The problems of Russian national identity sharply worsened in connection with the collapse of the USSR and in subsequent years in connection with the search of the Russian people for their place in new Russia, your way in the world. In order to find their worthy place in the family of peoples of the world and Russia, Russians are trying to realize their Self, their Path, their Mission. And in order to engage in self-awareness of the Self, it is necessary to “look” into your recent past, say, several centuries, to understand the dynamics of your development. And this process of self-deepening into the Self of the people, the Self of culture, the Self Russian society has begun. Thus, at the XVIII World Russian People's Council, the “Declaration of Russian Identity” was adopted, which defined some frameworks and directions for the search for Russian national identity. The “Declaration of Russian Identity” prompted many prominent representatives of the Russian people to discuss this sore issue for the Russian nation. In the reverse perspective, the Russian people can find many answers to the pressing issue of Russian national identity, many solutions to the challenges of today.
The path of finding oneself through turning “inward” is also indicated in another source of Russian thought: “Russian Doctrine”. In this interesting document, the authors try to answer current issues on the Russian agenda and outline the main directions of the Russian revival (in economics, politics, art, education, science, state building, etc.). The “Russian Doctrine” contains a methodology for achieving Russian national identity. Thus, the document notes: “The revival and new ascent of Russian civilization will not begin without a “return to oneself.” You need to look for your own, organic. You have to go from your own self. And only then will we (Russia) be recognized as a full-fledged player when we stop focusing on this idea of the need for recognition. Moreover, it is precisely in our otherness, dissimilarity from others, that is, in our civilizational independence, that is the key to our possible acquisitions and success along the paths of History.” The above and other documents indicate that the process of awareness of Russian identity is underway, but it is slow, intermittent, sometimes with great tension and disruptions. The process of Russians acquiring national identity evokes not only support, but also severe opposition from some part of society, oriented toward Western values and idols. The fact that the process is underway is evidenced by discussions not only in the patriotic and Russian national press, but also in moderate publications, individual programs on central television, and other media. For example, a discussion entitled “What do the Russians want?” in the Literary Gazette.
Previously, officials were afraid of the “Russian question” like fire. Now a lot has changed: a number of government officials speak openly about the Russian path, Russian consciousness and Russian culture. The question of national identity was posed especially deeply by V.V. Putin. Speaking on September 19, 2013 at a meeting of the Valdai international discussion club in the Novgorod region, V.V. Putin linked the acquisition of national identity with the formation of a national idea. He noted: “It is necessary historical creativity, synthesis of the best national experience and ideas, understanding of our cultural, spiritual, political traditions with different points vision with the understanding that this is not a frozen something given forever, but a living organism. Only then will our identity be based on a solid foundation, will be directed to the future, not to the past.”
Understanding one’s national identity is closely related to deepening one’s Russianness. Understanding your Self is impossible without turning to the Self of the people, the Self of Russian culture, the Self of Russian society, the Self of the Russian state. The authors of the monograph “Russians” are right. Russian ABC national identity”, speaking about the following: “To be Russian, you need to recognize yourself as Russian. This is a clear watershed. Over several centuries of living together in Russia, many people in their culture and language have ceased to differ from Russians. But they retained the identity and name of their people and consider themselves, for example, Chuvash or Mordvins. This is not only their right, it is worthy of respect, since ethnic diversity with a common cultural core is a great value, although it complicates many public relations". The peculiarity of Russian identity is that representatives of other nations can recognize themselves as Russian, feel comfortable in Russian culture, and build the Russian world. Many representatives of other ethnic groups in many mental characteristics they have long been no different from ethnic Russians. They are quite deeply integrated into the Russian world, they feel comfortable in Russian statehood and society.
Basic values act as the basis of national identity. What values are basic at the present stage for the Russian people? This question was raised at the XV World Russian People's Council, which adopted the document: “Basic values are the basis of national identity.” This important source for Russian national consciousness names the basic values: faith, justice, peace, freedom, unity, morality, dignity, honesty, patriotism, solidarity, mercy, family, cultures and national traditions, the good of man, hard work, self-restraint and sacrifice. The formation of these basic values among the younger generation and their cultivation in society is the most important pedagogical and social task. This task should unite everyone: social scientists, politicians, ideologists, and government officials. All social institutions, public organizations, and the media should be involved in the formation of a positive attitude towards these basic values. Otherwise, the Russian people will remain a people without solidarity, not knowing where to go, what to do and why. The problem of basic values should be raised more acutely and resolved at all levels of government, society, culture and business.
Currently, many basic values in the Russian consciousness are blurred. The Russian consciousness is not deeply enough aware of their significance for the moral health and spiritual development of the Russian nation. Moreover, in the era of civilizational shifts, when it is necessary to unite the nation around basic values, dangerous trends continue to develop leading to the degradation of culture, loss family values, dehumanization of man.
Knowledge of the Russian language and protection of the Russian language. The “Declaration of Russian Identity” adopted at the XVIII World Russian People's Council on November 11, 2014 notes the role of the Russian language in the formation of Russian identity. So the declaration says: “In the Russian tradition the most important criterion nationality was considered to be the national language (the word “language” itself is an ancient synonym for the word “nationality”). Knowledge of the Russian language is mandatory for every Russian.”
In recent years, pressure has been increasing on the Russian language to change the genetic code of Russian culture. The Russian language is becoming clogged with slang and in foreign words. In connection with economic reforms, many words from the English language spoken modern business. Although there are many words in the Russian language that could successfully replace linguistic borrowings. In the Russian language, some “scientists” are trying to legalize some slang words.
Belonging to the Orthodox faith is the most important element of Russian cultural and national identity. Difficult processes are unfolding in the spiritual sphere. Life is in full swing in the Church, they are reconstructing, restoring Orthodox churches, religious books and magazines are printed in large quantities, Orthodox music, book and film festivals are held. In the last decade, works of famous and forgotten Russian philosophers have been published in large editions: N.A. Berdyaeva, A.S. Khomyakova, N.O. Lossky, S.N. Trubetskoy, N.I. Ilyina, S.N. Bulgakova, S.L. Franka, V.V. Zenkovsky, G.P. Fedotova, A.F. Loseva, B.P. Vysheslavtseva, L.N. Gumeleva, I.V. Kirievsky, K.S. Aksakova, K.N. Leontyeva, V.V. Rozanov and many others. All this speaks of the revival of Russian culture, of the deepening of Russians into their Self.
Russian culture in general, Russian literature in particular, gives us a vivid idea of the national character of the Russian person. Russian readers discover previously unknown names outstanding writers Russian abroad. Russian people are finally beginning to pay attention to themselves, to delve deeper into their dignity, and to focus on the main and most sacred things. Political scientist, philosopher, scientist Ivan Ilyin writes: “A Russian person lives, first of all, with his heart, imagination, and only then with his will and mind,” “Russian people expect from a person, first of all, kindness, conscience, and sincerity.” It has long been known that Russian culture brings light, kindness, spirituality, conscientiousness, and sincerity of the Russian soul, that Russian culture is universal and cosmic. But over the centuries of Russophobic policies of Western countries, primarily Great Britain, and now the United States, secondly, through the efforts of the “fifth column” inside Russia, Russian culture, the Russian people, its glorious past have been slandered, distorted, denigrated so that to the younger generation we have to rediscover Russian culture, look anew at the great achievements of our descendants in all areas of life and activity.
American political scientist S. Huntington wrote: “... cultural characteristics and differences are less susceptible to change than economic and political ones, and as a result they are more difficult to resolve or reduce to compromises. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor, and the poor can become rich, but no matter how hard they want, Russians cannot become Estonians, Azerbaijanis cannot become Armenians... Religion divides people even more sharply than ethnicity. A person can be half-French or half-Arab, and even a citizen of both of these countries. It’s much more difficult to be half-Catholic or half-Muslim.” We must agree that religion really divides people more than nations and creates insurmountable obstacles to communication and dialogue. Acceptance of faith simultaneously means acceptance of Russianness, acquisition of Russian national identity. Russians and representatives of other nations, who once accepted the Orthodox faith, become staunch supporters and devotees of the Church. They become part of the Russian Orthodox Civilization, which has given the world so many examples of honest service to goodness, truth, peace, knowledge and justice.
