1. In 1223 and in 1237 - 1240. Russian principalities were attacked by the Mongol-Tatars. The result of this invasion was the loss of independence by most of the Russian principalities and the Mongol-Tatar yoke that lasted for about 240 years - the political, economic and, in part, cultural dependence of the Russian lands on the Mongol-Tatar conquerors. The Mongol-Tatars are an alliance of numerous nomadic tribes in East and Central Asia. This union of tribes received its name from the name of the dominant tribe of the Mongols, and the most warlike and cruel tribe of the Tatars.
Tatars of the 13th century should not be confused with modern Tatars - descendants of the Volga Bulgars, who in the 13th century. Along with the Russians, they were subjected to the Mongol-Tatar invasion, but subsequently inherited the name.
At the beginning of the 13th century. under the rule of the Mongols, neighboring tribes were united, which formed the basis of the Mongol-Tatars:
- Chinese;
- Manchus;
- Uighurs;
- Buryats;
- Transbaikal Tatars;
— other small nationalities of Eastern Siberia;
- subsequently - the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.
The consolidation of the Mongol-Tatar tribes began at the end of the 12th - beginning of the 13th centuries. The significant strengthening of these tribes is associated with the activities of Genghis Khan (Temujin), who lived in 1152/1162 - 1227.
In 1206, at the kurultai (congress of the Mongolian nobility and military leaders), Genghis Khan was elected all-Mongolian kagan (“khan of khans”). With the election of Genghis Khan as kagan, the following significant changes occurred in the life of the Mongol tribe:
— strengthening the influence of the military elite;
- overcoming internal disagreements within the Mongolian nobility and its consolidation around military leaders and Genghis Khan;
- strict centralization and organization of Mongolian society (population census, unification of the mass of scattered nomads into paramilitary units - tens, hundreds, thousands, with a clear system of command and subordination);
- introduction of strict discipline and collective responsibility (for disobedience to the commander - death penalty, for the offenses of an individual warrior, the entire ten were punished);
- the use of scientific and technical achievements that were advanced for that time (Mongolian specialists studied methods of storming cities in China, and battering guns were also borrowed from China);
- a radical change in the ideology of Mongolian society, the subordination of everything Mongolian people a common goal - the unification of neighboring Asian tribes under the rule of the Mongols, and aggressive campaigns against other countries in order to enrich and expand the habitat.
Under Genghis Khan, a unified and binding written legislation was introduced for all - Yasa, violation of which was punishable by painful types of death penalty.
2. From 1211 and in the next 60 years, the conquests of the Mongol-Tatars were carried out. Conquests were carried out in four main directions:
- conquest of Northern and Central China in 1211 - 1215;
- conquest of the states of Central Asia (Khiva, Bukhara, Khorezm) in 1219 - 1221;
- Batu’s campaign against the Volga region, Rus' and the Balkans in 1236 - 1242, the conquest of the Volga region and Russian lands;
- Kulagu Khan’s campaign in the Near and Middle East, the capture of Baghdad in 1258.
The empire of Genghis Khan and his descendants, stretching from China to the Balkans and from Siberia to the Indian Ocean and including Russian lands, lasted about 250 years and fell under the blows of other conquerors - Tamerlane (Timur), the Turks, and liberation struggle conquered peoples.
3. The first armed clash between the Russian squad and the Mongol-Tatar army occurred 14 years before Batu’s invasion. In 1223, the Mongol-Tatar army under the command of Subudai-Baghatur went on a campaign against the Polovtsians in close proximity to Russian lands. At the request of the Polovtsians, some Russian princes provided military assistance to the Polovtsians.
On May 31, 1223, a battle took place between Russian-Polovtsian troops and Mongol-Tatars on the Kalka River near the Sea of Azov. As a result of this battle, the Russian-Polovtsian militia suffered a crushing defeat from the Mongol-Tatars. The Russian-Polovtsian army suffered heavy losses. Six Russian princes died, including Mstislav Udaloy, the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan and more than 10 thousand militiamen.
The main reasons for the defeat of the Russian-Polish army were:
- the reluctance of the Russian princes to act as a united front against the Mongol-Tatars (most Russian princes refused to respond to the request of their neighbors and send troops);
- underestimation of the Mongol-Tatars (the Russian militia was poorly armed and was not properly prepared for battle);
— inconsistency of actions during the battle (Russian troops were not a single army, but scattered squads of different princes acting in their own way; some squads withdrew from the battle and watched from the sidelines).
Having won a victory on Kalka, the army of Subudai-Baghatur did not build on its success and went to the steppes.
4. After 13 years, in 1236, the Mongol-Tatar army led by Khan Batu (Batu Khan), the grandson of Genghis Khan and the son of Jochi, invaded the Volga steppes and Volga Bulgaria (the territory of modern Tataria). Having won a victory over the Cumans and Volga Bulgars, the Mongol-Tatars decided to invade Rus'.
The conquest of Russian lands was carried out during two campaigns:
- the campaign of 1237 - 1238, as a result of which the Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal principalities - the northeast of Rus' - were conquered;
- the campaign of 1239 - 1240, as a result of which the Chernigov and Kiev principalities and other principalities of southern Rus' were conquered. The Russian principalities offered heroic resistance. Among the most important battles wars with the Mongol-Tatars can be distinguished:
- defense of Ryazan (1237) - the very first large city to be attacked by the Mongol-Tatars - almost all residents participated and died during the defense of the city;
- defense of Vladimir (1238);
- defense of Kozelsk (1238) - the Mongol-Tatars stormed Kozelsk for 7 weeks, for which they called it the “evil city”;
- Battle of the City River (1238) - the heroic resistance of the Russian militia prevented the further advance of the Mongol-Tatars to the north - to Novgorod;
- defense of Kyiv - the city fought for about a month.
December 6, 1240 Kyiv fell. This event is considered the final defeat of the Russian principalities in the fight against the Mongol-Tatars.
The main reasons for the defeat of the Russian principalities in the war against the Mongol-Tatars are considered to be:
- feudal fragmentation;
- lack of a single centralized state and a unified army;
- enmity between princes;
- the transition of individual princes to the side of the Mongols;
- the technical backwardness of the Russian squads and the military and organizational superiority of the Mongol-Tatars.
5. Having won a victory over most of the Russian principalities (except for Novgorod and Galicia-Volyn), Batu’s army invaded Europe in 1241 and marched through the Czech Republic, Hungary and Croatia.
Having reached the Adriatic Sea, in 1242 Batu stopped his campaign in Europe and returned to Mongolia. The main reasons for the end of the Mongol expansion into Europe
— fatigue of the Mongol-Tatar army from the 3-year war with the Russian principalities;
- clash with the Catholic world under the rule of the Pope, who, like the Mongols, had a strong internal organization and became a strong competitor to the Mongols for more than 200 years;
- aggravation of the political situation within the empire of Genghis Khan (in 1242, Genghis Khan’s son and successor Ogedei, who became the all-Mongol Kagan after Genghis Khan, died, and Batu was forced to return to take part in the struggle for power).
