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Domestic policy of Alexander III. Main directions of state policy

Under internal politics is understood as a set of areas of state activity in economic, social, scientific, educational, demographic, law enforcement, military, environmental and other important areas public life inside the country. The state uses various means to implement its internal policies: taxes, the state budget, judicial and law enforcement agencies, the social security system, funding of science, education, and healthcare. Since government in the state is carried out at three levels - national, regional and local, then, accordingly, internal state policy is divided into national(federal), regional And local.

Among the main directions of the state’s internal policy, it is customary to highlight economic, social, industrial, agricultural, energy policies, as well as policies in the field of employment, labor relations, education, health care, law enforcement, and the environment.

Economic policy of the state

Economic policy is called upon to play a major role in ensuring the stability of the economic sphere of society, guaranteeing freedom of entrepreneurial activity and protection of the rights of owners and consumers.

For the effective functioning of a market economy, a favorable social, organizational, regulatory and legal environment, and political stability are required, which are ensured by the strength and authority of the state. It is the state that acts as a guarantor of maintaining a competitive environment when it monitors compliance with antimonopoly legislation. At the same time, the state regulates financial sector, providing guarantees of the reliability of the national currency and the stability of the monetary system. An important regulator of economic life is the acceptance and distribution state budget, which determines the budget for financing the most important government programs. During periods of economic crises, the role of state regulation of the economy is especially important, since it is the state that, at a critical moment, is able to mobilize all the resources of society to overcome the crisis.

On modern stage economic policy Russia is aimed at ensuring modernization the entire system of the socio-economic sphere of society. The data presented in table. 5.1, allow us to compare the main macroeconomic and scientific and technical indicators of Russia’s development in the 2000s. and clearly see their growth.

Table 5.1

Main macroeconomic and scientific-technical indicators of Russia's development in 2000–2009

Indicators

GDP (billion US dollars, 2000 prices)

GDP per capita (US$, 2000 prices)

Domestic research and development (R&D) costs (% of GDP),

– including private sector expenditures on R&D (in % of GDP)

Export of high-tech products (billions of US dollars, at current prices)

Export of high-tech civil products (% of world market)

Patent applications (residents)

Researchers per million population

Number of people employed in R&D, including:

- private sector

– public sector

– higher education sector (e.g. universities)

– non-profit sector

The concept of long-term social economic development Russian Federation for the period until 2020, approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 17, 2008 No. 1662-r, defines as a strategic goal of state policy the achievement of a level of economic and social development corresponding to the status of Russia as a leading world power of the 21st century. In 2015–2020 Russia should be among the top five leading countries in terms of GDP. Achieving this state policy goal means the formation of a qualitatively new image of the future of Russia by the end of the next decade and, in particular, provides for:

  • 1) Russia’s approach to the welfare standards of developed countries;
  • 2) high quality and comfortable living conditions for the population;
  • 3) creation of a favorable human environment;
  • 4) changing the social structure of society in favor of the middle class, reducing economic differentiation of the population and a sharp reduction in poverty;
  • 5) innovative leadership of Russia in the world based on advanced research developments, high technologies and educational services. Russia must take a significant place in the markets of high-tech goods (at least 10% of the market) and intellectual services for four to six or more large positions. It is expected that conditions will be created for the massive emergence of new companies in all sectors of the economy, primarily the “knowledge economy”;
  • 6) Russia’s leadership in the supply of energy resources to world markets, including through geographic and product diversification of supplies, turning Russia into a logistics hub of the global energy infrastructure and a key participant in developing the rules for the functioning of global energy markets;
  • 7) creation of an extensive transport network that ensures high territorial mobility of the population and global competitiveness of Russia in the transport services markets;
  • 8) Russia’s leadership in integration processes in the Eurasian space, the transformation of our country into one of the global centers of world economic relations, including as a world financial center;
  • 9) the formation of a new model of spatial development of Russia based on the creation of new territorial centers of growth and reduction of the scale of regional inequality;
  • 10) ensuring the guaranteed implementation of the constitutional rights of citizens, including a developed system of democratic institutions, the presence of effective law enforcement mechanisms and a system for ensuring national security.

Systematic achievement of the set goal consists in the transition of the Russian economy from the export of raw materials to an innovative socially oriented type of development. This will dramatically expand the competitive potential of the Russian economy by increasing its comparative advantages in science, education and high technology and, on this basis, tap into new sources of economic growth and increased well-being.

Formation of an innovative economy means the transformation of intellect, creative potential people into a leading factor in economic growth and national competitiveness, along with a significant increase in the efficiency of use of natural resources and productive capital. The source of high incomes is not only the possibility of obtaining rent from the use of natural resources and global conditions, but also the production of new ideas, technologies and social innovations.

The innovative path of development makes it possible to increase social sustainability and justice in society, since the benefits from economic growth are received not only by a narrow layer of society participating in the appropriation of rental and export income, but also by the main social groups associated with the development of infrastructure, the agricultural complex, basic industries and spheres of production. In this case, strengthening the social orientation of economic development is based on increasing national competitiveness and efficiency, and not on the redistribution of existing wealth and social confrontation.

The innovative socially oriented type of growth has a number of qualitative and quantitative characteristics that reflect the characteristics of its key factors. Innovative growth is growth based on:

  • A) economic diversification, in the structure of which the leading role is transferred to the branches of the “knowledge economy” and high-tech industries. The share of the high-tech sector and the “knowledge economy” in GDP should be at least 17–20%, and the contribution of innovative factors to annual GDP growth should be no less than two to three percentage points;
  • b) increasing the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy without significantly increasing production resources. By 2020, labor productivity should increase by 2.4-2.6 times (in certain sectors - up to 4 times), and energy efficiency - by 1.6-1.8 times;
  • V) high innovative activity of companies, associated with the development of new markets, updating the product range, mastering new technologies, and creating new forms of business organization. Share industrial enterprises carrying out technological innovations should increase to 40–50%, and innovative products in output volume – to 25–35%;
  • G) intensifying fundamental and applied research and development while radically increasing their effectiveness. Domestic R&D spending should rise to 3.5–4% of GDP in 2020;
  • d) improving the quality of human capital and the efficiency of its use, which is characterized, in particular, by the rapid growth of wages of qualified workers. Average monthly wage in the economy in 2020 it will increase to $2,700 (for comparison: in 2007 – $526);
  • e) accelerated growth of industries that ensure the development of human potential, primarily education and health care. In 2020, spending on education from public and private sources should amount to 5.5–6% of GDP (for comparison: in 2006 – 4.6%), on healthcare – 6.5–7% of GDP (in 2006 g. – 3.9%), which is comparable to the level of the most developed countries.

This approach requires the implementation of complex transformations interconnected in terms of resources, timing and stages main directions transition of the Russian economy to an innovative socially oriented type of development.