The deep connection of man with the history of Rus', is the most important element of Russian national identity. Member of the State Duma, political figure V. Aksyuchets wrote on this occasion: “Only high spiritual ideals cultivated such rare traits in the character of the people that made it possible to survive and maintain dignity in uniquely difficult historical circumstances. These features are, first of all, the universal openness and responsiveness of the Russian people, their healthy instinct for community life, their amazing survival.” A key place in the history of Russian culture, statehood and people was occupied by spirituality, associated in the pre-Christian period with pagan beliefs, and in the Christian period - in the Orthodox faith. Over the two-thousand-year history of the spread and establishment of Christianity in Rus' (from Chersonese to Kyiv, then to Moscow...), the Russian peoples have absorbed humility before the authority of the Creator, accepted the Ecumenical Cross and established themselves in their mission to bring love, goodness, truth, justice, knowledge , peace and wisdom to the nations. It is no coincidence that the Russian people are called the God-bearing people, that is, those who carry God within themselves.
The most important Russian characteristic is solidarity with the fate of the Russian people. In the Address of the Discussion Club of the World Russian People's Council to the thinking people of Russia “We believe in ourselves, our people, our civilization!” dated April 24, 2013, it is noted: “Solidarity differs from totalitarianism in the non-violent, conscious nature of social unity, the preservation of broad personal freedom along with the imperative of national and civilizational duty. It also presupposes broad and regular participation of citizens in government, maximizing the use of direct levers of governance (referendums, self-government of small spaces) and minimizing the level of alienation of ordinary citizens from political decision-making. The ideal of solidarity, the conciliar unity of the people and the government was not a utopian dream for our civilization, but was deeply rooted in our national history.”
Solidarity presupposes the participation of the Russian people, all its representatives, from ordinary people to leaders, in specific events governing the Russian state (elections, referendums, expressing opinions on the actions of deputies of all levels in the media, etc.), management of public associations, local governments, in companies to protect Russian interests at all meetings, rallies, in the media, support for Russians, Orthodox people around the world, etc. Solidarity is also ensured by a real desire for conciliar unity of the people, government and business. These are the three great forces on which the Russian state rests.
According to V.K. Egorova “The Russians, despite their conciliarity and collectivism (which occur, but are manifested inconsistently in everyday life, and “in fatal moments” or when, as the people say, “backed up against the wall”), are an undignified, atomized and long-suffering people , since human life at the individual level and national life matter only before God (subconsciously, according to culture - even non-believers “stand on this”) and before the Fatherland. Life (both individual and national, people's) is protected only when there is danger. A “normal” life is built slowly, without striving for arrangement (comfort, if you like), since (subconsciously) the main life is in the other world, or its meaning, almost to a decisive extent, is in the prosperity of Russia.” This conclusion of V.K. Egorova says that state institutions, public associations, and individual representatives of the Russian elite should develop a sense of solidarity among the people. It is necessary to create conditions for the manifestation of a sense of solidarity among the people on any issue.
Feeling of kinship with the Russian people and culture one of the most complex components of Russian national identity. And to the Russian people in the process historical development Many representatives of other ethnic groups joined. Thus, the “Declaration of Russian Identity” notes: “The Russian people had a complex genetic composition, including the descendants of Slavic, Finno-Ugric, Scandinavian, Baltic, Iranian and Turkic tribes. This genetic wealth has never become a threat to the national unity of the Russian people. Birth from Russian parents in most cases is the starting point for the formation of Russian identity, which, however, has never excluded the possibility of people from another national environment joining the Russian people who have adopted Russian identity, language, culture and religious traditions.” This means that the Russian people are international in their ethnic roots. Therefore, Russianness includes respect for the culture, feelings, character and temperament of all peoples living in Russia and beyond its borders.
Internationalism is the essence of Russianness. This feature of Russianness attracted oppressed peoples around the world to the Russian world. Not by chance Russian empire was formed in the process of voluntary entry into its composition of many neighboring peoples. These peoples sought protection in Russia from some aggressive neighbors and from the colonialist aspirations of Great Britain and France.
The identity of the Russian people is associated with the Russian state. Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus', speaking at the Tyumen Forum of the World Russian People's Council on June 21, 2014, noted: “Speculations about the heterogeneity of the Russian people are a myth that has a purely political nature. On a global scale, Russians are an exceptionally integral, united nation. In terms of the degree of religious and linguistic unity, and the proximity of cultural matrices, Russians have no analogues among the major nations of the planet. The phenomenon of Russian monolithicity is explained by the fact that in our national self-awareness the connection between the individual and the state occupies an exceptional place. The ethnic identity of Russians, more than that of any other people, is associated with the identity of the state, with Russian patriotism and with loyalty to the state center.” The merging of Russian national identity with state and civil identity leads to the fact that Russians have always fought and will fight, as long as they exist as a nation, for the sovereignty of the state in all senses: in symbolism, in defense, in making state decisions in politics and economics, which is not enough for most national cultures, especially the young, developing nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Considering the phenomenon of synthesis of the national, statist and civic identity of the Russian nation, Russian culture must create attractive models and programs for its development in the future. Russia's domestic and foreign policy can be successful if it is based on the above trends in the development of Russian culture and the Russian people. This policy only strengthens the integrity and unity of the Russian people, to which its best representatives strive.
Bibliography:
- Aksyuchets, A. “God and Fatherland - the formula of the Russian idea” / A. Aksyuchets // Moscow. – 1993. – No. 1. – P. 126
- Egorov, V.K. Philosophy of Russian culture / V.K. Egorov. – M.: RAGS, 2006. – P. 446
- Meeting of the international discussion club “Valdai” on September 19, 1913 / V.V. Putin // http: neus/kremlin/ru/transcripts/192443/print/ - P. 3
- Ilyin, I.A. Against Russia / I.A. Ilyin. – M.: Voenizdat, 1991. – P. 329
- Russian doctrine “Sergius Project” / Ed. A.B. Kobyakov and V.V. Averyanova. – M.: Yauza-press, 2008. – 864 p.
- Russians. The ABC of Russian national identity. – M.: Generation, 2008. – 224 p.
- Huntington, S. Clash of Civilizations? / S. Huntington // Political studies. – 1994. – No. 1. – P. 36
RUSSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: THEORY ISSUES
The article raises topical issues of the formation of Russian national identity; the main components and dynamics of Russian identity are analyzed; an attempt is made to determine the role of each component in the process of formation of Russian identity.
Written by: Kargapolov Evgeniy Pavlovich
The destruction of great power traditions, ideas and myths, and then the Soviet value system, where the key point was the idea of the state as the highest social value, plunged Russian society into a deep social crisis, as a result - the loss of national identity, feelings, national and socio-cultural self-identification of citizens.
Key words: self-identification, national identification, identity crisis.
After the collapse of the USSR, the need arose to create a new national identity in all newly formed states. The hardest thing this question was decided in Russia, since it was here that “Soviet” value guidelines were introduced more deeply than in other republics, where the key point was the idea of the state as the highest social category, and citizens identified themselves with Soviet society. The demolition of old life foundations, the displacement of previous value and semantic guidelines led to a split in the spiritual world of Russian society, as a result - the loss of national identity, a sense of patriotism, national and socio-cultural identification of citizens.
The destruction of the Soviet value system plunged Russian society into a deep value and identification crisis, in the context of which another problem arose - national consolidation. It was no longer possible to solve it within the framework of the old one; it could not be solved from the standpoint of the new domestic “liberalism,” which was devoid of a program for the development of society that was positive for the mass consciousness. Inert state policy during the 90s. in the field of social reform and the lack of new value guidelines led to increased interest among citizens in the historical past of the country; people tried to find in it answers to the pressing issues of today.