Subsequently, at the end of the 1240s, Batu was preparing a second invasion of Rus' (at Novgorod land), however Novgorod voluntarily recognized the power of the Mongol-Tatars.
INVASION OF THE MONGOL-TATARS ON Rus', 1237-1240.
In 1237, the 75,000-strong army of Khan Batu invaded Russian borders. Hordes of Mongol-Tatars, a well-armed army of the Khan's empire, the largest in medieval history, came to conquer Rus': to wipe out rebellious Russian cities and villages from the face of the earth, impose tribute on the population and establish the power of their governors - the Baskaks - throughout the entire Russian land.
The Mongol-Tatars’ attack on Rus' was sudden, but not only this determined the success of the invasion. For a number of objective reasons, power was on the side of the conquerors, the fate of Rus' was predetermined, as was the success of the Mongol-Tatar invasion.
By the beginning of the 13th century, Rus' was a country torn into small principalities, without a single ruler or army. Behind the Mongol-Tatars, on the contrary, stood a strong and united power, approaching the peak of its power. Only a century and a half later, in 1380, in different political and economic conditions, Rus' was able to field a strong army against the Golden Horde led by a single commander - the Grand Duke of Moscow Dmitry Ivanovich and move from a shameful and unsuccessful defense to active military action and achieve a devastating victory on the Kulikovo field.
Not about any unity of the Russian land in 1237-1240. there was no question, the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars showed the weakness of Rus', the invasion of the enemy and the power of the Golden Horde established for two and a half centuries, the Golden Horde yoke became retribution for internecine enmity and trampling of all-Russian interests on the part of Russian princes, too keen on satisfying their political ambitions.
The Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' was swift and merciless. In December 1237, Batu’s army burned Ryazan, and on January 1, 1238, Kolomna fell under enemy pressure. During January - May 1238, the Mongol-Tatar invasion incinerated the Vladimir, Pereyaslavl, Yuryevsky, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Uglitsky and Kozelsky principalities. In 1239 it was destroyed by Murom, a year later the inhabitants of the cities and villages of the Chernigov principality faced the misfortune of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, and in September - December 1240 the ancient capital city of Rus' - Kyiv - was conquered.
After the defeat of North-Eastern and Southern Rus', the countries of Eastern Europe were subjected to the Mongol-Tatar invasion: Batu’s army won a number of major victories in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, but, having lost significant forces on Russian soil, returned to the Volga region, which became the epicenter of the powerful Golden Horde.
With the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars into Rus', the Golden Horde period of Russian history began: the era of the rule of Eastern despotism, oppression and ruin of the Russian people, the period of decline of the Russian economy and culture.
The beginning of the Mongol conquests of the Russian principalities
In the 13th century the peoples of Rus' had to endure a difficult struggle with Tatar-Mongol conquerors, who ruled the Russian lands until the 15th century. ( last century in a softer form). Directly or indirectly, the Mongol invasion contributed to the fall of the political institutions of the Kyiv period and the rise of absolutism.
In the 12th century. There was no centralized state in Mongolia; the unification of the tribes was achieved at the end of the 12th century. Temuchin, the leader of one of the clans. At the general meeting (“kurultai”) of representatives of all clans in 1206 he was proclaimed great khan with the name Genghis(“limitless power”).
Once the empire was created, it began its expansion. The organization of the Mongol army was based on the decimal principle - 10, 100, 1000, etc. An imperial guard was created that controlled the entire army. Before the advent of firearms Mongol cavalry prevailed in the steppe wars. She was better organized and trained than any army of nomads of the past. The reason for the success was not only the perfection of the military organization of the Mongols, but also the unpreparedness of their rivals.
At the beginning of the 13th century, having conquered part of Siberia, the Mongols began to conquer China in 1215. They managed to capture its entire northern part. From China, the Mongols brought the newest for that time military equipment and specialists. In addition, they received a cadre of competent and experienced officials from among the Chinese. In 1219, Genghis Khan's troops invaded Central Asia. Following Central Asia there was Northern Iran captured, after which Genghis Khan’s troops made a predatory campaign in Transcaucasia. From the south they came to the Polovtsian steppes and defeated the Polovtsians.
The Polovtsians' request to help them against a dangerous enemy was accepted by the Russian princes. The battle between the Russian-Polovtsian and Mongol troops took place on May 31, 1223 on the Kalka River in the Azov region. Not all Russian princes who promised to participate in the battle sent their troops. The battle ended in the defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian troops, many princes and warriors died.
In 1227 Genghis Khan died. Ögedei, his third son, was elected Great Khan. In 1235, the Kurultai met in the Mongol capital Kara-korum, where it was decided to begin the conquest of the western lands. This intention posed a terrible threat to Russian lands. At the head of the new campaign was Ogedei's nephew, Batu (Batu).
In 1236, Batu's troops began a campaign against the Russian lands. Having defeated Volga Bulgaria, they set out to conquer the Ryazan principality. The Ryazan princes, their squads and townspeople had to fight the invaders alone. The city was burned and plundered. After the capture of Ryazan, Mongol troops moved to Kolomna. In the battle near Kolomna, many Russian soldiers died, and the battle itself ended in defeat for them. On February 3, 1238, the Mongols approached Vladimir. Having besieged the city, the invaders sent a detachment to Suzdal, which took it and burned it. The Mongols stopped only in front of Novgorod, turning south due to muddy roads.
In 1240, the Mongol offensive resumed. Chernigov and Kyiv were captured and destroyed. From here the Mongol troops moved to Galicia-Volyn Rus'. Having captured Vladimir-Volynsky, Galich in 1241 Batu invaded Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Moravia, and then in 1242 reached Croatia and Dalmatia. However, Mongol troops entered Western Europe significantly weakened by the powerful resistance they encountered in Rus'. This largely explains the fact that if the Mongols managed to establish their yoke in Rus', Western Europe only experienced an invasion and then on a smaller scale. This is the historical role of the heroic resistance of the Russian people to the Mongol invasion.
The result of Batu's grandiose campaign was the conquest of a vast territory - the southern Russian steppes and forests of Northern Rus', the Lower Danube region (Bulgaria and Moldova). The Mongol Empire now included the entire Eurasian continent from the Pacific Ocean to the Balkans.
After Ogedei's death in 1241, the majority supported the candidacy of Ogedei's son Hayuk. Batu became the head of the strongest regional khanate. He founded his capital at Sarai (north of Astrakhan). His power extended to Kazakhstan, Khorezm, Western Siberia, Volga, North Caucasus, Rus'. Gradually the western part of this ulus became known as Golden Horde.
The first armed clash between the Russian squad and the Mongol-Tatar army took place 14 years before Batu’s invasion. In 1223, the Mongol-Tatar army under the command of Subudai-Baghatur went on a campaign against the Polovtsians in close proximity to Russian lands. At the request of the Polovtsians, some Russian princes provided military assistance to the Polovtsians.
On May 31, 1223, a battle took place between Russian-Polovtsian troops and Mongol-Tatars on the Kalka River near the Sea of Azov. As a result of this battle, the Russian-Polovtsian militia suffered a crushing defeat from the Mongol-Tatars. The Russian-Polovtsian army suffered heavy losses. Six Russian princes died, including Mstislav Udaloy, the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan and more than 10 thousand militiamen.
