelessness of the situation became obvious, the command gave the order to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from the encirclement. This was done with heavy losses - more than 12 thousand soldiers and commanders were captured by the Germans.

On October 25, 1942, the 2nd Shock Army was redeployed in the area. It was assigned the role of the main striking force of the Volkhov Front in the upcoming breakthrough operation, codenamed “Iskra”. On the eve of the offensive, it was replenished and equipped with everything necessary. In December 1942, Klykov was replaced by Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky. By the beginning of 1943, the 2nd Shock Army consisted of 165 thousand soldiers and commanders, more than 2,200 guns and mortars, and more than 220 tanks. Air support for its actions was provided by the 14th Air Army (commander - Lieutenant General of Aviation I.P. Zhuravlev).

According to the plan for Operation Iskra, the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to break through the powerful German defenses (in winter conditions this task became even more difficult). Army units were concentrated 300-500 meters from the enemy’s forward line. During fierce battles, the 18th, 71st, 128th, 256th, 327th, 372nd divisions managed to break through the German defenses, develop an offensive and connect with units of the 67th Army advancing from Leningrad. After this, the 2nd Shock and 67th Armies turned south, trying to expand the corridor, but the well-fortified Sinyavinsky Heights did not allow the initial success to be developed. Having gained a foothold on the occupied lines, Romanovsky’s army held the line until late autumn.

Lifting the blockade and fighting in the Baltic states

In November 1943, the command of the 2nd Shock Army received a number of other formations under its command and began secretly transferring them to the Oranienbaum bridgehead. The army headquarters is located in the village of Bolshaya Izhora. In December 1943, Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninsky was appointed commander of the army. By the beginning of the operation to finally lift the blockade of Leningrad, up to 53 thousand soldiers and commanders, more than 210 tanks and armored vehicles, about 700 guns and mortars, a large number of automobile horse-drawn transport. By January 1944, the 2nd Shock Army included the 43rd and 122nd Rifle Corps, the 43rd Rifle Division, the 50th Rifle Brigade, the 48th and 71st Naval Rifle Brigades, and units of the 16th Fortified district, a number of artillery, tank, mechanized, and engineer units. Air support was provided by the Baltic Fleet Air Force. Measures were taken to misinform the enemy in the form of a false attack on.

On January 14, 1944, after artillery preparation, units of the 2nd Shock Army went on the offensive and broke through the first line of defense. On January 19, 1944, the city of Ropsha was liberated, and the next day the 168th Rifle Division met with the advanced units of the 42nd Army advancing from Leningrad. In this way, an encirclement ring was created, but most of the enemy troops managed to get out, losing heavy equipment and a large amount of weapons. During the further offensive, formations of the 2nd Shock Army liberated the village of Volosovo, crossed the Luga River and took the city by storm. At the beginning of February 1944, advanced units reached the Narva River in the area and captured several bridgeheads. Here the offensive stopped.

On July 24-25, 1944, during the Narva offensive operation, army units crossed the Narva River after artillery preparation, and liberated it on the morning of July 26. German troops retreated to the so-called Tannenberg defense line, which they could not break through immediately. In September, during the Tallinn operation, this army successfully broke through the German defenses, and during a further offensive liberated more than 450 settlements and met with the 8th Army in the city of Rakvere, Estonian SSR. The 8th Estonian Rifle Corps, which was part of the 2nd Shock Army (commanded by Lieutenant General L.A. Pern), advancing away from the main direction, reached the outskirts on September 21, 1944, and liberated the city the next day. Meanwhile, the main army units liberated the cities of Pärnu and Viljandi on September 23, 1944, and the city of Haapsalu on September 24, 1944.

The final stage of the war

On September 27, 1944, the 2nd Shock Army was withdrawn to the Headquarters Reserve and during the first half of October was transferred to Poland, where it was reassigned to the 2nd Belorussian Front. During the Mlawa-Elbing operation, it successfully broke through deeply layered defenses up to 17 kilometers wide and up to 20 kilometers deep. On January 19, 1945, she took the city of Ciechanów by storm and. Subsequently, by order of the command, she launched an offensive to the north in order to cut off the East Prussian Wehrmacht group. Conducting fierce battles for the city of Elbing (now Elblag, Poland), the 2nd Shock Army thwarted the enemy's plans to relieve its besieged garrison and, with its onslaught on the night of February 9-10, 1945, broke the resistance of the defenders.

