Exactly 94 years ago, on these September days, the fate of the future Soviet state was decided. Having won the Civil War, the Bolsheviks faced the need not only to establish new life, but also to determine the form of existence of the Soviet state. If previously they lived in their socialist ghetto and could draw and redraw the map within their cabal as they pleased - fortunately, none of the leading powers recognized them - now, in order to achieve this recognition, it was necessary to explain themselves to the world: who they are, how they live, where the boundaries are.
On September 22, 1922, the People's Commissar for Nationalities Joseph Stalin sent his project to Lenin, and on September 23 he presented his “autonomization” program to the commission on preparation for the plenum of the Central Committee on the issue of relations between the RSFSR and others Soviet republics. According to this program, all Soviet republics were to become part of the RSFSR with autonomous rights. Lenin at that time was in a semi-vegetable state and the program was almost accepted, but then Ilyich woke up briefly and went into a rage, demanding maximum federalization - with semi-independent union republics. This was surprising, since until now Ilyich was considered a staunch supporter of a unitary state, and Stalin’s program of autonomization was actually Lenin’s.
Lenin's program became a bomb, laid under the state foundation even at the construction stage. Sooner or later the landmine was bound to go off. This is exactly what happened in 1991, when the union collapsed in full accordance with the Soviet principle of national self-determination and exactly along the Soviet borders of the union republics.
Discussions about autonomy and federalization lasted throughout the autumn of 1922 and ended with Lenin’s victory, which predetermined the collapse of the Soviet state - it, although not in the near future, became inevitable.
Of course, during the Civil War, the Bolsheviks thought about national issues, but these were not problems of the first or even second importance. At the VIII Congress of the RCPb, held in the summer of 1919, not much time was devoted to issues of the future structure of the state. The congress adopted a program in which it devoted only a couple of lines to federalization:
“As one of the transitional forms on the path to complete unity, the party puts forward a federal union of states organized according to the Soviet type.”
Here, however, it must be taken into account that in the context of the Civil War, which tore the former unitary empire into shreds, ordinary regions/provinces were often called states, and their statehood was entirely fake. All over Russia in different parts Dozens of “states” arose for several weeks or months. For example, on the territory of Bobruisk district the Rudobel Partisan Republic was proclaimed. As many as three Soviet republics were proclaimed in the Caucasus: the Terek, North Caucasian and Mountain Autonomous Republics. And on the territory of the Kaluga province, the Kaluga Soviet Republic operated for some time.
Therefore, one should not be deceived by the word “republic” in the minutes of the congress. During the Civil War, republics and provinces were of equal importance and meant something completely different from what they did after the war.
In the first constitution of the RSFSR, the issue was also touched upon in passing. It included the following point:
“Councils of regions distinguished by their special way of life and national composition, can unite into autonomous regional unions, at the head of which, as at the head of any regional associations that can be formed in general, are the regional congresses of Soviets and their executive bodies. These autonomous regional unions are part of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic on a federation basis.”
Please note: regional unions are members of the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy, and not at all as equal allies in a supranational state entity.
So, by 1922, the Bolsheviks, in need of international recognition, began to puzzle over how to get out of international isolation. The British helped. On their initiative, the Genoa Conference was scheduled for the summer of 1922, which, among other Eastern European problems, was supposed to resolve a number of contradictions related to the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia. The British, as the victors in the world war and the inspirers of the conference, made not so much a cunning as a brazen diplomatic move, declaring all their dominions separately as participants, receiving six votes at once instead of one and almost single-handedly controlling the conference. The Americans flatly refused to participate in such a tent. The Soviet side also received an invitation, and initially the Bolsheviks wanted to cheat in the manner of the British - to invite all Soviet delegations to the conference separately: Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Transcaucasian. But what is allowed to Jupiter is not allowed to the Bolshevik - the friends of the workers were immediately turned away, they had to send a single delegation from the RSFSR.
Since the Bolsheviks planned to achieve recognition in the near future, it was necessary to somehow explain themselves to the world. Preparations for the conference forced them to intensify their work in this direction. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin without thinking twice proposed including all Soviet republics into the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy. Chicherin outlined his proposals in a letter to Molotov at the beginning of 1922. Christian Rakovsky, the famous agent of all intelligence services, who at that time still had significant weight in the apparatus and led Soviet Ukraine, spoke out against it. Rakovsky protested, calling Chicherin's proposal the greatest political mistake - they say, it actually abolishes the national principles of Bolshevism.
Chicherin did not want to argue with Rakovsky, but complained to the Politburo, saying that the lack of resolution this issue threatens failure in Genoa, and Rakovsky is generally so willful that he sends diplomatic missions from Soviet Ukraine to other countries, without even coordinating them with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, which destroys the “united diplomatic front” of the Soviet states.
Rakovsky was pulled back and even created a special commission, which was supposed to coordinate all actions between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. However, this format of coexistence was not convenient for either one or the other. In May 1922, at one of its meetings, the Politburo adopted a resolution on the need to carefully prepare for consideration at the next meeting the issue of interaction between the RSFSR and other Soviet republics.