The main reasons for the defeat of the Russian-Polish army were:
The reluctance of the Russian princes to act as a united front against the Mongol-Tatars (most Russian princes refused to respond to the request of their neighbors and send troops);
Underestimation of the Mongol-Tatars (the Russian militia was poorly armed and was not properly prepared for battle);
Inconsistency of actions during the battle (Russian troops were not a single army, but scattered squads of different princes acting in their own way; some squads withdrew from the battle and watched from the sidelines).
Having won a victory on Kalka, the army of Subudai-Baghatur did not build on its success and went to the steppes.
4. After 13 years, in 1236, the Mongol-Tatar army led by Khan Batu (Batu Khan), the grandson of Genghis Khan and the son of Jochi, invaded the Volga steppes and Volga Bulgaria (the territory of modern Tataria). Having won a victory over the Cumans and Volga Bulgars, the Mongol-Tatars decided to invade Rus'.
The conquest of Russian lands was carried out during two campaigns:
The campaign of 1237 - 1238, as a result of which the Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal principalities - northeast Rus' - were conquered;
The campaign of 1239 - 1240, as a result of which the Chernigov and Kiev principalities and other principalities of southern Rus' were conquered. The Russian principalities offered heroic resistance. Among the most important battles of the war with the Mongol-Tatars are:
Defense of Ryazan (1237) - the very first large city to be attacked by the Mongol-Tatars - almost all residents participated and died during the defense of the city;
Defense of Vladimir (1238);
Defense of Kozelsk (1238) - the Mongol-Tatars stormed Kozelsk for 7 weeks, for which they nicknamed it the “evil city”;
Battle of the City River (1238) - the heroic resistance of the Russian militia prevented the further advance of the Mongol-Tatars to the north - to Novgorod;
The defense of Kyiv - the city fought for about a month.
December 6, 1240 Kyiv fell. This event is considered the final defeat of the Russian principalities in the fight against the Mongol-Tatars.
The main reasons for the defeat of the Russian principalities in the war against the Mongol-Tatars are considered to be:
Feudal fragmentation;
Lack of a single centralized state and a unified army;
Enmity between princes;
The transition of individual princes to the side of the Mongols;
The technical backwardness of the Russian squads and the military and organizational superiority of the Mongol-Tatars.
Consequences of the Mongol-Tatars invasion for the Old Russian state.
The invasion of nomads was accompanied by massive destruction of Russian cities, the inhabitants were mercilessly destroyed or taken prisoner. This led to a noticeable decline in Russian cities - the population decreased, the lives of city residents became poorer, and many crafts were lost.
The Mongol-Tatar invasion dealt a heavy blow to the basis of urban culture - handicraft production, since the destruction of cities was accompanied by mass removals of artisans to Mongolia and the Golden Horde. Together with the craft population, Russian cities lost centuries of production experience: the craftsmen took their professional secrets with them. The quality of construction subsequently also dropped significantly. The conquerors inflicted no less heavy damage on the Russian countryside and rural monasteries of Rus'. The peasants were robbed by everyone: Horde officials, numerous Khan's ambassadors, and simply regional gangs. The damage caused by the Mongol-Tatars to the peasant economy was terrible. Dwellings and outbuildings were destroyed in the war. Draft cattle were captured and driven to the Horde. Horde robbers often raked out the entire harvest from barns. Russian peasant prisoners were an important export item from the Golden Horde to the East. Ruin, constant threat, shameful slavery - this is what the conquerors brought to the Russian village. The damage caused to the national economy of Rus' by the Mongolo-Tatar conquerors was not limited to devastating looting during raids. After the establishment of the yoke, huge values left the country in the form of “ani” and “requests”. The constant leakage of silver and other metals had dire consequences for the economy. There was not enough silver for trade; there was even a “silver famine.” The Mongol-Tatar conquest led to a significant deterioration in the international position of the Russian principalities. Ancient trade and cultural ties with neighboring states were forcibly severed. For example, Lithuanian feudal lords used the weakening of Rus' for predatory raids. The German feudal lords also intensified the attack on the Russian lands. Russia lost the way to the Baltic Sea. In addition, the ancient ties of the Russian principalities with Byzantium were broken, and trade fell into decline. The invasion dealt a strong destructive blow to the culture of the Russian principalities. Numerous monuments, icon paintings and architecture were destroyed in the fire of the Mongol-Tatar invasions. And also there was a decline in Russian chronicle writing, which reached its dawn at the beginning of Batu’s invasion.
The Mongol-Tatar conquest artificially delayed the spread of commodity-money relations and “mothballed” the natural economy. While the Western European states, which were not attacked, gradually moved from feudalism to capitalism, Rus', torn apart by the conquerors, retained the feudal economy. It is difficult to even imagine how dearly the campaigns of the Mongol khans would have cost humanity and how many more misfortunes, murders and destruction they could have caused if the heroic resistance of the Russian people and other peoples of our country, having exhausted and weakened the enemy, had not stopped the invasion on the borders of Central Europe.
The positive thing was that the entire Russian clergy and church people were spared from paying the heavy Tatar tribute. It should be noted that the Tatars are completely tolerant of all religions, and the Russian Orthodox Church Not only did she not tolerate any oppression from the khans, but, on the contrary, the Russian metropolitans received from the khans special letters (“yarlyki”), which ensured the rights and privileges of the clergy and the inviolability of church property. The Church became the force that preserved and nurtured not only the religious, but also the national unity of the Russian “peasantry.”
Finally, Tatar rule separated Eastern Rus' from Western Europe for a long time, and after the formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the eastern branch of the Russian people found itself separated from its western branch for several centuries, which created a wall of mutual alienation between them. Eastern Rus', which was under the rule of the Tatars, itself turned into “Tataria” in the minds of ignorant Europeans...
What are the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, the yoke?
Firstly, this is the backwardness of Rus' from European countries. Europe continued to develop, while Rus' had to restore everything destroyed by the Mongols.
The second is the decline of the economy. A lot of people were lost. Many crafts disappeared (the Mongols took artisans into slavery). Farmers also moved to more northern regions of the country, safer from the Mongols. All this delayed economic development.
Third, the slowness of cultural development of Russian lands. For some time after the invasion, no churches were built at all in Rus'.
Fourth – cessation of contacts, including trade, with the countries of Western Europe. Now the foreign policy of Rus' was focused on the Golden Horde. The Horde appointed princes, collected tribute from the Russian people, and carried out punitive campaigns when the principalities disobeyed.
The fifth consequence is very controversial. Some scientists say that the invasion and the yoke preserved political fragmentation in Rus', others argue that the yoke gave impetus to the unification of Russians.
Steppe ubermensch on a tireless Mongolian horse (Mongolia, 1911)
The historiography about the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars (or Tatar-Mongols, or Tatars and Mongols, and so on, as you like) into Rus' goes back over 300 years. This invasion has become a generally accepted fact since the end of the 17th century, when one of the founders of Russian Orthodoxy, the German Innocent Gisel, wrote the first textbook on the history of Russia - “Synopsis”. According to this book native history the Russians hammered away for the next 150 years. However, so far no historian has taken it upon himself to make a “road map” of Batu Khan’s campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 in North-Eastern Rus'.