After the end of the battle for Elbing, the army regrouped on the left flank, crossed the Vistula River and began the assault on the fortified city of Graudenz (now Grudziadz, Poland), which was completed only on March 6, 1945. On March 11, 1945, the city of Dirschau (now Tczew, Poland) was taken, and on March 30, after fierce two-week battles, Danzig (now Poland). After this, the army was redeployed to the Oder. During the offensive by the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, she made false preparations for the crossing in order to cover the direction of the main attack in the 65th Army zone. On April 26, 1945, the army crossed the Oder and on the same day entered Stettin (now Szczecin, Poland). On April 29, 1945, army units took the city of Anklam, on April 30, 1945 - the city of Stralsund, on the same day the garrison of the city of Greifswald capitulated. On May 5, 1945, in cooperation with the 19th Army, the city of Swinemünde was captured. In the last days of the war, army units captured the islands of Wollin, Rügen and Usedom.

In the post-war period, the 2nd Shock Army was first located as part of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. In April 1946, it was withdrawn to the USSR and disbanded.

Message quote THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SECOND SHOCK The tragedy of Vlasov’s 2nd Shock Army through the eyes of military counterintelligence

In blessed memory of the soldiers and commanders

Dedicated to the 2nd Shock Army who fell in battles with the Nazi invaders.

"Wherever you go or go,
But stop here
To the grave this way
Bow with all your heart."
M. Isakovsky.

On the M10 highway in the Novgorod region in the village of Myasnoy Bor, there is one of the largest mass graves of the 2nd World War memorial - the 2nd Shock Army. More than 11 thousand are buried on an area of ​​about 100*100 m. soldiers and officers of the Red Army. Burials continue to this day.

As you know, the 2nd Shock Army began breaking through the German defense line from this place in January 1942.

The article described how events developed, but I will remind you of the details. Shock, rather there was only one name. With a shortage of ammunition and food, but having a multiple superiority in manpower, the Red Army broke through the enemy’s defenses and moved deeper into the territory occupied by the Germans. It was unable to complete the assigned task of breaking the Siege of Leningrad or inflicting any significant damage due to a shortage or complete lack of ammunition, and suffered huge losses, mainly from cold, hunger and wounds. The commander of the 2nd UA, holder of the Order of Lenin, General Vlasov, approached the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with a proposal to withdraw, but Stalin categorically forbade it. The wounded began to accumulate, food, medicine, and ammunition ran out, the roads were washed away, and the trap finally slammed shut. The extermination of 2UAi began and the retreat was already along a narrow corridor that was being shot from all sides; thousands of wounded had to be abandoned. The adventure of the shoemaker generals ended tragically.

Caption: "The remains of 926 soldiers and commanders of the Red Army are buried here"

Very young, noble faces look at us from the photographs.

During the Soviet period, the heroic 2 UA was erased from military history along with the dead and the few survivors. This tragic area, like many others, had no identifying marks at all, as if nothing had happened here. Only rare enthusiasts carried out separate work on searching and burying dead soldiers. And only in 2005 a monument to the fallen heroes was erected.

Endless notches with surnames on granite. If desired, without much difficulty, anyone can find their namesake here. I found two.

Bouquets of fresh flowers or wreaths are visible everywhere. Patriotic events are held here periodically.

Finally they remembered that they were Orthodox, and wore crosses on their chests, and not portraits of leaders.

Small hills are visible everywhere. As the signs indicate, about 1,000 people are buried under each hill.

As soon as you start to think about the demographic situation in the country, looking at these hills, at the faces from the photographs, and the names, it is immediately clear that these are the people whom Russian villages and cities did not wait for.

In the center of the memorial there are pedestals indicating all the military units participating in the breakthrough.