There was interest in historical literature, first of all to alternative history, TV programs in the context of “memories of the past” have become very popular. Unfortunately, in most cases in such programs, historical facts were interpreted in a rather loose context, the arguments were not supported by argumentation, and many so-called “facts” were in the nature of falsifications. Today, it has become obvious to most educated people what damage such programs have caused to society, primarily the youth who are hostage to screen culture have suffered.
On the front of screen culture, today there is “confusion and vacillation”, false, anti-scientific information is presented as the “truth of history”, the interest of viewers, Internet users and listeners of numerous radio broadcasts is bought through the beautiful presentation of various kinds of historical falsifications, which, due to their anti-state orientation, are destructive effect on the historical consciousness and consciousness of the national identity of citizens.
At the same time, the state has not developed a unified policy in the field of examination of such information flows that deform historical consciousness and the perception of national identity. As a result, in consciousness Russian citizens The myth about the “ideal” times of the past was firmly entrenched. Despite these problems, positive trends have emerged in Russian society in recent years. Thus, according to sociological surveys in modern Russian society, the mass interest of people in patriotic ideas, slogans, and symbols has significantly increased, and there is an increase in the patriotic self-identification of Russians.
The problem of national identity is widely discussed in society today. This is due to the fact that in the age of global changes - integration, globalization, transnational migration and global disasters - man-made, environmental, people began to rethink their acquired ideological baggage, while wondering about their involvement in the history of the country, the national community and the process of its development. Russians have a need to revise existing concepts of social and national identity, and the need to construct new identities, which is primarily caused by instability in the world and the country - increased terrorism, transformation political regimes, financial crises. Obviously, if ideology and cultural moral values in society are not clearly defined or do not correspond to the expectations of the main part of society, there is a gradual change in the structure of the individual’s personality itself, a change in value guidelines, which ultimately leads to an identification crisis.
The most clear description of the identity crisis was given by the outstanding psychologist Erik Erikson, who described it as follows: “An unpleasant psychosocial syndrome associated with mass dissatisfaction of people, which is accompanied by feelings of anxiety, fear, isolation, emptiness, loss of the ability to emotionally communicate with other people, turns into a mass pathology of identity"46. In a crisis, an individual becomes more and more detached from social communities - he becomes individualized, and identity is maintained through interpersonal communication, in particular through social media, allowing you to support your “I” and build a dialogue with “We”.
A way out of the crisis is only possible if the political and cultural elites achieve balance within their social groups and begin to implement new identification projects, the purpose of which is to bring about changes in society and establish a balance of new values based on well-formed beliefs, principles and norms. In other words, the political elite must restore the lost balance of I-We identity in society. However, this is only possible if the authorities have not lost the trust of society, otherwise, the imposition of a new system of values by the political elite can lead to a social explosion47.
In different historical eras, the balance in this pair was constantly upset. The era of the Renaissance is recognized as the beginning of the dominance of “I” over “We”; it was at this time that “I” broke out and left the bonds of “We”. This was due to several factors - the erasure of class boundaries, increased attention to human individuality in literature and painting, and the expansion of the boundaries of worldview thanks to scientific and geographical discoveries. Centuries passed and in developed societies the “I” became more and more separated from the “We”; with the intensification of the processes of integration and globalization, the national identity (national-state we-identity) lost its clear outlines. At the present time in Russian society, largely thanks to the policies of V.V. Putin, there are qualitative changes in the content of cultural meanings, symbols and foundations of the new “capitalist” Russia, there is a return to the cultural and moral values of the Soviet era.
Quite a lot has already been done in this direction - cultural heritage is being restored - reconstruction of historical monuments, creation historical museums In various cities of Russia, series of programs dedicated to our history, literature, culture are broadcast, the Olympics became a new victory in this direction, and now Crimea is being restored before our eyes. Today in Russia, a reassessment of the cultural and historical baggage of the past continues to occur, which expands the boundaries for the search for social identifications; new identification constructs are emerging based on the combination of the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods of Russian history. Such cultural constructs have a serious impact on the formation of national identity. Recently, young people in Russia are demonstrating their national identity more and more, while the older generation, on the contrary, is discovering the inertia of Soviet identity.
This fact can be fully explained by the fact that the older generation at one time experienced the shock of the “lost generation” - in the post-perestroika period, many found themselves thrown out of the “ship of modernity”, their knowledge, skills and abilities were not in demand by the new society. They look to the future with anxiety and are not inclined to trust the actions of the political elite aimed at creating a set of new cultural and moral guidelines. People whose active period of socialization passed during the period of totalitarian political culture, having lost sight of those strictly defined by the political elite ideological goals and moral values, in the new conditions of personal freedom, openness and initiative, have lost their I-We identification. If such people are asked to behave “at their own discretion”, they usually experience frustration, it is difficult to make a choice, they are not taught to do so48.
In many ways, the conservatism of Russian society is associated with the peculiarities of historical and cultural memory formed during the period of totalitarian culture. Despite a certain incompleteness and mythologization, historical and cultural memory is the constant on the basis of which an individual’s behavioral models are formed. First of all, this is due to the fact that historical and cultural memory is preserved in mass consciousness assessments of past events that form the structure of values, not only determining the actions and actions of people in the present and future, but contributing to the formation of national identity.
Awareness of one’s national identity is extremely important for each of us due to the fact that national identity is also a special form of group identity, thanks to which, despite the lack of physical contacts, people consider themselves united together because they speak the same language, have are common cultural traditions, live in the same territory, etc. The connecting links of national identity are historical memory, cultural traditions, and patriotism. The very concept of “national identity” is an “invention” of modernity, its political significance is associated with maintaining the feeling of “being at home”, creating in citizens a sense of purpose, self-esteem, and involvement in the achievements of their country.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LIST:
1. Bourdieu Pierre. Practical meaning / Transl. from fr. / St. Petersburg, Aletheia, 2001.
2. Gudkov L. D. Russian neo-traditionalism and resistance to change // Otechestvennye zapiski. M., 2002 No.
3. URL: http://old.strana-oz.ru/? numid=4&article=206 3. Kiselev G.S. Man, culture, civilization on the threshold of the 3rd millennium. M.: Eastern literature. 1999.
4. Lapkin V.V., Pantin V.I. Russian order. - Polis. Political studies. 1997. No. 3.
5. Lapkin V.V., Pantin V.I. Rhythms of international development as a factor in the political modernization of Russia. - Polis. Political studies. 2005. No. 3.
6. Lapkin, V.V., Pantin, V.I. Evolution value orientations̆ Russians in the 90s // ProetContra, T. 4. 1999, No. 2.
7. Pokida A. N. Specificity of patriotic feelings of Russians // Power. 2010. No. 12.
8. Kjell L., Ziegler D. Theories of personality. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg: Peter, 1997. Erickson E. Identity: youth and crisis / Transl. from English / M.: Progress Publishing Group, 1996 - 344 p.
9. Shiraev E., Glad B. Generational Adaptations to the Transition // B. Glad, E. Shiraev. The Russian Transformation: Political, Sociological and Psychological Aspects. N. Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Plotnikova O.A.
Especially for the Perspectives portal
Leokadia Drobizheva
Drobizheva Leokadia Mikhailovna – chief Researcher Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Center for the Study of Interethnic Relations, professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Doctor of Historical Sciences.
The consolidating all-Russian identity is still discussed by scientists and politicians, but it also exists as a real social practice in the minds of Russian citizens. Habitual ideas of the past remain unchanged, people have not ceased to associate their ethnocultural distinctiveness with the nation, therefore, a consensus definition remains in the doctrinal space “ multinational people Russia." As research shows, the basis for the dynamics of all-Russian identity is, first of all, the state and the common territory, and only then the historical past, culture, and responsibility for affairs in the country.