Of all the Soviet republics, the strongest trends towards independence were in Georgia. It was the last to become a Soviet republic, since until 1921 local Mensheviks were in power there, whom the local Bolsheviks overthrew with the help of the 11th Army of the Red Army. A former member of the revolutionary military council of this army, the old Bolshevik “Will” (actually Gurgen) Mdivani became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia. I would understand the national policy of the Bolsheviks very broadly: as the complete independence of the union republics with some minor restrictions and mutual obligations of a military nature.
As for the new Ukrainian managers, the situation there was not so clear. The Bulgarian Rakovsky, appointed chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, campaigned for expanding the independence of the union republics; he had absolutely nothing to do with the Ukrainians and their national feelings, he did not know or understand them, but he did not want to share his newly acquired power - after all, the Ukrainian SSR was the second largest union republic. On the other hand, autonomist sentiments were quite strong in the Ukrainian Communist Party. For example, the leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Manuilsky, took similar positions to Stalin on the issue of autonomy and the inclusion of the Ukrainian SSR into the RSFSR, arguing that the Ukrainian peasant was indifferent to the national issue.
In August 1922, a special commission appeared on the issue of relations between the RSFSR and the Soviet republics. The commission included Kuibyshev, Stalin, Rakovsky, Ordzhonikidze, Sokolnikov and a representative from each of the Soviet republics. Of course, as a “specialist on the national question,” Stalin played first fiddle in the commission, and in fact, the plan that provided for the inclusion of Soviet republics in the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy (autonomization) was in many ways Stalin’s plan. But he had many supporters in high circles: Chicherin, Manuilsky, Ordzhonikidze, Dzerzhinsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev.
One should not think that Stalin's influence in 1922 was great or that the Bolsheviks were patriots of Russia. Of course not. The whole point is that the autonomization project is an item from the pre-revolutionary program of the Bolsheviks. It is customary for us to present the struggle between federalization and autonomization as a struggle between the ideas of Lenin and Stalin, but this is not the case at all. Autonomization is the original plan of the Bolsheviks, and federalization is the last phantom of the fading Leninist consciousness distorted by the paralyzing malice.
Classical Marxism never supported federalization. Engels quite clearly expressed the Marxist attitude to the problem:
“In my opinion, only the form of a single and indivisible republic is suitable for the proletariat.”
Lenin, as a diligent student of Marxists, adhered to the same position. Commenting on the correspondence between Liebknecht the elder and Engels, he wrote:
“Liebknecht’s newspaper is very bad: federalism. Empty. Liebknecht has federalism, but we are against federalism.”
Subsequently, Lenin regularly developed this idea. At the beginning of the 2000s, he wrote:
“We are certainly, other things being equal, for centralization and against the petty-bourgeois ideal of federal relations. The conscious proletariat will always defend a larger state. While and since different nations constitute a single state, Marxists will under no circumstances preach either the federal principle or decentralization.”
In his fiery pre-war correspondence with Shaumyan in 1913, Ilyich even went so far as to use his trademark swearing:
“We are for democratic centralism, of course. We are against the federation. We are for the Jacobins against the Girondins... We are, in principle, against the federation - it weakens economic ties, it is unsuitable for one state. Do you want to separate? Go to hell if you can break the economic connection, or rather, if the oppression and friction of “cohabitation” are such that they spoil and ruin the cause of the economic connection. Don't you want to separate? Then excuse me, don’t decide for me, don’t think that you have the “right” to a federation. In general, Marxists cannot include the defense of federalism in their program; there is nothing to say about this.”
As can be seen from Lenin's polemics and appeals, before the revolution, Ilyich was a staunch supporter of a centralized unitary state with cultural autonomy for individual regions. That is why the Stalinist autonomization program is the Bolshevik position of the pre-revolutionary era and that is why the majority of the top party supported it. Stalin, who always tried to look like Lenin's first disciple, wrote in Pravda in 1917:
“Isn’t it clear that federalism in Russia does not and cannot solve the national question, that it only confuses and complicates it with quixotic attempts to turn back the wheel of history.”
The title of the article was simple and unpretentious: “Against federalism!” But Lenin himself, in the period between the two revolutions, had already managed to change his position. Not so much because of a change of views, but because of its extreme populism. The situation in Russia between two revolutions should be presented as a symbolic auction. One by one, a lot was put up, after which all the parties in turn set their price, and Lenin at the very end interrupted everyone with laughter, giving three times as much. For example, a lot called “national question”: the Cadets stand up - we are ready to discuss the autonomy of the most developed outskirts. The Socialist Revolutionaries stand up - we are ready to discuss autonomy for everyone. Lenin (with laughter and a sly squint) - ready to provide independence to everyone who wants it. And so on for each point.
Lenin immediately noticed that many outskirts began to bargain with the provisional government on issues of autonomy. And since the Bolshevik tactic was to promise more than all their rivals combined, questions about autonomy turned into promises to give free rein to anyone and everyone who wanted it. At the April conference of the RSDLP in 1917, Lenin read out a resolution in general outline which became the new party program:
“The oppressed peoples that are part of Russia must be given the right to decide for themselves whether they want to remain part of the Russian state or secede into independent states. Now we are faced with a concrete conflict between the Finnish people and the Provisional Government. Representatives of the Finnish people, representatives of social democracy demand that the Provisional Government return to the people the rights that they enjoyed before joining Russia. The Provisional Government refuses this, not recognizing the Finnish people as sovereign. Which side should we take? Obviously, on the side of the Finnish people. If we, Social Democrats, had denied the Finnish people the right to express their will to secede and the right to put this will into practice, then we would thereby find ourselves in the position of continuing the policy of tsarism.
