Why is it called the Khrushchev Thaw? Khrushchev's thaw

25.09.2019

Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation

State budget educational institution higher professional education

"St. Petersburg State University technology and design"

Department of Philosophy and History

Test

in the discipline "History"

On the topic: “Khrushchev’s Thaw”

Completed:

Kryshtalev Konstantin Vitalievich

St. Petersburg 2014

Introduction

Criticism of Stalin's personality cult and its consequences

. "Thaw" in the sphere of culture

Science and education

Conclusion

Literature

Introduction

In 1953, the more than thirty-year reign of I.V. ended. Stalin. After many years of existence of a totalitarian regime, called Stalinism by historians, the tyrant leader, a charismatic personality, its central link, died. The most notorious era in life was associated with the life of this man

Soviet Union. Much of what was done during the 30 years of his reign was done for the first time. The USSR was the embodiment of a new socio-economic formation. Its development took place under conditions of severe pressure from the capitalist environment.

Exactly Soviet Union, took the main blow Hitler's Germany in World War II, as part of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, he saved not only his sovereignty and his territorial integrity, but also the sovereignty of many countries. However, behind all these successes lay the terrible crimes of the authoritarian, Stalinist leadership, which cost many millions of innocent victims, which cannot be justified by any arguments. The Stalinist dictatorship was an extremely centralized regime, relying primarily on powerful party-state structures, terror and violence, as well as mechanisms of ideological manipulation of society, selection of privileged groups and the formation of pragmatic strategies.

The Soviet Union needed a person who, after Stalin's death, could untie the tight knot of problems and lead the country to progress.

And this person was Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Sharp, decisive, careless in words and actions, Khrushchev went through all levels of party work and headed large party organizations (Moscow, Ukraine). Having never studied anything seriously, Khrushchev compensated for his lack of education with an amazing political instinct, almost always correctly guessing the main trend of the time. By the will of fate, he was destined to stand at the helm of the USSR for a whole decade, a very unusual decade that shook the world with metamorphoses, called the “decade of the thaw” in the world. Many events of those years were classified, or were subject to Soviet ideological polishing, despite the weakening of censorship and criticism of Stalin's rule. Much has become clearer thanks to the declassification of documents, openness and democracy. In the early 2000s, many publications appeared in periodicals, and previously unknown archival materials on the events of this period were published.

In this work I will try to find out: was the “Khrushchev Thaw” a thaw for the people and society? And what changes took place in people's heads?

1. Criticism of Stalin’s personality cult and its consequences

The report was made at the conclusion of the XX Congress of the CPSU convened for 8 months ahead of schedule and which brought together 1,436 delegates, its purpose was to take stock of the changes that had occurred after Stalin's death, and to discuss the choice of a future course.

To an absolute surprise for the majority of delegates present at the congress, on the last day of the 20th Congress, on February 25, 1956, at a closed meeting, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. spoke at a closed meeting with a report “On the cult of personality and its consequences.” Khrushchev. The report described and condemned the facts of mass repressions against the people, sanctioned by Stalin, and spoke the truth about the death of many prominent figures of the state, party, senior officers and command levels of the army. As a result of Khrushchev’s intentionally liberal attitude towards the secrecy of the text of the report, for a short time its contents were known to almost the entire country.

The report exposed Stalin as an anti-people tyrant ruler: he talked about purges and “illegal investigative methods”, with the help of which absolutely incredible confessions were wrested from thousands of communists, the fabrication of many false conspiracies: in 1949 (“Leningrad case”), 1951 . ("Mingrelian case") and 1953 ("case of the killer doctors"). From the report, the congress participants also learned about Lenin’s “testament,” the existence of which had until then been denied by the party. After debunking the myth of Stalin as the “heir” and “continuator” of Lenin’s work, Khrushchev’s report attacked and destroyed the myth of Stalin as the “Great Military Leader”, exposing him as an indecisive and incompetent person responsible for the crushing defeats of 1941-1942. the image of Stalin as a generalissimo. In Khrushchev's report, it emerged new image Stalin is the image of an anti-people, incompetent ruler who did not want to listen to anyone, a tyrant who created his cult on fear, hatred, and constant denunciations, responsible for the catastrophic economic situation of the country in 1953. It is worth noting that most of the subsequent policies directed against the cult of Stalin was a struggle with the name, a struggle with the idol, but not with the reasons that gave birth to it.

The report also had a secondary task; after the elimination of Beria, the need arose to eliminate Malenkov, Molotov and other people dangerous to Khrushchev’s power; one of the stages in eliminating them was precisely the “secret report” delivered at the congress.

The truth about Stalin, pronounced from the rostrum of the congress, became a shock for contemporaries - for some, it was an unexpected revelation and turn, for others, it was a long-awaited restoration of justice. In society and on the pages of the press, one discussion fed another, the wave of public activity became wider and deeper. There were some extreme performances. The political leadership was not prepared for such a scale of events.

In society, of course, multiple unrest began, resulting in a violation of public order both in the USSR itself and in the “socialist camp”; sometimes it was possible to reach an agreement, but increasingly such protests had to be pacified with the help of the army, armored vehicles, special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB. These unrest showed the ill-conceived nature of the entire anti-Stalinist campaign. Before Khrushchev’s speech, Stalin was idolized and prayed for, but now he has become a dictator and a tyrant. Having overthrown Stalin from his pedestal, Khrushchev partially destroyed the system of fear, but in the minds of the Soviet average, there was still a glimmer of faith that everything was clearer from above. Now people began to believe that they had the right not only to expect changes for the better from the leadership, but also to demand them, and sometimes even demand them forcefully.

In fact, all this developed into a crisis of the new course of the Soviet leadership. And after the anti-Soviet protest in Hungary, an anti-Khrushchev opposition gradually took shape, the open appearance of which took place in June 1957. With the defeat of the “oppositionists” (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, etc.), the period of “collective leadership” came to an end, and Khrushchev, as First Secretary, became the sole leader, taking the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The most important detail: Khrushchev’s enemies were not subjected to repression as they would have been under Stalin: Malenkov became director of the Siberian power plant, and Molotov was sent as ambassador to Mongolia.

Popular performances during the Thaw. Riots as the courage of the people to demand a better life

Relaxations in the severity of the ruling regime towards the people, condemnation and exposure of past repressions, and the party's commitment to democratize the USSR regime - all this gave the people a feeling of freedom and revanchism for past grievances from the state. The people, accustomed to a “firm hand” and having lived through the time when, with the help of denunciations, it was possible to turn an ill-wisher into an “enemy of the people” by sending him to fell the forest, or mine ore in the Gulag camps, began to feel the freedom they wanted more and more, which sometimes I had to defend myself in clashes with the government, police and military. An analysis of popular unrest in the USSR shows the heterogeneity of problems in Soviet society: from the elementary dissatisfaction of workers with food supplies, labor organization and simply living conditions at the sites of production, large construction projects, and harvesting, to dissatisfaction with party policies and decisions of the 20th Congress. In general, the popular unrest can be used to judge the regime’s failures, as the failure to resolve old problems before new ones arise.