  • 1. Human development. On the one hand, this is providing favorable conditions for the development of the abilities of each person, improving people’s living conditions and quality social environment, and on the other hand, increasing the competitiveness of human capital and the social sectors of the economy that provide it as a key factor innovative development.
  • 2. Creation of a highly competitive institutional environment, stimulating entrepreneurial activity and attracting capital to the economy.
  • 3. Structural diversification of the economy based on innovative technological development, which involves the formation of a national innovation system, including such elements as a system of scientific research and development integrated with higher education, flexibly responding to demands from the economy, engineering business, innovation infrastructure, intellectual property market institutions, mechanisms for stimulating innovation, etc.
  • 4. Consolidating and expanding Russia’s global competitive advantages in traditional areas(energy, transport, agricultural sector, processing of natural resources).
  • 5. Expansion and strengthening of Russia’s foreign economic positions, increasing the efficiency of its participation in the global division of labor.
  • 6. Transition to a new model of spatial development of the Russian economy, which involves the formation of new centers of socio-economic development in the Volga region and the Urals, in the South of Russia, in Siberia and the Far East

East, based on the development of energy and transport infrastructure and the creation of a network of territorial production clusters that realize the competitive potential of the territories.

In table 5.2 presents the Russian competitiveness index in 2012–2013. in comparison with other countries of the world based on the materials of an annual study conducted World Economic Forum(WEF). The WEF report includes two indices on the basis of which country ratings are compiled:

  • – Global Competitiveness Index ( Global Competitiveness Index, GCI);
  • – Business Competitiveness Index (Business Competitiveness Index, BCI).

The main means of generalized assessment of the competitiveness of countries is Global Competitiveness Index(GCI), first published in 2004. The GCI is made up of 12 criteria that detail the competitiveness of countries around the world at different levels of economic development. These criteria are: the quality of institutions; infrastructure; macroeconomic stability; health and primary education; higher education and vocational training; efficiency of the market for goods and services; labor market efficiency; financial market development; level of technological development; size of the domestic market; competitiveness of companies; Innovation potential.

Economy

Global Competitiveness Index

Change of position

Switzerland

Singapore

Finland

Netherlands

Germany

USA

Great Britain

Norway

Saudi Arabia

South Korea

Australia

Luxembourg

New Zealand

United Arab Emirates

Malaysia

Ireland

Iceland

Puerto Rico

Barbados

Azerbaijan

Brazil

Portugal

Indonesia

Kazakhstan

South Africa

Mauritius

Slovenia

Costa Rica

Bulgaria

Jordan

Philippines

Sri Lanka

Colombia

Slovakia

Montenegro

Seychelles

Global Competitiveness Ranking 2012–2013 led by Switzerland, which ranks first in the ranking for the fourth year in a row. Second and third places are occupied by Singapore and Finland, respectively.

Northern and Western European countries continue to dominate the top ten list, with Sweden (4), the Netherlands (5), and Germany (6) topping the list. The United States of America occupies seventh place: despite improving overall competitiveness indicators, the United States continues to fall in the ranking for the fourth year in a row, moving down two places.

The competitiveness gap among European countries continues to widen. In particular, countries in Northern and Western Europe have strengthened their traditionally strong competitive positions since the economic crisis of 2008-2009. At the same time, Southern European countries such as Spain (36th), Italy (42nd), Portugal (49th) and especially Greece (96th) continue to suffer from competitive disadvantages, among the main ones being macroeconomic instability, poor access to finance, inflexible labor markets and lack of innovation.

Large developing market economies - the BRIC countries - demonstrate different indicators. Despite a slight decline in the ranking by three positions, China (29th place) continues to lead the group. Brazil (48th place) moved up in the ranking, while India (59th place) and Russia (67th place) slightly decreased their positions.

Russia lost one position in the ranking and dropped to 67th place. The report notes that compared to the previous year, the relatively stable position of our country has worsened in terms of such components as the quality of institutions, competition in the markets for goods and services, antimonopoly policy and the development of the financial market. There was an improvement in only two indicators: the macroeconomic environment and infrastructure. As last year, business representatives cite corruption and inefficiency of the state apparatus, as well as high tax rates, as the key problems for Russia’s economic development. In addition, problems with the availability of financing and labor qualifications have increased significantly this year. All this prevents Russia from taking advantage of its competitive advantages, such as a relatively low level of public debt and budget deficit, a significant volume of the domestic market, a relatively high innovative potential and high-quality higher education.

In order to cope with negative trends, the most important task of Russia’s economic policy at the present stage is overcoming the country's technological backwardness .

Russia must occupy a significant place in the international division of labor, not only as a supplier of raw materials and energy, but also as the owner of constantly updated advanced technologies in at least several sectors. Otherwise, the country will constantly lose resources, paying them for new, increasingly complex and expensive technologies for the production of industrial goods, materials and medicines that we do not know how to create ourselves. At the same time, the share of the global gross product belonging to such technologies will grow, while raw materials and traditional services will decline. To regain technological leadership, we need to carefully choose priorities. Russia's new economic policy should be centered around industries such as pharmaceuticals, high-tech chemistry, composite and non-metallic materials, aviation, information and communications and nanotechnologies. Traditional sectors where we have not lost technological advantages are the nuclear industry and space.

The restoration of the innovative nature of the economy is expected to begin with universities– both as centers of fundamental science and as the personnel basis for innovative development. The international competitiveness of higher education is becoming a national goal: by 2020, it is planned to create several world-class universities across the entire spectrum of modern material and social technologies. For Russian Academy sciences, leading research universities and state research centers will approve ten-year programs of fundamental and exploratory research, it is planned to increase funding to 25 billion rubles. (in 2018) state scientific funds supporting the initiative developments of scientific teams. In 2012, only 47 companies with state participation adopted innovation programs, but in the future, private corporations must also get used to 3–5% allocate its gross income to research and development.

The second side of technological modernization is the fastest possible development of imported technologies. By investing in the competitiveness of advanced sectors of the economy, Russia is simultaneously solving a global social task - the development of the creative class and the creation of space for its implementation. It is assumed that the new Russian economy will become diversified: In addition to the modern fuel and energy complex, other competitive sectors will be developed. The share of high-tech and intellectual industries in GDP should increase by one and a half times by 2020, while Russia’s high-tech exports will double. This will be an efficient economy with low energy intensity and high labor productivity: it is expected to double productivity in the economy as a whole, and in key sectors to achieve productivity levels comparable to or even higher than those of our competitors. This will be an economy of constantly updated technologies: by the end of the decade, the share of enterprises introducing technological innovations should increase two and a half times - from the current 10.5 to 25%. In other words, it is planned to reach today's average European level.

At the investment forum "Russia-2012" V.V. Putin presented for the first time a new economic program. He noted that for Russia it is fundamentally important Become one of the countries with the most attractive investment climate:“You need to take 100 steps forward in order to rise from 120th place to 20th in the investment rankings.” V.V. Putin outlined specific guidelines: the time required to connect to power grids will be reduced by almost four times; the accountant will spend three times less time filling out paperwork; a cargo truck will cross customs seven times faster than now; To obtain permission to build a facility, it will take five times less time and three times less paperwork.