We must support every movement directed against imperialism. What will the Finnish workers tell us otherwise? Pyatakov and Dzerzhinsky tell us that everything national movement there is a reactionary movement. This is not true, comrades."
In the summer, negotiations began between the Ukrainian Rada and the Provisional Government. The Ukrainians hoped to bargain for more autonomy, but even the hottest heads at that time did not raise the issue of secession and independence, limiting themselves to moderate autonomy. Lenin, with his nose to the wind, immediately decided to pull the rug out from under the government and promise everyone a heap of gifts. At the 1st All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1917, he stated:
“Let Russia be a union of free republics<…>We want a fraternal union of all peoples. If there is a Ukrainian republic and Russian republic, there will be more connection between them, more trust. If the Ukrainians see that we have a republic of Soviets, they will not secede, but if we have a republic of Milyukov, they will secede.”
As often happened with Lenin, who always expressed wishful thinking, it turned out the other way around: during the republic, the Ukrainians did not even really proclaim autonomy, but almost immediately after October Revolution declared their independence.
It is worth noting that Lenin’s speeches between February and October 1917 seemed crazy even to many of his old comrades. Not everyone understood why there was a free distribution of territories in which, through such great efforts, it was finally possible to create the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, Ilyich reassured his nervous comrades:
“We are told that Russia will fragment, disintegrate into separate republics, but we have nothing to fear from this. No matter how many independent republics there are, we will not be afraid of this. What is important for us is not where the state border lies, but that the alliance be maintained between the working people of all nations to fight the bourgeoisie of any nation.”
It is not clear what bug bit Lenin, but after seizing power he became a staunch supporter of federalism, which he had previously castigated. Apparently, success turned his head, and Ilyich finally moved into the world of his megalomaniac fantasies: before his eyes, the fires of world revolutions flared up all over the world, castles collapsed, skyscraper huts rose, conscious workers from the German socialist republic sent advanced equipment, hardworking workers people came from the Chinese Socialist Republic to raise Russian cities with selfless labor, and the entire globe was one big republic, the agenda of which was dictated by the proletariat. In such conditions, state borders looked ridiculous. There was only one problem - these dreams existed only in Lenin’s consciousness, inflamed from victory and syphilis, but in reality the world revolution not only did not win, but also lost ground, losing every decisive battle.
Map of the USSR 1917–1922
However, Lenin still believed in his fantasies and became an increasingly convinced supporter of federalization. True, the Civil War, which began soon, eliminated the problem for several years government system in the farthest box. The question of the survival of the Bolshevik government was being decided; there was no time for dreams of beauty.
The issue was returned to only in 1922. Then the Georgians rebelled. Mdivani agreed only to limited cooperation in the economic sphere. He wanted to have everything else of his own, including a separate Georgian army and the Cheka. Moreover, following the example of Rakovsky, he even began to carry out international relations, in particular, he allowed the Turks to open an Ottoman bank in Tiflis (NEP was already underway), without consulting Moscow, which caused indignation among the People's Commissar of Finance Sokolnikov, who banned the deal, which infuriated already Mdivani. The powerful Georgian began to lure the top of the Azerbaijani Communist Party to his positions.
As a result, by the time the commission to create the commonwealth project began to work, three options had taken shape: autonomy - what was old program Bolsheviks, the Georgian position - a voluntary union of states with their maximum independence, the absence of a centralized bureaucratic apparatus and supranational governing bodies, and the Ukrainian option proposed by Rakovsky - the broadest possible federalization with the retention of certain functions and powers for the union center. A fourth option was also suggested - Lenin's - but Ilyich had shortly before fallen into a vegetable state.
On September 25, 1922, the materials of the Commission, and among them were Stalin’s draft, the resolution and minutes of the Commission’s meetings, the resolutions of the Central Committees of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, as well as, probably, materials on Belarus and Ukraine, were sent to Gorki, where Lenin was then located . After studying these materials, Lenin invited Stalin to a conversation that lasted 2 hours and 40 minutes. On the same day, Lenin sent Kamenev a letter for members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), specifically dedicated to work Stalin's commissions and positions. From this letter from Lenin it followed that on September 25, that is, on the eve of the meeting with Stalin, he had already had a meeting with one of the members of the Commission, Sokolnikov, and the next day, that is, on the 27th, he intended to meet with Mdivani. Lenin further wrote: “In my opinion, this is an extremely important question. Stalin has a bit of a desire to rush. You need (you once had the intention of doing this and even did it a little) think carefully; Zinoviev too." And then Lenin reports on one concession that Stalin agreed to make. Instead of “joining” the RSFSR, it was proposed to write: “Formal unification together with the RSFSR into the union of Soviet republics of Europe and Asia.” The spirit of this concession, I hope, is clear: we recognize ourselves as equal in rights with the Ukrainian SSR and others, and together and on an equal basis we enter into new union, a new federation, the "Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia".