Thus, the unrest in Georgia, like a litmus test, showed one of the main problems of society: the ideological and psychological crisis that society experienced as a result of Stalin’s half-hearted revelations, the “pumping” of the people with old Soviet propaganda: when the people, already without any command from above, marched through the streets of Tbilisi with portraits of Stalin, shouted pro-Stalin slogans, and forced mourning posters with portraits of Lenin-Stalin to be hung on administrative and government buildings. The whole gusto of the protests in Georgia is that, in general, neither the police nor the authorities could do anything against the protesters (with the exception of brutal criminal protests; the protesters were in line with Soviet state ideology, because the party and leading figures of Georgia themselves were in confusion and could not figure out what the solution would be will be the most correct in this situation. The escalation of the conflict and, as a result, the clash between the protesters and the deployed troops was caused by Georgian nationalism and chauvinism, the insult and exposure of Stalin, Khrushchev, as it turned out, affected the national feelings of the Georgians, because they hurt their beloved fellow countryman in the crowd, in addition to the anti-state ones. There were also nationalist, separatist slogans, slogans directed mostly against Russian soldiers. Unfortunately, such a clash was not without numerous casualties from the local population, wounded among the military and beaten police officers.

Popular uprisings were not only strictly political in nature: the mass amnesty of 1953 made adjustments to the life of Soviet people, a huge number of anti- social elements spilled out onto the city streets. The majority had formal registration and employment, but in reality they were involved in drunkenness and robbery, introducing young school and vocational school students to the criminal, camp romance, who were left at a young age without parental supervision after the war. It was they who caused considerable headaches to the population of small towns and villages, often occupying them, committing robberies, extortion and thefts. In many cities, the level of crime was simply unbearable for the common man, there were frequent cases of attacks on a police officer for hooligan reasons, students of vocational and vocational schools united in gangs, pestered passers-by and got drunk. To combat the sharp surge in street crime across the country, at the highest level an order was given to strengthen police units in particularly dangerous areas, party and Komsomol organizations sent a large number of Komsomol members and youth to police assistance brigades, only such methods gave results that, although it was not immediate, still solved the problem with crime.

Workers sent to construction, harvesting, and other work were also participants in the popular unrest. Naturally, pogroms were carried out by workers who were not qualified labor force, these were Komsomol members, students of universities and technical schools, schoolchildren, military and medical staff. Such people went to such events with a surge of enthusiasm under the influence of the propaganda of “shock, socialist construction projects", and wanted to make a contribution to the common cause. In fact, there was enormous disappointment in the authorities; arriving people found themselves literally broken trough: On the ground, problems were discovered with food, water, entertainment and leisure, accommodation and living conditions of workers, and even job insecurity. As a result, riots on domestic grounds, a desire for revenge with the authorities, and conflicts with the local population. A striking example is Temirtau, where all these problems were evident, there were clashes with troops and police, everyday problems spilled over into politics. Fortunately, after the end of the riots in this case, the Soviet government did not limit itself to the usual measures - trials and sentences for the participants in the riots. Immediately after the events in Temirtau, the prosecutor and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Kazakh SSR visited another workers' settlement in Ten-Tek, where they had meetings and conversations with young workers who arrived on Komsomol vouchers from various regions of the Soviet Union for the construction of a coking coal mine. The situation there was almost a mirror image of Temirtau on the eve of the riots. It was enough for some insignificant reason for the fire situation to take a difficult turn. The prosecutor and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan, under pain of criminal liability, demanded that the head of the trust immediately install electricity, install a sufficient number of washbasins, etc. The Deputy Minister of Trade of the Republic and the Deputy Chairman of the Regional Executive Committee arrived at the scene and took measures to improve trade and Catering.

Summing up the results of the consideration of mass riots, one could say about an unprecedented “clump” of problems, both social and political, during the era of Khrushchev’s rule, but for this test work this does not make sense. But it makes sense to note the positive fact of changes in the consciousness and self-awareness of the people - these “micro-Maidans” showed that soviet man freed from the shackles of communism primarily in the head, was it possible to imagine these events under the tyrant Stalin? Except that in the Gulag colonies, humiliated and insulted people tried to raise their heads, whom the Soviet punitive system tried to grind in its millstones. Of course, the main role in this was played by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev’s “secret report” and general liberalization state system and the party, of course, it was still very far from the level of the 90s of the twentieth century, but positive trends were already outlined.

. "Thaw" in the sphere of culture

Stalin thaw Khrushchev culture

The spirit of Khrushchev's rule and the events of the 20th Congress, first of all, gave hope to the intellectual elite and cultural figures, who were placed in strict limits during the reign of Stalin; in front of the eyes of poets, singers, writers, artists, many of their colleagues who had fallen under the heavy hammer emerged from the dungeons of the Gulag repression. Much of what was previously unacceptable became possible in the USSR, the Soviet people became acquainted with the works and creations of foreign writers, sculptors, film directors, and “samizdat” appeared.

One of the main features of Khrushchev's liberalization was the increase in criticism of the cultural spheres in Soviet society. In connection with these, starting from the late 50s. in the Soviet Union various ideological trends, informal public associations, public opinion is taking shape and strengthening. The writers in their works raised questions that concern everyone about the role of the intelligentsia in Russian history and modernity, its relations with the state, and the significance of the creativity of artists and writers in the existing system. For example, literary critic Vladimir Pomerantsev, in the article “On Sincerity in Literature,” on the pages of the magazine “New World,” wrote about the dominance in literature of standard official stamps, as if released from the same assembly line. Anti-Stalinist sentiments were clearly visible in the novels by V. Dudintsev “Not by Bread Alone,” P. Nilin “Cruelty,” and S. Antonov “It Was About Penkov.” The most striking works of this period turned their attention to participation in solving socio-political issues of the Soviet Union - about the attitude towards the Stalinist past, about the revision of the role of the individual in the state. Discussions took place at work, with friends, and, of course, on the pages of the press.

Among the new trends of that time in literature, one can single out “samizdat” - typewritten magazines in which young writers and poets who had no hope of publication in official publications published their works. Young people Soviet culture At first we met on Saturdays on Mayakovsky Square in Moscow. Later, meetings were banned and “samizdat” went underground. An example of a magazine that came out of the underground is the magazine "Syntax", whose founder was the young poet A. Ginzburg. The magazine published works by B. Akhmadulina, B. Okudzhava, E. Ginzburg, V. Shalamov. For “anti-Soviet agitation” A. Ginzburg was sentenced to two years in the camps. The appearance of “samizdat” became one of the manifestations of the dissident movement that was emerging among the intelligentsia in opposition to the Soviet state.