Work to improve the investment climate will be based on three principles: business integrity, widespread implementation of international practices And cooperation between business and government. To achieve this, firstly, Russia will have a commissioner for the protection of the rights of entrepreneurs, including Russian, and not just foreign investors. The new ombudsman will receive a special legal status: he will be able to initiate regulations, defend the interests of entrepreneurs in court, and suspend the operation of regulations until a court decision. Secondly, administrative and property cases will be combined in courts on the basis of the arbitration judicial system. Thirdly, all “rudiments of Soviet norms” must be removed from criminal legislation. In particular, it was proposed to introduce a ban on the initiation of criminal proceedings on the illegality of transactions without a corresponding decision of the arbitration court. In addition, state control over business activities will be changed: there should be a reorganization in favor of self-regulation and liability insurance. Finally, it is necessary to harmonize Russian corporate legislation with the documents of European partners, and, above all, speed up work on shareholder agreements.

Thus, serious work remains to be done to increase the competitiveness and investment attractiveness of the Russian economy, which is what Russia’s modern economic policy is aimed at.

Main directions of domestic policy

· Policy of “enlightened absolutism”

The essence of “enlightened absolutism” is the policy of following the ideas of the Enlightenment, expressed in carrying out reforms that destroyed some of the most outdated feudal institutions.

Catherine 2 imagined the tasks of the “enlightened monarch” as follows: “1.

It is necessary to educate the nation that is to be governed. 2. It is necessary to introduce good order in the state, support society and force it to comply with the laws. 3. It is necessary to establish a good and accurate police force in the state. 4. It is necessary to promote the flourishing of the state and make it abundant. 5. It is necessary to make the state formidable in itself and inspiring respect among its neighbors.”

· Illegal seizure of power

· Philosophy of enlightenment

· Growth of privileges of the nobility

To strengthen the role of the nobility locally in 1775 ᴦ. The "Institution for the management of the provinces of the All-Russian Empire" was adopted.

A continuation of the reforms of local authorities was the “Charter of Grant to Cities” (1785), which determined the management system in cities. It fixed the class structure of the city's population, dividing it into 6 categories with different rights.

In 1785 ᴦ. The “Certificate of the Nobility” was also published - “Certificate of the right of liberty and advantages of the noble Russian nobility.” The privileges of the nobles received the status of law. The diploma confirmed the right of the nobles not to serve the state. Nobles were exempt from taxes and corporal punishment, had the right to trade and entrepreneurship, and could not be deprived of their noble title, life and estate without trial. The nobles had exclusive ownership of land with the peasants.

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    • 2.1 Characteristics of the first stage of Alexander’s reign. This period, remembered by contemporaries as the wonderful beginning of the Alexandrov days, was very promising and in its essence meant not only a return to the policy of enlightened absolutism, but also giving it a new quality.

    2.2. First steps. Immediately after the coup on March 11, 1801, the new emperor abolished those regulations of his father that caused particularly acute discontent among the nobles:

    2.2.1 . All articles demoted by Pavel have been fully restored Certificate of Complaint to the nobility, which returned him the status and position of a privileged class.

    2.2.2 . Confirmed Certificate of Complaint cities.

    2.2.3. An amnesty was carried out for 12 thousand prisoners.

    2.2.4. Preparations for a military campaign in India were stopped and the ban on trade with England was lifted. But peaceful relations with France were not broken.

    2.2.5 . Alexander, not trusting either the former entourage of Catherine II, or the highest dignitaries who had discredited themselves by participating in the preparation of the palace coup, tried to rely on the liberal-minded friends of his youth: V.P. Kochubeya, P.A. Stroganova, N.N. Novosiltseva, A.A. Czartoryski. They formed a circle called Secret Committee , who performed the functions of an unofficial government and was involved in preparing reforms.

    2.3. Measures regarding the peasantry. It was Alexander who took the initiative to regulate the state of relations between the landowner and the serf, as well as to implement policies designed to really alleviate the situation of the peasants.

    2.3.1 . Was the practice of distributing state peasants was stopped to landowners. As a result, this led to an increase in the share of relatively free state and appanage peasants, who before the abolition of serfdom accounted for at least 50% of the total peasant population of the country.

    2.3.2. Limitations of landowner arbitrariness. Landowners were forbidden to send peasants to hard labor and to Siberia (1809), or to publish advertisements for the sale of peasants. Alexander sought more - a ban on selling serfs without land, but was unable to overcome the resistance of senior dignitaries. And the published decree was violated, because landowners began to print advertisements for the “rental” of peasants, which in reality meant the same sale.

    2.3.3 . In 1803 it was adopted decree on free cultivators, which allowed serfs to buy their freedom with land, but with the consent of the landowner. Only a very few serfs were able to take advantage of the goodwill of their landowners. (During the reign of Alexander I - 47 thousand male souls).

    ABSTRACT

    on the topic of:

    “The main directions of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation”



    Introduction

    Historical and strategic legacy of Russian foreign policy

    Foreign policy towards the EU countries and the USA

    Russian foreign policy towards the CIS countries and Asia

    Conclusion

    List of used literature


    Introduction


    The foreign policy of the state is, as is known, one of the most difficult areas of activity. But just as in the case of domestic policy, the effectiveness of this activity greatly depends on its realism, purposefulness and consistency. All these characteristics are largely laid down already at the stage of developing a theory of politics, which ultimately takes the form of doctrines, concepts, specific programs, etc. But no matter how perfect and verified the theory is, practical politics will always differ from it, since neither one theory is not able to take into account all the specific problems that happen in life.

    Russian foreign policy is striking both in its ability to take advantage of emerging situations and in its inability to create new ones. United States and many European countries actively criticize the steps taken by the leadership of the Russian Federation: they are concerned about what consequences the renationalization of income from the sale of energy resources will entail for domestic and foreign policy. But these critical statements should not obscure the main thing: compared to the Yeltsin period, Russia has acquired significantly greater freedom of action in the international arena.

    Russia's foreign policy is viable if only because it has the ability to constantly confuse or confuse its partners, who constantly have to puzzle over its interpretation. It is based on the process of national post-imperial self-identification acquired by a country whose memory of past relations with other states is still alive.


    Historical and strategic legacy of Russian foreign policy


    Without delving into the history of Russian strategic culture, it is nevertheless important to identify some of its characteristic features.

    Since the 17th century, Russia has been building its Grand Strategy against a geopolitical backdrop consisting of three theaters of action: western (from the Baltic to the Carpathians), southern (from the Danube to the mountains of Persia) and eastern (from the Volga to Altai). The country's political and military leadership always strived to be ready to act simultaneously on these three fronts.