A little background
At the end of the 12th century, a new leader appeared among the Mongol tribes - Temujin, who managed to unite most of them around himself. In 1206, he was proclaimed at the kurultai (analogous to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR) as the all-Mongolian khan under the nickname Genghis Khan, who created the notorious “state of nomads.” Without wasting a minute, the Mongols began to conquer the surrounding territories. By 1223, when the Mongol detachment of commanders Jebe and Subudai clashed with the Russian-Polovtsian army on the Kalka River, the zealous nomads managed to conquer territories from Manchuria in the east to Iran, the southern Caucasus and modern western Kazakhstan, defeating the state of Khorezmshah and simultaneously capturing part of northern China.
In 1227, Genghis Khan died, but his heirs continued his conquests. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle Volga, where they waged war with the nomadic Cumans and their allies - the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of the modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources - in 1236) at the kurultai, a decision was made on a global campaign against the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russians, as well as further to the West. The grandson of Genghis Khan, Khan Batu (Batu), had to lead this campaign. Here we need to make a digression. In 1236-1237, the Mongols, who by that time were fighting in vast areas from modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to the modern Volga republics, captured Tatarstan (Volga Bulgaria) and in the fall of 1237 began concentrating for a campaign against the Russian principalities.
Empire on a planetary scale
In general, why the nomads from the banks of Kerulen and Onon needed to conquer Ryazan or Hungary is not really known. All attempts by historians to laboriously justify such agility of the Mongols look rather pale. Regarding the Western campaign of the Mongols (1235-1243), they came up with a story that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to secure their flank and destroy potential allies of their main enemies - the Polovtsians (part of the Polovtsians went to Hungary, but the bulk of them became the ancestors of modern Kazakhs). True, neither the Ryazan principality, nor the Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called. " Novgorod Republic"were never allies of either the Cumans or the Volga Bulgars (you can read an interesting study on this topic).
Also, almost all historiography about the Mongols does not really say anything about the principles of forming their armies, the principles of managing them, and so on. At the same time, it was believed that the Mongols formed their tumens (field operational units), including from conquered peoples, the soldier was not paid anything for his service, and for any offense they were threatened with the death penalty.
Scientists tried to explain the successes of the nomads this way and that, but each time it turned out quite funny. Although, ultimately, the level of organization of the Mongol army - from intelligence to communications - could be envied by the armies of the most developed states of the 20th century (however, after the end of the era of wonderful campaigns, the Mongols - already 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan - instantly lost all their skills). For example, it is believed that the head of Mongolian intelligence, commander Subudai, maintained relations with the Pope, the German-Roman emperor, Venice, and so on.
Moreover, the Mongols, naturally, during their military campaigns acted without any radio communications, railways, road transport and so on. IN Soviet era historians interspersed the traditional by that time fantasy about steppe ubermenches who did not know fatigue, hunger, fear, etc., with classical ritual in the field of the class-formational approach:
With a general recruitment into the army, each ten tents had to field from one to three warriors, depending on the need, and provide them with food. Weapons in peacetime stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the state and was issued to soldiers when they went on a campaign. Upon returning from the campaign, each warrior was obliged to surrender his weapons. The soldiers did not receive a salary, but they themselves paid the tax with horses or other livestock (one head per hundred heads). In war, each warrior had an equal right to use the spoils, a certain part of which was obliged to hand over to the khan. In the periods between campaigns, the army was sent to public works. One day a week was reserved for serving the khan.
The organization of the army was based on the decimal system. The army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumyns or darkness), headed by foremen, centurions and thousands. The commanders had separate tents and a reserve of horses and weapons.
The main branch of the army was cavalry, which was divided into heavy and light. The heavy cavalry fought with the main forces of the enemy. The light cavalry carried out guard duty and conducted reconnaissance. She started a battle, disrupting the enemy ranks with arrows. The Mongols were excellent archers from horseback. Light cavalry pursued the enemy. The cavalry had large number clockwork (spare) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. A feature of the Mongol army was the complete absence of a wheeled train. Only the tents of the khan and especially noble persons were transported on carts...
Each warrior had a file for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle, thread and a sieve for sifting flour or straining muddy water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuks (leather bags): one for water, the other for kruta (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran low, the Mongols bled their horses and drank it. In this way they could be content for up to 10 days.
In general, the term “Mongol-Tatars” (or Tatar-Mongols) itself is very bad. It sounds something like Croatian-Indians or Finno-Negros, if we talk about its meaning. The fact is that Russians and Poles, who encountered nomads in the 15th-17th centuries, called them the same - Tatars. Subsequently, the Russians often transferred this to other peoples who had nothing to do with the nomadic Turks in the Black Sea steppes. Europeans also made their contribution to this mess, who for a long time considered Russia (then still Muscovy) Tatarstan (more precisely, Tartary), which led to very bizarre constructions.
The French view of Russia in the mid-18th century
One way or another, society learned that the “Tatars” who attacked Rus' and Europe were also Mongols only at the beginning of the 19th century, when Christian Kruse published “Atlas and tables for reviewing the history of all European lands and states from their first population to of our times." Then Russian historians happily picked up the idiotic term.
Particular attention should also be paid to the issue of the number of conquerors. Naturally, no documentary data on the size of the Mongol army has reached us, and the most ancient source that enjoys unquestioning trust among historians is historical work a team of authors under the leadership of the official of the Iranian state of the Hulaguids, Rashid ad-Din, “List of Chronicles”. It is believed that it was written at the beginning of the 14th century in Persian, however, it surfaced only at the beginning of the 19th century, the first partial edition in French published in 1836. Until the middle of the 20th century, this source was not completely translated and published.
According to Rashid ad-Din, by 1227 (the year of Genghis Khan's death), the total army of the Mongol Empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe Plano Carpini, then 10 years later the army of phenomenal nomads consisted of 150 thousand Mongols themselves and another 450 thousand people recruited in a “voluntary-forced” manner from subject peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimated the size of Batu's army, concentrated in the fall of 1237 near the borders of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. At the same time, it was taken for granted that each nomad had 2-3 horses.
By the standards of the Middle Ages, such armies look completely monstrous and implausible, we must admit. However, reproaching pundits for fantasizing is too cruel for them. It is unlikely that any of them could even imagine even a couple of tens of thousands of mounted warriors with 50-60 thousand horses, not to mention the obvious problems with managing such a mass of people and providing them with food. Since history is an inexact science, and indeed not a science at all, everyone can evaluate the range of fantasy researchers. We will use the now classic estimate of the size of Batu’s army at 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by the Soviet scientist V.V. Kargalov. His assessment (like everyone else, completely sucked from thin air, to be very serious) in historiography, however, is prevalent. In particular, it is shared by the largest modern Russian researcher of the history of the Mongol Empire, R.P. Khrapachevsky.