The amendment was indeed of a fundamental nature. The literature directly stated that in his letter on September 26, Lenin “put forward and substantiated the brilliant idea of forming the USSR on the basis of complete equality of all independent Soviet republics, the most careful respect for their sovereign rights.” The future structure of the new country was radically changed and, thus, a federation of a new type was created. Actually, for Lenin this was not something completely new. Lenin spoke about the union of Soviet republics at the April Conference, but was actually involved in it during the Civil War, for example, in 1919. He did not consider abandoning this idea in the fall of 1922. Trying to find the optimal relationship between the center and the outskirts, Moscow and the republics he proposes a new level of guidance and demonstrates it in subsequent comments to the Commission's draft. According to the 2nd paragraph of the resolution, he puts forward the idea of creating a “Federal All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.” And after this comes another important consideration: “It is important that we do not give food to the “independents”, do not destroy them independence, but they also created new floor, federation equal republics."
Lenin also proposed some other amendments to the Resolution of September 24 in the same spirit as the previous ones and emphasized that this draft of his was preliminary and after conversations with Mdivani and other comrades he would add and change it. For now, as follows from the same letter, Stalin agreed to postpone the submission of the resolution to the Politburo of the Central Committee until the arrival of Lenin, who was planning to return to Moscow on October 2. In the meantime, naturally, no earlier than September 26, 1922, a project on the relations of the RSFSR with the independent Soviet Socialist Republics, signed by members of the Central Committee commission Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov and Molotov, was sent to all members and candidates of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). It directly wrote about submitting to the Central Committee “a slightly modified, more precise formulation of the decision of the Central Committee Commission.” It also spoke about the need to conclude an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR on their unification into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, reserving for each of them the right to freely secede from the Union, and further reported on the bodies of the Union and the republics. The result, however, was not a “slightly modified” resolution, but a fundamentally revised one under the direct influence of Lenin. At the same time, Lenin, of course, took well into account the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress, which specifically emphasized: “All decisions of the RCP and its leading institutions are, of course, binding on all parts of the party, regardless of their national composition,” and the resolution of its Tenth Congress “On Unity parties,” which were a major support and, at the same time, a safety net for the unity of all Soviet republics.
Stalin, therefore, agreed with Lenin’s most important remark, although in a reply letter dated September 27, also addressed to members of the Politburo, rejecting the principle of autonomy and recognizing the need to unite the republics into the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia, he objected to the proposal to create a federal Central Executive Committee, since this will lead to the creation of two chambers in Moscow - Russian and federal, as well as against the creation of union people's commissariats. Having made a few more comments on Lenin’s proposals, Stalin emphasized: “One can hardly doubt that this “hasty” gives food to the “independents” to the detriment of Comrade Lenin’s national liberalism.” However, on the main issue of the non-inclusion of independent republics into the RSFSR, Stalin still recognized Lenin’s proposal as fair, and this was the fundamental issue of the heated discussion.
Of course, Stalin had a different opinion, and he tried to defend it in the future. Already on September 28, 1922, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), notes were exchanged between Stalin and Kamenev. Kamenev, apparently commenting on the letter he received from Lenin, wrote that Ilyich was going to war in defense of independence and was asking him, that is, Kamenev, to meet with the Georgians. Stalin, in a reply note, called for firmness against Ilyich, emphasizing at the same time, “if a couple of Georgian Mensheviks influence the Georgian communists, and the latter influence Ilyich, then the question arises - what does “independence” have to do with it? In response, Kamenev wrote the following words: “I think since Vladimir Ilyich insists, it will be worse resist". Kamenev considered it necessary to emphasize the word resist. To which came the following words from Stalin: “I don’t know. Let him do as he pleases."
Meanwhile, work on the union project continued. Lenin already on September 27 met with Ordzhonikidze, who was a supporter of autonomization, as well as with Mdivani, who was categorically against it. The next day, September 28, Lenin meets with opponents of autonomization, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia M. S. Okudzhava, L. E. Dumbadze, K. M. Tsintsadze. On the same day, he met with the chairman of the Armenian Council of People's Commissars A.F. Myasnikov, who shared the idea of autonomization. Lenin, therefore, tried to listen to the arguments of both representatives of the republics and try to develop an optimal design. Apparently, Lenin’s arguments, at least during these conversations, suited both sides. The details of these negotiations are not reflected in the sources and one has to rely on assumptions.
Lenin, on the one hand, retained his goal of creating a union of Soviet republics, on the other, he proposed the creation of a new leadership level. This made it possible to maintain the principle of equality with the centralization so necessary for such a large country as the Country of Soviets. And for old Russia the need for greater centralization than for many other countries was obvious. The prominent historian and leader of the cadets P. N. Milyukov, not without reason, wrote about weak adhesion forces in Russia, attributing them to the main Russian characteristics. Russia, indeed, was too diverse in geography, religion and nationality, not to mention a number of its other features, including those of a social nature, and there were no opportunities to skillfully manage it without taking these features into account. Lenin, indeed, for that time proposed the optimal option for taking into account centralism and federalism, especially since the party was united and ruling, and its use as a management tool was constantly taken into account by Lenin. In those conditions, it was necessary to calm down the national intelligentsia, most of them anti-Soviet, and to prevent a split in the party itself, since the example of Ukraine, where the chairman of the Ukrainian government Rakovsky was in some positions, and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party in others, was very alarming.