To the problem statement
The solidary identity of citizens is considered a condition for maintaining harmony in society and the integrity of the state. In modern conditions, when in different countries there is a growing demand for the right to decide one’s destiny, to freely choose the path of development, its importance is especially great. In Russia, a positive civic identity is especially important in connection with the loss of Soviet-era identity that people have experienced, but not forgotten, and increased foreign policy tensions.
Strengthening Russian civic identity is set as a task and one of the directions of activity in the Strategy of the state national policy for the period until 2025. The need for solidarity is recognized not only by the country's leadership, it is also a natural request of society. It is no coincidence that the 1990s, when the concepts of “Russian nation” and “civil identity” did not appear in doctrinal documents, speeches of the President of the Russian Federation, his addresses to the Federal Assembly (they appeared since 2000), more than half of the population during surveys on the all-Russian The sample was told that they feel like citizens of Russia [; ; With. 82].
In the 2000s, the Messages to the Federal Assembly of the President of the Russian Federation used the concept of “nation” in the all-Russian meaning and its derivatives. At a working meeting on issues of interethnic and interfaith relations in 2004, V. Putin directly noted: “... we have every reason to talk about the Russian people as a single nation. There is... something that unites us all. ... This is our historical and our current reality too. Representatives of the most diverse ethnic groups and religions in Russia feel themselves to be truly one people.”
In 2012, the concepts of “multinational Russian people"(Russian nation), "civic identity". Naturally, they began to be included in educational courses, appeared in school curricula, and are heard in political discourse. All-Russian identity is a formed idea, feelings, and norms of behavior.
Sociologists, political scientists, and historians in their methodology use M. Weber’s concept of “mass subjective beliefs,” “subjective faith,” and values that can become the basis for the integration of society. Turning to the value-normative concept of E. Durkheim and T. Parsons, studying identities as the perception of social reality, scientists rely on the constructivist direction. It is gratifying that after Thomas Luckmann’s interview with the journal Sociology and Social Anthropology [p. 8] a simplified idea of constructivism has become less common, and there is an understanding that the authors of constructivism themselves relied on the ideas of the anthropological works of K. Marx, the sociological objectivism of E. Durkheim, the understanding historical sociology of M. Weber, and the basis proposed by T. Luckmann and P. Berger synthesis “is the phenomenology of the lifeworld developed by [E.] Husserl and [A.] Schutz.” This conclusion orients us to the understanding that only those ideas that are based on the everyday “life world” of people can be successful. We proceeded from this when interpreting data from sociological surveys when studying people’s ideas about their identification with Russian citizens. It is unlikely that everyone who chanted “Russia, Russia!” during the Olympics or the World Cup read the State National Policy Strategy or even the messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly from the point of view of the presence of the idea of Russian civic identity in them, but they felt it. Also, when our country is presented in a negative image, this causes emotional distress in the majority of Russians.
We remind you of this because the purpose of the article is to consider changes in Russian identity not only in the country as a whole, but also in the regions. It is in the regional and ethnic version of Russian identity that motivational factors have the main explanatory significance.
Understanding Russian civic identity
Scientific debates that have political and ethnopolitical implications do not stop around the understanding of Russian identity. They focus primarily on three problems: can this identity be called civil, what are the main solidary meanings in it, and does all-Russian civic identity mean a replacement for ethnic identity.
At the beginning of the post-Soviet period, when Soviet identity was being lost, there was virtually no doubt that instead of the Soviet one we would have a civil identity. The text of the 1993 Constitution contained meanings that allowed us to interpret the community in the following way, which will be reflected in the civic identity of fellow citizens. The Constitution affirmed “human rights and freedoms, civil peace and harmony,” the inviolability of Russia’s democratic foundation, and “responsibility for one’s Motherland before present and future generations.” The “bearer of sovereignty” and the only source of power in the Russian Federation, says the Constitution, is its multinational people (Article 3, paragraph 1). When the state began to actively shape Russian identity in the 2000s, liberal-minded intellectuals began to express doubts. Author of the book “Between Empire and Nation” E.A. Pain asked the question whether Russian identity can be called civil if it cannot be said that we have formed a political, civil nation. (The title of his book is also symptomatic.) The discussion continues, and it is not only in relation to our country [; ; ].
Summarizing the development of identities in the Project under the leadership of I.S. Semenenko, S.P. Peregudov wrote that the civil identity of people is manifested in their adherence to the principles and norms of the rule of law and democratic political representation, in their awareness of their civil rights and responsibilities, responsibility for affairs in society, personal freedom, recognition of the priority of public interests over narrow group ones [, p. 163]. Of course, not all people in countries considered democratic fully share and observe all the norms and values of civil society. It is no coincidence that the European Social Survey (ESSI), as well as the Eurobarometer, did not use all indicators of civic identity, and their set changed. Not all citizens, but only half in each of the 28 EU states, believe that people in their countries have much in common. But in general, as researchers believe, in the foreseeable future in the West, including Europe, it is the political, state-country identity that will retain the significance of one of the most important group identities [ ; ; ].
We still have to conduct in-depth studies of the civil elements in Russian identity. But some of these elements have already been included in surveys and will be analyzed.
When preparing the State National Policy Strategy in 2012 and discussing its adjustment in 2016–2018. Representatives of the republics and active defenders of Russian identity expressed concerns about the substitution of ethnonational (ethnic) identity with Russian. A way to alleviate these concerns was to include goals and priority areas state national policy formulation: “strengthening the unity of a multinational people ( Russian nation), preservation and support of ethnocultural diversity.”
The question of the meanings that unite the citizens of the country into an all-Russian community, reflected in identity, was discussed in a complex manner. When discussing the implementation of the State Ethnic Policy Strategy at a meeting of the Council on Interethnic Relations on October 31, 2016, it was proposed to prepare a law on the Russian nation. In this regard, an opinion was expressed about the Russian nation as the basis of the national state. It was justified by the fact that the unity of our society is based on Russian culture, Russian language and historical memory, and the state and territory, which lie at the basis of a political nation, cannot form the basis of “patriotic loyalty”. “Citizenship of the Russian Federation exists after 1991, while culture and history connect generations.”
Sometimes the argument is made that abroad everyone who comes from Russia is called Russian. Similarly, Scots or Welsh who come to us (and other countries) are called not British, but English, although officially they are British citizens. The same situation is with the Spaniards. The Basques and Catalans are called nations (representatives of the Basque and Catalan movements), but they, like the Castilians, are part of the Spanish nation.
In 2017‒2018 proposals were prepared for inclusion in the State Ethnic Policy Strategy for the period up to 2025. Among them are “the main definitions that are used in the Strategy...”, proposed by the Scientific Council on Ethnicity and Interethnic Relations under the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences and taking into account the latest theoretical and empirical developments of academic institutions .
The Russian nation is defined as “a community of free, equal citizens of the Russian Federation of various ethnic, religious, social and other affiliations, aware of their state and civil community with the Russian state, commitment to the principles and norms of the rule of law, the need to respect civil rights and obligations, the priority of public interests over group."
In accordance with this, civic self-consciousness (civic identity) is “a sense of belonging to their country, its people, state and society, perceived by citizens, responsibility for affairs in the country, ideas about core values, history and modernity, solidarity in achieving common goals and interests of the development of society and the Russian state.”
Thus, our Russian identity is multi-component; it includes state, country, civic identity, ideas about a multinational people, social, historical community. It is based on shared values, community development goals and solidarity.
Naturally, all these components are present to one degree or another when people define their Russian identity. But in all-Russian surveys and surveys in the constituent entities of the federation, among specific nationalities, they manifest themselves in different ways. All-Russian identity, like all other social identities, is dynamic and is influenced by events and people. According to the approaches of E. Giddens, J. Alexander, P. Sztompka, P. Bourdieu, we consider participants in interactions in various “fields”. Therefore, it is important to show general trends in the perception of Russian civic identity and the features that appear in different regions of the country, in federal subjects with different ethnic compositions of the population.