From Ryazan to Vladimir
In the autumn of 1237, Mongol troops, who fought throughout the spring and summer over vast areas from North Caucasus, Lower Don and to the middle Volga region, were drawn to the place of general gathering - the Onuza River. It is believed that we are talking about the modern Tsna River in the modern Tambov region. Probably, some detachments of Mongols also gathered in the upper reaches of the Voronezh and Don rivers. Exact date There is no beginning of the Mongols’ offensive against the Ryazan principality, but it can be assumed that it took place in any case no later than December 1, 1237. That is, the steppe nomads with a herd of almost half a million horses decided to go camping in winter. This is important for our reconstruction. If so, then they probably had to be sure that in the forests of the Volga-Osk interfluve, still rather weakly colonized by the Russians by that time, they would have enough food for horses and people.
Along the valleys of the Lesnoy and Polny Voronezh rivers, as well as the tributaries of the Pronya River, the Mongol army, moving in one or several columns, passes through the forested watershed of the Oka and Don. The embassy of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich arrives to them, which turned out to be ineffective (the prince is killed), and somewhere in the same region the Mongols meet the Ryazan army in a field. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move up the Pronya, plundering and destroying small Ryazan cities - Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, and burning Mordovian and Russian villages.
Here we need to make a small clarification: we do not have accurate data on the number of people in the then North-Eastern Rus', but if we follow the reconstruction of modern scientists and archaeologists (V.P. Darkevich, M.N. Tikhomirov, A.V. Kuza), then it was not large and, in addition, it was characterized by low population density. For example, largest city Ryazan land - Ryazan, maximum 6-8 thousand people, another 10-14 thousand people could live in the agricultural district of the city (within a radius of 20-30 kilometers). The remaining cities had several hundred people, in best case scenario, like Murom - up to a couple thousand. Based on this, it is unlikely that the total population of the Ryazan principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.
Of course, for the conquest of such a “proto-state” 120-140 thousand soldiers were more than an excessive number, but we will stick to the classical version.
On December 16, the Mongols, after a march of 350-400 kilometers (that is, the pace of the average daily march here is up to 18-20 kilometers), reach Ryazan and begin its siege - they build wooden fence, build stone-throwing machines with which they shell the city. In general, historians admit that the Mongols achieved incredible - by the standards of that time - success in siege warfare. For example, historian R.P. Khrapachevsky seriously believes that the Mongols were able to build any stone-throwing machines on the spot from available wood in literally a day or two:
There was everything necessary to assemble stone throwers - the united army of the Mongols had enough specialists from China and Tangut..., and Russian forests abundantly supplied the Mongols with wood for assembling siege weapons.
Finally, on December 21, Ryazan fell after a fierce assault. True, an inconvenient question arises: we know that the total length of the city’s defensive fortifications was less than 4 kilometers. Most of the Ryazan soldiers died in the border battle, so it is unlikely that there were many soldiers in the city. Why did a gigantic Mongol army of 140 thousand soldiers sit for 6 whole days under its walls if the balance of forces was at least 100-150:1?
We also do not have any clear evidence of what the climatic conditions were in December 1238, but since the Mongols chose the ice of rivers as a method of transportation (there was no other way to pass through wooded areas, the first permanent roads in North-Eastern Rus' are documented only in the 14th century). century, all Russian researchers agree with this version), we can assume that it was already a normal winter with frosts, possibly snow.
An important question is also what the Mongolian horses ate during this campaign. From the works of historians and modern studies of steppe horses, it is clear that we were talking about very unpretentious, small - height at the withers up to 110-120 centimeters, koniki. Their main diet is hay and grass (they did not eat grain). In their natural habitat, they are unpretentious and quite hardy, and in winter, during tebenevka, they are able to tear up snow in the steppe and eat last year’s grass.
Based on this, historians unanimously believe that thanks to these properties, the question of feeding the horses during the campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 against Rus' did not arise. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to notice that the conditions in this region (the thickness of the snow cover, the area of grass stands, as well as the general quality of phytocenoses) differ from, say, Khalkha or Turkestan. In addition, the winter training of steppe horses consists of the following: a herd of horses slowly, walking a few hundred meters a day, moves across the steppe, looking for withered grass under the snow. Animals thus save their energy costs. However, during the campaign against Rus', these horses had to walk 10-20-30 or even more kilometers a day in the cold (see below), carrying luggage or a warrior. Were horses able to replenish their energy expenditure under such conditions? Another interesting question: if Mongolian horses dug through snow and found grass under it, then what should be the area of their daily feeding grounds?
After the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols began to advance towards the Kolomna fortress, which was a kind of “gate” to the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Having walked 130 kilometers from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid ad-Din and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the Mongols were “stuck” at this fortress until January 5 or even 10, 1238 - that is, at least for almost 15-20 days. On the other hand, a strong Vladimir army is moving towards Kolomna, which is probably Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich equipped immediately after receiving the news of the fall of Ryazan (he and the Chernigov prince refused to provide assistance to Ryazan). The Mongols send an embassy to him with an offer to become their tributary, but the negotiations also turn out to be fruitless (according to the Laurentian Chronicle, the prince still agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops to Kolomna. It is difficult to explain the logic of such an act).
According to V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the battle of Kolomna began no later than January 9 and lasted for 5 whole days (according to Rashid ad-Din). Here another logical question immediately arises - historians are sure that the military forces of the Russian principalities as a whole were modest and corresponded to the reconstructions of that era, when an army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 thousand or more people seemed like a huge army. It is unlikely that the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich could have collected more (if we make a digression: the total population of the Vladimir land, according to different estimates, varied between 400-800 thousand people, but they were all scattered over a vast territory, and the population of the capital city of the earth - Vladimir, even according to the most daring reconstructions, did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). However, near Kolomna the Mongols were pinned down for several days, and the intensity of the battle is shown by the fact of the death of Genghisid Kulkan, the son of Genghis Khan. With whom did the gigantic army of 140 thousand nomads fight so fiercely? With several thousand Vladimir soldiers?
After the victory at Kolomna in either a three- or five-day battle, the Mongols are vigorously moving along the ice of the Moscow River towards the future Russian capital. They cover a distance of 100 kilometers in literally 3-4 days (the pace of an average daily march is 25-30 kilometers): according to R.P. Khrapachevsky, the nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 (according to N.M. Karamzin - January 20). The nimble Mongols took the Muscovites by surprise - they did not even know about the results of the battle of Kolomna, and after a five-day siege, Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan: the city was burned, all its inhabitants were exterminated or taken prisoner.
Again, Moscow at that time, if we take archaeological data as the basis for our reasoning, was an absolutely tiny town. Thus, the first fortifications, built back in 1156, had a length of less than 1 kilometer, and the area of the fortress itself did not exceed 3 hectares. By 1237, it is believed that the area of the fortifications had already reached 10-12 hectares (that is, approximately half the territory of the current Kremlin). The city had its own suburb - it was located on the territory of modern Red Square. Total population There were hardly more than 1000 people in such a city. What a huge army of Mongols, possessing supposedly unique siege technologies, did for five whole days in front of this insignificant fortress, one can only guess.