Literally two days after Lenin’s letter to Kamenev on September 28, 1922, Rakovsky, who was then on vacation in Crimea, wrote a long letter to Stalin, outlining his comments on the draft resolution on the relationship of the RSFSR with the independent republics, noting ambiguities and contradictions in it. First of all, he touched upon the subordination of government bodies of other republics to Russian government bodies. He directly wrote about the need to put the RSFSR's relations with the independent republics on a strong footing. He saw this necessity in the manifestations of the new economic policy, which liberated the petty-bourgeois capitalist element, striving for conquests generally characteristic of capitalism. This led to a struggle for the takeover of enterprises between the central and local authorities. In this regard, the need to regulate relations between the center and the localities has increased in order to more correctly distribute all the benefits of the country among the working masses of the entire federation.
Rakovsky's second argument in favor of the necessary settlement is international situation. At the moment of entering into political and economic relations with the capitalist world, greater unity of leadership is needed than ever. And the third, was, in his opinion, the need to complete the construction of the Soviet state form and an end to the drafting of short, sketchy contracts that are frequently revised and even cancelled. Next, Rakovsky proceeds to criticize the Resolution adopted by the commission, which, in his opinion, will also need, and in the near future, a new revision.
According to Rakovsky, the project did not work out correct principles building a real federation.
“Its implementation,” Rakovsky further wrote, “that is, the formal abolition of independent republics, will be a source of difficulties both abroad and within the federation. He belittles the revolutionary liberation role of proletarian Russia.” According to Rakovsky, this new policy in relation to the republics, it will be considered as NEP, transferred to the field of national relations, and this with a noticeable aggravation of national feelings, in conditions when the proletariat itself has succumbed to the general petty-bourgeois element. This new policy, as Rakovsky believed, would also hit plans for economic revival, since the economic initiative of the independent republics was already extremely narrowed.
Internationally, if the resolution is implemented, according to Rakovsky, it can only strengthen the opponents of Soviet power from the bourgeois and compromising camps. The presence of eastern independent Soviet republics provides the opportunity for revolutionary penetration into the East. “Through independent Soviet Ukraine, the Soviet Federation had the opportunity to make the same revolutionary penetration into Galicia, Bukovina, Bessarabia. Without any serious need, we ourselves deprive us of this weapon and vice versa, we give the Polish and Romanian bourgeoisie new weapons to fight us and strengthen their national policy. Moreover, Rakovsky continued, “in relation to Ukraine, Poland will act as a defender of its independence, recognized by the Treaty of Riga.”
According to Rakovsky, all these emerging difficulties in relations between Soviet republics could be eliminated by appropriate changes in their constitution. And concluding his extensive letter, Rakovsky emphasized: “The most important question remains - the question of developing a strictly centralized, but federal system of government, in which the interests of the republic would be properly protected and the latter would enjoy a certain autonomy.” Rakovsky considered the commission's conclusion inconclusive and proposed to raise the issue again and resolve it in its entirety in accordance with the resolutions of the party congresses. The next day, September 29, Rakovsky sends a letter from Gurzuf to Manuilsky, emphasizing his disagreement with the decision of the commission on relations between the RSFSR and the independent republics. He sees in its decision harm to the strengthening of the party and Soviet power in all the outskirts and, if the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine shares his point of view, he considered it advisable for Petrovsky and Frunze to go to Moscow and defend this point of view.
Rakovsky, therefore, was not an opponent of centralism, he was clearly aware of it, but could not in any way support the elimination of the formal independence of the Soviet republics, putting forward the grounds of both internal and external order. He, apparently, did not yet know Lenin’s proposals, but their opinions agreed, first of all, on the issue of non-recognition of the autonomization plan.
A number of other leading party and Soviet workers also took part in the development of the project for the future structure of the country. Of interest in this regard is the note by the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M.I. Kalinin, sent to I.V. Stalin at the very beginning of October 1922. This note also contained a number of amendments, but to another, later project. It is noteworthy that in this note Kalinin, addressing Stalin, directly wrote: “Your project is completely violated democratic principle, with my amendments I strive to restore it. I hope that you, as People’s Commissar of Nationalities, will support me.” And then the “All-Russian headman” makes several amendments, which, in his opinion, will help reduce the costs of new government apparatuses and, in general, as he wrote there, they are closer to the spirit of Soviet power. But Kalinin gave amendments to another draft, where Lenin’s comments were taken into account.