    Having undergone profound ideological changes, this vision of the world has passed through the centuries and is felt even in today's behavior Russian leadership. In the minds of the modern political class, which considers itself the bearer of the traditions of the Tsarist and Soviet eras, such “mental tools” obscure modern tasks of self-identification and force it to carry out a certain synthesis. Putin’s behavior also bears the burden of this double legacy: he would like to reconcile Tsarist Russia and the USSR, using political purposes symbols and memorable events. For example, he revives the Soviet anthem (December 2000) and organizes a ceremonial burial in the Donskoy Monastery of the remains of the white general Anton Denikin (October 2005).

    This connection of times becomes much more controversial when it comes to Russia's attitude towards the states over which it previously dominated. It is difficult to even imagine to what extent the past dominates minds and influences actions. Reconciliation with its neighbors (primarily the Baltic states and Poland) would mean for Russia an acknowledgment of the ambiguity of its own history and a final farewell to illusions. Recognizing the impact of history could be the first step toward coming to terms with oneself.

    Such a legacy makes everything related to the country's sovereignty extremely sensitive. This question is at the center of any political debate; he is subjected to careful analysis from the point of view of the internal or external danger that allegedly threatens him. The exaggerated importance of sovereignty is the basis of the policy of independence, which consists of protecting national interests anywhere and anytime. Russians were, are and will be patriots. The transformation of patriotism into nationalism, and sometimes xenophobia, is encouraged by certain political forces for their own purposes. At the level of strategy, this is expressed in an organic inability to accept the role of someone else's junior partner. Therefore, assumptions that this kind of partnership could arise between Russia and the United States after the events of September 11, 2001 did not come true.

    Under Vladimir Putin, the strategic legacy is being put into practice in three areas.

    First, immediately after coming to power, the Russian president began efforts to rid the country of the burden of foreign debt and end the dependence on international creditors that existed under Boris Yeltsin. According to data from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, in 2000, external debt amounted to 61.3% of GDP; six years later it was only 14.8%.

    Secondly, both the global (participation in the activities of international organizations) and bilateral (actions from a position of strength, in particular in the post-Soviet space) policy of the Kremlin proceeds from the fact that the territory of Russia represents a strategic crossroads. In light of this, the concept of the great game, often used to describe the struggle for influence in Central Asia (by analogy with the Russian-British rivalry of the second half of the 19th century century) is illegal: the field of the big game that Moscow is playing is not only Central Asia, but also the entire territory from the Balkans to the Far East. In foreign policy, Putin never retreats from his zone of interests.

    Thirdly, Putin’s Russia is doing everything possible to maintain its position, that is, to stop the process of loss of influence that began under Yeltsin, in particular in the post-Soviet space. In parallel, at all levels of decision-making, Russia strives to maintain freedom of action, no matter what the cost. According to the Kremlin, maintaining freedom of action is not a means, but an end.


    Foreign policy towards the EU countries and the USA

    foreign policy european union strategic

    During his first presidential term, Vladimir Putin made a strategic turn in Russian foreign policy, choosing a course towards rapprochement with the West (he supported the United States after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and managed not to spoil relations with Washington after the start of the war in Iraq in 2003).

    The catalyst for the overdue revision of the role of the Russian Federation in the international arena were the events of September 11, 2001. They led to the resolution of a complex web of problems in relations with near and far abroad. Act of terrorism in the United States caused a sharp intensification of American policy in all key regions of the planet, prompted the United States to revise previously declared priorities, and, as a result, make certain adjustments in relations with Moscow. Russia, faced with the fact of the inevitability of global changes, had no choice but to react to them as quickly as possible and focus on finding its place in the impending era of counter terrorism . Apparently, the Kremlin clearly realized that delay in making fundamental decisions could push the country even further to the periphery in the hierarchy of the world community. The consequence was a shift in emphasis in understanding the main tasks of Russian diplomacy abroad.

    The very fact that Putin has chosen a new course in foreign policy does not automatically eliminate the basic problems of Russian diplomacy. It does not imply either the restoration of Moscow’s positions in the main regions of the planet, nor the emergence of an effective mechanism for mobilizing the forces and means necessary to achieve this goal. The success of the new course depends in the current situation not so much on the minimal capabilities of the reduced geopolitical bridgehead, but on the form of their use in dialogue with the West. Russia will have to achieve recognition in the world community by avoiding the harsh and unacceptable alternative between fruitless confrontation and the abandonment of any ambitious plans in favor of supposedly impressive monetary subsidies to the economy, which are not feasible in practice.

    The Russian-opposed war in Iraq, Moscow's nuclear cooperation with Iran, a shift to the right in Russian domestic politics, and the arrest of America's friend, oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, put an end to the US-Russian partnership, which some have compared to the anti-fascist alliance in World War II.

    Until now, Americans could not imagine Russia as a power - the guardian of order outside the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, in matters of strengthening the WMD non-proliferation regime and global energy security, Russia remains an indispensable strategic partner for the West.

    In the United States, the current prevailing view is that a true strategic partnership emerges only on the basis of a shared vision and a common value system, while Washington and Moscow have no such system - moreover, the difference in core values has increased in recent years. Vladimir Putin in the United States is no longer considered a democrat in the Western sense of the word. Washington is confident that as “authoritarianism” grows in Russia, friction will inevitably arise between the two countries. The Kremlin's actions will sooner or later come into conflict with the interests of America and its allies - including in the so-called “near abroad”.

    The deterioration of relations between Russia and Europe is caused by objective reasons. Moscow and Washington are pushing European leaders - Germany and France - out of the post-Soviet space. There is a very tough dispute between Russia and the United States over control of the hydrocarbon resources of the countries of the former USSR. However, both Moscow and Washington agree that Europe has no place here. Europe continues to depend on oil and gas supplies from Russia and the post-Soviet space. This state of affairs does not suit the “German-French locomotive” of European integration.

    The global trend is associated with the establishment not of economic, but of direct military control over resource-rich territories. The EU understands this very well, but Europe is still not participating in the big game and risks “falling out of the process”

    In May 2006, US Vice President Richard Cheney, with his speech at the Vilnius conference of the international forum “Shared Vision for a Common Neighborhood,” questioned the good neighborly relations between the United States and Russia

    Objects special attention Russia and Belarus, closely connected with it, appeared in Vilnius. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the invitation sent to him to the forum and did not even send a single official representative of Russia to it. And from Belarus, which for the West and “new democracies” has long become a “rogue” country, the forum organizers did not invite anyone from the authorities at all. Another thing is that there were plenty of representatives of the political opposition from these countries at the conference.

    In May 2006, in Vilnius, at the “Shared Vision for a Shared Neighborhood” conference, US Vice President Dick Cheney gave a keynote speech on the West’s relations with Russia. He criticized the Kremlin's internal policies and also accused Moscow of "blackmail", "intimidation", "undermining the territorial integrity of neighbors" and "interfering in democratic processes." On the eve of the St. Petersburg G8 summit, Russia was asked to make a choice: “return to democracy” or “become an enemy.” A return to democracy will guarantee more success and more respect from neighboring states,” said the US Vice President, thereby stating that Russia has already moved away from democracy.