The empirical basis for the analysis is the results of all-Russian surveys of the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Scientific Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences for 2015–2017. , as well as the results of representative surveys in the constituent entities of the federation (Astrakhan region, Republic of Bashkortostan, Kaliningrad region, Republic of Karelia, Moscow and Moscow region, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Stavropol Territory, Republic of Tatarstan, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug) conducted in 2014-2018. Center for the Study of Interethnic Relations of the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Scientific Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences. For comparisons, we also used data from VTsIOM surveys on behalf of the FADN in 2016–2017. In a number of cases, we use the results of studies conducted by scientists in the regions, stipulating the possibility of their comparability. During all-Russian and regional surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Scientific Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, we conducted in-depth interviews with experts, specialists, public figures, and representatives of a number of professions. Some of them are given below.
In the study we implement the approach of comparative sociology. Russian identity and the degree of association of respondents with it are compared in regions with a predominantly Russian population, as well as in republics with different levels of representation of Russians and residents of other nationalities, which give the name to the republics. The socio-cultural approach is used when comparing the Russian civil identity of Russians living primarily in their own and foreign cultural ethnic environment, as well as when comparing this identity among Russians and people of other Russian nationalities.
In understanding identity from the point of view of social psychology, we rely on E. Erikson’s ideas about the strategy of maintaining self-identification, its inclusion in social contexts, cultural values, and the significance of ideology [ Erikson]. The conclusions of J. Mead on the formation of identities in the process of intergroup interaction, G. Tajfel and J. Turner - on the importance of intergroup comparison in this process - are used. We also agree with R. Brubaker in understanding the different intensity and mass character of group identity in everyday practice [, p. 15-16].
All-Russian dimension of Russian identity
Historical psychologist B.F. Porshnev wrote: “... the subjective side of any really existing community... is constituted by a dual or two-sided psychological phenomenon, which we designated by the expression “we” and “they”: by difference from other communities, collectives, groups of people outside and at the same time similarity in something people inside each other" [, p. 107].
An obvious subject of research in Russian identity is the extent to which in each historical period, in a specific situation, it is formed by distinguishing, comparing or even contrasting oneself with others; determining who these others (“they”) are and what causes mutual attraction and unity of “we”.
The identity of Russians in the 1990s is called a crisis not only because there was a reconnaissance of the usual pillars of internal mutual attraction, but also because of increased hostility towards “others,” which often became our former compatriots, those who left the Union. Only in the 2000s, with the strengthening of the state, getting used to its changed status, the new outline of the borders, the “culture shock” began to pass (as Petr Sztompka figuratively put it, characterizing the state of people in post-Soviet states) and elements of positive identity began to be restored.
By the mid-2010s, according to national surveys, 70–80% had Russian identity.
The indicator for measuring all-Russian civic identity was the respondents’ answers to a question asked in the form of a projective situation: “When meeting in life different people, with some we easily find mutual language, we feel them as our own, while others, although they live nearby, remain strangers. Which of the following people would you personally say “that’s us” about? With whom do you feel connected often, sometimes, never?”
And then there was a list of the most widespread collective identities: “with people of your generation”; “with people of the same profession, occupation”; “with citizens of Russia”; “with the residents of your region, republic, region”; “with those who live in your city, village”; “with people of your nationality”; “with people of the same income as you”; “with people close to you in political views.”
This question was first formulated by E.I. Danilova and V.A. Yadov back in the 90s [Danilova, 2000; Yadov] and subsequently, in the same or slightly modified, but similar in content, formulation was asked in other studies of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (since 2017, Institute of Sociology of the Federal Scientific Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences), National Research University Higher School of Economics, in 2017 - in surveys of the FADN-VTsIOM.
From 2005 to 2018, the share of those who feel a connection with Russian citizens increased from 65% to 80–84%. According to the listed scientific centers civic identity was the most dynamic, it grew by 19 percentage points, while other collective identities - ethnic, regional - by 6-7 points. The share of those who often feel a connection with Russian citizens grew especially noticeably.
Two circumstances influenced mass consciousness. The influence of the media, which constantly stimulated “us versus them” comparisons in relation to Ukraine, motivated defensive sentiments in connection with the events in Syria and the complicated relations with the United States and the European Union, was obvious. Internal associativity was stimulated by the events of the Olympics, the reunification of Crimea with Russia, sports competitions, especially the World Cup.
The survey results make it possible to analyze Russians’ own ideas about what unites them. According to the All-Russian Monitoring Survey of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2015, people as citizens of Russia are united primarily by the state - 66% of responses; then territory – 54%; 49% named a common language; 47% - experienced historical events; 36‒47% – elements of culture – holidays, customs, traditions. This, we repeat, is data from an all-Russian survey, therefore, the majority of respondents (more than 80%) are Russians. Naturally, the language means Russian.
The choice of state and territory is easily explained, since Russian identification for a considerable part of people is a country identification. Some researchers generally study and interpret it as country-specific. This can be judged from the report of M.Yu. Urnova at the traditional annual conference of the Levada Center in 2017, which contained the results of a study by HSE scientists of the identification with the country of students from the most prestigious universities in Moscow and Princeton University in the USA. The surveys were conducted by the Southern Federal University, asking the question: “How connected do you feel with your region and country?” The responses were interpreted as evidence of a pan-Russian identity.
This interpretation is common, but identification with the state is also undeniable - quite clear not only from responses in mass surveys, but also from interview materials: “ They want to recognize themselves as Russians, which means they are part of the state... I don’t think there are many people in our country who would say, “I identify myself outside my state.” We want to recognize ourselves as equal citizens of the country... people in the sense of a state, territorial community" This is the opinion of a specialist working in the legal field (Moscow), but a public figure (in Moscow) also expressed approximately the same opinion: “ It seems to me that most people understand the term “all-Russian civic nation” ... as citizenship. The state is the anchor of all diversity. The state provides equal rights, opportunities..." An ethnopolitical scientist who knows press materials and the results of sociological surveys believed that “ if the respondent considers himself a member of the Russian nation (realizes), he talks about himself as a participant in fellow citizenship... they believe that the state belongs to them and will show respect to them as its citizens... the name of the state also matters" A sociologist working with data from mass surveys and focus groups: “ Everyone seems to consider themselves Russians, but most of them, apart from some established stereotypes, to be honest, don’t always call themselves Russians. The civic component is first and foremost... this is the feeling of oneself as a citizen of the state».
In interviews with experts in the regions, the main leitmotif is also citizenship in the state. The state dominant in the identification matrix gives grounds to consider our Russian identity as state-civil. However, we must keep in mind that the state itself is perceived ambiguously in our country. The level of trust in the president remains reliably high, although it changes depending on events in the country, but 37-38% trust the government, and even less trust the legislative and judicial authorities - 21-29%. The civic component of identity for the country as a whole (answers about a sense of responsibility for the fate of the country) is 29‒30%.
It is more difficult to explain the low identifiers for the historical past and culture in all-Russian surveys. The easiest way to associate such identification is with the fact that people live in the present and not in the past, especially young people. Longing for the past, as interpreted by socio-political psychologists, is evidence of trouble in public sentiment. But this is only a partial explanation.