It is also worth noting here that all historians recognize the fact of the movement of the Mongol-Tatars without a convoy. They say that the unpretentious nomads did not need it. Then it remains not entirely clear how and on what the Mongols moved their stone-throwing machines, shells for them, forges (for repairing weapons, replenishing lost arrowheads, etc.), and how they drove away prisoners. Because all the time archaeological excavations Not a single burial of “Mongol-Tatars” was found on the territory of North-Eastern Rus'; some historians even agreed on the version that the nomads took their dead back to the steppes (V.P. Darkevich, V.V. Kargalov). Of course, it’s not even worth raising the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light (otherwise our historians will come up with the fact that they were eaten, a joke) ...
However, after spending about a week in the vicinity of Moscow and plundering its agricultural contado (the main agricultural crop in this region was rye and partly oats, but steppe horses accepted grain very poorly), the Mongols moved along the ice of the Klyazma River (crossing the forest watershed between this river and Moscow River) to Vladimir. Having covered over 140 kilometers in 7 days (the pace of an average daily march is about 20 kilometers), on February 2, 1238, the nomads began the siege of the capital of the Vladimir land. By the way, it was at this transition that the Mongol army of 120-140 thousand people was “caught” by a tiny detachment of the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat of either 700 or 1700 people, against whom the Mongols - out of powerlessness - were forced to use stone-throwing machines in order to defeat him ( It is worth considering that the legend of Kolovrat was recorded, according to historians, only in the 15th century, so... it is difficult to consider it completely documentary).
Let’s ask an academic question: what is an army of 120-140 thousand people with almost 400 thousand horses (and it’s not clear if there is a convoy?) moving on the ice of some Oka or Moscow river? The simplest calculations show that even moving with a front of 2 kilometers (in reality, the width of these rivers is significantly less), such an army is in the most ideal conditions(everyone walks at the same speed, keeping a minimum distance of 10 meters) stretches for at least 20 kilometers. If we take into account that the width of the Oka is only 150-200 meters, then the gigantic army of Batu already stretches for almost... 200 kilometers! Again, if everyone walks at the same speed, maintaining a minimum distance. And on the ice of the Moscow or Klyazma rivers, the width of which varies from 50 to 100 meters at best? For 400-800 kilometers?
It is interesting that none of the Russian scientists over the past 200 years have even asked such a question, seriously believing that giant cavalry armies literally fly through the air.
In general, at the first stage of Batu Khan’s invasion of North-Eastern Rus' - from December 1, 1237 to February 2, 1238, a conventional Mongolian horse covered about 750 kilometers, which gives an average daily rate of movement of 12 kilometers. But if we exclude from the calculations at least 15 days of standing in the Oka floodplain (after the capture of Ryazan on December 21 and the battle of Kolomna), as well as a week of rest and looting near Moscow, the pace of the average daily march of the Mongol cavalry will seriously improve - up to 17 kilometers per day.
It cannot be said that these are some kind of record paces of march (the Russian army during the war with Napoleon, for example, made 30-40-kilometer daily marches), the interesting thing here is that all this happened in the dead of winter, and such paces were maintained for quite a long time.
From Vladimir to Kozelsk
On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War of the 13th century
Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, left Vladimir, leaving with a small squad for the Trans-Volga region - there, among the windbreaks on the Sit River, he set up a camp and awaited the arrival of reinforcements from his brothers - Yaroslav (father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. There were very few warriors left in the city, led by Yuri's sons - Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the Mongols spent 5 days with the city, shelling it with stone throwers, taking it only after the assault on February 7th. But before this, a small detachment of nomads led by Subudai managed to burn Suzdal.
After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol army is divided into three parts. The first and largest unit under the command of Batu goes from Vladimir to the northwest through the impassable forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed. The first march is from Vladimir to Yuryev-Polsky (about 60-65 kilometers). Then the army is divided - part goes exactly northwest to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (about 60 kilometers), and after a five-day siege this city fell. What was Pereyaslavl like then? It was a relatively small city, slightly larger than Moscow, although it had defensive fortifications up to 2.5 kilometers long. But its population also hardly exceeded 1-2 thousand people.
Then the Mongols go to Ksnyatin (about another 100 kilometers), to Kashin (30 kilometers), then turn west and move along the ice of the Volga to Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line it’s a little more than 110 kilometers, but they go along the Volga, there it’s all 250- 300 kilometers).
The second part goes through the dense forests of the Volga, Oka and Klyazma watershed from Yuryev-Polsky to Dmitrov (about 170 kilometers in a straight line), then after its capture - to Volok-Lamsky (130-140 kilometers), from there to Tver (about 120 kilometers) , after the capture of Tver - to Torzhok (together with the detachments of the first part) - in a straight line it is about 60 kilometers, but, apparently, they walked along the river, so it will be at least 100 kilometers. The Mongols reached Torzhok on February 21 - 14 days after leaving Vladimir.
Thus, the first part of the Batu detachment travels at least 500-550 kilometers in 15 days through dense forests and along the Volga. True, from here you need to throw out several days of siege of cities and it turns out about 10 days of march. For each of which, nomads pass through forests 50-55 kilometers a day! The second part of his detachment covers a total distance of less than 600 kilometers, which gives an average daily march pace of up to 40 kilometers. Taking into account a couple of days for sieges of cities - up to 50 kilometers per day.
Near Torzhok, a rather modest city by the standards of that time, the Mongols were stuck for at least 12 days and took it only on March 5 (V.V. Kargalov). After the capture of Torzhok, one of the Mongol detachments advanced towards Novgorod another 150 kilometers, but then turned back.
The second detachment of the Mongol army under the command of Kadan and Buri left Vladimir to the east, moving along the ice of the Klyazma River. Having walked 120 kilometers to Starodub, the Mongols burned this city, and then “cut off” the forested watershed between the lower Oka and middle Volga, reaching Gorodets (this is about another 170-180 kilometers, if the crow flies). Further, the Mongolian detachments along the ice of the Volga reached Kostoroma (this is about 350-400 kilometers), some detachments even reached Galich Mersky. From Kostroma, the Mongols of Buri and Kadan went to join the third detachment under the command of Burundai to the west - to Uglich. Most likely, the nomads moved on the ice of the rivers (in any case, let us remind you once again, this is the custom in Russian historiography), which gives about another 300-330 kilometers of travel.
In early March, Kadan and Buri were already near Uglich, having covered a little over three weeks to 1000-1100 kilometers. The average daily pace of the march was about 45-50 kilometers for the nomads, which is close to the performance of the Batu detachment.
The third detachment of Mongols under the command of Burundai turned out to be the “slowest” - after the capture of Vladimir, he set out for Rostov (170 kilometers in a straight line), then covered another 100 kilometers to Uglich. Part of Burundai's forces made a forced march to Yaroslavl (about 70 kilometers) from Uglich. At the beginning of March, Burundai unmistakably found the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Trans-Volga forests, whom he defeated in the battle on the Sit River on March 4. The transition from Uglich to the City and back is about 130 kilometers. In total, Burundai's troops covered about 470 kilometers in 25 days - this gives us only 19 kilometers of the average daily march.