    The theme of the Cold War ran through the entire speech of the US Vice President. This expression, first uttered exactly 60 years ago by Winston Churchill in Fulton, was used three times by Dick Cheney.

    President Putin's speech at the Munich Security Policy Conference in February 2007 may go down in history as a turning point in international politics. Russia will begin to play a more active role in the foreign policy arena.

    Putin criticized the US, NATO and the OSCE quite sharply. He accused Washington of attempting to dictate the world. He stated that NATO expansion has nothing to do with the modernization of the alliance and provokes Russia, and the OSCE is turning into a “vulgar instrument.”

    Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that the United States is trying to impose its vision and norms on all other states. “Individual norms, and in fact almost the entire legal system of one state, primarily, of course, the United States, have crossed their national borders in essentially all areas - both in economics and in politics,” he said at an international conference in Munich .

    He emphasized that the United States is trying to impose its will on other states. “Well, who will like it,” noted the Russian President. For the modern world, a unipolar model is impossible, said Russian President Vladimir Putin. “For the modern world, a unipolar model is not only unacceptable, but also completely impossible. Not only because with sole leadership in the modern world there will not be enough military-political or economic resources. More importantly, the (unipolar) model itself is unworkable, since it has no moral basis modern civilization", Putin said.

    This was not just a familiar, if outspoken, critique of the Bush administration's misdeeds. Speaking to an audience that included European leaders and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as Americans, Putin attacked NATO. He said that the inclusion of former pro-Soviet states in the North Atlantic Alliance would destabilize the situation in Europe and threaten Russia. “Who is this expansion against?” - he asked a question. The last time the international community faced such aggression from a Moscow leader was in 1960, when Nikita Khrushchev banged his shoe on the table at a UN meeting.

    Putin's speech in Germany, delivered just minutes after Chancellor Merkel warmly praised diplomatic relations between Europe and the United States, was a breach of normal diplomatic protocol. However, she was not just being rude.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his speech in Munich at the international security conference, demonstrated that Russia plays an important role in world politics and is ready to solve the most complex problems.


    Russian foreign policy towards the CIS countries and Asia


    In the field of foreign policy, Putin’s second term is characterized by a decisive cooling of relations with the CIS countries where the “color revolutions” took place (Georgia, Ukraine), as well as with Western countries, primarily the United States (in particular, regarding the Iranian nuclear program).

    In the 2000s, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine finally left the Russian orbit. Moreover, “color revolutions” did not play a role in this process decisive role. The first state to refuse exclusive Russian assistance in resolving its internal problems was not “democratic” Ukraine, but Moldova, led by communist president Vladimir Voronin. Wine or gas wars should not be misleading. Moscow can open or close its market for Moldovan wine as much as it wants, but the main thing is that since 2003, official Chisinau has abandoned Moscow’s exclusive role in resolving the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict.

    And this refusal became a strategic choice for Moldova, not subject to “wine” campaigns. Further, the 2000s became a period of activation of international structures alternative to the CIS - primarily GUAM and the Organization of Democratic Choice, which are grouped around Ukraine.

    The democratic revolution in Georgia struck fear into the leaders of other former Soviet republics. For the first time in the post-Soviet space, opposition leaders united and were able to organize a mass protest movement, which ultimately led to the cancellation of the results of the rigged elections. The election of Mikheil Saakashvili as President of Georgia was the first popular uprising against the system of pseudo-democracy that had been established in former USSR.

    On the eve of the elections in Ukraine, the Russian authorities feverishly rushed to look for a pro-Russian party in this country. However, there was no strong pro-imperial force in this state, and the bet had to be placed on a representative of Leonid Kuchma’s “less pro-Western” team operating at that time. The choice was made on the most unfortunate, but, in the opinion of Russian political constructors, the “heaviest” figure of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Super-heavy artillery in the person of Russian President Vladimir Putin was thrown to his aid. However, such a move was interpreted by Yanukovych’s opponents as interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, and the Western propaganda machine helped them here, skillfully playing on the most sensitive strings of the broad and open soul of the Ukrainian people. The result is massive popular protests.

    After the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, Ukraine generally became a center of political gravity in the post-Soviet space, alternative to Russia and supported by the West. Today, she has firmly outlined her interests in Transnistria (Victor Yushchenko’s road map, the blockade of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldavian Republic) and in the South Caucasus (Borjomi Declaration, signed jointly with the President of Georgia). It is Ukraine that is increasingly beginning to claim the role of the main mediator between the CIS states and Europe.

    For the Kremlin, the Georgian Rose Revolution was a major blow, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a nightmare. Putin, who openly supported candidate Viktor Yanukovych, has lost face. It has also now become clear that the manifestation of the power of the people is not an exceptional case of Georgia alone, and, like the Georgians, the Slavic brothers from Ukraine demanded fair elections and respect for the will of the voters. The Kremlin must understand that popular protest can rid the country of corrupt rulers.

    The same thing happened in Kyrgyzstan, and, I think, in the near future it may happen in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and, probably, in Turkmenistan. Russia is reaping the fruits of what was sown from the ruins of the USSR in the early 1990s. And it seems that nothing can be done - time is irretrievably lost. There is only one thing left to do - to build smooth official relations with the regimes established there and at the same time nurture, nourish and strengthen the pro-Russian forces that undoubtedly exist there. However, in order for them to agree to real cooperation, Russia must slightly change its foreign policy guidelines and clearly define its policy.

    The role of Asia in the world economy and politics has been growing very quickly in recent years and will continue to grow. Central Asia (CA) is becoming a region of increasingly active geopolitical rivalry, while undergoing obvious destabilization, as demonstrated by recent events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The main challenges of continental Asia are, as Putin rightly noted in Astana, trans-border in nature. All countries in the region, in one way or another, face the problems of Islamic extremism and terrorism, often supported from outside. There is an increase in the drug threat associated with an increase in the volume of drug trafficking from Afghanistan after the arrival of anti-terrorist coalition forces there. Tajikistan and the south of Kyrgyzstan are increasingly retreating from the onslaught of drug traffickers (a tragedy, in my opinion, is the departure of Russian border guards from the Tajik-Afghan border).

    Firstly, Uzbekistan occupies a strategically important geographical position, bordering on all other Central Asian states. The government in Tashkent retains unconditional subjectivity, the ability to control borders, and contain the pressure of radical Islamism and drug trafficking. Secondly, it is this government - Islam Karimov - that is subject to the most severe pressure, both from Muslim extremists and from the West. The tragic events in Andijan and the reaction to them in various countries demonstrate this well. Thirdly, and this is especially significant from the point of view of Russian interests, it was from Tashkent that over the past year the most noticeable steps have been taken towards our country and towards distancing itself from the pro-Western course.