Yu.V. Latov, in an article published in the journal Polis, made a number of interesting observations regarding assessments of our past. Following G. Kertman, he notes that, unlike the 80-90s, when the focus of public attention was the assessment of the events of the time of I. Stalin, in the last 10-15 years “memory wars” have been going on around the events of the last years of the USSR , more clearly focused in the mass consciousness as “Brezhnev times”. Historians and political scientists interpret them as times of “stagnation,” and in the assessments of ordinary people, the characteristics of life at that time “have the features of almost a “lost paradise”” in comparison with the times of V.V. Putin. But if Soviet people in the 80s “were informed that they would live in private apartments, that shortages in stores would disappear, that the majority would have the opportunity to go on vacation abroad at least once every few years, that even children would have pocket telephones, then this would be perceived as another promise of “communism.” The transformation of historical memory is determined by the mythologization of both the distant and recent past, associated with the political interests of the elites (E. Smith, V. Shnirelman). This makes not only our future unpredictable, but also our past. “The Unpredictable Past” - that’s what academician Yu.A. called his book. Polyakov, whose life spanned Soviet time, and a considerable part of the post-Soviet period.
There are also objective reasons for different perceptions historical events- not only age, but also socio-economic, material, social status. The materials of sociological research show that nostalgia for the past largely reflects the protest moods of low-income and elderly people. An assessment of the historical past can not only unite, but also divide. Therefore, the low indicators of the historical past as the foundation of Russian identity in the perception of our citizens are quite understandable. Studying the dynamics of this indicator is advisable both from the point of view of characterizing public sentiment and from the point of view of forming historical memory, if the analysis is carried out on the basis of objective events and reliable facts and their assessments.
It is not so easy to interpret respondents' answers about culture as a unifying factor. Culture is understood in different meanings not only by scientists different directions knowledge, but also in wide circles population. For some, these are norms of behavior, for others - art, literature, for others - traditions, monuments of historical heritage. Political scientists can afford to say: “We are united by culture,” but what they mean will be understood differently by everyone. To clarify this undeniable component of community identification, sociologists must pose questions so that they are understood unambiguously. Therefore, based on pilot (experimental) surveys, specific elements of culture were identified: public holidays, symbols (flags, anthem, coat of arms, monuments, etc.), folk traditions.
The undisclosed concept of culture as a solidarizing identifier gains more supporters in surveys (in the given interval 37‒47%), when this concept is disclosed there are fewer supporters. During free, semi-structured interviews, respondents found different justifications for their difficulties. One of them is the politicized perception of culture: “Nuriev... they want to erect monuments to him, but he left us and left his achievements there.”(representative of a Russian cultural organization in Ufa). “They erect a monument to Yermolov, then they destroy it, then they restore it. For the Russians, of course, he is a victorious general, but for the Circassians?(specialist teacher in Krasnodar). Another difficulty is the socio-demographic diversity of perception of cultural events and phenomena: “What culture unites us? It’s hard to say - they’re the only ones over there in suits with butterflies on the “What? Where? When?”, and I only have a tracksuit.”(representative of a public association in Kaliningrad). “Victory Day is a holiday for all of us, most of us, of course. But grandmother, mother - they worry, even cry sometimes, but for us, young people, it’s just a holiday, a walk, songs, even if we sing, what kind? Cheerful, victorious." “Culture of the past? Yes, of course, Tolstoy, Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Tchaikovsky - this unites, but only those who know literature and music.”(master's student in sociology, Moscow).
Expert journalist (Moscow): “ The mass “we” is being built in combination with history... Language is also an extremely important thing... Yes, of course, Tchaikovsky, Dostoevsky, Chekhov, the Bolshoi Theater. This is a cultural layer that unites. It’s sad when people try to formulate why they are a community; too often they say: “Yes, we are not them.” And further: “... these are the bad ones, those are the bad ones.” Alas... Our greatness is measured in kilotons of nuclear energy, the number of bayonets. But there is culture, it is the only thing that is essential».
As we can see, behind the final figures of mass surveys there are many diverse, albeit often stereotypical, opinions. By analyzing both data, we are looking for explanations for the complex manifestations in the mass consciousness of integrating ideas and values that are important for society.
Having data from comparable all-Russian surveys and surveys in the regions, we will now show how ideas about Russian identity differ in regions with different ethnic compositions.
Regional and ethnic uniqueness in all-Russian identification
Naturally, all-Russian data on the identification of respondents with other citizens of Russia and data in different regions and federal subjects differ.
In the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, according to the European Social Survey (ESI), identification with Russian citizens was recorded across the country among 64% of the population, and by region it ranged from 70% in the Central and 67% in the Volga federal districts to 52‒54 % in Siberia [p. 22].
Studies that would record all-Russian and comparable representative regional data (for all regions) on identification with Russian citizens have not yet been conducted. All-Russian surveys, covering even more than 4 thousand respondents, do not provide representative data for the subjects of the federation. Therefore, to represent situations in the regions, we use data from those regional surveys that asked comparable questions. According to all-Russian surveys by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Russian Monitoring economic situation and population health (RLMS-HSE), prevalence of Russian identity in 2013–2015. in general reached 75–80%, and the proportion of people with an associative, actual identity of this kind (who answered that they often feel a connection with Russian citizens) was 26–31%.
In assessing all-Russian integration, public attention usually attracts more attention to the republics. We will specifically look at those republics where in the 1990s there were elements of deviations in legislation and manifestations of national movements. Representative surveys conducted in 2012 and 2015 in Sakha (Yakutia) showed that civic identity in this republic was no lower than all-Russian indicators (in some years even slightly higher) - 80-83%; in Bashkortostan in 2012, up to 90% of respondents chose the answer “we are citizens of Russia”, in 2017 – slightly more than 80%; in Tatarstan, 86% reported a feeling of connection with Russian citizens in 2015, and 80% in 2018.
According to the estimates of our colleagues, presented in the fall of 2018 at a conference dedicated to the 50th anniversary of ethnosociology in Kazan, representative regional studies in Mordovia and Chuvashia recorded Russian civic identity no lower than all-Russian data.
In the south of Russia, in Kabardino-Balkaria, in one way or another, they associated themselves with Russian citizens in 2015–2016. up to 60%; in Adygea – 71%.
In 2018, we conducted a representative survey in one of the most economically prosperous regions with a dominant Russian population, but a high influx of migrants - the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug-Ugra. Regional identity is very common here, but Russian identity also accounts for 90%. Meanwhile, in the Stavropol Territory, the corresponding data barely reached the all-Russian [p. 22]. Let us note that in terms of residents’ feeling of a strong connection with other citizens of Russia, the indicators of the republics did not differ much from the national average. And when they differed, it was often even for the better. In Sakha (Yakutia), strong connections were spoken of more often by 9–14 percentage points (in 2012, 2015), in Tatarstan - by almost 17 percentage points (in 2018 - 46.7%), than in Russia as a whole. (thirty%).
Thus, it is not separatist sentiments in the past, but the current socio-economic and socio-political situation in the regions that determines people’s sense of connection with the greater Motherland, the citizens of the country. In Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, there was a slight decrease in the share of those who feel a connection with Russian identity in 2017–2018. influenced by the situation related to prosecutorial inspections in schools and the abolition of compulsory study of the state languages of the republics. In Sakha (Yakutia), Russianness is associated with the implementation by the federal center of northern deliveries, construction or cancellation of construction of previously planned objects (bridges, railway networks, etc.). Russian identity in these republics, which noticeably exceeded all-Russian indicators, approached the all-Russian level.
Where socio-economic difficulties are superimposed on interethnic contradictions, the unsettlement of which local population sees shortcomings in the federal center (as, for example, in Kabardino-Balkaria), and the feeling of connection with the all-Russian community decreases.
Where Russian civic identity really differs in the republics is in the strength of solidarity features. As already mentioned, according to all-Russian data, the most strong sign there was a state (66% of answers). In the republics, this characteristic dominates even more: in Sakha (Yakutia) - 75% of answers, in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan - 80‒81%. Moreover, among the Bashkirs, Tatars, and Yakuts, the dominance of this integrating factor is more noticeable than among Russians in the republics.