The renewal processes affected not only literature. Fine art also received a breath of fresh air, such trends in painting as “socialist realism”, “severe style”, “New Reality” and the “Lianozov group” appeared. Most of the new artistic movements seemed to oppose themselves to the art and creativity of past years, and some of them completely stood in opposition to the state course. So, for example, realism began to be interpreted by artists in a new way: in the paintings of D.D. Zhilinsky (“Young Sculptors” 1964), V.E. Popkova (“Builders of the Bratsk Hydroelectric Power Station” 1961), G.M. Korzhnev (triptych “Communists” 1960) Soviet reality appears without the usual one in the 40-50s. varnishing, deliberate festivity and pomp.

No matter how positive the new situation looked, many problems still remained in dire need of resolution. Firstly, pro-state and pro-party censorship has not gone away, although it has become much softer, more flexible and more humane. Art had to adapt to the new government policy. The clearest example of this is Boris Pasternak’s novel “Doctor Zhivago,” when not a single literary magazine agreed to accept and publish his work after being awarded in 1958. to him Nobel Prize according to literature, persecution began against Pasternak in his own country, he was forced to refuse the prize, denigrated, and offered to leave the USSR. The “Pasternak Affair” most clearly showed the limits of liberalism in the relationship between the authorities and the intelligentsia, and gave rise to a serious crisis in the consciousness of the Soviet intelligentsia, which showed itself unable to openly resist the pressure of the authorities. The same can be said about the exhibition of avant-garde artists from the “New Reality” studio in the arena; the art of this movement was simply not understood by Khrushchev and was subjected to harsh criticism by him; obscene expressions were used towards the artists themselves - “... Ban! Ban everything! Stop this nonsense! I order! I speak! And keep track of everything! And on radio, and on television, and in the press, root out all fans of this!” (N.S. Khrushchev). Still dominant in cinema military theme. It has found expression in the works of many directors: M.K. Kalatozov (based on the play “The Cranes Are Flying” by V.S. Rozov, 1957), G.N. Chukhrai “Ballad of a Soldier” 1959. And there are relatively few films dedicated to the problems of youth (M.M. Khutsiev “Ilyich’s Outpost” 1965), as well as light romantic films like “I’m Walking Around Moscow” (dir. G.N. . Danelia 1964).

To summarize, we can say that the process of concessions to the intelligentsia was combined with its pulling back. Khrushchev's liberalization sometimes led to unexpected results that had to be stopped and put back in the right direction, and such a pendulum inevitably remains in place in the long term, although, on the other hand, a cumulative progressive movement towards democracy and freedom of speech still took place.

Science and education

During the Thaw, serious reforms were carried out in the field of education. The law “On strengthening the connection between school and life and on the further development of the public education system in the USSR” was adopted in 1958. It was the law that marked the beginning of school reform, which provided for the introduction of compulsory 8-year education, instead of 7-year. The “connection of school with life” was that everyone who wanted to receive a complete secondary education (11 grades) and subsequently enter a university had to work two days a week at industrial enterprises or in agriculture. Along with the matriculation certificate, school graduates received a certificate of working specialty. For admission to higher education educational institution also required work experience in production for at least two years. This system did not justify itself and was canceled because employment in enterprises often reduced the quality of knowledge gained, while at the same time the masses of temporary workers, schoolchildren and future students, working not very well, brought more harm to the national economy than good. But still colossal successes were achieved: in 1958 - 59 academic year USSR universities graduated 3 times more engineers than the USA.

Soviet scientists achieved enormous success in science in the late 50s and early 60s. The system of the Academy of Sciences developed. In 1957, a decision was made to create a large scientific center- Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In the Novosibirsk region, construction began on a scientific town ("Akademgorodok"), which a few years later turned into the largest research center. Physics was at the forefront of the development of science, which in the minds of the people of that era became a symbol of scientific and technological progress and the triumph of reason for the Soviet people; among young people it became prestigious and fashionable to receive higher education and enlighten life with science. The works of Soviet physicists began to become world famous; the USSR under Khrushchev showed how a country, after huge military losses, could achieve incredible success. The Nobel laureates were N.N. Semenov (1956, study of chemical chain reactions), L.D. Landau (1962, theory of liquid helium), N.G. Basov and A.M. Prokhorov (1964, together with I. Townes, works on radio electronics, creation of the first quantum generator - maser). In the USSR, the world's first nuclear power plant was launched in Obninsk (1954), and the world's most powerful proton accelerator, the synchrophasotron, was built (1957). Under the guidance of scientist and designer S.P. The Queen developed rocket technology, and he did.

In 1957, the world's first artificial satellite was launched; in January 1959, the Luna-1 spacecraft launched towards the Moon, passing in close proximity to the lunar surface and entering a heliocentric orbit. In September of the same year, the Luna-2 spacecraft landed on the surface of the Moon, and a month later, the interplanetary station Luna-3 transmitted photographs of the far side of the Moon to Earth. And on April 12, 1961 Yu.A. Gagarin made the first flight into space in the history of mankind, which made a revolution in the minds of people. All concerts and performances began with congratulations to the audience on the successful completion of Gagarin's flight. And in the next two days, special planes landed at Moscow airfields, delivering delegations from various countries of the world to meet the first cosmonaut.

A large number of outstanding scientists were forced to deal with defense problems; this was due to the need to mobilize enormous human and material resources in order to create the most combat-ready army, and complete it in the shortest possible time. Scientific research and technical projects for production nuclear weapons. After all, the further foreign policy of the USSR was built on its development and improvement; only with the support of science did the USSR retain the status of a great power. Soviet science developed not only nuclear weapons for the army; in 1954, the Air Force fighter aircraft received an air-to-air missile aimed at a target using a radar beam. The Air Force also received an air-to-ground missile for strategic aviation, which could be launched from a heavy bomber 200 km to a target and carry a nuclear warhead.

Conclusion

Answering the question posed at the beginning of the work, we can say with confidence that colossal changes have occurred in the minds of the people of the Soviet Union. This applies to both ordinary people: workers, peasants, military men, office workers, and the intelligentsia: writers, artists, sculptors - they all have some relative freedom of choice, freedom of speech, a desire to demand a better life from the state and government, to ask him for his mistakes. Of course, the impetus for this turn was the 20th Congress with the famous “secret” report; the varied reaction to it gave rise to some free-thinking (compared to Stalin’s times). U different groups population, the “thaw” manifested itself in different ways in their heads: if from below it was riots, unrest, popular unrest, when the authorities had to bring in the army to suppress them military equipment, then the more sophisticated intelligentsia showed their attitude and vision of the situation in their creativity.

Creative opposition groups they created, created art, which, pointing out the mistakes of their present, stood across the throat of the Soviet state machine or the shameful Stalinist past, reminded of the millions of killed and repressed Russian people, not just people, but the intelligentsia, the flower of the nation. With the help of art at this time, the war was reflected from a more realistic point of view, the severity of military everyday life, instead of the victorious obscurantism of the general glorification of the war.

Literature

1.V.V. Dolgov. Brief essay history of Russian culture from ancient times to the present day. - 2001

2.V.A.Kozlov. Mass riots in the USSR under Khrushchev and Brezhnev (1953 - early 1980s) Third edition, corrected and expanded Moscow ROSSPEN, 2009.