In general, the conditional average Mongol horse clocked up “on the speedometer” from December 1, 1237 to March 4, 1238 (94 days) from 1200 (the minimum estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Mongol army) to 1800 kilometers. The conditional daily journey ranges from 12-13 to 20 kilometers. In reality, if we throw out standing in the floodplain of the Oka River (about 15 days), 5 days of the assault on Moscow and 7 days of rest after its capture, the five-day siege of Vladimir, as well as another 6-7 days for the sieges of Russian cities in the second half of February, it turns out that Mongolian horses covered an average of 25-30 kilometers for each of their 55 days of movement. These are excellent results for horses, taking into account the fact that all this happened in the cold, in the middle of forests and snowdrifts, with a clear lack of feed (it is unlikely that the Mongols could requisition a lot of feed for their horses from the peasants, especially since the steppe horses did not eat practically grain) and hard work.
After the capture of Torzhok, the main part of the Mongol army concentrated on the upper Volga in the Tver region. They then moved in the first half of March 1238 on a broad front south into the steppe. The left wing, under the command of Kadan and Buri, passed through the forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed, then went to the upper reaches of the Moscow River and descended along it to the Oka. In a straight line it is about 400 kilometers, taking into account the average pace of movement of fast-moving nomads - this is about 15-20 days of travel for them. So, apparently, already in the first half of April this part of the Mongol army entered the steppe. We have no information about how the melting of snow and ice on the rivers affected the movement of this detachment (the Ipatiev Chronicle only reports that the steppe inhabitants moved very quickly). There is also no information about what this detachment did the next month after entering the steppe; it is only known that in May Kadan and Buri came to the rescue of Batu, who by that time was stuck near Kozelsk.
Small Mongol detachments, probably, as V.V. believes. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, plundering and burning Russian settlements. How they came out into the steppe in the spring of 1238 is not known.
Most of the Mongol army under the command of Batu and Burundai, instead shortest path to the steppe, which the detachments of Kadan and Buri went through, chose a very intricate route:
More is known about Batu’s route - from Torzhok he moved along the Volga and Vazuza (a tributary of the Volga) to the interfluve of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk lands to the Chernigov city of Vshchizh, lying on the banks of the Desna, writes Khrapachevsky. Having made a detour along the upper reaches of the Volga to the west and northwest, the Mongols turned south and, crossing watersheds, went to the steppes. Probably some detachments were marching in the center, through Volok-Lamsky (through the forests). Approximately, the left edge of Batu covered about 700-800 kilometers during this time, other detachments a little less. By April 1, the Mongols reached Serensk, and Kozelsk (the chronicle Kozeleska, to be precise) - April 3-4 (according to other information - already March 25). On average, this gives us about 35-40 more kilometers of daily march (and the Mongols no longer walk on the ice of rivers, but through dense forests on watersheds).
Near Kozelsk, where ice drift on Zhizdra and snow melting in its floodplain could already begin, Batu was stuck for almost 2 months (more precisely, for 7 weeks - 49 days - until May 23-25, maybe later, if we count from April 3, and according to Rashid ad-Din - generally for 8 weeks). Why the Mongols necessarily needed to besiege an insignificant, even by medieval Russian standards, town that had no strategic significance is not entirely clear. For example, the neighboring towns of Krom, Spat, Mtsensk, Domagoshch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk were not even touched by the nomads.
Historians are still arguing on this topic; no sane argument has been given. The funniest version was proposed by the folk historian of the “Eurasian persuasion” L.N. Gumilyov, who suggested that the Mongols took revenge on the grandson of the Chernigov prince Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the Kalka River in 1223. It’s funny that the Smolensk prince Mstislav the Old was also involved in the murder of the ambassadors. But the Mongols did not touch Smolensk...
Logically, Batu had to quickly leave for the steppes, since the spring thaw and lack of food threatened him with the complete loss of, at a minimum, “transport” - that is, horses.
None of the historians was puzzled by the question of what the horses and the Mongols themselves ate while besieging Kozelsk for almost two months (using standard stone-throwing machines). Finally, it is simply difficult to believe that a town with a population of several hundred, even a couple of thousand people, a huge army of the Mongols, numbering tens of thousands of soldiers, and supposedly having unique siege technologies and equipment, could not take 7 weeks...
As a result, near Kozelsk, the Mongols allegedly lost up to 4,000 people, and only the arrival of the troops of Buri and Kadan in May 1238 from the steppes saved the situation - the town was finally taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor it is worth saying that former president Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, in honor of the services of the population of Kozelsk to Russia, awarded the settlement the title of "City military glory"The humor was that archaeologists, after almost 15 years of searching, were unable to find unambiguous evidence of the existence of Kozelsk destroyed by Batu. You can talk about what passions were boiling over this issue in the scientific and bureaucratic community of Kozelsk.
If we summarize the estimated data in a first and very rough approximation, it turns out that from December 1, 1237 to April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozelsk), a conventional Mongol horse traveled on average from 1,700 to 2,800 kilometers. In terms of 120 days, this gives an average daily journey ranging from 15 to 23-odd kilometers. Since periods of time are known when the Mongols did not move (sieges, etc., and this is about 45 days in total), the scope of their average daily actual march spreads from 23 to 38 kilometers per day.
Simply put, this means more than intense stress on the horses. The question is how many of them survived after such transitions in rather harsh climatic conditions and the obvious shortage of feed is not even discussed by Russian historians. As well as the question of the Mongolian losses themselves.
For example, R.P. Khrapachevsky generally believes that during the entire Western campaign of the Mongols in 1235-1242, their losses amounted to only about 15% of their original number, while historian V.B. Koshcheev counted up to 50 thousand sanitary losses during the campaign in North-Eastern Rus' alone. However, all these losses - both in people and horses, the brilliant Mongols quickly made up for at the expense of... the conquered peoples themselves. Therefore, already in the summer of 1238, the armies of Batu continued the war in the steppes against the Kipchaks, and in 1241 Europe was invaded by who knows what army - for example, Thomas of Splitsky reports that there were a huge number of... Russians, Kipchaks, Bulgars, Mordovians and etc. peoples It is not really clear how many of them there were “Mongols” themselves.
Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' historians call the period of invasion of the Mongol Empire with the aim of conquest, on the territory of the Russian principalities (1237-1240) during the Kipchak (Western) campaign, which was led by Batu and the military leader Subedei.
Plans to conquer Eastern Europe were long before Batu. In 1207, Genghis Khan himself sent Jochi (his son) to conquer the tribes living in the Irtysh valley. A little later, reconnaissance missions were organized with the goal of learning about the weak positions of Eastern Europe.
The Tatars were considered very good warriors. Their army was large and armed to the teeth. In addition, in addition to weapons, they often used psychological intimidation of the enemy (usually the strongest soldiers walked in front of the troops, who brutally killed their opponents, not giving them the opportunity to surrender). I would like to note that the Tatars frightened the enemy with their own appearance.
The Russians first encountered the Mongols on Kalka in 1223, when the Polovtsians asked for military support from the Russian princes. They, in turn, agreed to help, but for many reasons, the main one of which was the lack of cohesion and unity between the principalities, they lost the battle.