In the republics, the common territory is somewhat more often cited as a sign of solidarity – 57‒58% (compared to 54% in the Russian Federation). In most republics, up to 95% of the population or more know the Russian language well, but it is mentioned as a unifying feature, as well as culture, much less often than the state and territory. In Bashkortostan, for example, it was named by 24-26% of Bashkirs and Tatars. In Sakha (Yakutia) there are a quarter of Yakuts and 30% Russians.
Language, history, culture are the main solidarizers in the ethnic identity of peoples. But in the all-Russian identity in the republics, “wars of historical memory” leave an imprint on the prevalence of these characteristics as unifying ones. Among the Yakuts, no more than a quarter of those surveyed named them, and among the Bashkirs and Tatars in the republics - no more than a third. During free interviews, our respondents found an explanation for this. A journalist working on ethnopolitical topics said: “ Even among the Russian majority, sometimes people think that by being Russian they want to make them unified. But this is a horror story. Representatives of other nationalities have a pronounced feeling that they are Russians. I communicate with them, I see this. They are proud of it. But they also have their own culture, their own history of each people. Which of this is included in all-Russian history - everyone has their own idea about this. Of course, there is something uniting in culture - state holidays, Pushkin - “our everything”" A social activist from Ufa found it difficult to single out something from Bashkir culture that could unite all nationalities in Russia: “ Every nation considers some of its cultural figures to be great, but only of their own culture. Although they understand that for others they will not be like that at all. And what then unites us in culture - love for Rachmaninov or Mozart, Beethoven - but they are world classics».
An expert culturologist (Kazan) argued that “ During the Soviet period, our general culture included a constructed galaxy of figures - Khachaturian, Gamzatov, Aitmatov were added to the Russian greats, they created a bouquet that was even included in school programs. Now there is no such thing. Maybe it’s good that they don’t impose it, but it’s also bad, we even lose old baggage, sometimes devalue it, but don’t accumulate new things, although there is television, radio, and the Internet" Specialist in the field of interethnic relations (Moscow): “ I think that the Russian nation must be raised on the common history of all the peoples of the Russian Federation, common goals and objectives and joint victories, holidays, including national ones. This is a matter... for many years.” Public figure (Karelia): “The need to belong to something big, unifying must appear... This feeling of some kind of cultural and historical community, roots, traditions... Both Russians and all people of other Russian nations need to think about this... There is a lot of controversy, you just need to be able to negotiate».
The difficulty of forming a common unifying history and culture is naturally understood by both specialists and the authorities. It is no coincidence that it was so difficult to create school and university history textbooks. In this area there are disputes and some kind of movement, but in the sphere of culture, in addition to language, there is progress in the conscious formation of ideas about development cultural heritage noticeably less. Cultural monuments are being restored, concerts and exhibitions are held in memory of outstanding cultural figures, but only festive culture is voiced as unifying.
A common civic feature is responsibility for affairs in the country. In the republics where representative surveys were conducted, it was mentioned no less often than in all-Russian surveys, and in Sakha (Yakutia) even more often (50% or more). Moreover, the Sakha-Yakuts and Russians are in solidarity in these feelings. There are practically no differences in this identifier between Tatars and Russians in Tatarstan (34%, 38%, respectively), and between Bashkirs and Russians in Bashkortostan (36% and 34%, respectively).
Due to the limited ability to present within the framework of the article all the subjects related to the regional characteristics of identities, we did not dwell on the uniqueness of the hierarchy of Russian regional and local identities in the subjects of the federation. Let us only note that with all their diversity, the main trend in the 2000s was aimed at compatibility.
Strong regional identity, whether in the Kaliningrad region, Sakha (Yakutia) or Tatarstan, was primarily the result of the activities of regional elites and was presented through a sense of the significance of a given space for the country. In Kaliningrad we were often told: “We are the face of Russia for the West”; in Kazan: “We are a fairly rapidly developing region of Russia”; in Khanty-Mansiysk: “We are the energy base of the country’s security.” Of course, maintaining a balance between Russian and regional symbols is not an easy task and requires constant attention and study.
Some conclusions
The consolidating all-Russian identity is still discussed by scientists and politicians, but it also exists as a real social practice in the minds of Russian citizens.
The usual ideas of the past remain unchanged, people have not ceased to associate their ethnocultural distinctiveness with the nation, therefore, in the doctrinal space there remains a consensus definition of “the multinational people of Russia (Russian nation)”, that is, the term “nation” has a double meaning here.
An equally important problem is the basis on which Russian identity is formed. Ethnocultural identity is based on language, culture, and historical past. As the results of representative surveys show, Russian civic identity is based primarily on ideas about the state and territorial community. Historical memory and culture are less often associated with all-Russian identity due to the critical understanding of the Soviet and pre-Soviet past and the historical ideas of each people, not all of which are conceptualized as all-Russian.
Due to the high importance of the state as the basis of loyalty of Russians, government authorities have a high responsibility for maintaining trust between citizens and the authorities, ensuring justice and welfare in society.
In the last two years, the formation of Russian identity has become especially obvious through comparisons of “we” and external “they” in a negative content (Ukraine, USA, European Union). In such a situation, in order to maintain at least a normal balance, it will be especially important to fill the image of “we” with positive content. It is obvious that sports victories alone, which support the emotional component of identity, are not enough. Maintaining a positive balance requires efforts from both the state and civil society. At the same time, even theoretically clear questions must be implemented in practice, taking into account what is possible in modern conditions.
Notes:
1. In the Address to the Federal Assembly of the President of the Russian Federation in 2000, the concept of “nation” and its derivatives was used seven times, in 2007 - 18 times [Address to the Federal Assembly 2012: 2018].
2. Adjustment of the State Nationality Policy Strategy was entrusted to the Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs (FADN). Subjects of the federation and scientific institutions. It was discussed in the Committee on Nationalities of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, at meetings of the working group of the Council under the President of the Russian Federation on national relations.
3. Project “Dynamics of social transformation of modern Russia in the socio-economic and ethno-confessional context” (directed by academician M.K. Gorshkov). The author of this article is responsible for the section on ethnicity and identities. Sample – 4000 observation units in 19 constituent entities of the Russian Federation.
4. Project “Resource of interethnic harmony in the consolidation of Russian society: general and special in regional diversity” (directed by L.M. Drobizheva). In each federal subject, the sample included 1000–1200 observation units. Sampling is territorial, three-stage, random, probabilistic. The method of collecting information is individual interviews at the place of residence.
5. Data from the RLMS – Monitoring the Economic Situation and Health of the Population of the National Research University Higher School of Economics (RLMS-HSE); Monitoring surveys of the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Scientific Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, director. Gorshkov M.K. 2015-2016
6. Data from monitoring surveys of the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Scientific Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences for 2017.
7. The assessment was based on 27 characteristics entered into the questionnaire in the study “Dynamics of social transformations in modern Russia in socio-economic, political, socio-cultural and ethno-religious contexts”, 7th wave, 2017, led by. M.K. Gorshkov. A survey of 2,605 working respondents aged 18 years and older, residents of all types of settlements and territorial-economic regions of the Russian Federation.
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However, it should be remembered that national identity, including Russian, is not so much connected with the nationality of its bearer, but is determined by the individual’s attribution of himself to the nation. Therefore, strengthening the position of the Russian language abroad, as well as promoting and protecting the Russian language as the greatest civilizational value within the state, can be considered a certain legal task.
In this regard, the tasks of attracting public attention to the problems of preserving and strengthening the status of the Russian language as the spiritual basis of Russian culture and Russian mentality seem relevant; increasing the level of education and culture of Russian speech in all spheres of functioning of the Russian language; formation of motivation for interest in the Russian language and speech culture among different segments of the population; increasing the number of educational events popularizing the Russian language, literature and culture of the Russian people. Similar directions took place in some regional target programs.