History of the Soviet State //Vert N. 3rd revision. 2006 - “The Whole World” Publishing House.

Hosking, Geoffrey. History of the Soviet Union: (1917-1991) 2002.

History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the 20th century // Bokhanov A.N., Gorinov M.M.

L.A. Aslanov. “Mentality and power. Russian civilization" - M.: Teis, 2009.

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Khrushchev's thaw- an unofficial designation for the period in the history of the USSR after the death of I.V. Stalin (mid-1950s - mid-1960s). It was characterized in the internal political life of the USSR by the liberalization of the regime, the weakening of totalitarian power, the emergence of some freedom of speech, the relative democratization of political and public life, openness to the Western world, greater freedom of creative activity. The name is associated with the tenure of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N. Khrushchev (-).

The word "thaw" is associated with story of the same name Ilya Ehrenburg.

Story

The starting point of the “Khrushchev Thaw” was the death of Stalin in 1953. The “thaw” also includes a short period when Georgy Malenkov was in charge of the country’s leadership and major criminal cases were closed (“Leningrad Case”, “Doctors’ Case”), and an amnesty was given to those convicted of minor crimes. During these years, prisoner uprisings broke out in the Gulag system: Norilsk Uprising, Vorkuta Uprising, Kengir Uprising, etc.

De-Stalinization

With Khrushchev strengthening in power, the “thaw” began to be associated with the condemnation of Stalin’s personality cult. At the same time, in 1953-55, Stalin still continued to be officially revered in the USSR as a great leader; at that time, in portraits they were often depicted together with Lenin. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, N. S. Khrushchev made a report “On the cult of personality and its consequences”, in which Stalin’s cult of personality and Stalin’s repressions were criticized, and in the foreign policy of the USSR a course towards “peaceful coexistence” with capitalism was proclaimed peace. Khrushchev also began a rapprochement with Yugoslavia, with which relations had been severed under Stalin.

In general, the new course was supported at the top of the party and corresponded to the interests of the nomenklatura, since previously even the most prominent party figures who fell into disgrace had to fear for their lives. Many surviving political prisoners in the USSR and socialist countries were released and rehabilitated. Since 1953, commissions for verification of cases and rehabilitation have been formed. The majority of peoples deported in the 1930s and 1940s were allowed to return to their homeland.

Tens of thousands of German and Japanese prisoners of war were sent home. In some countries, relatively liberal leaders came to power, such as Imre Nagy in Hungary. An agreement was reached on the state neutrality of Austria and the withdrawal of all occupation forces from it. In the city, Khrushchev met in Geneva with US President Dwight Eisenhower and the heads of government of Great Britain and France.

At the same time, de-Stalinization had an extremely negative impact on relations with Maoist China. The CCP condemned de-Stalinization as revisionism.

In 1957, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR prohibited the naming of cities and factories after party leaders during their lifetime.

Limits and contradictions of the Thaw

The thaw period did not last long. Already with the suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, clear boundaries of the policy of openness emerged. The party leadership was frightened by the fact that liberalization of the regime in Hungary led to open anti-communist protests and violence; accordingly, liberalization of the regime in the USSR could lead to the same consequences. On December 19, 1956, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee approved the text of the Letter of the CPSU Central Committee “On strengthening the political work of party organizations among the masses and suppressing the attacks of anti-Soviet, hostile elements.” It said: “The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to appeal to all party organizations ... in order to attract the attention of the party and mobilize communists to strengthen political work among the masses, to resolutely fight to suppress the attacks of anti-Soviet elements, which have recently, in connection with some aggravation international situation, intensified their hostile activities against the Communist Party and the Soviet state." It went on to talk about the recent “intensification of the activities of anti-Soviet and hostile elements.” First of all, this is a “counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the Hungarian people”, conceived under the guise of “false slogans of freedom and democracy” using “the discontent of a significant part of the population caused by serious mistakes made by the former state and party leadership of Hungary.” It was also stated: “Recently, among individual workers of literature and art, sliding from party positions, politically immature and philistine-minded, attempts have appeared to question the correctness of the party line in the development of Soviet literature and art, to move away from the principles of socialist realism to the positions of unidealized art, demands to “liberate” literature and art from party leadership, to ensure “freedom of creativity,” understood in the bourgeois-anarchist, individualistic spirit.” The letter contained instructions to communists working in the organs state security, “vigilantly guard the interests of our socialist state, be vigilant to the machinations of hostile elements and, in accordance with the laws of Soviet power, promptly suppress criminal actions.” A direct consequence of this letter was a significant increase in 1957 in the number of people convicted of “counter-revolutionary crimes” (2,948 people, which is 4 times more than in 1956). Students were expelled from institutes for making critical statements.

Thaw in art

Thaw in architecture

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Increasing pressure on religious associations

In 1956, the anti-religious struggle began to intensify. The secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On the note of the department of propaganda and agitation of the CPSU Central Committee for the union republics “On the shortcomings of scientific-atheistic propaganda”” dated October 4, 1958 obligated party, Komsomol and public organizations launch a propaganda offensive against “religious relics”; government institutions were ordered to implement administrative measures aimed at tightening the conditions for the existence of religious communities. On October 16, 1958, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted the Resolutions “On monasteries in the USSR” and “On increasing taxes on the income of diocesan enterprises and monasteries.”

On April 21, 1960, the new chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kuroyedov, appointed in February of the same year, in his report at the All-Union Meeting of Commissioners of the Council, characterized the work of its previous leadership as follows: “ Main mistake Affairs Council Orthodox Church was that he inconsistently followed the line of the party and the state in relation to the church and often slipped into positions of serving church organizations. Taking a defensive position in relation to the church, the council pursued a line not to combat violations of the legislation on cults by the clergy, but to protect church interests.”

Secret instructions on the application of legislation on cults in March 1961 addressed Special attention that ministers of religion do not have the right to interfere in the administrative, financial and economic activities of religious communities. The instructions for the first time identified “sects whose creed and nature of activities are anti-state and fanatical in nature: Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, Adventist reformists” that were not subject to registration.

In the mass consciousness, a statement attributed to Khrushchev from that period has been preserved, in which he promises to show the last priest on television in 1980.

The end of the thaw

The end of the “thaw” is considered to be the removal of Khrushchev and the accession of Leonid Brezhnev to leadership in the year. However, the tightening of the internal political regime and ideological control began during the reign of Khrushchev after the end of the Caribbean crisis. De-Stalinization was stopped, and in connection with the celebration of the 20th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, the process of exalting the role of victory began Soviet people in war. They tried to avoid Stalin’s personality as much as possible; he was never rehabilitated. There was a neutral article about him in the TSB. In 1979, several articles were published on the occasion of Stalin's 100th birthday, but no special celebrations were held.

Mass political repressions, however, were not resumed, and Khrushchev, deprived of power, retired and even remained a member of the party. Shortly before this, Khrushchev himself criticized the concept of “thaw” and even called Ehrenburg, who invented it, a “swindler.”