This new project The resolution also dates back to the beginning of October, more precisely until October 6, and already in its first paragraph it was written: “Recognize as necessary the conclusion of an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR on their unification into the “Union of Socialist Soviet Republics”, leaving for each of They have the right to freely secede from the Union. This was the first and most important point of the draft resolution of the commission, which thus proposed a new name for the future state - the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. This was followed by proposals for the organization of state bodies, according to which some of the commissariats were subject to union subordination, and some to republican subordination. It was proposed to consider the Union Central Executive Committee as the highest body of the Union, where it was proposed to include representatives of the Central Executive Committees of the RSFSR, the Transcaucasian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus in proportion to the population they represented. Executive body It was proposed to consider the Union Central Executive Committee as the Union Council of People's Commissars, appointed by the Union Central Executive Committee. The draft of this resolution was signed by members of the Central Committee commission Stalin, Ordzhonikizde, Myasnikov, and Molotov.
Miliukov P., Why was the Russian revolution inevitable? // Russian idea. In the circle of writers and thinkers of Russian diaspora. M., 1994. T. P, p. 120.
The failed anniversary, p. 115–120. The letter was first published in the News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989, no. 9, p. 209–213.
Lenin about the federation. Lenin identified the need to consider this issue dialectically and in dynamics.
On the eve of February 1907, Lenin spoke out sharply against the federal structure of the state. Under these conditions, it was especially important to unite the proletariat (letter to Shaumyan vol. 48 p. 234). But already at this time he foresaw exceptions. It allowed for a Balkan federation for Serbia and Montenegro. Lenin spoke out approvingly for the separate existence of Norway and Sweden, for the separation of Ireland from England.
We can distinguish 3 stages in the formation of the Leninist concept of the federation. The first period of the struggle for victory in the democratic revolution (until February 1917). At this time he advocated a unitary state. The second period - February-October 1917 - recognizes the admissibility of the federation. The third period after October 1917, when conditions changed radically. Lenin emphasizes the need for federation.
After the October Revolution, Lenin not only spoke out for federation, but also formulated certain principles of federalism:
1) socialist federation based on Soviets,
2) federation based on nationality,
3) principles of voluntary association,
4) principles of equality of all republics,
5) democratic centralism.
31) Stalin’s “autonomization” plan.
Autonomization is a term that arose in connection with the work of the commission created by decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in August 1922 to develop a proposal for the unification of independent Soviet republics (RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, ZSFSR, BSSR) into a single state. The autonomization plan envisaged the proclamation of the RSFSR as a state, which included the Ukrainian SSR, ZSFSR, BSSR, as autonomous entities without right of exit
The following took part in the work of the commission: I.V. Stalin (chairman, People's Commissar of Nationalities), G.I. Petrovsky, A.F. Myasnikov, S.M. Kirov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, V.M. Molotov, A.G. Chervyakov and others.
The autonomization plan was proposed by Stalin and accepted by the commission. Accordingly, the supreme bodies of power and administration in the country were to become the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR. Stalin argued that this path would make it possible to create a single economic organism with a leadership center in Moscow.
The autonomization plan was discussed by the plenums of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the republics and was not supported at most of them. This idea was sharply opposed by the leaders of the Georgian Communist Party, who did not agree with such an understanding of the union, which should have led to a complete loss of independence. However, at meetings on September 23 and 24, 1922, the commission approved Stalin’s theses on autonomization.
V.I. Lenin, having familiarized himself with the materials of the commission, sent a letter on September 26, 1922 to members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in which he made a fundamental criticism of the plan. He argued that “autonomization” would inevitably worsen Moscow’s relations with the population of the outlying republics. He proposed a different form for the formation of a single state - a voluntary union of equal republics similar to a federation. “...We recognize ourselves as equal in rights with the Ukrainian SSR and others, and together and on an equal basis with them we are entering a new union, a new federation...” wrote Lenin.
32) Industrialization in the USSR: essence, sources and main stages.
Industrialization is the creation of basic industries.
1. The need for industrialization
Russia lagged behind world powers in terms of quality economic indicators, labor productivity, and technical equipment of enterprises. Elements of industrial production were weakened first by the First World War and then by the civil wars.
2. Goals of industrialization:
a) elimination of the country’s technical and economic backwardness;
b) achieving economic independence;
c) creation of a powerful defense industry;
d) development of basic industries.
3. Sources of industrialization
a) transfer of funds from agriculture in heavy industry;
b) forced loans from the population;
c) export of goods (consumption by the population is limited), sale of works of art;
d) unpaid work under the slogan of competition;
e) inclusion of prison labor in the planned economy;
f) sale of wine and vodka products.
4.Features of industrialization:
a) development of heavy industry to the detriment of light industry (defense interests);
b) sources of industrialization - internal reserves;
c) centralized distribution of resources;
d) fast pace (10-15 years);
e) significant role of the state.
5. Industrialization personnel
To fulfill the established production plan it was necessary large number labor force, therefore short term Unemployment was eliminated, but there was a shortage of engineering and technical personnel. The number of higher and secondary technical educational institutions, and over several years 128.5 thousand specialists were trained. Prisoner labor was also included in the planned economy.
The decision on industrialization was made in 1925 at the XIV Party Congress. Its task is to make the USSR an industrially independent country and allow it to confront Western capitalist powers on equal terms. Collectivization provided funds for the development of industry (primarily heavy industry), which simplified the confiscation of grain from the peasants. Many of them fled to the cities and were ready to work for meager wages. The free labor of prisoners was actively used. Masterpieces of art were sold abroad (mainly in the USA) for pennies. There was almost no Western investment due to the USSR's refusal to pay tsarist debts.