    Russia needs dialogue with all political forces in Uzbekistan and encouragement from official Tashkent for such dialogue. But supporting Karimov in this difficult moment, as Putin did, is justified: after all, he stopped, at least temporarily, a very serious threat of destabilization and bloodbath throughout Central Asia and, possibly, disintegration own country.

    In order to once again become a center of gravity for neighboring countries, the modern Russian Federation must offer the CIS states its own - and not the Soviet - project. If Russia does not soon change its strategy and rethink its political mission in the post-Soviet space, it will face not just a radical reduction in its influence on its neighbors, but a radical change in its status on the territory of the former Soviet Union. From a regional leader, the Russian Federation will simply turn into the largest state in this part of Eurasia, and far from being the most successful in terms of economic and social development. This, in turn, will entail a radical rethinking of Russia’s role at the global level. If this trend deepens further - and so far there are no grounds for a “fundamental change” - then Russia will turn from a country presiding over the G-8 into a very inconvenient partner for the West. The main incentive for the implementation of such a negative scenario is the “stagnation strategy” that the Russian elite has been adhering to over the past few years.


    The new edition of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept was approved on February 12, 2013. The decree on the development of this Concept was signed by President V.V. Putin on the day of his inauguration, which clearly shows the importance attached to this Concept by the head of state

    There were times when in Russia the foreign policy concept was contained in a short circular, which said that Russia “has reached its natural development; it has nothing to desire, nothing to coerce from anyone” and “all that remains is to strengthen its position, protect itself from external danger and develop internal forces, moral and material, accumulating reserves of funds and increasing one’s well-being.” (1) This was under Emperor Alexander III. Today the situation is radically different... The approval of a new foreign policy concept occurred against the backdrop of new serious changes in international relations and the promotion of new foreign policy concepts by a number of major powers. (2)

    Answers to questions about the legal status of the Concept, why the new edition was adopted, and what has changed in it compared to the old edition are contained in the text of the document itself. The Concept states that it is a “belief system.” (3) At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the document was approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, that is, all its provisions acquired the status of a presidential decree - this is lower than the law, but higher than all other legal acts, including decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation, acts of parliament etc.

    The answer to the question why the next new edition of the Concept was adopted can be found in the Constitution of Russia, which states that the President of the Russian Federation “determines the main directions ... of the state’s foreign policy” (Article 80, Part 3) and “manages the foreign policy” of Russia (Article 86), that is, it is the main government body and the main official in the field of foreign policy. If we remember the time of adoption of previous concepts, we will see their obvious connection with the change of head of state: these are 1993, 2000, 2008 and 2013.

    It is worth noting here that the constitutional status of foreign policy has not yet been regulated in Russia. While the constitutions of the USSR enshrined the basic principles of the country's foreign policy, the Russian constitution of 1993 is silent about these principles. This is probably not an entirely correct approach, since the powers of the head of state in foreign policy must be within the constitutional framework. This is one of the mechanisms for ensuring foreign policy in the interests of the state and people. Thus, a constitutional provision on such a foreign policy principle as the protection of the foundations of international law and the protection of Russia’s allies could possibly become a legal obstacle to the adoption of, say, UN Security Council Resolution No. 1973. (4)

    Now about the differences between the 2013 edition (Concept 2013) and the 2008 edition (Concept 2008). First of all, the new edition excluded a number of foreign policy goals and added several new ones. For example, from the Concept 2013, such a goal as the creation of a system of bilateral and multilateral partnerships designed to ensure the stability of the country’s international position to fluctuations in the foreign policy situation was excluded, and a new one was included: strengthening Russia’s trade and economic positions in the system of world economic relations, diplomatic support for the interests of domestic economic operators abroad, non-discrimination of Russian goods, services, investments, use of the capabilities of international and regional economic and financial organizations for these purposes. (5) It is quite obvious that it is largely due to Russia’s accession to the WTO.

    It is impossible not to note new approaches to the issue of human rights. If in the Concept 2008 the goal of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation was called “protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad,” then the Concept 2013 also adds “defending... Russian approaches on the topic of the protection of human rights." It must be said that the Russian Foreign Ministry very clearly and accurately assessed the activities of the UN Human Rights Council, noting that at international forums human rights are increasingly "used for the unilateral imposition of neoliberal concepts that promote an asocial lifestyle and destroy people as a person." (6)

    Analyzing the new philosophy of Russian foreign policy, Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov writes that attempts emanating from the West to spread their own value scale with messianic insistence make one recall the words of O. Spengler: “All of this is episodic and local, in most cases even conditioned by minute spiritual interests of the inhabitants of large cities of Western European type, and by no means general historical ones Eternal values"The Russian minister emphasizes that the rejection of traditional values ​​developed over thousands of years, separation from one’s own cultural and spiritual roots, absolutization individual rights and freedoms is a recipe for the loss of all guidelines in both domestic and foreign policy. (7)

    Another important innovation of the 2013 Concept is a truly conceptual definition of the essence of the current situation in the world. The correct (or incorrect) formulation of Russia's foreign policy strategy depends on the correct formulation of this understanding. If the 2008 Concept simply spoke about “fundamental and dynamic changes”, “a fundamental transformation of international relations,” then the 2013 Concept gives these changes a qualitative description. It is noted that the essence of the transition period that international relations are experiencing is the formation of a polycentric international system. The new edition of the Concept states that the ability of the historical West to dominate the world economy and politics continues to decline and the global potential for power and development is dispersing and shifting to the East, primarily to the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the entry of new players to the forefront of world politics and economics against the background of the desire of Western states to maintain their usual positions is associated with increased global competition, which is manifested in increasing instability in international relations. (8)

    Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov notes that we cannot even hypothetically consider the option of “linking” Russia as a slave to any other key player in the international arena. The independence of Russia's foreign policy is due to its geographical size, unique geopolitical position, centuries-old historical tradition, culture and identity of our people. (9)

    New notes have also appeared in the classification of Russian foreign policy priorities. If the 2008 Concept in the section “Formation of a new world order” said that Russia is “interested” in a stable system of international relations based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation, then the 2013 Concept says that Russia “carries policy" based on these principles; moreover, another principle was added, not previously mentioned - the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. This is a very important statement, given that recently concepts based on “legitimate” intervention have been promoted as “emerging rules of customary international law”. (10)

    Of course, the new edition of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept has not solved all problems, including conceptual ones. Among such problems we can name, for example, the problem of foreign policy powers of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The regulation of their participation in international life in the 2013 Concept did not undergo any changes and completely repeated the corresponding provisions of the 2008 Concept. However, the problem itself remains. But the foreign policy powers of the regions are far from so harmless. Usually among such powers they only talk about cross-border trade or tourism. However, this is not entirely true: among the areas of “peripheral” foreign policy activity today one can see the regulation of foreign migration, attracting foreign investment and many other issues that, in fact, should belong to the federal center. (eleven)

    There is another important conceptual issue related to the dependence of foreign policy on domestic policy. In the absence of a concept of domestic policy, the concept of foreign policy will inevitably look unclear, and even contradictory. In this regard, you should pay attention to two more important aspects new foreign policy concept.