A number of researchers believe that the Thaw finally ended in 1968 after the suppression of the Prague Spring. With the end of the Thaw, criticism of Soviet reality began to spread only through unofficial channels, such as Samizdat.

Mass riots in the USSR

On June 10-11, 1957, an emergency occurred in the city of Podolsk, Moscow region. The actions of a group of citizens who spread rumors that police officers killed the detained driver. The size of the “group of drunken citizens” is 3 thousand people. 9 instigators were brought to justice.
January 15, 1961, city of Krasnodar. Reasons: the actions of a group of drunken citizens who spread rumors about the beating of a serviceman when he was detained by a patrol for violating the wearing of his uniform. Number of participants - 1300 people. Applied firearms, one person was killed. 24 people were brought to criminal responsibility. See Anti-Soviet rebellion in Krasnodar (1961).
On June 21, 1961, in the city of Biysk, Altai Territory, 500 people took part in mass riots. They stood up for a drunk who the police wanted to arrest at the central market. The drunken citizen resisted the public order officers during his arrest. There was a fight involving weapons. One person was killed, one was injured, 15 were prosecuted.
On June 30, 1961, in the city of Murom, Vladimir Region, over 1.5 thousand workers of the local plant named after Ordzhonikidze almost destroyed the construction of a medical sobering-up station, in which one of the employees of the enterprise, taken there by the police, died. Law enforcement officers used weapons, two workers were injured, and 12 men were brought to justice.
On July 23, 1961, 1,200 people took to the streets of the city of Aleksandrov, Vladimir Region, and moved to the city police department to rescue their two detained comrades. The police used weapons, as a result of which four were killed, 11 were wounded, and 20 people were put in the dock.
September 15-16, 1961, street riots in the North Ossetian city of Beslan. The number of rioters was 700 people. The riot arose due to an attempt by the police to detain five people who were drunk in a public place. Armed resistance was provided to the law enforcement officers. One was killed. Seven were put on trial.
July 1-3, 1962, Novocherkassk, Rostov region, 4 thousand workers of the electric locomotive plant were dissatisfied with the actions of the administration when explaining the reasons for the increase retail prices for meat and milk, went to a protest demonstration. The protesting workers were dispersed with the help of troops. 23 people were killed, 70 were wounded. 132 instigators were brought to criminal responsibility, seven of whom were later shot (See Novocherkassk execution)
June 16-18, 1963, the city of Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk region. About 600 people took part in the performance. The reason was resistance to police officers by a drunken serviceman during his arrest and the actions of a group of people. Four killed, 15 wounded, 41 brought to justice.
On November 7, 1963, in the city of Sumgait, more than 800 people came to the defense of demonstrators who marched with photographs of Stalin. The police and vigilantes tried to take away the unauthorized portraits. Weapons were used. One demonstrator was injured, six sat in the dock (See Mass riots in Sumgayit (1963)).
On April 16, 1964, in Bronnitsy near Moscow, about 300 people destroyed a bullpen, where a city resident died from beatings. The police provoked popular outrage with their unauthorized actions. No weapons were used, there were no killed or wounded. 8 people were brought to criminal responsibility.

Notes

Footnotes

Links

Rudolf Pihoya. Slowly melting ice (March 1953 - late 1957)
A. Shubin Dissidents, informals and freedom in the USSR
And I gave my heart to search and test with wisdom everything that is done under heaven...

Periods of Soviet history

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With the death of I.V. Stalin in March 1953 ended an entire era in the USSR, which lasted 30 years and was remembered for terror, famine, and repression.

The tyrant was replaced for a short time by the head of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Under the leader, the party apparatus was controlled by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, that is, the same Stalin. But Malenkov had to cede leadership of the party apparatus to Khrushchev on March 14. From that day on, Khrushchev pursued a policy of seizing power in the country. Khrushchev was not a stupid politician at all. At first he rallied against less powerful politicians. Having secured the support of Colonel General P.F. Batitsky, achieved the arrest of Beria.

The appointment of Malenkov to the post of head of state was a kind of sacrifice of Malenkov to Beria. So, just in case, if Beria fails to weaken and overthrow. Managed. Malenkov, like many politicians, was himself afraid of Beria and therefore supported Khrushchev in his accusations against Stalin’s Cerberus. Malenkov also supported Khrushchev in his policy of de-Stalinization of society. I didn’t take into account that Khrushchev decided to rise above Stalin, trampling the Father of Nations into the mud. This was also part of Khrushchev's strategy. Having gotten rid of a strong and influential opponent, Khrushchev removed Malenkov. The so-called Khrushchev's thaw.

Some concessions

Feeling his strength and popular support, he gets rid of Malenkov and rises to the pinnacle of power. Then, in 1957, he removed from his post the Minister of Defense and the people's favorite, Hero of the Great Patriotic War Marshal Zhukov. Yes, Khrushchev was not stupid at all. He understood that he could not survive without the support of the people. He gave the people a taste of “freedom.” The Khrushchev Thaw was marked by the following events and processes:

Rehabilitation of victims of political repression;
Residents of collective and state farms received passports and the opportunity to move around the country.
Even those convicted of light criminal charges were amnestied.
Republics received more political and legal rights.
In 1957, Chechens and Balkars returned to their native lands,
The holding of the International Youth Festival showed the whole world the openness of the country of the Soviets.
During the same period, the pace of construction of residential buildings in cities increased, industry and energy began to develop.
Visit of the head of state to the USA.

Cultural life of the country

The Khrushchev Thaw lasted 10 years. Exactly as long as Nikita Sergeevich ruled the country. During this period, the avant-garde Taganka Theater of Yuri Lyubimov was born and flourished, which was called “the theater of freedom in an unfree country.”

The literary creativity of Viktor Astafiev, Bella Akhmadulina, Vladimir Tendryakov, Evgeny Yevtushenko, Andrei Voznesensky, and Robert Rozhdestvensky flourished.

Film production has increased manifold. The leading film directors of the Thaw were Marlen Khutsiev, Georgy Danelia, Mikhail Romm, Leonid Gaidai, Eldar Ryazanov. The following films became a cultural event of their time:

detective "Murder on Dante Street"
laureate of the 1958 Cannes Film Festival - the film “The Cranes Are Flying”,
The first Soviet-Indian production - the film “Walking across Three Seas”
"Spring on Zarechnaya Street"
"Ballad of a Soldier"
"Amphibian Man",

This far from complete list is complemented by comedies:

Comedies - “Carnival Night”,
The film “Striped Flight”, which became the leader of the Soviet box office in 1961, was viewed by 45.8 million viewers.
"Hussar Ballad"

"I'm walking around Moscow"

The years 1955-1964 were marked by the development of television. Television repeaters were installed throughout the main part of the country. National television began to emerge in all the capitals of the union republics. Television studios appeared in most regional centers and autonomous districts of the RSFSR.