In 1929-1932 The first five-year plan took place, and the second in 1933-1937. Old enterprises were reconstructed and hundreds of new ones were built. Major construction projects- Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (Magnitka), Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station (Dneproges), White Sea-Baltic Canal (Belomorkanal), Chelyabinsk, Stalingrad, Kharkov Tractor Plants, Turkestan-Siberian Railway (TurkSib), etc. Plans were inflated, deadlines were excessively compressed, enterprises were put into operation unfinished, which later led to long-term stagnation. Product quality was low.
The enthusiasm of the masses, inspired by the ideas of socialist construction, played a major role. In 1935, the Stakhanov movement began (its founder was miner A. G. Stakhanov) for exceeding plans. The government, demanding that everyone follow the Stakhanovites, doubled production standards. Product quality has decreased.
Nevertheless, during the first five-year plans, a powerful industry was created that made it possible to withstand a future war. However, this was often done contrary to the recommendations of economists; haste led to overexertion of forces. The standard of living has fallen compared to the NEP era.
Autonomation a term that arose in connection with the work of the commission created by decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviks) in August 1922 to develop a proposal for the unification of independent Soviet republics (RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, ZSFSR, BSSR) into a single state. The following took part in the work of the commission: I. V. Stalin (chairman, People's Commissar of Nationalities), G. I. Petrovsky, A. F. Myasnikov, S. M. Kirov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, V. M. Molotov, A. G. Chervyakov and others. Plan A., proposed by Stalin and adopted by the commission, envisaged the proclamation of the RSFSR as a state, which included rights autonomous republics Ukrainian SSR, ZSFSR, BSSR; Accordingly, the supreme bodies of power and administration in the country were to become the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR. The relationships that had developed by this time between the independent republics were built on the basis of equal treaties on military-political and economic alliances. The tasks of strengthening defense, reconstruction and further development national economy along the path of socialism, the political, economic and cultural rise of all nationalities demanded closer unity of the Soviet republics into a single multinational state. Question about political form multinational Soviet socialist state and was the main one in the work of the commission of the Central Committee of the party. Plan A. was discussed by the plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics and was not supported at most of them. Nevertheless, the commission, at meetings on September 23 and 24, 1922, approved Stalin’s theses on A. This decision was erroneous. Theses on A. took into account the requirements of strict unity and centralization of the efforts of the Soviet republics, but at the same time violated the sovereign rights of these republics; were, in essence, a step back in comparison with the already established forms of nation-state building. V.I. Lenin (he was ill), having familiarized himself with the materials of the commission and having talked with a number of comrades, sent a letter on September 26, 1922 to members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in which he made a fundamental criticism of the A. plan, put forward and substantiated the idea of forming a union states on the basis of complete equality of all independent Soviet republics: “... we recognize ourselves as equal in rights with the Ukrainian SSR and others, and together and on an equal basis with them we are entering into a new union, a new federation...” wrote Lenin (Poln. sobr. op. ., 5th ed., vol. 45, p. 211). Lenin emphasized that it was necessary not to destroy the independence of the republics, but to create “...another new floor, a federation of equal republics” (ibid., p. 212). On October 6, 1922, Lenin sent a note to the Politburo of the Party Central Committee in which he categorically insisted on equal representation of all union republics in the leadership of the federal Central Executive Committee (see ibid., p. 214). Lenin’s plan for the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics formed the basis of the commission’s new draft, which was reported by Stalin and approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on October 6, 1922. Lenin returned to criticism of the plan in one of his last letters - “On the question of nationalities or “autonomization”.” Lenin wrote that “... this whole idea, “autonomization,” was fundamentally wrong and untimely” (ibid., p. 356), that it could only bring harm, distorting the ideas of unification of Soviet republics in the spirit of great-power chauvinism. The draft violated the principle of self-determination of nations, giving independent republics only the right to autonomous existence within the RSFSR. Lenin opposed excessive centralism in matters of unification and demanded maximum attention and caution in resolving issues of national policy. The unification of the republics must be carried out in a form that will truly ensure the equality of nations and strengthen the sovereignty of each union republic, “... the union of socialist republics should be retained and strengthened; - Lenin wrote, - there can be no doubt about this measure. We need it, just as the world communist proletariat needs it to fight the world bourgeoisie and to protect itself from its intrigues” (ibid., p. 360). Lenin’s letter was read out at a meeting of the heads of delegations of the 12th Congress of the RCP(b) (April 1923), his instructions formed the basis of the congress resolution “On the National Question”. The formation of the USSR, completed on the 1st All-Union Congress Soviets December 30, 1922. Lit.: Lenin V.I., On the formation of the USSR, Complete. collection cit., 5th ed., vol. 45; him, On the question of nationalities or “autonomization”, ibid.; History of nation-state building in the USSR, M., 1968, p. 355-69. L. A. Zavelev, L. V. Metelitsa.
Great Soviet Encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet encyclopedia . 1969-1978 .