In 1237 they attacked Ryazan, thereby beginning his military campaign to the West. As they say literary monuments of that time (for example, “The Tale of Batu’s Ruin of Ryazan”), the city was completely plundered, and most of the inhabitants were killed.
After Ryazan the Mongols burned Moscow, which resisted for a long time, but still fell, and then Vladimir, after the conquest, which the Mongols sent their army to the northeast of Rus', burning one city after another. In 1238, a battle between Russian and Mongolian warriors took place again on the Sit River, which the latter again won.
During the Mongol attack on the cities, the Russian army fought with dignity, but still, for the most part, suffered defeats (the exception was the recaptured city of Smolensk and Kozelsk, which had been defending for a long time).
After this, the Mongols were forced to return to their homeland in order to gather strength. They repeated the next campaign against Rus' in 1239, trying to capture it from the south. First they took Pereyaslavl, then the Principality of Chernigov, and in 1240, unable to withstand the pressure, the city of Kyiv fell.
Mongol invasion ended with the capture of Kyiv, and the period from 1240 to 1480 is called by historians and researchers of the Slavs Mongol-Tatar yoke in Rus'.
A striking episode in national history is the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'.
Union of Nomads
An army was formed along the banks of the Onon River three decades before its appearance on the Russian borders. It was dominated by Mongol feudal lords and their warriors, who came from all corners of the steppe. They chose Temujin as their supreme ruler, who was later given the name Genghis Khan. Under his leadership, he united many nomadic tribes. At the same time, internal strife came to an end, and a solid economic base was formed that ensured the development of the new state. Despite favorable prospects, the government did not choose a peaceful path, but led its people along the path of war and aggression, eventually organizing the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'. The purpose of this campaign was easy economic enrichment. Since own cattle breeding was unprofitable, it was decided to replenish resources through robberies neighboring peoples and tribes. At the end of Genghis Khan's life, the Mongol-Tatars owned a significant part of the territories from the Caspian Sea to the Pacific Ocean. This was not a reason to stop planning new trips. The main secret of the success of the Mongol-Tatars was a well-thought-out strategy and the political weakening of the conquered countries. The tactics of the warriors boiled down to a surprise attack and fragmentation of enemy forces in parts with their subsequent destruction.
Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'
With Khan Batu coming to power, it was decided to conquer Russian lands. The Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' began from the city of Torzhok. At first, the residents put up a significant resistance to the enemy, but the enemy’s numbers were so high that their forces were diminishing. As a result of a two-week siege by the Mongols, Torzhok was conquered on March 5, 1238. Ruthless nomads entered the city and began to exterminate local residents. They killed everyone mercilessly: starting with women and children, ending with old people. The fugitives were caught up on the road to the north and subjected to the same fate.
The Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' continued with the unsuccessful capture of Novgorod. By the time the enemy approached, all approaches to the settlement were blocked. Khan Batu had no choice but to continue on his way past. He moved south, ravaging and burning cities, leaving dead residents on their ashes. A line of captured Russians followed the invaders. The booty became heavier, the convoys more heavy. Rus' was not familiar with such a terrible defeat before.
Heroic resistance
The Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' dates back to the years 1237-1240. During this time, the invading troops encountered a worthy rebuff. Rus''s resistance to the Mongol-Tatar invasion significantly weakened the enemy's forces and smashed to smithereens plans to conquer Western civilization. The invaders' troops were greatly weakened and bled dry due to continuous fighting in North-Eastern Rus'. The Russians and other peoples of our homeland saved Europe from the Mongol-Tatar invasion. Even after the pogrom of Batu, the inhabitants of Rus' did not submit to the conqueror. It took the khan more than a decade to establish control over the devastated cities, and then over the state as a whole. The resistance of Rus' prevented Batu from organizing a campaign to the West.
Attempts at confrontation
The Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' and its consequences forced peasants and townspeople to live in the forests. Only some time after the pogrom did residents slowly begin to return to populated areas. The surviving princes gradually restored order. However, this did not exclude the threat of new invasions from the Mongol-Tatars. The powerful state founded by Batu in the south of Rus' - Golden Horde- forced all Russian princes to come to the formidable khan for approval. However, the formal fact of submission did not yet mean the conquest of the entire Russian land. Pskov, Smolensk, Novgorod, Vitebsk remained unoccupied, and therefore decided not to recognize dependence on the Khanate of the Golden Horde.
The first attempt to openly oppose the yoke was made by Andrei Yaroslavich after the murder of his father by the Mongols. Having united with Prince Daniil of Galitsky, he organized resistance to the conquerors. However, some princes established mutually beneficial relations with the Golden Horde and did not intend to spoil these ties. Having learned about Andrei Yaroslavich's campaign plans, they conveyed the prince's intentions to the khan. A powerful army was sent against the “rebellious” one, and Andrei was defeated. Prince Daniil Galitsky continued to offer desperate resistance. Beginning in 1254, he firmly repulsed the khan's attempts to subjugate his domain. Only in 1258, when Batu sent a large army to the prince, was he forced to admit his dependence.
Establishment of the yoke
The Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' and its consequences culminated in 1257. Mongol officials traveled across Rus' with the goal of organizing a population census, imposing a heavy tribute on everyone. In fact, this meant the establishment of the yoke of the Mongol-Tatars in Rus'. The princes personally assisted the Mongols in the census issue. After this event, a difficult period of two hundred years of yoke began. Restoring cities turned out to be overwhelming. Complex crafts are being undermined and disappear completely over the next hundred and fifty to two hundred years. Trade ties with other entities are severed.
This is what the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' led to. Briefly it can be formulated this way - to colossal damage in all spheres: economic, cultural, political. Subsistence farming was mothballed, crafts were destroyed, and the people were burdened with unaffordable payments. The progress of political development was cut short, and discord was deliberately sowed between the princes, preventing the unification of Rus'. Dependence on the Golden Horde set the Russian people back in development several centuries ago.
Fall of the Yoke
Tsar Ivan III, who reigned from 1462 to 1505, played a great role in the unification of Russian lands. First of all, he annexed Veliky Novgorod and the Rostov Principality to Moscow. Then he took up the rest of the unruly lands, year after year collecting the fragmented Rus'. The year 1480 was a decisive stage in the liberation: the Mongol-Tatar yoke fell. Thanks to the diplomatic skills of Ivan III, the united state, called Russia, threw off the heavy Mongol burden.
Main stages
Let us repeat how the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' developed. Let us briefly list the main points.
- XII century - the unification of the Mongolian tribes, the proclamation of Genghis Khan’s desire for world domination. Conquest of neighboring countries.
- 1223 - the battle of the Kalka River, which was lost by the Russian princes.
- 1237 - campaign against the Mongol-Tatars.
- 1240 - successful invasion of the Mongol-Tatars into Southern Rus'.
- 1243 - formation of the Golden Horde in the Lower Volga.
- 1257 - establishment of the yoke in Rus'.
Thus, the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' led to the formation of an enemy yoke, which lasted for several centuries. Despite the weakness and brokenness, the conquered inhabitants did not lose the will to fight and win.