Soldiers from the Second Shock.
In Myasny Bor they lie in the ground
Soldiers from the Second Shock.
None of them are to blame
That their commander is mediocre.
The stain of shame cannot be washed away
From his dress uniform.
But you need to know, not to forget
Those who fell behind the commander.
They're looking at us now
From that unimaginable distance,
They do not expect rewards for themselves,
They don't need medals anymore.
Their name is good and honor
The earth preserved for fifty years.
Count everyone by name
We needed it a long time ago.
After all, this is someone's husband and brother
He fell, hit by a shell.
We can't bring him back
But we must remember, we really must
He is not a traitor or a coward,
He remained faithful to the Fatherland.
And the son of the Tatars, and the Belarusian
They died here in the name of life.
They lie shoulder to shoulder
How they walked back in '41.
And I live, laugh, joke.
They saved the whole world from evil.
No, the reproach was not noticed,
After all, the promises didn’t sell
And they didn’t step over the “hill”,
We stayed in the Novgorod region.
The sun is replaced by the moon,
Now day, now night over the obelisk.
How far has the war gone...
And how close she stayed.

M. V. Fedorova, V. Novgorod
REMEMBER!

About the tragedy of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, which was almost completely destroyed in the summer of 1942. Military security officers conducted their own investigation into the causes of the “Vlasov Army” tragedy.At the beginning of January 1942, according to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to break the blockade of Leningrad. Before January 6, 1942, it was supposed to advance to the firing lines, and from January 7, 1942, begin combat operations to break through the enemy’s defenses along the Volkhov River.

However, the Special Department informed the command of the Volkhov Front about serious shortcomings in the preparations for the offensive, about the insufficient supply of food, ammunition, fuel and lubricants to units and formations of the 2nd Shock Army. There was also no stable and reliable communication between headquarters at various levels. Let me remind you that monitoring the real state of affairs in the troops at that time was the most important task of the security officers. It is to monitor, not to influence. However, this has already been written about earlier //. Despite the objections of counterintelligence officers, the army command stated that it could launch an offensive. On January 7, units and formations of the 2nd Shock Army, without communication with higher headquarters, began a scattered and uncoordinated offensive. By 2 p.m., military security officers, in numerous reports from the field, reported that the attackers were suffering huge losses, and the offensive itself had “choked.” The leadership of the Volkhov Front hastily arrived at the command post of the 2nd Shock Army and, having become convinced of the veracity of the messages of the military security officers, canceled the offensive. The army lost 2,118 troops killed that day. As will soon become clear - only 2118! The Red Army command did not always listen to the opinion of the military security officers. It is a myth that the “special officers” could, at their own request, arrest and shoot any commander of the Red Army. Of course, they could use weapons if any of the servicemen tried to go over to the enemy’s side, but then, anyway, an investigation was carried out for each such fact. Few people know that according to the GKO Resolution “On the procedure for the arrest of military personnel” dated August 11, 1941, even “... Red Army soldiers and junior command personnel are arrested in agreement with the division’s military prosecutor...”. Only in “cases of extreme necessity can Special Bodies detain persons of middle and senior command staff with subsequent coordination of the arrest with the command and the prosecutor’s office.”
If the military leader poorly manages the units and formations entrusted to him, commits criminal negligence in organizing their supply of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants, etc., and has actually partially or completely withdrawn from performing his duties, then the military security officers could only report. One more thing to consider important fact. Due to many objective reasons, employees of Special Departments located directly on the front line or at division headquarters could not see the full picture of what was happening. They recorded only individual facts. Let's explain this with a simple diagram. The detective of the Special Department, who was on the front line, reported to his superiors that the soldiers had not received hot food for several days and there was no supply of ammunition. His colleague from the division headquarters reported that the division commander, instead of fulfilling his job responsibilities, the second day he drinks alcohol and is going to shoot himself. Based on these facts, an employee of the Special Department of the Army may petition to remove the division commander from his post and replace him with a combat-ready commander. In this case, the command will be presented with two facts: poor organization of supply to the division and the self-removal of the commander of this formation from command. The main weapon of military security officers in situations similar to the January offensive of the 2nd Shock Army is reports and messages to their own leadership, front commands and heads of political agencies.
As a result, the 2nd Shock Army was killed, and military security officers conducted their own investigation into the causes of this tragedy. For several decades, the results of their investigation were kept secret. One of the reasons is that the tragedy occurred due to the fault or criminal negligence, let’s call a spade a spade, of the command of the 2nd Shock Army. Of course, part of the blame lies with the higher command.