Kinks

All these are positive moments in the development of the country. But Nikita Sergeevich also had obvious excesses, which became the subject of condemnation of his policies and popular jokes. For example, his slogans on the highways “Let’s catch up and overtake America” next to the road sign “not sure, don’t overtake” brought smiles to the drivers of that time.

The requirement to sow corn instead of wheat in fields where there was none in the first place caused irritation. There were collective farm leaders who categorically ignored this requirement. Nikita Sergeevich himself was known among the people as a “corn grower”.

The Khrushchev thaw also became years of brutal persecution of the church. Also, the Secretary General did something that even Lenin and Stalin did not dare to do: he sold to Israel the lands that belonged to our country in the Holy Land. He did not even sell these lands, which had the highest spiritual value, but exchanged them for oranges. It is noteworthy that these oranges rotted during transportation.

Also, there was no particular “thaw” in international politics. Whether the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of the third world war and the first atomic war, was Khrushchev’s mistake, analysts and historians should already answer this question. Perhaps this conflict did not receive a resolution that satisfied everyone. Perhaps strategic mistakes were made, which later served as an accusation against Khrushchev of inability to manage the state and the basis for his removal.

the first large-scale conscious attempt to destroy Stalinist totalitarianism, undertaken on the initiative of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N. Khrushchev after the death of I. Stalin in March 1953. In its content, this is the system of the then reforms of N. Khrushchev. They made significant changes in the social and political life of the Soviet Union, its domestic and foreign policy, and put an end to gross lawlessness and mass repression. However, without destroying the social foundations of totalitarianism, the Thaw ended with the removal of N. Khrushchev from the leadership of the party and the country, and the entry of Soviet society into a period of stagnation and degradation.

Although the totalitarian system created under the leadership of I. Stalin - barracks pseudo-socialism - contradicted the essence of the views of Marx and Lenin, as well as the fundamental interests of working people, its destruction was not predetermined by the death of I. Stalin. Created by the “great helmsman” and the fourth classic, the totalitarian monoideology “Marxism-Leninism” sanctified the existing structure as the social system of working people (“victorious socialism”), and the party-state bureaucracy, nurtured under the auspices of I. Stalin, stood guard over public order, while how the people, intimidated and crushed by repression, continued to believe in the country’s successful advancement towards a glorious communist future.

Something else is also important. From the time when Stalin’s despotic power, having pushed the working class and its allies out of the leadership and management of the country, established the undivided dominance of the party-state bureaucracy, the contradiction between the working people, the masses and the administrative-bureaucratic forces became the center of the contradictions of Soviet society, and this itself the contradiction took the place of the main contradiction of Soviet society, remaining as such since the late 20s. The nature of this contradiction is far from simple. The undivided power of Stalin did not mean at all that under this power there were no attempts by certain representatives of the party-state apparatus to take the side of the people, the working people, to challenge the despotic rule of Stalin (repeated attempts of this kind precisely determined Stalin’s destruction of the “Leninist guard” in 30s).

Although attempts to change power did not lead to the desired results, their very appearance was inevitable and ineradicable. The fact is that the political dominance of the party-state bureaucracy contains in itself an insoluble contradiction. Its essence lies in the deep gap between content and form, words and deeds. After all, the dominance of the party-state bureaucracy is possible only in a society following the socialist path, where the need for the conscious implementation of the ideals of the working people makes the people managing this process an irreplaceable, key part of society, its political power. This means that by subordinating this process to its own selfish interests and goals, the bureaucracy is forced to pretend that it is realizing the interests of the working class, the working people. As a result, both the deceived workers and the bureaucracy, which is obliged to constantly deceive, are unhappy. This gives rise to periodic explosions of discontent on both sides of the contradiction - among the working people and among the nomenklatura, which indicates the fragility and fragility of bureaucratic domination, setting in motion leaders who are dissatisfied with the domination of the bureaucracy and all the falsehood, who want to return power to the working people. The death of Stalin just gave the opportunity for such a leader - N. Khrushchev - and the figures who supported him to become more active.

To realize the opportunity that presented itself, personal courage and remarkable abilities of the new leader were needed. N. Khrushchev was a political genius. We are talking not only about his political directness and spontaneity of temperament, but also about the peculiarity of his political thinking, who most often relied not on logical reasoning, but on intuition, which often helped him out.

Having headed the party in September 1953, N. Khrushchev faced the task of correctly assessing what was happening and charting the path further development. The new First Secretary saw and understood a lot, but not everything.

It must immediately be emphasized that for N. Khrushchev, who began the reforms, as well as for M. Gorbachev, who acted as the highest leaders of the CPSU, much later, there was no doubt about the truth of Marxism-Leninism, as they represented it (and both knew it, as did everything, through the Stalinist interpretation, because they didn’t teach another). Despite the fact that the miner and the lawyer perceived “Marxism-Leninism” individually differently, they had no doubt about the correctness of the socialist path chosen in October 1917. However, as it later turned out, each leader had his own assessment of what happened to the country after October.

For N. Khrushchev, all the troubles of Soviet (and world) socialism and the communist movement (if we do not forget about the constant pressure and “intrigues” of imperialism) were associated with the “cult of personality and its consequences,” i.e. with the grossest miscalculations, mistakes, lawlessness of I. Stalin, whose comrade-in-arms long time was N. Khrushchev himself. Therefore, one general idea runs through all of N. Khrushchev’s reform activities: if one “cleanses oneself from Stalinism” and, first of all, from everything connected with mass repressions, and conducts business in the spirit of the general truths of Marxism-Leninism, then when fulfilling the proposal put forward at the XXII Congress of the CPSU in October 1961 Programs of “expanded construction of communism”, the communists will win both internally and on the world stage.

It was with this understanding that the main reforms and actions of N. Khrushchev were associated: the arrest, trial and execution of L. Beria, the destruction of the repressive apparatus, the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the closed report at it, condemning Stalin and his repressions, the 22nd Congress with innovative ideas and the removal of the body Stalin from the mausoleum, the exposure of the anti-party group in 1957, virgin lands, the housing epic, a whole array of innovative ideas in domestic and foreign policy and at the same time attacks on objectionable writers, poets, artists and other retreats and hesitations.

And yet, for all its inconsistencies and contradictions, the “Khrushchev thaw” became very important stage in Soviet development not only because, on behalf of the CPSU, it dealt a fatal blow to Stalinism, after which it could no longer rise. It was this period of Soviet history that became the cradle of nascent democracy, many reform initiatives, it was here that the galaxy of “sixties” began to form - the forerunners of perestroika, here not only A. Solzhenitsyn made himself known, but also conditions began to be created for the establishment of differences of opinion; Soviet citizens learned to discuss politics and criticize their own people without fear and without whispering political leaders, and the policy of peaceful coexistence ceased to be a slogan, a phrase became a reality, a meaningful system of measures.