    Firstly, in the absence of an official domestic political concept, it was in the Foreign Policy Concept that important directions for domestic policy appeared. Thus, if among the goals of Russian foreign policy in the Concept 2008, this policy was aimed at creating favorable external conditions for “modernizing Russia, transferring its economy to an innovative path of development, increasing the standard of living of the population, consolidating society, strengthening the foundations of the constitutional system, the rule of law and democratic institutions, the implementation of human rights and freedoms and, as a result, ensuring the country’s competitiveness in a globalizing world,” the 2013 Concept speaks of other goals, namely the sustainable and dynamic growth of the Russian economy, its technological modernization and transition to an innovative path of development , improving the level and quality of life of the population, strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions, realizing human rights and freedoms. (12) Taking into account the fact that the 2013 Concept was approved by presidential decree, important conclusions, including legal ones, can be drawn from this.

    Secondly, attention should be paid not only to the dependence of foreign policy on domestic policy, but also to their feedback, which is expressed, among other things, in the possibility of pursuing a certain domestic policy depending on the situation in the world. It seems that it was precisely this aspect of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy that became the basis for the adoption of the new edition of the Concept of Russian Foreign Policy in 2013.


    Conclusion


    Thus, Boris Yeltsin led the state during the transition to democracy and left Russia devastated. Vladimir Putin will pay off his debts, but after his departure the political space will be much narrower. The shifting center of gravity in politics is expressed in the increased influence of nationalists, fueled by the relative increase in prosperity in the country, which owes this only to its own resources and ability to resist.

    Russian foreign policy traditionally interpreted depending on its relations with Europe. This vision is determined both by the deep conviction among Russians themselves that, thanks to close cultural ties, Europe is their natural partner, and by the desire of the Russian population to join the European way of life.

    But such a vision is deceptive. After all, based on it, the Russian Federation closes the discussion within the traditional framework: how to join Europe without losing its national identity. In other words, European analysis is based on an assessment of the prospects for integration. Moscow mainly continues to reason based on an assessment of the balance of power. Therefore, although Russia does not seek to enter into direct competition with the United States or spoil its relations with the European Union, it advocates interaction that is not based on a system of coercion or shared values.

    As for Russia's foreign policy towards the CIS countries, in order to once again become a center of gravity for neighboring countries, the modern Russian Federation must offer the CIS states its own - and not the Soviet - project. If Russia does not soon change its strategy and rethink its political mission in the post-Soviet space, it will face not just a radical reduction in its influence on its neighbors, but a radical change in its status on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

    Russia's foreign policy is very vulnerable due to two factors that will definitely make themselves felt. Firstly, when creating a system of energy deterrence, Vladimir Putin forgot that the fundamental principle of any deterrence system is the non-use of existing weapons. By resorting - albeit in a controlled and limited way - to stopping energy supplies (Boris Yeltsin also used this technique in his time), Putin is destroying his main trump card. After all, this could lead to clients finding workarounds, thereby exacerbating the lopsided nature of Russian power.

    Secondly, speaking about the historical continuity of his course, the owner of the Kremlin places it within the strict framework of the traditions of Russian foreign policy, but, paradoxically, shows surprising inconstancy and changeability in defining long-term goals. Without a doubt, this inconsistency is explained not so much by the unforeseen situations that he faces as president, but by the long-term trends in Russian policy towards neighboring states: the contrast between the narrowness of strategic thinking and the abundance of tactical actions. Inconstancy manifests itself whenever there is a need to give rapprochement with a partner the form of an alliance or an integration system, that is, as soon as you need to express your trust for a long period of time. Apparently, this is explained both by an inherited tradition of suspicion and by lack of self-confidence.

    An important (if not the most important) moment in Russian foreign policy over the past year has been the desire to “move to a formula that is more consistent with both Russia’s status in the world and our national interests: an equal partnership.” This approach brought results. “At the global level - through the obvious strengthening of our positions in the G8. Russia’s powerful “ally”, which contributes to the establishment of the principles of equality in relations with the leading powers of the world, is the objective tendency towards the formation of a multipolar world. This means that “Russia has a wide field for maneuver, for multi-vector diplomacy."

    The second new emphasis of Russia’s foreign policy in recent years is “the line towards diversifying Russia’s international relations. A country like Russia cannot walk on one, “Western leg.” The diversification of foreign policy relations has already borne fruit. It has led to progress in relations with The PRC (from an equal partnership to a trusting one, with a strategic perspective of interaction in the 21st century), with India, after a stagnant break, there has been progress in relations with Latin American countries.

    Summing up the analysis of the issue of the theory of foreign policy of modern Russia, it should be noted that over the months and years that have passed since January 1992, when the first attempt was made to present the foreign policy doctrine to the country and the world new Russia, and until mid-2002 several concepts were formulated, markedly different from each other. Every turn in political life within the country, changes in the balance of forces in it, every significant change in international relations were reflected in the content of the doctrine of Russian foreign policy. Ultimately, the foreign policy concept of mid-2002 turned out to be very different from all previous ones. Becoming more realistic and more focused on the national and state interests of Russia, it at the same time becomes more multi-vector and tougher.

    The next conclusion can be attributed to the fact that at the current stage, in contrast to the first, i.e., from the stage of 1992-1993. , the legislative branch of the Russian Federation no longer practically takes part in the formation of the country’s foreign policy concept. There is little participation in this kind of activity by various parties or movements, with the exception of those that actually lay claim to power. But their activity in this area is limited mainly to election campaigns.

    An unbiased analysis leads to another conclusion. Its meaning is that since the transition period in Russia has not ended, the balance of political forces is changing every now and then, and the new system of international relations is also just taking shape, so more than one update of Russia’s foreign policy concept will be required.


    List of used literature


    1. Russian foreign policy. - M., 1999

    Russian foreign policy. Collection of documents. - M., 1997

    On the current international situation and foreign policy ruling circles Russia. // Propaganda. No. 3, 2002

    Protopopov A. S. History of international relations and foreign policy of Russia 1648-2000. Textbook" [BOLERO]. , 2001.

    Protopopov A. S. Kozmenko V. M. History of international relations and foreign policy of Russia from the Peace of Westphalia to the present day (textbook). - M., 2002


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    In 1998, V.V. Putin headed the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. From March to August 1999, he served as Secretary of the Russian Security Council. On August 16, he was confirmed as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. And already on December 31 of the same year he began to serve as President of the Russian Federation.