So: “According to agent data, interviews with commanders and soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army who emerged from encirclement, and personal visits to the site during combat operations of units and formations of the 2nd, 52nd and 59th armies, it was established: encirclement of the 2nd The enemy managed to carry out the th shock army consisting of the 22, 23, 25, 53, 57, 59th rifle brigades and the 19, 46, 92, 259, 267, 327, 282 and 305th rifle divisions only due to criminally negligent attitude the front commander, Lieutenant General Khozin, who did not ensure the implementation of the Headquarters directive on the timely withdrawal of army troops from Lyuban and the organization of military operations in the Spasskaya Polist region. Having taken command of the front, Khozin from the area of ​​​​the village of Olkhovka and the Gazhi Sopki swamp brought 4 to the front reserve 1st, 24th and 378th rifle divisions. The enemy, taking advantage of this, built a narrow-gauge railway in the forest west of Spasskaya Polist and freely began to accumulate troops to attack the communications of the 2nd [shock] army - Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest ( see maps No. 1 and No. 2). The front command did not strengthen the defense of communications of the 2nd [shock] Army. The northern and southern roads of the 2nd [shock] Army were covered by the weak 65th and 372nd Infantry Divisions, stretched out in a line without sufficient firepower on insufficiently prepared defensive lines.
The 372nd Rifle Division with a combat strength of 2,796 people by this time occupied a defense sector stretching 12 km from the village of Mostki to elevation. 39.0, which is 2 km north of the narrow-gauge railway.
The 65th Red Banner Rifle Division with a combat strength of 3,708 men occupied a defense sector stretching 14 km from the corner of the forest of the southern clearing of the flour[grinding] plant to the barn, 1 km from the village of Krutik. Commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov hastily approved the undeveloped scheme of the division's defensive structures, presented by the commander of the 372nd Infantry Division, Colonel Sorokin, the defense headquarters did not check it. As a result, of the 11 bunkers 7 built by the 8th company of the 3rd regiment of the same division, 7 turned out to be unsuitable. Front commander Khozin, The chief of staff of the front, Major General Stelmakh, knew that the enemy was concentrating troops against this division and that they would not provide defense of the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, but they did not take measures to strengthen the defense of these sectors, having reserves at their disposal.
On May 30, the enemy, after artillery and air preparation with the help of tanks, launched an attack on the right flank of the 311th Regiment of the 65th Infantry Division.
The 2nd, 7th and 8th companies of this regiment, having lost 100 soldiers and four tanks, retreated.
To restore the situation, a company of machine gunners was sent out, which, having suffered losses, withdrew. The Military Council of the 52nd Army threw the last reserves into battle - the 54th Guards Rifle Regiment with 370 reinforcements. The replenishment was introduced into battle on the move, not united, at the first contact with the enemy they scattered and were stopped by barrage detachments of special departments. The Germans, having pushed back units of the 65th division, came close to the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky and cut off the 305th Infantry Division with their left flank.
At the same time, the enemy, advancing in the sector of the 1236th [Rifle] Regiment of the 372nd Infantry Division, broke through the weak defenses, dismembered the second echelon of the reserve 191st Infantry Division, and reached the narrow-gauge railway in the area of ​​elevation. 40.5 and linked up with units advancing from the south. The commander of the 191st [Rifle] Division repeatedly raised the question with the commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, about the need and expediency of withdrawing the 191st Rifle Division to Myasny Bor in order to create a strong defense along the northern road.
Korovnikov did not take any measures, and the 191st [Rifle] Division, inactive and without erecting defensive structures, remained standing in the swamp.
Front commander Khozin and commander of the 59th Army Korovnikov, being aware of the concentration of the enemy, still believed that the defense of the 372nd division had been broken through by a small group of machine gunners, so reserves were not brought into battle, which enabled the enemy to cut off the 2nd shock army.