We must also agree that national identity, unlike ethnic identity, presupposes the presence of a certain mental attitude, the individual’s sense of belonging to a large sociopolitical entity. Therefore, one should caution against popularizing the idea of creating a “Russian state.” At the same time, the introduction into the current federal legislation of provisions aimed at introducing federal level appropriate national-cultural autonomy as a form of national-cultural self-determination of citizens of the Russian Federation who identify themselves as belonging to a certain ethnic community, in order to independently resolve issues of preserving identity, developing language, education, and national culture, is completely justified.
Let us note that the formation of a single Russian nation is possible only if each citizen understands not only his ethnicity, but also his community with fellow citizens of a single multinational country, involvement in their culture and traditions. In this sense, the creation of effective legal mechanisms aimed at the emergence of Russian identity is necessary. Understanding oneself as a Russian, a member of a large community of a single Russian nation, a bearer of Russian national identity as belonging to the Russian state is a task for several generations. In this regard, legal measures must be taken at the legislative level, along with the existing legal instruments for the protection of national and state languages, the development of folk and Russian culture, supporting the development of regions and geopolitical interests of Russia, which already take place.
Outstanding politicians, economists and scientists speak about the role of Russia in the 21st century with its new threats, globalization and reactions to it. They talk about the causes of civilizational conflicts, whether Russian (Russian) civilization exists, how globalization affects identity and, finally, what the role of countries rich in resources, including Russia, will be in the new century.
Confusion reigns on the issue of the formula and mechanisms for establishing national identity as one of the foundations of Russian statehood, which is accompanied by superficial and conflictual debates. Ignoring or manipulating key points in the use of the concepts of “people” and “nation” carries serious risks for society and the state. In contrast to the negative meaning attached to nationalism in Russian political language, nationalism played a key role in the formation of modern states and, to varying degrees and variations, remains the most important political ideology of our time.
In Russia, nationalism and nation-building are studied poorly and using old approaches. This is one of the reasons for the existence of at least three different views on society and the state:
- 1) Russia -- multinational state with a population consisting of many nations, and this is its radical difference from other states;
- 2) Russia is a national state of the Russian nation with minorities, whose members can become Russians or recognize the state-forming status of Russians;
- 3) Russia is a national state with a multi-ethnic Russian nation, the basis of which is Russian culture and language and which includes representatives of other Russian nationalities (peoples).
Global context.
In world social practice, the idea of nations as territorial and political entities with complex but unified socio-cultural systems has become established. No matter how heterogeneous in composition state communities may be, they define themselves as nations and consider their states to be national or nation-states. People and nation act in this case as synonyms and give the original legitimacy to the modern state. The idea of a single people-nation is a key point in ensuring stability and harmony in society and the key to the stability of the state no less than the Constitution, the army and protected borders. The ideology of a civic nation includes the principles of a responsible citizen, unified system education, a version of the common past with its dramas and achievements, symbolism and the calendar, a sense of love for the Motherland and loyalty to the state, as well as defending national interests. All this constitutes what is called nationalism in its civil and state version.
Civic nationalism is opposed by the ideology of ethnic nationalism on behalf of a particular ethnic community, which may constitute a majority or minority of the population, but which defines its members, and not fellow citizens, as a nation and on this basis demands its own statehood or privileged status. The differences are significant, because ethnic nationalism is based on the ideology of exclusion and denial of diversity, while civil nationalism is based on the ideology of solidarity and recognition of diverse unity. A particular challenge to the state and the civil nation is posed by radical nationalism on behalf of minorities who wish to secede common state through armed secession. Majority ethnic nationalism also carries risks because it can claim the state as the exclusive property of one group, creating opponents among minorities.
Thus, in India, Hindu nationalism on behalf of the Hindi-speaking majority became one of the reasons civil wars. Therefore, the concept of the Indian nation is affirmed there, although the country has many large and small nations, languages, religions and races. Since Gandhi and Nehru, the elite and the state have championed Indian nationalism (the name of the leading party, the Indian National Congress) as opposed to Hindi and minority nationalism. Thanks to this ideology, India remains intact.
In China, the dominant people - the Han - and the Chinese nation are almost identical numerically and culturally. Nevertheless, the presence of 55 non-Han peoples numbering more than 100 million people does not allow us to talk about the Han people as a state-forming nation. The image of the Chinese nation as all citizens of the country was constructed several decades ago and successfully copes with the task of ensuring the national identity of the Chinese.
A similar situation of two levels of identity (civil nation and ethno-nation) exists in other countries - Spain, Great Britain, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Canada and others, including Russia. All modern co-citizen nations have a complex ethnic, religious, and racial composition of the population. The culture, language and religion of the majority are almost always the basis of the national culture: the English component in the British nation, Castilian in the Spanish, Han in the Chinese, Russian in the Russian; but a nation is understood as a multi-ethnic entity. For example, the Spanish nation includes both the main population - Castilians, and Basques, Catalans, and Galicians.
In Russia the situation is similar to other countries, but there are peculiarities in the treatment of the ideology of nation-building and the practice of using the category “nation”. These features should be taken into account, but they do not cancel the global norm.
New Russian project
Due to the inertia of political and legal thinking, the formula of multinationality was preserved in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, although the formula of a “multi-national nation” would be more adequate. It is difficult to correct the text of the Basic Law, but it is necessary to more consistently affirm the concepts of “nation” and “national” in the national and civil sense, without rejecting the existing practice of using the concept in the ethnic sense.
The coexistence of two different meanings for such a politically and emotionally charged concept as “nation” is possible within one country, although the primacy of civil national identity for its inhabitants is indisputable, no matter how much ethnonationalists dispute this fact. The main thing is to explain that these two forms of community are not mutually exclusive and the concepts of “Russian people”, “Russian nation”, “Russians” do not deny the existence of Ossetian, Russian, Tatar and other peoples of the country. The support and development of the languages and cultures of the peoples of Russia must go along with the recognition of the Russian nation and Russian identity as fundamental for the citizens of the country. This innovation is in fact already recognized at the level of common sense and everyday life: in surveys and in specific actions, citizenship, connection with the state and recognition of Russianness are more important than ethnicity.
The proposal expressed by some experts and politicians to establish in Russia the concept of “Russian nation” instead of “Russian” and to return the pre-revolutionary, broad understanding of Russians as everyone who considers themselves such, is impossible to implement. Ukrainians and Belarusians will no longer agree to consider themselves Russians again, and Tatars and Chechens have never considered themselves as such, but all of them, together with representatives of other Russian nationalities, consider themselves Russians. The prestige of Russianness and the status of Russians can and should be increased not by denying Russianness, but by asserting a dual identity, through improving the living conditions of the regions where Russians predominantly live, through promoting their social and political representation in the Russian state.
Modern states recognize multiple, non-mutually exclusive identities at the level of collective communities and the individual. This weakens the ethnocultural dividing lines within one co-citizenship and contributes to national consolidation, not to mention the fact that the self-awareness of the part of the population consisting of descendants of mixed marriages is more adequately reflected. In Russia, where a third of the population are descendants of mixed marriages, the practice of mandatory fixation of a single ethnicity of citizens is still maintained, which leads to violence against the individual and violent disputes about who belongs to which people.
All states consider themselves national, and there is no point in Russia being an exception. Everywhere among the people of a particular country, the idea of a nation is being established, regardless of the racial, ethnic and religious composition of the population. A nation is the result not just of ethnocultural unification and “long-term historical formation,” but of deliberate efforts by the political and intellectual elite to establish among the population ideas about the people as a nation, common values, symbols, and aspirations. Such general ideas occur in countries with more divided populations. In Russia, there is a real community of Russians based on historical and social values, patriotism, culture and language, but the efforts of a significant part of the elite are directed towards denying this community. The situation needs to change. National identity is affirmed through many mechanisms and channels, but primarily through ensuring civil equality, the system of upbringing and education, the state language, symbols and calendar, cultural and mass media production. After restructuring the foundations of the economy and political system, the Russian Federation needs to update the doctrinal and ideological sphere of ensuring civil solidarity and national identity.
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