But, condemning Stalinism and breaking with it, N. Khrushchev did not understand (later M. Gorbachev would repeat this mistake) that we must look much more broadly if we seriously talk about the troubles of Stalinism, because its essence is not just the villainy of the leader - AND .Stalin, and in a certain socio-political force, class - the party-state bureaucracy, the nomenklatura, which does not at all distort and pervert the scientific views of Marx and Lenin, but has its own ideology - Stalin’s “Marxism-Leninism”, its own social ideal - barracks pseudo-socialism , within the framework of which it exploits and oppresses the working people, reigns supreme, hiding behind socialist verbiage.

This mistake will cost N. Khrushchev his post, and for the Soviet people it will result in the loss of the opportunity to return to the socialist path.

At the end of his reform activities, N. Khrushchev will begin to understand that the omnipotence of the party and state bureaucracy is the main obstacle to the improvement of Soviet society. He will outline two decisive blows to the (party and state) nomenclature: the division of regional committees into urban and rural and the replacement of ministries with economic councils. However, the party-state bureaucracy, well understanding all the dangers threatening it emanating from the “corn farmer”, secretly, behind N. Khrushchev’s back, will prepare its answer: it will urgently convene the October (1964) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, where it will remove the leader-reformer from all posts , and the Khrushchev thaw will become history.

Khrushchev's Thaw - The activities of individuals such as Khrushchev can serve as an illustration of the most serious attempts at reform in the USSR. Having become a member of the Politburo quite late, he only gradually approached the reformist current represented by Malenkov... However, after the 20th Congress and the expulsion of the anti-party group, everything changed very quickly. Aware of the objective necessity and unexplored possibilities of political development, Khrushchev, with the powerful support of Mikoyan, increasingly asserts himself as a defender of the growing strength and open anti-Stalinism... Agriculture, liberalization, peaceful coexistence - these are the three stable fundamental elements of Soviet anti-Stalinism.

This amazing policy, which in just a few years mobilized against itself a motley coalition stretching from the extreme right to the extreme left on the Soviet political horizon, was the expression of a kind of neo-populism, in its content and norms going back to a certain Leninist integratism. Thus, the themes of the withering away of the state and the building of communism have been used since the late 50s. in order to establish new, albeit utopian, relations with the masses. The partial failure of these attempts subsequently gave rise to an increasingly uncontrollable desire for last stage Khrushchev's leadership to dismantle the party apparatus itself. The permanent rotation of leading party workers, the division of the party into urban and rural - all this opened the way... to a kind of socio-political pluralism, unacceptable for the majority of party cadres. However, it should also be noted that Khrushchev was deeply hostile... to dialogue with the Soviet intelligentsia and with specialists in the field of economics. Until the very end, Khrushchev remained hostile to reforms in the field of management, preferring to encourage forms of industrial corporatism, and his speeches on cultural topics were characterized by rudeness , not even devoid of contempt.

Khrushchev's open statements about his anti-Stalinism should not give us the impression that these elements indicate a break with the past. In addition, the almost symbolic list of victims of Stalinism, chosen by the General Secretary for mention in the report read only to the Soviet delegates of the 20th Congress, indicates that certain boundaries were set for criticism of the past..., and collectivization and five-year plans were considered as correct strategic decisions that exercised mythical collective leadership. This extremely cautious and even servile attitude towards orthodoxy in assessments of Soviet history is in itself a valuable indication of the limitations of the operation undertaken by Khrushchev.

Being a powerless witness to the moral coarsening of the top of the apparatus in the last years of Stalin’s rule, Khrushchev made an attempt, as Solzhenitsyn shows in his story “A Calf Butted an Oak Tree,” to direct the mass dynamics of Stalinism in a different direction, purifying Stalinism from its most brutal aspects and smoothing out its most blatant authoritarian tendencies...

Finding himself unable to really change the central mechanism of reproduction of the leadership of the party and state, Khrushchev turned to measures aimed at establishing a direct connection with the masses; he even began to invite “drummers” to meetings of the Central Committee and flaunt the private aspects of his life, appearing on film and television screens. Thus, he became the inventor of a kind of hardware "populism" with the goal of combining the authoritarian aspects of Stalinism with the popular base in a new synthesis, bold in words, but in practice not much different from the previous situation. The main aspect of “Khrushchevism” lies precisely in the desire to transfer into the hands of “the whole people” ... that part of the initiative that was confiscated from them by the party and the state, without essentially changing the previous type social development. In the field of agriculture, Khrushchev, having rejected proposals put forward earlier by Malenkov to expand the sphere of personal initiative, tried to get out of the situation by providing an appeal to the masses (the dissolution of the MTS, which, at least formally, allowed collective farmers to become owners of the means of production; the development of virgin lands) with traditional faith into the transformative power of technology received from above, with promises to improve the production of fertilizers, introduce new crops (for example, corn) and turn to Lysenko and other charlatans for advice. From point of view traditional structures, the most important reform that was implemented was the abolition of numerous ministries and a sharp reduction in the power of the State Planning Committee in favor of territorial-type associations.

In the last years of the Khrushchev period (1962-1964), more significant changes took place: the priority of heavy industry was questioned, and public opinion appeared autonomous in relation to the party. Lieberman published his first articles on the need to introduce new criteria for economic management. It was at this moment that Khrushchev’s conservative allies came to the conclusion that the rubicon beyond which the crisis of power began had already been crossed.

Similar “voluntarist” positions can be traced in Khrushchev’s foreign policy. Soviet leadership, demonstrating goodwill, sought to expand the anti-imperialist struggle. The opening of doors towards Tito and Mao, the sometimes adventuristic support of Fidel Castro and Nasser, were the most significant steps in this attempt at a “return to Lenin”, which included an obvious revision of the concept of internationalism. But here, too, the lack of understanding of the relationship between the USSR and the world revolutionary movement caused a sudden hangover almost everywhere.

“Khrushchevism” appears before us as a policy, in fact, not without a certain consistency, as a mass neo-populist political line, designed to overcome the Stalinist legacy by connecting new social elements to political life that had previously been excluded from the sphere of power, i.e. .e. peasantry, national minorities. However, the refusal to reach a real agreement with authoritative representatives of these elements very soon completely stopped the reform movement. Nevertheless, criticism, even if only verbal, of Stalinist dogmatism increasingly united those yearning for past times, so that the right and extreme right, i.e. The Stalinists managed to launch their counter-offensive, while the social strata interested in reforms did not have time to mobilize in support of populism, which in this case revealed not only her uncertainty, but even her inability to defend herself. Of course, Khrushchev could take credit for a significant acceleration economic development The USSR, when during its 10-year reign, untapped opportunities for extensive development of agriculture and industry were realized, which was accompanied by rapid social uplift, as well as the latest revolutionary results of decolonization. However, having exhausted this capital, politics Secretary General entered a period of obvious crisis. It was obvious that much more decisive and less improvised action was needed to implement a consistent and decisive policy of economic reform and peaceful coexistence.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