Only on June 1, 1942, the 165th Infantry Division was brought into battle without artillery support, which, having lost 50% of its soldiers and commanders, did not improve the situation. Instead of organizing the battle, Khozin withdrew the division from the battle and transferred it to another sector, replacing it with 374- 1st Rifle Division, which, at the time of the change of units of the 165th Rifle Division, retreated somewhat back. The available forces were not brought into battle in a timely manner; on the contrary, Khozin suspended the offensive and began moving division commanders: he removed the commander of the 165th Rifle Division, Colonel Solenov, and appointed him commander division of Colonel Morozov, releasing him from the post of commander of the 58th Infantry Brigade.
Instead of the commander of the 58th [rifle] brigade, the commander of the 1st rifle battalion, Major Gusak, was appointed.
The chief of staff of the division, Major Nazarov, was also removed, and Major Dzyuba was appointed in his place; at the same time, the commissar of the 165th [Rifle] Division, senior battalion commissar Ilish, was also removed.
In the 372nd Rifle Division, the division commander, Colonel Sorokin, was removed, and Colonel Sinegubko was appointed in his place.
The regrouping of troops and the replacement of commanders dragged on until June 10. During this time, the enemy managed to create bunkers and strengthen the defense.
By the time it was encircled by the enemy, the 2nd Shock Army found itself in an extremely difficult situation; the divisions numbered from two to three thousand soldiers, exhausted due to malnutrition and overworked by continuous battles.
From June 12 to 18, 1942, soldiers and commanders were given 400 g of horse meat and 100 g of crackers, on subsequent days they were given from 10 g to 50 g of crackers, on some days the fighters did not receive food at all, which increased the number of exhausted soldiers and cases of mortality from starvation.
Deputy beginning The political department of the 46th division, Zubov, detained a soldier of the 57th rifle brigade, Afinogenov, who was cutting a piece of meat from the corpse of a killed Red Army soldier for food. Having been detained, Afinogenov died of exhaustion on the way.
The army's food and ammunition ran out; transporting them by air was essentially impossible due to the white nights and the loss of the landing site near the village of Finev Lug. Due to the negligence of the army's logistics chief, Colonel Kresik, the ammunition and food dropped by planes into the army were not fully collected.
The position of the 2nd Shock Army became extremely complicated after the enemy broke through the defense line of the 327th Division in the Finev Lug area.
The command of the 2nd Army - Lieutenant General Vlasov and the division commander, Major General Antyufeev - did not organize the defense of the swamp west of Finev Lug, which the enemy took advantage of, entering the division's flank.
The retreat of the 327th division led to panic, the army commander, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was confused, did not take decisive measures to detain the enemy, who advanced to Novaya Keresti and subjected the rear of the army to artillery fire, cutting off the 19th [Guards] and 305th Army from the main forces of the army th rifle divisions.
Units of the 92nd Division found themselves in a similar situation, where, with an attack from Olkhovka by two infantry regiments with 20 tanks, the Germans, with the support of aviation, captured the lines occupied by this division.
The commander of the 92nd Rifle Division, Colonel Zhiltsov, showed confusion and lost control at the very beginning of the battle for Olkhovka.
The withdrawal of our troops along the Kerest River line significantly worsened the entire position of the army. By this time, the enemy artillery had already begun to sweep the entire depth of the 2nd Army with fire.
The ring around the army closed. The enemy, having crossed the Kerest River, entered the flank, penetrated our battle formations and launched an attack on the army command post in the Drovyanoe Pole area.
The army command post turned out to be unprotected, a company of the Special Department consisting of 150 people was brought into battle, which pushed back the enemy and fought with him for 24 hours - June 23 of this year.
The military council and army headquarters were forced to change their location, destroying communications facilities and, essentially, losing control of the troops.
The commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, and the chief of staff, Vinogradov, showed confusion, did not lead the battle, and subsequently lost all control of the troops.
This was used by the enemy, who freely penetrated into the rear of our troops and caused panic.
June 24 this year Vlasov decides to withdraw the army headquarters and rear institutions in marching order. The entire column was a peaceful crowd with disorderly movement, unmasked and noisy.
The enemy subjected the marching column to artillery and mortar fire. The Military Council of the 2nd Army with a group of commanders lay down and did not emerge from the encirclement. The commanders heading for the exit safely arrived at the location of the 59th Army.
In just two days (June 22 and 23 this year), 13,018 people emerged from encirclement, 7,000 of them wounded.
The subsequent escape from the encirclement of the enemy by the 2nd Army soldiers took place in separate small groups.