See what “Autonomization” is in other dictionaries:
An enterprise management scheme that makes it possible to autonomously detect failures and deviations in the production process in companies. Dictionary of business terms. Akademik.ru. 2001 ... Dictionary of business terms
autonomization- and, f. autonomisme m. The process of establishing autonomy. Lead to the autonomy of economics and politics. NINI 2004 4 11 … Historical Dictionary of Gallicisms of the Russian Language
autonomization- Jidoka Bringing human intelligence into machines that can independently detect the first defect, and then immediately stop and signal that help is needed. ... Morphemic-spelling dictionary
Autonomation- (from the Greek αυτονομια self-government, from αυτοσ itself and νομοζ law) one of the forms of politics. forms of association of owls. republics The idea of A. belonged to J.V. Stalin and was reflected in the Draft Resolution on the relationship of the RSFSR with the independent republics... ... Russian humanitarian encyclopedic dictionary
AUTONOMIZATION, a term that arose in connection with the work of the commission created by decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in August 1922 to develop a proposal for the unification of independent Soviet republics into a single state ( RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, ZSFSR, BSSR). The following took part in the work of the commission: I. V. Stalin (chairman, People's Commissar of Nationalities), G. I. Petrovsky, A. F. Myasnikov, S. M. Kirov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, V. M. Molotov, A. G. Chervyakov and others. The autonomization plan proposed by Stalin and adopted by the commission assumed the proclamation of the RSFSR as a state, which included the autonomous republics of the Ukrainian SSR, ZSFSR, and BSSR as autonomous republics; Accordingly, the supreme bodies of power and administration in the country were to become the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR.
The relationships that had developed by this time between the independent republics were built on the basis of equal treaties on military-political and economic alliances. The tasks of strengthening defense, restoring and further developing the national economy along the path of socialism, the political, economic and cultural rise of all nationalities required closer unity of the Soviet republics into a single multinational state. The question of the political form of the multinational Soviet socialist state was the main one in the work of the commission of the Central Committee of the Party. The autonomization plan was discussed by the plenums of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the republics and was not supported at most of them. Nevertheless, at meetings on September 23 and 24, 1922, the commission approved Stalin’s theses on autonomization. This decision was wrong. Theses on autonomization took into account the requirements of strict unity and centralization of the efforts of the Soviet republics, but at the same time violated the sovereign rights of these republics; were, in essence, a step back in comparison with the already established forms of nation-state building.
V.I. Lenin (he was ill), having familiarized himself with the materials of the commission and talking with a number of comrades, sent a letter on September 26, 1922 to members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in which he made a fundamental criticism of the autonomization plan, put forward and substantiated the idea of forming a union state on the basis of complete equality of all independent Soviet republics: “... we recognize ourselves as equal in rights with the Ukrainian SSR and others, and together and on an equal basis with them we are entering into a new union, a new federation...” wrote Lenin (Poln. sobr. op. , 5th ed., vol. 45, p. 211). Lenin emphasized that it was necessary not to destroy the independence of the republics, but to create “...another new floor, a federation of equal republics” (ibid., p. 212). On October 6, 1922, Lenin sent a note to the Politburo of the Party Central Committee in which he categorically insisted on equal representation of all union republics in the leadership of the federal Central Executive Committee (see ibid., p. 214). Lenin's plan for the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics formed the basis of a new commission project, which was reported by Stalin and approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on October 6, 1922.
Lenin returned to criticism of the plan in one of his last letters - " On the issue of nationalities or “autonomization”". Lenin wrote that “... this whole idea of 'autonomization' was fundamentally wrong and untimely" (ibid., p. 356), that it could only bring harm, distorting the ideas of unification of Soviet republics in the spirit of great-power chauvinism. The draft violated the principle of self-determination of nations and granted independent republics only the right to autonomous existence within the RSFSR. Lenin opposed excessive centralism in matters of unification and demanded maximum attention and caution in resolving issues of national policy. The unification of the republics must be carried out in a form that will truly ensure the equality of nations, strengthen the sovereignty of each union republic, “... the union of socialist republics should be preserved and strengthened,” Lenin wrote, “there can be no doubt about this measure. We need it as much as we need it.” to the world communist proletariat to fight the world bourgeoisie and to protect against its intrigues" (ibid., p. 360). Lenin's letter was read out at a meeting of the heads of delegations of the 12th Congress of the RCP(b) (April 1923), his instructions formed the basis of the congress resolution “On the National Question.” The triumph of Lenin's ideas of proletarian internationalism, fraternal friendship and the unity of equal and sovereign peoples was the formation of the USSR, completed by the 1st All-Union Congress of Soviets on December 30, 1922.
L.A. Zavelev, L.V. Metelitsa.
Materials from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia in 30 volumes were used. Ch. ed. A.M. Prokhorov. Ed. 3rd. T. 1. A – Engob. – M., Soviet Encyclopedia. – 1969. – 608 p.
Literature:
Lenin V.I., On the formation of the USSR, Poly. collection cit., 5th ed., vol. 45; him, On the question of nationalities or “autonomization”, ibid.; History of nation-state building in the USSR, M., 1968, p. 355 - 69.