    V.V. Putin was elected head of state on March 26, 2000 and began to fulfill his duties on May 7, 2000. Vladimir Vladimirovich was elected for a second term on March 14, 2004 (until 2008). On May 7, 2008, he ceased to serve as president and became chairman of the party " United Russia" And the very next day, the new head of state, Dmitry Medvedev, signed a statement appointing Putin as prime minister. But already in 2012, the politician returned to the post of president of the state.

    Briefly about Vladimir Putin's foreign policy

    As soon as Putin came to power in 2000, he approved the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. The main direction of Putin’s foreign policy, according to this agreement, is: “The Russian Federation must be an active player in the international arena, which is necessary to maintain the proper image of the state.” For seven years, the president took part in the G8 summits. The politician spoke in Okinawa (Japan), Genoa (Italy), Heiligendamm (Germany) and Kananaskis (Canada).

    In 2004, Putin's foreign policy was still actively developing. The President officially visited China, where he signed the transfer agreement, and the President often states to the public and journalists that he considers the destruction of the USSR a geopolitical catastrophe and calls for the return of the Russian Federation to the status of the most powerful state in the world.

    True, until 2004, Putin was of little interest in foreign policy; the head of state was busy with the country’s internal politics. That same year, he repealed Yeltsin's production sharing law. After this cancellation, huge sums of money from oil and gas began to flow into the state treasury of the Russian Federation. Many scientists believe that it was this abolition that led Russian Federation to true independence, and also marked the beginning of the country's sovereignty. But this state of affairs did not suit the West. In 2004, Russia experienced a wave of terrorist attacks involving Chechen militants. In order to prevent terrorist attacks, reforms were carried out in the police and the FSB, and counter-terrorism measures were strengthened.

    Putin’s foreign policy, which we briefly outlined in the article, turned out to be difficult in 2016: the unresolved conflict on the territory of Ukraine, the lack of a positive result of the Minsk agreements, and the extension of sanctions from the European Union.

    New policy of the Russian Federation

    In 2007, President Putin's foreign policy finally moved away from international strategy. That same year, at the Munich Conference on Security and Policy in Europe, the president gave a speech that was quoted by media around the world. The statement consisted of the following theses:

    • In international relations, a unipolar model of the world order is impossible.
    • The United States imposes its own policies on the entire world, sometimes even by force.
    • The question of the need for military intervention is decided only by the UN.
    • The political actions of the United States and the president himself are very aggressive.
    • NATO does not comply with international agreements.
    • The OSCE is a convenient tool for bringing benefits to the Northern Alliance.
    • The Russian Federation will continue to conduct foreign policy solely in its own interests.

    Despite such loud statements by the head of the Russian Federation, some countries supported his speech. But most world politicians recognized Putin as one of the most aggressive in the whole world.

    Domestic policy of the head of the board of the Russian Federation

    When Putin was still prime minister, he published an article entitled “Russia at the turn of the millennium.” After this speech, his rating overtook Yeltsin and amounted to 49%. In January 2000, popular trust in the politician was already 55%.

    When the new head of the board assumed the post of president of the state, the country was close to destruction. There were a large number of social, economic and political problems in the Russian Federation. Russia's gross domestic product was ten times less than that of the United States and 5 times less than that of China. Already in 2000, V. Putin published an “Open Letter” to the people, which clearly outlined the steps for the restoration and further development of the state, and outlined the planned reforms and political course.

    Four basic principles that were voiced in Vladimir Vladimirovich’s “Open Letter”:

    • active fight against poverty;
    • protecting the domestic market from criminal gangs and local oligarchs;
    • revival of the national dignity of Russia and Russians;
    • Putin's foreign policy as president should be based on protecting national interests.

    From that moment on, the government, led by the president, began the fight against law-abiding oligarchs and actively supported medium and small businesses. In May 2000, the president began to implement federal reform.

    Creation by the President of a single legal space

    Establishing and maintaining order in the country, strengthening the vertical of power and state institutions - these were the first steps to bring Russia out of the crisis. In accordance with federal legislation, the legal framework of the state has been updated. The legal space of the state was restored. There was a clear division of powers between local governments and regions. There has been decentralization of power in the country.

    Domestic policy and social orientation of actions

    Putin took a new path to solution social problems and called it “a course towards investing in people, which means in the future of the country itself.” State policy has set the goal of improving and raising the standard of living of citizens. The process of restoration of particularly neglected areas has begun: agriculture, education, healthcare and housing.

    About forty thousand units of diagnostic equipment and thirteen thousand ambulances were purchased. Approximately 1.3 million needy poor women and about 300 thousand children received free medical care.

    Improving the state's population growth

    Thanks to new health care reforms and financial incentives for fertility, the country's demographics have significantly improved. In 2010, the first certificate holders were able to benefit from financial assistance. About 314 thousand young mothers received money from the state in 2010. The amount of aid has increased. Also, since 2010, benefits for social support for families with children have been increased.

    Strengthening the army and stabilizing the situation in Chechnya

    With great effort, the President of the Russian Federation still managed to stop the war in the North Caucasus. A serious blow was dealt to terrorism and separatism. Chechnya became a full-fledged subject of Russia. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held, and a Constitution was adopted.

    But at the same moment, serious problems were discovered in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. After the resolution of the conflict in the north of the Caucasus Russian authorities improved the material support of the military, purchased modern weapons and carried out reforms in the army.

    Prosperity of corruption in the country

    Despite the positive development of the country’s domestic policy, the president still fails to overcome and completely eradicate corruption. In 2007, about a thousand criminal cases were initiated due to bribes of officials. Today, corruption in the public procurement system amounts to about 300 million rubles, which is 10% of the total amount of bribes. Despite all this, there is still no anti-corruption article in the legislation. Moreover, the laws of the Russian Federation do not even have the very definition of corruption.

    Apathy of citizens towards politics

    About 60% of Russians today are not interested in politics. About 94% of citizens admitted that everything that happens in the country in no way depends on them. Many blame the government led by V. Putin for this.

    Domestic and foreign policy, briefly reviewed by us, shows that the country’s leadership has not created a single mechanism where dialogue with the people would take place, the requests of the population would be heard, where residents could take an active part in the development of their Fatherland. Changes in electoral legislation increasingly separated the “tops” of society from the “bottoms.” The system of power is monopolized.

    V. Putin's politics: pros and cons

    In recent years, Putin's foreign policy has outperformed its domestic policy. On the world stage, the Russian Federation is gaining influence. To reduce Vladimir Putin’s influence on other countries, the West is trying to introduce the Russian Federation into economic and political isolation. In 2014, attempts were made to exclude Russia from the G8.

    Putin's domestic and foreign policies during his second and fourth presidential terms have acquired ambiguous meaning. On the one hand, one can see the power’s successful foreign policy, but on the other, corruption negates all efforts. To eradicate this phenomenon in the country, Putin had more time than other rulers. But, unfortunately, corruption still exists.