It has been established that Vlasov, Vinogradov and other leading members of the army headquarters fled in panic, withdrew from the leadership of combat operations and did not announce their location, they kept it under wraps.
The military council of the army, [in particular] in the persons of Zuev and Lebedev, showed complacency and did not stop the panicky actions of Vlasov and Vinogradov, broke away from them, this increased the confusion in the troops.
The head of the Special Department of the Army, Major of State Security Shashkov, did not take decisive measures in a timely manner to restore order and prevent betrayal at the army headquarters itself.
On June 2, 1942, during the most intense combat period, he betrayed his Motherland - he went over to the enemy’s side with [cipher] oval documents - pom. beginning 8th Department of the Army Headquarters, 2nd Rank Quartermaster Technician Semyon Ivanovich Malyuk, who gave the enemy the location of the 2nd Shock Army units and the location of the army command post. (Attached is a flyer).
There have been cases of voluntary surrender to the enemy by some unstable military personnel.
On July 10, 1942, German intelligence agents Nabokov and Kadyrov, who we arrested, testified: during the interrogation of captured soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army, the following were present in the German intelligence agencies: the commander of the 25th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Sheludko, assistant. beginning Operators of the army department, Major Verstkin, quartermaster 1st rank Zhukovsky, deputy. the commander of the 2nd [shock] army in the ABTV, Colonel Goryunov, and a number of others who betrayed the command and political composition of the army to the German authorities.
Having taken command of the Volkhov Front, Army General Comrade. Meretskov led a group of troops of the 59th Army to join forces with the 2nd Shock Army.
From 21 to 22 June this year. units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area and formed a corridor 800 m wide.
To hold the corridor, army units turned to the south and north and occupied combat areas along the narrow-gauge railway.
By the time units of the 59th Army reached the Polist River, it became clear that the command of the 2nd [shock] Army, represented by Chief of Staff Vinogradov, had misinformed the front and had not occupied defensive lines on the western bank of the Polist River.
Thus, there was no ulnar connection between the armies.
On June 22, a significant amount of food was delivered to the formed corridor for units of the 2nd [shock] Army, by people and on horseback.
The command of the 2nd [shock] Army, organizing the exit of units from the encirclement, did not count on leaving in battle, did not take measures to strengthen and expand the main communications at Spasskaya Polist and did not hold the gates.
Due to almost continuous enemy air raids and shelling of ground troops on a narrow section of the front, exit for units of the 2nd [shock] Army became difficult.
Confusion and loss of control of the battle on the part of the command of the 2nd [shock] Army completely aggravated the situation.
The enemy took advantage of this and closed the corridor.
Subsequently, the commander of the 2nd [shock] Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was completely at a loss; the chief of staff of the army, Major General Vinogradov, took the initiative into his own hands.
He kept his latest plan a secret and didn’t tell anyone about it. Vlasov was indifferent to this.
Both Vinogradov and Vlasov did not escape the encirclement. According to the chief of communications of the 2nd Shock Army, Major General Afanasyev, who was delivered on July 11 on a U-2 plane from behind enemy lines, they were heading through the forest in the Oredezhsky region towards Staraya Russa.
The whereabouts of members of the Military Council Zuev and Lebedev are unknown.
Beginning From the [special] department of the NKVD of the 2nd [shock] army, state security major Shashkov, being wounded, shot himself.
We continue the search for the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army by sending agents behind enemy lines and partisan detachments.”
What reaction will the country's leadership have after reading such a document?
The answer is obvious.
Resolution of the State Defense Committee “On the procedure for the arrest of military personnel” dated August 11, 1941: "…1. Red Army soldiers and junior command personnel are arrested in agreement with the division's military prosecutor.2. Arrests of mid-level commanders are made in agreement with the division command and the divisional prosecutor.3. Arrests of senior command personnel are made in agreement with the Military Council of the army (military district).4. The procedure for arresting senior officials remains the same (with the approval of the NGO).”And only in “cases of extreme necessity can Special Bodies detain persons of middle and senior command staff with subsequent coordination of the arrest with the command and the prosecutor’s office”