Decade 1954-1964 entered our history as the time of the “thaw”. It began back in 1953, shortly after the death of I.V. Stalin. “The era of circuses is over, the era of bread is coming...” These lines of the poet B. Slutsky correctly reflected the mood in society. The people have long been waiting for changes for the better. Throughout the post-war years, the Soviet Union lived in constant overstrain. The Soviet economy was suffocating under the burden of military spending and the arms race with the West. Industry and agriculture required technical re-equipment. People were in dire need of housing and adequate food. Prisoners of Stalin's camps (GULAG) were in a difficult situation, of which by the beginning of the 50s. there were a total of about 5.5 million people (see Soviet society in 1945-1953). The extremes of the Stalin regime: repression, lawlessness, deification of the personality of the “leader” - were so obvious to Stalin’s inner circle that without overcoming them there was no way forward. Only three people from the power elite - G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria and N. S. Khrushchev could really lay claim to leading the Soviet state after the death of the “father of nations.” Each of them realized the impossibility of maintaining the totalitarian system (see Totalitarian regime in the USSR). For Stalin's heirs, the immutable truth was the need to continue the course of building a communist society, strengthening the military and industrial power of the country, and supporting communist regimes in other countries. Therefore, none of the contenders for power was ready for a serious “revision” of the communist idea. In a tough behind-the-scenes struggle for power, Khrushchev won. In the summer of 1953, “Lubyansk Marshal” Beria was arrested on charges of conspiracy to seize power and in December of the same year he was shot along with six of his closest employees. The removal of Beria put an end to mass terror in the country. Political prisoners began to return from prisons and camps. Their stories, as well as rumors about strikes and uprisings of Gulag prisoners, had a strong impact on society. The growing pressure from below contributed to the development of criticism of the Stalinist regime and Stalin himself. The former’s first timid criticism of the “cult of personality of Stalin” awakened Soviet society and gave rise to hopes for changing life for the better. A powerful flow of letters, proposals, and requests went to the country's leadership.

N. S. Khrushchev initiated numerous, sometimes poorly thought out and inconsistent reforms to democratize and liberalize Soviet society. The first transformations began already in 1953 with the elimination of Soviet “serfdom” in the countryside. Collective and state farms were given relative independence. All debts accumulated since the war years were “written off” from personal farms, the agricultural tax was halved, and the norms for compulsory natural supplies, introduced under Stalin and which kept the village in a half-starved state, were reduced. Even these partial measures made it possible to ensure an increase in agricultural production. By 1958, its gross output doubled, and agriculture became profitable for the first time.

In 1956, the system of forced labor that fixed people in their jobs was eliminated, harsh punishments in enterprises were abolished, villagers gained civil rights, and trade unions gained the right to control the dismissal of workers, production standards, and tariff rates.

At this time, Khrushchev’s position in the leadership was so strengthened that he could do new step. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, held in February 1956, at a closed meeting, Khrushchev announced Stalin’s personal involvement in mass repressions, brutal torture of prisoners, and death through the fault of the “leader” outstanding commanders. The speaker blamed him for the collapse of agriculture, for the defeat of the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, for gross miscalculations and distortions in national politics. The “secret” report at the 20th Congress, which shocked most of its delegates, did not become available to the general public and was published in print only in 1989.

While condemning Stalin's crimes, Khrushchev did not address the nature of the Soviet totalitarian system. He was not ready to democratize public institutions, to include in the struggle for reforms liberal-minded layers of the intelligentsia - writers, publicists, scientists, through whose efforts in the early 50s. The ideological preconditions for the “thaw” were created. For this reason, Khrushchev’s “thaw” never became a real spring. Frequent “freezes” after the 20th Congress set society back. At the beginning of 1957, more than 100 people were prosecuted for “slander of Soviet reality.” Members of the group of MSU graduate student L. Krasnopevtsev received sentences from 6 to 10 years in prison. They issued a leaflet that called for a fight against the Stalinist system of oppression and demanded a trial of all Stalin's accomplices. Khrushchev's actions in economic and foreign policy were also contradictory. The brutal suppression of the uprising of the Hungarian people in 1956 had a huge impact on the fate of reforms and put a limit to further liberalization. Nevertheless, the 20th Congress accelerated the development of many new processes in economics, politics, and spiritual life. First of all, the rehabilitation of Gulag prisoners has accelerated. Extraordinary commissions with broad powers directly in places of imprisonment and exile resolved many issues, and the mass release of prisoners began. The national autonomy of 5 peoples unjustly deported to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In February 1957, the Supreme Council of the RSFSR restored the Chechen-Ingush ASSR as part of Russia and formed the Kalmyk Autonomous Region (since 1958 - Autonomous Republic). The Kabardian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was transformed into the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Circassian Autonomous Region into the Karachay-Cherkessian Autonomous Region. Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, Germans were not rehabilitated. Nevertheless, the entire system of political repression was practically eliminated.

Since the mid-50s. cultural management has become more democratic. The reader finally gained access to works that were undeservedly forgotten or previously unknown. Forbidden poems by S. Yesenin, A. Akhmatova, M. Tsvetaeva, and stories by M. Zoshchenko were published. 28 magazines, 7 almanacs, 4 literary and artistic newspapers began to be published. It has become easier for historians to study the past. Of great importance were the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee of May 28, 1958 “On correcting errors in the evaluation of the operas “The Great Friendship”, “Bogdan Khmelnitsky”, “With all my Heart”. For the first time, the CPSU tried to publicly admit its erroneous decisions on issues of art. The publication in the magazine “New World” of A. Solzhenitsyn’s story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” opened the topic of Stalin’s camps and mass terror, which was taboo for Soviet literature. At the same time, B. Pasternak was unfairly expelled from the Union of Writers of the USSR for publishing the novel “Doctor Zhivago” abroad (he was forbidden to travel to Sweden to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature). Pasternak’s “case” clearly defined the boundaries of the “thaw” in spiritual life. Attempts by the party leadership in the early 60s. a return to strict regulation of the artistic process alienated the creative intelligentsia from the reformers.

In the second half of the 50s - early 60s. The country's leadership, having achieved certain successes in de-Stalinization of society, began a new series of reforms in the economic and cultural spheres. N.S. Khrushchev wanted to achieve real results in raising the material standard of living of the people. To do this, it was necessary to reorganize and decentralize economic management. In May 1957, Khrushchev, having eliminated sectoral ministries, created economic councils. Now many economic problems were resolved locally, and the influence of the bureaucracy weakened. But the reform did not change the very principles of management and planning, but only replaced the sectoral organization with a territorial one. The quality indicators of industrial products fell, the control system became even more complex and unreliable. The reform failed. Reforms in agriculture and public education were not completed. But the social consequences of even such half-hearted transformations turned out to be much wider than the country’s leadership expected. The liberalization of spiritual life gave rise to freethinking, the emergence of dissidents, and samizdat. The expansion of local initiative deprived the capital's nomenklatura of power and privileges (see Bureaucracy). Increasing economic difficulties presented the country's leadership with a choice: either radical changes in the foundations of the existing system, or regular administrative reorganizations. Ultimately, the third path was chosen - in October 1964, N.S. Khrushchev was removed from his posts. The era of the “thaw” is over.